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BANS N. PERSAUD vs BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY, 98-002717 (1998)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:St. Petersburg, Florida Jun. 15, 1998 Number: 98-002717 Latest Update: Dec. 24, 1998

The Issue Whether Petitioner, Bans N. Persaud, should be awarded a passing grade on the "Financial Accounting" part of the Certified Public Accounting examination given on May 7-8, 1997.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bans N. Persaud, took the Certified Public Accountant Exam in May of 1997. The Department of Business and Professional Regulation's Bureau of Testing notified Petitioner by Examination Grade Report dated August 4, 1997, that he had earned a score of 75.00 which was a passing grade on three parts of the exam: Audit, Accounting & Reporting, and Law Exam. The report informed him that, "CREDIT ON PASSED PARTS HAS BEEN GRANTED." The report also informed Mr. Persaud that he had failed the Financial Accounting Part of the exam. On that part, he received a score of 62.00 when a minimum passing score was 75. Petitioner, "very certain that [he] passed this examination," filed a letter of appeal with the Department, treated by the Department as request for a formal administrative hearing. During the course of pre-hearing procedures, Mr. Persaud requested that he be allowed to audit the grading of the examination. The Department responded by pointing to Section 455.217(2), Florida Statutes, which states in pertinent part, The board . . . shall make available an examination review procedure for applicants . . . . Unless prohibited or limited by rules implementing security or access guidelines of national examinations, the applicant is entitled to review his examination questions, answers, papers, grades, and grading key . . . and the following language of Rule 61-11.012(6), Florida Administrative Code: In order to preserve the security and integrity of the examination, such candidate shall be permitted to review only the questions and answers missed on the examination. Furthermore, the Department pointed to the following excerpt of Section 119.07(3)(a), a provision of the public records law, Examination questions and answer sheets of examinations administered by a governmental agency for the purpose of licensure, certification, or employment are exempt from the provisions of subsection (1) and s.24(a), Art. I of the State Constitution [provisions which require disclosure of public record]. In light of the response, the ruling was made at hearing that the Department was not required to allow Petitioner to conduct the requested audit. In fact, it was determined that the requested audit was a prohibited act under the force of law through the operation of Rule 61-11.012(6), Florida Administrative Code. Mr. Persaud claimed that without an audit, he would not be able to prove that he had, in fact, passed the examination. The examination was developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, a national organization of certified public accountants whose function it is to develop, prepare and grade the "in-force CPA exam." (Tr. 74). As such, the exam is considered a "national examination," id., developed by a national organization. About such exams, the following is stated in the rules of the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Bureau of Testing: If the examination being challenged is an examination developed by or for a national board, council, association or society, (hereinafter referred to as national organization) the Department shall accept the development and grading of such examination without modification. Rule 61-11.012(1), Florida Administrative Code. The examination consisted of six questions, two of which (Questions five and six) were essays. Mr. Persaud received 36 points out of the 60 points available for question one, 2.15 out of five points available for question two, 4.38 out of five available for question three, 3.68 out of five for question four, 8.5 out of ten for question five, and 5.5 out of ten for question six, for a total of 62 points. Mr. Persaud pointed to his background as a person of Indian descent (that is, from the subcontinent of India) who immigrated from Georgetown, Guyana, to the United States where, in 1984, he received U.S. citizenship. Mr. Persaud felt that lack of points on the essay for English composition, grammar and expression were due to prejudice and incorrect because of the excellent state of his English. During the hearing, it was obvious that Mr. Persaud's spoken English, although at times difficult to understand because of pronunciation, is otherwise of high quality. Whatever the state of his written English, however, had he received all points available for the essay questions he still would have failed the Finance and Accounting part of the exam with a score of 68 when a passing score of 75 was necessary. It was therefore incumbent on Mr. Persaud to show more than just that improper grading of English (which he did not show) in the essay portion of the exam led to the failing grade. Mr. Persaud made no attempt to do so. To the contrary, Mr. Persaud did not show that the examination was faulty, or that it was arbitrarily worded, or that the answers to challenged questions were capriciously graded or that he was arbitrarily denied credit through a grading process of the challenged questions devoid of logic or reason. In fact, Mr. Persaud does not appear to have ever identified the questions among those that he missed that were under challenge. He simply insisted that he had passed the exam. Rather than challenge specific questions for which he was not given credit or the grading of the answers to those questions, Mr. Persaud took a different tack. He testified that immediately after passing parts 3 and 4 of the CMA in 1996, he was suddenly bombarded on a daily basis by the noise of planes from the international