Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein the Respondent, Linda H. Abraham, was licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate broker under license number 0323486. During the months of February and March 1983 Martha L. Tew owned a parcel of waterfront property located in Panama City Beach which was identified as being for sale by a sign on the property reflecting her husband's real estate company. Her husband was Ronald Eugene Tew and Mrs. Tew also held a salesman's license. Mr. Tew was contacted by Gregory A. Peaden, a contractor and developer in the Panama City Beach area on several occasions prior to March 1983 with offers to purchase the Tew property. The contacts with Mr. Peaden subsequently culminated in a contract dated March 8, 1983, between Greg Peaden, Inc., and the Tews in the amount of, initially, $180,000.00. During the negotiations for the property, Mr. Peaden had introduced the Respondent to the Tews as his broker. When, at the time of Use contract, Mr. Peaden advised the Tews he wanted Respondent to get a commission for the sale, Mr. Tew refused to pay any commission indicating that Respondent had performed no service for him; that he, Tew, was a broker himself; and that he had no intention of paying any commission to the Respondent or to anyone, for that matter. After some further negotiation, a second contract was prepared and agreed upon wherein the contract price was raised to $189,000.00 and the Respondent's commission was to be paid with the additional money from Mr. Peaden. The contract in question executed by the parties on March 8, 1983, reflected that the sum of $5,000.00 deposit was paid to Linda Abraham, Inc., by check. Mr. Tew contends that at this point he was led to believe that Respondent had the $5,000.00 check and, he contends, he would not have signed the contract if he had known that the check had not been delivered and placed in Respondent's escrow account. The actual signing of the contract took place in Respondent's office, a mobile home which she shared with Mr. Peaden's business. This trailer home was described as having Mr. Peaden's office on one end, and Respondent's on the other, with the living-kitchen area in the middle used as a reception area for both businesses. Mr. Peaden contends that once the contract was signed by the Tews, he gave a check drawn on one of his business accounts, that of Peaden and Guerino, a property management company he owned, to his secretary, Judy White, to deposit in Respondent's escrow account and thereafter promptly forgot about the matter until the date scheduled for closing, two months in the future. Ms. white, on the other hand, contends that Mr. Peaden at no time gave her a check for $5,000.00 to deposit to Respondent's escrow account. It is her contention that when she received the contract after it was signed, she, on her own, inserted the receipt portion on the bottom of the second page and signed as having received it merely to complete the contract. At the time, she contends, she did not know if the deposit was received from Peaden or not. She has never signed a contract like this before without a deposit and cannot give any other reason why she did it on this occasion. She is certain, however, that at no time did Mr. Peaden ever give her a $5,000.00 check or tell her to draw one for his signature on March 8, 1983, or, for that matter, at any time thereafter. What is more, neither Mr. Peaden nor the Respondent, at any time after the signing of the contract and prior to her departure under less than friendly circumstances approximately a week or so later, ever asked her whether she had made the escrow deposit or discussed it with her at all. Ms. white contends that she left Mr. Peaden's employ because he expected her to perform certain functions she was unwilling to do. When she left his employ, she did not feel there was any unfinished business that needed her immediate attention. To the best of her recollection, there were no sales contracts or deposits left in or on her desk - only bills. According to Respondent, the $5,000.00 deposit by Mr. Peaden was to stay in her escrow account. She understood Mr. Peaden was going to arrange with the bank to borrow the entire cash payment called for under the contract, including the deposit, and when that was done, it was her intention to give him back his $5,000.00 check. Under these circumstances, the amount in escrow would never be paid to the sellers but would be returned to Mr. Peaden and the Tews would receive the entire cash amount called for by the contract from the proceeds of the bank loan. Respondent also indicated that this procedure had been followed at least once, in a prior transaction. Under the circumstances, it is clear that no deposit was ever received from Mr. Peaden nor was it placed in Respondent's escrow account. Therefore, the contract, dated on March 8, 1983, was false in that it represented a $5,000.00 deposit had been received. The check for $5,000.00 dated March 8, 1983, payable to Linda Abraham, Inc. and drawn by Mr. Peaden on the Peaden and Guerino account with the stub admitted to show the date of issuance, does not establish that it was written on March 8, 1983, as contended. This check, number 1349, comes after two other checks, 1347 and 1348, which bear dates of April 4 and September 7, 1983 respectively. Mr. Peaden's explanation that the checks were drafted out of sequence is non-persuasive. Of greater probative value is the fact that neither Mr. Peaden nor Respondent bothered to review their bank statements on a regular basis. The check in question was drawn on an account not related to the construction and development business of Greg Peaden, Inc. Further, examination of Respondent's escrow account reflects that there were approximately eleven transactions over a three year period even though, according to her, she handled numerous other closings as well as this. Her explanation is that in most cases the attorney handling the closing served as escrow agent even though she was the sales broker. Her explanation is not credible. This appears to be a classic situation of movement of accounts to satisfy a particular end. The contract called for closing of the sale to be held on or before May 8, 1983, in the office of Panama Title Company. May 8, 1983, fell on a Sunday. As a result, the closing would not have been held that day, but it was not held the following day, Monday, May 9, 1983 either. Mr. Peaden admits that he had not checked with Panama Title prior to May 9 to see if everything was prepared for the closing. Instead, he contacted the title company for the first time at approximately noon on May 9. Apparently he received disquieting information because he thereafter called his attorney, Mr. Hutto, and asked him to check with the title company to see if and when the closing would be held. Mr. Hutto's inquiry reflected that the title insurance binder was ready but the closing statement and the package were not because the title company required a copy of the contract. At this point Mr. Peaden immediately had a copy of the contract delivered to the title company but later that day was advised that the closing still could not be held because of the failure to provide a survey. Mr. Hutto indicates that the reason given was that the release clauses called for in the contract required the survey to be furnished though he did not necessarily agree with that. In any event, closing was not held on May 9. At this time both Mr. Peaden and Respondent allegedly became concerned about the $5,000.00 deposit. Admittedly, neither had concerned themselves with it from the time of the signing of the contract. At this