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GLENN D. WHALEY vs DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 90-006262 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Oct. 02, 1990 Number: 90-006262 Latest Update: Jan. 25, 1991

The Issue The issue is whether the Petitioner's application for registration as an associated person of Koch Capital, Inc. should be denied.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Glenn D. Whaley submitted a Form U-4, Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration, seeking registration as an associated person of Koch Capital, Inc. One of the states in which Petitioner sought registration was the State of Florida. The Department of Banking and Finance (Department) is the Florida agency charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 517, Florida Statutes, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act (the Act), and its implementing rules. The Department denied Mr. Whaley's application for registration as an associated person in a letter dated August 27, 1990, based upon its determination that he had violated the Act, that he had filed an application for registration which contained a material false statement; and that his disciplinary history within the securities industry constituted prima facie evidence of his unworthiness to transact the business of an associated person. Mr. Whaley has been employed in the securities industry since approximately 1984, and has been employed with several different securities dealers, including Rothschild Equity Management Group, Inc. (Rothschild), Fitzgerald Talman, Inc., and H. T. Fletcher Securities, Inc. The effective date for Mr. Whaley's registration as an associated person of Rothschild in the State of Florida was April 18, 1985. In October 1985, Department examiner Michael Blaker, conducted an examination of the books and records of Rothschild. The examination revealed violations of the provisions of the Act, including the sale of securities by unlicensed representatives. The commission reports and sales journals prepared by Rothschild revealed that Mr. Whaley, while unregistered with the Department, had effectuated approximately sixteen (16) sales of securities during the period of April 1 through 17, 1985. On May 15, 1989, the State of Missouri Commissioner of Securities issued a cease and desist order against Fitzgerald Talman, Inc. and Glenn D. Whaley. The order found that Mr. Whaley had offered for sale and sold securities on behalf of Fitzgerald Talman, Inc. in the State of Missouri without benefit of registration for himself or the securities. On or about November 8, 1989, the Department issued an Administrative Charges and Complaint against Mr. Whaley seeking revocation of his registration as an associated person of H. T. Fletcher Securities, Inc. based on his failed to timely notify the Department of the Missouri Cease and Desist Order, as required by Rule 3E-600.010(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Administrative Charges and Complaint were served on November 13, 1989. On or about December 12, 1989, the Department issued a Default Final Order revoking Mr. Whaley's registration with H. T. Fletcher Securities, Inc., based upon his failure to request a hearing regarding the Administrative Charges and Complaint. The Form U-4 requires the applicant to swear and affirm that the information on the application is true and complete to the best of his knowledge and that false or misleading answers will subject him to administrative penalties. The Form U-4 application contains no disclosure of the Department's December 1989, revocation of Petitioner's registration with H. T. Fletcher Securities, Inc., as required by Question 22E.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a Final Order denying the application of Mr. Whaley for registration as an associated person of Koch Capital, Inc., in the State of Florida. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of January, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Karniewicz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Legal Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Glenn D. Whaley 5400 Northwest Fifth Avenue Boca Raton, Florida 33487 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

Florida Laws (4) 120.57517.12517.161517.301
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DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE vs ARMANDO ADAMES RIVAS, 20-003889PL (2020)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Aug. 28, 2020 Number: 20-003889PL Latest Update: Sep. 22, 2024

The Issue Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, by committing fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, etc., or by violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; Whether Respondent violated section 475.25(1)(d)1., by failing to timely account or deliver to any person any personal property such as money, funds, deposit, check draft, etc. and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty; and Whether Respondent, a sales associate, registered as an officer, director of a brokerage corporation, or general partner of a brokerage partnership is in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61J2-5.016 and, if so, what is the appropriate penalty.

Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of real estate pursuant to section 20.165 and chapters 120, 455, and 475, Florida Statutes. DOAH has jurisdiction, pursuant to section 120.574, to render a decision in this matter, which shall be final agency action subject to judicial review under section 120.68. Mr. Rivas is a licensed real estate sales associate, holding license number 3385508, issued by the State of Florida. Structure of the Brokerage Corporation On or about April 7, 2015, Respondent registered GREH with the State of Florida, Division of Corporations ("Division of Corporations"), identifying himself as the registered agent and manager of GREH. Respondent filed documents on behalf of GREH with the Division of Corporations on the following dates and identified himself with the following titles with GREH: On April 13, 2016, March 14, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as the registered agent, managing member, and president; On November 22, 2017, and April 17, 2018, Respondent identified himself as an authorized member; On April 22, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, an authorized member, and managing member; On October 23, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and member; On November 27, 2019, Respondent identified himself as a registered agent, member, and manager; On December 6, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent and shareholder; and On December 10, 2019, Respondent identified himself as registered agent. On March 23, 2017, GREH registered with the Florida Real Estate Commission ("Commission") as a real estate corporation in the State of Florida, having been issued license number CQ 1053189. At no time was Respondent registered with the Commission as a real estate broker in the State of Florida. From November 27, 2017, to October 3, 2019, Mr. Avila, who at that time was a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number BK 3401612, was the qualifying broker of GREH. From October 3, 2019, to October 15, 2019, and from November 25, 2019, to December 9, 2019, GREH's license was invalidated due to it not having a qualifying broker. From October 15, 2019, to November 25, 2019, Gamila Murata was the qualifying broker for GREH. From December 9, 2019, to July 29, 2020, Mr. Henson was the qualifying broker for GREH. On August 22, 2019, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH, Respondent filed a civil action on behalf of GREH against Arnauld and Annelyn Sylvain (collectively, the "Sylvains") in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CA008774XXXXMB, seeking, among other things, to recover real estate commissions allegedly claimed due by GREH and Respondent. Respondent subsequently retained attorney Monica Woodard to represent GREH in the civil proceedings, and GREH's complaint was dismissed. On or about November 19, 2019, the Sylvains filed a separate civil action against GREH in the Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida, in case number 502019CC015230XXXXMB, seeking to recover a $10,000.00 escrow deposit. Respondent failed to inform the qualifying broker of record for GREH, Mr. Henson, who assumed that position shortly after the filing of the civil action, of the pending lawsuit. Respondent opened bank accounts on behalf of GREH, including an account called an "Escrow Account," which was controlled by Respondent and at no time was controlled by a qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent deposited escrow funds into the Escrow Account for GREH, without the authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent closed the Escrow Account held in the name of GREH and removed funds that were to be held in trust from the account without authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent controlled all communications regarding certain real estate transactions on behalf of GREH, without the knowledge or authority of the qualifying broker for GREH. Contract 1 On or about March 4, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase ("Contract 1") was entered into between the Sylvains, as buyers, and Frederick F. Breault and Evelyn Breault (the "Breaults"), as sellers, for property located at 16595 93rd Road North, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 1"). Respondent facilitated Contract 1 on behalf of the Sylvains. Pursuant to the requirements of Contract 1, the Sylvains deposited $10,000.00 with GREH, to be held in escrow as the initial deposit. The escrow funds were delivered to Respondent in the form of a certified check drawn from SunTrust Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and purchased by Mr. Sylvain on March 4, 2019 ("SunTrust Certified Check"). The $10,000.00 escrow funds were deposited into a bank account held in the name of GREH. The SunTrust Certified Check was deposited into a bank account over which Respondent had sole control. The GREH account in which the SunTrust Certified Check was deposited was at no relevant time controlled by a Florida licensed real estate broker. Contract 1 provided that the Sylvains had 20 days from the effective date to obtain loan approval ("Loan Approval Period"). Paragraph 18(F) of the Contract provided as follows: TIME: Calendar days shall be used in computing time periods. Time is of the essence in this Contract. Other than time for acceptance and Effective Date as set forth in Paragraph 3, any time periods provided for or dates specified in this Contract, whether preprinted, handwritten, typewritten or inserted herein, which shall end or occur on a Saturday, Sunday, or a national legal holiday (see 5 U.S.C. 6103) shall extend to 5.[:]00 p.m. (where the Property is located) of the next business day. Because 20 days from the effective date fell on a Sunday, the Loan Approval Period expired on Monday, March 25, 2019. Paragraph 8(b)(i) of Contract 1 provided that: "Buyer [the Sylvains] shall ... use good faith and diligent effort to obtain approval of a loan meeting the Financing terms ('Loan Approval') and thereafter to close this Contract." Paragraph 8(b)(v) of the Contract further provided that if neither party timely cancelled the Contract pursuant to paragraph 8, the financing contingency would "be deemed waived." Paragraph 8(b)(vii) finally provided that "[i]f Loan Approval has been obtained, or deemed to have been obtained, as provided above, and Buyer fails to close this Contract, then the Deposit shall be paid to Seller … ." The parties agreed to close Contract 1 by April 10, 2019. The Sylvains did not obtain final loan approval ("clear to close") within the Loan Approval Period. The loan was not denied for any of the exceptions set forth in paragraph 8(b)(vii), to release of the escrow deposit to the seller. The Sylvains did not terminate the contract within the Loan Approval Period. After the Loan Approval Period expired, the Sylvains sought to extend Contract 1, without consideration for the extension. The Breaults countered the Sylvains' request to extend with an offer that an extension would be granted for consideration that the Sylvains agree to forfeit the earnest money deposit. The parties never reached an agreement to extend Contract 1 and Contract 1 failed to close. On or about May 2, 2019, the Sylvains's loan application for Contract 1 was denied. On May 8, 2019, the Breaults executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract