Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations 3/ and admissions of the parties, the exhibits received in evidence, and the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact: FIRST HOSPITAL's address is the World Trade Center, Suite 870, Norfolk, Virginia 23510. CHARTER GLADE HOSPITAL is a freestanding psychiatric hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. CHARTER GLADE has (80) licensed psychiatric beds, and twenty-four (24) licensed substance-abuse beds. The service area served by CHARTER GLADE includes Collier, Lee, and Charlotte Counties. The address of HRS is 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32301. HRS is responsible for the administration of the "Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act," Section 381.493, et seq., Florida Statutes (the Act), and has implemented its provisions through the adoption of rules set forth in Chapter 10, Florida Administrative Code. FIRST HOSPITAL applied to HRS for a certificate of need (CON) for the establishment of a freestanding specialty hospital in Naples, Florida. Pursuant to the Act, a CON is required before FIRST HOSPITAL can establish its specialty hospital. FIRST HOSPITAL's application was denied by HRS. FIRST HOSPITAL appealed the denial of its application to the Division of Administrative Hearings, DOAH Case No. 84-1835. CHARTER GLADE has intervened in DOAH Case No. 84-1835. In this proceeding, Petitioner has challenged the validity of Rule 10- 5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, asserting that the rule is arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, invalid. By virtue of the fact that CHARTER GLADE is an existing facility located in the same service area in which Petitioner proposes to construct and operate its facility, and further by virtue of its participation in DOAH Case No. 84-1835, at least in part, on the basis of the provisions of Rule 10 15.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, CHARTER GLADE is substantially affected by the issues presented for determination in this cause and should be allowed to participate as a party. The Act contemplates rule adoption by HRS of specialty bed-need methodologies for psychiatric services. See, e.g., Subsection 381.494(8)(g), Florida Statutes (1983). Toward this end, HRS has adopted Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 10-5.11(25), cited as the basis for denying FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application, addresses need for short-term psychiatric beds; Rule 10-5.11(26) purports to address need for long-term psychiatric beds. FIRST HOSPITAL's substantial interest in establishing its proposed specialty hospital has been determined by both of these rules. In particular, Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, was applied by HRS in the denial of FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application. In addition, FIRST HOSPITAL alleges that Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) combined fail to assess the need for intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services, one of the types of psychiatric services proposed by FIRST HOSPITAL. FIRST HOSPITAL's CON application proposes intermediate inpatient specialty psychiatric services. Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26), Florida Administrative Code, were adopted in early 1983. The adoption process began in the summer of 1982 when HRS assigned to one of its employees, Elfie Stamm, the task of developing a bed-need rule for psychiatric services. Ms. Stamm, at that time, was a planner in the Office of Comprehensive Health Planning of HRS. Ms. Stamm has been a planner with HRS for several years and had been responsible for the development of the State Health Plan and for the development of various rules used in the CON process. She had also been employed in the Mental Health Program Office of HRS, where her responsibilities included the development of a state plan with regard to alcoholism and mental health. She was also responsible for monitoring statewide mental health programs. Upon being assigned the task of developing the subject rules, Ms. Stamm made a thorough review of all information available to HRS with regard to the number of existing psychiatric beds and programs throughout Florida. She also evaluated all available local health plans and spoke with various individuals who had been involved in health planning, particularly those with interest in mental health planning. Ms. Stamm surveyed the available literature on health planning emphasizing mental health planning and bed-need methodologies for psychiatric beds. Ms. Stamm wrote the initial draft of Rule 10-5.11(25) based upon her collection and evaluation of data regarding existing and approved psychiatric beds in Florida and her review of literature, both Florida specific and national. A primary feature of the drafts, as well as of the adopted version, of Rule 10-5.11(25) is a fixed bed-to-population ratio of .35/1000, meaning that normally there should be no more than .35 short-term psychiatric beds for each 1,000 persons. Ms. Stamm was instructed to develop rules to assess the need for inpatient psychiatric services. As finally adopted, short-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(25) as care not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and 60 days or less for children and adolescents, and long-term care is defined in Rule 10-5.11(26) as care averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Neither rule defines the term "intermediate care." The documents contained in HRS Composite Exhibit IX and reviewed by Ms. Stamm are a representative sample of the literature available in the field and the level of knowledge among health planners as of the date of the promulgation of the subject rules. The documents are a reasonable cross-section of the literature available in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment. In terms of the literature