The Issue Whether Respondents, Donna and Randy Morrison, managers of Hillside Mobile Home Park, discriminated against Petitioners, Linda Parah and Andrew Loveland, Sr., by failing to make reasonable accommodation for Petitioners' service animal necessary to afford equal opportunity to use and enjoy the rental premises in violation of the Fair Housing Act, Sections through 760.37, Florida Statutes (2004).1
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the witnesses' demeanor and manner while testifying, character of the testimony, internal consistency, and recall ability; documentary materials received in evidence; stipulations by the parties; and evidentiary rulings during the proceedings, the following relevant and material facts are found: On June 24, 2004, Andrew Loveland, Sr., made application for tenancy at Hillside Mobile Home Park, Inc. (Hillside), 39515 Bamboo Lane, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542, when he completed and signed Respondents' "Application for Tenancy" form. The prospective tenants listed were Andrew Loveland, Sr., and Linda Parah. Ms. Parah did not sign the application. As of June 24, 2005, Petitioners listed their then-current address as 5824 23rd Street, Lot 1, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. The application for tenancy form listed Ms. Parah as one of the persons to reside in the rental dwelling and, as such, was a "person associated with the intended renter," Mr. Loveland. The tenancy application signed by Mr. Loveland contained the following acknowledgement: [U]nder penalty of perjury, I declare that I have read the foregoing and the facts alleged are true to the best of my knowledge and belief. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a copy of the Prospectus and Rules and Regulations of Hillside Mobile Home Park, Inc. Mr. Loveland, though present at the proceeding, chose not to challenge his written acknowledgment of receiving a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside, and the undersigned accordingly finds that Mr. Loveland received a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside on June 24, 2004, and was fully informed of his duties and obligations as a tenant of Hillside therein contained. On June 24, 2004, neither Mr. Loveland nor Ms. Parah informed or advised management of any medical disability(s) suffered, requiring companionship (living in the trailer) of a dog (comfort or service). Petitioners did not, at that time, request Respondents to make any reasonable accommodations for any mental and/or physical disability(s) that required the presence of their service dog in the rented premises. No copy of management's park prospectus or rules was offered in evidence, and, accordingly, a finding of receipt thereof is made, but no findings herein are based on the specific content therein. On or after June 24, 2004, Petitioners and their dog occupied the leased premises 6528 Pecan Drive, Hillside Mobile Home Park, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. The credible evidence of record convincingly demonstrated management had knowledge that Petitioners and several other park tenants owned dogs. Tenants, often times together, walked their dogs about the trailer park in sight of management and other residents. Based upon the above, it is concluded that management was or should have been aware that other tenants, including Petitioners, had dogs in the trailer park. On October 21, 2004, management, by and through its attorney, by certified mail, made demand upon Petitioners to cure noncompliance within seven days (October 28, 2004) or vacate premises for noncompliance with the park prospectus or rules, to wit: You have been driving your golf cart behind and between mobiles. Residents must govern themselves in a manner that does not unreasonably disturb or annoy other residents. We have had several complaints regarding this issue. Please drive and walk on the streets only. (Emphasis added) Ms. Parah acknowledged the golf car incident, explaining that Mr. Loveland occasionally drove his golf cart through the trailer park and not always on the walkways during the evening hours. She insisted, however, that after receipt of the October 21, 2004, notice to cease from management, Mr. Loveland discontinued driving his golf cart behind and between mobile homes during the evenings and nights and, during the day, restricted his cart driving to only the park roadways. By letter dated November 5, 2004, to Mr. Loveland, Respondents issued a "Notice of Termination of Tenancy," for failure to correct the (October 21, 2004, notice of violation-- driving golf cart) within seven days. Accordingly, his tenancy was to be terminated 35 days from the postmarked date of delivery of the notice. On November 11, 2004, S. D. Hostetler, a tenant whom management did not call to testify, allegedly filed the following hand-written complaint letter to management: On 11-3-04 at around 3 am I was awaken by a loud sound. I got up to see what it was and it was an older red golf cart going through the camping section, it must not have a muffler on it, that morning I did complain to the management about some one going around the Park that early in the morning with such a noisey [sic] scooter. I later found out it was Andrew Loveland. The above-written document was not notarized; the author was not made available and subject to cross-examination. This document therefore is unsupported hearsay and insufficient to support and establish the factual content therein to wit: "[O]n 11-3-04 around 3 a.m., Mr. Loveland was driving his golf cart through the camping section and, thus, failed to correct the October 21, 2004, notice of violation--driving golf cart, within 7 days." This complaint did, however, establish the fact that management received a complaint about Mr. Loveland from another tenant after having given him notice to cease and desist. On November 18, 2004, two weeks after the golf cart notice of