demanding release of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent received by email on that date from Betty Khan, the sales associate representing the Breaults. The Sylvains also executed a Release and Cancellation of Contract seeking return of the $10,000.00 escrow deposit on Contract 1, which Respondent communicated to Ms. Khan on May 8, 2019. Also, on May 8, 2019, Respondent informed the Sylvains of the Breaults's claim on the earnest money deposit. Despite knowing that there were conflicting demands for the escrowed funds, Respondent failed to inform Mr. Avila, the qualifying broker for GREH at the time, or the Department, of the escrow dispute. The Breaults were never informed of any escrow dispute filed with the Department, were never sued in relation to the escrow deposit, and never went to mediation or arbitration with regard to the escrow deposit, despite making a demand for the escrow deposit. Respondent claimed that he applied the $10,000.00 escrow funds to another contract under which the Sylvains were buyers. Respondent closed the GREH Escrow Account, removing the $10,000.00 from the account, without consent of either the Sylvains or the Breaults. Contract 2 On or about May 2, 2019, an "AS IS" Residential Contract for Sale and Purchase (Contract 2) between the Sylvains, as buyers, and the Mossuccos, as sellers, for property located at 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470 ("Subject Property 2"). Respondent facilitated Contract 2 on behalf of the Sylvains. In relation to Contract 2, specifically paragraph 2(a), which required an earnest money deposit in the amount of $10,000.00, Respondent requested that the Sylvains provide him a check in the amount of $10,000.00 to show the Mossuccos. On or about May 6, 2019, the Sylvains then drew a check from a business account held with TD Bank in the amount of $10,000.00 and payable to Global Business Financial Investment ("TD Bank Check"), which the Sylvains delivered to Respondent. Respondent took a photograph of the check and promised the Sylvains that the check would not be cashed or deposited. On or about May 6, 2019, Miledy Garcia, now known as Miledy Rivas, Respondent's spouse, a Florida licensed real estate sales associate, having been issued license number SL 3383271, issued an escrow deposit receipt for $10,000.00 for Contract 2 on a GREH form ("May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt"). The TD Bank Check was never deposited or cashed by Respondent; rather, the Sylvains immediately issued a stop payment order on the check to TD Bank. Despite having never deposited the TD Bank Check, Respondent communicated the May 6, 2019, GREH Receipt and a photo of the TD Bank Check to Mrs. Mossucco and Ms. Weintraub. The $10,000.00 escrow funds from Contract 1 were the escrow funds represented on Contract 2. Respondent represented that the $10,000.00 escrow funds were applied to Contract 2, prior to cancellation of Contract 1, and continued to represent the same, even after Respondent knew the Breaults were making a claim against the funds. Contract 2 failed to close. After Contract 2 failed to close, the Mossuccos and Sylvains agreed to cancel Contract 2 and release each other from liability under the terms of Contract 2, and further agreed that any earnest money deposit could be returned to the Sylvains. Respondent failed to deliver the escrow funds to the Sylvains. Rather, Respondent believed that the funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he was entitled to remove the escrow funds and use them as he (or his company) saw fit. Respondent testified that he submitted a notice of escrow dispute, dated "9-30-2019," to the Department, identifying the parties to the transaction as the Mossuccos and the Sylvains, and the subject property as 7584 Apache Boulevard, Loxahatchee, Florida 33470. Respondent gave conflicting testimony, including, for example: First testifying that he believed the $10,000.00 escrow funds belonged to him (or his company) to be spent as he saw fit; then, after a break in the proceedings and on re-direct by his counsel, changing his story by saying that counsel for Petitioner put words in his mouth and that he meant only that there was a "dispute on the funds." First testifying that Mr. Avila was a signatory on the GREH "Escrow Account," then admitting that Mr. Avila was not a signatory on the account. There was also conflicting testimony between Respondent and several of the witnesses; however, where there were inconsistencies, Petitioner's witnesses' testimony was substantially consistent and supported by the documentary evidence presented. Parts of Respondent's testimony were inconsistent with documentary evidence admitted into evidence by stipulation of the parties. Facts Concerning Aggravation or Mitigation of Penalties Respondent collected escrow funds and deposited them into an account that he, only a licensed real estate sales associate, controlled, rather than one that was controlled by the qualifying broker for GREH. Respondent admittedly removed escrow funds in the amount of $10,000.00 from the bank account in which they were deposited, without all parties having a claim to the escrow funds executing a release. Respondent testified that he believed the escrow funds belonged to him (or one of his companies) and that he had a right to do with the funds as he (or he through one of his companies) saw fit. Respondent used vulgar language, threats, and demeaning language toward his clients, other real estate professionals, and title agents to attempt to coerce those individuals into submitting to his demands. Respondent failed and refused to comply with the direction of the qualifying broker with supervisory responsibility over Respondent and GREH. Respondent failed to keep the qualifying broker of GREH apprised of the real estate transactions in which Respondent was involved. There was significant testimony establishing that Respondent was performing tasks that are only allowed to be performed by a licensed real estate broker, not a real estate sales associate, mortgage broker, or mortgage loan originator. Additional Facts Raised by Respondent In his proposed conclusions of law, Respondent raises, as a matter of fact, that the "Department failed to plead sufficient facts underpinning its argument" regarding the handling of escrow funds. In paragraph 25 of his Proposed Final Order, Respondent states: Nowhere in the administrative complaint does the Department allege that Mr. Rivas falsely represented that GREH received the TD Bank Check as earnest money for Contract 2, or that he falsely represented to the Sylvains that the Breaults did not have a legitimate claim against the $10,000.00 escrow funds deposited by the Sylvains toward Contract 1, or that he misrepresented to the Sylvains that the $10,000.00 funds from the SunTrust Certified Check could be and were applied to Contract 2. Respondent further argued that none of the "facts relevant to aggravation or mitigation" set forth in the Department's Proposed Final Order were pled in the A.C., in violation of Respondent's due process rights. Both of these arguments are rejected as set forth in paragraphs 108 and109 below. Additional Facts Concerning Department Costs The Department presented competent evidence that it incurred investigative costs in the amount of $1,551.00.

