Findings Of Fact Ben A. Posdal is the owner of property commonly known as 166 Brightwater Drive, in the City of Clearwater, Florida. On August 7, 1986, he applied for variances to construct two wooden decks on his property, located at the above address. The property which is the subject of the variance request is a building which contains four apartments, which are rented by Ben A. Posdal to various tenants. On August 28, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board (DCAB) denied the variance requested by Mr. Posdal on the grounds that he had not demonstrated a hardship and that he had not demonstrated that the requested variance would not violate the general spirit and intent of the Clearwater Land Development Code. On September 9, 1986, an appeal was filed by Ben A. Posdal from the decision of the Development Code Adjustment Board. The appeal alleges that the DCAB decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable on the following grounds: Other properties allegedly are in violation of the back line setback regulations; The DCAB failed to give enough evidentiary weight to photographs he submitted; and Appellant allegedly is being deprived of the beneficial use of the property in a manner commensurate with the community. There are no physical conditions which are unique to the property. There is no particular physical surroundings, shape or topographical condition that would result in an unnecessary hardship upon the Appellant. Failure to obtain a variance would not impinge upon Appellant's use of the property in any way. The record on appeal contains competent, substantial evidence to support the DCAB decision. Nonconforming uses in the area of the subject property are legal nonconforming uses.
Findings Of Fact On or about April 5, 1988, Petitioner filed an application for a variance to replace an existing four foot fence extending to the seawall on his property at 643 Harbor Island, Lot 12 Island Estates, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned RS-6. Petitioner had already replaced his previous fencing prior to the filing of this application with wooden fencing which extends on the north and south side of his property through the setback to the seawall. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered Petitioner's application at its meeting on May 12, 1988, and based upon the Petitioner's explanation that the variance was sought simply to replace an existing fence that had termite damage, the Board approved his application on a 3 to 2 vote. The variance approval was conditioned upon the Petitioner obtaining a building permit within one month of the approval. Petitioner failed to obtain the required building permit, and no excuse was offered for this failure. Therefore, he had to reapply for the variance. On or about July 21, 1988, Petitioner filed his variance reapplication. The Development Code Adjustment Board considered this reapplication on August 25, 1988, at which time Petitioner again stated that he was simply replacing an existing fence. Due to a tie vote, consideration of the reapplication was continued to the Board's meeting of September 8, 1988. At the meeting on September 8, he explained for the first time that while the fencing on the south side of his property was simply the replacement of a previous fence which had extended to the seawall, the fencing on the north side was not. The previous fence on the north side of his property had stopped prior to the fifteen foot setback. With this clarification, the Board approved his variance reapplication for the south side of his property, but denied the variance for the north side. Petitioner has timely appealed the denial of his variance reapplication as it relates to the north side of his property. Petitioner testified at hearing that prior to the construction of his current wooden fence, he had a wood fence all the way to the seawall on the south side of his property. Since he had to replace that fencing due to termite damage, he took the opportunity to also replace and extend the wooden fencing on the northern side of his property through the setback. This action was not based on any hardship, but simply because he and his family felt it would look better if he had the same fencing on both sides of his property. It is clear and undisputed that Petitioner constructed a new fence on the north side of his property through the setback without obtaining a variance or permit. He did this simply for aesthetic reasons, and not due to any hardship. He failed to disclose this in his applications, or when the Board met on May 12 and August 25, 1988 to consider this matter.
The Issue The issue on appeal is whether, pursuant to Clearwater Code of Ordinances Section 4-505, to sustain or reverse, with or without conditions, the decision of the Community Development Board on June 20, 2003, denying Cepcot Corporation's application to build a convenience store with two islands for pumping gas.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner The Cepcot Corporation (Cepcot) owns real property located at 657 Court Street in the downtown zoning district of the City of Clearwater (Property). On December 17, 2002, Cepcot filed a Flexible Development Application for a comprehensive infill redevelopment project (Application) on the Property. At the time of the proposal, the Property, which comprises 0.95 acres, was developed with a restaurant in a building that was the former Clearwater train station, a thrift store, and a park. The Application proposes the demolition of these improvements and their replacement with a 3200 square-foot convenience store and two gas pump islands. The Property fronts Chestnut Street to the south, East Avenue to the east, and Court Street to the north. The surrounding area is developed with office uses to the west and south, a privately owned utility plant to the north, and warehouse uses to the east. Upon the completion of the Memorial Causeway bridge, which is presently under construction, traffic to the beach will use Court Street and traffic from the beach will use Chestnut Street. In response to questions and suggestions from Respondent's staff, Cepcot revised the proposed site plan several times. The Application is presently complete. Respondent's Planning Department prepared a Staff Report, which finds that the proposed project does not meet certain requirements and recommends denial of the Application on several grounds. On June 17, 2003, Respondent's Community Development Board (CDB) considered the Application. CDB denied the Application and issued a development order explaining the reasons for denial as follows: The proposal is inconsistent with the adopted Community Development Code, the Comprehensive Plan, 1995 Clearwater Downtown Redevelopment Plan, and the Downtown Design Guidelines. The proposed automobile service station is not a permitted use within the downtown district. Approval of the proposed use may encourage other like uses and may be detrimental to downtown redevelopment. The proposal does not comply with the Flexible Development criteria as a comprehensive infill redevelopment project per Section 2-803. The proposal is not in compliance with the other standards in the Code including the general applicability criteria for Section 3-913. Most of the reasons cited for denial involve Respondent's Community Development Code (CDC), which is the land development regulations. The Property is in the Downtown District. CDC Section 2-901 states: "The intent and purpose of the Downtown District is to establish a mixed use downtown where citizens can work, live, and shop in a place which is the economic, governmental, entertainment and cultural focal point of a liveable city." CDC Section 2-902 sets forth the permitted uses within the Downtown District, and CDC Chart 2-100 lists permitted uses by zoning district. The proposed uses are not among the permitted uses for the Downtown District (or the Tourist District, to which portions of the record refer). CDC Section 2-903.C sets forth the following ten criteria to be applied in determining if the proposed use qualifies as a Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Project (CIRP) that may qualify an otherwise non-permitted use: The development or redevelopment of the parcel proposed for development is otherwise impractical without deviations from the use, intensity and development standards; The development of the parcel proposed for development as a Comprehensive Infill Redevelopment Project will not reduce the fair market value of abutting properties; The uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are otherwise permitted in the City of Clearwater; The uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are compatible with adjacent land uses; Suitable sites for development or redevelopment of the uses or mix of uses within the comprehensive infill redevelopment project are not otherwise available in the City of Clearwater; The development of the parcel proposed for development as an comprehensive infill redevelopment project will upgrade the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development; The design of the proposed comprehensive infill redevelopment project creates a form and function which enhances the community character of the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole; Flexibility in regard to lot width, required setbacks, height and off-street parking are justified by the benefits to community character and the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development and the City of Clearwater as a whole; Adequate off-street parking in the immediate vicinity according to the shared parking formula in Division 14 of Article 3 will be available to avoid on-street parking in the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development; The design of all buildings complies with the Downtown District design guidelines in Division 5 of Article 3. CDC Section 3-913.A sets forth the General Applicability criteria. CDC Section 3-913.A.1 states: "The proposed development of the land will be in harmony with the scale, bulk, coverage, density, and character of adjacent properties in which it is located." CDC Section 3-913.A.5 states: The proposed development is consistent with the community character of the immediate vicinity of the parcel proposed for development."
