The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Department of Transportation (Respondent) committed an act of unlawful employment discrimination against Stephen G. Leslie (Petitioner) in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA) of 1992.
Findings Of Fact In 1986, the Petitioner began his employment with the Respondent as a "Safety Specialist." Beginning in 2001, and at all times material to this case, the Petitioner was employed by the Respondent as an "Outdoor Advertising Regional Inspector." As an outdoor advertising regional inspector, the Petitioner's responsibilities included patrolling state roads in his assigned counties to ascertain the status of permitted outdoor advertising signs and to remove signs that were illegally placed on state right-of-way. The Respondent's duties required extensive driving, which he did in a state-supplied vehicle. The Petitioner was based at the Respondent's Tampa headquarters, but was supervised by employees located in Tallahassee. In 2007, the Petitioner began to experience neurological health issues, but he continued to work and was able to perform the responsibilities of his employment. From September 2008 to June 2011, the Petitioner was supervised by Robert Jessee. In 2009, the Petitioner's health issues got worse. He began to take more sick leave, which the Respondent approved upon request of the Petitioner. The Respondent also provided equipment to accommodate the Petitioner's health issues, including a laptop computer and larger mirrors on the Petitioner's state vehicle. The Respondent also assigned another employee to ride with the Petitioner and to remove signs illegally placed on state right-of-way so that the Petitioner did not have to exit the vehicle. In 2010, the Petitioner was involved in two automobile accidents while driving the state vehicle. In January, he ran into a vehicle that was stopped for a school bus. In February, while transporting a group of other employees on I-75, the Respondent struck rode debris and the vehicle was damaged. In April 2010, the Petitioner's presence in the Tampa headquarters building was restricted for reasons that were unclear. Although the restrictions caused embarrassment to the Petitioner, there was no evidence presented at the hearing to suggest that such measures were related in any way to the Petitioner's disability. Following an investigation of the traffic incidents by the Respondent's inspector general, the Petitioner received a written reprimand dated August 18, 2010, and was directed to take the Respondent's online driving course. Beginning in June 2011 and through the remainder of the Petitioner's employment by the Respondent, the Petitioner was supervised by Michael Green. The Respondent collects statistical data to measure the productivity of persons employed as outdoor advertising regional inspectors. The Petitioner's productivity statistics were significantly lower than those of other inspectors, and he was behind in his assignments. Accordingly, Mr. Green rode along with the Petitioner for three consecutive days in September 2011 to observe the Petitioner's work. At the hearing, Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner arrived late to pick him up at his hotel on all three days. On one of those days, the Petitioner accomplished an employment- related task prior to picking up the supervisor. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner's driving made him feel unsafe during the observation. Mr. Green observed that the Petitioner accelerated and slowed the vehicle in an abrupt manner, and that he failed to use turn signals at appropriate times. Mr. Green also testified that the Petitioner was preoccupied as he drove by electronic devices, including a cell phone. Mr. Green testified that the Petitioner appeared to have difficulty entering and exiting the vehicle, and with hearing certain noises in the vehicle, including the click of the turn signal. Mr. Green testified that he felt so unsafe that he asked the Petitioner to alter his driving practices while Mr. Green was in the vehicle. Mr. Green testified that during the observation ride, the Petitioner discussed his physical condition and admitted that medical appointments during the week made it difficult to maintain the routine work schedule. The Petitioner also advised Mr. Green that he was considering filing for disability retirement. After returning to the Tallahassee headquarters, Mr. Green prepared a memorandum dated September 19, 2011, to memorialize his observations about the Petitioner's job performance. Mr. Green's memorandum was directed to Juanice Hughes (deputy director of the Respondent's right-of-way office) and to the Respondent's outdoor advertising manager. In the memo, Mr. Green recommended that the Petitioner be required to provide medical verification of his continued ability to perform the responsibilities of his position. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 23, 2011, Ms. Hughes restated Mr. Green's observations and directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that the Petitioner was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. The letter specifically directed the Petitioner to provide medical information related to his ability to work his normal schedule, the existence of any work restrictions or required accommodations, and the impact of any medications prescribed for the Petitioner. The letter established a deadline of September 30, 2011, for the Petitioner's compliance with its requirements, and advised that he would not be permitted to resume his employment duties until the medical verification information was provided and any required accommodations were in place. The Petitioner apparently did not become aware of the letter until September 29, 2011. On that date, both Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes attempted to contact the Petitioner via his work cell phone and by email to advise him of the letter and to direct that he retrieve the letter from the district headquarters. Shortly after 4:00 p.m., contact was made with the Petitioner by calling his personal cell phone. At that time, the Petitioner was advised that he needed to return to the district headquarters to pick up the letter. He was further advised that he was being placed on leave until the requirements of the letter were met and that he needed to turn in his state vehicle when he arrived at the headquarters. The Petitioner advised Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes that he was attempting to obtain documentation required to file for disability retirement, and he asked for an extension of time during which to do so. His request for an extension was denied. The Petitioner, clearly unhappy with the circumstance, made a statement during the conversation that was considered by Mr. Green and Ms. Hughes to suggest that the Petitioner could cause damage to himself or to the state vehicle. The actual words spoken were disputed at the hearing, and the evidence fails to establish that the Petitioner would have actually damaged the vehicle or himself. Nonetheless, it was clear after the conversation that the Petitioner was resistant to the Department's instructions. The Respondent immediately directed James Moulton, the director of Transportation Operations for the Tampa district, to check on the Petitioner's condition and to retrieve the vehicle assigned to the Petitioner. Mr. Moulton did so, accompanied by local law enforcement personnel, at approximately 7:00 p.m. on September 29, 2011. In a letter to the Petitioner dated September 30, 2011, Ms. Hughes recounted the events of the day before and again directed the Petitioner to obtain medical verification that he was able to perform the responsibilities of his position safely. No deadline was set for the Petitioner's compliance, and he was advised that he could use leave for any absence related to obtaining the medical documentation. A few days later, the Petitioner advised the Respondent that he would be unable to obtain the requested medical verification and that he would be filing an application for medical disability retirement. In November 2011, the Petitioner filed the application accompanied by medical documentation establishing that the Petitioner had a "total and permanent disability," as defined by section 121.091(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2011).1/ His application was approved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2013.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, respondent, Jack Michael Schwartz, held a life and health agent and ordinary combination life including health agent license issued by petitioner, Department of Insurance and Treasurer. Respondent presently resides at 2027 Northeast 172nd Street, North Miami Beach, Florida. On November 30, 1981 respondent submitted an application to petitioner for licensure as an ordinary life including disability agent. Question 15 on the application asked the following: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" Respondent answered "No." The application was subsequently approved by petitioner in February, 1982 after respondent successfully completed a written examination. On June 18, 1985 respondent submitted an application to petitioner for licensure as a general lines agent. Question 11 on the application asked the following question: "Have you ever been charged with or convicted of a felony?" Respondent answered "No." During the course of a routine background check of Schwartz, petitioner later learned that respondent had pled guilty to grand larceny by fraudulent representation on August 3, 1977 in circuit court in and for Broward County, Florida. The offense is a felony. Schwartz was thereafter placed on probation for five years under the direct supervision of the Department of Offender Rehabilitation. He was released from probation after two and one-half years. Schwartz acknowledged that he had pled guilty to a felony. However, after his probation was ended, Schwartz interpreted advice from his probation officer to mean he did not have to acknowledge on job or licensure applications that he had been convicted of a felony. He had no further explanation for his answers.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the license and eligibility for licensure of respondent be REVOKED. DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of September, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 86-1809 PETITIONER: Covered in finding of fact 4. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 2. Covered in finding of fact 3. Covered in finding of fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Bill Gunter Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Wilbur W. Anderson, Esquire 413-B Larson Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack Michael Schwartz 2027 N.E. 172nd Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33162
