STATE OF FLORIDA

DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

1. A. KENNING INVESTMENTS ) INC., AND H. A. KENNING, JR., )

   )

   Petitioners, )

   )

   vs. ) CASE NO. 86-3569

   )

   OFFICE OF COMPTROLLER, )

   DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND ) FINANCE, DIVISION OF SECURITIES, )

   )

   Respondent. )

   )

   
   

   RECOMMENDED ORDER

   
   

   Pursuant to notice, a formal hearing was conducted in this case in Tallahassee, Florida, on January 29, 1987, before M. M. Parrish, a duly designated Hearing Officer of the Division of Administrative Hearings. The parties were represented at the hearing by the following counsel:

   
   

   FOR PETITIONER: A. Keith Logue, Esquire

   900 Rhodes-Haverty Building

   134 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

   
   

   FOR RESPONDENT: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire

   Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302

   Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 ISSUES AND INTRODUCTION

   The basic issue in this case is whether the Petitioners' applications for registration in the state of Florida should be granted or denied. The corporate applicant has applied for registration as a broker/dealer. The individual applicant has applied for registration as a principal of the corporate applicant. The Department Proposes to deny both applications on the basis of Section 517.161(1)(h), Florida Statutes, contending that the applicants have demonstrated unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer and principal.

   The Petitioners have little, if any, dispute with the facts relied upon by the Department, but offered evidence in mitigation and assert that, on the facts in this case, they are entitled to registration.

   
   

   On January 28, 1987, one day before the hearing, the Petitioners filed Petitioners' Motion For Summary Recommended Order. The motion seeks relief on the basis of legal and factual

   issues which were not raised by the initial petition in this case. At the commencement of the hearing, the Respondent filed a Motion To Strike Petitioners' Motion For Summary Recommended Order. Following argument of

   counsel, the motion to strike was granted for the reasons stated in paragraphs 2 and 5 of the motion to strike.

   
   

   Subsequent to the hearing in this case, a transcript was filed on February 26, 1987, and, pursuant to ruling at the close of the hearing, the parties were allowed until March 18, 1987, within which to file their proposed recommended orders The deadline was subsequently extended to March 23, 1987, for all parties due to difficulties experienced by Petitioners' counsel with their word processing equipment. On March 23, 1987, both parties filed their proposed recommended orders The Petitioners also filed a brief in support of their position. Specific rulings on all findings of fact proposed by all parties are contained in the Appendix attached to and incorporated into this recommended order.

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   Based on the stipulation of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence and on the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact.

   
   

   1. Petitioner H. A. Kenning, Jr. ("Kenning"), a Georgia resident, has been in the securities business since May 1, 1972, serving in various capacities including that of registered representative and vice president of sales.

      Kenning was first registered in Florida in 1972. Kenning has an extensive history of registration in the state of Florida as a registered representative. Kenning was last registered in the state of Florida as an associated person from February of 1982 to June of 1983. Petitioner H. A. Kenning Investments, Inc., ("Company"), a Georgia corporation, is registered as a securities broker/dealer in the states of Georgia, Louisiana, and Illinois, as well as with the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Securities Investor Protection Corporation. Such registrations were effective prior to Petitioners' submission of their applications for registration as a broker/dealer and principal thereof.

      
      

   2. In an effort to pursue his chosen profession in the state of Florida and to service clients now residing in Florida, on October 29, 1985, Kenning filed an application and supporting documentation for registration as a securities principal. On that same date, the Company filed its application and supporting documentation for registration as a broker/dealer. The Respondent received Petitioners' applications on October 30, 1985. The applications took the form of Form BD for the broker/dealer and Form U-4 for the principal, H. A. Kenning, Jr.

      
      

   3. Following various exchanges of correspondence between the Department and the Petitioners, by letter dated August 8, 1986, the Department notified the Petitioners that it intended to deny their applications. The first paragraph of the letter included the following:

      
      

      These denials are based upon the Depart- ment's determination that you have demon- strated your unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer and principal.