noncompliance termination, Respondents, by certified mail delivered on November 22, 2004, made demand upon Petitioners to cure noncompliance within seven days or vacate premises for a second noncompliance with the park prospectus or rules, to wit: "(A) You have a dog and dogs are not allowed in the park." The November 22, 2004, copy of the notice to cure noncompliance was received by Mr. Loveland as evidenced by a copy of a U.S. Certified Mail delivery receipt signed by Mr. Loveland. In the December 13, 2004, letter from Attorney Schlichte addressed to Andrew Loveland (only), Re: Notice of Termination of Tenancy (reference November 18, 2004, 1st Notice of Rule Violation; i.e. you have a dog and dogs not allowed), Petitioners were given 30 days to vacate the premises. It is significant and noted that as of December 13, 2004, Ms. Parah had not made a demand or request upon management for "reasonable accommodations for her service animal necessary to afford the Petitioner an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the rental premises," as alleged in the administrative complaint. Ultimate Factual Determinations On February 28, 2005, 76 days after receipt of management's December 13, 2004, first Notice of Rule Violation (no dog allowed) and filing of Eviction Compliant in Pasco County Court,2 Petitioners made their first written request to management for reasonable accommodation under the American Disabilities Act as follows: Dear Sir: I am requesting reasonable accommodation under the American with Disability Act to have rules and regulations of the Park (Hillside) sent to me. On my pet. I have documentation from my physician Joseph Nystrom, M.D. on my service, my comfort dog. And this can be furnished upon request! Rules and Regulations were not clear to fact that Mr. Andrew Loveland, Sr. never had them unless you can show pictures on the grass 10/21/2004. I feel that your violating Mr. Loveland and my civil right under fair housing rules. [sic] Please acknowledge our reasonable accommodation as stated above by Tuesday of next week 3/8/2005. Accordingly, Linda Alan Parah Andrew Alton Loveland, Sr. cc: C.J. Miles Deputy Dir. Fair Housing Continu [sic], Inc., 1-888-264-5619. Having provided a copy of the Prospectus and the Rules and Regulations of Hillside on June 24, 2004, to Mr. Loveland, management's refusal to provide a second copy was a reasonable nondiscriminatory business decision. The offer to provide "documentation from my physician Joseph Nystrom, M.D. on my service, my comfort dog," imposed no obligation upon management to accept such offer. Within the totality of circumstances then present, ignoring Petitioners' offer to provide medical and/or willingness statements regarding their medical, physical, and mental disabilities, requiring the presence of a service/comfort dog by Respondents, is not found to have been discriminatory. On or about May 19, 2005, Pasco County Court entered Final Judgment of Eviction against Andrew Loveland and Unknown Tenant (i.e. Linda Parah). The Pasco County Sheriff's Office, pursuant to Final Judgment of Eviction for Removal of Tenant entered by the Pasco County Court, evicted Petitioners from Respondents' rented premises of Hillside, 39515 Bamboo Lane, Zephyrhills, Florida 33542. Petitioners submitted an abundance of credible evidence relating to their physical and mental health conditions. As to Mr. Loveland, Dr. Nystrom's written and signed notation concluded that Mr. Loveland's condition required: "Motorized wheelchair multi-level spinal stenosis- medically necessary and due to his illness, the presence of his little Dog is medically necessary." The document contained hearsay evidence to which counsel for Respondents did not raise an objection and is, thus, accepted by the undersigned. This document was dated after the date Mr. Loveland received his second notice regarding failure to correct and the filing of the complaint for eviction. As to Ms. Parah, Tracey E. Smithey, M.D., East Pasco Medical Group, reported her medical conclusion stating in part that: "Linda Parah, was seen in my office on 11-20-03, 01-19-04 and today (April 8, 2004). She had been diagnosed with Bipolar Disorder, Depressed type. She is prescribed Paxi, Xanax, and Ambien. She has been referred for psychotherapy also." Dr. Smithey did not include in her written document that Ms. Parah had to have a dog for her condition. Dr. Smithey, as had Dr. Nystrom, signed the document. The document contained hearsay evidence to which counsel for Respondents did not raise an objection and is, thus, accepted by the undersigned. Had Petitioners made their request for reasonable accommodations and presented their medical reports, evidencing their medical conditions and limitations, to include the need of Mr. Loveland for his comfort dog, to Respondents on or before June 24, 2004, or even as late as on or about November 18, 2004, Petitioners would have, arguably, established the requisite basis for finding of a request for reasonable accommodation. There is, however, insufficient evidence of record to support a finding that Petitioners, Mr. Loveland nor Ms. Parah, made a reasonable accommodation request to Respondents for the housing of the comfort dog for Mr. Loveland. The sequence of dated events and documented evidence is an inference that after receiving the notice to vacate for the two alleged rule violation(s), Petitioners did not make a request for reasonable accommodation to management for Mr. Loveland's dog, but rather offered to provide medical support of Mr. Loveland's need for a comfort dog should Respondents request such proof. Respondents were under no duty or obligation to do so and did not make such a request.3 Petitioners failed to establish that either Mr. Loveland or Ms. Parah: (1) made a request for reasonable accommodation based upon the demonstrated disability of Mr. Loveland; (2) the animal in question was a medically required service (comfort dog) animal for