Findings Of Fact Oak Park Village is a mobile home park which is owned and operated by the COOPERATIVE. All of the one hundred and thirty three (133) corporate shareholders are former renters who formed the corporation in order to purchase the park from Mr. Paster and Mr. Perrault, the previous park owners. When the purchase was made, the remaining sixty-six (66) mobile home owners who rented lots within the park did not participate in the purchase. These mobile home owners remained within the park in their status as renters. The COOPERATIVE'S predecessors in title filed a mobile home park prospectus and an amended prospectus with the DIVISION, as required by law. The renters who received the initial prospectus between April 1985 and October 1986, continued their relationship with the park under this prospectus. All of the newer renters were subject to the amended prospectus, which became effective October 1986. Each prospectus contains a copy of the lease form. All of the renters had to sign a written lease before they could enter the park. The term of a lease within the park was normally for a one year period, which ended on December 31st. However, if a tenancy did not begin on January 1st of any year, the first term would end on December 31st of the year the lease was made. Each lease contains an automatic renewal clause. Unless the renter notifies the mobile park owner in writing sixty (60) days in advance of the automatic renewal on December 31st of his intention to leave the park, the lease is automatically renewed for another one year period. In the lease and in each prospectus, only the renters can prevent the automatic renewal from taking effect. On September 19, 1986, the mobile home park owners, Mr. Paster and Mr. Perrault gave written notice to the renters of their intent to increase the lot rental amount effective January 1, 1987, from one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) a month to one hundred and fifty six dollars and forty cents ($156.40) per month for a one year period. This advance notice gave the renters the opportunity to terminate their leases and relocate before the automatically renewal or January 1, 1987, which would include this lot rental price increase. None of the renters gave the owners a sixty (60) day advance written notice of their intention to leave the park at the end of the term. Therefore, potential purchasers were on notice that sixty-six (66) renters intended to automatically renew their written leases on January 1, 1987, for a one year term. On January 1, 1987, the automatic renewal went into effect. Under the lease terms and each prospectus, every renter owed one thousand eight hundred seventy six dollars and eighty cents ($1,876.80) as lot rent for the year 1987. The renters had the option to pay this amount in equal monthly installments of one hundred and fifty six dollars and forty cents ($156.40) over the twelve month period. However, the mobile home park owner's right to the one thousand eight hundred seventy six dollars and eighty cents ($1,876.80) vested on January 1, 1987. Contrary to the stipulation of the parties, the law and the evidence shows that written leases were in effect on January 1, 1987. On December 26, 1986, the COOPERATIVE purchased Oak Park Village. At the time of purchase, the COOPERATIVE took the property subject to the existing leases, and the automatic renewals which were inchoate on December 26, 1986, but which would become operative on January 1, 1987. After the sale was completed, Mr. Paster attempted to rescind the notice of rent increase, which was to take effect on January 1, 1987. As Mr. Paster no longer owned the property at the time he attempted this recision, he was unable to effectuate a recission. On December 30, 1986, the COOPERATIVE mailed written notices to its sixty-six (66) renters. The notices informed the renters that the rent would remain at one hundred and fifty dollars ($150.00) for three months and would then increase to one hundred and eighty seven dollars ($187.00) per month from April 1, 1987, to December 31, 1987. This came to an annual rental amount of two thousand one hundred and thirty three dollars ($2,133.00). This was an annual increase of two hundred and fifty six dollars and twenty cents ($256.20) per renter during the 1987 lease term, when the increase initiated by the prior owners is compared with the proposed increase. In comparing the notice of increase dated September 19, 1986, and the notice dated December 24, ,1986, it appears that the first three reasons listed for the proposed increases are identical. The only additional reason for an increase which is listed on the notice dated December 24, 1986, from the new owners is "Maintenance needs of the park." The notices sent by the new owners, the COOPERATIVE, were postmarked December 30, 1986, and were placed in the individual post office boxes of all of the tenants on the same day. Page twelve of each prospectus defines "notice" as follows: Unless otherwise provided by statute, administrative rule, or this Prospectus, any notice shall be deemed given by posting by first class mail or by actual hand delivery. Rule 7D-32.02(3), Florida Administrative Code, the applicable rule to these proceedings, provides as follows: Notice given by personal delivery shall be deemed given when actually delivered to the homeowner. Notice by U.S. Mail shall be deemed given five days after notice is placed in the U.S. Mail addressed to the mobile homeowner's last known address. As the prospectus and the amended prospectus both defer to the administrative rule in effect which defines the term "notice," the COOPERATIVE's notice did not occur within a ninety day period, even under the COOPERATIVE's theory of the case, as set forth in its Proposed Recommended Order.
The Issue Whether the discriminatory housing practices alleged in Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint were committed by Respondents and, if so, what relief should the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission) provide Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is a woman of Native American heritage. The record evidence, however, does not reveal that, at any time material to the instant case, anyone outside of her family, including Respondents, was aware of Petitioner's Native American background; nor does the record evidence establish that Petitioner was ever subjected to derogatory remarks about being of Native American descent. At all times material to the instant case, Petitioner has suffered from health problems that have substantially limited her ability to walk and have required her to use a motorized wheelchair to ambulate. Petitioner is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a resident of Kings Manor Estates (Park), a residential community of single-family mobile homes that is located in Davie, Florida. The Park is one of various mobile home communities that Respondent Uniprop Corporation (Uniprop) owns and operates. Like the other residents of the Park, Petitioner owns the mobile home in which she resides and pays rent to Uniprop for the use of the lot on which home is situated. Petitioner's home occupies lot 78 in the Park. As a resident of the Park, Petitioner has use of the Park's common areas and facilities, which include a swimming pool. There has been no showing that Petitioner has been denied access to any of these common areas or facilities due to her handicap. Residents of the Park must comply with the Park's rules and regulations. These rules and regulations reasonably require, among other things, that residents obtain, in addition to any permits they may need from the Town of Davie, the approval of Uniprop (referred to as "design approval") before constructing any improvements on their lots, including wheelchair ramps. To obtain such "design approval," a resident must submit to Park management a completed "design approval" application form and any supporting documentation. The application form provides a space for the resident to provide a "[d]escription, [d]rawing [l]ocation & [s]ize of [the proposed] [a]ddition." Immediately underneath this space on the form is the following pre-printed language: It is the Resident's responsibility to obtain all governmental approvals, to make certain the proposed improvement is suitable for the purpose intended and that the improvement complies with all applicable codes, standards and governmental requirements. Approval by Management of any improvement is limited to considerations of appearance. Resident agrees to have their home improvements built to the specifications listed above and illustrated in the space above and/or attached drawings, exhibits and permits. It is the responsibility of the Park's property manager, with the help of the Park's assistant property manager, to enforce the Park's rules and regulations. The duties of the Park's property manager and assistant property manager (whose work stations are located in the Park's business office) also include collecting rent from the Park's residents and taking appropriate action when residents are delinquent in their rental payments. There is a "drop off box" located outside the Park's business office in which residents can place their rental payments when the office is closed and the Park's property manager and assistant property manager are unavailable. Neither the property manager nor the assistant property manager is authorized to give residents "design approval." Only the Uniprop regional supervisor has such authority. The property manager and assistant property manager merely serve as "conduits" between the resident and the Uniprop regional supervisor in the "design approval" process. They take the completed "design approval" application form from the resident, provide it to the Uniprop regional supervisor, and, after hearing back from the regional supervisor, communicate the regional supervisor's decision to the resident. At all times material to the instant case, Respondent Delores Maddox was the Park's property manager. Ms. Maddox no longer works for Uniprop. Hazel Crain is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, the Park's assistant property manager. At all times material to the instant case, Milton Rhines was the Uniprop regional supervisor having authority over the activities at the Park. Mr. Rhines was based in Ft. Myers, Florida, on the other side of the state from the Park. Josephine Patricia Silver is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, employed as a sales consultant for Uniprop. In this capacity, she engages in activities designed to facilitate the sale of mobile homes manufactured by Uniprop (to be placed in the Park and other mobile home communities Uniprop owns and operates). Although her office is located in the Park, she plays no decision-making role in Park management. Notwithstanding that it is not her job responsibility to accept rental payments, she sometimes will do so as a courtesy to Park residents when she is at the Park on weekends or during the evening hours and the business office is closed. Although Ms. Silver and Petitioner do not get along, Ms. Silver has never threatened to "throw away" Petitioner's rental payments; nor has she ever told any of Park's residents that Petitioner was not paying her rent. Ms. Silver, however, has "gossiped" and made derogatory comments about Petitioner, but no showing has been made that Petitioner's handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having exercised any of her rights under Florida's Fair Housing Act played any role in Ms. Silver's having made these comments. In August of 2002, Petitioner mentioned to Ms. Crain about her interest in having a wheelchair ramp constructed on her lot. Ms. Crain suggested to Petitioner that she contact the Town to discuss the feasibility of such a project. Petitioner subsequently telephoned Brian Dillon, the Town's chief structural inspector. Mr. Dillon not only attempted to assist Petitioner in her efforts to obtain a permit from the Town to construct the wheelchair ramp, he also helped her make arrangements to have a boy scout troop construct the ramp for her with