      
      

      The denial letter of August 8, 1986, went on to state at length the specific factual and legal bases for the denials and concluded with a statement advising the Petitioners of their right to request a hearing.

   4. In an Exchange Hearing Panel decision 80-70, entered November 12, 1980, the New York Stock Exchange found that H. A. Kenning, Jr.:

      
      

      1. engaged in conduct inconsistent with just and equitable principles of trade in that he failed to follow customer instructions; and

         
         

      2. violated Exchange Rule 408(a) in that he exercised discretionary power in a customer's account without first obtaining the written authorization of the customer. The Hearing Panel found Kenning guilty of the above-stated charges and as a penalty, imposed a bar on him from employment in any capacity with any member or member organization for a four (4) month period.

         
         

   5. In Exchange Hearing Panel decision 82-72, entered July 6, 1982, the New York Stock Exchange found that H. A. Kenning, Jr., violated Exchange Rule 408(a) in that he accepted orders for the account of a customer of his member organization employer from a person other, than the customer without first obtaining the written authorization of the customer. The Exchange Hearing Panel found Kenning guilty of the aforesaid charge and, as a penalty, in a consent order censured Kenning, imposed a fine of $10,000 against him, and suspended him from employment or association in any capacity with any member or member organization for a period of two (2) months.

      
      

   6. In June 1983, Kenning's employment with J. C. Bradford & Co. was terminated for depositing checks into his personal securities account which were later returned for insufficient funds. The New York Stock Exchange admonished Kenning's conduct and cautioned him with respect to any further misconduct.

      
      

   7. The events described in paragraphs 4 and 5, above, took place while Kenning was registered in the state of Florida. The Department did not revoke his registration or take any action against him. After the first disciplinary action against Kenning, the Department allowed Kenning to transfer brokerage firms two times without revoking, or in any manner restricting, his registration.

      
      

   8. Except for the reasons stated in the Department's denial letter dated August 8, 1986, (which are the incidents described in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, above,) the Petitioners are otherwise eligible for registration. Moreover, Petitioners were registered in the states of California and Texas subsequent to the Department's denial on August 8, 1986. Since the last disciplinary action entered July 1982, no federal, state, or self-regulatory organization has found Kenning to be in violation of any disciplinary rule. The Company has never had a disciplinary action filed against it by any federal, state, or self-regulatory agency.

      
      

   9. During 1985, the staff of the Department's Division of Securities was almost tripled in size. Shortly after the increase in staff size, a Task Force recommended that the Division devote more time and energy to the review of applicants with disciplinary history in order to more carefully screen such applicants. As a result of the increase in staff size and the increased emphasis on review of applicants with disciplinary history, the Department is now rejecting applications that previously might have gotten through a cursory review.

      
      

      CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

      
      

      Based on the foregoing findings of fact and on the applicable legal principles, I make the following conclusions of law.

   10. The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction over the subject matter of and the parties to this case. Sec. 120.57, Fla. Stat.

       
       

   11. Section 517.161, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part:

       
       

       (1) Registration under s. 517.12 may be denied or any registration granted may be revoked, restricted, or suspended by the department if the department determines that such applicant or registrant:

       
       

       (h) Has demonstrated his unworthiness to transact the business of dealer, investment adviser or associated person;

       
       

   12. In Rule 3E-600.11, Florida Administrative Code, the Department has determined "prima facie evidence of unworthiness" to be as follows:

       
       

       Primal Facie evidence of unworthiness to transact the business of a dealer, investment adviser, principal, or agent in the State of Florida shall include, but shall not be limited to:

       
       

       1. a conviction of any felony or first degree misdemeanor which relates to the registration being sought; or

          
          

       2. Any injunction, suspension, prohibition, revocation, denial or administrative order by any state or federal agency, national securities exchange, or national securities association, involving a violation of any federal or state securities law or any

          rule or regulation promulgated thereunder, and any injunction or adverse

          administrative order by a state or federal agency regulating banking, insurance, finance or small loan companies, real estate, mortgage brokers, or other related or similar industries, or any court of competent jurisdiction;

          
          

       3. Evidence of the applicant or

       registrant previously or presently engaging in any of the practices outlined in Rule 3E- 600.13.