point, Mr. Peaden indicates that he examined his bank records which failed to show the deposit being made and his subsequent search of Ms. White's desk finally revealed the check, undeposited, still there. On May 11, 1983, a $5,000.00 deposit was made to the account on which the deposit check was drawn and on the same day, May 11, 1983 check number 1349, in the amount of $5,000.00 was presented against the account. When on May 10, 1983, Mr. Peaden and Respondent went to Mr. Hutto's office the primary reason for the visit was because Mr. Peaden had heard that the Tews were planning to sell the property in question to someone else at a price much higher than that agreed upon for the sale to Peaden. At this point Mr. Hutto indicated that if Peaden so desired, Hutto could "fix up the contract to jam up the works" until he could do something about it. His examination of the contract revealed that it was not recorded or acknowledged and under the laws of Florida, acknowledgment is required in order for a contract to be recorded. Hutto asked the Respondent if she had seen the parties sign the contract and when she said that she had, he had his secretary prepare a jurat. Unfortunately, his secretary prepared an affidavit type notary jurat rather than an acknowledgment and Hutto quickly admits that he did not look at it when it was given back to him. He says that if he had, he would have had it changed but in any event, without looking at what was given him, he gave it to the Respondent with the implication, at least, that she should notarize it and have the contract recorded. According to Hutto, Peaden, and the Respondent, the sole purpose for notarization and recordation was to preserve the status quo to protect Mr. Peaden's interest in the property so that the matter could be adjudicated in a lawsuit which was soon to be filed. Respondent contends she never intended any misconduct throughout this transaction nor did she do any of the things alleged in the Administrative Complaint. She contends she never saw the check which Mr. Peaden allegedly gave to his secretary for deposit to her escrow account. She merely assumed that it was given and never checked to insure that it had been placed in her account. She does not know why Mr. Peaden did not give her the check. When she took the contract to the Tews, she was operating under the assumption that the check had been received but did not verify this to insure that it had. She contends that since she represented the buyer, her duties were limited to insuring that he performed and this made it simple. She did not check on him because she had had so much experience with him, him being by far her largest account, if he said something, she believed him and when the contract was executed, she merely instructed the secretary, Judy White, to make the file and did not check on it again. As to the recordation and the notarization after the fact, she acted upon the advice of counsel, she states, and did what was suggested to her by Mr. Hutto. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Hutto did not represent her but instead represented Mr. Peaden and while because of her long-standing relationship with him and Mr. Hutto, she may have felt safe in relying on his advice, the fact remains that Hutto was not her attorney.
Recommendation On the basis of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Respondent's license as a registered real estate broker in Florida be suspended for six months and that she pay an administrative fine of $2,000.00. RECOMMENDED this 6th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 W. Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801 John D. O'Brien, Esquire P. O. Box 1218 Panama City, Florida 32402 Harold Huff Executive Director Division of Real Estate P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida Fred Roche Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent is licensed by the State of Florida as a real estate brokers and holds license No. 0002997. On May 7, 1979, Respondent acted in the capacity of a real estate broker in the transaction of the sale of a parcel of real property located in Polk County, Florida. The purchaser in that transaction was Margaret Rhoden, and the seller was June Davis, who was represented in the transaction by a relative, Henry Goodwin. On May 7, 1979, Margaret Rhoden entered into a Contract for Sale of Rea1 Estate for the purchase of a piece of property Frostproof, Florida, from June Davis. The full purchase price of the property was $3,500, which Ms. Rhoden paid to Respondent in cash on May 7, 1979, and obtained a receipt from Respondent for that amount. At the time the contract was entered into, Ms. Rhoden was advised that a deed should be forthcoming from the seller within two to four weeks. A date of June 20, 1979, was established to close the transaction, subject to a 120-day curative period should any cloud on the title be discovered. The contract between the parties provided that should any such cloud appear of record, the seller would have a period of 120 days after receipt of written notice prior to the date set for closing in which to attempt to cure the defect. The contract further provided that if title defects were not cleared within the l20-day period, the deposit would be returned to the buyer, or, at the buyer's option, the transaction should be closed in the same manner as if no defect had been found. A warranty deed purporting to transfer the property from the seller to the buyer was executed on June 7, 1979, and a title binder was issued on that same date. The title binder indicated an outstanding mortgage on a larger piece of property of which the parcel purchased by Ms. Rhoden was only a part. When efforts to clear this cloud on the title took longer than expected, Ms. Rhoden asked, and was granted, permission by the seller's agent to commence construction on the improvements on the property notwithstanding the fact that she knew that a cloud remained on the title to the lot, and the transaction had not been closed. Construction was not completed on the improvements because Ms. Rhoden ran out of cash during the course of construction. She moved into the dwelling while it was still in a partially completed condition and, on September 8, 1979, with the permission of the seller's agent, received a loan of $3,000 from the $3,500 deposit she had placed with Respondent, Ms. Rhoden executed a promissory note dated September 8, 1979, in which she agreed to repay the $3,000 loan when clear title to the property was issued. Ms. Rhoden used the proceeds of this loan to make additional improvements on the property. On October 26, 1979, Respondent received both the warranty deed dated June 7, 1979, and the title binder issued on that date from the attorney for the seller. When approached by Ms. Rhoden, Respondent agreed to lend her the deed and title binder to attempt to obtain additional financing to complete construction on her home. The clear inference from the record in this proceeding is that there was never any understanding between Respondent and Ms. Rhoden that this deed could be recorded at this or any other juncture in this transaction. In fact, the contract entered into between the buyer and seller clearly called for the payment of the full purchase price of the property at closing, and the note subsequently executed by Ms. Rhoden conditioned the issuance of a warranty deed to her on the payment of the $3,000 face value of the note. Ms. Rhoden was unsuccessful in obtaining additional financing to complete construction on her home, probably due to the fact that when she sought that financing the outstanding mortgage on the property had still