donated materials. The Town would not issue Petitioner a permit for the ramp unless and until she obtained the written approval of the Park owner, Uniprop. The ramp was constructed for Petitioner by the boy scouts during a weekend in mid-November 2002, without Petitioner's having first obtained Uniprop's "design approval" or a permit from the Town. Prior to the construction of the ramp, Petitioner had received a "design approval" application form from Ms. Crain and, on or about November 12 or 13, 2002, with Ms. Crain's assistance, had begun the application process. Petitioner, however, did not wait to receive the "design approval" she had applied for from Uniprop before giving the boy scouts the go ahead to start constructing the ramp. After discovering that the ramp had been constructed, Park management attempted to "work" with Petitioner to enable her to complete the paperwork necessary to obtain (belatedly) "design approval" for the ramp. On November 21, 2002, Petitioner submitted to Park management the following note from her physician, James Milne, D.O.: Due to Medical Necessity, my patient Mary Helen Meacham requires use of a motorized wheelchair, and it is necessary for her to have ramp access. If you have any questions, please feel free to call my office. By December 5, 2002, Petitioner had yet to submit the design plans needed to obtain "design approval" for the ramp. Accordingly, on that date, Uniprop's attorney, Ernest Kollra, Esquire, sent Petitioner, by certified mail, a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Please be advised the undersigned represents Kings Manor Estates with respect to your tenancy at the Community. This Notice is sent to you pursuant to Florida Statute, Chapter, 723.061, Et Seq. Park Management has advised the undersigned that you are in violation of the following Community Covenants of Kings Manor Estates: 7. Improvements: Before construction of any type is permitted on the homesite or added to a home, the Resident must obtain written permission from Management in the form of a Design Approval. Additional permits may be required by the municipality in which the Community is located. 10. Handicap Access: Any Residents requiring handicap access improvements such as ramps are permitted. All plans for such ramps must be approved by Management and comply with all other Community Covenants and governmental standards. You are in violation of the above Community Covenants, in that you have failed to submit plans to Management prior to the construction of your ramp. Park Management has been apprised by the Town of Davie that permits are required and none was obtained by you prior to construction, in compliance with Town of Davie governmental standards. In order to correct the above violation, you must within seven (7) days from delivery of this Notice, remove the ramp from your homesite. Delivery of the mailed notice is deemed given five (5) days after the date of postmark. If you fail and/or refuse to comply with this Notice, your tenancy will be terminated in accordance with Florida Statute Chapter 723.061.[2] If you have any questions concerning any of the above, you may contact Park Management at . . . . Petitioner did not remove the ramp by the deadline imposed by the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants. Park management, however, took no action to terminate her tenancy. After receiving the December 5, 2002, Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, Petitioner stopped making rental payments to Uniprop and, instead, deposited these monies with the Florida Justice Institute to be held in escrow until the controversy concerning the ramp was resolved. In or around mid-January 2003, Park management received from Petitioner corrected design plans for the ramp (that had been prepared by Doug Amos of Doug Amos Construction). On January 15, 2003, Ms. Maddox sent to Mr. Rhines, by facsimile transmission, a copy of these plans. Petitioner was subsequently granted "design approval" for the ramp. It has not been shown that there was any unreasonable or excessive delay involved in the granting of such approval. On February 19, 2003, Ms. Maddox wrote the following letter to the Town's Building Department: Please be advised that MaryHelen Meacham Woods is authorized to have permits issued for site #78 at 12620 SW 6th Street Davie, Florida 33325 for the Installation of a handicapped ramp. Thank you for your consideration in this matter. Following an inspection, the Town, in March 2003, issued a permit for the ramp. Petitioner has had use of the ramp since mid-November 2002 when it was first built (notwithstanding that she did not obtain Uniprop's "design approval" and a permit from the Town until some months later). On or about May 30, 2003, Petitioner authorized the Florida Justice Institute to deliver to Uniprop the rental payments it was holding (at Petitioner's request) in escrow. Uniprop accepted these rental payments when they were delivered. Petitioner has had raw eggs thrown at her wheelchair ramp. She suspects that Ms. Maddox's children were responsible for this vandalism, but there is insufficient record evidence to identify the culprits, much less ascertain their motives. On or about August 31, 2004, at a time when Hurricane Frances was approaching the Florida peninsula from the southeast, Park management sent Petitioner a Notice of Violation of Community Covenants, which read as follows: Pursuant to Florida Statute 723.061 et seq, you are hereby advised that you are in violation of the following Community Covenant(s) of which the Community first became aware on August 30, 2004. SECTION I: HOME AND SITE MAINTENANCE - Eachresident shall keep his/her site and home in a clean and neat condition and free of any fire hazards, there is no storage permitted around or under the home or in screened rooms. ALL items must be stored inside the home or storage shed. Although you have previously been furnished a copy of the Community Covenants of the park, and said Community Covenants are posted in the recreation center and business office, a copy of the rule(s) of which you are in violation is attached to this notice for your convenience. Specifically, you are in violation of the above Community Covenant(s) in that Your home, trim and utility shed are dirty, there is growth in the gutters and there is a window air conditioner on the home. In order to correct the above violation of the Community Covenant(s) you must Wash your home, trim and utility shed, paint with colors approved by management, clean the growth from the gutters and remove the window air conditioner within seven (7) days from delivery date of this letter. If you fail and/or refuse to correct the violations of the Community Covenant(s) in the manner listed above, the park will pursue all its rights and remedies pursuant to 723.061 et seq. PLEASE GOVERN YOURSELF ACCORDINGLY It has not been shown that Park management took this action to retaliate against Petitioner for having requested permission to construct a wheelchair ramp on her lot or that such action was motivated by any other improper purpose. Park management has not pursued the matter the further. At no time has Park management initiated legal action to terminate Petitioner's tenancy and evict her. The record evidence is insufficient to establish that Respondents, or anyone acting on their behalf, have said or done anything having the purpose or effect of disadvantaging Petitioner based on her handicap, her Native American heritage, or her having asked to be allowed to build a wheelchair ramp on her lot.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order finding that Respondents are not guilty of any "discriminatory housing practice" and dismissing Petitioner's amended housing discrimination complaint based on such finding. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of May, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ___ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of May, 2005.
Findings Of Fact As of June 4, 1984, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided on the property. Some of those ten or more residents were Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, and Helen Sutton. As of May 25, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On May 25, 1986, Johnny Owens owned the mobile home in which he resided on leased Lot 10. As of October 28, 1986, ten or more spaces in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were being leased by individuals who owned the mobile homes in which they resided. On that date, Charles and Pauline Murphy owned the mobile home in which they resided on leased Lot 26. Upon paying the annual fee for southwinds Mobile Home Park, pursuant to Section 723.007 F.S., for the period of October 2, 1987 through October 1, 1988, Respondent Hugh D. Rowles, the park owner, advised Petitioner agency that he had dropped below ten lots available for rent. Respondent had reached this stage by simply not leasing out lots to new tenants as lots were voluntarily vacated by old tenants, and a natural attrition had occurred. The Petitioner's Fees Section accepted Respondent's word on the matter without further investigation, and Petitioner sent Respondent no more statements for the payment of the annual fee. In its business and public records, Petitioner listed Respondent and his park as not under jurisdiction of Chapter 723 F.S. On December 27, 1988, Respondent Rowles still owned Southwinds Mobile Home Park. As of that date, Beverly Leight, William Daniel, Frank Addison, Keith Hellstrom, Faye Koch, Helen Sutton, Johnny Owens, and the Murphys (8 tenants) were still residing in their respective mobile homes on the lots they were leasing from Respondent in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, as described supra. On that date, Leight, who had sold the park to Respondent in 1980, and Daniel, Addison, Hellstrom, Koch, and Sutton had been residents of Southwinds Mobile Home Park for at least three and a half years each; Owens had been a resident approximately two and a half years, and the Murphys had been residents approximately two years. In the park there were also some mobile homes owned' by Respondent which were rented as units--lot and mobile home together. To those individuals who owned their mobile homes and were leasing lots in Southwinds Mobile Home Park, Respondent sent a letter dated December 27, 1988, which provided in pertinent part: To those of you who own your own homes, I want to give you as much advance notice as possible. Sometime within the next few weeks, you will begin seeing land surveyors, soil testing people and others in the park. There is a VERY STRONG possibility that the property will be sold in JUNE of 1989. If and when the property is sold, there will NO LONGER be a trailer park here. It is STRONGLY SUGGESTED that you start making plans NOW for the removal of your trailer. If there is any way that I can assist you in relocating, I will be glad to help you. Until further notice, everything remains as usua1. After serving the letter f December 27, 1988, Respondent served the mobile home owners in Sothwinds Mobile Home Park with no other notice prior to June 1989. Faye Koch interpreted the letter of December 27, 1988 as requiring her to leave southwinds Mobile Home Park. Beverly Leight, on the other hand, understood it to mean that the park might be sold, but not that it definitely would be sold. In January 1989, Mr. Rowles offered Mrs. Koch $1,000 to leave the park by February 1, 1989. She moved out to a larger, better mobile home, after paying Respondent her overdue rent. Respondent rented the mobile home purchased from Mrs. Koch and the lot it was on, as a unit, to another person foil a short while. Rowles also purchased the mobile home of Keith Hellstrom for $1,000, which he likewise rented to someone else as a unit with his lot for a short time, He purchased Johnny Owens' mobile home for $1,000. Thereafter, Rowles sold each of these mobile homes at a loss. The Koch, Hellstrom, and Owens mobile homes were sold by Rowles for $100, $500, and $100, respectively. In March 1989, Respondent Rowles was contacted