Florida Laws (7) 120.574120.60120.6820.165455.225455.227475.25 Florida Administrative Code (4) 61J2-10.03261J2-14.01161J2-24.00161J2-5.016 DOAH Case (1) 20-3889PL
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TAUL ENTERPRISES, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, 95-003115BID (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 21, 1995 Number: 95-003115BID Latest Update: Oct. 20, 1995

Findings Of Fact In April 1995, DMS issued ITB #94/95-053 soliciting bids for providing an indefinite quantity of interior painting of buildings statewide. Bidders were to submit unit prices for ten categories of work in each of five districts. The unit prices were added together to arrive at a total for each of the five districts. The invitation to bid (ITB) contemplated the award of five contracts--one for each district. The contract was to be issued for one year with the anticipated renewals of one year each. The ITB provided that bids would be "evaluated and awarded to the responsible low bidder(s) per region." On May 1, 1995, DMS issued an addendum to the ITB. DMS issued the addendum to add the requirement for a bid bond or cashier's check in the amount of $5,000. The purchasing specialist in charge of the solicitation had inadvertently omitted the bid bond requirement from the ITB. The purpose of the bid bond is to compensate the agency for damages in the event the low bidder fails to enter the contract at issue. To underscore the importance of the bid bond requirement, DMS required that all bidders return a signed acknowledgment form with their bid. Ten bidders submitted bids on May 15, 1995. The lowest bidder for regions two through four was Brighton Painting Company (Brighton). Although the ITB provided that bids could only be withdrawn prior to bid opening, David Batts, who will be responsible for managing the contracts, contacted Brighton's president after the bid opening and questioned him because the contractor was based in Illinois. Based on that conversation, Mr. Batts determined that Brighton would not be able to adequately manage the contract while based out of state. Although the ITB provided that bids could only be withdrawn prior to bid opening, DMS allowed Brighton to withdraw its bid. Taul submitted the lowest bid for region one and the second low bid for regions two through five. J. F. Ward Painting and Decorating (Ward) submitted the third lowest bid for regions one, two, four and five. CEM Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a Sunshine Painting (CEM) submitted the third lowest bid for region three. The total of the unit prices submitted by Ward and CEM were higher than the total of the unit prices submitted by Taul. 1/ After the bid opening, all bids were reviewed by the agency purchasing office in order to determine responsiveness. Ms. Joyce Plummer is the purchasing officer for DMS, who was responsible for evaluating and awarding the contract. Ms. Plummer found no irregularities in her review of Taul's bid. After her review, Ms. Plummer provided Mr. Batts the three lowest bids for review by him. Mr. Batts reviewed the bids because he was the individual primarily responsible for preparing the ITB and because he would be the contract administrator once the contracts were awarded. On May 30, 1995, at 10:20 a.m., DMS posted a notice of intent to award the contract to Ward. The posting indicated that Taul's bid was disqualified for failure to submit a bid bond. Ms. Plummer posted the notice of intent to award the contracts to Ward based on the opinion of Mr. Batts that Taul had not submitted a valid bid bond. At the request of Mr. Taul, DMS Bureau Chief Wayne Smith reviewed Taul's bid bond and determined that it was responsive. At that time DMS had in its possession a letter from the surety agent affirming the surety's obligation in a minimum amount of $5,000 under the bid bond. 2/ Ms. Plummer therefore reconsidered the posting and spoke with another purchasing officer, Kathleen McKenzie. Ms. McKenzie had been employed by DMS longer than Ms. Plummer and she recalled a prior bid process in which a bid bond similar to Taul's had been accepted. McKenzie did not know at the time she gave her opinion that the contract in question was an indefinite quantity contract. As a result of the further inquiry into the sufficiency of Taul's bid bond, DMS posted an amended bid tabulation announcing its notice of intent to award the contracts to Taul. Sometime after the second posting, Mr. Ward called Mr. Batts to discuss the award to Taul. Mr. Batts advised Mr. Ward that, in his opinion, Taul's bid bond was no good. After this conversation with Mr. Batts, Ward filed a notice of intent to protest the award to Taul. When she received the notice of intent to protest filed by Ward, Ms. Plummer discussed the matter with DMS assistant general counsel. 3/ As a result of that discussion, Ms. Plummer posted a second amended tabulation indicating an award of all five regions to Ward. That tabulation subsequently also was amended to represent the award of the contract for region three to CEM. The first posting showing an intent to award to Ward was verified by Mr. Batts and Ms. Plummer. The second posting showing an intent to award to Taul was verified by Ms. Plummer. The third and fourth postings were verified by DMS general counsel. The bid security requirement in the ITB called for submission of a bid bond or a cashier's check in the amount of $5,000. The ITB also required bidders to commit to furnishing a $100,000 performance and payment bond if they were successful. In order to obtain a bid bond, a bidder must secure a commitment from the bonding company to issue a performance and payment bond. If the surety agrees to provide the payment bond, it will issue a bid bond without charge. Taul has been in the commercial painting business since 1978. For the past 8 years 95 percent of its work has been awarded by governmental entities pursuant to competitive bids. Taul has consistently expressed the intent to execute and perform the contracts in accordance with its bid in this case. In obtaining the bid bond in this case, Taul followed his standard practice--contacting the bonding agent and providing information regarding the nature of the contract and extent of commitment that would be required for the performance and payment bond. The bid specification for the bonds was given to and reviewed by the surety agent. The surety agent, David Pichard, was of the opinion that, since the ITB called for a performance bond in the amount of $100,000 and because the amount of the contract was indefinite, the amount of the bid upon which to issue the bid bond was $100,000. The standard bid bond requirement on public contracts is five percent. The plain wording of the bid bond submitted is that the sum of the surety obligation is "FIVE PER CENT (5 percent) OF AMOUNT BID." Since the contract to be awarded in this case is for an indefinite quantity of work, the "amount bid" is indeterminate. Petitioner was unable to establish, either prior to or at the final hearing, what the "amount of the bid" is. Mr. Batts was of the opinion that the amount of the bid bond was not clear. Based on that opinion, Mr. Batts believed that the bond did not meet the specification in the ITB. The purpose of the bid bond requirement was to ensure that DMS received considered bids. Due to the vagaries of the contract DMS wanted a contractor it could depend on to enter into the contract in case there was an emergency painting need such as storm damage. With a valid bid bond or a cashier's check the contractor could not unilaterally decide to walk away from the bid without leaving money on the table. The ITB addendum is clear and definite with respect to the required bid bond. Taul's bid bond is indefinite and not specific with regard to the amount of the bid bond furnished. Taul's bid bond was therefore not responsive with regard to the bid bond requirement. Petitioner has failed to prove that the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, fraudulently, or illegally, in determining that Petitioner's bid was materially not responsive to the requirements of the ITB at issue.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's formal bid protest. DONE and ORDERED this 11th day of September, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES W. YORK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of September, 1995.

