The Issue Whether respondent discriminated against petitioner on account of her gender in terminating her employment?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner Audrey Owens began work in January of 1985 or thereabouts as the "service writer" at what was then Santa Rosa Datsun, an automobile dealership in or near Milton. Until she was fired in April of the same year, she had the job of dealing with customers who brought cars to be serviced. She wrote up what needed to be done, then gave the job to a mechanic to do. Several mechanics worked at the dealership, but on commission. By allocating work among them, the service writer determined what their income would be. A number of mechanics did not feel that she distributed the work equitably. This was no secret to parts and service manager George O. Brewer, the service writer's immediate supervisor; he saw a mechanic nearly burst into tears on account of it. He had complaints from numerous employees and from some customers about Ms. Owens behavior toward them. He also felt she should not wear blue jeans to work, and asked her to dress more formally. She persisted in wearing attire she was repeatedly told was inappropriate. In addition to the unresolved issue of dress, other frictions marred the relationship between Ms. Owens and Mr. Brewer. She pouted when he "gave her guidance," and failed to follow various instructions. Once he declined her request to install a rubber mat to stand on behind the counter on which she wrote service orders, and she responded that she would go over Mr. Brewer's head to George R. Kearney, who owned the dealership. It was in that context that Mr. Brewer told her he would fire her if she went to Mr. Kearney. All the while, the mechanics dissatisfaction and resentment grew. Eventually Mr. Brewer did fire her, giving her only a day's notice. She threw a pen at him. At hearing, Ms. Owens made various false and sensational charges against Mr. Brewer, although she did not testify that her termination was for failure to bestow sexual favors. She said she was fired when she asked Mr. Brewer why he had made a fool of her by yelling at her rudely, telling her to ask a mechanic to install seat belts in a Toyota truck. Jean Rubbards, petitioner's predecessor as service writer," left the job to spend more time with her son, when the child's father died. Mrs. Rubbards and Andrea Penten, who succeeded petitioner as service writer, testified that Mr. Brewer was demanding but fair, a good person to work for, and that their relationships with him lacked sexual overtones. When Mr. Brewer's supervisor, Mr. Kearney, bade Ms. Owens farewell, she did not report that she had been harassed sexually. In addition to Messrs. Brewer and Kearney, seven employees who worked at the dealership contemporaneously with Ms. Owens testified at the hearing, although at least one had since left for another job. Not one of them ever received any indication at the time that anybody at work had ever harassed her sexually.
The Issue Was Petitioner denied a promotion on account of her gender?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner has been employed by the Department since 1991. Petitioner is a Field Biologist, Grade Level I. Among other things, she monitors surface water quality by collecting water in various environments and analyzing it in a laboratory. Early in 1994, there was a reorganization of her section and she began to work in the laboratory under the supervision of Jerry Owen. In the middle of 1994, Jim Wright became the supervisor of the laboratory section and, thus, Petitioner's supervisor. Subsequent to Mr. Wright becoming her supervisor, she experienced problems with regard to work assignments. Petitioner had been trained to operate the section's motorboats in 1991, and had operated them in the past. In January 1995, there were questions about Petitioner operating the boats. Subsequently, Environmental Specialist III Lee Banks told her she could no longer operate the boats. Under the supervision of Mr. Wright, Petitioner was assigned many secretarial duties. She was criticized for her lack of skill in filing. Mr. Wright suggested that she get some advice on how to properly file. She was instructed to learn to type and criticized when she failed to learn that skill. She was told that she couldn't travel to meetings and seminars until she completed a typing tutorial. During this period at least two informal documents were circulated in the section which were derogatory toward women. They could be considered offensive to someone with tender feelings, but they contained no vulgarity and were not outrageous. The origin of the documents was not demonstrated. Mr. Wright sometimes belittled the employees who were under his and he or others in the section sometimes told jokes, including "dumb blonde" jokes. On October 15, 1996, Petitioner learned that a co- worker, Pat O'Conner, a Field Biologist, Grade Level I, had his position upgraded to Field Biologist, Grade Level II. Pat O'Conner is a male and had less seniority in the Department than Petitioner. The position upgrade was not advertised and was not open to competition. Petitioner complained about this and was told to "sit tight" until an ongoing investigation of Mr. Wright was completed. Mr. Wright was removed from his position in March 1997. Petitioner prepared a complaint with the Jacksonville Equal Opportunity Commission, which was signed on September 20, 1997, and filed sometime shortly afterward. Petitioner's complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations was filed on November 14, 1997.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and because of the reasons set forth in paragraphs 21 and 28, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which dismisses Petitioner's claim of discrimination based upon gender. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Azizi M. Coleman, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Amy B. Kalmbacher 600 Domenico Circle, A-10 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Marshall G. Wiseheart, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-6515 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent aided and abetted an unlicensed contractor to engage in contracting by pulling permits for the unlicensed contractor; whether Respondent failed to qualify a firm for whom he was acting as licensed contractor; whether Respondent acted in the capacity of a contractor other than in his own name; and, whether Respondent violated local building codes as alleged in Second Amended Administrative Complaint filed 6-30-89, and Administrative Complaint filed 7-26-89.
