Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent was the owner and operator of a facility within the meaning of Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. The facility is a large 2 bedroom house on 5 acres of land in South Dade County that serves ACLF clients. Respondent is the Administrator of the facility. Respondent has 1 full time employee, Jan Shaw. Ms. Shaw is a registered nurse who lives and works at the facility. The facility provides for four (4) clients. Respondent is employed at the district office of Petitioner as a full- time employee. Respondent is physically present at the facility on an occasional and unscheduled basis. Ms. Shaw is present at the facility 24 hours a day except for time taken for personal leave, or other time away from the facility. Ms. Shaw does not maintain a schedule for personal leave or other time away from the facility. Instead, Ms. Shaw takes time for personal leave when the need arises and when she chooses to take such time. Ms. Shaw always advises Respondent when personal leave or other time away from the facility is required or desired. After a routine annual survey of the facility to determine the facility's compliance with state statutes and regulations on October 29, 1987, Petitioner determined that Respondent failed to maintain a work schedule as required in Florida Administrative Code Rule 10A-5.024(1)(h). On September 15, 1988, the facility was again inspected, and no work schedule was observed during that survey. When asked to produce a work schedule, Ms. Shaw could not locate a work schedule. Respondent was not present during that survey. Respondent prepared a document characterized by the Respondent as a work schedule. A copy of the document characterized by Respondent as a work schedule is contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The document is hand printed, provides for duty by Ms. Shaw 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, with no identification of who is to relieve Ms. Shaw and when. The document does not include schedules for relief staff, and does not include schedules for vacations, sick leave, and emergencies. Respondent was advised by James Valinoti, Director of Code Compliance, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, on September 15, 1988, that the document characterized as a work schedule by Respondent did not qualify as a work schedule because it failed to contain the essential elements of a work schedule. Respondent and Petitioner conversed and corresponded on a variety of occasions as to the elements required in a work schedule. Respondent was advised that a work schedule must identify the individuals working each hour of a 24 hour day, 7 days a week. It must show who the relief person is and when the relief person will be on duty. The schedule must also contain telephone numbers that may be needed by facility clients for various purposes including emergency numbers. Respondent's work schedule contained 911 for the emergency number, and no telephone number for the Administrator. Respondent advised Mr. Valinoti that the facility was a small facility with one registered nurse on duty 24 hours a day. Respondent covered for the registered nurse as needed. Respondent was advised by Mr. Valinoti that no one can work 24 hours a day, and that the schedule for Respondent, as the relief person for Ms. Shaw, was not posted. Further, Mr. Valinoti explained that the emergency number and other contact information required in a work schedule was for the benefit of facility clients in the event they needed such information in the absence of the Administrator or Ms. Shaw. As of the date of this Order, no work schedule, other than the document duplicated in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, has been maintained by Respondent at the facility.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order assessing a $250 fine for failing on October 29, 1987, and again on September 15, 1988, to maintain written records in the form of a work schedule, within the meaning of Florida Administrative Code Rule 10A-5.024(1)(h), in a place, form, and system ordinarily employed in good business practice and accessible to facility and Department staff. DONE and ENTERED this 29 day of September, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 89-2758 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Petitioner did not submit proposed findings of fact with unnumbered paragraphs. Neither did Petitioner include a separate category of proposed conclusions of law. Instead, Petitioner interspersed its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law under the heading of "Discussion." This Appendix, therefore, addresses only Respondent's proposed findings of fact. The Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection NONE The Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection Rejected for the reasons stated in finding 5. Rejected in part as irrelevant and in part for the reasons stated in finding 5. COPIES FURNISHED: Leonard T. Helfand, Esquire Licensure and Certification HRS Regional Counsel 401 N.W. Second Avenue, #N526 Miami, Florida 33128 Walter E. Nottebaum, Esquire 2525 S.W. Third Avenue, #412 Miami, Florida 33129 John Miller, Esquire General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether the Respondent overpaid the Petitioner for hours of annual leave, and, if so, the amount of the overpayment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Ms. Bamishigbin was employed by the State of Florida for 17 years. In June 2001, her position classification was changed from Career Service to Select Exempt Service. Ms. Bamishigbin was terminated from her employment effective January 4, 2002, because of budget cuts. After her termination, Ms. Bamishigbin was paid for her accrued annual and sick leave balances; accrued annual leave hours are paid in full, but only one-quarter of accrued sick leave hours are paid. Based on the final audit of her annual and sick leave balances, Ms. Bamishigbin was paid a net total of $5252.59 for 441 hours of annual leave and 98 (391.5 hours ÷ 4) hours of sick leave by warrant dated February 22, 2002. Subsequent to this payment, Ms. Bamishigbin's leave records were again audited, and, based on the revised calculations, the Department concluded that she had been paid for more hours of annual leave and for fewer hours of sick leave than she had accrued as of her termination date. In calculating the revised annual leave and sick leave hours for Ms. Bamishigbin, Department personnel used the leave balances shown for Ms. Bamishigbin in COPES, the official compilation of annual and sick leave for all state employees, as of June 8, 2001, and supplemented this data with a manual audit