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 by committing unlawful employment practice (discrimination) on the basis of Petitioner's sex (female), National Origin (Hispanic), handicap when it terminated Petitioner from employment, or on the basis of sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact As noted above in the Preliminary Statement, the parties have entered into an Agreement of Settlement and Mutual and General Release. Their agreement, in pertinent part, includes the following: "DM, on the one hand, and JBF (under the name Joe Blasco Cosmetics), on the other hand, are parties to proceeding which took place before the State of Florida Division of Administrative Hearings, in Case No. 01- 2328, on about June 28, 2001, with respect to DM's claims of discrimination against JBE (the"Action"). Each of the parties hereto considers it to be in its best interest, and to its advantage, forever to settle, adjust, and comprise all claims and defenses which have been, or could have been, asserted in connection with the employment relationship, the Action, and/or in an other action or proceeding arising out of any employment or other relationship between the parties hereto. The terms of this Agreement are contractual, not a mere recital, and this Agreement is the result of negotiation between the parties, each of whom has participated in the drafting hereof, through each of the parties' respective attorneys. Diana Morales shall dismiss with prejudice Case No. 01-2328 pending before the State of Florida, Division of Administrative Hearings. Diana Morales agrees to execute and file any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any and all documents necessary to dismiss her claim and advise any investigative bodies, administrative bodies and/or courts that she has withdrawn, dismissed and resolved any and all claims with Joe Blasco Cosmetics, Joe Blasco Enterprises and/or Joe Blasco." The parties' stipulated settlement agreement constitutes an informal disposition of all issues in this proceeding.
The Issue Whether respondents are guilty of an unlawful employment practice as alleged by petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, including the pleadings and argument of counsel, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Carolyn E. Simmons, is a black female. In 1990, she began employment as a cook with respondent, Inverness Inn (Inn), an employer allegedly subject to the Florida Human Rights Act, as amended. At that time, the Inn was owned by respondent, Cvetko Blazevski. On March 25, 1992, petitioner filed a charge of discrimination with the Commission on Human Relations (Commission) alleging that she was "harassed and subjected to racial terms by Mr. Cretko (sic) Blazevski, Owner, from the beginning of (her) employment until the present time." For the purpose of ruling on this motion only, the undersigned has accepted this allegation as being true. The charge of discrimination, and the petition for relief subsequently filed, did not specify the relief being sought. In April 1992, Blazevski's ownership in the Inn was terminated by a court, and the Inn later closed and went out of business. Petitioner continued to work in her position as a cook after Blazevski left the Inn and until it closed. According to petitioner's counsel, Simmons seeks only compensatory damages against respondents for their conduct.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order dismissing with prejudice the petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of October, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of October, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Kenneth S. Stepp, Esquire 305 North Apopka Avenue Inverness, Florida 34450 David L. Wilcox, Esquire 452 Pleasant Grove Road Inverness, Florida 34452
The Issue Should discipline be imposed against Respondent's license to practice medicine for violation of Section 458.331(1)(b) and (kk), Florida Statutes (2005)?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state department charged with the regulation of the practice of medicine pursuant to Chapter 20.43, Florida Statutes; Chapter 456, Florida Statutes; and Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. Respondent is Gina Marie Dieudonne, M.D. Respondent is a licensed medical doctor in the State of Florida, having been issued license ME 89209. Respondent's mailing address-of-record is 48 Goldfield Cove, Jackson, Tennessee 38305. The Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR) is the licensing authority regulating the practice of medicine in the State of Illinois. On or about January 4, 2006, the IDFPR entered an Order indefinitely suspending Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois. The IDFPR disciplined Respondent for failing to pay Illinois individual income tax for the tax years of 1999 and 2003. On March 27, 2006, Respondent