by a representative of Petitioner, apparently from the Enforcement Section, who had been contacted by Mrs. Leiht, and who advised Rowles of Petitioner agency's position that the tenancies of the remaining mobile home owners in Southwinds Mobile Home Park were subject to the protections of Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent advised Petitioner's representative that he did not regard his park as covered by Chapter 723 F.S. Respondent also requested Petitioner's representative to show Respond.ent that Chapter 723 FS was applicable to him and his park and advised the agency representative that, if he was subject to the agency's jurisdiction, he would comply. Respondent received no written response from the agency until the Notice to Show Cause was filed on July 18, 1989. On April 6, 1989, Respondent and his wife entered into a contract for the sale of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park to a third party. An addendum to the contract required Respondent to remove or pay for the removal of all personal property (that is, the mobile homes) located on the parcel upon being given thirty days notice from the third party buyer. The contract c6ntemplated that the property would continue to operate as rental property until the new owners elected to close it down or change its function. The closing on this contract for sale still had not occurred as of the date of formal hearing. The purchasers of the property comprising Southwinds Mobile Home Park have never given Respondent notice to remove any personal property from the park, nor has permitting of the property occurred such as would entitle the buyers to demand removal of such personal property. At the time Respondent entered into the April 6, 1989 contract for sale of Southwinds Mobile Home Park, only four mobile home owners were still leasing lots in the park. It may be inferred from the testimony as a whole that these were month to month tenancies. Respondent attempted to negotiate purchase of those four mobile homes. He did not suggest to any residents that they had any other options besides moving their mobile homes out of his park or selling them to him. Mrs. Leight held out for $2,500 and refused to move. She was joined in her refusal by Mr. Daniel, Ms. Sutton, and a Miss Warnock, all of whom were residing in their own mobile homes on Respondent's lots. On June 1, 1989, Respondent notified the fourmobile home owners remaining in Southwinds Mobile Home Park toremove their mobile homes no later than June 30, 1989. Thisnotification is in accord with the standards of Section 83.03(3)F.S. for month-to-month tenancies. At that point, Leight, Daniel, and Sutton were four-year residents There is noinformation as to Warnock's term of residency at southwindsMobile Home Park. On August 4, 1989, Respondent shut off waterservice to the mobile home owners remaining in southwinds MobileHome Park. As a result of Respondent's action, Beverly Leightwas compelled to move out of her mobile home in order to complywith health department requirements. In so doing, she incurredcosts of 4,486, for which she has not been reimbursed; however,she is one of the four remaining mobile homed owners (Leight,Daniel, Sutton, and Warnock) who left the subject property on orbefore October 30, 1989, pursuant to a stipulation with the Respondent whereby the Respondent deposited $10,000 with their attorney pending a judicial determination as to whether themobile home lot tenancies were governed by Chapter 723 or by Chapter 83, Parts II F.S. The Circuit Court action wherein the stipulation was filed had not yet resulted in such adetermination as of the date of formal hearing.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Notice to Show Cause. DONE and ENTERED this 6th day of March, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of March, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 89-4572 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Accepted: 1-17, 19. Rejected as mere characterization of testimony and argument of counsel: 18 (with footnote) Respondent' s PFOF: Accepted: 1-3, 5-10, 12 Except for irrelevant, immaterial, subordinate or unnecessary material, the following PFOF are accepted: 4 Rejected as containing a conclusion of law: 11 COPIES FURNISHED: Eric H. Miller Assistant General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1007 F.A. Ford, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box-48 DeLand, Florida 32721-0048 E. James Kearney, Director Florida Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Stephen R. MacNamara, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1000 =================================================================
The Issue The issue is whether Respondents imposed upon mobile home owners an invalid "pass-through" charge to pay for the cost of work on the park's electrical distribution system, in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc., owns the Tanglewood Mobile Home Park located at 345 Weatherbee Road, Fort Pierce, St. Lucie County, Florida (Tanglewood). The Patricia Yu Irrevocable Trust owns Tanglewood Mobile Home Park, Inc. Respondents Chester Yu and Ronald Yu are the trustees of the trust; Respondent Carol Yu is not a trustee. References to "Respondents" shall include only Chester Yu and Ronald Yu. Tanglewood was developed in 1969. The park was originally owned and operated for many years by Respondents' father. An undated prospectus for Tanglewood Mobile Home Park (Prospectus) contains several provisions that have some bearing on this case. Prospectus Section VI.A.1 requires each mobile home owner to bear the expense of "electrical connections." Prospectus Section VI.A.2.a states that, "to the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." Prospectus Section VIII.3 states that the Owner may assess, on a pro rata basis, "pass-through charges" as rent increases. Prospectus Section VIII.3.a prohibits more than one increase in lot rental annually, except for "pass-through charges." Section VIII.1.c defines "pass-through charges" as "those amounts, other than special use fees, which are itemized and charged separately from the rent and which represent the mobile homeowner's share of costs charged to the Park Owner by any state or local government or utility company." Section VIII.3.b.4 states: "To the extent permitted by law, the mobile home owner may also be required to bear, in the form of increases in the lot rental, the costs incurred by Owner in installing capital improvements or performing major repairs in the Park." The Prospectus states that Tanglewood has 158 lots. In reality, only 148 lots are improved and available for rent. One of these lots is the park office. At present, 139 lots are leased. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene caused flooding in Tanglewood. After the flooding had receded, the power company restored power to the area, but a submerged transformer blew out and damaged part of the Tanglewood's electrical distribution system, leaving 16 mobile homes without power. After repairing or replacing the transformer, the power company employee responsible for reconnecting Tanglewood's electrical distribution system reenergized eight mobile homes, but refused to reenergize the remaining eight due to the deteriorated condition of their meter bank. Meter banks are located in groups at various points in the park. Power enters the park either above- or below-ground and is fed into individual meters for each mobile home. Each meter bank typically contains eight meters, and each meter typically has a junction box and a disconnect box. The concern of the power company employee was that the mechanical force required to reconnect power to one meter bank could possibly be too great for the deteriorated supports to withstand. As was typical of many meter banks at Tanglewood, the meter bank for these eight lots was poorly supported due to the deterioration of its support structure. Most supports at Tanglewood were made of wood, which required close monitoring and careful maintenance. Exposed to the elements, wood suffered considerable damage over time from wood rot. If the support failed, a meter bank would fall over to the ground, exposing live electrical lines in close proximity to the mobile homes and their occupants. Many meter banks throughout Tanglewood also suffered from deteriorated supports. Many meter banks were deficient because of the use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes as conduit, which are of a decreased thickness, when compared to PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use and, when exposed to sunlight, tend to deteriorate faster than the type of PVC pipes approved for outdoor electrical use. The use of plumbing-grade PVC pipes may not have been legal at the time it was used. Other meter banks also suffered from rusted and missing components, which might allow rainwater to enter the system and damage the parts. Some of the larger missing components left gaps large enough to allow a child's finger to penetrate and touch a live wire. Meter cans were damaged, masts (for above-ground supply lines) were inadequately supported, and drop wires (for above-ground supply lines) were too low. Confronted with the problem of eight lots without electrical service, Respondents contacted a local electrical contractor, who replaced the meter bank and its supports, using new pressure-treated wood. He also increased the service for these eight meters from 100 amps to 150 amps. The power company promptly restored electrical service after these repairs were completed. Respondents did not try to assess the mobile home owners a pass-through charge for this work. Instead, on January 28, 2000, Respondents sent the mobile home owners a notice that their monthly rent would increase by $15 (net, $12, after relieving the tenants of the obligation to pay a $3 monthly administration fee for water and sewer). The notice states that the rent increase is effective May 1, 2000, which may reflect a common commencement date on all lot leases. The letter notes that the park owner "has expended and will expend substantial sums for improvements and upgrades in the park," but warns that the park owner does not know if "any additional tax, utility or assessment prorations will be necessary." The rent increase covered, among other things, the cost of the work to restore electrical service to the eight lots whose meter bank required replacement. On February 12, 2000, the St. Lucie County Building Inspector inspected the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. He noted the conditions described above and issued numerous citations, which were submitted to the St. Lucie County Code Enforcement office. In 1998, St. Lucie County adopted the National Fire Protection Association code, which is based on the 1996 National Electrical Code. The new code requirements prohibit a wood support system, require the placement of meters within 30 feet of the mobile home, and require underground wiring, but do not require service above 100 amps, which was the minimum level of service at Tanglewood prior to any electrical work following Hurricane Irene. On May 25, 2000, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued a notice of citations to Respondents for unsafe electrical equipment. The officer required the replacement of the remainder of the electrical distribution system. When work stopped at Tanglewood, the County Code Enforcement Officer issued other notices of citations in June 2000. Respondents responded to these demands from the County by undertaking extensive work to Tanglewood's electrical distribution system. The result was a modern electrical distribution system--at a cost of $161,912, plus $28,977.76 in finance charges, for a total of $190,889.76. By Notice of Pass-Through Charge dated August 14, 2000, Respondents advised the mobile home owners of a monthly pass-through charge of $28.61 per lot from December 1, 2000, through November 1, 2004. The notice discloses that the reason for the pass-through charges is the electrical distribution system upgrade that had recently been completed. The evidence is clear