of Ms. Bamishigbin's timesheets from June 8, 2001, to the date of her termination. When preparing the revised audit, Department personnel discovered that Ms. Bamishigbin's annual leave hours for 2001-2002 had not been pro-rated to account for her termination on January 4, 2002: COPES showed 380.5 accrued annual leave hours for Ms. Bamishigbin as of June 8, 2001, together with an additional 4.5 hours of annual leave that she had accrued in June 2001 as a career service employee, before her position was changed to Select Exempt Services. In accordance with the usual procedure for Select Exempt Service employees, Ms. Bamishigbin was credited in June 2001 with 176 hours of annual leave for the 12-month period extending from June 2001 to June 2002, for a total of 561 hours of annual leave. In the original leave audit, the entire 176 hours had been included in the calculation of Ms. Bamishigbin's accrued annual leave. However, because she was terminated on January 4, 2002, the 176 hours of annual leave accrued for the 12-month period from June 2001 to June 2002, should have been pro-rated for 7 months. Ms. Bamishigbin, therefore, had 102.669 ((176 ÷ 12) x 7) hours of annual leave that she was entitled to use from June 8, 2001, to January 4, 2002. Ms. Bamishigbin used 117.25 hours of annual leave between June 8, 2001, and January 4, 2002. Even though Ms. Bamishigbin used an amount in excess of the number of pro-rated annual leave hours available to her between June 2001 and January 2002, the Department does not penalize an employee who is terminated for using annual leave hours in excess of the pro-rated amount, so Ms. Bamishigbin was credited with no hours of annual leave accrued between June 2001 and January 2002. The Department calculated that Ms. Bamishigbin had accrued annual leave hours equal to the 380.5 hours of accrued annual leave she had on June 8, 2001, plus 4.5 hours, for a total of 385 hours. Ms. Bamishigbin was paid for 441 hours of accrued annual leave, so the Department calculated that she had been overpaid for 56 hours of annual leave. The Department also discovered that Ms. Bamishigbin had been underpaid for her accrued hours of sick leave. She was paid for 391.5 hours of sick leave, but she should have been paid for 410.169 hours of sick leave, a difference of 18.669 hours. The total underpayment to Ms. Bamishigbin for her accrued sick leave was 4.66 (18.669 ÷ 4) hours. The Department finally determined that Ms. Bamishigbin had been overpaid by a total of 51.5 hours of accrued leave (56 hours of annual leave - 4.66 hours of sick leave). Based on these figures, Ms. Bamishigbin was overpaid in the amount of $612.97. Ms. Bamishigbin claims that the 380.5 hours of accrued annual leave shown in COPES for June 8, 2001, was incorrect, and that she had more hours of annual leave than was shown in the system. Ms. Bamishigbin did not, however, provide any evidence to contradict the information regarding the total annual leave hours the Department obtained from COPES, although Ms. Bamishigbin testified that COPES incorrectly reported the amount of compensatory leave she had accrued.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order finding that Ms. Bamishigbin is liable to repay $612.97 for an overpayment of 51.5 hours of accrued leave. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Olivia O. Bamishigbin 4466 Northwest 200 Street Carol City, Florida 33055 Richard D. Davison, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive, Suite 312 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 William G. Bankhead, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Robert N. Sechen, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice Knight Building 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent is guilty of insubordination for the use of excess leave and sleeping in his vehicle during working hours.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 21, 2004, Petitioner hired Respondent as a school custodian. Starting on December 11, 2007, Petitioner transferred Respondent to Toledo Blade Elementary School. One year later, Petitioner transferred Respondent to the Transportation Department, which is the building housing the transportation offices. As a custodian, Respondent is a "classified" employee. He is covered by the Classified Bargaining Unit Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Sarasota Classified/Teachers Association and Petitioner (the contract). Twice on the morning of April 25, 2008, during working hours and not while on a break, Respondent walked from his worksite to his vehicle, climbed into the vehicle, and nodded off to sleep. The first nap lasted for about one hour, and the second nap lasted about one and one-quarter hours. The second nap ended when Respondent's boss and the boss's boss walked out to the vehicle where they found Respondent, who had put the driver's seat down, laid out in the front driver's seat, with the radio on, sound asleep. They woke him and ordered him back to work. Respondent's defenses are: 1) he was not asleep; he was unconscious; and 2) he was suffering from extreme drowsiness due to medications that he was taking following his recovery from a three-month coma into which he had fallen two years earlier. Both of Respondent's defenses are makeshift. According to Webster's online dictionary, "sleep" is the "natural periodic suspension of consciousness during which the powers of the body are restored." (http://www.merriam- webster.com/dictionary/sleep, as found on June 17, 2009) If he had suddenly lost consciousness at the worksite, no one would claim he was sleeping on the job. Instead, without reporting any difficulties to anyone, he walked out to his vehicle, made himself comfortable, and fell asleep. The problem was that his natural period of suspended consciousness coincided with time during which Petitioner was paying him. The requisite restorative effect is inferred. Nor is there any credence to the claim of a medical condition or effect of a medication that would leave Respondent unable to resist falling asleep while on duty. Although ample opportunity existed, Respondent failed, on the day in question, to bring to the attention of his supervisor any medical reason for sleeping on the job, which was exactly what he was doing. Article XXI of the contract authorizes discipline for "just cause." Sleeping while on duty, for over two hours prior to lunch, constitutes insubordination and just cause for discipline. The leave issue is more complicated. Petitioner is on a fiscal year starting July 1. For the entire year, classified, 12-month, hourly employees, such as Respondent, accrue six personal days on July 1. For sick days, these employees accrue one day at the end of