       
       

   13. Based on the foregoing findings of fact, especially the findings in paragraphs 4 through 6, it is concluded that the individual Petitioner is unworthy to transact the business of a principal of the corporate applicant. Accordingly, the denial of the individual Petitioner's application is warranted pursuant to Section 517.161(1)(h), Florida Statutes.

       
       

   14. Section 517.161(4), Florida Statutes, reads in pertinent part:

       It shall be sufficient cause for denial of an application ..., in the case of

       a... corporation... if any officer or director of the corporation... has been guilty of an act or omission which would be cause for denying... the registration of

       an individual dealer... or associated person.

       
       

   15. Inasmuch as the individual applicant is unworthy of registration, pursuant to Section 517.161(4), Florida Statutes, the denial of the corporation's application is also warranted.

RECOMMENDATION

Based on all of the foregoing, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance issue a final order in this case which denies the application of both Petitioners.

DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of March, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida.

M. M. PARRISH Hearing Officer

Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550

(904) 488-9675

Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of March, 1987.

APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-3569

The following are my specific rulings on all of the findings of fact proposed by the parties.

Findings proposed by Petitioner's

The findings of fact proposed by the Petitioners are found in a series of eleven unnumbered paragraphs. The ordinal numbers which follow correspond to the sequence of those eleven unnumbered paragraphs. I have treated as the beginning of a paragraph each indented unnumbered line.

First paragraph: Accepted.

Second paragraph: First ten lines accepted. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.

Third paragraph: Rejected as irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.

Fourth paragraph: Rejected as irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.

Fifth paragraph: Rejected as irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.

Sixth paragraph: Accepted in substance with modifications in the interest of clarity and accuracy.

Seventh paragraph: Rejected as constituting procedural details that are not in dispute. (These details are covered in the introductory material and not in the findings of fact.)

Eighth paragraph: Rejected as constituting procedural details that are not in dispute. (These details are covered in the introductory material and not in the findings of fact.)

Ninth paragraph: Accepted in substance (with some modifications) except for the sequence of events. Sequence of events is only partially consistent with the evidence.

Tenth paragraph: Rejected as irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details.

Eleventh paragraph: Accepted.

Findings proposed by Respondent

The numbers which follow correspond to the numbers of the paragraphs in the findings of fact portion of the Respondent's proposed recommended order.

Paragraph 1: Rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.

Paragraph 2: First two and a half lines accepted. Portion beginning "...and is therefore" is rejected as

Paragraph 3: First three and a half lines accepted. Portion beginning"...and is therefore" is rejected as constituting a conclusion of law rather than a finding of fact.

Paragraph 4: Accepted.

Paragraph 5: Accepted.

Paragraph 6: Accepted.

Paragraph 7: First sentence accepted in substance along with additional findings about Mr. Kenning's Florida registration history. Second sentence rejected as subordinate or unnecessary details in light of other evidence.

Paragraph 8: Rejected as subordinate commentary rather than proposed findings. (This paragraph might make good footnote material for the findings proposed in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6.)

Paragraph 9: Rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions rather than proposed findings of fact.

Paragraph 10: Rejected as constituting argument or legal conclusions rather than proposed findings of fact.

COPIES FURNISHED:

H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

A. Keith Logue, Esquire

900 Rhodes-Haverty Building

134 Peachtree Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0305

=================================================================

AGENCY FINAL ORDER

=================================================================

STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE

DIVISION OF SECURITIES AND INVESTOR PROTECTION

1. A. KENNING INVESTMENTS, INC. AND H. A. KENNING, JR.

   
   

   Petitioners,

   
   

   vs. DOAH CASE NO: 86-3569

   File No: 618-S-9/86

   DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, DIVISION OF SECURITIES,

   
   

   Respondent.