Airport who were assisted in some way by a Village Inn not far from his house. When he complained to the authorities, they stated that they did not fly anywhere near his house. He complained of other noises and pressures to which he was subject while trying to study and identified them as "[p]lanes at four o'clock," (Tr. 48) and a "12 part air conditioner." Id. He also complained that his computer had been sabotaged and produced documents he had composed where the word "and" appeared in a sentence when his choice, and the more appropriate word, would have been "but." (Tr. 55). After this line of the challenge to the exam had been exhausted at hearing, Mr. Persaud was asked to identify the questions among those he missed that he now challenges as well as any of their answers. Aside from testimony about written English on the Essay questions, Mr. Persaud made no reference to individual questions. He chose to maintain his position that he had passed the test.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's challenge to the grade he received on the Financial Accounting part of the CPA Exam administered in May of 1997. DONE AND ORDERED this 16th day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DAVID M. MALONEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: R. Beth Atchison, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 Bans N. Persaud 310 Ninety-Second Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33702 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Office of the General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Martha Willis, Executive Director Division of Certified Public Accounting Department of Business and Professional Regulation 4001 Northwest 43rd Street, Suite 16 Gainesville, Florida 32606

Florida Laws (4) 119.07120.57120.66455.217 Florida Administrative Code (1) 61-11.012
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GAINESVILLE AMATEUR RADIO SOCIETY, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 94-001200 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Mar. 03, 1994 Number: 94-001200 Latest Update: Aug. 02, 1995

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Background Petitioner, Gainesville Amateur Radio Society, Inc. (GARS or petitioner), a Florida non-profit corporation, was incorporated on December 31, 1975. Its stated purpose is to promote an interest in amateur radio operation. Among other things, GARS provides preparation for Federal Communication Commission licensing examinations, supports community activities with free communication services, and encourages public awareness of ham radio activities through the publication of a monthly newsletter called the GARS-MOUTH. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is charged with the responsibility of administering and implementing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. It has the specific task of collecting sales taxes and enforcing the state tax code and rules. By law, certain transactions are exempt from the state sales and use tax. Among these are sales or lease transactions involving "scientific organizations." In order for an organization to be entitled to an exemption, it must make application with DOR for a consumer's certificate of exemption and demonstrate that it is a qualified scientific organization within the meaning of the law. Once the application is approved, the certificate entitles the holder to make tax exempt purchases that are otherwise taxable under Chapter 212, Florida Statutes. In the case of petitioner, a certificate would enable it to save a hundred or so dollars per year. Claiming that it was entitled to a certificate of exemption as a charitable organization, GARS filed an application with DOR on December 21, 1993. After having the application preliminarily disapproved by DOR on the ground it did not expend "in excess of 50.0 percent of the . . . organization's expenditures toward referenced charitable concerns, within (its) most recent fiscal year," a requirement imposed by DOR rule, GARS then amended its application to claim entitlement on the theory that it was a scientific organization. Although DOR never formally reviewed the amended application, it takes the position that GARS still does not qualify for a certificate under this new theory. Is GARS a Scientific Organization? Under Section 212.08(7)(o)2.c., Florida Statutes, a scientific organization is defined in relevant part as an organization which holds a current exemption from the federal income tax under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. A DOR rule tracks this statute almost verbatim. Accordingly, as a matter of practice, in interpreting this statutory exemption, DOR simply defers to the final determination of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). If the IRS grants an organization a 501(c)(3) status based on the determination that it is a scientific organization, then DOR accepts this determination at face value. DOR does not make an independent determination whether the organization is "scientific" or question the decision of the IRS. This statutory interpretation is a reasonable one and was not shown to be erroneous or impermissible. GARS received a federal income tax exemption from the IRS regional office in Atlanta, Georgia by letter dated August 12, 1993. The record shows that GARS was granted an "exempt organization" status as a "charitable organization" and as an "educational organization" under Treasury Regulation Section 1.501(c)(3). However, GARS did not receive an exempt status as a "scientific organization" nor did the IRS make that determination. Therefore, GARS does not qualify as a scientific organization within the meaning of the law. While petitioner submitted evidence to show that it engages in what it considers to be a number of scientific endeavors, these activities, while laudable, are irrelevant under Florida law in making a determination as to whether GARS qualifies for a sales tax exemption as a scientific organization. Therefore, the application must be denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order denying petitioner's application for a consumer certificate of exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of June, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of June, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-1200 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 5. Rejected as being irrelevant. 