July and three advance days. They then accrue a day at the end of each following month through March. Unused sick days rollover to the next year, but unused personal days do not. Personal days count against the sick days. In other words, if an employee has five sick days and six personal days and uses a personal day, he will then have four sick days and five personal days. Employees also earn vacation days. As explained by Petitioner's payroll supervisor, the payroll system facilitated recharacterizations between sick and personal days. However, the system did not incorporate vacation days in the same fashion. Thus, if an employee took off one day, without claiming sick leave, and lacked one day of personal time, the system would dock his pay, even though he might still have had sufficient vacation time to absorb the time that he had taken off. For the 2007-08 school year, Respondent used "personal leave charged to sick" as follows: September 12--8.0 hours; September 24--8.0 hours; December 20--8.0 hours; December 21-- 8.0 hours; January 30--0.5 hours; February 15--8.0 hours; and February 27--7.5 hours. On February 27, Respondent missed the entire day of work. Consistent with acceptable practices, on the next day, he submitted a form entitled, "Certificate of Absence." In it, Respondent requested approval for 8.0 hours of "personal leave charged to sick," rather than one of the other categories, such as sick leave or vacation leave. His supervisor signed the form. When the payroll supervisor checked his balances, she saw that he only had 7.5 hours of personal leave charged to sick, so, on May 2, 2008, Respondent had to sign a form entitled, "Request for Personal/Sick/Vacation Leave in Excess of Earned Leave." This form requested approval for the use of 0.5 hours of personal leave in excess of earned leave. The request was disapproved by the Director of Facilities Services with a signature bearing a date of March 13, 2008. The payroll department's practice was not to deduct personal leave charged as sick against vacation leave, if an employee consumed all of his personal leave charged as sick. On March 14, Respondent again requested 2.5 hours of personal leave charged to sick. His supervisor noted on the form that he "cautioned Tim to make sure he has the time available--Tim told me that he does. 3-14-08." By this time, it is unlikely that Respondent had received a new statement of leave balance reflecting the 0.5 hours that he had been short two weeks earlier. On May 2, 2008, Respondent signed another request for permission to use personal leave in excess of earned leave, and the Director of Facilities denied the request with a signature bearing a date of March 27, 2008. The same process took place again on April 11 for 8.0 hours on April 7. Petitioner notes that this request also violated policy regarding custodial leave on the day immediately after spring break, for which leave requests must be submitted well in advance of the leave sought. Article XVII of the contract requires a special procedure for leave on days immediately preceding and following a school holiday, but the emphasis in testimony was on the importance of adequate custodial staff on such days. However, the purpose of this policy is to address the needs of schools with respect to returning students. Because Respondent was not assigned to a school, nor had he been assigned to one temporarily for returning students, he was not undermining this policy by conforming to general policy, which allowed after-the-fact requests. In any event, as the payroll supervisor testified, it is possible that Respondent still had vacation time each time that Petitioner docked him for requesting personal leave charged as sick when he had already exhausted his personal leave. On these facts, Petitioner does not have just cause to discipline Respondent on the ground of insubordination or any other ground. There is no doubt that Respondent understood the interplay between personal leave charged to sick and sick leave, but there is considerable doubt as to, on the first two occasions on which he overdrew on his balance of personal leave charged to sick that he knew that he was doing so. Additionally, there is a reasonable possibility that he had available vacation leave, against which all of this time could have been charged; absent proof from Petitioner precluding this possibility, the entire dispute is reduced to the level of finding the proper account to debit these relatively few hours of missed work. This does not rise to insubordination, nor does it constitute just cause for discipline. Article XXI of the contract requires progressive discipline, which constitutes a verbal reprimand, written reprimand, suspension with or without pay, and dismissal. The next step in progressive discipline for Respondent is suspension with or without pay, not dismissal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the School Board of Sarasota County, Florida, enter a final order dismissing the charge of excessive use of leave and finding Respondent guilty of the charge of sleeping while on duty and suspending him, without pay, for five working days. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of June, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Hunter W. Carroll, Esquire Matthews, Eastmoore, Hardy Crauwels & Garcia, P.A. 1777 Main Street, Suite 500 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Lisa J. Kleinberg, Esquire Law Offices of Kleinberg, Ingram & Murphy, P.L. 2189 Ringling Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34237 Mrs. Lori White, Superintendent Sarasota County School Board 1960 Landings Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34231-3365 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner, an employee of the Department of Children and Family Services (the "Department"), was overpaid in the amount of $826.82 and should be required to repay that amount to the Department.