Findings Of Fact At all times relevant hereto, Fred S. Petersen was licensed as a general contractor by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (FCILB) and issued License Nos. CG C023928 and CB CA23929 (Exhibit 1). Neither American Weatherall Industries Inc. (AWI), Mel C. Wyatt, nor Steven C. Wyatt were licensed as contractors by the FCILB (Exhibit 2). Prior to mid-August 1987, Kirk Evenstad was the qualifying general contractor for AWI. By letter dated August 20, 1987, AWI proclaimed Kirk Evenstad to be no longer working for AWI because of mismanagement (Exhibit 3). Mel Wyatt, President of AWI, testified that Everstad had stolen between $30,000 and $50,000 of materials from AWI, leaving AWI in a precarious financial situation. In order to continue in business to work out of the financial hole created by Everstad, AWI, through one of its employees, Danny O'Brien, introduced Mel Wyatt to Respondent. Respondent had known O'Brien for some 20 years and, for the proposed reason of helping O'Brien, Respondent agreed to act as qualifying contractor for AWI. To carry out this project, Respondent entered into a contract (Exhibit 4) or Employment Agreement dated July 31, 1987, in which Respondent agreed to supervise construction of projects contracted for by AWI, but the latter was to provide all material and handle all financial aspects of the contracts. Respondent received $1000 for signing this agreement and was to receive a percentage of the gross proceeds of future contracts entered into by AWI. Respondent authorized O'Brien to pull permits for AWI pursuant to Respondent's contractor's license. Although Respondent testified he gave O'Brien authorization for each specific permit pulled and did not believe he signed Exhibit 11, dated August 11, 1987, a copy of General Authorization for O'Brien to pull permits for AWI under Respondent's license, it is found as a fact that Respondent signed the original of Exhibit 11 which is a copy. Within a short period of time after executing Exhibit 4, Respondent became aware of the financial difficulties facing AWI and ceased his efforts to qualify AWI. In the latter part of 1987 (believed to be November-December), AWI reached the point that it could no longer remain solvent and filed for bankruptcy leaving several contracts unfinished for which AWI had received partial payment. Of the four contracts entered into between AWI and homeowners for additions to their houses (Exhibits 7-9 and 14), all were entered into under a printed document showing Everstad's license number; however, the building permits for Exhibits 7-9 were pulled under Respondent's license. By agreement dated August 10, 1987 (Exhibit 7), Alfred and Marjory Hauk contracted with AWI to convert a garage at their home into an office. Hauk made payments of $1000 and $2300 to AWI, the permit for the work was pulled by O'Brien under Respondent's license, but no work was ever done under this contract. AMI subsequently went out of business, and Hauk received no refund of the monies he had paid to AMI. Hauk never met Respondent. On June 12, 1987, John Davis contracted with AWI to convert an existing garage to bedroom and bath and add a garage to his home. The initial permit for this work was pulled by Kenn Covicc as contractor on June 21, 1987, and a subsequent permit was pulled by O'Brien using Respondent's license. Although Davis paid over $6000 to AWI for this work, the work stopped after the footing for the garage addition was poured. On June 2, 1987, Albert Charette entered into a contract with AWI to add a room to his house. Charette paid some $9300 of the $34,400 contract amount during the progress of the work. Differences arose between Charette and AWI involving whether the construction was being done in accordance with the plans and specifications. In September, 1987, Respondent met with Charette and submitted a proposal (Exhibit 15) to Charette to complete the project in accordance with the plans and specifications. About one week after Exhibit 15 was signed, all work stopped on the project, and Respondent never received compensation or commenced work on this contract, which he had entered into in his own name and not as a representative of AWI.
Recommendation It is recommended that Fred S. Petersen be found guilty of violating Sections 489.129(1)(e), (f) and (g), Florida Statutes, and assessed a monetary fine of $3000. ENTERED this 11th day of June, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. K. N. AYERS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Desoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of June, 1990. APPENDIX Proposed findings submitted by Petitioner are accepted, except: Finding #7, penultimate sentence which is rejected as uncorroborated hearsay. Finding #11, that portion stating the purpose of Petersen's visit to Charette was to change the licensure on the permit to Petersen is rejected. See HO #13. Proposed findings submitted by Respondent are accepted, except: Finding #4, Accepted, except with regard to Respondent's notification of termination of his association with AWI. No documentation of this act was submitted and, even though Respondent may have ultimately revoked O'Brien's authority to pull permits, this was done well after the permits were pulled. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert B. Jurand, Esquire G. W. Harrell, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Brian A. Burden, Esquire Post Office Box 2893 Tampa, FL 33601 Fred Seely Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, FL 32202 Kenneth E. Easley General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to a hostile work environment condoned by Respondent due to his sex in violation of Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The School Board of Orange County, Florida, (Respondent) is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Dexter V. Thomas (Petitioner) was an employee of Respondent, as defined in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes, during the relevant time period. Petitioner timely filed his Charge of Discrimination (Charge) with the Commission, pursuant to the Florida Civil Rights Acts of 1992, on August 4, 1995. The Commission failed to make a Cause/No Cause Determination within 180 days of the filing of the Charge. Petitioner filed a form with the Commission on January 27, 1998, seeking to withdraw his Charge and filed a Petition for Relief to proceed to an administrative hearing. Petitioner has not filed a