not been satisfied. When Respondent advised the seller's attorney that he had loaned the warranty deed to Ms. Rhoden for the purposes outlined above, he was advised that there was nothing to keep Ms. Rhoden from recording the deed, at which point Respondent apparently determined that it would be prudent for him to retrieve the deed from Ms. Rhoden's possession. Ms. Rhoden had her mother return the deed to Respondent in February of 1980. According to the testimony of both Ms. Rhoden and her mother, they felt the purpose for the returning of the deed was to have it recorded. Respondent denies any such understanding. In resolving this conflict in testimony, the clear inference from the circumstances involved in this transaction, including the wording of the contract of sale and the note executed by Ms. Rhoden, supports a finding that all of the parties to this transaction either knew, or should have known, that the recording of the deed at this juncture in the transaction would have been improper. Although the outstanding mortgage had been satisfied in January of 1980, Ms. Rhoden had not Performed her obligation under the contract of sale by paying the full purchase price. When Respondent had recovered the deed from Ms. Rhoden, he was advised by the attorney for the seller not to record the deed until he had received payment from Ms. Rhoden in accordance with the contract and the promissory note. As indicated above, the outstanding mortgage on the property was satisfied in January of 1980. On February 6, 1980, Respondent Prepared a closing statement reflecting the purchase price of the property as $3,500. From this amount he deducted a total of $478 for state documentary stamps, title insurance, Preparing the deed, and amount of real estate commission leaving a the apparently forwarded the note from Ms. Rhoden for $3,000, together with the $22.00 cash balance remaining from her initial $3,500 deposit to the seller along with the deed which the seller had earlier executed. Ms. Rhoden apparently never made or tendered payment of the $3,000 note, the transaction never closed, and at the time of final hearing in this cause an eviction action was apparently pending between the seller and Ms. Rhoden. Paragraph seven of the contract of sale executed between the seller and Ms. Rhoden Provides as follows: If Buyer fails to perform this contract, the deposit this day paid by Buyer as aforesaid shall be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages.
The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated April 20, 1995, and, if so, the penalty which should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing, the stipulation of the parties, and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute Administrative Complaints pursuant to Chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. The Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") operates within the Department and is the entity directly responsible for licensing and disciplining those licensed under Chapter 475. Section 475.02, Florida Statutes. The Division of Real Estate operates within the Department and assists the Commission in carrying out its statutory duties. Section 475.021, Florida Statutes. Janice H. Little is, and was at all times material to this action, licensed as a real estate broker in Florida and was issued license number 0370239. The last license issued to Ms. Little was as a broker %Dennis & Little, Inc., t/a Kays Realty, 421 Southwest 31st Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, 33312. On April 7, 1993, Ms. Little obtained an offer from Karlene Bascombe to purchase real property owned by Maxine Williams. Ms. Little was acting as the seller's co-broker in this transaction. Ms. Little provided Ms. Bascombe with the names of several mortgage companies. Ms. Bascombe decided to apply for financing to Vision Mortgage Corporation, one of the companies identified by Ms. Little, and she met with Henry Yee, the manager of Vision Mortgage Corporation, at Ms. Little's office. Ms. Little introduced Ms. Bascombe to Mr. Yee but did not participate in their meeting. As part of her loan application, Ms. Bascombe authorized Vision Mortgage Corporation to verify her past and present employment records, among other things. At some point during the time Ms. Bascombe's loan application was being processed, Ms. Little learned that Ms. Bascombe's income was not sufficient to warrant approval of the application. Ms. Little was aware that Ms. Bascombe was a bookkeeper and that she worked full time at Lerner's. After learning that Ms. Bascombe had insufficient income to secure financing for the purchase of Ms. Williams' property, Ms. Little approached Donaval Powell and asked if he would be interested in hiring a part-time bookkeeper. Mr. Powell owns Filament Electronics, a business that sells and repairs electronic equipment. The business is located in the same shopping center in which Ms. Little's office was located and in close proximity to her office. Filament Electronics has been in the same location since it opened in 1992. Ms. Little and Mr. Powell have known each other since shortly after he opened his business. Mr. Powell told Ms. Little he might want to hire a part-time bookkeeper, but Mr. Powell heard nothing further about this matter. He never met Ms. Bascombe, he did not hire her, and she was never employed by Filament Electronics.1 Blanca Tanadell, an employee of Vision Mortgage Corporation, prepared a Fannie Mae Request for Verification of Employment form for Ms. Bascombe. Ms. Tanadell filled out boxes one through eight of the form, and she identified Filament Electronics as the employer from whom verification of Karlene Bascombe's employment was sought. Ms. Tanadell sent the form to Ms. Little, even though the instructions included on the form direct the lender to send the form to the named employer. Ms. Little completed boxes nine through thirty of the employment verification form in which Filament Electronics was identified as Ms. Bascombe's employer. Ms. Little represented that Ms. Bascombe was employed there in January, 1991, and that her present position was as a bookkeeper. Ms. Little knew when she completed the form that Ms. Bascombe had not been employed by Filament Electronics prior to April 10, 1993, but she testified that she believed that Mr. Powell had hired Ms. Bascombe subsequent to that date. Ms. Little further represented that Ms. Bascombe's annual "current gross base pay" was $24,250.00 and that her gross earnings for 1992 were $24,250.00 and for 1991 were $23,500.00. At the time she completed the employment verification form, Ms. Little had no documentation to support the earnings she attributed to Ms. Bascombe.2 Finally, Ms. Little signed the name "Hyacinth Fuller" and identified her as "Supervisor."3 She then sent the completed employment verification form to Vision Mortgage Corporation. Ms Little did not ask Mr. Powell to complete the employment verification form, nor did she ask him whether he employed Ms. Bascombe and, if so, the amount of her earnings. Ms. Bascombe's loan application was approved, and she purchased the real property offered for sale by Maxine Williams. Ms. Little was paid a commission at closing in the amount of three percent of the sales price of the property. Ms. Bascombe subsequently defaulted on her loan, and it was in the course of the loan company's investigation of the default that Mr. Powell denied ever having employed Ms. Bascombe. Ms. Little is licensed in Florida as a mortgage broker, and, at one time, her license was with Vision Mortgage Corporation. She is familiar with the procedures for processing loan applications. The stipulation entered into by the parties and the evidence presented by the Department are sufficient to establish that Ms. Little is guilty of fraud or misrepresentation in a transaction related to her business as a real estate broker. Ms. Little seeks to excuse her actions by claiming that she believed that Ms. Bascombe had been hired by Mr. Powell after April 10, 1993, and that she was provided with the earnings figures by Henry Yee, who was the manager of Vision Mortgage and whom she considered trustworthy. She also claims that Mr. Powell wants to harm her because she spurned his sexual advances and told his wife that he constantly bothered her. These contentions are, however, contrary to the more credible and persuasive proof and, even if true, do not alter the fact that Ms. Little acted with, at the very least, extreme reckless disregard for the truth.