Mr. Loveland; (3) the requested accommodation was necessary to permit full enjoyment by Mr. Loveland of the rental premises; and (4) thereafter, management denied their reasonable accommodation request for Mr. Loveland. In short, and based upon the findings of fact herein, Respondent did not unlawfully discriminate against Petitioners; rather, management terminated Petitioners' tenancy for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons, to wit: off-road driving of a golf cart and unapproved dog within the rental unit in violation of park rules and regulations after written notice to correct the noted violations. Management's Counsel's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs There is not a scintilla of evidence to substantiate a finding that Petitioner, Mr. Loveland, who did not testify, knew or should have known that his claim and defense presented during this proceeding was not supported by material facts. Likewise, Respondent made no query of Ms. Parah (referred to in the eviction complaint as "unnamed tenant") that elicited statements or acknowledgements from which reasonable inference could be drawn to demonstrate that within the situational circumstances Ms. Parah knew or should have known the claim herein made was not supported by material facts.4
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order: Dismissing Petitioners', Linda Parah and Andrew Loveland's, Petition for Relief; and Denying Respondents' counsel's motion for an award of attorney's fees and costs. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of March, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of March, 2006.
The Issue The issue in this supplemental proceeding is whether Respondents Soo Y. and Myung S. Chung, separately or together, retaliated against Petitioners as a result of Petitioners' exercise, or attempted exercise, of a protected housing right.
Findings Of Fact From August 2012 through January 2015, Petitioners Verdell Carter ("V. Carter") and her daughter Courtney Carter ("C. Carter"), who are African-Americans, rented and occupied a residential unit in Cité Condominiums ("Cité") in Miami, Florida, which served as their principal residence. At all relevant times, the owners of this unit were Soo Y. Chung and Myung S. Chung (collectively, the "Lessor"). Respondent Cité Condominium Association, Inc. (the "Association"), oversees the operation of the property. The Association's Board of Directors (the "Board") is its governing body. At all relevant times, a third-party property management company, FirstService Residential Florida, Inc. ("Management"), performed on-site management services at Cité. V. Carter and the Lessor entered into a lease agreement concerning Unit No. 3206 at Cité in July 2012. Pursuant to the applicable declaration of condominium, this lease (like all such leases of units at Cité) was subject to Board approval as a condition precedent of V. Carter's taking possession of the leased premises. To obtain Board approval, V. Carter and the Lessor were required (as were all persons entering into such leases) to execute an Addendum to Lease, which made the Association a third-party beneficiary of the lease and, among other things, bound the lessee to all of the rules and conditions applicable to unit owners. There is some dispute concerning the term of the subject lease. It commenced on or around August 15, 2012——that much is certain. The Carters assert that the lease was for three years, until August 15, 2015. The Association contends that the lease had a one-year term with options to renew annually for up to two additional years. The Association maintains——and acted on the belief——that it had the right to veto any attempt to renew the lease. This particular dispute is immaterial, however, for whether or not the Association could veto a renewal attempt, it clearly had the right to dispossess the Carters if they disobeyed the Association's rules. The Addendum to Lease provides, in pertinent part, as follows: Lessee agrees to abide by this Addendum, the [provisions of the Association's Declaration, By-Laws, Articles of Incorporation, Rules and Regulations, as same may be amended from time to time,] and all applicable laws, ordinances and regulations. If Lessee fails to comply with [any of these], Lessor shall promptly commence action to evict Lessee. If Lessor fails to promptly commence action to evict Lessee, Lessor hereby authorizes the Association . . . to commence eviction proceedings [on Lessor's behalf.] Unfortunately for everyone concerned, the Carters repeatedly violated the rules. Early in the lease term, V. Carter brought her dog into the unit without first registering the pet with the Association as required. After Management became aware in November 2012 that V. Carter had an unregistered pet on the premises, it provided her the form for curing the violation, but she failed timely to return the paperwork. As a result, on November 26, 2012, the Association assessed a charge of $56 against the Lessor's account.3/ Meanwhile, C. Carter moved into Unit No. 3206 without informing the Association, which gave rise to a series of violations. Although C. Carter initially occupied the premises as a guest, before long she decided to remain as a resident. In time, Management noticed that C. Carter's stay had exceeded 30 days, making her an "unregistered visitor." Additionally, C. Carter parked her car——which was an "unregistered vehicle"—— in spaces reserved for Cité's owners and tenants (both residential and commercial). This resulted in several $56 charges being posted to the Lessor's account in November 2012 for unauthorized parking and for parking an unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area. In January 2013, the Lessor was again assessed a $56 charge because C. Carter had parked her unregistered vehicle in an unauthorized area, along with a separate $56 charge for the presence an unregistered visitor (namely C. Carter). By letter dated January 23, 