Findings Of Fact At all times to the issues herein the Department of Environmental Protection was the state agency in Florida responsible for the regulation of water pollution and the issuance of dredge and fill permits in the specified waters of this state. Mr. Byrd has been a resident of the City of Treasure Island, Florida for many years and resides at 123 123rd Avenue in that city. His property is located on Boca Ciega Bay next to a public boat ramp operated by the City. On April 12, 1995, the City of Treasure Island applied to the Department of Environmental Protection for a permit to construct a dock six feet wide by seventy-five feet long, located on the edge of its property on which the public boat ramp is located. This property is located in a basin off Boca Ciega Bay, which is classified as a Class III Outstanding Florida Water. The dock involves the placement of pilings in the water, and the construction of a walkway thereon. In order to be obtain a permit, the applicant must provide the Department with reasonable assurances that the proposed project will not degrade water quality and will be in the public interest. The project is permanent in nature, but the temporary concerns raised by construction have been properly addressed in the permit. In the instant case, the dock is intended to accommodate the boating public which will utilize it to more safely launch, board, debark, and recover small boats at the ramp in issue. The dock will be equipped with a hand rail which will increase the safety of the project. Evidence establishes that without the dock, boaters have to enter the water to launch and recover their boats on a ramp can be slippery and dangerous. The site currently in use as a boat ramp, a part of which will be used for the dock, is almost totally free of any wildlife. No evidence could be seen of any sea grasses or marine life such as oysters, and there was no indication the proposed site is a marine habitat. Manatees do periodically inhabit the area, and warning signs would be required to require construction be stopped when manatee are in the area. The water depth in the immediate area and the width of the waterway is such that navigation would not be adversely impacted by the dock construction, nor is there any indication that water flow would be impeded. No adverse effect to significant historical or archaeological resources would occur and taken together, it is found that the applicant has provided reasonable assurances that the project is within the public interest. Concerning the issue of water quality, the applicant has proposed the use of turbidity curtains during construction which would provide reasonable assurances that water quality would not be degraded by or during construction. The water depths in the area are such that propeller dredging and turbidity associated therewith should not be a problem. No evidence was presented or, apparently is on file, to indicate any documented water quality violations at the site, and it is unlikely that water quality standards will be violated by the construction and operation of the structure. The best evidence available indicates there would be no significant cumulative impacts from this project. Impacts from presently existing similar projects and projects reasonably expected in the future, do not, when combined with the instant project, raise the possibility of adverse cumulative degradation of water quality or other factors of concern. By the same token, it is found that secondary impacts resulting from the construction of the project would be minimal. It is also found that this project is eligible for an exemption from the requirements to obtain a permit because of the Department's implementation on October 3, 1995 of new rules relating to environmental resources. However, the City has agreed to follow through with the permitting process notwithstanding the exemption and to accept the permit including all included conditions. This affords far more protection to the environment than would be provided if the conditions to the permit, now applicable to this project, were avoided under a reliance on the exemption to which the City is entitled under current rules. To be sure, evidence presented by Mr. Byrd clearly establishes the operation of the existing boat ramp creates noise, fumes, diminished water conditions and an atmosphere which is annoying, discomfiting, and unpleasant to him and to some of his neighbors who experience the same conditions. Many of the people using the facility openly use foul language and demonstrate a total lack of respect for others. Many of these people also show no respect for the property of others by parking on private property and contaminating the surrounding area with trash and other discardables. It may well be that the presently existing conditions so described were not contemplated when the ramp was built some twenty years ago. An increase in population using water craft, and the development and proliferation of alternative watercraft, such as the personal watercraft, (Ski-Doo), as well as an apparent decline in personal relations skills have magnified the noise and the problem of fumes and considerably. It is not likely, however, that these conditions, most of which do not relate to water quality standards and the other pertinent considerations involved here, will be increased or affected in any way by the construction of the dock in issue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Protection issue to the city the requested permit to construct the dock in issue at the existing public boat ramp at the east end of 123rd Avenue right of way in the City of Treasure Island. RECOMMENDED this 12th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of December, 1995. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Schnell, Esquire 3535 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 James W. Denhardt, Esquire 2700 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 Christine C. Stretesky, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Virginia B. Wetherell Secretary Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kenneth Plante General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