   /

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW FINAL ORDER AND NOTICE OF RIGHTS

   
   

   The State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Securities and Investor Protection (hereinafter "the Department"), authorized and directed to administer the provisions of Chapter 517, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, after due consideration of the subject matter hereof, hereby denies the application of H.A. Kenning Investments, Inc. and H.A. Kenning, Jr. (hereinafter Petitioners) to be registered as a broker dealer and principal thereof, respectively, in the State of Florida. The grounds for issuance of this Final Order are as follows:

   
   

   FINDINGS OF FACT

   
   

   1. The Department received the application of H.A. Kenning Investments, Inc. to be registered as a broker dealer in the State of Florida.

      
      

   2. The Department received the application of H.A. Kenning, Jr. to be registered as a principal of H.A. Kenning Investments, Inc. in the State of Florida.

      
      

   3. On August 8, 1986, after its own review, the Department denied said applications by letter. Said letter is incorporated herein and made a part hereof by reference although not attached hereto.

   4. After petition by Attorneys Page and Logue, of Atlanta, Georgia, representing the Petitioners, a formal administrative hearing was held before Hearing Officer Michael Parrish on January 29, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. Each party submitted proposed recommended orders in a timely fashion to the Hearing Officer for review. On March 31, 1987, Hearing Officer Parrish issued a Recommended Order to the Department containing his recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that said applications be denied. Said Recommended Order is incorporated herein and made a part hereof by reference although not attached hereto. The Petitioners filed "objections" to the Hearing Officer's Recommended Order on or about April 10, 1987.

      
      

   5. The Department hereby adopts in this Order those findings of fact contained in the Recommended Order.

      
      

      CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

      
      

   6. In the Recommended Order, dated March 31, 1987, the Hearing Officer concluded as a matter of law that the individual Petitioner, H.A. Kenning, Jr., is unworthy to transact the business of a principal and inasmuch as the individual applicant is unworthy of registration, pursuant to Section 517.161(4), Florida Statutes, found that the denial of H.A. Kenning Investments, Inc. application is also warranted. Each conclusion of law is sufficient under Section 517.161(1)(h) Florida Statutes, and Rule 3E-600.011, Florida Administrative Code to deny Petitioners' applications. The Hearing Officer finally concluded as a matter of law that based upon the foregoing, the denial action of the Department was warranted.

      
      

   7. The Department hereby adopts in this Order those conclusions of law contained in the Recommended Order as if the same were set forth herein.

      
      

      RULINGS ON EXCEPTIONS

      
      

   8. The Department received by mail on or about April 13, 1987, a document entitled "Objections to Recommended Order" (hereinafter "Objections") filed by the Petitioners H.A. Kenning Investments Inc. and H.A. Kenning, Jr. The Department makes the following rulings with regards to objections IA, IB, II, III, IV, and sic [V] (V was incorrectly numbered by Petitioners as "IV").

      
      

      1. Objection IA.: This objection pertains to the Petitioners' filing of a motion for "Summary Recommended Order" in the above-styled cause. This motion was served upon the Department by the Petitioners on January 28, 1987, one day before the final hearing. The Petitioners sought relief on the basis of legal and factual issues which were not raised by the initial petition in this case. At the commencement of the hearing, the Department filed a "Motion to Strike the Petitioners Motion for Summary Recommended Order" and upon argument of counsel, the hearing officer granted the motion to strike for the reasons stated in paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Department's motion. Paragraph 2 of the Department's motion to strike Petitioners' Motion for Summary Recommended Order was based upon the argument that the Petitioners' motion was untimely filed and that the Petitioners did not raise the issue in the pleadings before the Division of Administrative Hearings and therefore waived and/or should be estopped from raising such an argument presently before the Division of Administrative Hearings.

