Findings Of Fact Petitioner proposes to erect nine signs along SR 29 advertising the Cypress Knee Museum located in Palmdale, Florida. The signs are unique in that they are comprised of tree limbs with letters one foot high also made from parts of limbs formed to make the letters which carry interesting messages regarding the Cypress Knee Museum. Many people would consider these proposed signs add to the beauty of the natural scenery bordering SR 29 and not to detract therefrom. SR 29 is a federal-aid primary highway. The location of the proposed signs is zoned agricultural. No effort has been made by Petitioner to get zoning changes for the proposed location for these signs.
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 1980, Dowden Funeral Home, Respondent, obtained a building permit from Highlands County (Exhibit 4), to construct a wooden sign along U.S. 17 near Sebring, Florida; and thereafter constructed a 20-foot by 14- foot sign along U.S. 17, 0.25 mile northeast of U.S. 27. The location is just outside the city limits of Sebring, Florida, and U.S. 17 is a federal-aid primary highway. Respondent's sign is located approximately 200 feet from a Barnett Bank sign which was permitted and erected in 1977 (Exhibit 6). Respondent's witness contends that when he obtained the building permit and inquired if additional permits were needed to erect this sign, he was told no by the county building officials.
The Issue At issue in these consolidated proceedings is whether the permits for signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116 should be revoked, pursuant to Section 479.08, Florida Statutes (2007).
Findings Of Fact Lamar owns and maintains outdoor advertising signs in the State of Florida. Pursuant to the permitting requirements of Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, the Department issues permits and tags to outdoor advertising signs along interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. Signs that met permitting criteria at the time they were erected, but that do not comply with subsequently enacted laws or that no longer comply with the law due to changed conditions, may nonetheless be permitted and maintained as "nonconforming signs."1 In compliance with Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, the Department in 1997 and 1998 conducted a statewide inventory of all signs on the state interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems. This inventory became the database for all signs permitted at the time it was completed. The Department sent the inventory results to all sign owners in order to provide them an opportunity to confirm or challenge the accuracy of the results. The database includes the location of the sign; the dates the sign was permitted and constructed; its date and method of construction; the height, including the Height Above Ground Level ("HAGL"); the height, width, and square footage of the sign facing; the number and type of support structures used; whether the sign is lighted or not; the status of the sign as a conforming, nonconforming, or illegal sign; and other identifying information. Subsection 479.02(8), Florida Statutes, provides that the inventory of signs is to be updated no less than every two years. The Department in fact performs the update every year. In 2004, a series of hurricanes passed through Florida, destroying or damaging thousands of outdoor advertising signs. The Department issued notices of intent to revoke the permits of nonconforming signs that appeared to have been destroyed by the storms. In February 2005, the Department and Lamar entered into a settlement agreement that allowed Lamar to rebuild some signs and required the removal of others. The signs at issue in this proceeding were among those allowed to remain standing with repair. As to these signs, the settlement agreement provided: The outdoor advertising signs referenced above remain lawfully erected nonconforming signs and LAMAR may repair said signs, provided that said repair shall be at the pre-storm location and to pre-storm specifications, including configuration, type of materials, height, size, area of face and lighting. Exceptions to pre-storm specifications will be allowed to the extent required to comply with local building codes. Such repairs shall be completed within 270 days of entry of a Final Order approving this Joint Stipulation of Settlement. The referenced Final Order was entered on March 15, 2005. The Department issued permit numbers 13778 and 137790 and tag numbers BT339 (replaced by tag number CF221 