6. Rejected as being unnecessary. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 8-9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 13. Rejected as being unnecessary. 14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Respondent: 1. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Rejected as being unnecessary. 4. Rejected as being cumulative. 5-12. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 13-14. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 16. Covered in preliminary statement. 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 18-19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 20-21. Rejected as being unnecessary. 22. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being irrelevant, unnecessary for a resolution of the issues, not supported by the evidence, cumulative, subordinate, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Sidney Schmukler, Esquire 3922 N. W. 20th Lane Gainesville, Florida 32605-3565 Olivia P. Klein, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050

Florida Laws (1) 120.57
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY vs ROBERT JARKOW, 01-002597PL (2001)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Jul. 02, 2001 Number: 01-002597PL Latest Update: May 24, 2002

The Issue Whether the Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated February 5, 1999, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed. The Respondent maintains that the instant action is barred by laches and violates Section 455.225, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility of regulating the practice of certified public accountants licensed within the state. At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Respondent, Robert Jarkow, has been licensed in Florida as a certified public accountant, license number AC0010963. On or about December 1996, the Respondent orally agreed to provide accounting services for an individual named Kasman who was doing business as Traditions Workshop, Inc. (Traditions). Traditions manufactured uniforms and listed the federal government among its clients. Revenues to the company from the sale of uniforms were presumably posted in accordance with written contracts. Although the Respondent participated in the monthly completion of financial records for the company, the exact description of his responsibilities for the company and the individual are not known. It is undisputed that Ms. Kasman asked the Respondent to provide a financial statement for the company as part of an effort to secure a line of credit from a bank in New York. It is also undisputed that Ms. Kasman refused to pay for the statement. According to the Respondent, based upon that refusal, he declined to prepare the instrument. Nevertheless, a document entitled "Financial Statements" was generated with a notation "MANAGEMENT USE ONLY-NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION." The Respondent maintains that the document was not prepared as a financial report and that if generated using his data disk it was done without any intention on his part for the product being used to secure a line of credit. The document did not comply with provisions of accounting practice. The Respondent admitted that when his relationship with the party deteriorated, and payment for services was not rendered, he did not release information to a succeeding accountant. Ms. Kasman needed the information, depreciation schedules, in order to accurately complete tax records for Traditions. The Respondent attempted to locate Ms. Kasman and her bookkeeper for hearing but was unable to do so. Ms. Kasman filed a complaint with the Petitioner against the Respondent that was not investigated until several months after it was filed. The Respondent obtained a civil judgment against Traditions for unpaid accounting fees. The Administrative Complaint filed in this case was submitted over a year after the consumer complaint. Neither party presented testimony from the complainant, her bookkeeper, or her succeeding accountant.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation enter a final order finding the Respondent violated Rule 61H1-23.002, Florida Administrative Code, as set forth in Count II of the Administrative Code; imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $1000; and placing the Respondent on probation for one year subject to terms as may be specified by the Board of Accountancy. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 4th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles F. Tunnicliff, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Victor K. Rones, Esquire Law Offices of Rones & Navarro 16105 Northeast 18th Avenue North Miami Beach, Florida 33162 Martha Willis, Division Director Division of Certified Public Accounting Department of Business and Professional Regulation 240 Northwest 76 Drive, Suite A Gainesville, Florida 32607 Hardy L. Roberts, III, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202

Florida Laws (2) 120.57455.225
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BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY vs FLANAGAN AND BAKER, 89-003717 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sarasota, Florida Jul. 11, 1989 Number: 89-003717 Latest Update: Oct. 30, 1989

The Issue The issue is whether respondent's certified public accountant's license should be disciplined for the alleged violations set forth in the administrative complaint.

Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Respondent, Flanagan & Baker, P. A. (respondent or firm), was a certified public accounting firm having been issued license number AD 0006179 by petitioner, Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Accountancy (Board). When the events herein occurred, the firm's offices were located at 2831 Ringling Boulevard, Suite E-118, Sarasota, Florida, and John R. Flanagan and Michael L. Baker, both certified public accountants (CPA), were partners in the firm. In addition, Thomas A. Menchinger, also a CPA, was a junior partner. The firm has since been dissolved, and Flanagan and Menchinger have now formed a new firm known as Flanagan & Menchinger, P. A., at the same address. It is noted that Flanagan, Baker and Menchinger are not named as individual respondents in this proceeding, and at hearing respondent's representative assumed that only the firm's license was at risk. Whether license number AD 0006179 is still active or valid is not of record. In 1987, respondent, through its partner, Flanagan, accepted an engagement to prepare the 1986 calendar year financial statements for Ballantroe Condominium Association, Inc. (BCA or association), an owners' association for a fifty unit condominium in Sarasota. Financial statements are a historical accounting of what transpired for an entity during a particular period of time as well as the status of its assets, liabilities and equity on a given date. They are prepared for a variety of persons who rely upon them to see what transpired during that time period. If the statements are not properly prepared, the possibility exists that harm or other problems may accrue to the users of the statements. After the statements were prepared and issued, a unit owner made inquiry with respondent in August 1987 concerning two items in the statements. When he did not receive the desired response, the owner wrote the Department in September 1987 and asked for assistance in obtaining an opinion regarding the two items. Eventually, the matter was turned over to a Board consultant, Marlyn D. Felsing, and he reviewed the statements in question. Although Felsing found no problems with the two items raised by the owner, he noted what he perceived to be other errors or irregularities in the statements. This led to the issuance of an administrative complaint on September 29, 1988 charging the firm of Flanagan & Baker, P. A., with negligence in the preparation of the statements and the violation of three Board rules. That precipitated the instant controversy. The engagement in question represented the first occasion that the firm had performed work for BCA. The association's annual financial statements from its inception in 1980 through calendar year 1983 had been prepared by Touche Ross & Company, a national accounting firm, and for the years 1984 and 1985 by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., a Sarasota accounting firm. Some of these statements have been received in evidence. As a part of the Board investigation which culminated in the issuance of a complaint, Felsing visited respondent's firm, interviewed its principals, and reviewed the work papers and financial statements. A formal report reflecting the results of his investigation was prepared in June 1988 and has been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. In preparing his report, Felsing relied upon a number of authoritative pronouncements in the accounting profession which underlie the concept of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). These included various opinions issued by the Accounting Principles Board (APB), Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) issued by the Auditing Standards Board, and Accounting Research Bulletins (ARB) issued by the Committee on Accounting Procedure. The three organizations are a part of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). With regard to the concept of materiality, which requires an accountant to consider the relative importance of any event, accounting procedure or change in procedure that affects items on the statements, Felsing did not exclude any matters on the ground they were immaterial. Rather, he included all possible irregularities, regardless of their materiality, on the theory that the probable cause panel (for which the report was initially prepared) should consider all items in the aggregate. According to Felsing, a number of irregularities or errors were found in the financial statements prepared by respondent. These are discussed separately in the findings below. The first alleged deficiency noted by Felsing concerned a change by the association from accelerated to the straight-line method of depreciation. According to APB 20, such a change is considered to be significant, and "the cumulative effect of changing to a new accounting principle on the amount of retained earnings at the beginning of the period in which the change is made should be included in net income of the period of the change." In other words, APB 20 requires the cumulative effect of the change to be reported in the net income of the current year. However, respondent accounted for the change as a prior period adjustment on the statement of members' equity. Respondent justified its treatment of the item on the ground the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., did not show any accumulated depreciation. Thus, respondent asserted it was merely correcting an error because the other firm had not reported depreciation on the balance sheet. In addition, respondent noted that the effect on the balance sheet was only $721, deemed the item to be immaterial, and concluded its treatment of the item was appropriate. However, APB 20 requires the auditor to address the cumulative effect of the change ($2,072) rather than the effect of only the current year ($721), and therefore the cumulative effect should have been reported in current income. By failing to do so, respondent deviated from GAAP. The association had