executed a Petition for Restoration in front of a Notary Public in Illinois, seeking to have her Illinois license to practice medicine reinstated. On or about July 10, 2006, the Respondent signed a Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement that, if approved by the IDFPR, would lift the suspension and allow the Respondent to renew her Illinois license, while placing her Illinois medical license on indefinite probation, until such time as the Respondent satisfactorily completed the payment of delinquent state income taxes and satisfactorily completed repayment of her Illinois Student Assistance Commission student loans outstanding. The Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement was approved by the Medical Disciplinary Board on August 2, 2006. On or about October 18, 2006, the Director of the IDFPR signed an Order adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation. The January 4, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR, which indefinitely suspended Respondent's license to practice as a physician and surgeon in the State of Illinois, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. The October 18, 2006, Order entered by the IDFPR adopting the Stipulation and Recommendation for Settlement, subject to the terms therein, including the indefinite probation, constitutes disciplinary action against the Respondent's Illinois medical license. Respondent failed to report, in writing, to the Board within thirty (30) days of the January 4, 2006, suspension of her medical license by the IDFPR. Respondent reported the October 18, 2006, order of stipulated indefinite probation of her medical license by the IDFPR to the Board on February 12, 2007. The report letter dated February 12, 2007, had a copy of the disciplinary documents from Illinois attached to it and was received by DOH Licensure Services Unit on February 15, 2007. On April 3, 2007, an order was entered by IDFPR terminating the earlier order of probation on Respondent's Illinois' license pertaining to Respondent's failure to repay student loans. Other restrictions imposed on the license remained in force and effect. Prior Disciplinary History Respondent's Illinois medical license was subjected to disciplinary action in two prior cases. In Case No. 92-2870 Respondent's Illinois medical license was placed on probation by terms of a Consent Order signed by Respondent on September 14, 1992, for failure to repay student loans. The probation was terminated by Consent order approved March 26, 1993. In Case No. 96-4999, an Order was issued, effective July 31, 1996, ordering that her license not be renewed for failure to repay student loans. Her license was restored by Order to Restore dated August 20, 1996.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of facts found and the conclusions, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered reprimanding Respondent's medical license, imposing an administrative fine of $4,000.00, and placing Respondent's license on probation until she presents evidence to the Florida Board of Medicine that her Illinois medical license is free and unencumbered. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of June, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of June, 2008.
The Issue Whether the Respondent violated Chapter 626, Florida Statutes, by entering a plea of nolo contendere of grand theft of the third degree; whether he was placed on probation without an adjudication of guilt for grand theft of the third degree; and whether he lacks the fitness and trustworthiness to engage in the insurance business contrary to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Ronald David Lewis, holds various licenses to sell insurance contracts issued by the Petitioner, which is charged by statutes to regulate licensees. The Respondent misappropriated over $10,000 from Audrey M. Walker, who was a client of the Respondent. The State's Attorney for the Seventh Judicial Circuit filed an information against the Respondent charging him with grand theft of the third degree. The Circuit Court Judge Shawn L. Briese entered an order of probation which reflects that the Respondent entered a plea of nolo contendere, and was placed on 60 months' probation by order withholding adjudication of guilt. The deposition of Audrey M. Walker establishes that the Respondent misappropriated funds from Ms. Walker, whose trust he had gained by virtue of his licensed status.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter its final order revoking all the licenses Respondent holds to sell insurance contracts. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of March, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance Division of Legal Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Ronald David Lewis 3800 South Atlantic Avenue Apartment 304 Daytona Beach, Florida 32127 Daniel Y. Sumner, General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, Lower Level 26 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0307 Honorable Tom Gallagher State Treasurer/Insurance Commissioner Department of Insurance The Capitol, Plaza Level 02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by the University of South Florida on or about November 18, 1990 as a Senior Computer Support Specialist. As with all university employees she was required to satisfactorily complete a probationary period of six months. By memorandum dated April 26, 1991, subject: Pre-probationary appraisal (Exhibit 6), Petitioner was advised of the areas in which she should improve her performance. Petitioner offered into evidence monthly reports for February through May, 1991 (Exhibit 1-4) submitted by Petitioner's supervisor, Janis Rawdin, for the apparent purpose of showing that other members of the group supervised by Rawdin were mentioned more than was Petitioner. Nothing in these reports supports Petitioner's allegation of discrimination by reason of national origin. After Petitioner had completed her testimony with cross-examination, redirect and recross without testifying regarding her national origin, the Hearing Officer asked where she was born and Petitioner responded, the Virgin Islands. Petitioner testified that Rawdin was short and abrupt with her, treated her badly, and that she was not included in all of the training sessions. No evidence was presented that this alleged treatment resulted from, or was influenced by, Petitioner's national origin. Petitioner also testified that she was assigned projects for which she had not been trained. However, the nature of her assignment to field question from computer users at the University (and perhaps from the general public), would necessarily result in questions requiring additional research before giving a correct answer. Petitioner's assignment, as noted above, was to answer questions regarding computer usage and to help those inquiring to solve the problem they had encountered. Although repeatedly advised to use only computer terminology when responding to inquiries, which terminology was contained in the instruction books, Petitioner failed to do so. Janis Rawdin, who was Petitioner's supervisor and recommended Petitioner for dismissal at the expiration of the six months probationary period, found that Petitioner was not learning the job at the expected rate; and that Petitioner was unlikely to reach the stage where she would qualify for advanced training. In summary, Petitioner presented no evidence that her dismissal was in any wise related to her national origin. Those allegations in the Petition for Relief that she was mistreated, etc. unless associated with a right protected by the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, do not constitute grounds for relief in these proceedings.
Recommendation That a Final Order be entered dismissing Christie A. Jacobs' Petition for Relief from an unlawful employment practice filed against the University of South Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 2nd day of December, 1992, at Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Jones, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Christie A. Jacobs P.O. Box 310774 Tampa, FL 33680-0744 Wendy J. Thompson, Esquire University of South Florida 4202 Fowler Avenue, Adm. 250 Tampa, FL 33620-6250
Findings Of Fact The following facts are stipulated by the parties and are incorporated herein: The Respondent has been the clerk of court for Collier County since June of 1986. The Respondent was the clerk of court at all times material to this complaint. In July of 1990, the Respondent's wife was issued a citation for having glass bottles on the beach, a violation of municipal ordinance No. 16.30, City of Naples. On August 21, 1990, upon failure to timely pay the fine for the violation of the above-described ordinance or to appear in court on this date, an arrest warrant for Theresa Giles was issued. On August 30, 1990, on or about 4:30 p.m., police officers arrived at the Respondent's residence to arrest Ms. Giles for her failure to appear or to pay fine. The officers allowed Ms. Giles to make a telephone call to her husband at the clerk's office. The Respondent went to one of his deputy clerks, Lorraine Stoll and discussed the situation with her. As a result, Ms. Stoll called the officers at the Respondent's home and informed them that the bench warrant for Ms. Giles was recalled. Ms. Giles was not taken into custody as a result of Ms. Stoll's action. These facts are derived from the evidence presented, weighed and credited: Respondent, James Giles was the Collier County finance director, performing the pre-audit function for the county, when he was appointed county clerk to finish a two year term in 1986. He was then elected to a four year term ending in January 1993, and was not reelected. His prior employment experience was as a private certified public accountant, an employee of St. Johns County, and an auditor for the State of Florida. On August 30, 1990, when Theresa Giles called her husband, she was very upset. He had promised to pay the fine, but had forgotten. She was home alone with her young child and her elderly mother when the deputies came to serve the warrant and arrest her. The ticket, or "Notice to Appear" issued to Ms. Giles for her infraction plainly provides notice that if the fine is not paid or the person fails to appear in court at the appointed time, an arrest warrant shall be issued. (Advocate Exhibit No. 2) James Giles immediately called his misdemeanor division and Kathleen Heck answered the