Florida Laws (2) 120.53120.57
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CHRISTOPHER JAMES ARENAL vs. OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, 86-002903 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-002903 Latest Update: Jun. 09, 1987

Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Christopher James Arenal, filed a Form U-4 application seeking registration as an associated person with Rocky Mountain Securities & Investments, Inc., located at 1600 Stout Street, Suite 920, Denver, Colorado 80202. Said application was received by the Respondent on April 24, 1986. By letter dated June 17, 1986, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that it intended to deny his application for registration for the reasons set forth at length in the letter. (At the hearing the Respondent stipulated that the allegations of the top paragraph on the second page of the denial letter of June 17, 1986, should be deleted.) Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely request for hearing. Except for the reasons stated in the Respondent's denial letter dated June 17, 1986, the Petitioner is otherwise eligible for the registration he seeks. On October 26, 1982, the State of Tennessee issued a Complaint and Notice in the matter of First Colorado Investments and Securities, Inc., Mr. Arenal, and others, alleging the sale of securities while not being properly registered. On February 7, 1983, Mr. Arenal entered into a Findings and Consent Order which found that Mr. Arenal and others had engaged in securities transactions involving Tennessee residents at a time when Mr. Arenal and others were not registered in the State of Tennessee. Mr. Arenal and others were ordered to cease and desist from acting as agents in the State of Tennessee without being lawfully registered to do so. The transactions in question took place during 1981. The evidence does not show how many of those transactions involved Mr. Arenal. On April 28, 1983, the State of Wisconsin entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order of Prohibition with Mr. Arenal in which Mr. Arenal agreed to the entry of an Order of Prohibition. On June 2, 1983, a Consent Order of Prohibition was entered into in which Mr. Arenal was prohibited from transacting business as a securities agent in Wisconsin without lawful registration in that state. That order had as its genesis the fact that during 1981 Mr. Arenal had engaged in nine securities transactions for a Wisconsin resident who had previously been a client of Mr. Arenal when the client resided in New York. On January 11, 1984, the State of Iowa issued a Summary Order Denying Application For Securities Agent License on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The findings of fact in that order included findings that Mr. Arenal had "engaged in securities transactions on behalf of an Iowa resident in March, 1981, while unlicensed as a securities agent," and, with regard to an affidavit filed with the Iowa Division of Securities, that "Mr. Arenal's filed and notarized statement is a false statement." Since the issuance of the January 11, 1984, order, the State of-Iowa has approved Mr. Arenal's application to be registered as a securities agent and he is presently registered in that state. On November 5, 1984, the State of Utah entered an Order Summarily Denying Application For Registration as an Agent on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The denial was based on Mr. Arenal's prior disciplinary history. Since the issuance of the November 5, 1984, order, the State of Utah has approved Mr. Arenal's application to be registered as a securities agent and he is presently registered in that state. The State of Oregon, by letter dated November 1, 1985, denied Mr. Arenal's application for registration in that state. The Oregon denial letter does not set forth a factual basis for the denial. On September 6, 1984, the State of Nebraska issued an Order Denying Agent Registration on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The denial was based on his prior disciplinary history. Mr. Arenal was again denied registration in the State of Nebraska on February 20, 1986. During 1985, the staff of the Respondent's Division of Securities was almost tripled in size. Shortly after the increase in staff size, a Task Force recommended that the Division of Securities devote more time and energy to the review of applicants with disciplinary history in order to more carefully screen such applicants. As a result of the increase in staff size and the increased emphasis on review of applicants with disciplinary history, the Respondent is now rejecting applications that previously might have gotten through a cursory review. All of the adverse actions taken against Mr. Arenal by the states of Tennessee and Wisconsin were based on events that occurred in 1981, at one firm, First Colorado Investments and Securities, Inc. Mr. Arenal's supervisors at that firm advised him that it was permissible for him to sell certain securities in states where he was not registered. Since those improper sales in 1981, Mr. Arenal has not engaged in any subsequent transactions in states where he was not registered. During his approximately eleven years of professional experience in the securities field, there have never been any client complaints against Mr. Arenal. Mr. Arenal has been previously registered as an associated person in the State of Florida. He was last registered in Florida from approximately February of 1985 until December of 1985. His prior registrations were processed prior to the changes in policy and procedure described in paragraph B, above.

Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order granting Mr. Arenal's application for registration as an associated person. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Mr. Christopher James Arenal 1600 Stout Street Suite 920 Denver, Colorado 80202 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================

Florida Laws (4) 120.57120.68517.12517.161
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DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE vs. TIMOTHY GIBBONS, 89-002214 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 89-002214 Latest Update: Sep. 07, 1989