at the time of the hearing) and AE862 to a nonconforming, back-to-back sign located along U.S. 1 in Martin County, .08 miles north of Constitution Boulevard in Hobe Sound. At the time of the 1997 inventory, the Martin County sign was a five-pole wooden structure. The Martin County sign sustained heavy damage during the 2004 hurricanes. After the storms, Lamar sent a work crew to the sign's location to rebuild the sign. The work crew replaced the sign with a four-pole wooden structure. Dave Henry, the real estate leasing manager for Lamar, testified that he gave the crew no particular instruction on how to rebuild the sign. During the rebuilding process, Mr. Henry gave his crews the locations, and told them to rebuild the signs as they had been before the storms. Mr. Henry stated that the crew probably looked at the remains of the damaged sign, saw only four stumps in the ground, and assumed that the original sign had only four supports. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag numbers BT339 and AE862 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule." On February 20, 2007, a Recommended Order was entered in Lamar South Florida v. Department of Transportation, Case No. 06-3281 (DOAH February 20, 2007). In that case, Judge R. Bruce McKibben recommended that the Department withdraw a Notice issued to Lamar South Florida because the Notice failed to specify exactly which changes to the sign in question caused the sign to be in violation of the Department's rules. Rather, the Notice merely provided a citation to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.007(2)(a). In a final order dated May 21, 2007, the Department accepted Judge McKibben's recommendation, and acknowledged the "apparent confusion" regarding the running of the 30-day notice period and the nature of the notice required to trigger the running of that period. As a result of the Lamar South Florida case, the Department began to issue Notices that contained more specific information regarding the alleged violations. On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Martin County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation, which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code Rule: the number of supports has changed."2 The replacement notice also added the following provision: REVOCATION OF THE PERMIT(S) WILL BECOME FINAL thirty (30) days from your receipt of this notice unless you provide information to the Department showing the Notice was issued in error OR you correct the violation within 30 days of your receipt of this Notice, and provide evidence of the correction to the Department. For nonconforming signs, while you may correct the violation, you may not exceed the allowable maintenance standards as stated in s. 14-10.007(2), F.A.C. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Martin County sign to a five-pole structure. Mr. Henry testified that a fifth pole was added to the structure on November 16, 2007. The Department issued permit number 7359 and tag number AX116 to a nonconforming, single-faced sign in Polk County along U.S. 27, .141 miles east of Heatherwood Boulevard in Lake Wales. On November 22, 1997, the Polk County sign was inventoried and photographed as a seven-pole wooden structure. Lamar did not own the sign at the time the 2004 hurricanes damaged it. Lamar acquired the Polk county sign in 2005, after it had been rebuilt as a six-pole structure. On March 21, 2006, the Department issued a Notice to Lamar, stating that the sign bearing tag number AX116 "has been structurally changed and is no longer substantially the same as it was on the date it became nonconforming, in violation of s. [sic] 14-10.007(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code." On July 31, 2007, the Department sent Lamar a replacement Notice for the Polk County sign, adding a more specific description of the violation which stated that the sign "has been structurally modified in violation of s. [sic] 14- 10.007(2), Florida Administrative Code: the number of supports has changed. . .".3 The replacement notice also contained the language quoted at finding of fact 14, supra. Lamar did not act within 30 days of the Notice to correct the violation and restore the Polk County sign to a seven-pole structure.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation revoking the permits for the nonconforming signs bearing tag numbers BT339, AE862, and AX116. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of February, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 2008.