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Janice H. Little guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and revoking her real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 1997.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondent on September 9, 1981 be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 11th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Jordan, Esquire CONRAD, SCHERER & JAMES 707 Southeast Third Avenue Post Office Box 14723 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Philip Jansen, Esquire JANSEN & DE GANCE, P.A. Post Office Box 7375 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33304 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a state governmental licensing and regulatory agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints relative to real estate transactions. (Official recognition of Florida Statutes, TR 6-7) Respondent is now and was at times material hereto, a licensed real estate broker in Florida, having been issued License No. 0149408. The last license to Respondent was as a broker, t/a Marathon Realty at Post Office Box 2386, Marathon Shores, Florida 33052. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 1) On or about May 2, 1985, Respondent solicited and obtained a sales contract entered into by Emily Cathy Cronnon, as purchaser, and W. J. and Delores Sarver , as sellers, for the purchase and sale of certain residential property (contract for sale). (Petitioner'S Exhibit 2) The sales transaction was scheduled to close on or about July 1, 1985, but the transaction did not close. On or about December 2, 1985, the purchaser and sellers terminated the sales contract. (Petitioner'S Exhibit 3) On or about May 13, 1985, the Respondent allowed Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, to take possession and occupy the property with the knowledge and consent of seller W. J. Sarver. In this regard, W. J. Sarver denies giving permission to Ms. Cronnon to occupy the property prior to closing. However, it is found herein and the testimony of Billy Hull and Respondent substantiate the fact that Emily Cronnon and Billy Hull visited Respondent's office during early May, 1985, to find out whether they could move into the Sarver property with their furnishings prior to closing. Initially, Ms. Diabo advised Cannon and Hull that she was not at liberty to permit them to move in. However, she told them that if they liked, they could phone Mr. Server and get his permission. This was done and it is found that Mr. Sarver gave his permission to Respondent to allow Ms. Cronnon and Billy Hull to occupy the premises prior to closing, provided they turned the utilities off and then had the same turned on in their name. This was done, and the contract purchaser (Cronnon) and her boyfriend, Billy Hull, moved in prior to the time that the transaction closed. Respondent received a $500 rental payment from the purchaser on August 19, 1985. (Respondent's Exhibits 1 and 2) Respondent deposited said check in an appropriate bank account and waited eleven (11) days for that check to clear. On August 30, 1985, she wrote a $500 check to the Sarvers indicating that the same was rental payment to them for the use of their property by Cronnon and Hull. Respondent customarily waits at least ten (10) days for any check to clear before she writes a check drawn on those same funds.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint filed herein be DISMISSED. RECOMMENDED this 9th day of July, 1987, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of July, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's proposed findings: 1. Accepted as modified. 7. Rejected based on credible evidence herein which reveals that Emily Cathy Cronnon and her live-in boyfriend, Billy Hull, took possession and occupied the property with the prior knowledge and consent of seller, W. J. Sarver. Rejected based on credible evidence which reveals that Respondent did not conceal the rent payment, but rather deposited the rent payment until the funds cleared her bank and she immediately thereafter transmitted the proceeds to the Sarvers. Rejected as irrelevant and unnecessary to decide the issues posed. Rejected as a conclusion and not a finding of fact. Respondent's proposed findings and conclusions are largely a brief in the form of resolutions of credibility, conflicts, recommendations as to how those conflicts should be resolved, and conclusions in the form of ultimate findings of fact. As such, they are not specifically addressed in the Appendix, but were carefully considered and reviewed by the under signed in preparation of the Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: JAMES H. GILLIS, ESQUIRE SENIOR ATTORNEY DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32802 MICHAEL H. DAVIDSON, ESQUIRE WATSON & CLARK POST OFFICE BOX 11959 FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA 33339 HAROLD HUFF, EXECUTIVE DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE POST OFFICE BOX 1900 ORLANDO, FLORIDA 32502 HONORABLE VAN B. POOLE, SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750 JOSEPH A. SOLE, ESQUIRE GENERAL COUNSEL DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION 130 NORTH MONROE STREET TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Petitioner should be granted an equitable adjustment to increase the contract price in the amount of $337,714 for a mistake in bid on project No. BR-7702/8701, Library/Auditorium, Florida International University.
Findings Of Fact In April 1974, Respondent advertised for bids for the construction of a library-auditorium building at Florida International University, Miami, Florida, State Project No. B.R. 7702/8701. Respondent's representative for this project was the architectural firm of Ferendino/Grafton/Spillis/Candela, Coral Gables, Florida. The advertisement for bids specified that sealed bids would be received until 2:00 p.m. on May 16, 1974, at which time they would be publicly opened and read aloud. In fact, the advertised time period was extended until the same hour on May 23, 1974. The advertisement provided that bids must be submitted on the proposal form furnished by the architect/engineer and be accompanied by a bid bond or an equivalent cash amount in a sum not less than five per cent of the amount of the base bid as a guarantee that the bidder would enter into an agreement with the owner if this bid was accepted. It further provided that the bid would remain in force for thirty (30) days after the time of opening. The advertisement also contained the following statement: "The Department of General Services reserves the right to reject any and all bids and to waive informalities in any bid whenever such rejection or waiver is in the interest of the State of Florida." (Exhibit 1a, testimony of Williams) In