that, except for the upgrade to 200-amp service, the electrical work done in this case was governmentally mandated. This finding is supported by the reluctance of Respondents to attend to the electrical system unless a mobile home was without electricity. Despite Respondents' electrical invoices, their park-management policy obviously deferred maintenance, at least with respect to the electrical distribution system. The closer question in this case is whether the work was a capital improvement or a repair. The addition of 50-100 amps of service was a capital improvement, but it was not mandated by the government. So the capital improvement versus repair question applies to the remainder of the work. In their proposed recommended order, Respondents contend that the electrical distribution system was "completely functional" prior to the inspection and citations. This is true as to the function of conducting electricity; this is untrue as to the function of conducting electricity safely. Weakened and sometimes nonexistent supports, rusted holes, holes from missing components, and occasionally exposed wiring substantially undermined the safety of the electrical distribution system at Tanglewood. Respondents argue that new code requirements forced them to relocate disconnects closer to the mobile homes, use four-wire (not three-wire) feeder line to all mobile homes, use electrical-grade conduit, and use metal supports for meter banks. However, these are subsidiary costs of repair, not capital improvements. As contrasted to the expansion of service, the remaining work does not enlarge the capacity of the electrical distribution system. The remaining work repairs the system to make it safer, with some additional work required to meet current code requirements. Respondents argue that the work increases the value of the land. The record does not support this assertion. Even if such evidence were present in this case, it would not be determinative. Although a capital improvement normally adds value, a residential safety hazard subtracts value, so its elimination would have the appearance of adding value. Respondents argue that the work substantially extends the life of the electrical distribution system. This argument would be more appealing in the presence of an effective preventative maintenance program covering such basic needs as replacing wooden supports and metal covers when needed. However, the nature of the work, other than raising the service from 100 amps, is more retrospective than prospective; the work is really only catching up on preventative repairs and maintenance that was not done for years. Once Respondents allowed the system to fall into such a state of disrepair, the secondary costs of bringing the system up to code, such as adding four-wire feeds and relocating disconnects, do not change the nature of the expenditures; they are repair expenses, not capital improvements. Respondents have proved that a portion of the work was clearly the responsibility of individual mobile home owners. For instance, about two-thirds of the mobile homes required $150-$200 of work to separate the grounded conductors from the grounding conductors. However, it is unclear that any of such work, for which individual mobile home owners were directly responsible, was performed on all lots. Even if this work were a capital expenditure, which it is not, it could not be passed "proportionately" among all of the mobile home owners, if only some of them required the work. Respondent contends correctly that the pass-through charges are a minor violation, as defined in Section 723.006(9), Florida Statutes. Respondents fully disclosed the pass-through charges prior to assessing them. The pass-through charges did not endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the mobile home owners; to the contrary. The charges arose from a substantial expenditure by Respondents to enhance the health, safety, and welfare of the mobile home owners. The pass-through charges caused no economic harm to the mobile home owners because Respondents were authorized by the Prospectus to raise the rent by a sufficient amount to compensate for the entire cost of the work on the electrical distribution system. For these reasons, alone, neither a penalty nor a refund is appropriate; a cessation of the assessment of further pass-through charges and the imposition of the maximum civil penalty for a minor violation are sufficient. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the collected pass-through charges may have a disproportionately disturbing effect on Respondents and the mobile home owners. Respondents borrowed the full cost of the work on the electrical distribution system, and this note is payable in 48 equal monthly instalments ending on August 4, 2004. An order requiring a refund of any portion of the monies already collected may result in a significant disruption in the anticipated cash flow to Respondents, necessitating an even greater increase in rent to cover the loss of these funds. Mobile home owners who have left the park between the time of the electrical work and the time of the rent increase would unfairly be relieved of their proportionate share of the cost of this work, and mobile home owners coming to the park after this rent increase would unfairly be imposed with a disproportionately larger share of the cost of this work.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order dismissing the Amended Notice To Show Cause against Respondent Carol Yu. It is further RECOMMENDED that the Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes enter a final order finding that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu have assessed a pass-through charge in violation of Section 723.031(5), Florida Statutes; that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall cease and desist from assessing this pass-through charge upon the effective date of the final order; that the violation is a minor violation and no refund is appropriate under the circumstances; and that Chester Yu and Ronald Yu shall pay a single civil penalty of $250, for which they are jointly and severally liable. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of September, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of September, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Ross Fleetwood Division Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Hardy L. Roberts, III General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Janis Sue Richardson Attorney for Petitioner Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street, Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Bernard A. Conko Attorney for Respondent Cohen, Norris, Scherer, Weinberger & Wolmer 712 U.S. Highway One Fourth Floor North Palm Beach, Florida 33408
Findings Of Fact Michael Weiss is part owner of Suncoast International, Inc. and general manager of the corporation's only business, a trailer park in Flagler County known as Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park. At all pertinent times, the park has leased or offered for lease a total of 44 mobile home lots. In mid-1985, Mr. Weiss received a letter from petitioner Department of Business Regulation (DBR) informing him that park owners were required by law to prepare and distribute prospectuses to mobile home tenants. Efforts to draft a prospectus meeting petitioner's approval began in August of 1985. After several revisions, the petitioner approved a prospectus on June 13, 1986, No. 1802171P, for all lots. Mr. Weiss received written notice of approval, together with a copy of the prospectus to which it pertained, with attachments, on June 26, 1986; and promptly arranged for a copier to produce 50 uncollated copies of everything received from the petitioner, see Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, including the cover letter. With the assistance of Mr. and Mrs. Whaley, who worked for the company at the park, he tried to assemble at least 44 complete sets of these materials. In late May of 1986, Mr. Weiss had given all tenants notice by registered mail of his intention to raise rents, effective September 1, 1986. Realizing he needed to distribute prospectuses before any rent increase, he had simultaneously informed tenants that a then current (but unapproved) version of the prospectus was available for inspection. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Hand Delivery As instructed, Ms. Whaley encouraged tenants to pick copies of the prospectus up when they paid their rent. She kept a list of persons to whom she distributed copies of the prospectus. Part of the list survived and has been received in evidence. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2. One tenant, Mary Oetken, received a copy of the approved prospectus on July 29, 1986. But the prospectus given to Ms. Oetken did not contain rules and regulations, a copy of the lot rental agreement, a lot layout plan, or the number of her lot. Ms. Oetken already had a copy of her lot rental agreement, and park personnel customarily distributed copies of rules and regulations to each tenant, before tenancies began. On August 29, 1986, another tenant, Betty Marinoff, wife of Peter, received a copy of an approved prospectus. Before September 1, 1986, Ms. Whaley hailed Mr. Philip H. Bird, and handed him a copy. Whether these copies of the approved pro-spectus included all attachments the evidence did not disclose. Robert Onusko, who has leased a lot in Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park continuously since August of 1981, has had a copy of the park's rules and regulations since he moved in. As did all other tenants, he paid increased rent beginning September 1, 1986. Although Mr. Onusko himself received no copy of an approved prospectus until January of 1989, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 7, Angela Whaley gave his daughter Marilyn a copy of the prospectus when Marilyn paid rent in July or August. Taped to Doors Not all tenants were then in residence at the park. About half lived there full time. (T.127) With respect to lots whose lessees were away, Mr. Weiss directed Mr. and Mrs. Whaley to tape copies of the prospectus on trailer doors. "That was common procedure with late payments or whatever . . . " T.112. In mid-August of 1986, Ms. Whaley told him that prospectuses had been distributed for each lot, either by delivery to a tenant or by posting. Clarence Rainey leased a lot from 1977 to 1989 at Flagler by the Sea Mobile Home Park, where he lived part of the year, returning to Illinois in the summer. Told by a neighbor that they were available, he asked for and received a prospectus in November of 1986. He had not received one earlier. With her husband Roger, Madeline DuJardin resided at Flagler by the Sea from February of 1979 until February of 1988. She did not get a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased on September 1, 1986, from $125.00 to $150.00 per month. Neither Mr. and Mrs. Rainey nor Mr. and Mrs. DuJardin received copies when they were originally distributed. Their trailers were among those to which copies were taped, weeks or months before their return in cooler weather. Charles A. Bond, who shared a trailer with a half-brother, resided at Flagler by the Sea from November 21, 1985, until December 31, 1988. While he lived at the park he never received a prospectus. Brothers surnamed Karcher each leased lots from respondent. Ms. Whaley gave one Mr. Karcher a copy of the approved prospectus, before September 1, 1986. But Richard Karcher, who in those days only spent a week at a time in the park, at intervals of several months, did not receive a copy of the approved prospectus before the rent increased. Richard Karcher had obtained a preliminary draft of the prospectus, but it differed in important respects from the draft which was eventually approved. In June of 1988, he obtained another copy of the prospectus, the copy, he testified, which he gave DBR's investigator, which also differs in important respects from the approved version. Attached to the copy Mr. Karcher gave DBR's investigator was a set of the park rules and regulations. It is not clear whether Ms. Whaley told Mr. Weiss that she had taped an approved copy to Mr. Richard Karcher's door. (T. 126, 128) Change of Law Effective July 1, 1986, statutory changes altered prospectus requirements. Petitioner mailed advice concerning the new requirements when it sent out annual fee statements to mobile park owners. Mr. Weiss did not personally receive this advice nor any written notice of the nine workshops petitioner conducted in August of 1986 to acquaint park owners with the statutory changes. Although approved a few days earlier, respondent's prospectus did not conform to all the new requirements. In early 1988, Mr. Weiss heard from Gloria Thompson, a DBR employee in its Tampa office, in connection with a complaint filed by Charles Jagde, the same person whose complaint led to the investigation that gave rise to the present proceedings. Ms. Thompson found no violation on the original complaint. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Eventually Mr. Weiss learned that revisions to prospectus No. 1802171 were necessary. On November 18, 1988, he filed another proposed prospectus with petitioner. After its approval on January 30, 1989, park personnel distributed the revised, approved prospectus, No. 1802171P86, to the tenants.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, RECOMMENDED: That DBR enter an order requiring respondent to send complete copies of currently approved prospectuses by registered mail to all tenants who have not received such copies personally and signed receipts so stating. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of July, 1990. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 6, 9, 11 through 14 and 16 through 19 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, the evidence did not establish the contents of the copy of the prospectus the Miranoffs received. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 8, Mr. Onusko's adult daughter Marilyn received a copy of the prospectus before the rent increased. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 10 pertains to subordinate matters only. With respect to petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 15, Mr. Karcher so testified, without contradiction. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1 through 5, 7 through 10, 12 through 19, 21, 22, 24, and 27 through 30 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as material. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 6, the prospectus had not been approved at that time. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 11, she did not personally deliver prospectuses to all tenants. With respect to respondent's proposed finding of fact No. 20, the differences were material. Respondent's proposed findings of fact Nos. 23, 25 and 26 are immaterial. COPIES FURNISHED: Donna H. Stinson, Esquire Moyle, Flanigan, Katz, Fitzgerald & Sheehan, P.A. The Perkins House, Suite 100 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, FL 32301 Debra Roberts, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1007 Joseph A. Sole General Counsel Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 Paul Martz, Esquire Martz & Zimmerman 3 Palm Row St. Augustine, FL 32084 Stephen R. MacNamara Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-1000 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact The Subject Property. The property at issue in this proceeding consists of approximately 66 lots (hereinafter referred to as the "Subject Property"), located in Highridge Estates Subdivision (hereinafter referred to as "Highridge"). Each lot is approximately one-third acre in size. Highridge and the Subject Property are located in Clay County, Florida. Highridge was filed in the public records of Clay County, Florida, as a platted subdivision in January of 1970. At the time Highridge was platted, each lot met the zoning requirements applicable to Highridge. Pursuant to then-existing zoning, each Highridge lot could be developed as a single-family residence by construction or the placement of a mobile home thereon. Adoption of the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan. Clay County adopted the Clay County 2001 Comprehensive Plan (hereinafter referred to as the "Plan"), on January 23, 1992, as required by the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act, Part II, Chapter 163, Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). At the time of the adoption of the Plan, the Plan contained policies which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed as a single-family residence by the placement of a mobile home thereon. As required by the Act, the Plan was submitted to the Florida Department of Community Affairs (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), for review and determination of whether the Plan was "in compliance" as defined by the Act. During the time that the Plan was being considered it was publicly known that the policies which would allow the placement of mobile homes on each of the lots in Highridge might not be accepted by the Department. Petitioner's Acquisition of the Subject Property. During the early 1990's William Bitetti began looking for real estate to invest in. Mr. Bitetti, through the services of Century 21 Lakeside Realty, became aware of the availability of lots in Highridge as a possible investment. Mr. Bitetti was assured by Century 21 Lakeside Realty's realtor that Highridge could be developed by the placement of a single mobile home on each lot. On or about March 25, 1992 Mr. Bitetti entered into a Contract for Sale and Purchase of 56 lots in Highridge. The following condition was included in the Contract for Sale and Purchase: this contract is only conditioned upon Buyer being able to place a Doublewide Mobile Home with attendant well, septic tank and system and electric service on each Lot, to be deter- mined by Buyer's attorney within 2 (two) weeks of the effective date of this contract. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be purchased by the Petitioner, St. William Land Company, Inc. Mr. Bitetti is the sole shareholder and the President of Petitioner. Mr. Bitetti intended that the lots would be marketed for sale as single-family mobile home sites. Mr. Bitetti's attorney, Paul D. Newell, had experience with Highridge, having owned lots within Highridge himself. Mr. Newell was also aware of the language of the Plan that would allow development of the lots in Highridge. Mr. Newell had attempted to keep himself informed as to the progress of the Plan. Mr. Newell spoke to an official of the Clay County Planning and Zoning Department to confirm the language that would allow development of the lots in Highridge was included in the Plan and was told that it was. Mr. Newell also confirmed that regulations in existence at the time would allow Mr. Bitetti to market the lots as intended. The evidence failed to prove that any official of Clay County gave Mr. Newell assurances that the Plan would be approved by the Department as written. Mr. Newell was aware that the Plan had been submitted to the Department for review and had not yet been approved by the Department. Mr. Newell was also aware that it was possible that the Department would not accept the portion of the Plan that allowed continued development of developments like Highridge. On May 21, 1992 the Petitioner purchased the 56 lots in Highridge. Two of the 56 lots were subsequently sold by Petitioner. On or about October 12, 1992, Petitioner purchased an additional 12 lots in Highridge. The 12 lots purchased on October 12, 1992 and 54 of the lots purchased on May 21, 1992 constitute the Subject Property. At the time of purchase, the Subject Property lots could be sold for the installation of a mobile home on each lot pursuant to the law then in effect. The Plan was, however, still being reviewed by the Department. The Subject Property lots have direct access to a publicly owned and maintained right-of-way or to a privately owned platted right-of-way. Alleged Government Action Relied Upon by the Petitioner. On or about July 5, 1992, after acquiring the first 56 lots, Petitioner was issued a permit by the Clay County Building Department authorizing Petitioner to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots. The evidence failed to prove that Clay County made any representation to Petitioner or Mr. Bitetti, or their representatives, that the policies of the Plan which would allow each lot of the Subject Property to be developed as individual sites for mobile homes would be approved by the Department or that, if it was, the law would not subsequently be changed. Nor did the evidence prove that Clay County represented in anyway that the Subject Property could be developed as Petitioner intended. Petitioner's Alleged Detrimental Reliance. Petitioner purchased the Subject Property for approximately $49,048.18, including closing costs. Two of the 68 lots purchased by Petitioner were subsequently sold. Petitioner realized a profit of approximately $2,582.31 on the sale of these lots. During 1992 Petitioner paid $29,515.37 to purchase and locate a mobile home as a model on one of the lots, to furnish the mobile home, and for landscaping, utilities, and the installation of a well, septic tank and power pole associated with the lot the mobile home was placed on. Petitioner also incurred the following expenses: $1,452.29 for postage associated with attempting to sell lots; $250.00 for charitable donations; $167.66 in bank account service fees; $2,957.85 for hazard and liability insurance; $36.50 in "miscellaneous" expenses; $2,355.72 for ad valorem taxes; and $510.00 in legal fees. Similar expenses were also incurred in 1993. The evidence failed to prove that Petitioner incurred any expenses or obligations for the development of the Subject Property. Rights That Allegedly Will Be Destroyed. Subsequent to Petitioner's acquisition of the Subject Property, the issuance of the permit to place a mobile home sales model on one of the lots and the acquisition of the mobile home and placement of the mobile home on one lot, the Plan was determined to not be in compliance with the Act. In particular, it was determined that the policies of the Plan which would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot caused the Plan to be "not in compliance". Clay County subsequently amended the Plan to eliminate the policies that would have permitted lots such as those in Highridge that had not yet been developed to be developed by the placement of a mobile home on each lot. The Plan was determined to be in compliance on April 27, 1993. As a result of the elimination of the policies pertinent to this matter, Clay County was required to modify the zoning for the Subject Property. The Subject Property was zoned for use for the smallest lot size allowed pursuant to the Plan: one-half acre. As a result of the foregoing, most of the Subject Property lots are too small to be developed individually. Pursuant to the Plan, lots that stand alone may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. Two of the 66 lots stand alone and, therefore, may be developed by the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The remaining 64 lots of the Subject Property are located in contiguous groups and, pursuant to the Plan, must be combined into one-half acre lots or larger. As a result, the Petitioner will lose the ability to sell some number of his lots for the placement of a single mobile home thereon. The evidence failed to prove what the actual economic impact will be to Petitioner if it cannot sell each lot for use as a single mobile home lot. Petitioner was notified by a letter dated August 24, 1993 and a letter to its real estate broker dated January 24, 1994 and a letter to Mr. Bitetti dated February 2, 1994, of the restrictions on the use of the Subject Property. The letters were all from Clay County personnel.