The Issue Whether Respondent's sign displays lights in violation of Section 479.11(5), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The sign that is the subject of the notice of violation issued by the Department is a "sign" as defined by 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The sign is located within 100 feet of the right-of-way of U.S. Highway 17. The sign is visible from U.S. Highway 17. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the State Highway System. U.S. Highway 17 is part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The lights in question are contained in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible through openings in a panel at the top of the sign. The lights in question are visible from U.S. Highway 17. Prior to September 25, 1992, the lights in question were being automatically turned on and off on a regular cycle. The lights in question were flashing at regular two-second intervals. After September 25, 1992, Central Florida changed the lights in question to remain lighted in a steady manner. Subsequently, Central Florida returned the lights to their earlier state and they are now flashing as they were before. The lights in question are not part of, nor do they illuminate, a written message on the sign. The lights in question have never been part of, nor have they illuminated, a written message on the sign. The photograph of the sign attached to the joint motion is an accurate photograph of the sign in question.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent's sign to be in violation of Section 479.011(5), Florida Statutes, and directing Respondent to remove those intermittent lights forthwith from his sign or change the lights to fixed instead of flashing. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 9th day of April 1993. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul Sexton, Esquire Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert L. Valentine, Esquire Post Office Box 2538 Lakeland, Florida 33806-2538 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation ("DOT") originally issued sign permits in 1964 for the location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2, and these permits have been renewed continuously thereafter. The location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2 is on the east side of U.S. 441. Effective October 30, 1987, Eagle Outdoor Advertising, Inc., which has owned Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2 since 1968 or earlier, transferred them to Peterson Outdoor Advertising Corp. ("Peterson"). On July 10, 1987, Gator Outdoor Advertising, Inc. ("Gator") applied to DOT for sign permits. The location for which Gator sought sign permits is on the same side of U.S. 441, approximately 348 feet from the location authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. On July 16, 1987, DOT rejected Gator's application solely because the proposed sign location did not meet applicable spacing requirements relative to the sign authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. In 1984, the owner withdrew his permission for maintaining the sign authorized by Permits 3966-2 and 3967-2. There has been no sign lease or owner permission for a sign at this location since 1984. As of the date of the final hearing, Peterson had not obtained the owner's permission to maintain a sign. Representatives of the property owner and a representative of Peterson have discussed the possibility of owner permission, but it had not been unequivocally granted.
The Issue Whether Respondent's outdoor sign permit should be revoked because the original sign has been destroyed by an Act of God, as alleged by Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this controversy, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke a permit (No. BP844) for an off-premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, National Advertising Company (Respondent), an entity now known as "Infinity Outdoor," on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a hurricane in October 1999, the sign has lost its nonconforming status, and Respondent cannot lawfully rebuild the structure. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that after the sign was damaged, unknown persons stole the damaged structural pieces that were going to be used in part to rebuild the sign. Under a theory first disclosed at hearing, Respondent went on to contend that if those materials were still available, it could qualify for a seldom, if ever, used exception found in Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, which would otherwise allow it to reconstruct the sign. That rule provides in part that a sign will not be considered destroyed if the owner can demonstrate that "the replacement material costs to reerect the sign would not exceed [fifty percent] of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction." Using that provision, Respondent argues that much of the sign's structure could have been rebuilt with the now- stolen materials, and the remaining "replacement material costs" would not exceed the threshold in the rule. The sign was erected in 1968 before spacing requirements for signs were first adopted in 1972; therefore, unless it is destroyed, the sign can continue to qualify for nonconforming status as long as it remains substantially the same as it was as of the date it became nonconforming. Because the sign is situated on U.S. Highway 1 in Brevard County, a federal-aid primary highway, and another permitted sign lies approximately 200 feet away, under current spacing requirements, a sign cannot be rebuilt on the same site. This is because current spacing requirements prohibit two signs from being closer than 1,000 feet apart on a federal-aid primary roadway. The sign in question is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1, 0.341 miles north of Florida Memorial Gardens in Brevard County, Florida. In October 1999, Hurricane Irene tracked northward along the eastern coast of Florida causing extensive wind damage, including substantial damage to Respondent's sign. Photographs received in evidence as Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 3 show the condition of the sign on October 26, 1999, or shortly after it was damaged by the hurricane. Among other things, two of the five support poles (which were buried to a depth of eight feet) were "splintered" approximately two to three feet above ground level, while the other three were "knocked over" and "broken" at ground level. The wooden facing of the sign "had