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing, the following findings of fact are made: On June 5, 1995, Petitioner entered into a settlement agreement with Respondent to resolve certain disciplinary matters not directly relevant to this case. For purposes of this proceeding, the key element of the settlement agreement was that Petitioner would accept a voluntary demotion. The terms of the settlement agreement provided that Petitioner would retain his current salary status for a period not to exceed five years, though it would exceed the maximum for his new pay grade. On June 7, 1995, the Public Employees Relations Commission ("PERC") entered a final order approving the settlement agreement in disposition of Petitioner's complaint. Petitioner did not appeal the final order. Rule 60K-2.004(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a demoted state employee's base rate of pay may exceed the maximum of the salary range to which the employee has been demoted for a maximum of five years. Petitioner's base rate of pay was allowed to exceed the maximum of his new pay grade for the full five years. During this period, Petitioner benefited from pay grade increases, received a reclassification of his position, and was not promoted. The five-year period ended in June 2000. Respondent's main office in Tallahassee twice per year issues a computer-generated list of employees receiving pay over the maximum of their pay grades. Human resources employees in Respondent's branch offices then examine the list to determine whether these employees' base rate of pay should continue to exceed the maximum. Respondent issued an "Employees Over Maximum" list in September 2000. Rex Duley of the District 8 human resources office examined the approximately 15 listed names of persons working in District 8. Mr. Duley determined that the applicable five-year period for Petitioner's receipt of pay above his grade had expired in June 2000. Mr. Duley prepared a letter, dated September 11, 2000, notifying Petitioner of the overpayments. The letter stated that Petitioner had received $1,316.11 in gross overpayments since June 2000. Respondent subsequently completed the full computation through the Bureau of State Payroll's automated system, and determined that the net overpayment to Petitioner was $826.82. At the hearing, Petitioner did not dispute the amount of the net overpayment. Petitioner testified that he would be able to repay the money at a rate of $25 to $50 per pay period. Instead, Petitioner sought to introduce evidence calling into question the validity of the 1995 settlement agreement. This evidence was deemed irrelevant and was not admitted. The evidence established that Petitioner voluntarily entered the settlement agreement, did not appeal from the PERC final order adopting the settlement agreement, and accepted the benefits of the settlement agreement for a period of five years. The time for contesting that agreement has long passed. Petitioner also questioned Respondent's diligence in discovering the overpayments. Petitioner was well aware of the five-year limitation on the salary arrangement established by the settlement agreement, and was in at least as good a position as Respondent to know that he was being overpaid between June and September 2000. Petitioner accepted the overpayments without questioning them or calling Respondent's attention to them. Petitioner's contention that he is being penalized for Respondent's lax bookkeeping is thus without merit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent repay $50 per pay period to the Department of Children and Family Services beginning with the pay period immediately following entry of a final order in this case and continuing each pay period thereafter until the overpayment is repaid. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Eugenie Rehak, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 60085 Fort Myers, Florida 33906-0085 Robert J. Richmond 5411 Loyloa Lane Southwest Fort Myers, Florida 33908 Virginia A. Daire, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204B Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 2, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant, Petitioner was employed as a Clerk Typist with Respondent. Petitioner did not report to work on February 3, 4 and 5, 1988. Respondent's leave policy is that leave should be requested in advance; if an employee gets sick, he or she needs to call in. Petitioner had not requested leave prior to February 3, 1988. On February 3, 1988, Ms. Lester, a co-worker of Petitioner's received a telephone call from a Ms. Williams who stated that Petitioner was in the hospital. Ms. Baker, Petitioner's supervisor, called three hospitals in the area and none had a Ms. Stanyard listed as a patient. Also, she contacted Ms. Stanyard's brother and another person, neither of whom had any knowledge of Petitioner's whereabouts. Finally, Ms. Baker went to Ms. Stanyard's home, but could not find Ms. Stanyard. As of the end of the day on February 5, 1988, Petitioner had not contacted her supervisor or her office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Administration issue a final order ruling that Petitioner abandoned her position and resigned from the career service. DONE and ORDERED this 29th day of September, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOSE A. DIEZ-ARGUELLES Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of September, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Ms. Ethelda Stanyard 7855 Wilson Boulevard Apartment 17 Jacksonville, Florida 32210 Scott D. Leemis Assistant District Legal Counsel Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Agustus D. Aikens, Jr. Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, John C. Scott, has been a Career Service employee with the Department of Transportation for approximately ten years, assigned to the Centerline Maintenance Office in Pompano Beach, Florida. During all times material to these proceedings, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Allen Thomas. Robert Lucas, Highway Maintenance Supervisor in charge of the District III Centerline Crew, is the Petitioner's second-level supervisor. Thomas and Lucas are the only individuals at the Centerline Maintenance Office authorized to approve leave for Petitioner. On May 23, 1987, the Petitioner was arrested for D.U.I. and placed in jail for fifteen days. After the Petitioner was arrested, he called his mother and asked her to inform his supervisor at work that he had some personal business to attend to and would need annual leave. On May 26, 1987, the Petitioner failed to report to work and had not previously requested leave from any of his supervisors. On the morning of May 26, 1987, Ms. Scott, the Petitioner's mother, called Mr. Lucas and told him that her son would need a couple of days off from work because of personal business. Mr. Lucas informed Mrs. Scott that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone for personal business but that leave could be granted for an emergency situation. Ms. Scott reiterated that the Petitioner had some personal business to take care of. Mr. Lucas advised her that annual leave could not be authorized over the telephone under those circumstances. On June 1, 1987, Mr. Lucas was informed by Mr. Oshesky, the District Personnel Supervisor, that Petitioner's attorney had called and told him that Petitioner was in jail. The Petitioner was absent from work on May 26, 27, 28, and June 1, 2, 3, and 4, 1987. May 29, 30 and 