preparing its bid on the project, Petitioner utilized two company forms. One included columns for the various portions of the work with blocks opposite each portion for the insertion of the names of subcontractors and the amounts of their bids. The other form was a recapitulation of the low subcontractors' bid by the various segments of the contract, and the form also included spaces and amounts for the work to be accomplished by the contractor itself. The normal procedure followed by Petitioner in this and prior projects was to enter subcontractors' bids on the subcontractor's bid tabulation form when received over the telephone and, when all such bids had been received shortly before the deadline for submission of bids by the prime contractors on the project, to enter each low subcontractor bid on the recapitulation form. This would then be totaled to arrive at Petitioner's bid to be submitted to Respondent. (Testimony of Kearns). The subcontractor tabulation form for the instant project listed an item for "PRECAST STRUCTURAL." Opposite this entry in blocks on the form had been printed the names of subcontractors from whom Petitioner expected to receive bids, including Pre-Stressed Systems, Inc. (P.S.I.), Meekins, Stresscon, and Houdaille. However, since there were two different pre-case structural items called for under the specification, i.e., joists under section 3-B and pre-case panels under section 3-C, the words and figures "3B Joists" and "3C panels" were penciled in above and below the printed words "PRE-CAST STRUCTURAL" to show the need for entering bid figures for both items. However, there was no separation of these items in the various blocks for subcontractor's bids. (Exhibits 1b, 1c, Testimony of Kearns) Usually bids of major subcontractors were not received until the morning of the final day for submission of the total bids, and many were not received until immediately prior to the time the bid must be tallied and submitted. On the morning of May 23, 1974, the day for bid opening, Petitioner's employee, Edward A. Kearns, Jr., an estimator, was responsible for preparing Petitioner's bid. The only bid Petitioner had received for precast joists was that submitted by P.S.I. in the base amount of $460,000. This sum was entered on the bid tabulation from in pencil under the printed name P.S.I. Bids for the pre-cast panels were received from two of the subcontractors whose names were printed on the form an the amounts were entered in pencil as follows: "Meekins - 399,800, Stresscon - 400,00." No bid was entered for Houdaille. About 11:00 a.m., a telephonic bid on the panels was received from Cast-Crete Corporation of Kissimmee. This bid was considerably lower than that of Meekins and, because Petitioner had not heard of or dealt with Cast-Crete in the past, it asked all three bidders on the panels to verify the requirements and prices. While awaiting the return of this information, the Cast-Crete bid was not entered on the bid tabulation form. Thereafter, Cast-Crete informed Petitioner that it was raising its bid somewhat and this information was placed on a separate subcontractor bid form for cast-Crete, but not entered on the tabulation form containing all bids. The final Cast-Crete bid was in the amount of $337,714. By this time, Petitioner's office was quite hectic in that other bids were coming in at a fast pace and the phone was ringing continuously. Many bidders sought clarification on items or had to give their bids to Kearns which was time-consuming. As the time for submission by Petitioner to Respondent drew near, Kearns took the low subcontractor bids from the bid tabulation form and transferred them for each category of work to the recapitulation form. On this form, there was a single line for "Precast structural" and, on that line, Kearns entered the bid that had been received from P.S.I. for precast joists, but forgot to include any bid for the precast panes. Since no breakdown for joists and panels was shown on the recapitulation form, he assumed that bids for all portions of the work hand been included. All items on the recapitulation form were added and Petitioner arrived at a total base bid of $3,999,259, which did not include the bid for precast panels in the amount of $337,714. (Testimony of Shafer, Sr., Kearns, Exhibits 1b, 1c, 1f) Petitioner's employee, Ron Shafer, Jr., previously had been sent to the place of bid opening at Florida International University with the formal bid letter with the amounts left blank. Shortly before 2:00 p.m., Petitioner provided him by telephone with the amounts to place on the be bid form and submit to the Respondent's representative. He submitted the formal bid just prior to the deadline. The bids were thereafter opened and, although Ron Shafer, Jr., noted that Petitioner's bid was some $400,000 lower than the next lowest bidder, he was unaware of the circumstances of the mistake and returned to the office. The representative of Respondent had opened the bids and an officer of the architectural firm, Freeman J. Williams, was also present. Nothing was said at the time concerning the large disparity between Petitioner's bid and the other bids, and Williams saw no need to ask Petitioner to verify its bid at that time. (Testimony of Shafer, Jr., Williams, Exhibits 1d, 1v) Meanwhile, after Kearns had tallied the final bid figures and they had been called in to the employee at Florida International University, Petitioner's personnel sat around the office and discussed the job for several minutes. They then started to gather up all the sub-bids to put in a folder when they discovered a "subcontractor's bid form" for Cast-Crete Corporation and realized that it had not been included on the tabulation sheet or on the final recap sheet. Immediate attempts were made to telephone the architect about the mistake. When Williams was reached at his office some thirty minutes after he had left Florida International University, Petitioner requested that its bid be withdrawn after explaining the circumstances. Williams suggested that Petitioner immediately send a telegram to Respondent explaining this situation. Petitioner did so in the following language: "In reviewing our bid, we discovered we had omitted the cost of precast panels manufacturers bid from our tabulation sheet, in the amount of $282,714. We, therefor, regretfully must with- draw our bid on the FIU library and auditorium building. We could, however, accept award of contract if this amount could be added to either of our base bids. Please advise. SHAFER AND MILLER, INC. R C Shafer" In the telegram, an additional mistake was made by using the figure of $282,714 which did not include the erection of the panels in the amount of $55,000 that had been the subject of a separate bid by Cast-Crete. After receipt of the telegram, Respondent's representatives requested that Petitioner come to Tallahassee with their pertinent documents relating to the bid to discuss the matter. They did so and thereafter heard nothing further until June 5, 1974, at which time a letter was received from the Department of General Services, dated May 31, 1974, advising that, subject to final approval by the Governor and the Cabinet, it was propose to recommend acceptance of Petitioner's low bid and award the contract to it in the amount of $4,122,000 for Base Bid 1 and Priority 1 Alternate A, Priority 2, Alternate C, and Priority 3, Alternate D. The meeting of the Cabinet at which the award was to be recommended was stated in the letter to be held on June 4, 1975. Since Petitioner did not receive the letter until June 5, it had no opportunity to be present at the time matter was considered. By separate