that was available at the time of the rule adoption in the area of psychiatric bed-need assessment, there is nothing missing from these documents which would have been important to a health planner in developing a psychiatric bed-need methodology. There is discussion in those documents of all the basic methodologies for determining psychiatric bed need. After reviewing all of the available materials, the HRS established a range of from .35 to .37 beds per 1,000 population and from that point made a policy decision to establish a figure of .35 to use in the bed-need formula. In promulgating the subject rules HRS invited and received comment from a broad cross-section of the public, with particular emphasis on those persons and organizations with special knowledge and interest in the provision of mental health services and the determination of psychiatric bed need. HRS conducted a workshop to which it invited a broad cross-section of individuals and organizations with particular knowledge about psychiatric bed need, including representatives of the Florida Hospital Association, Florida Psychiatric Association, Florida Council for Community Mental Health, Florida State Association of District Mental Health Boards, Florida League of Hospitals, Florida Association of Voluntary Hospitals, and the Florida Alcohol and Drug Abuse Association. The comments and results of the workshop were considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS in the promulgation of the subject rules. In response to several requests, HRS conducted a public hearing in accordance with Section 120.54(3), Florida Statutes, to receive comments from interested persons on the subject rules. More than fifteen (15) people representing various hospitals and organizations concerned with psychiatric services entered appearances and made comments at the public hearing. In addition to the oral comment presented at the public hearing, various persons and organizations submitted numerous written comments expressing their opinion with regard to the proposed rules. The comments, both oral and written, were all considered by Ms. Stamm and HRS prior to the promulgation of the subject rules. The process engaged in by HRS, primarily through Ms. Stamm, in the development of the subject rules was extensive and reasonably calculated to invite substantive public comment and to procure the knowledge on the part of HRS necessary to write workable and rational rules concerning psychiatric bed need. The knowledge acquired by HRS through this process with regard to the assessment of psychiatric bed-need methodologies was reasonably sufficient to allow it to knowledgeably draft and promulgate the subject rules. Consideration of this substantive public comment led to several changes in the subject rules as originally drafted. As originally promulgated, Rules 10-5.11(25) and (26) were challenged pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, in various petitions filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings. In settling these proposed rule challenges, HRS modified the rules to provide for even greater flexibility in their application. HRS Composite Exhibits I through XII constitute all written matters considered or produced by HRS in the rule adoption process with regard to the subject rules. All of those documents and papers have been maintained in the records of HRS since the promulgation of the subject rules. The statutory criteria for reviewing CON applications are set out in Sections 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes. Rule 10-5.11, Florida Administrative Code, sets forth the rule criteria against which CON applications are evaluated. Subsections (1) through (12) and (25) of Rule 10-5.11 are the rule criteria against which applications for CONs for short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Subsections (1) through and (26) of Rule 10-5.11 are rule criteria against which applications for CONs for long-term psychiatric services are to be evaluated. Rule 10-5.11(25) sets forth certain criteria specifically for the evaluation of CON applications for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services. Short-term services are in part defined as services averaging a length of stay of thirty (30) days or less for adults and a stay of sixty (60) days or less for children and adolescents under eighteen (18) years. Rule 10- 5.11(25) in its adopted form provides in relevant part as follows: Short Term Hospital Inpatient Psychiatric Services. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services means a category of services which provides a 24-hour a day therapeutic milieu for persons suffering from mental health problems which are so severe and acute that they need intensive, full-time care. Acute psychiatric inpatient care is defined as a service not exceeding three months and averaging a length of stay of 30 days or less for adults and a stay of 60 days or less for children and adolescents under 18 years. Short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services may be provided in specifically designated beds in a hospital holding a general license, or in a facility holding a specialty hospital license. Applications for proposed short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services will be reviewed according to relevant statutory and rule criteria. A favorable need determination for proposed general acute care psychiatric inpatient services will not normally be given to an applicant unless a bed need exists according to paragraph (25)(d) of this rule. A favorable Certificate of Need determination may be made when the criteria, other than as specified in (25)(d), as provided for in Section 381.494(6)(c), Florida Statutes, and paragraph (25)(e) of this rule, demonstrate need. Bed allocations for acute care short term general psychiatric services shall be based on the following standards: A minimum of .15 beds per 1,000 population should be located in