The Issue The ultimate issue in this appeal is whether to approve, approve with conditions, or deny the Development Order issued to Appellee Pinellas Education Organization, Inc., d/b/a Enterprise High School (Applicant or School), by the Board on December 3, 2019. Specifically, the following issues must be resolved: Whether Appellants have standing to appeal the Development Order. Whether the issues raised by Appellants at the Oral Argument were properly preserved for appeal. Whether there is substantial competent evidence in the record to support approval of the Development Order.3 Whether the Board's decision departs from the essential requirements of the law. If the Development Order is affirmed, whether any additional conditions are appropriate. PROCEDURAL HISTORY Appellee School filed an application to renovate an existing building to operate a high school at 2495 Enterprise Road, in Clearwater, Florida.4 The Board held a quasi-judicial public hearing on the application on November 19, 2019 (Board Hearing). The Board approved the School's application with conditions and the City issued the Development Order on December 3, 2019. On December 4, 2019, two separate Appeal Applications were filed regarding the Development Order: (1) by 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP, Countryside Property Principals, LLC, Bruce Levine, and Joan Levine; and by 2505 Enterprise, LLC, and Greg Willsey, and Sandra Willsey. The Appeal Applications were fairly similar and raised a number of issues: four issues pertaining to traffic and parking requirements; and one issue as to whether a high school is a compatible use with the surrounding area. The City referred the matter to DOAH on December 4, 2019, and it was 3 Section 4-505C states, "The burden shall be upon the appellant to show that the decision of the community development board cannot be sustained by substantial competent evidence before the board, or that the decision of the board departs from the essential requirements of law." 4 The School's application went through a Level Two approval process which requires a quasi-judicial public Board hearing to approve flexibility (i.e. deviation) from the minimum development standards set forth in the Code. See Code at §4-401. Level Two approvals must meet both the general applicability criteria and the flexibility criteria outlined by the Code. See Code at Art. 4, Divisions 1, 3, 4 and 6. assigned to an administrative law judge. On December 13, 2019, a telephonic scheduling conference was held to determine the record on appeal and set the oral argument hearing. During that conference the parties agreed not to submit pre-argument briefs, but rather, chose to file post-hearing proposed final orders. The Oral Argument was held at the Clearwater Library and was open to the general public. Applicant, the City, the Board, and all persons who were granted party status at the Board Hearing were allowed to present arguments at the Oral Argument. See Code at 4-505B. At the Board Hearing the following people were granted party status: Dr. Richard Gottlieb, who was represented by Todd Pressman; Sandra Willsey; Greg Willsey; and Todd Burch. The transcript of the Oral Argument was filed with DOAH on February 19, 2020. Pursuant to section 4-505D, the proposed final orders were due within 20 days after the filing of the transcript, or no later than March 11, 2020. Per the City's request, the parties were granted an extension to submit proposed final orders. The additional time was to allow the parties to collaborate on a master index to the record on appeal (Index), which they intended to cite to in their proposed orders. The Index and the proposed final orders were timely submitted on March 23, 2020.5 5 At the Oral Argument, the parties stipulated that the undersigned could take official recognition of the Code provisions and City of Clearwater Comprehensive Plan (Comprehensive Plan) found online. As such, the undersigned takes official recognition of the Code found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/ community_development_code?nodeId=CODECO (last visited April 14, 2020); and of the Comprehensive Plan found at https://www.myclearwater.com/government/city- departments/planning-development/divisions-/development-review-zoning/comprehensive- plan (last visited April 14, 2020). FACTS IN THE RECORD Pursuant to section 4-505A, the record includes the application file of the Clearwater Planning and Development Department (Planning Department); the agenda packet of the Board Hearing; all exhibits accepted into evidence at the Board Hearing; and the streaming video of the Board Hearing.6 The following findings of fact are supported by substantial competent evidence found in the record. Parties and Property The School filed an application with the Planning Department to renovate a 16,696 square foot building located on a 1.730 acre site at 2495 Enterprise Road in Clearwater, Florida (proposed development). The proposed development is in a retail/office plaza known as Village at Countryside (Plaza), located on the east side of Enterprise Road, just south of Countryside Boulevard in Clearwater, Florida. The Plaza consists of 11 parcels, including a large vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. The Plaza is located within the US 19 Corridor Redevelopment Plan, and has a designation of "US 19 District, Regional Center sub-district" (US 19-RC). Property within US 19-RC is subject to the special zoning district and development standards found at Appendix B of the Code.7 The School seeks to operate Enterprise High School, a charter high school, at the proposed development site.8 As explained below, relevant to this appeal is the number of students at the School and whether there will be adequate parking for the proposed development as required by the Code. 6 See Video of Board Hearing held November 19, 2019, on Agenda FLD2019-8026 at time marker 9:25 at http://clearwater.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=50&clip_id=3782 (last visited April 1, 2020). 7 See Code at Appendix B – US 19 Zoning District and Development Standards, found at https://library.municode.com/fl/clearwater/codes/community_development_code?nodeId=APX BUS19ZODIDEST (last visited April 14, 2020). 8 Enterprise High School is an existing charter school which intends to move from its current location to the proposed development site. The School is subject to section 1013.33, Florida Statutes. Appellants own and operate property within the Plaza and adjacent to the proposed development site. Specifically, Bruce and Joan Levine own Appellants 2521 Countryside Blvd., LLP,9 and Countryside Property Principals, LLC. The LLP and/or LLC operate the Countryside Foot and Ankle Center.10 The Countryside Foot and Ankle Center's administrator, Todd Burch, was granted party status at the Board Hearing. Greg and Sandra Willsey own Appellant 2505 Enterprise, LLC, which is a property in the Plaza. The Willseys were also granted party status at the Board Hearing. At the conclusion of the Board Hearing, the Board voted to approve the School's application. On December 3, 2019, a Development Order was issued to memorialize the Board's action. Thereafter, Appellants filed the Appeal Applications with a document titled "Notice and Statement" which stated the following grounds for the appeals: The Neighbors assert that the decision of the Community Development Board ("the Board") was not supported by substantial competent evidence and was a departure from essential requirements of law. Specifically: The Board's decision was based upon a high school with two, 200-student shifts. However, the record below established that these student shifts would substantially overlap during the noon hour. In other words, the evaluation of the proposed change of use was based on impacts and site requirements that were substantially less than what would actually occur on the site. 9 The Appeal Application lists this entity as 2521 Countryside Boulevard Land Trust. 