been knocked up against a pine tree" and the wooden plywood "panels [on which the sign message is printed] were split." The "stringers," whose numbers were variously described in the record as nine and sixteen, and which measure 2 x 4 x 20 feet and support the backside of the structure between the poles, were also damaged. The condition of the sign is corroborated by similar photographs taken on October 18 and 22, 1999, by a code enforcement officer of Brevard County. In the judgment of the DOT inspector who visited the site shortly after the hurricane, none of the damaged structural materials (poles and stringers) could be reused due to the amount of damage caused by the hurricane's winds. However, the inspector was unable to assign a replacement cost for any of those structural materials, or the replacement value of the sign immediately prior to its destruction. On an unknown date, but after the photographs were taken by DOT on October 26, 1999, Respondent's operations manager, Billy Nichols (Nichols), instructed a subcontracting crew to inspect each of the company's signs and to drop off at each sign location "what they thought we may have needed" to repair the signs. After inspecting the sign in question, the crew deposited five brand new poles at the site. Respondent takes the position that it always intended to use a combination of old and new materials, rather than all new materials, to repair the damaged sign. The date on which this decision was made by Respondent is not apparent in the record. In addition, despite a lack of clarity in the record, in its post-hearing filing, Respondent represents that the new poles were deposited at the site before the damaged materials were removed. However, it can be reasonably inferred from the evidence that based on the subcontractor's actions, Respondent originally intended to replace virtually the entire structure since five new poles were dropped off at the site of the sign; after a Citation was issued, Respondent apparently decided to reerect the sign under the theory proposed at hearing. Sometime after November 8, 1999, when DOT issued its Citation, Respondent maintains that much of the debris from the site, including the damaged poles and stringers, was unlawfully removed by unknown persons, resulting in Respondent being forced to rebuild the sign with all new materials. The new poles, however, were not removed and remained at the site. Because of the Citation, no work has occurred pending the outcome of this proceeding. In applying the terms of the rule relied upon by Respondent, DOT ascertains the cost of the sign and the replacement materials by utilizing cost data from retail stores, such as Home Depot or Lowe's, on a date as close to the date of destruction as is possible. In this case, that date would fall in September or October 1999. In addition, even if a sign owner decides to repair his sign with used or recycled materials, those materials would still be valued as if they were new. Further, only items such as supporting braces (stringers) or members of the sign structure (support poles) qualify as structural materials. This means that the sign facing would not be considered a structural component within the meaning of the rule. Finally, any old materials from the original sign that were reused would not be a part of the overall cost. Apart from the cost issue, in reconstructing the sign, the owner must return the sign to substantially the same configuration as before the damage. Thus, any change in the height or width of the sign facing, the number of feet that the sign sits above the ground, the structural safety of the sign, or the size of the replacement materials, might constitute a substantial change and prohibit reerection. In the case at bar, the testimony establishes that if Respondent proposes to change the height of the sign, the type of structural materials used, or the number of support poles, this would constitute a substantial change in the sign and disqualify Respondent from utilizing the exception in the rule. Although the rule does not specifically require such information, to prove that materials were stolen by unknown persons, historically DOT has required that the owner submit a police report confirming that materials were stolen. In this case, no police report was ever filed by Respondent, nor did it file a claim with its insurance company for the value of the materials allegedly stolen. Respondent submitted cost data from three local "supplier[s]" confirming that the value of the structural components of the sign just prior to its being damaged was not greater than $1202.00. This figure was derived by taking the cost of five new poles at $202.00 per pole, or $1010.00, and sixteen new stringers at a cost of $12.00 per stringer, or $192.00. Respondent's suggestion that the cost of plywood for the new sign facing ($636.00) should also be counted as a structural material has been rejected since that component does not qualify as such a material under the rule. Respondent's operation supervisor (Nichols) offered two alternatives for repairing the sign. First, he suggested that by lowering the structure below its previous height, he could reerect the sign using only two new poles. This alternative, however, would substantially change the sign's configuration and violate the terms of the rule. Second, in order to keep the sign at its original height, Nichols stated that he would purchase three new poles and "stub" two of the damaged poles by adding two more stringers. The second option would cost only $630.00, but under this alternative, the value of the replacement materials would exceed fifty percent of the cost of the structure ($1202.00) just prior to the sign being damaged. Then, too, the record shows that by making this type of repair, the sign facing would be weaker, making it less safe; its wind load would be changed; and the sign height would be lower. Thus, these modifications would constitute a substantial change.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by National Advertising Company under Permit No. BP844 has been destroyed, is nonconforming, and cannot be reerected. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 12th of May, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation Attn: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Jodi B. Jennings, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the signs of Respondent, Cannon Motel, should be removed for violation of Chapter 499, Florida Statutes, improper setback and no permit to erect the signs.