hospitals holding a general license to ensure access to needed services for persons with multiple health problems. These beds shall be designated as short term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds. .20 short term inpatient hospital beds per 1,000 population may be located in specialty hospitals, or hospitals holding a general license. The distribution of these beds shall be based on local need, cost effectiveness, and quality of care considerations. The short term inpatient psychiatric bed need for a Department service district five years into the future shall be calculated by subtracting the number of existing and approved beds from the number of beds calculated for year x based on a bed need ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for year and based on latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. These beds are allocated in addition to the total number of general and acute care hospital beds allocated to each Department District established in Rule 10-5.11(23). Occupancy Standards. New facilities must be able to project an average 70 percent occupancy rate for adult psychiatric beds and 60 percent for children and adolescent beds in the second year of operation, and must be able to project an average 80 percent occupancy rate for adult beds and 70 percent for children and adolescent short term psychiatric inpatient hospital beds for the third year of operation. No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 2 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. Unit size. In order to assure specialized staff and services at a reasonable cost, short term inpatient psychiatric hospital based services should have at least 15 designated beds. Applicants proposing to build a new but separate psychiatric acute care facility and intending to apply for a specialty hospital license should have a minimum of 50 beds. Other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a Certificate of Need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds are as follows: . . . . 7. Access standard. Short term inpatient hospital psychiatric services should be available within a maximum travel time of 45 minutes under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's population. There are three basic types of methodologies generally accepted in the field of health planning as valid for determining the need for psychiatric hospital beds. The first type is a need-based methodology which evaluates the need for services. The second is a demand or utilization-based method, which utilizes current or projected utilization statistics for a particular service. The third is a fixed-ratio method which involves the use of a ratio, or rate, of service to population to determine projected need for that service in the future. All three of these methodologies are generally accepted and utilized by health planners throughout the United States. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, but all are valid. The fixed ratio methodology is that which HRS has employed in Rule 10 5.11(25). The ratio of .35 beds per thousand population is a reasonable ratio with a rational basis in fact. It is not arbitrary and capricious as a measure of short-term psychiatric bed need. The National Institute of Mental Health developed draft guidelines in the late 197Os suggesting a range of .15 beds to .40 beds per thousand population as an appropriate fixed-bed ratio program for psychiatric short-term acute-care programs. At least four other states presently or in the past have utilized a fixed bed-need ratio in planning for health care needs. They are Massachusetts, Indiana, Michigan and Georgia. Some of those states used fixed-bed ratios less than .35 per thousand. Ms. Stamm, in developing this rule methodology for HRS, considered and balanced the different approaches relating to the establishment of need. One of her concerns on behalf of HRS, in developing the methodology was to strike a proper balance between need and demand since not everyone who needs psychiatric care will choose to seek that care or can afford to seek that care. In 1982, during the time of the rule adoption process, the ratio of existing short-term psychiatric beds per thousand population in Florida was .29 per thousand. Ms. Stamm selected .35 per thousand, in part, to allow for growth in the number of psychiatric beds for reasons other than just population growth. The current rate of existing licensed short-term psychiatric beds in Florida in 1985 is .28 beds per thousand. However, the ratio for currently existing short-term psychiatric beds, plus CON approved beds not yet licensed in 1985, is .39 beds per thousand. The fact that the existing and approved inventory of psychiatric beds is greater than the .35 ratio specified in the rule demonstrates that HRS has applied Rule 10-5.11(25) in a flexible manner as envisioned by the "not normally" language in the rule. A theoretically ideal way to determine psychiatric bed need would be for HRS to go into each community and conduct epidemiological surveys to identify the people who actually need mental health care. While such a survey, properly conducted, might produce momentarily reliable date, it is not a realistic method for statewide planning purposes because of several problems attendant to such a methodology. Such a survey would be very expensive and very time-consuming and is not practical for use on a statewide basis in a state the size of Florida. Because of the time-consuming nature of such a methodology, if applied on a statewide basis, some of the data would be stale before all of the data was gathered. Further, the rapidly changing population in Florida would require that such a survey be continually updated. The allocation of short-term beds between general and specialty hospitals set forth in subsections (d)1 and 2 of Rule 10-5.11(25) has a rational basis in fact and is not arbitrary. There are many patients who simultaneously need medical as