10 Although Appellants state that Bruce Levine was granted party status at the Board Hearing, there is no substantial competent evidence in the record supporting this statement. See Appellees' Proposed Final Order at p. 3; compare Tab 30 of the Index, Board Meeting Minutes for November 19, 2019, at p. 3 and 5. The Board's decision was based on a traffic analysis provided by the applicant that used a wrong ITE trip generation code - an elementary school instead of a high school - so it cannot be relied upon as a basis for the underlying decision. The change of use to a high school required that the applicant establish that it had one parking space per three students. There is no substantial competent evidence to establish that this parking requirement was satisfied. To the contrary, the substantial competent evidence establishes that the parking on the property failed to meet this requirement. In fact, granting this change of use would result in a substantial oversubscription of the available parking at the site. The proposed use would create tortured on-site parking and traffic circulation patterns that would substantially impact the existing medical office uses on the property, including a kidney dialysis office that serves a substantial elderly population. There is no substantial competent evidence to support the finding that the change of use would "have no impacts on the adjacent retail plaza." To the contrary, the change of use would have substantial impacts on the current retail and office plaza. The proposed change of use would have substantial negative impacts on the surrounding community and is incompatible with the existing surrounding retail, office and residential uses. At the Oral Argument, Appellants raised for the first time whether the operation of a school is an inconsistent use with: (1) an Amended and Restated Declaration of Establishment of Restrictive Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions, and Grants of Easements dated December 7, 1983 (the "Parking Easement"); and (2) the Comprehensive Plan. The Studies The first four issues raised in the Appeal Applications are related to the Parking Study and Traffic Study (collectively referred to as the Studies) which were submitted by the School as part of its application. The Parking Study, dated September 2, 2019, consists of overall parking calculations; aerial photographs of the development site and surrounding areas; and the Parking Easement. The purpose of the Traffic Study was to analyze the impact of the development on the traffic intersection at Countryside Boulevard and Enterprise Road, as well as the full access drive at the site. The 50-page Traffic Study, dated October 18, 2019, included numerous charts, maps, and tables with underlying information and data relating to the traffic counts for the proposed development. Jerry Dabkowski, a local traffic engineer who prepared the Studies for the School, testified at the Board Hearing about the traffic and parking calculations. To rebut the Studies, at the Board Hearing Mr. Pressman presented a two-page letter from a professional engineer dated November 15, 2019, titled "Traffic Study Review." Relevant to the appeal, the letter finds fault in the number of students and the "ITE Code" used in the Traffic Study and in the Planning Department's Staff Report and Recommendation (Staff Report), dated November 19, 2019, which was also presented to the Board. These factors would affect the calculations for the number of parking spaces required for and the trip distribution caused by the proposed development. Number of Students Appellants argue the parking calculations should be based on the total number of students enrolled at the School, or 400 students. The Studies and the Staff Report calculated the traffic and number of parking spaces necessary based on two shifts with 200 students per shift. At the Board Hearing, Donna Hulbert, the School's Director, testified that unlike a traditional high school, the School operated in two shifts to allow the students to hold employment while completing their high school education. Although the School intends to enroll a total of 400 students, she explained, each of the two shifts would have a maximum of 200 students. Additionally, the students are eligible for a public transportation bus pass, which some students utilize instead of driving their personal vehicles. The Study establishes that "[t]o reduce the impacts during the AM and PM peak hours, the school intends to split the day into two shifts, each with 200 students attending." Although there was conflicting information between the School's application and Ms. Hulbert's testimony at the Board Hearing about whether the shifts would overlap, the Staff Report recommends approval of the application because, "[t]he applicant has provided the school will operate in two shifts . . . with no more than 200 students present per shift." There is substantial competent evidence that there will be only 200 students at the School at a time, and that this number was correctly used in calculating the required parking spaces and the trip generation for the proposed development. ITE Trip Calculation Appellants argue the Traffic Study utilized the wrong Institute of Transportation Engineers' (ITE) Trip Generation Code, 520, which is the code applicable to an elementary school. The Study, however, states it utilized ITE Code 530 from the Institute of Transportation Engineers' Trip Generation, 10th Edition for Office, to calculate the change in trips attributed to the proposed development. A copy of the ITE Code 530 was attached to the Traffic Study. Additionally, Mr. Dabkowski testified that ITE Code 530 was the correct code for high schools. There is substantial competent evidence that ITE Code 530 was used in calculating the change in trips for the Traffic Study which was relied upon in the Staff Report, and which was accepted by the Board. Parking Requirements Table 2 in section B-303, Permitted uses and parking, provides the following parking requirements relevant to this appeal. Use Regional Use Specific Standards Minimum Off-Street Parking Spaces Retail Plaza BCP[Level 1 Minimum Standard(Building Construction permit)] [Not included] 4/1,000 SF GFA Schools FLD [Level 2 Flexible Development (Board approval required)] 1. All off-street parking is located at least 200 feet from any property designated as residential in the Zoning Atlas 1 per 3 students Based on this criterion, the School would require 67 parking spaces (200 students/3 = 66.6667). The Staff Report and Studies establish the proposed site has 55 parking spaces, but five of these spaces cannot be used because they are within 200 feet from a parcel designated as Residential. Thus, there are 49 available parking spaces "on site," leaving 18 spaces to be designated. As stated earlier, the proposed site is one of 11 parcels in the Plaza. The Parking Study contains a copy of a Parking Easement that allows cross- parking among the parcels. Based on the square footage of the buildings on the parcels (including the proposed development site), the entire Plaza is required to have 975 parking spaces. The Plaza actually has 1,137 parking spaces, an excess of 162 parking spaces. The Code also requires off-street parking spaces be located within 600 feet of the principal and accessory uses they serve. See Code at § 3-1404A. Next to and within 600 feet of the proposed development site is currently a vacant building that formerly housed a Toys-R-Us store. That parcel has 228 parking spaces, but only 177 spaces are required for that building, leaving an extra 51 parking spaces. Based on the excess spaces available through the Parking Easement, there is substantial competent evidence supporting the City's staff finding of adequate parking spaces to satisfy the additional 18 spaces necessary for the proposed development, and the Board's approval of the same. Compatible Use The fifth issue raised in the Appeal Applications is regarding the use of the proposed development site as a charter high school. Whether this site is appropriate for the type of school operated by the Applicant was a topic of discussion among the Board members at the Board Hearing. At the Board Hearing, Planning Department Manager Mark Parry testified as an expert witness. Mr. Parry explained the nature of the US 19- RC standards and gave his opinion that the proposed development complies with all applicable provisions of the Code, including the use requirements. In contrast, Appellants expressed anecdotal fears that the types of students attending the School would disrupt Appellants' medical businesses. For example, at the Board Hearing, Mrs. Willsey expressed concern that the students at the School were known to have "behavioral problems." Mr. Burch spoke about the increased number of pedestrians in the Plaza and cited to a letter in the record from Dr. Levine: "For us to have to monitor and police our properties for trespassing students would be untenable." There was no actual evidence in the record that the School's operations would cause any problems such as increased crime or trespassing in the area. At the Oral Argument and in their proposed final order, however, Appellants' argument shifted away from the potential effects of the students in the area and instead offered the new arguments that the School was inconsistent with the Parking Easement which states the Plaza shall be used "for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices."11 Regardless, as explained below, this argument is not appropriate on appeal because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. At the Oral Argument, Appellants also argued that the School is an inconsistent use with the Comprehensive Plan. Appellants cited a paragraph from the Staff Report: The proposal includes a new charter school with grades nine through 12 and constitutes a public educational facility as defined by Policy J.2.1.2. The school will be located within the US 19–RC future land use designation. The prior designation was Commercial General (CG). The intent is that all uses permitted in the CG are also permitted in the US 19–RC classification. The City is planning to update the Comprehensive Plan to reflect this. Schools are a listed permitted use in the CG classification. As explained below, this argument is also inappropriate because it was not raised at the Board Hearing or in the Appeal Applications. Appellants also argue the proposed development is an inconsistent use with the existing businesses because the adjacent properties are commercial in nature and the School is not commercial. The Code, however, clearly allows Schools as an allowable use in the US 19-RC zoning district, and in the 11 The Complete section of the Parking Easement titled "Uses" states: 2.1 Uses in General The Property, consisting of both the Building Area and the Common Areas, shall be used for commercial purposes only, including without limitation the operation of merchandising establishments, restaurants, and professional offices. No portion of the Property shall be used or operated as a discotheque, bar or cocktail lounge (except in connection with a restaurant) ... theatre, bowling alley, skating rink, roller disco or catering hall, funeral parlor, or for the sale of pornographic literature or material, or an adult book store or so called "head shop" or for a video or other game arcade, flea market, or for a use which would be noxious or immoral or otherwise constitute moral turpitude or constitute an undignified, disreputable use. previous zoning designation of CG. See Code at § B-303. Moreover, unlike the Parking Easement, the Code does not divide use categories into "Commercial" and "Non-Commercial." Rather, the uses are categorized as "Residential" and "Non-Residential." Id. Based on the Code and the review of the application submissions, the Staff Report concluded the School will be an appropriate use in the area. Based on Staff visits, aerial photographs and material submitted by the applicant it is evident that the proposal will be in harmony and consistent with the scale, bulk, coverage and character of adjacent properties and, generally, with properties in the greater neighborhood. The reuse of the 16,700 square foot building with a school will not result in any adverse visual impacts on adjacent properties. Since the character of the site will not change with the proposal, and it is currently similar in nature vis-a-vis placement of other uses in the area it is not expected to impair the value of those properties. The proposal will likely have no effect, negative or otherwise, on the health or safety of persons residing or working in the neighborhood. The testimony of Mr. Parry, coupled with the Staff Report, constitute substantial competent evidence supporting the Board's finding that the School is a compatible use with the area.
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner is entitled to a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock and seawall by provision of reasonable assurances that the project is in the public interest.