phone. After he briefly explained the situation, she went to find the supervisor, Lorraine Stoll. As the two women were at Ms. Stoll's desk, bringing Ms. Giles' case up on the computer, Mr. Giles appeared in person. This was a very unusual situation because the clerk rarely came back to the misdemeanor office. He was Lorraine Stoll's immediate supervisor. He asked if there was anything that could be done and Ms. Stoll responded that the warrant could be recalled. Before she could explain any further, he handed her a paper with his home phone and asked her to make the call. Ms. Giles answered the phone and put the deputy on; Ms. Stoll told him the warrant was recalled, and Ms. Giles was not arrested. Ms. Stoll then told Mr. Giles that the fine and court costs had to be paid. He said the whole thing was ridiculous, that he could not believe a warrant could be issued for such a minor offense. By this time it was after 5:00 p.m. and the cashier's office was closed. Giles paid the $36.50 fine the next day and paid the $100.00 court costs on September 13, some two weeks later. (Respondent's exhibits nos. 1 and 2). James Giles admits being upset at the time that the phone call was made, but was trying to calm down because he knew Lorraine Stoll to be excitable. He was flabbergasted that someone could be arrested for having bottles on the beach. He denies that he pressured Ms. Stoll, but claims he was trying to be rational and get sound advice. He wanted her to make the call because he felt it would "look bad" if he did. James Giles did not raise his voice but both Ms. Stoll and Ms. Heck perceived he was upset and in a pressure situation. Ms. Stoll had never been involved in a circumstance where the warrant was recalled while the deputies were getting ready to make an arrest. She has worked in the misdemeanor section of the clerk's office for eleven and a half years, as deputy clerk. No ordinary citizen could have received the advantage that the clerk and his wife received. Judge Ellis, a Collier County judge, has a written policy providing that a bench warrant may be set aside after payment of costs and fine. Another county judge, Judge Trettis, requires that his office or the State's Attorney be called, and does not have a written policy. Ms. Stoll does not have the authority to recall a warrant without following the proper procedure. This situation was out of the ordinary. She made the telephone call because her boss told her to, and their main concern was that the warrant needed to be recalled so Ms. Giles would not go to jail. On the other hand, Ms. Stoll did not tell Mr. Giles that he was pressuring her, nor did she have the opportunity to tell him the proper procedure before making the telephone call. James Giles' explanation that he was simply seeking advice of his staff and then acting on it without wrongful intent is disingenuous. Whatever his actual knowledge of proper procedures for recalling a warrant, he knew or should have known that what he was doing was not an opportunity available to other citizens. His experience in the clerk's office and in prior public service should have clued him that no one else could simply get a deputy clerk to intercept an arrest with a telephone call.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Commission on Ethics enter its final order finding that James Giles violated Section 112.313(6), F.S., and recommending a civil penalty of $250.00. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 27th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of January, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4942EC The following constitute specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by the parties: Advocate's Proposed Findings 1. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraph 9. Adopted in substance in paragraph 12. 8.-10. Adopted in substance in paragraph 10. 11. Adopted in substance in paragraph 13. Respondent's Proposed Findings 1. A.-E. Adopted as stipulated facts in paragraphs 1-5. Adopted in substance in paragraphs 8 and 12. Rejected as the sequence suggested is contrary to the weight of evidence. Rejected as misleading. The evidence shows the process was incorrect and both staff knew it was incorrect. The clerk was informed about the correct procedure after the phone call. The procedure is set out in paragraph 13. The evidence is not clear that the fine and costs could not have been paid the same day. By the time Mr. Giles finished complaining, it was after 5:00. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence, considering the totality of Ms. Stoll's testimony as well as Ms. Heck's. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Rejected as immaterial. 3. Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of evidence. More specifically, this proposed finding suggests that the culpability was Ms. Stoll's rather than Respondent's. That suggestion is supported only by Ms. Stoll's timid admissions that she should not have made the phone call without having received the payment from her boss. Ms. Stoll's acceptance of blame does not relieve the Respondent of his responsibility. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig B. Willis Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol, Suite 1502 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Raymond Bass, Jr., Esquire Bass & Chernoff 849 7th Avenue, South - Suite 200 Naples, Florida 33940-6715 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission Post Office Box 6 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0006