well as psychiatric care. To have those patients located in a specialty hospital, away from a general hospital, would be inappropriate. There are also patients who have acute episodes of psychiatric illness and who need to be treated very rapidly. Because there are many more general hospitals than there are freestanding psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to ensure that psychiatric beds are available to general hospitals to fill the particular episodic acute needs. Further, there are many patients in Florida who can afford health care only through Medicaid. Because Medicaid does not provide funding of mental health inpatient services in psychiatric specialty hospitals, it is appropriate to include in the methodology an incentive for the location of some psychiatric beds in general hospitals where psychiatric services can be funded by Medicaid. The specific allocation of the .35 per thousand bed need ratio set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)(1) and (2) is that .15 beds per thousand "should" be associated with general hospitals and .20 beds per thousand "may" be associated with specialty hospitals. This allocation was designed to be flexible so that, in any given circumstance, an allocation other than the .15 and .20 guideline could be applied. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10 5.11(25) specify that normally, additional beds should not be approved unless the average occupancy of all existing beds in a service district exceeds 75 percent for adults and 70 percent for children and adolescents. The occupancy rate standards set forth in Rule 10- 5.11(25) were not arrived at in an arbitrary fashion and are reasonable in themselves. The occupancy rates are designed to ensure that a reasonable number of beds in each facility are filled. Hospitals with a substantial number of empty beds are not cost effective. Therefore, it is reasonable to project occupancy rates in the range of those projected in the subject rule. Indeed, the occupancy rates in the rule are liberal in terms of minimum occupancy levels, compared with those in the past and those recommended by others in the industry. With regard to the travel access standard in the rule, the Task Force for Institutional Care recommended a 60 minute travel standard for 90 percent of the population in the district. The 45 minute standard is reasonable. The rule does not exclude from within the travel standard area other facilities providing the same service. At the time of the final hearing, there were sixty five (65) existing hospital facilities in Florida which had psychiatric bed services. Of those sixty-five (65) facilities, sixty-one (61), or 93 percent, had more than fifteen (15) psychiatric beds, and fifty-five (55), or 84 percent, had more than twenty (20) psychiatric beds. In the exceptional event that the average occupancy rate for a particular district did not accurately reflect the availability of beds, the language of Rule 10-5.11(25)(d)5, which says that no additional beds shall "normally" be approved unless the occupancy rates are met is sufficiently flexible to account for the exceptionality. The methodology set forth in Rule 10-5.11(25) is designed to identify and express a need for short-term psychiatric inpatient beds for the overall population of Florida. The rule was intended to be sufficiently flexible that, when balanced with the other criteria set forth in Rule 10-5.11(1) through (12), it would allow substantive input from the district and community levels with regard to the need for beds by subpopulation groups such as child, adolescent, adult, and geriatric. The "national guidelines" referred to by Ms. Stamm were proposed hut never adopted. They recommended fixed bed ratios between .15/1000 and .40/1000. The guidelines were based on a 1978 survey by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), which indicated that .15/1000 was the 25th percentile and .40/1000 was the 75th percentile of 1978 existing short-term psychiatric beds nationwide. The NIMH report stated that selection of an appropriate ratio for a particular state depended on the development of the state's mental health system and recognized that special consideration was necessary for traditionally underserved groups such as children, adolescents, and geriatrics. In the context of inpatient psychiatric care, there has been a trend over the last twenty years, and more particularly over the last five years, toward the development of specialty treatment programs, separately planned for children, adolescents, adults, and geriatrics. In recent years in Florida there has also been a trend toward the provision of alternatives to inpatient psychiatric services in facilities such as residential care. In 1982, Ms. Stamm considered evidence that children, adolescents, and geriatrics were not being adequately served by Florida's mental health facilities. Nevertheless, she did not plan for these subgroups in the rule because in her judgment decisions about allocation of services to subpopulation groups were best made at the district level by the local health councils.