Petition with the Commission. However, the Commission forwarded Petitioner's Charge to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a formal hearing on February 2, 1999, and this proceeding followed. Petitioner is an adult male and a United States citizen of African-American descent. Petitioner worked as a custodian at Apopka Middle School on the day shift from 1989 until his termination on November 22, 1995. Petitioner testified that he had received good evaluations until the fall of 1994, when a new principal took charge of the school. Shortly thereafter, it was Petitioner's perception that he was being harassed because of certain statements that he made to other school employees about the faculty and staff at Apopka Middle School which he believed to be true. The statements made by Petitioner were defamatory in nature. In addition, they were perceived by other school board employees as threatening to the safety and welfare of staff and students. Due to these statements and his general conduct while working his shift, Petitioner was relieved of duty with pay on September 21, 1995. On October 4, 1995, Petitioner was directed to be examined by a licensed psychiatrist at the expense of the school board. Petitioner refused to be examined by the school board's licensed psychiatrist on the grounds that it was part of the continuing conspiracy to silence him about illegal activities he believed were going on at Apopka Middle School. Petitioner was subsequently terminated by action of the school board on November 22, 1995. None of the testimony and other evidence produced by Petitioner, taken as true, could be construed to establish a prima facie case of sexual harassment by employees or supervisors of Respondent. Petitioner failed to offer any credible evidence that he was subjected to any unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature by employees of Respondent. Petitioner appears to have mistakenly checked the "race" box on his Charge of Discrimination. At the hearing, Petitioner did not raise any contentions that he suffered discrimination on the basis of race while in the employ of Respondent.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered as follows: The Charge of Discrimination should be dismissed, as Petitioner's request for administrative hearing was not timely filed under Chapter 760.11(4),(6), and (8), Florida Statutes. In the alternative, Petitioner has failed to prove that he was discriminated against on the basis of his sex by being subjected to a hostile work environment and the Petition should be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of June, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank C. Kruppenbacher, Esquire Orange County School Board Post Office Box 3471 Orlando, Florida 32802-3471 Dexter V. Thomas 3920 Country Club Drive, Number 3 Orlando, Florida 32808 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, Esquire General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dennis Smith, Superintendent Orange County School Board Post Office Box 271 Orlando, Florida 32302-3471
The Issue Mary Harrison's charge of discrimination dated August 4, 1995, alleges that Jodan, Inc., doing business as Manpower (Jodan), discriminated on the basis of her race and for retaliation by constructively discharging her, giving her verbal and written reprimands and a poor performance rating, by denying her training and by intimidating her. The issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether the alleged discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Jodan, Inc., is a family owned franchise of Manpower Temporary Services. Jodan provides temporary staff to its clients. It has six offices in Central Florida: two in north Orlando; one in south Orlando; and one each in Deland, Daytona, and Melbourne. Dan Gavin, president, is responsible for the day to day operations; John Gavin, his brother, is a co-owner. In March 1994, Margaret Jones was Jodan's district manager for the north Orlando (Maitland) and south Orlando (Sand Lake Road) offices. She recruited and hired Ms. Harrison to work as a service representative in the Maitland office. Shortly before that time John Gavin had asked her to recruit specifically for a minority employee as it would be helpful for the office to have a more diverse staff to serve its clients. Ms. Harrison is an African-American woman. At the time that she was hired by Ms. Jones in March 1994, her substantial work experience was in real estate and property management. Service representatives at Jodan perform the intake process with temporary employees (application, interview and testing); they take orders from clients and place temporary employees with those clients. Jodan provides a detailed training program for its employees, including its service representatives. Upon the commencement of her employment with Jodan, Ms. Harrison began a training program known as Professional Service 1 (PS-1) under the supervision of Margaret Jones. PS-1 is a self study course where the employee learns the policies and procedures of a Manpower franchise through tapes and other training materials. It is the responsibility of the employee to keep track of and complete PS-1. Normally it takes between three and six months for an employee to complete PS-1; however, it can take longer, depending on the employee's office work load at the time. Disgruntled and upset by what she perceived as criticism of her management and hiring decisions, Ms. Jones left the employ of Jodan on or about August 1, 1994. Prior to that time, Ms. Harrison had completed all but three or four minor details in the PS-1 training. Ms. Harrison was satisfied by her training under Ms. Jones and she admits that no one at Jodan attempted to prevent her from completing PS-1. In September 1994, Ms. Harrison reported to Dan Gavin that her PS-1 materials were lost. He was surprised that one of his employees would lose her training materials and he assisted Ms. Harrison in looking for the materials by, among other things, looking in an off-site storage facility for them. Ms. Harrison's materials were never found and she includes the disappearance of her training materials as one of the basis for her charge of discrimination. There is no evidence that anyone took the materials but neither is there any explanation for their disappearance. Normally, when an employee completes PS-1, a checklist is sent to Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, indicating the