The Issue Whether the Respondent is guilty of the violations alleged in the Notice of Cease and Desist Order dated March 13, 1989; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Timothy Gibbons, was an associated person and employed by J.B. Hanauer as a sales representative in institutional sales. Each of the subject transactions at issue in this case constituted a purchase and sale of securities. In the summer of 1988, Mr. Gibbons subscribed the City of Daytona Beach, Florida, as a client. Mr. Mike Robertson, as Deputy Finance Director for the City, was charged with investing the City's funds. The subscription was consummated by a written agreement between the City and J.B. Hanauer establishing a non-discretionary account on behalf of the City. Both Mr. Gibbons and Mr. Robertson were designated in the agreement as authorized representatives of their respective employers for the purpose of conducting transactions between the City and J.B. Hanauer. Mr. Gibbons contacted Mr. Robertson on an almost daily basis with numbers for proposed deals at different market levels. In these conversations, Mr. Robertson would give Mr. Gibbons the authority to enter the market for the City when the market reached certain, agreed market levels. The direction to initiate a trade at a certain previously approved market level was the sole "discretion" granted to Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Robertson retained and required the non-discretionary authority to approve all transactions. Mr. Gibbons did not at any time have the authority to encumber the City's funds without the prior approval of Mr. Robertson. Mr. Robertson further limited Mr. Gibbons by placing a $1,000,000 cap on the amount of the City's funds he would risk per trade. Mr. Robertson told Mr. Gibbons about the $1,000,000 trading practice and each of the approved trades was limited to the $1,000,000 amount. Their first trade was executed on August 25, 1988. Then, on August 31, 1988, without the knowledge or consent of the City, Mr. Gibbons executed several trades in the name of the City. Most of the subject trades were in excess of $1,000,000. In fact, they encumbered increments of $5,000,000 and $6,000,000. When these trades were settled, the City's account owed J.B. Hanauer in excess of $29,000. On September 1, 1988, Mr. Gibbons left the employment of J.B. Hanauer, and subsequently, J.B. Hanauer absorbed the City's loss as a result of the subject trades. By trading without the authorization of his client, the City, the respondent misrepresented his authorization to purchase and sell securities for the City and demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business of an associated person.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a Final Order: Revoking any and all registrations of Timothy Gibbons under Chapter 517, Florida Statutes; and Assessing against Timothy Gibbons an administrative fine of $5,000. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th of September 1989. JANE C. HAYMAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of September 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-2214 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Addressed in paragraph 1. Addressed in paragraphs 2 through 4. Addressed in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. Addressed in paragraph 4. Addressed in paragraph 5, and subordinate to paragraph 5. Subordinate to paragraphs 4 and 5. COPIES FURNISHED: Eric Mendelshon, Esquire Office of Comptroller 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 201 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Timothy Gibbons Number 5 Par Drive Maumelle, Arkansas 72118

Florida Laws (4) 517.12517.161517.221517.301
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs MURRAY WIEDER AND WIEDER REALTY, INC., 89-006351 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 22, 1989 Number: 89-006351 Latest Update: Aug. 22, 1990

The Issue Whether Respondents committed the offenses described in the administrative complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against them?

Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence and the stipulations entered into by the parties, the following Findings of Fact are made: Murray Wieder (Respondent Wieder) is now, and was at all times material hereto, a real estate broker licensed in the State of Florida pursuant to license number 0303130. His last license was issued c/o Wieder Realty, Inc., 900 S. Pompano Parkway, Pompano Beach, Florida 33069. Wieder Realty, Inc. is now, and was at all times material hereto, a corporation licensed in the State of Florida as a real estate broker pursuant to license number 0254413. Its last license reflects its address as 900 S. Pompano Parkway, Pompano Beach, Florida 33069. Respondent Wieder is now, and was at all times material hereto, the President of Wieder Realty, Inc., and its qualifying broker. Margaret Hoskins has been an investigator with the Department of Professional Regulation for the past year and a half. As part of her responsibilities, she conducts audits of escrow accounts maintained by real estate brokers licensed in the State of Florida. On April 27, 1989, Hoskins conducted a routine audit of Respondents' escrow accounts. Her investigation revealed that, on that date, Respondents maintained at Bank Atlantic in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a noninterest-bearing escrow account (number 005-50199 0-3) with a balance of $14,577.39 and an interest- bearing account (number 005-175922-1) with a balance of $32,955.50. Respondents' "trust liability" with respect to these two accounts was $41,856.50. The $5,676.39 difference between the total balance of these two escrow accounts and Respondents' "trust liability" represented accrued interest on the monies deposited in the interest-bearing account. Respondents used the accrued interest to cover their incidental operating expenses. Hoskins further discovered as a result of her investigation that on March 13, 1989, Respondents had deposited $50,000.00 into the noninterest- bearing account, which prior to the transaction had had a balance of $950.58, and that on March 30, 1989, Respondents had withdrawn $25,000.00 from the interest-bearing account and had deposited $25,000.00 in the noninterest-bearing account. During the course of her investigation, Hoskins spoke with Respondent Wieder, who indicated to her that it was his practice to transfer funds from one of the Bank Atlantic escrow accounts to the other. Of the fully executed sales contracts and lease agreements Respondents' had on file, only one, the Kutner-Fox contract, contained a provision authorizing Respondents to place escrow monies in the interest-bearing account and to use the accrued interest for incidental operating expenses. The remaining contracts and leases were silent regarding the matter. Hoskins, in her conversation with Respondent, therefore attempted to find out from him if the escrow monies in the interest-bearing account, other than those attributable to the Kutner-Fox contract, had been deposited in the account with the permission of all interested parties. Wieder, who was otherwise very cooperative, failed to provide Hoskins with a direct answer to her question. Hoskins did not thereafter make any effort to contact these parties and ask them if they had given Respondents permission to place monies held in escrow in an interest- bearing account and to use the accrued interest to cover incidental operating expenses. Later on April 27, 1989, after Hoskins had completed her visit to their office, Respondents withdrew all of the funds from the interest-bearing account and deposited them in the noninterest-bearing account. They then closed the interest- bearing account. Respondents then transferred from the noninterest- bearing account to their operating account $5,676.39, the amount of interest that had accrued on the monies that had been in the interest-bearing account.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission issue a final order in this matter finding the proof insufficient to establish Respondents' guilt of the offenses charged and dismissing the instant administrative complaint. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 22nd day of August, 1990. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of August, 1990.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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FLORIDA REAL ESTATE COMMISSION vs. DAVID W. STUART AND BENCHMARK BROKERS OF DESTIN, 85-002696 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-002696 Latest Update: Mar. 03, 1986

Findings Of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 2-4. Rejected as Conclusions of Law and not Finding of Facts. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 6. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence in that Hardage, for Respondent Benchmark, arranged the joint venture which culminated in the sale. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. 9-10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Rejected as a Conclusion of Law and not a Finding of Fact.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the allegations against the Respondent, David W. Stuart, and the allegations of a violation of Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, against Respondent, Benchmark Brokers of Destin, Inc., be dismissed, but that the license of Benchmark Brokers of Destin, Inc., be suspended for a period of 90 days for the violation of Section 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of March, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of March, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Arthur Shell, Jr., Esquire Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 David L. Selty, Esquirer Executive Park, Building H, Suite 3 11 Racetrack Road, NE Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 32548 Harold Huff, Exec. Director Division of Real Estate Department of Professional Regulation P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 N. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all Proposed Findings Of Fact submitted by the parties to this case.