letter of May 31, 1974, the Department of General Services enclosed four copies of a standard form of agreement and performance and payment bond to be executed and returned. (Testimony of Williams, Shafer, Sr., Kearns, Exhibits 1e, 1g, 1h) Petitioner contacted legal counsel, James E. Glass, on June 5. He checked into the matter and found that the contract had already been awarded on June 4 by the Cabinet. He then telephoned Arnold Greenfield, General Counsel for the Department of General Services, and asked if the state could rebid the job at which time Petitioner would submit its original intended bid. Greenfield stated that the project was critical from a budget standpoint and that the state would not rebid it, and insisted that the Petitioner proceed or else forfeit its bid bond and be subject to suit for any excess costs of performance. Glass reminded Greenfield that Petitioner proceed or else forfeit its bid bond and be subject to suit for any excess costs of performance. Glass reminded Greenfield that Petitioner could seek injunctive relief in the matter, and the latter then stated that if Petitioner would proceed with the contract, Respondent would acknowledge its right to claim a modification of the contract. This conversation was confirmed in a letter from Greenfield to Glass, dated June 7, 1974, wherein it was stated "We further understand that your client may wish to seek a modification of such contract, after execution." Glass, in a return letter dated June 12, returned the executed contracts and bonds, stating that Petitioner was doing so in order to act "equitably and in good faith", and was fully reserving its rights to contest the erroneous bid by judicial action for equitable relief. Thereafter, Petitioner received notice to proceed with the work and in due course satisfactorily completed the contract within the required period. This was evidenced by a certificate of acceptance of the building by the using agency, which was approved by Respondent on December 4, 1975. (Testimony of Glass, Exhibit 1e, 1g, 1h, 1i, 1j, 11, 1m, 1s) In December, 1974, Petitioner had submitted its claim for an equitable adjustment in the amount of $337,714 which was the amount of the omitted Cast- Crete bid. During the ensuing year Petitioner submitted audits of its expenses on the job to Respondent and in January, 1976, further audit information was provided at the request of Respondent. On May 6, 1976, Respondent informed Petitioner that it would not approve any increase in the contract amount. Thereafter, on June 11, Petitioner filed its petition herein seeking an equitable adjustment in the amount of $337,714. The petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Respondent on August 2, 1976, and the undersigned Hearing Officer was assigned to conduct the hearing therein. (Exhibit 1r, 2, 4, 5, 6) By a Motion to Abate, dated August 23, 1976, Respondent requested that the matter be held in abeyance pending the submission of the petition to the project architect and his rendering of a determination indicating whether the relief should be granted or denied, as a "condition precedent to the contractor obtaining consideration of said petition in any proceeding authorized by Chapter 120, Florida Statutes." Respondent stated in its motion that the contract clearly provided that nay and all claims or disputes should be first submitted to the architect for determination, and that thereafter, either party could obtain administrative review of the determination by filing a written appeal to the Department of General Services within thirty days. The motion further stated that since this prerequisite had not been accomplished, there was no basis for an administrative appeal at that time. On the same date, Respondent advised the architect of the situation and requested expeditious consideration of the matter. On August 27, the architect issued its determination stating "From our personal knowledge of the events during the bid opening process, and the subsequent events that led to the awarding of the bid, we concur in the contractor's request." In November 1976, Respondent's general counsel advised the Hearing Officer that settlement efforts were in progress but requested that the matter be scheduled for hearing nevertheless. Notice of hearing was issued on December 15, 1976, and the case was heard on January 27, 1977. (Exhibits 1t, 1u, Pleadings) Petitioner's intended total bid, including alternates, amounted to $4,459,714. A change order of $194 was issued during the course of the work, amounting to a total of $4,459,908. Petitioner's direct costs on the project were $4,094,890. Overhead was computed at 2.85 per cent of direct costs in the amount of $116,705, for a total cost of $4,211,595. Overhead was computed based on the ratio of total general and administrative expense to total direct costs incurred on all of Petitioner's jobs in process for the year ending May 31, 1975. However, the audit reports included payment in the amount of $335,634 to Cast-Crete Corporation. The actual amount paid to that firm was $325,234 - difference of $10,400, making Petitioner's actual costs $4,201,195. During the course of the contract, Respondent paid Petitioner $4,122,194, resulting in a net loss to Petitioner of $79,001. An anticipated profit for performance of the contract was computed on the basis of the average profit on other jobs of 4.4 per cent, amounting to the sum of $180,377. The latter two sums total $259,378, and it is found that figure is the reasonable amount of Petitioner's claim. (Exhibits 2-5)
Recommendation That Petitioner's claim for equitable adjustment under Project No. BR- 7702/8701 be granted and that a change order be issued increasing the contract price by $259,378.00. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of March, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 388-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson and Daniel S. Dearing, Esquires Post Office Box 1118 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James E. Glass, Esquire 2600 First Federal Building 1 Southeast 3rd Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 John A. Barley, Esquire General Counsel Department of General Services Room 110 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact The complaining witnesses in this case, the Marino's, owned real property in Fern Park, Florida that they listed in November, 1973, with Area One, Inc., a corporate broker. They were very anxious to sell this property. At all times here involved, respondent was a registered real estate broker and was employed as a salesman and office manager of Area One, Inc. The property was listed through salesman Eleanor Stanfield although respondent Greene accompanied her to the Marino's when the listing was obtained. Approximately two weeks thereafter, respondent obtained a prospective buyer for the property who was willing to purchase but couldn't meet the cash down payment required to make up the balance over a 95 percent mortgage. The buyer, Borsack, was an acquaintance respondent had known socially for a year or so. The suggestion was made that if Marino could loan Borsack the money for the down payment the latter would sign a balloon note payable twenty dollars per month for the first five years with the balance then due and payable. When bringing this proposal to Marino, respondent told him it was not the best deal but it was the best he could offer at the moment. At the time, Borsack was employed as a salesman and was apparently earning a good salary. Marino was receptive to the idea and agreed to loan the buyer $2400. Marino was advised by his lawyer that he should have more security for the loan