31, 1987 were non-work days for Petitioner. At the time, the Petitioner's work week consisted of four ten hour days from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. The last day that Petitioner actually reported for work was Wednesday, May 20, 1987. However, on Thursday, May 21, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work on authorized annual leave, May 22-24, 1987, were non-work days and on Monday, May 25, 1987, the Petitioner was absent from work due to an official holiday (8 hours) and authorized annual leave (2 hours). On June 5, 1987, the Respondent advised Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested, that he was being terminated effective May 20, 1987, (Petitioner's last day at work) for abandonment of his position. The Petitioner's absence from work and involvement with civilian authorities were related to an admitted alcohol problem. Since the Petitioner was released from jail, he has participated in a twenty-day in-patient substance abuse program at John F. Kennedy Hospital and is presently involved with a Fort Lauderdale after-care program. The Petitioner had been provided with a Department of Transportation Employee Handbook by his employers. The Handbook outlined the requirements for annual leave and leave of absences without pay. The Handbook provides in part as follows: Annual Leave - Get your supervisor's approval before taking leave. If an emergency develops, tell your supervisor of the emergency and ask verbal approval to use annual leave. When you return to work complete the leave request form, as appropriate. Leaves of Absence Without Pay - Upon request, you may be granted leave without pay ... for a period not to exceed twelve calendar months.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, John C. Scott, has abandoned his Career Service position with the Department of Transportation. DONE and ORDERED this 16th day of October, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. W. MATTHEW STEVENSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-2750 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in substance in Finding of Fact 3. Partially adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 5 and 6. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as subordinate and/or unnecessary. Partially adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Matters not contained therein are rejected as argument and/or subordinate. Adopted in substance in Findings of Fact 3, 5, and 6. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Respondent Adopted in Findings of Fact 1 and 2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Findings of Fact 7 and 9. COPIES FURNISHED: Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Hon. Kaye N. Henderson Department of Transportation Secretary Room 562 Burns Building Department of Transportation Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Patrick J. Curry, Esquire Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, 200 Southeast Sixth Street M.S. 58 Suite 200 Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 32301 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esquire 435 Carlton Building General Counsel Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Janet Truett was a former vocational rehabilitation client due to a hearing problem. After successfully completing the program, she was employed as a secretary by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation in Tampa, a position which she retained for approximately five years. In 1983, petitioner often took annual leave, sick leave and leave without pay, usually calling in at the last minute. On October 13, 1985, her immediate supervisor advised her that "in the future, all leave must be approved in advance except for emergency sick leave." (HRS Exhibit 1). Due to an automobile accident and gall bladder surgery, Mrs. Truett was absent from work approximately one-fourth of the time from mid-November of 1984 through mid-April of 1985. On April 22, 1985, petitioner and her supervising counselor had a conference and discussed her continued use of leave without pay. Petitioner was advised that her absence put undue stress on the rest of the unit and that her physician was being consulted to determine if she was able to return to work on a full-time basis. Another conference was to be scheduled after receiving her doctor's response. By letter dated April 30, 1985, Dr. Michael J. Wiley advised petitioner's supervisor that petitioner had been discharged from care after recovering from her surgery on March 18, 1985, but had come back to his office on April 3, 1985, complaining of abdominal pain. She was instructed to stay home and return for a follow-up visit the following week. She did not return to Dr. Wiley's office after April 3, 1985. Petitioner received her annual performance evaluation on May 2, 1985, with an overall rating of "conditional". The areas of deficiency included dependability, quality of work and quantity of work. Petitioner was advised that her attendance at work would be monitored over the next sixty days and that she would "not be given any approved leave whether sick leave, annual leave or leave without pay without a written explanation. If she falls ill during the 60 days she must provide me with a doctor's report indicating her problem. If she is to take any other type of leave she must provide me with a written explanation. I will then make a determination as to whether or not I will approve this leave." (HRS Exhibit 3). On May 17, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor and indicated she had car problems. She did not come in to work for the entire day. A counseling session was held on May 20, 1985, and petitioner was advised by her supervisor that she was expected to take the city bus or arrange for other transportation should she experience further car trouble. On May 24, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor at 9:45 A.M. and requested leave because of an alleged family problem. She was told that her story would be verified and was reminded that she had been instructed to call in to request leave before 8:30 A.M. The stated reason for her absence on May 24, 1985 was not truthful. On May 28, 1985, petitioner called in at 8:20 A.M. and requested leave, stating that her car had broken down and that she had numerous family problems. She was told that the leave for May 24 and May 28, 1985, would not be approved. On May 29, 1985, she arrived to work late at 8:15 A.M. Also on that date, she received a written reprimand from her supervisor for taking unauthorized leave on May 24 and May 28, 1985. She was instructed to be honest and to call in by 8:30 A.M. if she was going to be out for any reason. On May 31, 1985, petitioner