Florida Laws (1) 475.25
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DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE vs. FORBES, WALSH, KELLY AND COMPANY, INC., ET AL., 79-002378 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002378 Latest Update: Nov. 14, 1980

Findings Of Fact Forbes, Walsh & Kelly is a New York corporation licensed to deal in securities under the laws of New York. The company through its secretary, Mr. Robert E. Kelly, contacted the Division of Securities on March 2 and 21, 1979 concerning the procedure for registering to be a securities dealer in Florida. After receiving the appropriate application forms and a copy of the relevant Florida Statutes, Forbes, Walsh & Kelly filed its application on March 26, 1979, to be licensed in Florida as a securities dealer. On April 2, 1979, FWK was notified that its application as a dealer was being held in abeyance, pending receipt of the corporate by-laws, a branch office application, and other materials. Subsequently, on April 20, 1979, FWK applied for a branch office license with Respondent, Carl F. Bailey, Jr. to be the company's "principal" and branch manager in Florida. Between March 26, 1979 and June 26, 1979, while Mr. Carl F. Bailey was not licensed as a securities salesman and while FWK was not registered as a securities dealer, FWK through Bailey executed approximately 774 security sales transactions on behalf of their customers. On June 27, 1979, the Division told FWK that its registration as a security broker-dealer had been approved. At the same time notice was also given that the application for a branch office in Orlando was approved as was the transfer of Carl F. Bailey's registration as a salesman for FWK. Between March 26, 1979 and August 14, 1979, in the course of its business, FWK through Carl F. Bailey "introduced" approximately 263 security transactions on a fully disclosed basis to Robb, Peck, McCooey & company, Inc., which though registered as a securities dealer in New York was not at that time so registered in Florida. Aside from the instant order of suspension, neither Carl F. Bailey, Jr. nor FWK has ever been charged with previously violating the Florida Securities Act. FWK and Carl F. Bailey, Jr., have at least two very satisfied customers, Mr. A.J. Rusterholtz and Mr. Richard W. Baker. They testified in support of Respondents at the final hearing. No evidence was presented to show that either Carl F. Bailey or FWK ever made any inquiry with the Division about when they would be eligible to engage in securities transactions in Florida after submitting their applications for registration. FWK through its Orlando branch office serves approximately 500 securities customers, many of whom are in direct daily contact with the office.

Recommendation In light of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the registration of Forbes, Walsh, Kelly & Company, Inc., as a dealer and to operate a branch office and the registration of Carl F. Bailey, Jr., as an associated salesman, with Forbes, Walsh, Kelly & Company, Inc. be suspended for a period of 65 business days from the effective date of the Department's final order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of October, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip J. Snyderburn, Esquire Director, Division of Securities Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1402 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patrick T. Christiansen, Esquire AKERMAN SENTERFITT & EIDSON 17th Floor, CNA Building Post Office Box 231 Orlando, Florida 32802

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.65517.021517.12517.161
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND TREASURER vs HAROLD RUSH LEIFFER, 92-004366 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Orlando, Florida Jul. 17, 1992 Number: 92-004366 Latest Update: Mar. 19, 1993

The Issue The issue for consideration in this hearing is whether the Respondent's licenses as an insurance agent in Florida should be disciplined because of the matters set forth in the Administrative Complaint filed in this case.