than the note signed by Borsack alone and respondent agreed to guarantee the note. Marino prepared a check for $2400 which he exchanged for a cashier's check for a like amount. This was given to respondent when he executed as the guarantor and was subsequently given to the closing agent. There was conflicting testimony regarding the dispenser of the information that the existence of the note should be withheld from the mortgage broker at the closing. The complaining witnesses contended that respondent so advised them, but he denies ever giving such advice. Regardless of the complicity of respondent in this regard, both parties to the contract were aware that the mortgage would not be approved if the existence of the loan was disclosed to the mortgagee. To account for his cash payment at closing, Borsack produced for the mortgage a letter from his sister reciting a gift from her of $2200. Borsack also signed a residential loan application (Exhibit 8) in which he indicated no financing other than first mortgage and the cash he would pay at closing. Both buyer (Borsack) and seller (Marino) executed an affidavit (FNMA Form 1009)(Exhibit 10) on which they advised the mortgagee no secondary financing was involved in the transaction. At the time the loan was made by Marino to Borsack the former's attorney was aware of the circumstances surrounding the transaction and this attorney advised Marino that it would be all right for him to accept the note provided payment was guaranteed by respondent. Although no testimony was elicited from the attorney in this regard, I would expect him to be cognizant of the fact that the mortgage would not be approved if the mortgagee was aware of the loan from seller to buyer. Considerable testimony was adduced regarding whether or not the promissory note given by the buyer to the seller constituted secondary financing as intended on Exhibits 8 and 10. Since this determination is not necessary to the results reached below, respondent's understanding that "secondary financing" relates only to that financing that would create a lien on the property is likewise immaterial to the result. During a 60 day period including the time this transaction occurred, respondent sold four pieces of property for the Marino's. At no time during the negation which resulted in the sales of the property from Marino to Borsack did respondent give any false or misleading information to the Marinos. Although no evidence was presented to this effect, the complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that after the transaction closed Borsack subsequently defaulted on his mortgage and on his note to Marino; that respondent made a few payments on the note he had guaranteed before stopping these payments; and that Marino obtained a judgment against respondent for the amount of the promissory note. Thereafter, in December 1975, some two years after any act of respondent in this transaction that could have given rise to a violation of Chapter 475, F.S. occurred, the Marinos filed a complaint with the FREC and the investigation and administrative complaint here involved followed.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents are guilty of misrepresentation or breach of trust and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact In October 1993, Respondent Sylvester (Respondent) took his daughter, whose last name was Rodriguez by marriage, to a real estate sales office that was selling units of a new condominium building. Respondent's daughter was 42 years old at the time. Speaking to the qualifying broker for the selling broker, Respondent advised her that he was a real estate salesperson for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. and wanted to show a unit to his daughter. Respondent referred to his daughter by name, rather than as his daughter, and did not mention to the broker that his customer was his daughter. Respondent gave the qualifying broker his card and signed his name in a log to protect his interest in the cooperating broker's sales commission. After touring a model unit, Mrs. Rodriguez expressed sufficient interest that Respondent obtained a form contract from the qualifying broker before leaving the premises. Respondent completed the contract, but left negotiations to Respondent Mitulinsky because Respondent was going out of town. Respondent Mitulinsky is the qualifying broker for Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc. Her involvement with the transaction was limited to contact with the listing broker, transmitting prices between Mrs. Rodriguez and the seller. Respondent Mitulinsky did not disclose that Mrs. Rodriguez was Respondent's daughter. But the evidence fails to suggest that Respondent Mitulinsky was in any way aware that the seller's broker was ignorant of the relationship between Respondent and Mrs. Rodriguez. The evidence also fails to suggest that the nature and extent of the conversations between Respondent Mitulinsky and the qualifying broker were such as to support an inference of concealment of the relationship by Respondent Mitulinsky. Prior to agreeing upon a final price, the seller's qualifying broker agreed to increase the commission to be paid Respondent Lyric Group Realty, Inc. by one percentage point to three percent. The listing price for the unit was $285,000. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez submitted the contract with a price of $240,000. Following verbal negotiations, the seller returned the same contract with a price of $268,000, which the buyers accepted on October 29, 1993. A salesperson employed by the listing broker admits that she knew of the relationship between Respondent and his daughter prior to closing. After the contract was signed but prior to closing, Respondent, Mrs. Rodriguez, a home inspector, and the salesperson visited the unit. As the inspector worked, Mrs. Rodriguez and her father spoke freely, as they had in past visits, with Mrs. Rodriguez referring to Respondent as "dad" and he referring to her by her first name. The salesperson immediately informed her broker, who immediately reported the information to the seller. However, the seller elected to do nothing with the information because he was satisfied with the sales price and net proceeds. Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez were purchasing the first unit to be sold at the seller's project. This makes the first transaction especially risky for both the seller and the buyers. The purchase price represented the fair market value for the unit. The unit appraised at $271,000 at the time of the sale to Mr. and Mrs. Rodriguez. On January 6, 1994, the parties closed on the unit pursuant to the provisions of the contract. The $16,080 sales commission was split evenly between the listing broker and Respondent Lyric Realty Group, Inc.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Real Estate enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint against all respondents ENTERED on September 30, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this September 30, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda L. Goodgame General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Daniel Villazon, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Peter Hobson, Esquire 606 East Madison Street Tampa, Florida 33602