         
         

         Paragraph Number 5 of the Department's Motion argued that the Petitioners' motion for summary recommended order represented an effort on the Petitioners'

         part to delay the proceedings by raising an issue at the "eleventh hour" which should have properly been raised by Petitioners at the initial stages of pleading in the petition for hearing. The Department is in agreement with the hearing officer that the striking of the Petitioners' motion for summary recommended order was in accordance with applicable law and within the discretion of the hearing officer to so rule and that he ruled correctly.

         Therefore, the objection in IA raised in Petitioners' "Objections" to recommended order is hereby denied insofar as it was properly considered by the Hearing Officer and properly ruled upon by same.

         
         

         The record is clear that the Petitioners had the opportunity to raise such an argument as stated in their "Motion for Summary Recommended Order" as to the timeliness of the Department's denial of their applications throughout this proceeding. In fact, one would assume it would have been the first argument raised by the Petitioners had it been meritorious. Despite this, Petitioners failed to assert such an argument until serving upon the Department their subject motion less than twenty-four (24) hours prior to the scheduled final hearing in this cause. The Hearing Officer was clearly correct in ruling that the Petitioners had untimely raised such an issue; that the Petitioners had waived or were estopped from raising such an argument; that the Motion was untimely filed; and that the Petitioners were seeking to delay the proceeding.

         
         

      2. With regards to the objection stated in IB of the Petitioners' objections to recommended order, the Department finds that the Hearing Officer was correct in rejecting as "irrelevant or as constituting subordinate and unnecessary details" the findings of fact proffered by the Petitioners in their tenth unnumbered paragraph. The Petitioners therein complained that certain testimony elicited at the final hearing regarding the granting of "conditional" or "restricted" licenses to in-state v. out-of-state people should be considered by the Hearing Officer in establishing what the Petitioners contended was an alleged arbitrary and capricious decision-making policy by the Division of Securities in denying the Petitioners' applications. The facts revealed, however, that the Petitioners did not seek or raise as an issue in the pleadings the granting of a "conditional" or "restricted" license from the Division of Securities. The Department is not inclined to grant a conditional or restricted license to the Petitioners because it did not consider the Petitioners worthy of a license at all, which view was supported by the Hearing Officer. The Department is therefore of the view that the Hearing Officer was correct in finding that the Petitioners' argument relative to the granting of a "conditional" or "restricted" license by the Department was irrelevant, immaterial and unnecessary to the issue of whether or not a license should be granted outright to the Petitioners in this cause. Petitioners' objection IB is therefore denied as being immaterial and irrelevant.

         
         

      3. As to Petitioners' objections set forth in Part II of their "Objections," the Department finds same to be repetitive and duplicative of the Petitioners' objections set forth in IA, supra. Therefore, the Department incorporates herein its prior ruling on the Petitioners' objection IA by reference as if the same were set forth herein. In addition to the above incorporation, the Department shall further address other several arguments raised by the Petitioners set forth in Part II.

         
         

         1. In ruling against Petitioners in striking their Motion for Summary Recommended Order, the Hearing Officer was, of course, aware that this administrative proceeding and the Petitioners' Petition for Formal Hearing had been filed since or about September 8, 1986, well over four (4) months prior to the scheduled January 19, 1987, final hearing. The Petitioners had ample

            opportunity to conduct discovery well before the final hearing, but apparently decided to delay same until shortly before the final hearing date. Petitioners now argue, as they did before the Hearing Officer, that their receipt of discovery responses from the Department prompted the filing of their Motion for Summary Recommended Order and in essence constituted an excuse for the Motion's service upon the Department less than twenty-four (24) hours prior to the scheduled final hearing. As evidenced from the face of their Motion and exhibits attached thereto, and as argued before the Hearing Officer, only one

            (1) such exhibit attached to their Motion showed a Departmental "date stamp"; thus, the Petitioners' Motion, on its face, utilized little information that they otherwise possessed (and could have raised) prior to the filing of the Petition for Formal Hearing in this cause. A careful review of the Petitioners' Petition for Formal Hearing reveals that the Petitioners did not raise as a "material issue of disputed fact" the timeliness of the Department's denial of Petitioners' application. One would assume that it would have been the first argument raised by Petitioners had an argument been meritorious. The Hearing Officer was clearly correct in striking the Petitioners' motion by ruling that the Petitioners had untimely raised such an issue, that the Motion was untimely filed, and that the Petitioners were seeking to delay the proceeding, per paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Department's Motion to Strike same.