2013, the Association notified the Lessor that it intended to take steps to terminate the lease between the Lessor and V. Carter due to the Carters' failure to comply with the Association's rules. Before that could happen, however, V. Carter registered her dog, C. Carter became a registered tenant, and C. Carter rented an additional parking space from the Association for her car. The Carters assured the Lessor and the Association that, in the future, they would comply with all of the Association's rules. In due course, the Board agreed to acquiesce to the continuation of the lease, and——with the exception of a few relatively minor issues too trivial to recount——relations between the Carters, Management, the Association, and the Lessor calmed down to a reasonably peaceful state of affairs. This détente ended on Sunday, June 22, 2014. On or around that date, the commercial tenant directly below Unit No. 3206 experienced damage from water intrusion at the ceiling. Minor dampness was observed on the carpet outside the front of Unit No. 3206. Management contacted V. Carter and notified her that maintenance personnel needed to enter her unit immediately to locate the source of the leak, which there were grounds to believe was inside. Management's authority to enter the unit was clear and is not disputed. The Addendum to Lease provides: The Association and/or its authorized agent(s) shall have the irrevocable right to have access to the Unit as may be necessary for inspection, maintenance, repair or replacement of any Common Elements accessible therefrom, or for making emergency repairs necessary to prevent damages to the Common Elements or other units. Claiming that she was in the process of showering and in a state of partial undress, V. Carter refused to admit the maintenance men that Sunday morning. They left, so that V. Carter could finish getting ready. When the repair crew returned a short while later, however, V. Carter turned them away again, explaining that she was leaving for church. First thing the next day, June 23, Management notified the Lessor that V. Carter had refused to let maintenance personnel into the unit so that they could identify and repair the source of a suspected leak. The Lessor authorized Management to access the unit that morning. V. Carter, however, again refused to allow the maintenance men to enter the unit. This obstinacy violated the Association's rules and resulted in the imposition of charges totaling $126, for which the Association billed the Lessor. Eventually, Management gained access to the unit and fixed the problem in the bathroom which had caused the leak. Because V. Carter had refused access to the unit in violation of the Association's rules, the Association notified the Lessor and the Carters that it would not approve an extension of the lease beyond August 15, 2014. On June 25, 2014, V. Carter requested a meeting with the Board to discuss this decision. Her request was denied. By letter dated July 11, 2014, the Lessor notified the Carters that the lease would terminate on August 15, 2014. The Lessor also demanded payment of past due rent for April ($500) and July ($1,500) plus reimbursement of a returned-check charge of $30 that the Lessors had incurred when the Carters' June rent check bounced. A few weeks later, a heavy rainstorm, which took place late at night on Sunday, August 3, 2014, and during the early morning hours of August 4, caused Unit No. 3206 to flood. Other units flooded as well, causing an emergency situation for Management, which by all accounts responded promptly. The Carters claim to have been out of town at the time of this incident. Regardless, V. Carter acknowledges that Management contacted her by phone and requested permission——which she gave——to enter her unit to take remedial measures. Maintenance personnel entered the unit and extracted the water. In doing so, they discovered that the patio drain had been plugged with a flower pot, which likely had allowed water to pool on the patio and ultimately flood into the unit through the patio door. The Carters allege that the maintenance men discriminated against them on the basis or race or color by entering other units before taking care of Unit No. 3206. There is no persuasive evidence, however, of any sort of delay (discriminatory or otherwise) on the part of the maintenance crew, which as mentioned responded quickly and reasonably to an overnight situation affecting multiple units in addition to the Carters'. The Carters did not vacate Unit No. 3206 on or before August 15, 2014. As it happened, however, there was another rainstorm on that day which caused further flooding in the unit. C. Carter was present at the time, and she contacted Management, which addressed the immediate problem. After that, a months-long struggle ensued, during which Management and the Lessor attempted to arrange for repairs to be made to fix the damages that had resulted from the August floods and the earlier, June leak, and the Carters, while demanding that the repairs be made, refused access to repairmen and generally failed reasonably to cooperate. Around this time, as well, the Carters——who in the Lessor's eyes had become holdover tenants as of August 15——stopped paying rent to the Lessor. On August 19, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters a statutory three-day notice to pay rent or vacate the premises on or before August 22, 2014. The Carters did not leave. On September 12, 2014, the Lessor gave the Carters another statutory three-day notice. The Carters, however, did not quit the premises. On or around September 19, 2014, the Lessor commenced an action for eviction in the Miami-Dade County Court. Several months later, the county court entered a judgment of eviction against the Carters, and, on January 20, 2015, a writ of possession was issued. The Carters moved out of Unit No. 3206 on January 23, 2015, but not without incident. Association rules prohibit the use of the