employee has completed the training. On the checklist, the employee is required to record the dates that she completed each aspect of PS-1. Mr. Gavin contacted Manpower headquarters and obtained a new checklist. He also set up a schedule to meet with Ms. Harrison to go over the items on the checklist and verify that all of PS-1 had been completed. At their first meeting, Ms. Harrison assured Mr. Gavin that she had completed all of PS-1. Based on their conversation, he called Manpower headquarters and verbally confirmed that Ms. Harrison had completed PS-1. Manpower records indicate that she officially completed PS-1 as of December 1, 1994. Ms. Harrison's testimony at hearing with regard to whether she actually had an opportunity to finish the training was confused and unclear as she seemed to contend that there were materials that she was supposed to send to the home office, but could not, due to the lapse of time and loss of her training package. After an employee completes PS-1, the next step is to attend PS-2, which is a week-long training seminar at Manpower headquarters in Milwaukee. PS-2 reinforces what is learned in PS-1 and teaches additional marketing skills. Employees are given a list of dates during which PS-2 will be offered and, because the training requires them to be away from home for a week, they can schedule it at their convenience. Employees can schedule PS-2 before actually completing PS-1 but must have completed PS-1 before they actually attend PS-2. Ms. Harrison could have attended PS-2 any time after December 1, 1994. In January 1995, Mr. Gavin directed the area manager, Kathy Stanford, to ensure that all eligible employees, including Ms. Harrison, sign up for and attend PS-2. The PS-2 classes fill up quickly and it was a priority for Mr. Gavin to have his employees enroll. On more than one occasion, Ms. Stanford gave Ms. Harrison a list of available classes and the opportunity to attend PS-2. However, Ms. Harrison failed to sign up for PS-2. Jodan evaluates employees' performance and salaries on an annual basis. On January 30, 1995, Ms. Harrison was given her annual evaluation. Although the "Appraisal Period" on her evaluation is listed as March 21, 1994, to September 1994, the uncontradicted evidence was that this was a scrivener's error and the appraisal period was March 21, 1994, (Harrison's date of hire) through December 31, 1994. Her review was performed by Mr. Gavin, who was familiar with her performance, with input from Ms. Harrison's immediate supervisor, Gloria Michael. Ms. Stanford sat in on all evaluations done at that time, including Ms. Harrison's, because she was the new area manager and sitting in on the reviews was one way for her to become familiar with the staff and their performances. Ms. Harrison's overall score on the evaluation was a 2.66 on a scale of 1 to 5. A score of 2 means "Below Expectations" and a score of 3 means "Consistently Meets Expectations." A service representative learns all performance areas covered by the evaluation through PS-1. Although she claims that she was evaluated in areas in which she was not trained, Ms. Harrison did not raise this issue with Mr. Gavin and she did not write in any comments on the evaluation in the space provided for employee comments. Further, the uncontradicted testimony, including that of Margaret Jones, established that Ms. Harrison did receive training in all areas of her job in which she was evaluated. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any job detriment as the result of this evaluation or the unusual circumstances surrounding her PS-1 training. She received a pay increase following the evaluation and was then the highest paid service representative. On March 29, 1995, Ms. Harrison was presented with a memorandum by Ms. Michael that addressed concerns she had with Ms. Harrison's job performance. Specifically, the memorandum addressed the following areas: Failure to be responsive to customer needs; The high number of personal calls Ms. Harrison was receiving at the office; Failure to properly match an employee's skills with a client's needs; Failure to consistently enter and update employee information in the computer system each time she spoke with an employee; Failure to open the office on time in the morning; Failure to set up computer training for applicants when she opened the office in the morning. Neither Mr. Gavin nor Ms. Stanford played any role in the preparation or presentation of this memorandum. Ms. Harrison did not suffer any adverse employment action as the result of the March 29, 1995, memorandum. Ms. Michael followed up the March 29, 1995, memorandum with a memorandum on May 3, 1995, detailing Ms. Harrison's improvement in all of the areas discussed in the March 29, 1995, memorandum. On May 15-16, 1995, Ms. Harrison and Ms. Michael (who is white) failed to provide an important client with prompt and appropriate service. As a result, Ms. Stanford counseled both women and placed them both on 90 days probation. Ms. Harrison does not contend that this action was discriminatory. On July 17, 1995, Ms. Harrison submitted a letter of resignation. In the letter she stated that she enjoyed her position as service representative. She also stated that she felt she had been subjected to discriminatory treatment. Ms. Harrison's resignation and the allegations of discriminatory treatment came as a surprise to Ms. Stanford and Mr. Gavin as Ms. Harrison had never before told them she was unhappy or felt discriminated against. In her letter of resignation, Ms. Harrison offered to meet with Mr. Gavin and Ms. Stanford to discuss her resignation, but during her exit interview she refused to discuss her allegations. Although many of Jodan's temporary employees were minorities, Ms. Harrison was the only African-American service representative. There were, however, other minorities, including Hispanic-Americans. Ms. Harrison presented her case in an articulate organized professional manner. It is clear that she felt the work environment was stressful and uncomfortable. However, she did not prove that she was discriminated against or was the object of hostile or adverse employment actions. The temporary employment agency business is highly competitive. Jodan had several large corporate clients and it had to work hard to meet the needs of those clients, sometimes on short notice. This created pressure on Jordan's regular staff that was experienced by white or non-minority employees as well as Ms. Harrison.