designated several cash accounts as being reserve accounts for deferred maintenance and replacements. Under ARB 43, such accounts must be segregated in the balance sheet from other cash accounts that are available for current operations. This would normally be done in a separate classification called "other assets" so that the user of the statements would be aware of the fact that the reserves were not available for current operations. However, the statements reflect that three such reserve accounts were placed under the classification of current assets. It is noted that these accounts totaled $25,514, $18,550 and $30,927, respectively. While respondent recognized the difference between cash available for current operations and reserves for future use, and the requirements of ARB 43, it noted that the association's minute book reflected the association regularly withdrew funds from the accounts throughout the year to cover current operations. Also, the prior year's statements prepared by Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., had classified the item in the same fashion. Even so, if respondent was justified in classifying the accounts as current assets, it erred by identifying those accounts as "reserves" under the current assets portion of the balance sheet. Therefore, a deviation from GAAP occurred. One of the most important items in a condominium association's financial statements is how it accounts for the accumulation and expenditure of reserves, an item that is typically significant in terms of amount. The accounting profession does not recommend any one methodology but permits an association to choose from a number of alternative methods. In this regard, APB 22 requires that an entity disclose all significant accounting policies, including the choice made for this item. This disclosure is normally made in the footnotes to the financial statements. In this case, no such disclosure was made. Respondent conceded that it failed to include a footnote but pointed out that when the statements were prepared by Touche Ross & Company, one of the world's largest accounting firms, that firm had made no disclosure on the basis of immateriality. However, reliance on a prior year's statements is not justification for a deviation from GAAP. It is accordingly found that APB 22 is controlling, and footnote disclosure should have been made. The financial statements contain a schedule of sources and uses of cash for the current fiscal year. According to APB 19, all transactions in this schedule should be reported at gross amounts irrespective of whether they utilize cash. However, respondent reported all transactions in the schedule at their net amount. In justifying its action, respondent again relied upon the prior years' statements of Touche Ross & Company and Mercurio and Bridgford, P. A., who reported the transactions in the same manner. It also contended the item was immaterial and that a detailed explanation of the item is found in the statement of members' equity. Despite these mitigating factors, it is found that the schedule was inconsistent with APB 19, and a deviation from GAAP occurred. Felsing's next concern involved the language used by respondent in footnote 6 to the statements. That footnote pertained to the unfunded reserve and read as follows: NOTE VI - UNFUNDED RESERVE As of December 31, 1986, the Association reserves amounted to $103,953 consisting of $18,931 as a reserve for depreciation and statutory reserves of $85,022. The amount funded was $95,422 leaving an unfunded balance of $8,531 due to the reserves from the operating funds. Felsing characterized the footnote as "confusing" because it referred to depreciation as a part of a future reserve for replacements. Felsing maintained the footnote contained inappropriate wording since depreciation relates to assets already placed in service and not to their replacements. Respondent agreed that the footnote, taken by itself, might be confusing. However, it contended that if the user read the preceding footnote, which he should, there would be no possible confusion. That footnote read as follows: NOTE V - RESERVE FOR DEPRECIATION The Association funds the reserves for depreciation through its operating budget. These funds are to be used for the replacement of property and equipment as the need arises. As previously noted, the Association changed its method of computing depreciation to conform with generally accepted accounting principles. As of December 31, 1986, the reserve for depreciation totaled $18,931. According to respondent, the above footnote made clear to the user that the firm was not referring to depreciation as a reserve but rather was setting aside funds equal to depreciation in an effort to have sufficient cash to purchase assets in the future. While the deficiency here is highly technical and minute in nature, it is found that the footnote is not sufficiently clear and that the user might be confused. Felsing next observed that the footnotes did not disclose how the association accounted for lawn equipment or other capital assets. According to APB 22, such a choice is considered a significant accounting policy and, whatever policy is utilized, the same must be disclosed in the footnotes to the statements. In response, Flanagan pointed to a footnote in Note I of the statements which read in part as follows: Property and Equipment and Depreciation Property and equipment capitalized by the Association is stated at cost. During 1986, the Association changed its method of depreciation from the accelerated cost recovery method to a straight line method in which property and equipment is depreciated over its estimated useful life in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. According to respondent, this footnote was adequate in terms of explaining the method of depreciation. Also, a number of other statements were introduced into evidence to show that other entities routinely used a corresponding footnote. Flanagan's testimony is accepted as being the