Findings Of Fact On May 8, 1989, the Petitioner, Kathryn Haughney, applied to DER for a permit to construct a dock and seawall on the shore of the Halifax River in Volusia County. The portion of the Haughney property where the dock and seawall would be constructed is separated from the Haughney home by John Anderson Drive, which parallels the river's edge and is separated from the river by a ribbon of undeveloped property at that location and to the south. A house is located at water's edge on the lot to the north of the proposed construction site. The Haughney home itself is set well back from John Anderson drive on the side of the street away from the river. The Halifax River is classified as a Class III water body under DER rules. The particular part of the Halifax River where the Haughney property is located and where the dock and seawall are proposed is also within the Tomoka Marsh Aquatic Preserve, which is an Outstanding Florida Water under DER rules. The dock as proposed by Petitioner will be 320 square feet. DER denied the permit application on July 19, 1990, but in so doing did not deny the application on the basis of the proposed dock, which, because of its dimensions, is exempt from DER permitting requirements. The seawall as proposed is to be 137 feet long. Petitioner applied to extend it 16 feet out into waters of the state at the northern end, gradually increasing to 34 feet into waters of the state at the south end. Additionally, 5 feet of riprap would also extend out into waters of the state along the seawall's entire length. The waters of the state that would be filled by the proposed seawall contain lush wetland vegetation that provides habitat for a number of macroinvertebrate species which are part of the food chain feeding fish and wading birds such as egrets and herons. Fiddler crabs and colonies of mussels have been observed on the site. The area to be filled provides a valuable habitat for fish and wildlife. There was no mitigation offered by Petitioner to make up for the loss of habitat to be occasioned by the proposed construction. Although Petitioner asserted DER had named no "endangered species" and that the Environmental Protection Administration had not designated this area as "endangered," those federal concerns were not at issue. If such federally designated species or location designation existed in the locale, it might militate against granting this application for permit, but in the negative, it is irrelevant. A vertical seawall exists immediately north of Petitioner's shoreline. The shoreline to the south remains undeveloped. (See Finding of Fact 2). Construction of seawalls, especially those that extend out from the existing shoreline, typically causes erosion on adjacent shorelines, and additional seawalls exaggerate wave energy and can have a cumulative erosive effect. The foregoing fact is found in reliance upon the testimony of Don Medellin, an Environmental Specialist II for DER, and Barbara Bess, an Environmental Manager for DER, both accepted as experts in environmental aspects of dredge and fill permits. The assertion that actual erosion on the property to the south has already occurred was contained in a letter from Petitioner's southern neighbor (DER Exhibit 6). Petitioner's representatives objected to consideration of this exhibit as "hearsay." They are correct and current erosion to the south is not found as a fact. Nonetheless, actual erosion in a pocket on the north end of Petitioner's shoreline has been shown by the direct testimony of Emmett and Martha Haughney, who assert that their property is eroding due to the existing seawall and that Petitioner wants a permit for a seawall to alleviate this erosion. Their evidence is confirmed by the personal observations and testimony of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess. Further, upon their testimony, it is accepted that this minimal pocket of erosion is most likely due to the existing seawall to the north and that if the Petitioner builds a seawall to the specifications now set out in the permit application, there is potential for similar and perhaps cumulative erosion to the shoreline to the south of Petitioner's lot. Neither the city nor county involved has land use restrictions which would prohibit Petitioner's proposed seawall except that Volusia County advocates riprap requirements if this permit application were granted. In its Notice of Permit Denial, DER advised Petitioner as follows: The Department has determined that the follow- ing changes to the project may make the project permittable: The vertical seawall should be eliminated and replaced with coquina rock riprap revet- ment. The riprap should be located further landward and conform to the slope of the existing embankment. Backfilling on the north property line is acceptable provided the fill area does not extend more than 10 feet westward in the most eroded area. Accordingly, the riprap could extend to the adjacent seawall and gradually extend in a more landward direc- tion to prevent excessive elimination of the littoral zone vegetation. Whatever alternative the applicant elects to choose, the removal or elimination of littoral zone vegetation must be offset in the form of mitigation if the impacts can not be reduced any further. Finally, the agent should eliminate the use of generic drawings which must be continually revised. All drawings should reflect the existing and proposed conditions and the impacts associated with the project. Petitioner's contractor, Andy Harris, testified to other alternatives that could be used by Petitioner in constructing her seawall, but the evidence of Mr. Medellin and Ms. Bess is persuasive that the alternative measures proposed by Mr. Harris would not provide the reasonable assurances the law requires DER to obtain from Petitioner.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order affirming its July 19, 1990 Notice of Permit Denial. RECOMMENDED this 25th day of April, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-7215 The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's letter to Hearing Officer (filed March 22, 1991) The first paragraph complains that a VCR was unavailable in the hearing room so that Petitioner's videotape could not be shown. Petitioner should have made arrangements for showing the tape and did not. Likewise, Petitioner never offered the tape in evidence (for viewing by the Hearing Officer afterwards in preparation of this Recommended Order). Therefore, it very properly was not considered. The next 3 paragraphs refer to the Casden letter (DER Exhibit 6), which is covered in FOF 8-9. The remaining paragraphs are rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need to made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; however, they are alluded to in the Conclusions of Law. Petitioner's letter to DER Counsel (filed March 25, 1991 by DER, suggesting it was Petitioner's proposed findings of fact) 1-3 For the reasons set out above, the Petitioner's videotape was not considered. The subject of erosion to the degree proved at the hearing is covered in the Recommended Order. 4-5, PS 1-3 Mere rhetoric and legal argument upon which no ruling need be made under Section 120.59(2) F.S.; covered in the Conclusions of Law to the degree appropriate. Respondent's PFOF: 1-11 Accepted as modified to reflect the greater weight of the credible and probative record evidence as a whole. That which is rejected is rejected as not proven or not persuasive. Unnecessary or irrelevant material has likewise been excluded. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas MacLaughlin Assistant General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Kathryn Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Emmett and Martha Haughney 2301 John Anderson Drive Ormond Beach, FL 32074 Carol Browner, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact On or about March 7, 1986, Petitioner submitted an application for a variance from the open space and rear set-back line requirements applicable to property located at 2612 U.S. 19 North, Clearwater, Florida. The subject property is zoned CC (commercial center). Petitioner's application requests a variance to provide 12.33% open space instead of 25%, and to construct a building 30 feet from the rear property line rather than 50 feet as required by the Land Development Code for property zoned CC. On or about April 24, 1986, the Development Code Adjustment Board denied Petitioner's application for a variance, and Petitioner timely appealed on May 6, 1986. The only evidence in support of its application offered by Petitioner was the testimony of Robby Tompkins. He testified that Petitioner's application is "unique" because Petitioner was 90% complete with its architectural plans for the renovation and modernization of the subject property when the current ordinance took effect, and Petitioner therefore urges that the current ordinance should not apply. Additionally, Petitioner argues that there will be no injury to the public as a result of the variance, and in fact the project will add 6800 square feet to its shopping center. Tompkins admitted that an increase in financial return was the primary reason Petitioner has sought the variance. Finally, he stated that if Petitioner complies with the 25% open space requirement, there will not be enough parking to meet Code provisions, and if sufficient parking is provided, there will not 25% open space.