Recommendation Based on the above, it is RECOMMENDED: that the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismiss Ms. Harrison's charge of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of December, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Mary A. Harrison 2356 Carborn Street Orlando, Florida 32839 Kelly T. Blystone, Esquire Moran & Shams, P.A. Post Office Box 472 Orlando, Florida 32802-0472 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent engaged in unlawful employment practices with regard to Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Graham is a black male. He filed an employment application with Pier 1, a "chain retailer," on August 23, 1999. The application indicated that he applied for a position as a sales associate but in fact he was to be employed as a stockroom assistant. His employment application included a block denominated, "Work Availability." Graham completed this block indicating that he was available to work between 6:00 a.m., and 12 p.m., Monday through Saturday. The employment application stated in the block denominated, "Work Availability," the following: "Although an effort will be made to accommodate individual work schedule preferences and availability, work schedules such as start time, number of daily or weekly hours and assigned work days are subject to change at any time. Availability to work on weekends is required. Number of hours may vary based on business necessity and could change an individual's employment status." Graham was hired on August 30, 1999, as a full-time employee. He worked primarily in the back stockroom. A meeting of store personnel was scheduled at the store on Sunday, November 17, 1999, at 6:30 p.m. Graham was aware of the meeting. He was 20 minutes late because he was participating in a church service at Macedonia Primitive Baptist Church. As a result of his tardiness he was presented with an Associate Corrective Action Documentation, which is a confidential Pier 1 form. The form noted that this was his first "tardy." The form as completed took no action such as suspension or loss of pay. It merely informed him that further instances of tardiness could lead to disciplinary action. Graham testified that he was treated differently from a white woman employee, one Christy Musselwhite, who did not attend the meeting, because Musselwhite did not receive a counseling form. However, Graham's personal knowledge of Musselwhite's situation was insufficient to demonstrate that Musselwhite was treated differently from Graham because of race or gender. Graham felt humiliated because he received the Associate Corrective Action Documentation form. Graham resigned from Pier 1 effective November 12, 1999, so that he could begin employment with the Florida Department of Children and Family Services at a rate of pay in excess of that which he received at Pier 1.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission Human Relations enter a final dismissing Petitioner's claim of discrimination. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Russell D. Cawyer, Esquire Kelly, Hart & Hallman 201 Main Street, Suite 2500 Fort Worth, Texas 76102 Kenneth Terrell Graham 2811 Herring Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32303-2511 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Ronni Morrison Pier 1 Imports Post Office Box 961020 Fort Worth, Texas 76161-0020
Findings Of Fact Based upon the entire record, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Samuel J. Marshall, was born on November 19, 1936. In March 1986 he began employment as a truck driver hauling sand for Taylor Concrete and Supply, Inc. (Taylor) at its Palatka, Florida plant. When he began his employment with Taylor, Marshall advised his supervisor that because of his religious beliefs, he could not work on Saturdays. The name of the religion is not of record. Marshall says that after giving such notification to his employer, he was never required to work on Saturdays during his tenure with Taylor. This was not contradicted. In 1989, Taylor sold the plant to respondent, Tarmac Florida, Inc. (Tarmac). As an employer with more than fifteen full-time employees, Tarmac is subject to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (Commission). Shortly after the sale, petitioner was advised that his position as a sand truck driver was being eliminated but he could transfer to a position as a ready-mix driver in the ready-mix division at the same plant. Petitioner accepted this offer effective November 28, 1989. Because the new position required the driver to work every other Saturday, petitioner advised the new plant manager, Byron White, that he could not work on Saturdays because of his religious beliefs. After Marshall produced evidence to verify his claim, White excused Marshall from working on Saturdays. Tarmac employee timecards confirm that Marshall was never required to work on a Saturday. Petitioner was required to undergo a brief period of training by riding for several weeks with a senior driver, James Bolt. During petitioner's training period, Bolt was engaged in the illicit practice of selling any concrete left in his truck at the end of the day to third parties and then pocketing the money. This was obviously contrary to company policy. Petitioner was aware of this activity but said nothing. On occasion, Bolt would give petitioner some of the illicit proceeds, which he accepted. In the first week of February 1990, or after he had completed his training with Bolt, petitioner went to White and told him that there was "illicit" activity being conducted at the plant, but he refused to disclose the nature of the activity or the name of the individual engaged in that enterprise. He also failed to tell White that Bolt had given him money. White communicated this conversation to the regional manager, Jack Stegall, but because they had no specific information on which to proceed, they were unable to investigate the allegations. Tarmac has a number of plants within each division. It is not uncommon for drivers to be transferred from one location to another, based on the varying demands of the different plants. In June 1990 Stegall decided to transfer two drivers from the Palatka plant to the Green Cove Springs plant due to increased business at the latter facility. Petitioner and another driver, Dennis Folmer, then approximately thirty years of age, were selected for transfer since they had the least seniority in the Palatka ready-mix division. After learning of Stegall's decision, petitioner contacted Stegall and advised him that he believed the company policy required that transfer decisions be made based on seniority with the company, rather than seniority in a particular position. Stegall then checked with the human resources department and learned petitioner was correct. Petitioner's name was thereafter removed from the transfer list and James Bolt, who had less seniority than petitioner, was placed on the list. During his meeting with Stegall, petitioner informed him about the illegal concrete sales that had occurred during his training period. After petitioner was told to inform White about this matter, he took White to the locations where he was with Bolt when the concrete was illegally sold. He also turned over to White the $30 he had received from Bolt. Based on Marshall's revelation, on June 25, 1990, Bolt was terminated as an employee for the unauthorized sale of concrete. Because he had come forward and disclosed the illegal activity, petitioner was only given a one-week suspension without pay. Petitioner did not question nor challenge the suspension and admitted to White that he was involved in the sales. Also, on July 11, 1990, he was given a warning notice prepared by White and which read in part as follows: Sam confessed to selling unauthorized concrete