The Issue Whether the Petitioner's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesman should be approved or denied.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and on the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: The Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Florida Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating yacht and ship brokers and salespersons in Florida. Section 326.003, Florida Statutes (1997). On July 28, 1998, the Division received an application for a yacht and ship salesperson's license from Richard Badolato. Question 13 on the application solicits information of the applicant's criminal history as follows: Have you ever been convicted of a crime, either pled or been found guilty, or entered a plea of nolo contendere (no contest), even if adjudication was withheld? NOTE: This question applies to any violation of the laws of any municipality, county, state, or nation, including traffic offenses (but not parking, speeding, inspection or traffic signal violations), without regard to whether you were placed on probation, had adjudication withheld, paroled, or pardoned. Your answer to this question will be checked against local and state records. Failure to answer this question accurately could cause denial of licensure. After Question 15 of the application, the following statement appears in bold type: "If your answer to question 13, 14, or 15 is Yes, attach your complete signed statement of the charges and facts, together with the dates, name and location of the court in which the proceedings were held or are pending." Mr. Badolato answered Question 13 in the affirmative, and he signed the application, thereby certifying that "the foregoing information is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief." Mr. Badolato did not provide the statement of particulars which must be submitted by those answering Question 13 in the affirmative. In a letter dated July 28, 1998, the Division notified Mr. Badolato that his application was incomplete and that he should, among other things, provide a complete written explanation of his criminal history. In response to this letter, Mr. Badolato provided a signed statement in which he stated: "I was arrested and charged with possession of marj. in 1981." Mr. Badolato also provided a telephone number on the statement, indicating that he could be contacted at that number if the Division had any questions. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 326.004(15), the Division issued a 90-day temporary license to Mr. Badolato, pending completion of the criminal history analysis that is done on all applicants by the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. The Division subsequently received a report from the Federal Bureau of Investigation which revealed that Mr. Badolato had three drug-related felony convictions, as well as an arrest on June 22, 1977, which resulted in a charge of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On August 24, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Brunswick, Georgia, of conspiracy to smuggle marijuana; he was sentenced to ten years in prison and ordered to pay a $30,000 fine. On October 23, 1981, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Miami, Florida, of conspiracy to distribute cocaine; he was sentenced to thirty months in prison, to run consecutively with the ten-year sentence in the Georgia case. On January 31, 1989, Mr. Badolato was convicted in federal district court in Maryland of conspiracy to distribute marijuana; he was sentenced to thirty-six months in prison, to run concurrently with any sentence imposed for a violation of parole. Mr. Badolato was released from prison in 1991 and successfully completed parole in December 1996 with respect to the 1989 conviction. In late 1997, Mr. Badolato received a letter advising him that he might be eligible for clemency. An attorney acting on behalf of Mr. Badolato filed an application for clemency with the Florida Parole Commission. Although Mr. Badolato has never seen this application, he assumes that the file developed during review of the application contains complete information regarding his criminal history.2 When the Division received the Federal Bureau of Investigation report, Peter Butler, head of the Division's general enforcement section, contacted Mr. Badolato by telephone, read to him the statement in the application quoted in paragraph 4 above, and asked him if he wanted to amend his application. Because he could not remember the exact dates of his three felony convictions, Mr. Badolato responded by referring Mr. Butler to the Clemency Board if Mr. Butler wanted to obtain further information about Mr. Badolato's criminal history. Mr. Badolato acknowledged in his testimony that he should have been more thorough in completing his application for licensure, that he was lazy and stupid for not being more forthcoming in the application, and that he did not intend to mislead the Division. He