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, the Department of Insurance was the state agency in Florida responsible for the licensing of insurance professionals and the regulation of the insurance industry in this state. Respondent, Harold R. Leiffer, was licensed by the state as a life and health (debit) agent, a life agent, a life and health agent, a general lines agent, and a public adjuster (for fire and allied lines, including marine casualty and motor vehicle damage and mechanical breakdown insurance), and was engaged in the practice of the insurance profession under those licenses in Florida. In January, 1991, Donna L. Devor, at the time, the owner of Cobra Construction Co., a corporation, was contacted by the Respondent after she received a bid for the construction of a fire station in Florida. Ms. Devor had previously known the Respondent as an insurance agent through a company she was associated with to which he had provided construction bonds in the past. On this occasion, in January, 1991, according to Ms. Devor, Respondent called to say he was with a new company and could get her the bond she needed to support the bid she had been awarded. Ms. Devor invited him over to talk about it and they discussed it. Again, he indicated he would be able to get her the bond she needed. The next day, when he came back with the preliminary paperwork, he asked for a check in the amount of $850.00. According to Ms. Devor, he indicated that of that sum, $500.00 was to cover setup fees and other fees by the bonding company and $300.00 was to go to DSI, his agency. In response, Ms. Devor gave him a check for $850.00 made payable, at his request, to ICI, Respondent's other company, after which he left with the forms she had signed, some in blank. When he left, he promised to process the paperwork immediately in response to her stressing the urgency of the need for the bond. After several days passed with no response, Ms. Devor attempted to contact Respondent by phone but was unable to reach him. When she finally was able to speak with him, he asked her to come to his office to discuss the bonding company's requirement that she place her house as collateral for the bond. Ms. Devor immediately declined to do this but nonetheless went to his office at DSI to talk with him. When she arrived, he immediately called the bonding company which again requested she place her house as security, and she again refused. When this happened, Respondent asked her to come back the next day as he would try another source for the bond. When she contacted him the following day, he indicated he could get the bond from an Atlanta firm but she would have to go there to pick it up. She agreed to do this and Respondent, in addition, asked for a financial statement which she arranged to have provided. Ms. Devor flew to Atlanta and was met there by Respondent who drove her to the bonding company's office. When she met with company officials, she was told they imposed a coinsurance requirement of $100,000.00 in the company's name be put up by her and she did not have this cash available. Respondent, she claims, knew this. Nonetheless, she was furnished an office and a telephone to try to get the money but was unable to do so and as a result, the bonding company declined to issue the bond. After that failure, she returned to Orlando and, realizing that Respondent was apparently unable to help her, started to look for another bonding company. She called Respondent's secretary several times attempting to reach him to get her money back but, when she was unable to do so, finally sent him a letter requesting the return of her $850.00 payment. Respondent failed to respond to that letter and she continued to try to reach him, unsuccessfully, by phone. Finally, she was able to contact DSI's owner who indicated she had never heard of Ms. Devor and asked she be shown proof that the bond premium was paid. When Ms. Devor sent a copy of the check she had given to Respondent, the owner evidenced some dissatisfaction with Respondent but failed to refund the money. Ms. Devor continued to try to reach Respondent by phone without success. When she found where he lived, she wrote him another letter asking not only for the return of the amount she had paid him but also for reimbursement of expenses she had incurred in flying to Atlanta. She received neither. However, about a week or so later, she received a call from Respondent on her answering machine which left no return number. She was thereafter unable to again contact Respondent nor did she ever receive reimbursement of her payment to him. The $850.00 check was endorsed by Respondent with his own name and deposited to his personal account, Number 1307004115, at the Orange Bank in Winter Park, Florida. According to Mr. Leach, Vice-President of security operations for Pinnacle Insurance in Carrolton, Georgia, the company to which Ms. Devor flew at Respondent's request, the company file for Cobra Corporation shows no bond was ever issued to that company. Florida does not allow a charge for setup fees in any case, and he would not have received one in connection with this application even if the bond had been issued. It is company policy not to charge a fee of any kind if a bond is not issued. Only if the application is approved and the applicant then withdraws is a fee charged. In any case, the premium on a $100,000.00 bond such as that sought here would be $2,500.00. Respondent at one point owned Statewide Insurance and sold it to DSI, the company with whom he was associated at the time he took the bond application from Ms. Devor. His story of the transaction differs somewhat from that of Ms. Devor, however, in that he denies calling her to solicit her business. Instead, he claims, she called him and begged that he get her the bond she needed for this contract. In fact, he claims, she said she'd do anything she had to do, or pay any fee necessary, to get the bond. When he explained what the fees would be, she agreed to them. Respondent contends he got the bond through United American Security in Boston, which charges a setup fee of $500.00. When Ms. Devor, however, could not live with the company's conditions, indicating she could not get the required additional credit from her bank, she rejected that condition and Respondent agreed to try with Pinnacle. It is, he claims, Ms. Devor, who suggested they go to Atlanta where Mr. Mathieson, the representative of the insurance company at the time, imposed the requirement for collateral. He also contends she agreed to this. Afterwards, he asserts, Ms. Devor claimed to have gotten a bond without collateral from a company in Ft. Lauderdale which she presented to the contracting party. From the check for $850.00 which Respondent received from Ms. Devor, he paid $500.00 to United American as its setup fee, and $250.00 to Pinnacle for its fees. Respondent did not provide a cancelled check as evidence of either payment, however. He cannot account for the additional $100.00. In any case, he contends, after Ms. Devor requested a refund, he contacted both United American and Pinnacle to request reimbursement, but both refused because, they claimed, they had accepted her and had done credit checks on her. Respondent claims that Ms. Devor was offered two bonds, both of which she rejected because she did not want to put up the collateral or security requested by the bonding companies. He went to the companies under those conditions because, he contends, she had previously stated she would accept conditions, implying she would do anything necessary to get the bonds. In support of Mr. Leiffer's assertions, he introduced an enrollment form with United American Contractor's Association signed by Ms. Devor which indicates Cobra Construction Corp. applied for enrollment in the association and submitted a check for $500.00 as an enrollment fee. He also introduced a contractor's questionnaire reflecting the payment of a $250.00 application setup fee with Pinnacle to cover underwriting reviews and efforts in establishing a bond account. Ms. Devor, however, while admitting her signature appears thereon, does not recall having signed either document, contending that they may have been among those documents Respondent asked her to sign at the beginning of their relationship regarding this bond, some of which she signed in blank. Respondent, who had previously been with DSI and had just recently gone with ICI, nonetheless could give no reasonable justification for placing the $850.00 fee paid to him by Ms. Devor in his personal bank account and not in the account of one of the two companies.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint in this case, alleging misconduct by Respondent, Harold Rush Leiffer, be dismissed. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. FOR THE PETITIONER: - 5. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. & 8. Accepted and incorporated herein. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence not a FOF. Second sentence accepted but evidence was presented by Respondent to show that Respondent signed an application for membership in UACA ($500.00) and with some other unspecified concern for 1 $250.00 setup fee. Balance of paragraph accepted. Rejected as unproven by clear and convincing evidence. FOR THE RESPONDENT: No Proposed Findings of Fact submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: James A. Bossart, Esquire Department of Insurance 412 Larson Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Harold R. Leiffer 2026 St. George Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Tom Gallagher State Treasurer and Insurance Commissioner The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Bill O'Neill General Counsel Department of Insurance The Capitol, PL-11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68626.561626.611626.621626.691
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