was granted approval for three hours leave in order to get her electricity turned on. On June 3, 1985, she called in requesting leave stating that she still had no electricity, that she had been up late the night before due to family problems and that she had no way to get to work anyway. Her daughter picked up some checks for her around 1:10 P.M. On June 4, she came to work but requested leave. This request was not approved and she received a second written reprimand for taking unauthorized leave on June 3, 1985. In this second reprimand dated June 4 but signed June 11, 1985, petitioner was advised that "further occurrences of unauthorized leave could result in a suspension or dismissal." (HRS Exhibit 5) A counseling session was held with petitioner on June 4, 1985, to review her job performance since the time of her conditional performance rating. She was advised that her attendance problem had not improved. She was referred to the Employee Assistance Program and was advised that the only way she could obtain future approved sick leave was to provide her supervisor with a doctor's statement. On June 14, 1985, a Friday, petitioner called in and requested sick leave. Her supervisor told her that in order for him to approve her sick leave, she must provide him with a doctor's report. On June 17 and 18, 1985, petitioner failed to report to work and failed to request additional leave. On June 19, 1985, she called in and said she was "too upset" to come to work. When asked if she had seen a doctor, she replied that she had not. Petitioner was then advised by her supervisor that he would not approve her leave for June 14, 17 or 18, 1985. When petitioner was absent from work, other secretaries in the office were required to perform her duties, as well as their own. This created a hardship on the other secretaries, and petitioner's frequent absences impaired both the quantity and the quality of her own work. By letter dated June 21, 1985, petitioner was advised that the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation was processing her resignation from her position as a secretary effective June 13, 1985 at 5:00 P.M. Citing Rule 22A-7.10, F1orida Administrative Code, it was assumed that petitioner had abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service since she had been on unapproved leave for three consecutive work days.
Conclusions Rule 22A-7.10(2t(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that "An employee who is absent without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the Career Service." The evidence clearly demonstrates that petitioner's absence on June 14, 17 and 18, 1985, was not authorized. Petitioner does not even contend that it was authorized, but merely urges that it was not "reasonable" for her supervisor not to grant her retroactive approval for these absences. Given the numerous amount of leave time utilized by the petitioner and the repeated warnings, both oral and written, concerning future absences, HRS's action can hardly be termed "unreasonable." Petitioner's supervisors and co-workers were aware that petitioner had medical and personal problems and attempted to work around those problems and provide help and counseling to her. Her absences were both disruptive to the operation of the office as a whole and affected the quality and quantity of her own performance. Petitioner was repeatedly advised and counseled concerning the problems her absences were causing and was instructed and warned of the proper procedure to follow should future absences be necessary. It is difficult to envision any further steps HRS could have taken to solve petitioner's problems with continued absences. She was fully aware of the consequences which would ensue should she fail to report to work without authorized leave. Nevertheless, she chose to do so in the face of two written reprimands within a one-week period, and the passage of less than ten days between the second written reprimand and June 14, the first of her three days of absence without authorized leave. Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code; is clear and mandates the action to be taken when an employee is absent without authorized leave for three consecutive work days. A review of the facts of this case clearly supports the conclusion that petitioner abandoned her position with HRS and must be deemed to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner Janet E. Truett be deemed to have abandoned her position with HRS and to have resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 19th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Truett 1605 East Kirby Apartment B Tampa, Florida 33610 Robert Cox Regional Director, ASCME 4404 Westmoreland Court New Port Richey, Florida 33552 Claudia Isom-Rickert District VI Legal Counsel 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 Richard L. Kopel Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, William Thomas, was employed at times pertinent hereto as a permanent employee at the Duval Regional Juvenile Detention Center (Detention Center) operated by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. His title was Detention Case Worker I. During the two week period beginning June 13, 1988, the time period relevant to this proceeding, he was working a so called "asymmetric workweek." This is a modified work schedule such that the Petitioner was working two work days on the weekends consisting of two sixteen hour shifts, one for each day, for a total of thirty-two hours of work scheduled to be performed by the Petitioner on June 18 and 19, 1988. Prior to the problem which arose in this situation, the Petitioner was also scheduled to work on Tuesday, June 21, but not on Monday, June 20. The Petitioner's immediate work supervisor was Wilson Reynolds, Jr., who testified on Petitioner's behalf. In addition to the Petitioner, Mr. Reynolds supervised twelve other employees who were working the asymmetric work week. This work week had been approved by the Department of Administration approximately two years previously, in 1986, at least as to this juvenile detention center. Pursuant to HRS rules, Mr. Wilson had authority to grant emergency leave when employees requested as, for instance, when an employee phoned in such a request when he was unable to come to work due to some emergency having arisen. Mr. Wilson also had authority to schedule employees to work shifts outside of their routine work schedule if the need arose. Mr. Wilson's employees, for instance, had been scheduled to work some extra duty in order to perform the duties of other employees who had to be absent from their normal work stations to attend training sessions. According to agency policy, in Mr. Reynolds' absence, the