most credible and persuasive evidence on this issue, and the footnote is accordingly deemed to be adequate disclosure on this policy. In the statement of members' equity, there is an item in the amount of $1,730 described as "capitalization of lawn equipment expensed in previous year." Although Felsing did not question the amount shown, he faulted respondent for not properly describing whether the item was a change in accounting principle or an error correction. According to APB 20, the disclosure of an error correction is required in the period in which the error was discovered and corrected. Although respondent considered the footnote described in finding of fact 11 to constitute adequate disclosure, it is found that such disclosure falls short of the requirements of APB 20. Work papers are records and documentary evidence kept by the accountant of the procedures applied, tests performed, information obtained and pertinent conclusions reached in the engagement. They serve the purpose of documenting the work performed and provide verification for the accountant. In addition, another important, required tool is the audit program, a written plan for how the auditor intends to perform the audit. The plan serves the purpose of documenting the accountant's mental process of deciding what procedures are necessary to perform the audit and to communicate those procedures to the persons actually conducting the audit. The audit plan should include in reasonable detail all of the audit procedures necessary for the accountant to perform the audit and express an opinion on the financial statements. Although a variety of checklists have been prepared by the AICPA and other organizations, each audit program must be tailored to fit the needs of a particular client. Felsing noted what he believed to be a number of deficiencies with respect to respondent's work papers, audit program, and engagement planning. In reaching that conclusion, Felsing relied upon various SAS pronouncements which govern that phase of an auditor's work. Those pronouncements have been received in evidence as petitioner's exhibits 7-14. Although the work papers themselves were not introduced into evidence, Felsing stated that his review of them reflected they were "deficient" in several respects. For example, he did not find a planning memorandum, time budget, checklist or other evidence that planning procedures were performed as required by SAS 22. In this regard, Flanagan corroborated the fact that no formal planning memorandum to the file was prepared. Although respondent's audit program was written for a condominium association, Felsing found it "extremely brief" and was not tailored to this particular client. He opined that such a program should have included reasonable detail of all audit procedures necessary to accomplish the audit and to express an opinion on the financial statements. In particular, it was noted that some required procedures were not on the list while some procedures actually used by respondent were not included. Through conversations with respondent's members, Felsing learned that much of the audit work was performed by Menchinger, the junior partner in the firm. In addition, "a few" other work papers were prepared by an unknown assistant. Although Menchinger reviewed all work performed by the assistant, Felsing found no evidence that the papers were reviewed by the supervising partner, Flanagan. Such review, which is a required step in the audit process, is generally evidenced by the supervising partner placing check marks or initials on the individual work papers. Felsing noted further that the decision to rely on the testing of internal controls was not documented in the work papers by respondent. He added that the amount of time budgeted by respondent for this engagement (around thirty hours) was inadequate given the fact that it was the first year the firm had prepared this client's statements. Finally, Felsing concluded that the violations were not peculiar to a condominium association but were applicable to all enterprises. Respondent pointed out that the association was a small client with less than five hundred line items, and the audit program and engagement planning were planned within that context. Respondent introduced into evidence its audit program which contained the steps taken by the firm in planning for the engagement. Testimony that all steps contained therein were followed was not contradicted. Similarly, Flanagan testified without contradiction that he reviewed all work performed by Menchinger but did not evidence his review with tick marks on each page. According to Flanagan, on a small audit such as this, he considered the signing of the tax return and opinion letter evidence that he had reviewed the work papers. However, Flanagan acknowledged that someone examining the papers would not know they had been reviewed by the supervising partner. Based upon the above findings, and after reconciling the conflicting testimony, it is found that respondent violated GAAP by failing to have a planning memorandum, time budget, and evidence of testing of internal controls within its work papers. All other alleged violations are found to without merit. Respondent has continued to represent the association since the Board issued its complaint. Indeed, Flanagan noted that the association is pleased with the firm's work, and this was corroborated by a letter from the association's board of directors attesting to its satisfaction with the firm. There was no evidence that the association or any other third party user of the statements was injured or misled by relying on the statements.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent be found guilty of the violations discussed in the conclusions of law portion of this Recommended Order, and that license number AD 0006179 be given a reprimand. All other charges should be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of October 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October 1989.