Findings Of Fact The following findings are based on the uncontested facts alleged in Petitioner's Motion For Summary Recommended Order and from the Final Orders issued in Bayshore Homeowners Association v. Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. On December 29, 1980 DER entered a Final Order on the application of Petitioner for a 90 slip marina in Biscayne Bay, Florida. The Order denied the permit because Grove Isle had not demonstrated that the project is "affirmatively in the public interest" and because the applicant had not demonstrated that it "can meet ambient water quality standards within the project area itself." In the Recommended Order on Remand the Hearing Officer had defined "existing ambient waters" to be the area in the cove between Grove Isle and the Miami mainland. The Final Order rejected that concept and held if any waters others than those contained within the immediate project site were to be considered as ambient, Petitioner must request a mixing zone as part of its application. See Section 17-4.242, (1)(a)2.b. and Section 17-4.244, Florida Administrative Code. By a letter received at the Department of Environmental Regulation on May 20, 1981, Grove Isle reapplied for the boat dock permit which was the subject of the foregoing proceedings. Petitioner's application, which was in the form of a letter from counsel, stated: May 18, 1981 Mr. Larry O'Donnell Department of Environmental Regulation Post Office Box 3858 West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 RE: GROVE ISLE - Application for Boat Dock Dear Mr. O'Donnell: On behalf of Grove Isle, LTD, I am reapplying for the boat dock permit previously applied for by Grove Isle, LTD. Please consider this a short-form application. Your office designated a previous file number, DF 13-7956, to this matter. In conjunction with that application I am applying for a mixing zone, pursuant to Rule 17-4.244, for both the construction and operation of this marina. Please refer to your file on the previous application and incorporate said documents into this reapplication. I am submitting with this application: A scale drawing (one inch = 100') of the proposed facility. (which you have) A certified survey of the proposed mixing zone. (one inch = 100') An application fee of $20.00 A copy of the Final Order issued by Jacob D. Varn, former secretary of DER, on the previous application. A copy of the Notice of Intent previously issued for this project, dated 9/23/79. (which you have) As you will note from reading Mr. Varn's Final Order, he concluded that issuance of this permit was not appropriate inasmuch as the applicant had not applied for nor received a designated mixing zone. We do not necessarily agree with this order and have, in fact, appealed this decision to the First District Court of Appeal. However, in an attempt to keep this matter from becoming any more complicated, we have decided to reapply for the permit and to apply for a mixing zone. We do not concede that a mixing zone should be required for this project or that the facility will result in the release of any pollutants so as to significantly degrade ambient water quality. However, should this project, through its construction or operation, result in the release of any pollutants, I believe they would be limited to: Bottom sediments placed in suspension by the installation of the concrete piles used to support the docking facility during construction; Minimal amounts of oil and grease which may escape from the various vessels moored to the docks; The constituants of anti-fouling paint which may be applied to the hulls of the various vessels moored at the docks. Turbidity will be controlled by the use of curtains during construction. If lowered water quality occurs at all in this project it would only occur within the designated mixing zone, as per Rule 17-4.242 (2)(b) F.A.C. Please advise me should additional information be needed to process this re-application. Yours truly, /s/ KENNETH G. OERTEL On June 19, 1981, DER sent a "completeness summary letter" to Petitioner which requested the following information: Your project is in Outstanding Florida Waters. Please provide the following items demonstrating compliance with Section 17-4.242, Florida Administrative Code. Please demonstrate that this project is clearly in the public interest and that this project will not result in the degradation of ambient water quality beyond the 30 day construction period. Petitioner responded by letter dated June 22, 1981 and which was received at DER on June 25, 1981. Petitioner said in pertinent part: Dear Mr. Duke: If you would check your previous file no. DF-13-7956, I believe you will find all the information you have requested has previously been provided to your office either in that permit file or through the administrative hearings held in pursuit of this application. I think it would be more fruitful if you would communicate with Al Clark, Attorney for DER, with regard to the status of this application. As I do not wish to speak on behalf of Mr. Clark, I believe you should confirm the status of this application with him, particularly in view of our attempt to comply with Secretary Varn's Final Order which suggests the application for this mixing zone. The record reflects no further correspondence between the parties until September 23, 1981 when the Department entered a Final Order Denying Application for Permit. The Order provided that: This project was reviewed previously (DF 13-7956) and was determined not to be clearly in the public interest pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. No further evidence upon resubmittal, has been provided to clearly demonstrate that this project is in the public interest. Furthermore, the requested mixing zone exceeds that allowable pursuant to Section 17-4.244, F.A.C. and can be applied only during the construction period, pursuant to Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. During the operation of this facility ambient water quality is expected to be degraded in violation of Section 17-4.242, F.A.C. This order was entered ninety-one days after DER received Petitioner's June 22, 1981 letter.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Environmental Regulation issue the permit applied for by Petitioner, Grove Isle, Ltd. on May 20, 1981 subject to the conditions contained in the Notice of Intent To Issue Permit dated October 23, 1979 which is a part of the record in Bayshore Homeowners Association et al., v. State of Florida Department of Environmental Regulation and Grove Isle, Inc., Case Nos. 79-2186, 79-2324 and 79-2354. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 12th day of February, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL P. DODSON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of February, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Respondent TCI has more than 70 homes completed or under construction in furtherance of plans to build 141 single family residences as part of Tymber Creek Phase I, a development in Volusia County. The development site is partially bounded by the Little Tomoka River, a natural body of water which is navigable in fact. The site of the construction respondent DER proposes to permit is home to wildlife of various kinds, including woodpeckers, great horned owls, herons, mussels, manatees, snakes, turtles and alligators. At the present time, boat traffic on the Little Tomoka River is negligible. The dock TCI proposes to build would have a total area of 120 square feet and would not impede the flow of the river. It would protrude over the water no more than five feet along the bank of the river at a point where the river widens, described by some of the witnesses as a lagoon, and would not constitute a hazard to navigation. With respect to the dock, the foot bridges, the boat ramp and the removal of the agreed upon portion of unauthorized fill, the permit DER proposes to issue would be before the fact. According to DER's appraisal of TCI's original, revised permit application, which was received in evidence as DER's exhibit No. 5, TCI made revised application, on November 29, 1977, for "after-the-fact approval for the placement of approximately 3500 cubic yards of fill After TCI had filled, it constructed parking and recreational facilities. In evaluating TCI's application, Steve Beeman, a DER employee, described the site in January of 1978: Approximately 1.6 acres of filled flood plain is presently covered by a sports complex including tennis courts, swimming pool and recreation building and an asphalt parking lot. An additional 3000 square feet has been filled and paved (asphalt was applied after receipt of DER cease and desist notice) for [access to] a [proposed] boatramp and parking area, and approximately 14,000 square feet of swamps have been filled in the construction of a 1800+ feet "natural trial". DER's exhibit No. 5. By letter dated February 22, 1978, respondent DER notified respondent TCI of its intent to deny TCI's initial application, as revised. Among the reasons DER gave for its intended denial were expected violations of various water quality standards, including a prohibition against oils and greases in concentrations greater than 15 mg. per liter ("or that no visible oil, defined as iridescence, be present to cause taste or odors, or interfere with other beneficial uses.") DER's exhibit No. 4. Rule 17-3.05(2)(r) , Florida Administrative Code. This water quality standard violation was anticipated because of "the [projected] focussing of stormwater runoff into the Little Tomoka River, across paved surfaces, which are high in petroleum based pollutants." DER's exhibit No. 5. In its notice of intent to issue a permit, DER proposes to authorize TCI "to realign (straighten) existing boatramp access road." DER's exhibit No. Mr. Wheeler's letter to Mr. Shirah of April 6, 1978, DER's exhibit No. 2, describes the proposed access road change as part of "discussions and agreements concerning resolution of the initial unauthorized fill and subsequent after-the- fact application." A drawing attached to this letter indicates that the contemplated alteration of the roadway would decrease the amount of paved surface to some unspecified extent. Another part of these "discussions and agreements concerned removal of some 1900 cubic yards of fill. Most of the fill designated for removal had been placed with the idea of creating a dry pathway through the marshy area separating the Little Tomoka River from an asphalt parking area. So placed, the fill dirt acts as a dike, preventing the preexisting communication between the waters of the Little Tomoka River and the waters of the adjacent marsh. At the hearing, Mr. Wheeler testified that, if revised in accordance with DER's exhibit No. 2, TCI's project would pose no threat to water quality, but he conceded that the effects of gasoline boat motors were not considered. An increase in beat traffic would likely result in an increase in oils and greases in the waters of the Little Tomoka River.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent DER, deny the permit is proposed to issue to respondent TCI in letters to petitioners dated April 7, 1978. DONE and ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Segundo J. Fernandez, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida Judson I. Woods, Jr., 32301 Esquire Post Office Box 1916 Ormond Beach, Florida 32074 Tymber Creek, Inc. c/o Stan Shirah Route 40 Twin River Drive Ormond Beach, Florida 32074
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns property located at 1315 N. Betty Lanes Lots 8 and 9, Block E, Pine Ridge Subdivision in Clearwater, Florida. This property is zoned "CO" (general commercial) The consumption of alcoholic beverages on, premises is not permitted on premises zoned "CO," and therefore requires conditional use approval. Petitioner applied for conditional use approval on or about February 20, 1986 and on March 18, 1986 the Planning and Zoning Board disapproved Petitioner's application for conditional use. Paula Harvey, Planning Directors recommended approval because her review of the application indicated the location was suitable for a restaurant and lounges and the police department indicated no reason for disapproval. She did condition her recommendation on Petitioner demonstrating that all parking requirements of the Land Development Code would be met. A 6,000 square foot; two-story building is located on the subject property, but Petitioner only intends to use 2500 square feet for a restaurant and lounge. Petitioner currently operates a bar serving beer and wine directly across Overlea Lane on Beverly Lanes about forty feet away from the subject property. He testified he intends to close his present bar if he obtains this conditional use approval and opens his restaurant and lounge on the subject property. At his present locations Petitioner serves beer and wine; but not food. On the subject property, he would not sell alcoholic beverages without food, except to 7 persons waiting to be seated in the restaurant. Other than Paula Harvey's testimony that the subject property does not have sufficient parking spaces for the utilization of the entire 6,000 square foot building as a restaurant and lounges there is no competent, substantial evidence in the record as to the number of parking spaces on the property. It cannot be determined if there would be sufficient parking if Petitioner used only 2,500 square feet for the restaurant and lounges and the remainder of the building for some other commercial purpose. The neighborhood surrounding the subject property includes a church, residential, shopping and commercial areas. In addition to Petitioner's present barb there is also one other bar in the neighborhood. Public testimony evidences neighborhood concern about noise, litter, traffic and fighting associated with Petitioner's present bar and Petitioner offered no testimony as to how he intended to control noise, litters traffic and fighting which can reasonably be expected to occur if he opens a 2500 square foot restaurant and lounge with seating for more than 150 people compared to his current 1,600 square foot beer and wine bar.