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Bertram Gould, is president and stockholder of Mohican Valley, Inc., d/b/a Indian Woods Subdivision. The Indian Woods Subdivision is located in Seminole County and consists of in excess of 150 subdivided lots. On May 20, 1982, Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased a mobile home park located in Seminole County, Florida, from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. The park was formerly known as Mohawk Village, but is now known as the Indian Woods Subdivision. Bertram Gould and Mohican Valley, Inc. acquired their interest in the subdivision by virtue of a purchase and sale agreement, deed and assignment of lease indentures from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation. Individuals desiring to live in the mobile home park purchase their mobile home and contemporaneously sign a 99-year lease on the lots upon which the mobile homes are to be placed. The mobile homes purchased by prospective residents in the subdivision are typically purchased from Vaughn Motors, Inc., a corporation of which Mr. Gould is president. In 1981, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold a mobile home to Alfred and Beverly Powers, which arrived at the park and was setup on November 30, 1981, or shortly thereafter. On March 1, 1982, Vaughn Motors, Inc. sold that mobile home to Warren E. and Sylvia Joyce Krummel, since the Powers had elected not to close the purchase. On the date of the sale to the Krummels, the mobile home was already setup on Lot 1, Block E, of the subdivision and ready for occupancy. On June 14, 1982, after the May 20 purchase of the subdivision by Mohican Valley, Inc, through its president, Bertram Gould, the Krummels executed an Indenture of Lease for Lot 1, Block E. There was thus a residential building on that property subject to the lease at the time the lease was entered into. On June 5, 1982, Dorothy Merritt signed a purchase agreement to buy a mobile home and the mobile home was delivered and setup on her lot on August 6, 1982. On that date she also signed a lease for the lot where the mobile home was placed. Thus, when the interest in that property was conveyed by lease, there was a residential building on the lot. Roy and Lydia Ardizzone initially leased a lot in the park from Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation before the sale to Mohican Valley, Inc. and Bertram Gould. In August, 1982, after Mohican Valley, Inc. purchased the subdivision, the Ardizzones decided to place a mobile home on their lot, but since the Phase II portion of the subdivision in which their original lot was located was not completely developed, it was not feasible to place the home on the lot at that time. Accordingly, they asked Mr. Gould to substitute their lot for a lot in Phase I in order to facilitate placing a home on the lot and begin living in the park. Mr. Gould agreed and the substitution occurred on August 31, 1982, on which date the Ardizzones also signed a lease for the lot. They ordered a mobile home to be placed on that lot, which arrived some 10 days later, on September 9, 1982. It was immediately setup on the Ardizzone's lot. Thus, at the time the lease of August 31, 1982, was executed by the Ardizzones and Bertram Gould, the Ardizzones had already ordered the mobile home for immediate delivery, which was delivered and setup some 10 days later. Thus, there was an obligation on the part of the Respondent to provide a mobile home to them in less than two years and indeed within days. On or about September 4, 1982, Bertram Gould caused a mobile home to be placed on Lot 3, Block B of the subdivision and had it prepared for occupancy. On November 5, 1982, George W. and Alice H. Woodward signed a purchase agreement for the mobile home and ultimately executed a lease for the lot upon which that mobile home sat on January 10, 1983. They moved into their home on or about February 17, 1983. Thus, at the time the lease was executed by the Woodwards and Respondent, a residential building was present on the property subject to the lease. Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title, Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, had, during the course of its development of the mobile home park, entered into approximately 156 ground leases for mobile home lots. In conjunction with the acquisition of title to the park by Mohican Valley, Inc., Mohican Valley Inc. was assigned all rights of Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation in those 156 leases which had already been recorded by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation prior to the acceptance of assignment by Mohican Valley, Inc. It was not established that Mohican Valley, Inc. or Bertram Gould had participated in any offer or disposition of the property which was the subject of those leases prior to Mohican Valley, Inc.'s acceptance of their assignment. Prior to May 20, 1982, the Respondent had no ownership interest in either the mobile home park or in Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, which owned and managed the Park. He was not an officer, director, employee, salesman or any type of agent for the owner of the mobile home subdivision prior to May 20, 1982. The only nexus between the Respondent and the mobile home park prior to May 20, 1982, was his position as president of Vaughn Motors, Inc. which had sold mobile homes to some of the residents of the park who had executed leases which ultimately became assigned to Mohican Valley, Inc. The Respondent caused certain advertisements to be placed in the Orlando Sentinel newspaper. Although an advertisement was placed April 25, 1982, the Respondent was not involved in the publishing of that advertisement. It appeared in the newspaper approximately a month prior to purchase of the park by Mr. Gould's company. On June 4 and 5, 1982; September 19, 1982; October 10, 1982; and January 29, 1983, the Respondent admittedly placed advertisements in the Orlando Sentinel representing amounts of monthly lot rent, terms of available bank financing, the office address, the phone number and hours of operation, as well as representing the fact that mobile homes could be purchased at the park for a listed price, including certain optional features, as well as the representation that the mobile home park then owned by Mohican Valley, Inc. offered quarter-acre lots and double-wide homes with certain amenities. The price for lot rent was represented as never increasing. Bank financing was advertised as available variously at 14 and a quarter percent interest and 13 and a half percent interest. The representations contained in those advertisements were true, however, at the time Mohican Valley, Inc. took title to the mobile home park, a foreclosure action and lis pendens had been filed on that property by Florida Land Company, the mortgagee on a mortgage executed by Winter Springs Mobile Home Corporation, Mohican Valley, Inc.'s predecessor in title. That foreclosure had been filed on or before March 21, 1983, as evidenced by the Motion to Intervene (in evidence as Petitioner's Exhibit 4), which was filed in that foreclosure proceeding by Mohican Valley, Inc. No representation was made in these advertisements concerning the fact that the property which was the subject of the mobile home lot leases offered by Respondent was the subject of a mortgage encumbrance which was then in foreclosure, which foreclosure predated those advertisements. Bertram Gould, as president of Mohican Valley, Inc., as the movant in that Motion to Intervene, and as the successor in title to the mortgagor-in-foreclosure, knew of the existence of the facts surrounding that foreclosure as they related to the interest in the land he sought to convey and the effects such a foreclosure might have on the persons or residents of the park who executed those leases as lessee thereafter. Bertram Gould thus materially participated in the offer or disposition of the lots for lease in the subdivision and advertised those dispositions or offerings without representing that the real property to which they related was the subject of a pending foreclosure action. No reservation program has been approved by Petitioner for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. and/or Indian Woods, nor has any application for such been filed. No public offering statement for Bertram Gould, Mohican Valley, Inc. or Indian Woods, nor any application for such has, as of the time of the hearing, been filed and approved. The Indian Woods Subdivision has not been registered with the Petitioner by either Bertram Gould or Mohican Valley, Inc. Bertram Gould has engaged in the disposition of these subdivided lands directly as well as on behalf of Mohican Valley, Inc., of which corporation he is president and stockholder. Bertram Gould has offered, disposed of or participated in the offer or disposition of interests in the subdivided lands involved herein, which are located in Florida, by offering the subject land for leases to prospective mobile home purchasers and park residents.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence in the record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED: That Bertram Gould be found guilty of violations of Sections 498.023(1) and (2), and Section 498.049(4) and Sections 498.051(1)(a), (b), and (d); that a penalty of $2,000 be imposed and that the Respondent be ordered to cease and desist the above described activities until the requirements delineated above involving registration of the subject subdivision, approval and promulgation of a current offering statement have been accomplished. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ladd H. Fassett, Esquire Post Office Box 2747 Orlando, Florida 32802 E. James Kearney, Director Division of Florida Land Sales and Condominiums Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gary R. Rutledge, Secretary Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the Petitioner has been the subject of a discriminatory housing practice by the Respondent through the alleged failure of the Respondent to provide a reasonable accommodation for a disability.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the case, the Respondent operated an age-restricted mobile home park in Sarasota, Florida. With limited exceptions, residents of the mobile home park are 55 years of age and older. In September 2000, the Petitioner, a woman over 55 years of age, purchased a mobile home located within the Ridgewood Mobile Home Park. The mobile home was purchased through a real estate broker. The mobile home park apparently identifies itself through signage as a community for persons 55 years of age and older. Prior to the purchase the Petitioner had no communication with the Respondent and made no inquiry of the Respondent as to whether her son, who is under 55 years of age, would be allowed to live in the mobile home park. Within a few days of the purchase, the Petitioner was advised that residence in the mobile home park was limited, with certain exceptions, to persons 55 years of age and older. The Respondent advised the Petitioner that her son, who is under 55 years of age, could remain with her only for a period of up to two months to help her "settle in." By lease application dated October 1, 2000, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that her son would remain with her for a period of two months. In November 2000, after the two months had passed, the manager of the mobile home park (Mr. Cobb) informed the Respondent that her son would have to leave the residence. At that time, the Petitioner's son asserted that he was his mother's full-time, live-in caregiver. Prior to this point, the Petitioner had not indicated to the Respondent that she suffered from a handicap or required the services of a full-time, live-in caregiver The evidence fails to establish that, either at the time of the Petitioner's initial residence at the Respondent's mobile home park or by November 2000, the Petitioner suffered from a handicap or from any condition that substantially limited any major life activity, or that the Petitioner required the assistance of a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time the Petitioner moved into the Respondent's mobile home park, the Petitioner was able to accomplish all major life activities. Although