on three separate occasions. Sam also reported others involved. For this reason only Sam was given one week off. If for any reason this happens again or attempt (sic) to, Sam will be terminated. Although petitioner was handed a copy of the notice, he refused to sign it, threw it back at White and walked away. At the same time petitioner notified Stegall of the illegal concrete sales, he also asked Stegall about the possibility of transferring to Tarmac's Deland facility, which was closer to his home. Stegall indicated he would try to assist petitioner with a transfer, if possible. The next day, petitioner drive to the Deland facility and spoke with the Deland plant manager who indicated there was a ready-mix driving position available. The plant manager also agreed to contact White on petitioner's behalf. Even so, because the Palatka facility was short two drivers due to the transfer of Bolt and Folmer to Green Cove Springs, White could not afford to allow petitioner to transfer to Deland. He did promise petitioner that he would arrange for a transfer as soon as an opportunity arose which would not adversely impact the Palatka facility. After petitioner's suspension for his participation in the illegal sale of concrete, Tarmac received complaints from other Tarmac employees regarding petitioner. Believing this conduct to be detrimental to the integrity of the company and a disruption of the harmony of the work unit, Minor Turrentine, then the Tarmac area production manager, advised petitioner that if he continued to talk about the illegal sale of concrete with other drivers and customers, he would be terminated for breaching company policy, that is, disclosing confidential information that was contrary to the company's best interests. He was also given a written warning on July 16, 1990, which read as follows: You were recently suspended for your admitted involvement in certain activities that are against company policy. It has been reported that you have openly discussed these matters with employees at various locations. Be advised that any further discussion concerning your suspension and the circum- stances surrounding it will be considered breach of confidentiality, which is a violation of company policy. Any further violation of company policy will subject you to severe disciplinary action, up to and including discharge. After White received further complaints regarding petitioner, Tarmac terminated petitioner's employment effective August 21, 1990, for breaching company policy. The separation notice, which was dated the same date, gave the following reason for his termination: Employee was formally warned on July 16 to discuss no further his recent suspension. Discharged for further discussion on or about 8/20/90. There is no evidence as to whether petitioner was replaced by another driver, and if so, the age of that driver. When terminating petitioner, Tarmac did not do so because of petitioner's age or religious beliefs. Indeed, Marshall conceded at hearing that he had no direct proof of discrimination but merely believed he was improperly terminated for those reasons. As evidence of age discrimination, petitioner speculated that Tarmac may have been attempting to lower its insurance rates by removing an older person from its payroll, a belief based solely on a conversation he had with an insurance agent a few weeks prior to hearing. However, at least three other ready mix drivers at the Palatka plant are older than Marshall. He also speculated that because he was not required to work on Saturdays, this caused ill-will among his co-workers, and Tarmac terminated him for his religious beliefs. Again, there was no proof, either circumstantial or direct, to support this assertion. Regarding the claim that Tarmac's decision to transfer petitioner to Green Cove Springs in June 1990 was in retaliation for him telling White that working Saturdays was against his religion, the evidence shows that petitioner was removed from the transfer list once his seniority was brought to the company's attention. Petitioner also suggests that he was denied a transfer to the Deland facility in June 1990 as retaliation for his religious beliefs. However, the evidence shows that it was not feasible for Tarmac to transfer him at that time due to a shortage of drivers but Tarmac promised that an effort would be made to comply with his request when it was feasible. Petitioner did not state whether he desires reinstatement to his former position. In his petition for relief, petitioner did request "70 percent of (his) average yearly base pay since August 20 on". However, petitioner's salary at the time of discharge is not of record. Further, there was no evidence presented to establish his salary nor the monetary losses, if any, petitioner has suffered by virtue of his termination. He is currently employed with another company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying the petition for relief. DONE AND ORDERED this 29th day of April, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-5927 Respondent: Partially accepted in findings of fact 1 and 2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 7-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 10-11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 12-13. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 14-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 16-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 19. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 20-23. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 24. Rejected as being unnecessary. Note - Where a finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, irrelevant, subordinate, a conclusion of law, or not supported by the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esquire General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Samuel J. Marshall S. R. Box 1075 Georgetown, Florida 32139 Grant D. Petersen, Esquire Donna M. Griffin, Esquire 1408 North Westshore Boulevard Suite 1000 Tampa, Florida 33607
The Issue This is a license discipline case in which the Petitioner seeks to take disciplinary action against the Respondent on the basis of conduct alleged in an Administrative Complaint. The Respondent is charged with failure to maintain good moral character by trespassing on the premises of another and by being naked on such premises.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified as a sworn law enforcement officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on May 13, 1983, and was issued Law Enforcement Certificate Number 4384. The Respondent held such certification at all times material to this proceeding. The Respondent began employment with the Metro-Dade Police Department in early 1983, and was so employed at all times material to this case. At all times material to this case, the Respondent resided at 1421 Cottonwood Circle, Weston, Florida 33326. The Respondent's residence was one of several units in a townhouse building. In December of 1991, Ms. Kimberly McDonald3 resided at 1419 Cottonwood Circle, Weston, Florida 33326. Her 11-year-old daughter resided with her at that address. Ms. McDonald's residence was next door to the Respondent's residence. Ms. McDonald's residence in December of 1991 had a yard and patio area at the rear of the residence. There were sliding glass doors and windows that faced the yard and patio area at the rear of the residence. That yard and patio area was enclosed by a wooden fence. The fence was slightly more than six feet high. As of December 1991, Ms. McDonald had lived next door to the Respondent for approximately six months. As of December 1991, Ms. McDonald and the Respondent were casual acquaintances; neighbors who occasionally spoke to each other. On the morning of December 4, 1991, Ms. McDonald left her residence and