stairways when moving furniture and other household goods. Residents who are moving in or out of Cité must reserve (and pay a fee for the use of) the freight elevator and loading dock. The Carters had not arranged to use the freight elevator, preferring instead to use the stairs. Management saw this violation in progress and sought to stop the Carters from moving their belongings down the stairs. The Carters would not be deterred. Management called the police, an officer arrived, and the unauthorized transport of goods through the stairwell was arrested. Meantime, V. Carter's dog urinated on the hallway carpet and on the wall. As a result of this memorable departure, the Association imposed charges against the Lessor's account totaling $950. V. Carter claims to suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder, which she characterizes as a "non-visible" disability. C. Carter claims to suffer from attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, which she characterizes as a "non- visible" disability. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of the Association's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, the Carters, or either of them, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus directed toward V. Carter or C. Carter. There is no persuasive evidence that the Association refused, upon request, to make a reasonable accommodation for either V. Carter or C. Carter. There is likewise no persuasive evidence that any of the Lessor's actions, including bringing suit to evict the Carters, were motivated by discriminatory animus or were taken to retaliate against the Carters for their exercise of a protected housing right. In sum, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination or retaliation could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that the Association did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter a final order finding the Association not liable for housing discrimination and awarding the Carters no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of April, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of April, 2015.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of discrimination based on her sex or handicap in leasing her apartment from Respondent in violation of Sections 804d and 804d or f of Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by the Fair Housing Act of 1988 and the Florida Fair Housing Act, Chapter 760.23(2) (4), Florida Statutes (2006).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner resided at Respondent’s Thacker I property for at least a year prior to her move to Respondent’s Pinewoods Place Apartments located at 5929 Pinewoods Place, Milton, Florida 32570. Petitioner moved to Pinewoods, Apartment 25, around March or April of 2003. Neither Petitioner nor Respondent had any material problems with each other during her residency at Thacker I. Her move to Pinewoods resulted from her request to move to a larger apartment. Pinewoods is a large complex managed by Respondent. Some of the units are subsidized by HUD. A list of tenants in the Pinewood complex reflect 58 tenants. Of the 58 tenants, 34 are female. Eleven of the tenants have a disability. In fact, Respondent contracts with providers who serve the disabled to provide apartments to their clients and provides such apartments regularly. Respondent accommodated Petitioner’s request to move to Pinewoods by not requiring a full year’s lease since she had already completed a year at Thacker I and by allowing Petitioner to transfer her deposit from the Thacker I apartment to the Pinewoods apartment. Because of these accommodations, Petitioner was permitted to lease her Pinewoods apartment on a month-to-month lease with an additional deposit of $95. Respondent also accommodated Petitioner in her move by leaving her rent amount the same as it was at Thacker I. Thus, Petitioner paid $400 a month rent instead of the normal $450 a month rent paid by other tenants in comparable apartments. Petitioner did not visit Unit 25 prior to her move to Pinewoods because it was occupied. No other units were available for her to inspect prior to her move. Additionally, HUD inspected the Unit 25 prior to Petitioner’s move and found no violations and that the apartment met HUD standards for being mechanically sound and safe. There was no evidence of any representations made by Respondent to Petitioner regarding Unit 25, and Petitioner did not introduce any evidence of such misrepresentations. Clearly, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions of misrepresentations about her apartment or her assertion that she looked at her Unit or a model, her apartment was not misrepresented to her prior to her move to Pinewoods, and no discrimination on the basis of sex or handicap occurred. Sometime after her move, Petitioner began to complain about her apartment. The evidence was vague regarding most of her complaints, and Petitioner declined to testify about many of her allegations. For instance, there was a vague complaint about leaves being blown into her yard from the sidewalk when the maintenance crew would clear the sidewalk of leaves. However, this method of clearing the sidewalk occurred throughout the complex and was not directed toward Petitioner. Likewise, there was a vague complaint about the trash lady disturbing Petitioner’s morning coffee by performing her assigned duty of picking up trash around the apartment complex. Again, there was no evidence of any activity being directed at Petitioner based on her sex or handicap. At some point, Petitioner complained to Respondent about her dryer vent not working properly. After several complaints and in an effort to resolve Petitioner’s complaint, Respondent’s maintenance person put an interior box-style lint trap, in her Unit. Respondent stated he felt this was the best solution because a member of the maintenance staff used the same type lint trap at his home. Petitioner, for a