supervisor immediately on duty could grant tentative approval of emergency leave requests. In the event the supervisor on duty was unable to approve or deny the leave request, Mr. Reynolds had authority to approve leave requests "after the fact." It developed that some time during the week of June 13, the Petitioner became incarcerated. The Petitioner was unable to obtain access to a telephone for several days, and so, at his behest, his wife called the "Master Control" office at the detention center on June 16, 1988, to advise the Petitioner's employer that he would not be able to report to work, as scheduled, due to emergency reasons. On June 18, 1988, she again called that same "Master Control" office to advise that the Petitioner would be away from work until June 30, 1988, due to an emergency beyond his control. The Petitioner, after his last duty shift which he had performed, was not scheduled to work until June 18, 1988. He was then scheduled to work two eight hour shifts on June 18 and two eight hour shifts on June 19, which was a Sunday. On Monday, he was not scheduled to work. Then on June 21, Tuesday, he was scheduled to work an eight hour shift. Mrs. Thomas' reason for calling the employer's office was to put the employer on notice of his unavoidable absence from work. She was not aware of the rule requiring her to speak with the immediate supervisor. The immediate supervisor was not on duty on the day that she called in any event. She did speak with a staff member, a Mrs. Wavel Johnson, with whom she was acquainted, who advised her to have the Petitioner himself call in and request approval for the absences. Mrs. Thomas then revealed that her husband was incarcerated and would be incarcerated until June 30, 1988, which was why he was unable to call. This information was then conveyed to Mr. Reynolds, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor on June 19, 1988 at the beginning of the shift. On that day, during the morning, the Petitioner called and spoke with Mr. Reynolds, his supervisor. The Petitioner advised him of his incarceration and his anticipated release date of June 30, 1988, requesting that he use his accrued annual leave to cover this absence. Mr. Reynolds orally agreed to the request and approved it, pending the Petitioner's return to work and submittal of proof of the reason for the stated emergency basis for absence. Mr. Reynolds considered Mr. Thomas' incarceration as a sufficient justification for granting emergency leave. In the log book, Mr. Reynolds had a staff member, Mrs. Johnson, make a note that Mr. Thomas had called in requesting leave and that he "had no problem" granting emergency leave. He testified that he intended that notation to mean that he had approved the leave request. During Mr. Reynold's conversation with the Petitioner, he advised Petitioner that he would schedule him off duty for Tuesday, June 21, 1988, because he already had sufficient staff who would be present for duty to cover his assignment and would not need the Petitioner. Thus, for the eight hour shift he was originally scheduled to work on June 21, 1988, the Petitioner was not absent without approval either. The roster was changed so that he was not even scheduled to work that day. Andrea Cash is the superintendent of the Duval Regional Detention Center. On or about June 20, 1988, she read Mrs. Johnson's entry in the log book and concluded that Mr. Reynolds had not granted the necessary leave approval to cover the Petitioner's absence. Ms. Cash interpreted that entry to be that the leave approval was merely pending and that Mr. Reynolds had "no problem" with granting it. Ms. Cash, however, did not confer with Mr. Reynolds or Mrs. Johnson about what the entry meant nor seek any clarification as to the meaning of the entry or Mr. Reynolds' intentions with regard to the leave approval. Ms. Cash concluded that the leave had neither been approved nor denied, but did not communicate that position to the Petitioner. Instead, on June 23, 1988, she wrote the Petitioner advising him of his alleged job abandonment due to his absences of June 18th and 19th. She never discussed her plans to terminate the Petitioner, for alleged abandonment, with Mr. Reynolds. The approval granted during June or July 1986 to the Detention Center to implement an asymmetric work week was in accordance with Rule 22A-8.003(1), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides that eight hours of work shall constitute a work day for all full-time employees, unless a different work day is specifically approved by the Secretary of Administration. The asymmetric work day had been so approved and implemented at times pertinent hereto. The Petitioner normally worked two 16 hour work days from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m. on Saturday and on Sunday plus one other eight hour work day. Thus, three calendar work days constituted Petitioner's normal work week of 40 hours. The Detention Center has a "Facility Operating Procedure on Leave and Attendance" which provides that an employee must contact the supervisor on duty in advance of the beginning of his shift and advise that supervisor of the nature of any emergency concerning which he asks for leave. The duty supervisor then has authority to tentatively approve or deny the request. The employee must personally speak with the supervisor who is on duty. Thereafter, on the first day the employee reports back to work an "HRS Form 84" must be completed and the immediate supervisor must provide final approval if the annual leave is to be approved due to the stated emergency. The procedure does not provide that the employee's supervisor is to discuss the request with higher levels of supervision prior to granting approval for use of annual leave to cover such an absence. This procedure and policy does not require that higher level supervisors review the request and give final approval or denial. In other words, the employee in this situation is using his own annual leave to make up for his absence for emergency reasons and the facility's policy gives the immediate supervisor himself or herself the authority to approve it or deny it without recourse to higher supervisory authority. The Petitioner's wife contacted the person or office she believed was appropriate to report the Petitioner's impending absence and to explain that it was for emergency reasons, not knowing that she should speak to his immediate supervisor. In any event, before the Petitioner had missed three consecutive days of work he himself contacted his immediate supervisor, Mr. Reynolds, during the morning of June 19, 1988, and obtained Mr. Reynolds' verbal approval for absence due to emergency reasons, to be "covered" by Petitioner's annual leave. Mr. Reynolds did not tell the Petitioner that his request did not comply with the Facility Operating Procedure on Leave and Attendance. Mr. Reynolds, rather, accepted the Petitioner's justification for the emergency leave and approved it.