Findings Of Fact On October 9, 1992 Petitioner executed a sworn application for licensure as a life and variable annuity and health insurance agent. Such application was filed with the Department on October 13, 1992. At the Department's request, the Petitioner sent a second application by facsimile transmission on February 19, 1993. This second application was unexecuted, that is, unsworn but was on the same form as previously described in paragraph 1. On each copy of the application, Petitioner responded "yes" to the question: Has your application for a license ever been declined or denied by this or any other Insurance Department or has your License or eligibility to hold a license ever been declined, denied, suspended, revoked, placed on probation or an administrative fine or penalty levied? On each copy of the application, Petitioner responded "no" to the question: Does any insurer or general agency claim that you are indebted under any agency con- tract or otherwise? If yes, please attach a letter of explanation. When the Department requested additional information regarding Petitioner's answer to the question described in paragraph 3, the Petitioner gave a response that led to the review of a final order entered by the Department on October 30, 1990. As set forth in the final order and the recommended order attached thereto, the basis for the Petitioner's prior revocation, was a pattern of deceit evidenced by false statements on applications for insurance, by the forgery of names on applications for proposed insureds, and by forging names for requests for cancellation of coverage. As a result of the actions described in paragraph 6, the insurer for whom Petitioner worked at the time, Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Company (Colonial), took legal action against Petitioner for damages incurred or to be incurred by the company as a result of the deceit. That civil suit was settled by the entry of a settlement judgment in which Petitioner agreed to repay Colonial damages in the amount of $60,000. The amount was to be repaid pursuant to a payment schedule. At the times Petitioner filed applications with the Department (October and February), such monies had not been repaid and Petitioner was, in fact, in default on the payment schedule. Colonial is currently owed approximately $32,000 of the original settlement. Additionally, when Colonial sought to enforce its judgment against Petitioner, he filed for bankruptcy to protect his assets and to restructure his debt. Thus when Petitioner answered in the negative to the question outlined in paragraph 4, such answer was incorrect and misleading. On February 24, 1993, the Department notified Petitioner that his application for licensure had been denied. The actions complained of, and which gave rise to Petitioner's prior revocation, were fully established in the prior proceeding. Petitioner's misstatement on the current application gives concern as to whether misleading statements or misrepresentations may recur.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Insurance and Treasurer enter a final order that denies Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 11th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2587 The Petitioner submitted proposed findings in the form of a letter. Only the second and third paragraphs of that letter set forth findings of fact, the remainder of the letter is hereby rejected as argument, comment, or conclusions of law, not fact. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: With regard to the second paragraph, it is accepted that the Department was aware of the Petitioner's indebtedness to Colonial. That Petitioner, or his agent, wrote to Mr. O'Neil is rejected as irrelevant. Further, such letter is not accepted for the truthfulness of the matters asserted in it. When confronted, Petitioner has been truthful regarding the indebtedness to Colonial; such indebtedness, however, was not accurately depicted on the application for licensure. With regard to the third paragraph, it is accepted that Petitioner has repaid some of the indebtedness to Colonial; otherwise, the paragraph is rejected as not supported by the credible evidence presented in this case. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Respondent: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 19 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence Sherman Lowe, III, pro se 9150 South West 23rd Street, Apt. D Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33324 John R. Dunphy Department of Insurance and Treasurer Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neil General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the charges, Respondent was a licensed real estate salesman and broker-salesman, license number 0326235. In 1983, Dorothy Nutt and Diane Falstad were the owners of a house located at 608 Hillcrest Street, Orlando, Florida. In December of 1983, Ms. Nutt and Ms. Falstad placed this house for sale with real estate broker Frank Daley. The listing was an exclusive listing except as to the Respondent and another individual, for which no commission would be paid, if a contract submitted by the Respondent was accepted by Nutt and Falstad prior to December 26, 1983. On December 25, 1983, the Respondent, along with his parents, Barbara Okoniewski and Louis Okoniewski, Jr., submitted a written contract to Diane Falstad and Dorothy Nutt for the purchase of the 608 Hillcrest Street property. The contract was accepted by the sellers on December 26, 1983. The contract, as executed by the Respondent and his parents, specified that a $1,000 deposit was to be held in escrow by "Closing Agents." Additionally, Respondent represented to Ms. Falstad that the $1,000 deposit was being maintained in an escrow account. Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Respondent applied for a V.A. mortgage loan, but was later determined to be ineligible. Subsequent thereto, on or about February 8, 1984, application was made with Residential Financial Corporation (RFC), to obtain financing to purchase the 608 Hillcrest Street property. The application was in the name of the Respondent's parents, with Respondent handling the matter on their behalf. Thereafter, the Respondent requested that the loan officer (Charlyne Becker) at RFC not submit the loan application for approval to the underwriters. Pursuant to his request, the application was not submitted for approval. The transaction did not close. Subsequent to the scheduled date of closing both Ms. Falstad and Ms. Nutt made demands of the Respondent for forfeiture of the $1,000 deposit, due to their belief that, he had breached the contract by failing to secure financing. It was not until after the scheduled closing date that the sellers learned the $1,000 was not in escro. To date, Respondent has neither deposited the $1,000 in any trust account nor paid any money to the sellers. Respondent admits through his own testimony, that he did not make the deposit, nor was the deposit placed in any escrow account by his parents. Respondent's testimony, which was not rebutted, established that he and his parents sought to purchase the 608 Hillcrest Street property and that adjacent to it for rental purposes. However, they were advised by the RFC loan officer (Charlyne Becker) that the applications were not likely to be approved by RFC. Respondent did not thereafter pursue any of the loan applications.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a Final Order fining Respondent $500. DONE and ENTERED this 12th day of July, 1985 in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of July, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: James R. Mitchell, Esq. Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Louis S. Okoniewski 730 Lake View Avenue, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Harold Huff. Executive Director Division of Real Estate Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore A. Carpino, Esq. General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