Findings Of Fact Cannon Motels, Inc. was served with a violation notice on October 18, 1976. The alleged violation was that the Cannon Motel signs were in violation of the state statute inasmuch as they had been erected without first obtaining a permit from the Petitioner, Department of Transportation, and they violate the setback requirements of Chapter 479. Petitioner, by certified letter dated November 11, 1976, requested an administrative hearing. Respondent moved to continue the hearing on the grounds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction and failure by Petitioner to follow the technical rules. The motion was denied for the reason that the venue was proper being in the district in which a permit for an outdoor advertising sign must be obtained; the Hearing Officer has jurisdiction under Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, and the parties were fully advised of the issue to be heard. The subject signs each read "Cannon Motel." One is located one-half mile west of State Road 85 facing Interstate 10 and the other is located 1.3 riles east of State Road 85 facing Interstate 10. The sign east of State Road 85 is 30 by 12 and is approximately 18 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way. The sign that is west of State Read 85 is approximately 38 feet from the nearest edge of the right of way. Both signs were erected within 660 feet of the federal aid primary road without applying for or securing a permit from the Florida Department of Transportation. At some time prior to the hearing but after the erection of the signs, the area in which the sign located west of State Road 85 was erected was annexed by Crescent City, Florida. That area in which the signs are located is unzoned by the city and zoned agriculture by Okaloosa County.
Recommendation Remove the subject signs within ten (10) days of the filing of the Final Order. DONE and ORDERED this 31st day of October, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Carlton Building Room 530 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James E. Moore, Esquire Moore and Anchors Post Office Box 746 Niceville, Florida 32578
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: In this sign permit dispute, Petitioner, Department of Transportation (DOT), seeks to revoke the permit for an off- premise outdoor advertising sign owned by Respondent, North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc. (Respondent), on the grounds that the original sign was destroyed by a fire in June 1998, the newly rebuilt sign has lost its nonconforming status, and any rebuilt sign is now illegal. In response to these charges, Respondent contends that the fire that destroyed the sign was an act of criminal mischief or arson, rather than an Act of God, and thus the sign still qualifies for a nonconforming status. The sign in question is located 12.2 miles north of the Flagler County line on the west side of Interstate 95 (I-95) facing south, and is perhaps a mile or so south of the intersection of State Road 207 and I-95 (intersection) in St. Johns County, Florida. Respondent does not own the property where the sign is located, and it conducts no other business activities on that property. The property on which the sign is located is zoned Open Rural by St. Johns County (County), and it is not designated predominately for commercial or industrial uses by the County under the County's future land use map, comprehensive plan, or zoning ordinances. The sign is used to advertise Respondent's combination gas station and "open-area fruit market" located "just off" the intersection. The parties have stipulated that the sign was originally constructed more than 20 years ago before the current sign regulations became effective; under the present law, it would be a nonconforming sign and illegal. On May 27, 1998, a thunderstorm occurred in St. Johns County, resulting in between one-quarter and one-half inch of rainfall in the area. Due to a lightning strike on a tree, a 2-acre fire started approximately 1,000 feet southwest of the intersection in the vicinity of the sign. Although firefighters believed they had "knocked out" the fire within a day or two, the fire continued to smoulder under the dampened top layer of organic matter for several weeks until June 15, 1998, when it "worked its way back to the surface," broke out again, and cleared the containment line of the earlier fire. Aided by a light wind from the southeast and extremely dry conditions, the fire quickly spread eastward at the rate of 1,000 to 1,500 feet every 15 minutes and consumed several hundred acres, including the land on which Respondent's sign was located, before it was brought under control. That fire is commonly referred to as the Fort Peyton fire. In determining the cause of the Fort Peyton fire, forestry officials could not find any indicators of arson, and visual burn patterns clearly indicated that the new fire's origin was where the May 27 fire had begun. Therefore, it was officially classified as a "rekindle or breakout" of