diabetic, the Petitioner was able to walk, drive, and shop for food or other necessities. Her son assisted in house cleaning and in other routine activities, but there is no credible evidence that, prior to August 2002, such assistance was required for performing major life activities. In August 2002, shortly after a medical procedure on the Petitioner's carotid artery, the Petitioner suffered a stroke. She was hospitalized for a period of approximately ten days and then transferred into a rehabilitation hospital for a period of approximately six weeks. Letters submitted from medical professionals involved with the Petitioner's case at the time of her stroke suggest that assistance was needed during the period of incapacity related to the stroke. There is no credible evidence that, subsequent to rehabilitation, the Petitioner needed the services of a full- time, live-in caregiver. After rehabilitation, the Petitioner recovered from the stroke sufficiently to regain her ability to perform major life activities, including driving an automobile. A subsequent automobile accident wherein she ran down a stop sign in the mobile home park after going shopping suggests that driving at night may be inappropriate. Following post-stroke rehabilitation, the Petitioner's son continued to reside with his mother, to assist in household duties and in assuring that the Petitioner followed a medication regimen, but the evidence fails to establish that she currently requires a full-time, live-in caregiver. At the time of the hearing, neither the Petitioner nor her son was residing in the Respondent's mobile home park. The evidence establishes that disabled or handicapped persons in the mobile home park who require full-time, live-in caregivers are accommodated without regard to the age of the caregiver or to the mobile home park's age-related restrictions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the complaint of Dona M. Burgess against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of July, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of July, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Elizabeth M. Boyle, Esquire Gulfcoast Legal Services, Inc. 1750 17th Street, Building 1 Sarasota, Florida 34234 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Kimberly P. Walker, Esquire Kevin Bruning, Esquire Williams, Parker, Harrison, Dietz & Getzen 200 South Orange Avenue Sarasota, Florida 34236-6802 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent Tardiff committed the violations as set forth in the Notice to Show Cause dated February 24, 1997, and what penalty, if any, should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility to administer and to enforce the Florida Mobile Home Act, Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has been the owner of Pondview Mobile Home Park. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent has had 10 or more lots offered for rent or lease. Respondent offered for rent or lease at least 22 lots. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondent was a "mobile home park owner," as the term is defined in Section 723.003(7), Florida Statutes. No annual fees were paid by Respondent from 1984 until 1996. Currently, annual fees are $4.00 per lot, per year. Annual fees are payable to the division between July 1 and October 1 of each year. When Respondent increased his rent in 1993, he failed to file a copy of the lot rental increase notice with the Bureau of Mobile Homes. Under Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the reason for the increase in rent is irrelevant to the filing requirement. When new tenants entered Respondent's mobile home park, Respondent failed to give them a prospectus or written notification of required information. Twelve homeowners have entered into rental agreements without receiving the statutorily required document. Respondent produced a cancelled check at the formal hearing showing that 1996 annual fees had been paid to the division. It is the park owner's responsibility to comply with Chapter 723, Florida Statutes. It is not the duty of the division to pursue park owners in order to obtain compliance with the Florida Mobile Home Act. Respondent has been permitted with the Department of Health (formerly Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS)) every year since 1983.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order finding Respondent has violated the Sections of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, as charged in the Notice to Show Cause, and ordering the Respondent to Pay annual fees for the years 1984-1995 in the amount of $814, plus a 10 percent penalty of $81.40 which equals $895.40; Pay a penalty of $1,200 for the violation of Section 723.013., Florida Statutes; Pay a penalty of $5,000 for the violation of Section 723.037, Florida Statutes; and Comply with all provisions of Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, in the future. DONE AND ENTERED this 28th day of August, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of August, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Suzanne V. Estrella, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Roland Tardiff Route 12 Box 394 Lake City, Florida 32025 Robert H. Ellzey, Jr., Director Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Lynda L. Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact Chapter 723, Florida Statutes, the Florida Mobile Home Act, became law on June 4, 1984, created by Chapter 84-80, Laws of Florida. Chapter 723 expressly preempts to the state all regulation and control of mobile home lot rents in mobile home parks and all those matters relating to the landlord-tenant relationship treated by or falling within the purview of the chapter. The statute regulates any residential tenancy in which a mobile home is placed upon a rented or leased lot in a mobile home park in which 10 or more lots are offered for rent or lease. The statute requires that every owner of a mobile home park containing 26 or more lots shall file a prospectus with the Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement. Respondent has the power and duty to enforce and ensure compliance with the provisions of the chapter and rules promulgated pursuant to the chapter relating to the rental of mobile home lots. Respondent is further authorized to promulgate rules, pursuant to Chapter 120, which are necessary to implement, enforce and interpret the chapter. The proposed rule at issue in this proceeding was first published in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 14, Number 7, February 19, 1988. The parties have requested official recognition of the proposed rule and its date of publication, and that request is hereby granted. Proposed rule 7D-31.002, Florida Administrative Code, provides: 7D-31.002 Fees, Charges and Assessments. For tenancies in existence before June 4, 1984, including any assumptions of those tenancies pursuant to Section 723.059, Florida Statutes, the mobile home owner is not obligated to pay any fees, charges or assessments which were not disclosed fully in writing prior to occupancy, any provision to the contrary in a prospectus notwithstanding, unless the park owner can establish that the fees, charges or assessments have been collected as a matter of custom as defined in subsection (4) of this rule. Furthermore, the mobile home owner is not obligated to install any permanent improvements at all, including those mandated by governmental entities or utility companies. For tenancies created on or after June 4, 1984, pass through charges, as defined in Section 723.003(9), Florida Statutes, may be imposed by the mobile home park owner if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was disclosed in general terms pursuant to Sections 723.011 and 723.012, Florida Statutes, or pursuant to Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, even though the charge being imposed was not disclosed specifically, and the imposition of such pass through charges is not a violation of Section 723.042, Florida Statutes. However, pass through charges may not be imposed if the mobile home owner's obligation to pay such charges was not disclosed generally and prior to occupancy as required by Section 723.042, Florida Statutes and by Sections 723.011(2) and 723.012, Florida Statutes or Section 723.013, Florida Statutes, whichever is applicable. No fee, charge or assessment shall be imposed by a mobile home park owner on the purchaser of a mobile home situated in the park that is offered for sale by a resident of the park and as a condition to the purchaser being reviewed or approved for residency in the park. A fee, charge or assessment has been collected as a matter of custom if it was collected prior to July 1, 1976. Petitioner is a not-for-profit incorporated association, whose members include approximately 1,000 mobile home park owners and operators who own and operate mobile home parks in the State of Florida. Petitioner's members each lease at least 25 or more lots for the placement of mobile homes within each of their mobile home parks. Each of the members is therefore required to file and receive approval of a prospectus from Respondent prior to entering into an enforceable rental agreement for the lease of lots in those mobile home parks. Tom Coon, owner and operator of Hillsboro Mobile Home Park, located at Route 3, Box 801, Pompano Beach, Florida 33067, has "passed through" and charged for the hook-up fees and installation of sewer and water lines for hook-up to the Coconut Creek City Utility System. The cost to Mr. Coon for hook-up was $116,808 which includes fees which were not disclosed prior to occupancy and permanent improvements which were mandated as a result of actions by state and local government and the utility company. David Zell, owner of Colony Mobile Home Park, 2301 North 29th Avenue, Hollywood, Florida 33020, has "passed on" real estate tax increases in 1987 and 1988, as a result of entering into a three year negotiated agreement with the home owners negotiating committee, pursuant to mediation in 1986. The agreement allows for pass-on of increases in taxes and limits rent increases during that three year term. The total cost of pass-on charges for ad valorem property tax increases was $6,417.62 over that two year period. There is at least a $3,337.62 ad valorem property tax increase which will be passed-on in 1989. This pass-on charge for real estate taxes would be prohibited in that the real estate taxes were not disclosed to the residents prior to occupancy, nor were they collected prior to July 1, 1976. Charles Aultman is the owner and operator of Plantation Manor Mobile Home Park, 3032 South U.S. Route 1, Fort Pierce, Florida 33450. Aultman passed-on ad valorem property tax and utility increases for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 for all residents of the park. The total amount passed-on was $33,872.57. This charge would be prohibited as not disclosed prior to occupancy or charged as a matter of custom as defined in the proposed rule. Jim Dale, owner of Rexmere Village Mobile Home Park, 11300 Rexmere Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33325-4099, has passed-on increases to ad valorem property taxes for the mobile home park to each of his residents in 1987 and 1988. The approximate cost of the pass-ons at this point is $120,000 per year. The pass-on charge for increased ad valorem property taxes is based upon an agreement entered into between the mobile home owners and the park owner that limits the increases in lot rental amount in the park, but allows for pass-ons of increased ad valorem property taxes. In addition, the mobile home park prospectus includes a charge for parking which limits the on-street parking in the mobile home park. This charge was not collected prior to July 1, 1976, and was not disclosed prior to occupancy, but has been collected since the prospectus was delivered in the mobile home park. There is a collection rate of approximately $8,000 per year parking charges in the mobile home park. Pauline Mantwil is the owner of Sunshine Mobile Manor, which had its sewage