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered determining that the circumstances presented in this case, found and discussed above, did not constitute abandonment of position, as contemplated by Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, and directing that the Petitioner be reinstated to his former position with backpay and reimbursement of related benefits. DONE and ORDERED this 20th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of March, 1989. APPENDIX Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted, but subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter and to some extent immaterial. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of material issues presented. Accepted, but not in itself dispositive of material issues presented. Rejected as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Rejected as contrary to the preponderant weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Linoria Anthony, Esquire 345 South Magnolia Drive & Suite F - 21 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Scott D. Leemis, Esquire P. O. Box 2417 Jacksonville, FL 32231-0083 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of HRS 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner, a former employee of the Respondent, was overpaid in the amount of $1,165.76, and should be required to repay that amount to the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was a career service employee of the Respondent and was initially employed on November 17, 1997. The Petitioner’s employment with the Respondent was terminated on June 30, 2003, due to layoffs created by the outsourcing of the Family Services Unit of the Respondent. The Petitioner’s annual rate of pay at the time of her termination was $19,797.44, paid bi-weekly. By letters dated August 26, 2003, October 14, 2003, and February 16, 2004, the Petitioner was informed that six separate salary overpayments had occurred. The Petitioner actually worked 56 hours during the pay period of June 20, 2003 through July 3, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The Petitioner was inadvertently paid for working the days of July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, although her employment had been terminated effective June 30, 2003. The overpayment was for 24 hours, amounting to $183.79, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. The Petitioner was no longer employed by the Respondent during the pay period of July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, but was inadvertently paid for 80 hours of work. The overpayment amounted to $601.70, based upon the Petitioner’s annual rate of pay. Following termination of employment, the Respondent’s Human Resources Department conducted an audit of the terminated employee’s leave. An audit was performed by the Respondent concerning the Petitioner’s leave. In the course and scope of the Respondent performing the audit of the Petitioner’s leave, the Respondent discovered that the Petitioner had been overpaid for four pay periods in 2003. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages in sick leave. Once an employee of the Respondent no longer has either sick leave or annual leave remaining, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time becomes “leave without pay.” The Petitioner was overpaid in four separate pay periods when she had insufficient sick or annual leave as follows: 1/31/03-2/13/03: 16.50 hours 4/11/03-4/24/03: 22.75 hours 4/25/03-5/08/03: 4.25 hours 5/23/03-6/05/03: 4.75 hours The sum of the hours of overpayment is 48.25, which translates to the amount of $380.27 in overpayment to the Petitioner for the referenced pay periods. The total amount of the Respondent’s overpayment to the Petitioner, based upon the salary payments for July 1, 2, and 3, 2003, July 4 through 17, 2003, and the four pay periods in which the Petitioner was overpaid when her sick and annual leave had run out is $183.79 plus $601.70 plus $380.27, which totals $1,165.76. The Petitioner was not at fault for the overpayment. She did not falsify her leave reports or timesheets, nor was she accused by the Respondent of having done so. The Petitioner believed that the pay she received for July 4, 2003 through July 17, 2003, was severance pay since she had been terminated when her position had been eliminated. The Respondent does not issue severance pay to terminated employees. The Petitioner believes that some of the leave she had taken during the four pay periods when her sick and annual leave had run out should have been considered administrative leave which, according to the Respondent, was offered to employees in the Family Services Unit who were facing termination as an aid to finding new jobs. Administrative leave was available to employees whose positions were being eliminated to allow them to use the Internet while at the office to search for jobs, and to leave the office for interviews or any testing required for re- employment. The Petitioner failed to document leave time, if any, during the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, that she took for purposes of job testing or interviews. The Petitioner failed to properly designate administrative leave on the automated leave system, Time Direct, for the pay periods at issue in this proceeding, even though, as a secretary specialist for the Respondent for seven years, her duties included keeping track of leave for the people in her work unit. The Respondent offered several of the Petitioner’s timesheets that reflect the Petitioner’s having taken administrative leave on more than 30 occasions from October 2002 through May 2003. These time entries for administrative leave include time during each of the four pay periods at issue in this proceeding, January 31, 2003 through February 13, 2003, April 11, 2003 through April 24, 2003, April 25, 2003 through May 8, 2003, and May 23, 2003 through June 5, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order requiring the Petitioner to repay the Respondent $1,165.76. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Rosanna Boyd Apartment 162 3400 Townsend Boulevard Jacksonville, Florida 32277 Robin Whipple-Hunter, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 2417 Jacksonville, Florida 32231-0083 Paul Flounlacker, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Jerry Regier, Secretary Department of Children and Family Services Building 1, Room 202 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