believed that, by answering "Yes" to Question 13 and admitting that he was arrested and charged with possession of marijuana in 1981, he had provided enough information to alert the Division that he had a criminal history. He also assumed that it would be very easy for the Division to obtain complete information about his background merely by running a computer check and by reviewing the information in his clemency application file. From 1991, when he was released from prison, until December 1998, Mr. Badolato was involved in the restaurant business in a managerial capacity, and, as part of his duties, he handled large sums of money. No money in his care was ever found missing, and no adverse employment actions were taken against him during this time. In addition, during the time he was on parole, Mr. Badolato periodically submitted to random drug-testing and never failed a test. The evidence presented by Mr. Badolato is not sufficient to establish that he is of good moral character. He admitted in his answer to Question 13 on the application that he had been convicted of a felony, yet he included in the statement which he filed as part of the application a vague, incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate reference to an arrest and charge of possession of marijuana in 1981.3 Furthermore, Mr. Badolato certified by his signature on the application form that the information he provided was "true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief," when he was certainly fully aware that he had three separate felony convictions. Mr. Badolato presented evidence of his good employment history subsequent to his release from prison in 1991, his successful termination of probation, and his faithful payments on the $30,000 fine imposed in 1981, all of which tend to show rehabilitation and good moral character. However, Mr. Badolato's failure to include in his application complete and accurate information regarding his criminal history tends to show lack of rehabilitation and lack of good moral character. On balance, Mr. Badolato's failure to disclose in his application his complete criminal history outweighs the evidence he presented to show rehabilitation and good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums, and Mobile Homes, enter a final order denying Richard Badolato's application for licensure as a yacht and ship salesperson. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of August, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1999.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, as alleged in Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Findings of fact set forth in the Recommended Order are approved and adopted and incorporated herein. There is competent substantial evidence to support the findings of fact.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license to practice medicine in Florida be suspended for a period of five years or completion of his appellate review in Vermont whichever first occurs; and, unless the revocation of Respondent's license to practice medicine in Vermont is set aside, then, upon completion of appellate review in Vermont, Respondent's license number ME 0042228 be revoked and that Respondent be assessed an administrative fine of $2,000.00. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings are accepted except Findings 12-18, which are rejected as fact, accepted as Conclusions of Law. Respondent's proposed findings are accepted except: Accepted as a recital of the deposition testimony of the witness. Second sentence rejected. However, in making the recommendation for punishment in this case the Hearing Officer did not consider Exhibit 5. Rejected. Exhibit 6 was accepted as an Order of the Superior Court of Vermont expressing the law in Vermont, which order was approved by the Supreme Court of Vermont without opinion. The Hearing Officer made no comparison of the curriculum vitae in Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 8. No independent review of Mr. Langrocks' rating in Martindale-Hubbell was done by this Hearing Officer. With respect to Mr. Langrock's testimony of the law in Vermont respecting the administrative appeal, his testimony conflicts with the following generally accepted principles: The Superior Court will reject the appeal until Respondent has exhausted his administrative remedies; The revocation of 26 VSA 1363 and its replacement by 3 VSA 130 is in the nature of procedural change rather than a substantive change in the law. If so, the general rule of law is that procedural changes take effect upon enactment and the former statute which provided for a de novo appeal to the Superior Court is no longer available to Respondent, even though his right to appeal occurred prior to the change in the law. Once Respondent has exhausted his administrative remedies he can appeal that decision (if adverse) under 3 VSA 130. COPIES FURNISHED: Larry G. McPherson, Esquire Chief Medical Attorney Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Paul B. Johnson, Esquire JOHNSON & JOHNSON Post Office Box 3416 Tampa, Florida 33601 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0700 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Florida Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 0750