Florida Laws (2) 120.57473.323
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ANNETTE WHITNER vs HIGHLANDS COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, 15-005982 (2015)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Sebring, Florida Oct. 21, 2015 Number: 15-005982 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 2016

The Issue Did Respondent, Highlands County Board of County Commissioners (County), discriminate against Petitioner, Annette Whitner, on account of her age?

Findings Of Fact At the time of the alleged discrimination, Ms. Whitner was 71 years old. Ms. Whitner claims that the County discriminated against her by not interviewing her for its business services director position due to her age. Ms. Whitner claims that she was discriminated against because the position required an applicant to be a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). She argues that older people are less likely to hold a CPA certification. The weight of the credible evidence did not establish this claim. Ms. Whitner did not establish any connection between possessing a CPA certification and age. On November 10, 2014, the County posted the position online. It was a newly created position, established as part of a reorganization by the County. Because of previous audit errors and the departments the position would oversee, the County determined the minimum qualifications for the position should be: Bachelor’s degree with major course work in public administration, business administration, accounting, finance or related field and possession of Certified Public Accountant (CPA) professional certification or equivalent is required. Master degree in business administration, finance management, public administration, or related discipline is preferred. In determining the equivalent to a CPA, the County referred to the Guide for Certifications for Accounting, Finance and Operations Management (Guide). This was a reasonable non- discriminatory decision. Based on the Guide, the County determined a Certified Government Auditing Professional, Certified Governmental Financial Manager, and Certified Internal Auditor would constitute an equivalent to a CPA certification. The certifications were deemed equivalent because they required similar education, experience, and completion of an examination, similar to one taken for a CPA certification. The closing date for all applicants was December 15, 2014. Ms. Whitner submitted her application near midnight of December 15. Ms. Whitner is not a CPA. In addition, Ms. Whitner did not follow the instructions on the application. She scratched out the instructions on the application and wrote “first” above where it read “current or most recent employer.” Ms. Whitner’s application contained typed and handwritten information. Ms. Whitner’s application did not provide her complete work history as the application instructed. In one of the fields of employment, after 1992, Ms. Whitner wrote “various employers.” Ms. Whitner’s application left an unexplained gap in work history, from 1992 to the present. Ms. Whitner’s application included copies of her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration degree, Master of Public Affairs degree, certification as a Certified District Manager, Certificate of Recognition from the Indiana Executive Program, and a letter of reference from Al Grieshaber, General Manager at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring, dated February 8, 2010. Ms. Whitner’s application indicated she had a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant. Ms. Whitner asserts that a certification as a Certified Professional Government Accountant should be equivalent to a CPA certification. However, the Guide does not include a certification for a Certified Professional Government Accountant as a CPA equivalent, nor does the County consider it equivalent. Additionally, Ms. Whitner did not attach a copy of her certification or provide persuasive evidence of the certification criteria and their similarity to CPA criteria. The County could not determine if Ms. Whitner had worked since 1992. Ms. Whitner argues that her letter of reference from Al Grieshaber demonstrated her employment since 1992. However, the letter did not include the dates Ms. Whitner worked, the position held, or her duties and the type of work she performed at Sun ‘N Lake of Sebring. Randal Vosburg, Assistant County Administrator, was involved in the hiring and selection process for the position. The primary criteria he was looking for when reviewing the applications was whether the applicant had a CPA. Mr. Vosburg did not have any contact with Ms. Whitner and did not know her age when reviewing her application. Mr. Vosburg did not consider Ms. Whitner’s age when reviewing her application. The County did not select Ms. Whitner for an interview because she was not a CPA and did not possess a certificate that is equivalent to a CPA certification. Additionally, Ms. Whitner presented an unprofessional application, did not provide a complete work history so that there appeared to be more than a twenty-year gap in employment, and did not follow the instructions on the employment application. These were all reasonable non-discriminatory bases for deciding not to interview