started driving towards her place of employment. Earlier that morning, Ms. McDonald's daughter had gone to school. The Respondent saw Ms. McDonald leave her residence that morning. The Respondent also knew that Ms. McDonald's daughter had gone to school and that their residence was unoccupied. For reasons that are not made clear by the record in this case,4 shortly after the Ms. McDonald drove away on the morning of December 4, 1991, the Respondent walked to the back of Ms. McDonald's residence, removed all of his clothes, and jumped or climbed over the wooden fence around the back yard and patio area of Ms. McDonald's residence. The Respondent then walked naked across Ms. McDonald's back yard and attempted to open one of the sliding glass doors of Ms. McDonald's residence. In the meantime, before she got to her office, Ms. McDonald remembered that she had forgotten something she would need later in the day. Accordingly, she turned around and drove back home. Ms. McDonald entered her residence through the front door and had taken only a few steps into the residence when she saw the Respondent standing in her back yard, completely naked, with one of his hands on the handle of one of the sliding glass doors. Ms. McDonald was frightened and upset by the unexpected and uninvited presence of a naked neighbor. Ms. McDonald had never invited the Respondent into her house or into her enclosed back yard, nor had she ever given the Respondent permission to climb the fence and enter her back yard and patio area. The Respondent saw Ms. McDonald at about the same time she saw him. The Respondent panicked, immediately turned away from Ms. McDonald, and ran naked towards the wooden fence. When the Respondent got to the fence, he stepped on a chair and jumped over the fence. Once over the fence, the Respondent retrieved his clothes, dressed, and returned home. Ms. McDonald was very upset about finding a neighbor in her yard who appeared to be trying to enter her residence. A few minutes later, after talking to a relative, Ms. McDonald called the Broward County Sheriff's Office and reported the incident. The Sheriff's office conducted an investigation and filed criminal charges against the Respondent. Following a jury trial, the Respondent was found guilty of the offenses described in Sections 800.03 and 810.08, Florida Statutes (1991). As a result of the Respondent's conduct on December 4, 1991, Ms. McDonald was concerned about the possibility that the Respondent might engage in future bizarre conduct. She also feared for the safety of herself and her daughter, because she did not know what purpose the Respondent had in mind when he came to her house naked. Because of these concerns and fears, Ms. McDonald and her daughter immediately moved to another residence.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be issued in this case finding that the Respondent committed the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint and imposing a penalty consisting of the revocation of the Respondent's law enforcement certification. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of May, 1999.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether the Petitioner was discriminatorily dismissed from her employment by the Respondent on the basis of race and whether she was retaliated against by the Respondent for filing a complaint of discrimination with the City of Jacksonville.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, the University of Florida, is a state university located in Gainesville, Florida. The Respondent, through its Institute of Food and Agricultural Sciences, operates a Cooperative Extension Service, which maintains a county extension office in each of the 67 counties in the State of Florida. Each of these offices is headed by a county extension director. On September 13, 1991, the Petitioner, Pamela R. Dallis, was hired by the University of Florida as a part-time secretary for the Expanded Food and Nutrition Education Program (EFNEP) in the Duval County Extension Office located in Jacksonville, Florida, which is headed by Mr. Thomas Braddock. The Petitioner was hired in a temporary position known as Other Personal Services (OPS). The Petitioner was initially interviewed for a permanent position, but she did not meet the minimum qualifications for the position because she did not achieve the required score (35 c.w.p.m.) on the typing test. The Respondent changed the classification of the position from permanent to temporary in order to be able to hire the Petitioner despite her typing deficiency. As an OPS employee, she did not have permanent status in the position and was not subject to a probationary period or to periodic written evaluations concerning her performance. The Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Ms. Deborah Patterson, provided the Petitioner training as to the policies and procedures applicable to her position. Specifically, the Petitioner received training concerning data entry, reimbursement of expenses incurred for EFNEP and travel reimbursement vouchers. The Petitioner was also provided assistance concerning computer data entry from another employee in EFNEP. The Petitioner was provided oral counseling concerning deficiencies in her performance on several occasions beginning on January 7, 1992. By June 22, 1992, Respondent considered dismissing the Petitioner from her employment because of her performance deficiencies. Due to budgetary constraints, the decision was made to work more closely with the Petitioner because if she were dismissed, there was no assurance that her position could be filled by another individual. On July 6, 1992, in order to provide closer supervision to the Petitioner, the Respondent moved the Petitioner's work station to a location close to her supervisor's office. Prior to this time, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor had requested to Mr. Braddock that this move be made. Mr. Braddock did not approve the request and recommended that the Petitioner be counseled concerning her work performance. In July, 1992, Mr. Braddock agreed to the move because the Petitioner's performance had not improved despite the performance counseling provided. On July 24, 1993, a few weeks after the Petitioner's work station was moved, she reported to Mr. Braddock an incident that had occurred with a white co-worker, Rachel Fleming. Mr. Braddock spoke separately with each employee and asked for their written description of the incident. There were no other witnesses to the incident. Mr. Braddock received conflicting reports from the Petitioner and Ms. Fleming. The Petitioner stated that on July 24, 1992, after informing Ms. Fleming of her dislike for "chain letters" while talking in the printing room, Ms. Fleming placed a chain letter on the Petitioner's desk with her name on it. The Petitioner scratched her name, placed Ms. Fleming's name on the letter and taped it on Ms. Fleming's desk drawer. The Petitioner stated that she later went to the restroom, and as she was exiting, Ms. Fleming came in, blocked her exit, pushed and grabbed her, and said, "I don't like you no more than you like me, bitch!" Ms. Fleming then allowed her to exit. Ms. Fleming acknowledged in her statement that she had an exchange of words with the Petitioner concerning a chain letter that she had given the Petitioner. Ms. Fleming stated that the Petitioner told her, "This is stupid and so are you." Ms. Fleming also stated that about 15 minutes later, she saw the Petitioner as she was leaving the restroom, asked to speak with her, but the Petitioner "brushed past her" saying nothing. Ms. Fleming grabbed the Petitioner, turned to face her and told her that they did not like each other and to "leave me the hell alone". Ms. Fleming denied pushing the Petitioner or calling her a "bitch". She