the May 27 fire, which was started by lightning. Put another way, the fire was the result of an Act of God, which is "the sudden manifestation and forces of nature." On either May 30 or June 5, 1998, depending on whether court or forestry records are accepted as being the most accurate, a fire began in Flagler Estates, which, "as the crow flies," lies approximately 12 to 15 miles southeast of the Fort Peyton fire. The Flagler Estates fire, however, was the result of an unattended illegal burn which was started by three individuals and went out of control. The fire was brought under control the same evening by firefighters, but only after some 450 surrounding acres were destroyed. The three individuals were later charged with arson. Respondent established that the prevailing winds during May and June 1998 were from the southeast and that "spoilers" or "floaters" (hot debris) from existing fires can sometimes float in the air and ignite new fires several miles away. Indeed, Respondent's investigator observed spoilers from inland fires floating through the air some 8 or 9 miles out in the Atlantic Ocean while he was fishing during that period of time. Accordingly, Respondent contends that it is just as likely that a spoiler floated northeastward from the Flagler Estates fire on May 30, 1998, and ignited the Fort Peyton blaze, some 12 to 15 miles away. If this theory is accepted, it would mean that the Fort Peyton fire would be attributable to arson, and not to an Act of God. The foregoing assumption has been rejected for several reasons. First, spoilers from the Flagler Estates fire did in fact ignite several spot fires in the area, but all of these spot fires occurred on the same day as the fire started and were within an eighth of an mile from the Flagler Estates perimeter. Second, it is highly unlikely that a spoiler would float up to 15 miles and then lie dormant for two weeks before igniting the Fort Peyton fire. Finally, the theory goes counter to the more persuasive evidence given by the supervising forester who investigated the Fort Peyton fire and concluded that it was an outbreak of the earlier fire that was started on May 27, 1998. After the sign was destroyed, Respondent rebuilt the sign at the same location using substantially the same materials that had composed the sign before it burned. However, the materials used to rebuild the sign were not part of the sign structure which was burned in the Fort Peyton fire. The new sign is the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed sign.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order confirming that the outdoor advertising sign maintained by North Florida Pecan 1 & 2, Inc., under sign permit number BR 252-55 is illegal and must be removed. The permit should also be revoked. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675, SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this day 17th of March, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Department of Transportation ATTN: James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 J. Stephen Alexander, Esquire 19 Old Mission Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela S. Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact Based on the record transmitted to the Division of Administrative Hearings by the Petitioner, the following are found as the relevant facts: The Respondent, Hinson Oil Company, owns four outdoor advertising signs in Gadsden County, Florida, located on the south side of I-10, in the proximity of County Road 270-A. On October 3, 1984, the Department of Transportation notified the Respondent in writing that these signs violated Section 479.11, Florida Statutes, in that they were alleged to be located in an area which is not a zoned or unzoned commercial or industrial area. The return receipt was signed by E. W. Hinson, Jr., on October 9, 1984. Paragraph 2 of the notices of violation served on October 3 and received on October 9, 1984, sets forth the following procedural requirements: You must comply with the applicable provisions of said Statute(s) and Cede(s) within thirty (30) days from the date of this notice, . . . or in the alternative, an administrative hearing under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes, must be requested by you within thirty (30) days of the date of this notice . . . E. W. Hinson, Jr., on behalf of the Respondent, requested an administrative hearing by letter dated November 16, 1984. This request was received by the Department of Transportation clerk on November 19, 1984.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a Final Order dismissing with prejudice the Respondent's request for an administrative hearing in each of these cases. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 24th day of January, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire and Maxine Fay Ferguson, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 E. W. Hinson, Jr. Hinson Oil Company P.O. Box 1168 Quincy, Florida 32351 John Curry, Esquire P.O. Drawer 391 Quincy, Florida 32351