            
            

         2. With regards to the timeliness of the filing of the Petitioners' Motion for Summary Recommended Order, an examination of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provides persuasive support as to its untimeliness. Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Motions for Summary Judgment (an analogous motion to that proposed by Petitioners), must be filed at least twenty (20) days before the hearing date scheduled for same. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Clearly, the Petitioners' Motion for Summary Recommended Order was not filed at least twenty

            (20) days before the time fixed for hearing. Clearly, the same policy reasons behind this waiting period apply to the analogous Motion for Summary Recommended Order. With regards to the application of the case of Doheny v. Grove Isle Limited et al., 442 So.2d 966 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977), a careful reading of that case clearly shows that it is factually distinct and not relevant or on point as to the matters raised by the Petitioners herein especially insofar as

            the Motion in that case was filed approximately thirty (30) days before the hearing in same and different operating statutes and rules were applied therein.

            
            

         3. In summary, the Hearing Officer fully and correctly heard argument of counsel and the law relative to both pending motions and, in the Department's opinion, he correctly ruled in favor of the Department by granting the Department's Motion to Strike Petitioners' "Motion for Summary Recommended Order" per paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Department's Motion to Strike.

            
            

      4. Petitioners' Objection III objects to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Hearing Officer's Conclusions of Law as set forth in the Recommended Order. Petitioners failed at any point of the pleadings prior to the final hearing in this cause to raise as an issue a request for or the granting of a "conditional" or "restricted" license to the Petitioners, if such indeed could properly have been raised as an issue. Petitioners never placed in issue in the pleadings any matters concerning any alleged departmental policy concerning the granting of a "conditional" or "restricted" license. Furthermore, the Hearing Officer was correct in disregarding this matter insofar as it was irrelevant and immaterial to the issue raised by Petitioners in their Petition wherein they sought the granting of a license outright, without restrictions or conditions. Therefore, the Department rejects Objection III as immaterial and irrelevant.

      5. Petitioners' Objection IV objects to the finding of the Hearing Officer that the Petitioners are unworthy to transact the business of a principal and broker/dealer. The Department has carefully reviewed the Recommended Order and finds that the proceedings upon which the findings are based comply with the essential requirements of the law and are supported by competent substantial evidence. Therefore, the Department rejects Petitioners' Objection IV.

         
         

      6. Petitioners' Objection IV (correctly numbered #V) consists of a summary of the Petitioners' previous objections, to which the Department's previous responses and rulings are incorporated herein by reference.

FINAL ORDER

Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ordered that the applications of H.A. KENNING INVESTMENTS, Inc. AND H.A. KENNING for registration as a broker dealer and principal thereof, respectively, is hereby DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of May, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida.

GERALD LEWIS, Comptroller of the State of Florida and Head of the Department of Banking and Finance

COPIES FURNISHED:

Michael Parrish, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building

2009 Apalachee Parkway

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

Don Saxon, Director Division of Securities

Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

H. Richard Bisbee Assistant General Counsel The Capitol, Suite 1302

Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was served by U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid, this 8th day of May, 1987, to A. Keith Logue, Page & Logue, 900 Rhodes Haverty Building, 134 Peachtree Street N.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30303, Attorney for Petitioners.

Walter W. Wood

Deputy General Counsel Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302

Tallahassee, Florida 32399

(904) 488-9896

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

A party who is adversely affected by this Final Order is entitled to judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one (1) copy of a Notice of Appeal with the agency clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the appellate district where the party resides. The Notice of Appeal must be filed within thirty (30) days of rendition of the order to be reviewed.

Docket for Case No: 86-003569

Orders for Case No: 86-003569