treatment plant condemned by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park was required to tie into the Martin County Sewage Treatment System (Dixie Plant). The cost to each mobile home owner was allocated at $730 per space. The park owner passed-through this cost. The cost was disclosed in the prospectus, but was not disclosed prior to occupancy in the mobile home park. The total cost for impact fees and other costs associated with tie-in to the system is approximately $150,000. This pass-on of tie-in and other costs to hook up to the sewage treatment plant would be prohibited under the proposed rule because it was not disclosed prior to occupancy and because, in part, the costs include some permanent improvements to the sewage treatment system within the park. Mike Pond is the owner of Palm Shores Mobile Village, Inc., a mobile home park located at Number 1, East Lane, Lake Alfred, Florida 33850. The mobile home park consists of 97 lots. The park owner has no records of the fees and charges which were collected prior to July 1, 1976, and there was no disclosure of fees and charges prior to occupancy to the residents who moved in prior to the time the prospectus was approved and delivered. The prospectus was approved August 21, 1985, and delivered shortly thereafter. The mobile home park was mandated to enlarge its sewage treatment plant by the Department of Environmental Regulation. The park passed-through the costs of the sewage treatment plant enlargement to each resident within the park, at a cost of $218.25 per lot. In addition, there is an ad valorem property fire tax which is passed-on to each resident of $34.05 per lot. The fire tax is included within the November 1 tax bill and is paid March 31 of the next year. Neither the charge for sewer enlargement or the fire tax was disclosed prior to occupancy. The park owner has no record as to whether these types of fees and charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is a partnership doing business in the State of Florida, which operates the Coral Lakes Mobile Home Park located in Broward County, Florida. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood has passed-on increases in ad valorem property taxes in 1986 and 1987 to each resident within the mobile home park. The total pass-on charges for those two years is $15,600. There are 118 lots in the park that were occupied by residents prior to June 4, 1984. Each of these lots was charged a pass-on charge for taxes. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is not aware of whether ad valorem tax increases were passed-on to residents prior to July 1, 1976, nor are they aware as to what disclosures were made to the residents in the mobile home park prior to occupancy. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is the park owner of Shadow Hills Mobile Home Park in Orange County, Florida. Orange County has mandated that the mobile home park hook-up to the county sewer system. The cost of hook-up is $829,000 for hook-up fees, $50,000 to install a lift station for the purpose of complying with regulations for hook-up to the county sewage system, and $50,000 to eliminate percolation ponds which are currently on site. The owner of the mobile home park intends to pass-through the cost of the hook-up to the Orange County sewer system by amortizing that cost over a fourteen-year period. The mobile home park prospectus provides that the mobile home park may pass-through costs incurred due to the actions of state and local governments or utility companies. The park owner does not know whether these charges were collected prior to July 1, 1976. Clayton, Williams and Sherwood is also the park owner of Lakewood Mobile Home Park in Indian River County, Florida. Indian River County has mandated that Lakewood Mobile Home Park hook-up to the county sewer system at a cost of $484,000 to the mobile home park. This $484,000 includes hook-up fees and approximately $50,000 for a lift station to be installed as part of the hook-up. The prospectus for Lakewood Mobile Home Park provides that the park owner may pass-through costs incurred due to actions by state and local governments or utility companies as a separate charge. However, the park owner does not know whether a pass-through charge was disclosed to the residents of the park prior to occupancy nor whether such charge was collected prior to July 1, 1976. Charles Metcalf is the owner of Woodall's Trailer Park, located at 2121 New Tampa Highway, Lakeland, Florida 33801. Woodall's Trailer Park was required by the City of Lakeland to upgrade the electric utility system in the park. The approximate cost of this upgrade, which is presently being installed, is $35,000. The park owner operated the mobile home park based upon oral leases prior to the submission and approval of the prospectus of the mobile home park. The prospectus was approved June 4, 1985, by Respondent. The mobile home park owner intends to pass-through the cost of upgrading the electrical utility system to 253 mobile home lots located in the park. Those 253 mobile home lots are occupied by residents who were residents of the park as of June 4, 1984. The park owner did not disclose a pass-through or pass-on charge to any of those residents prior to occupancy, nor has a pass-through or pass-on charge been collected in the park prior to July 1, 1976. A pass-through charge is allowed in the mobile home park prospectus for costs incurred as the result of actions of state or local governments or utility companies. Jack Zieaer is the manager of Gulfstream Harbor, a 383 unit mobile home park, which began development in 1980. Approximately 235 lots were occupied on June 4, 1984 and approximately 260 lots were occupied on December 31, 1984. The prospectus for the mobile home park, which was filed on December 31, 1984, and distributed to existing tenants in the park, authorizes the imposition of separate charges on the home owners in addition to the basic lot rental amount, which separate charges were not disclosed in advance of occupancy. One hundred and twenty-three residents of the park received advance disclosure of all the charges set forth in the prospectus prior to occupancy. The tenancies of those 123 residents began after June 4, 1984. James F. Gould is the resident manager of Mobile Home Country Club, which contains 269 lots and which has been in operation for approximately 25 years. Twenty to twenty-five residents apply for residency in the park each year. The park imposes an application fee of $50 to screen the residents. Approximately $32,000 per year is collected for separate water and sewer charges plus an administrative fee. The separate charge for water was disclosed to people when they moved into the park. William Hart is the owner and operator of seven mobile home parks, including Havenwood Adult Mobile Home Community. In 1981, 1986 and 1987, Hart passed-through to the residents at Havenwood tax increases in addition to the basic lot rental amount. All of Hart's prospectuses authorize the pass-through of charges billed by state or local governments or utility companies and provide for a $50 investigation fee to investigate proposed residents. The total investigative fees collected from all seven of Hart's parks in 1987 was approximately $9,400. The taxes passed-on in Havenwood in 1981, 1986 and 1987 total approximately $850, $1,300, and $2,100 respectively. DeAnza Corporation owns eight mobile home parks in Florida with about 5,300 spaces, including Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park in St. Petersburg, Florida. Mobil Americana Mobile Home Park was in operation prior to June 4, 1984, and was developed beginning about 22-23 years ago. DeAnza purchased Mobil Americana in 1976, at which time there was a lease in place in the park. There were 758 residents in the park at the time it was purchased of whom 275 continue in occupancy today. DeAnza charges an application fee in all of its parks of $50, except for one park which charges an application fee of $20. Five hundred and forty-eight of the 758 lots presently occupied at Mobil Americana are occupied by residents who moved in before June 4, 1984. The City of St. Petersburg has instructed DeAnza to install 11 new fire hydrants in Mobil Americana, and DeAnza has responded by proposing to install two. An engineer has estimated that it would cost approximately one-half million dollars to install 11 hydrants in the park and that it would cost approximately $68,500 to install only two. DeAnza and the City are continuing to negotiate concerning the fire hydrants. The park intends to pass-through the costs of any fire hydrants to the residents. Rents are increased in the park yearly, and every two years the rental level is set by the market. The park owner determines the market. A substantial number of Petitioner's members will experience an adverse and/or substantial economic impact as a result of the proposed rule, if adopted. The past practice of collecting pass-through and pass-on charges by the park owners will be illegal under the proposed rule. In addition, the past collections of fees, charges and assessments which were not disclosed prior to occupancy or collected prior to July 1, 1976, will be illegal and subject to Respondent's enforcement jurisdiction. Those illegal charges may be required to be paid back to the homeowners. As such, there is a substantial economic impact from the proposed rule. Petitioner has standing to challenge proposed rule 7D-31.002, pursuant to sections 120.54(4) and 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's Executive Director conducted a partial survey of Petitioner's members. Over 5 percent of the surveyed parks have already charged pass-through charges for governmentally mandated capital improvements to their residents, including residents of the parks prior to June 4, 1984, and a substantial number of others intend to in the future. The term "entrance fee," as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a fee charged for moving a mobile home onto a vacant mobile home lot in a mobile home park, whether that is done by a dealer or a home owner. The term "application fee" as that term is commonly understood in the mobile home industry, is a charge for recouping the costs associated with credit checks, screening, and criminal background checks in qualifying a potential resident of the park. It applies to someone who purchases an existing home in the park. The Respondent acknowledges that there is an economic impact from the statute as interpreted by the proposed rule and that the economic impact of the proposed rule on regulated persons was pointed out to the Respondent during workshops on the proposed rule. However, the Respondent did not conduct any investigation of the economic impact of the proposed rule. No economist conducted the economic impact analysis; rather, the economic impact statement supporting the proposed rule was prepared by Respondent's legal section. No consideration was given by Respondent to the amount of monies involved in pass- through charges. Further, no review was made by Respondent of the prospectuses contained in its own files in order to determine the kind or extent of economic impact on the persons regulated by Respondent, i.e., the park owners. The parties have stipulated that there is no provision in chapter 723, Florida Statutes, which expressly provides that all fees, charges and assessments have to be fully disclosed in writing. Pass-through charges or pass-on charges are not prohibited by chapter 723, Florida Statutes; rather, that chapter specifically defines pass-through charges and even requires that all prospectuses contain a description of the manner in which pass-through charges will be assessed. It is the common understanding in the mobile home industry that park owners cannot require mobile home owners to install permanent improvements on their individual lots, such as driveways, etc. However, mobile home owners can be contractually obligated to pay the cost of installing capital improvements required by local governments or utility companies--pass-through charges by statutory definition.