variety of reasons, was not satisfied with Respondent’s solution and vented the dryer to the outside herself. There is some dispute over whether Petitioner’s repair was safe or done correctly. There is no evidence that indicates Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of sex or handicap. Petitioner also complained about the sliding glass doors being fogged and wanted them replaced. Respondent explained that the doors were safe and that 55 other residents have fogged glass doors. Respondent refused to replace the glass doors. The next day Petitioner complained to HUD about the fogged glass door being “non-operable.” Because of the complaint, Robert Youngblood from the HUD office in Milton met Respondent’s maintenance staff at Petitioner’s apartment and discovered that the slider had been knocked off its track. Mr. Youngblood reported to Respondent that it was very clear the door had been sabotaged because he had just inspected that same door just days before because of a prior complaint. Respondent fixed Petitioner’s door again. Additionally, the sliding glass door that Petitioner complained about was inspected by both Santa Rosa Glass and Milton Glass. Petitioner also kept an untagged vehicle in the parking lot and threatened to sue if it were towed. All the Pinewoods’ leases contain a provision that untagged vehicles are not permitted on the premises and will be towed. In order to avoid the vehicle being towed, Petitioner switched the tag from her tagged vehicle to her untagged vehicle and back again as notice was given to her. Petitioner again felt this action was discrimination. Again there was no evidence to support Petitioner’s claim. On January 5, 2006, a little more than two years after she moved to Pinewoods, Petitioner complained, when she came to the office to pay her rent, that her garbage disposal did not work. The staff person who took Petitioner’s rent sent a maintenance person that day to look at Petitioner’s garbage disposal. The maintenance person looked at the alleged disposal location and discovered that Petitioner did not have a garbage disposal. There was no plumbing for one. The evidence showed that many units did not have a garbage disposal and that disposals were removed from each unit as they broke down. Petitioner insisted that she should have a garbage disposal since there was a switch on the wall for one. Because of her actions concerning the garbage disposal, Petitioner was given a Notice of Non-Renewal, dated January 6, 2006. Petitioner refused to pay any rent and refused to vacate the apartment based on her belief that Respondent had discriminated against her based on her sex and handicap. She maintained this belief even though she testified that “everybody had problems getting things fixed.” Indeed, her only witness corroborated that men and women, handicapped and non-handicapped have trouble getting things fixed. No reason was given for the non-renewal. Respondent testified that he was tired of Petitioner’s actions and deceitfulness. Petitioner chose to withhold her rent when it was due in February 2006, so that Respondent would bring eviction proceedings against her. Respondent eventually brought eviction proceedings against Petitioner. At the eviction hearing, Petitioner told the judge she wanted to be evicted so it would become public record. Respondent was awarded possession of the premises. After Respondent was given possession, the next morning he received a copy of a letter to the judge requesting that he rescind his decision and requesting another judge. Petitioner has since moved to another apartment. As with the other incidents described above, the evidence did not demonstrate that Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of her sex or handicap. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent unlawfully discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his national origin or race in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Manuel Rodriguez ("Rodriguez") is a middle- aged white man of (in his words) "Spanish and Italian" descent who at all times relevant lived in Vero Beach, Florida. Respondent Indian River County Habitat for Humanity, Inc. ("Habitat"), is a nonprofit charitable corporation that makes interest-free loans to qualified applicants for the purchase of affordable housing, which the buyers, in return, must help build or renovate. In or around December 2018, Rodriguez submitted a "pre- screening" application for a Habitat home. By letter dated January 3, 2019, Habitat informed Rodriguez that, according to the information he had provided, he fell "within the income guidelines." This meant that Rodriguez could progress to the next step (group orientation) of the multi-step application process. As it happened, however, he did not make it all the way. In a letter dated February 19, 2019, Habitat told Rodriguez that his application could not be approved because his monthly income was insufficient to cover the estimated debt service. Rodriguez presented no evidence at hearing suggesting that Habitat had denied his application for any reason other than the one given to him, namely that "you [Rodriguez] do not earn enough to support a mortgage." Rodriguez was not satisfied with this rationale and arranged to meet with a Habitat employee named David Willis to discuss the matter. Rodriguez believes that Mr. Willis was rude and disrespectful to him. Further, Rodriguez testified that, during their conversation, Mr. Willis used the phrase, "you people." Clearly, this is a potentially offensive remark, and Rodriguez was, in fact, offended by it. When pressed, however, Rodriguez admitted that he did not consider the comment to have been a slur against Spanish or Italian people; rather, he took it as a more focused insult——against, for example, disputatious people. In any event, there is no evidence that Mr. Willis intended to disparage an ethnic or racial group. Determinations of Ultimate Fact There is no persuasive evidence that any of Habitat's decisions concerning, or actions affecting, Rodriguez, directly or indirectly, were motivated in any way by discriminatory animus. Thus, there is no competent, persuasive evidence in the record, direct or circumstantial, upon which a finding of any sort of unlawful housing discrimination could be made. Ultimately, therefore, it is determined that Habitat did not commit any prohibited act.