Ms. Whitner. On January 5, 2015, Ms. Whitner submitted an addendum to her employment application. This was after the application deadline and after the County had selected candidates to interview. Ms. Whitner’s addendum did not provide documentation or certification that she possessed a CPA certification or the equivalent. The County selected Tanya Cannady and Stanoil Raley for interviews. Both possessed CPAs. Both were reasonably deemed to be more qualified than Ms. Whitner. A panel of three people interviewed Ms. Cannady and Mr. Raley. Randal Vosburg, June Fisher, County Administrator, and Mark Hill, then-Development Services Director, served on the panel. Ms. Cannady performed much better than Mr. Raley during the interview. Additionally, Ms. Cannady’s work experience was more relevant to the position than Mr. Raley’s work experience. The County selected Ms. Cannady for the position because she met the requirement of having a minimum of five-years of progressively responsible relevant experience, was a CPA, and was more qualified than Mr. Raley and the other applicants. The County offered the position to Ms. Cannady. She did not accept the offer and withdrew her application. On August 5, 2015, the County re-posted the position online. The county changed the CPA requirement from “required” to “preferred” because the County was having trouble finding CPA applicants. Ms. Whitner did not reapply for the position. The County conducted additional interviews and selected Tasha Morgan. Ms. Morgan was female and was a CPA. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence did not establish that the County discriminated against Ms. Whitner due to her age. The preponderance of the credible, persuasive evidence established that the County had legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for not interviewing Ms. Whitner.

Florida Laws (3) 120.569120.57120.68
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BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY vs. WILLIAM J. PABREY, 77-000985 (1977)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 77-000985 Latest Update: Mar. 31, 1978

Findings Of Fact Pabrey holds certificate number R-0211 as a Certified Public Accountant practicing in the State of Florida and held such certificate in good standing on January 1, 1974. At that time, Pabrey was subject to professional certification require- ments set forth in Chapter 473, Florida Statutes. The records of the Board reflect that Pabrey provided no evidence of the completion of any courses or studies that would give him credit towards the reestablishment of his professional competency in the period between January 1, 1974, and April 2, 1977. On October 15, 1976, Pabrey sat for an examination which was approved by the Board and given to practicing Certified Public Accountants pursuant to applicable law requiring reestablishment of professional competency. Pabrey received a score of 57 out of a possible score of 100. The established passing grade for the examination is 75. On December 31, 1976, Pabrey tendered his check to the Board in the amount of forty dollars ($40.00) as the required license fee. On May 13, 1977, the Board suspended Pabrey's certificate R-0211 as a Certified Public Accountant for failing to comply with requirements for the reestablishment of his professional knowledge and competency to practice public accounting. The check was returned to Pabrey by the Board on May 18, 1977, along with a copy of the Administrative Complaint and Order of Suspension. The questions to be answered in the uniform written professional examination administered to Pabrey on October 15, 1976, were based upon "Current Authoritative Literature' which included Accounting principles Board's Opinions, Accounting Research Bulletins, Statements and Interpretations of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, Statements on Auditing standards, and the Laws and Rules of the Florida State Board of Accountancy. Pabrey challenges thirty-six of these one hundred questions on the grounds that the approved answers are incorrect and that the answer selected by Pabrey is the proper choice. The questions attacked by Pabrey are numbers 5, 7, 11, 15, 18, 19, 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 36, 37, 42, 45, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, and 98. The title of the uniform written professional examination is "Examination of Current Authoritative Accounting and Auditing Literature and Rules of the Florida State Board of Accountancy. The approved answer to each of the questions on the examination is that which is mandated by the "Current Authoritative Literature." The examination does not purport to seek answers outside of the requirements of the Current Authoritative Literature. Each of the approved answers in the thirty-six questions listed above are consistent with the demands of the Current Authoritative Literature. None are vague, misleading, unfair or improper. Each of Pabrey's answers is contrary to the provisions of the Current Authoritative Literature. Accordingly, the answers selected by Pabrey are not the best answers and were properly graded incorrect on his examination answer sheet.

Florida Laws (1) 120.60
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