said she called the Petitioner "a biddy". Based upon the unsubstantiated conflicting reports given by each employee, Mr. Braddock determined that no disciplinary action was warranted and counseled each employee. A few weeks after the incident with Ms. Fleming, the Petitioner filed a complaint of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Office of the City of Jacksonville on the basis that Ms. Fleming had not been disciplined. After having learned of the complaint, the Petitioner's second level supervisor, Ms. Halusky, advised the Petitioner that the proper avenue for her to file a complaint was through the University's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, not the City of Jacksonville. The City of Jacksonville did not proceed with the Petitioner's complaint because she was not an employee of the City of Jacksonville. The Petitioner never filed a complaint with the University of Florida. Despite the performance counseling and assistance provided to the Petitioner, her performance did not improve. The deficiencies concerning the Petitioner's data entry skills continued. Two reports that were due in September, 1992 at the main EFNEP office in Gainesville were late because the work done by the Petitioner had to be redone. The Petitioner's supervisor decided that the Petitioner's continuing performance deficiencies were causing additional work for the EFNEP staff and, even without the assurance of a replacement, it was better to have the position vacant rather than having to redo the Petitioner's work to correct the mistakes. By letter dated September 10, 1992, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor advised her of her termination effective at the close of business that day. The reason given for her dismissal was that she had not developed in her job as expected and because of performance deficiencies. Sixty-six percent of the employees in EFNEP in the Duval County Office are African American. They serve a clientele that is 75 percent African American. Thus, EFNEP is interested in hiring and retaining African American employees for the program. Three of the individuals who testified at the Petitioner's request are African Americans who work at the Duval County Extension Office. They testified that they had not experienced discrimination in their employment at the Duval County Extension Office. Two of those three employees are in EFNEP. One has been an employee in the office for 23 years, and the other has been an employee for 14 years.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's petition for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of December, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The Respondent's proposed findings of fact are all accepted. The Petitioner filed no proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana C. Baird, Esq. General Counsel Human Relations Commission Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Pamela R. Dallis 8050 Arlington Expressway #C-401 Jacksonville, FL 32211 Isis Carbajal de Garcia, Esq. Associate General Counsel University of Florida 207 Tigert Hall Gainesville, FL 32611
The Issue Whether Petitioner was the subject of an unlawful employment practice as defined in Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On April 10, 1989, Petitioner, Mark Cleveland, a male, applied through Job Service of Florida, for employment as a telemarketer with Respondent, Sears Roebuck and Company at the Sears store located in Pensacola, Florida. Petitioner had several years of sales experience with at least six months of experience in telemarketing. He also had a good speaking voice as evidenced by the fact that he is currently employed as a disc jockey at a local radio station. Clearly, Respondent was qualified for the telemarketing position. The telemarketer position would enable Petitioner to earn approximately $85.00 a week or $365.50 a month. The telemarketing section at the Pensacola Sears store consisted of virtually all women with perhaps three or four rare male telemarketers. Petitioner had two separate interviews with two different Sears employees responsible for filling the telemarketing positions. During the Petitioner's interviews with the two Sears employees, Petitioner was repeatedly questioned on whether he could work with all women or mostly all women and be supervised by women. Petitioner assured his interviewers that he could since he grew up with six sisters and in general liked working with women. Petitioner left the interview with the information that he would be hired after another supervisor reviewed the applications and that he would be called once the supervisor's review was complete. After several days, Petitioner, being excited about what he thought was going to be his new job, called one of the two women who interviewed him. He was informed that the telemarketing positions had been filled. Later that same day Petitioner discovered that the positions had, in fact, not been filled and that he had been told an untruth. The telemarketing positions were eventually filled by women. Petitioner remained out of work for approximately four months before he was hired as a telemarketer by the Pensacola News Journal. A Notice of Assignment and Order was issued on August 27, 1991, giving the parties an opportunity to provide the undersigned with suggested dates and a suggested place for the formal hearing. The information was to be provided within ten days of the date of the Notice. This Notice was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent did not respond to the Notice. On October 10, 1991, a Notice of Hearing was issued setting the formal hearing for 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990. The location of the hearing was listed in the Notice. The Notice of Hearing was sent by United States mail to the Respondent at the address listed in the Petition for Relief. Respondent's address and acknowledgment of this litigation was confirmed when Respondent filed its answer to the Petition for Relief with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Even though Respondent received adequate notice of the hearing in this matter, the Respondent did not appear at the place set for the formal hearing at the date and time specified on the Notice of Hearing. The Petitioner was present at the hearing. The Respondent did not request a continuance of the formal hearing or notify the undersigned that it would not be able to appear at the formal hearing. After waiting fifteen minutes for the Respondent to appear, the hearing was commenced. As a consequence of Respondent's failure to appear, no evidence rebutting Petitioner's facts were introduced into evidence at the hearing and specifically no evidence of a nondiscriminatory purpose was introduced at the hearing. 1/ Petitioner has established a prima facie case of discrimination based on his sex, given the fact that Sears tried to mislead him into believing the telemarketing positions had been filled when they had not, the positions were all eventually filled by women and Sears' clear concern over Petitioner's ability to work with women. Such facts lead to the reasonable inference that Sears was engaging in an unlawful employment practice based on Respondent being a male, a protected class, in order to preserve a female work force in telemarketing. Such discrimination based on sex is prohibited under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes, and Petitioner is entitled to relief from that discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Petitioner was the subject of an illegal employment practice and awarding Petitioner $1,462.00 in backpay plus reasonable costs of $100.95 and an attorney's fee of $2,550.00. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of March, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1992.