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order finding Habitat not liable for housing discrimination and awarding Rodriguez no relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of August, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of August, 2019.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Ameron Homes, Inc., discriminated against Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act; and, if so, the relief to which Petitioner is entitled.
Findings Of Fact On March 12, 2015, Petitioner entered into a contract with Ameron to build a new home in Micco, Florida. Petitioner selected Ameron because of the reasonable price it offered to construct her house, as well as the fact that Ameron could immediately begin work. The total contract price for Petitioner’s new house was $198,052. This figure included a base price of $170,000, plus “extras” that Petitioner requested in the amount of $27,552. Ameron completed construction of Petitioner’s house in September 2015. Petitioner moved into her home on September 25, 2015. She paid her final bill to Ameron on September 29, 2015. Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to construct her home using the required standard of care. She also maintains that Ameron overcharged her for certain building materials. Petitioner specifically alleges that the house Ameron built for her did not include several of the details, features, or “extras” that she specifically requested. Petitioner further asserts that she paid approximately $8,500 for items that should have been covered in her “extra” charges. Petitioner claims that she found a number of deficiencies when she moved in. Petitioner’s issues include: Storm shutters: Ameron provided storm shutters for Petitioner’s exterior windows as part of its standard contract. Petitioner represented that the shutters delivered to her home were made of steel. Petitioner explained that steel shutters are much too heavy for her to hang over her windows. Petitioner insisted that she should have been given aluminum shutters instead of steel shutters. Petitioner complained that Mr. Brognano never discussed the different types of shutters that Ameron could have offered with her contract. Flooring: Petitioner disliked the laminate flooring Ameron installed in her home as part of its standard contract. Therefore, she purchased wood-like, tile flooring on her own. Petitioner was upset that she had to pay an additional cost (above the “extras”) for the tile she selected (approximately $2,000). Kitchen cabinets: Petitioner was upset at the poor quality of her cabinets. Petitioner asserts that under her contract, she was entitled to select the cabinets for her kitchen. Instead, Petitioner declared that Ameron installed cabinets with a very cheap exterior coating. Petitioner testified that the finish on her cabinets is beginning to peel. Front door: Petitioner complains that her front door does not fit tightly into the doorframe. In addition, the front door needs to be adjusted to eliminate a gap at the bottom of the doorway. Sod and soil: Petitioner is upset that she had to pay extra for part of the sod laid around her home (approximately $1,000). Furthermore, after rain eroded soil away from her home, Petitioner believes that Ameron should have corrected the situation. General construction complaints: Petitioner complained about the general quality of her home, as well as its condition upon completion. Petitioner asserted that she found dust, nails, and gobs of plaster scattered throughout her house. Petitioner claims that she has plumbing and sewer issues. In addition, a ceiling register is broken and some grout and cement is cracked and worn away. Finally, Petitioner complains that Ameron failed to make several modifications she requested as she moved into her home. Petitioner alleges that Ameron inadequately or failed to include handicap accessible features in her bathroom. These features most notably included grab bars in her shower. Petitioner also asserted that Ameron failed to account for her disability when it installed the soap dish and fixtures in her shower. They are positioned too high for her to safely reach or adjust. (As explained below, at Petitioner’s request, Ameron hired and paid a third party to install grab bars in Petitioner’s shower. At the final hearing, Petitioner testified that, at this time, the grab bar is broken.) Petitioner believes that Ameron took advantage of her because she is a woman, elderly, alone, and handicapped. Petitioner asserts that when she expressed her frustration at the manner in which her house was built, Ameron never listened to her. Petitioner also believes that Ameron overcharged her for the inferior “extras” it added to her home. Petitioner asserts that Ameron would not have ignored her complaints if she was a man. Petitioner was 87 years old at the time of the final hearing. Respondent does not dispute that Petitioner suffers from a physical disability.4/ Petitioner testified that she sent her initial complaint to the Commission alleging a discriminatory housing practice by Ameron on October 31, 2016.5/ Ameron is owned by William and Todd Brognano. At the final hearing, William Brognano testified on Ameron’s behalf. Mr. Brognano relayed that Ameron has been building homes since 1981. Mr. Brognano asserted that Ameron has a fine reputation for the quality of the homes it constructs. Mr. Brognano expressed that Ameron builds between 100 and 170 homes a year. Ameron has built many homes for women and handicapped persons. Mr. Brognano denied building Petitioner’s home in a faulty manner. He further denied that Ameron discriminated against Petitioner in any way. Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner contracted with Ameron to construct a single-family home for the base price of $170,000. In addition, Petitioner requested “extras” to her home in the amount of $27,552. These “extras” included certain enhancements and modifications, such as a two-foot addition to her bedroom, different laminate and tile for certain floors, walls, and countertops, additional lighting, a tile roof, and the relocation of several palm trees in her yard. Mr. Brognano asserted that all the standard features of Petitioner’s home, as well as each “extra” that Petitioner requested, were clearly itemized in her contract. In response to Petitioner’s specific complaints, Mr. Brognano offered the following: Windows: Mr. Brognano commented that all standard homes are built with windows and shutters that meet Florida Building Code requirements. Ameron could have installed impact windows on Petitioner’s house for an additional charge. However, Petitioner specifically declined impact windows because of the cost. Storm shutters: Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner’s contract did not specify the type of storm shutters to include with her home. In addition, Petitioner specifically declined upgraded shutters because of the cost. Therefore, Mr. Brognano believed that Ameron initially provided steel shutters, which are standard. (Steel shutters are heavier, but stronger, than aluminum shutters.) However, Mr. Brognano testified that after Petitioner notified Ameron of her desire for aluminum shutters, Ameron agreed to arrange for a third-party shutter company to deliver aluminum shutters to Petitioner’s home at no extra charge. (The bill from the company that supplied the shutters referenced “aluminum” shutters. However, Petitioner maintains that the storm shutters she received were steel.) Flooring: Ameron installed floor coverings, including carpeted bedrooms, vinyl kitchen flooring, and tile, as standard features in Petitioner’s home. Petitioner, however, wanted to use laminated wood flooring in parts of her home. Therefore, in June 2015, on her own, Petitioner bought wood tile flooring from a third-party tile company. The additional tile cost Petitioner $2,331.29. Ameron agreed to pay a subcontractor to install the tile Petitioner purchased. Kitchen cabinets: Mr. Brognano refuted Petitioner’s assertion that her cabinets were made of cheap material. Mr. Brognano relayed that, not only did Petitioner select the cabinets that Ameron installed, but they were of nice quality. Sod and soil: Per the specific terms of Petitioner’s contract, Ameron provided 8,000 square feet of Bahia sod for Petitioner’s property. However, Petitioner’s lawn required a total of 10,625 square feet of sod. Mr. Brognano asserted that Petitioner was obligated to pay the additional cost. Mr. Brognano further testified that Ameron fixed the parts of Petitioner’s lawn affected by erosion at no additional cost. General construction complaints: Mr. Brognano commented that Petitioner’s complaints reveal that she does not understand how home construction works. The presence of sawdust, nails, and construction materials is common in most homes during, or immediately after, construction. Just before Petitioner moved in, Ameron paid to have her house professionally cleaned (as is its common practice). Mr. Brognano further testified that everything in Petitioner’s home meets building code standards. Mr. Brognano also claimed that Ameron addressed a number of Petitioner’s complaints. Finally, upon completion, Petitioner’s home was inspected, and no construction issues were found. Regarding Petitioner’s shower, Mr. Brognano explained that Petitioner first notified Ameron about the issues in her shower just after Ameron had completed her home, but before she took occupancy on September 25, 2015. Mr. Brognano relayed that Petitioner’s contract did not contain any provisions regarding grab bars. Instead, Petitioner personally bought grab bars and requested Ameron install them. (Petitioner produced a purchase receipt from Lowe’s showing that two grab bars were purchased on September 10, 2015.) Mr. Brognano testified that Ameron agreed to pay for the installation of both the grab bars and the soap dish at no extra charge to Petitioner. (At the final hearing, Petitioner asserted that she personally paid the individual Ameron hired to install the grab bars.) Ameron hired Chuck Velek, who has worked as a carpenter for over 30 years, to install the grab bars. At the final hearing, Mr. Velek testified that when he reported to Petitioner’s home, she provided him with a grab bar and instructed him to place it in her shower. Mr. Velek declared that he installed one grab bar in Petitioner’s shower. Mr. Velek stated that Petitioner’s friend directed him where to position the grab bar in the shower. Mr. Brognano testified that, when she moved into her home on September 25, 2015, Petitioner did not alert Ameron to any issues with her shower. On the contrary, Petitioner told Mr. Brognano that she loved her house. Based on the evidence and testimony presented at the final hearing, Petitioner did not demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Ameron discriminated against her based on her age, sex, (aloneness) or handicap in violation of the FHA.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Carolyn Henke, for lack of jurisdiction based on Petitioner’s failure to timely file her petition under the Florida Fair Housing Act. Alternatively, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a file order concluding that Respondent, Ameron, did not commit a discriminatory housing practice against Petitioner and dismiss her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. BRUCE CULPEPPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of December, 2018.