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged by statute with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is and at all times material to this case was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license #OS 0004352, last known address identified as 1232 S.W. 8th Place, Cape Coral, Florida 33991. From 1985 until 1992, the Respondent had a private general medical practice in Fort Myers. In 1991, the Respondent began to exhibit signs of emotional instability. In April 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) received a report that the Respondent was attempting to locate injectible Demerol allegedly for his own use. This information was forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN is a program operated by the health care professions to assist practitioners impaired by mental illness, physical or mental disability or chemical dependence. Demerol is a Schedule II Controlled Substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On July 8, 1991, the DPR again received a report that the Respondent was writing inappropriate prescriptions for patients and obtaining the medication for personal use. This information was again forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN contacted the Respondent about the allegation. The Respondent denied the report. In 1992, the Respondent began to exhibit profuse sweating, involuntary muscle jerks, and inattentiveness to his work. Some patients expressed concern to office staff about the Respondent's condition. In 1992, a DPR investigator visited pharmacies in the Fort Myers area. She learned that the Respondent had been contacting area pharmacies in an attempt to locate injectible Demerol. She further learned that the Respondent would arrive at a pharmacy with a Demerol prescription made out to a patient and which he would obtain supposedly on the patient's behalf. She collected a number of such prescriptions which had been filled by pharmacies. Many of the prescriptions were made out for patients at Meadowbrook Manor, a nursing home at which the Respondent had patients. A review of the patient records indicated that none of the patients had been prescribed Demerol. On March 27, 1992, an member of his office staff contacted the Respondent by telephone and determined him to be incoherent. She went to the Respondent's house to ascertain his condition. After gaining entry to the home, she found a number of Demerol bottles in an open dresser drawer, at least one of which was empty. She also discovered syringes in the drawer. The Respondent's eye was blackened. Blood was visible about the bathroom in the house. The staff member determined that although the Respondent had fallen during the night, he was reluctant to seek medical attention. Several hours after the staff member had arrived at the Respondent's house, he was incoherent. She called for an ambulance. The Respondent was subsequently transported to the hospital. Examination of the Respondent clearly indicated that he had suffered a head injury. While in the hospital, the Respondent was examined by a board certified psychiatrist. According to the psychiatrist, the Respondent exhibited substantially impaired memory, was very guarded with his communication and, notwithstanding the injury, indicated his intent to leave the hospital quickly. He was unable to recall the current month and date. He denied prior consumption of alcohol despite lab tests to the contrary. He also denied having previously been chemically dependent, although he had been involved in the intervention of said problem in 1981. The psychiatrist diagnosed the Respondent as having residual organic brain syndrome as a result of his chemical intake. Based on the diagnosis, the psychiatrist recommended that the Respondent begin an inpatient drug rehabilitation program. The psychiatrist also referred the Respondent's impairment to the DPR. In March of 1992, the DPR alerted the PRN about the Respondent's condition. The PRN assigned a local representative to encourage the Respondent to seek treatment. On March 31, 1992, the Respondent entered a treatment program at Palmview Hospital. While in the program, he admitted to having self-injected Demerol. The Respondent was resistant to treatment while at Palmview Hospital. Although he acknowledged having previously received inpatient treatment at another facility, he alternately admitted and denied abusing Demerol. On April 10, 1992, the Respondent discharged himself from Palmview Hospital. The discharge was against the advise of the treating physician at Palmview. At the time of the discharge, PRN representatives discussed the matter with the Respondent. The Respondent stated that he was leaving the inpatient treatment program and was going to being outpatient treatment from the Palmview facility. The treating physician at Palmview told the PRN that the Respondent required three to four weeks of inpatient treatment. It was the opinion of the treating physician that the Respondent was not capable of safely providing medical care to patients at that time. Based on the Palmview information, the PRN instructed the Respondent that he must complete inpatient treatment and that he could not practice medicine until it was decided that he could do so safely. In April 13-16, 1992, the Respondent obtained a second opinion from another physician affiliated with the Addiction Treatment Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida, where he was examined by a board certified addictionologist. According to the Mount Sinai addictionologist, the Respondent is addicted to Demerol and requires treatment. Based on the Mount Sinai information, the PRN instructed the Respondent not to practice and to seek immediate treatment for his addiction. On April 22, 1992, the Respondent reentered Palmview Hospital. Upon reentry, the Respondent denied using Demerol, but eventually acknowledged using the drug and being chemically dependent. It was determined during the second Palmview admission, that the Respondent was in need of approximately four months in a long term inpatient care treatment facility. On May 22, 1992, the Respondent was admitted to the Talbott-Marsh recovery program. He was diagnosed as having a personality disorder with antisocial, paranoid and narcissistic traits, and to being opiate dependent, On August 3, 1992, the Respondent left the Talbott-Marsh center without completing the program. The records and reports of the Respondent's condition were reviewed by Dr. Roger Goetz, M.D., the director of the PRN. Dr. Goetz, who also has personal knowledge of the Respondent's condition, is certified by the American Association of Addiction Medicine and has extensive experience as a medical doctor and in treating impaired physicians. Dr. Goetz asserted that the Respondent is suffering from a dangerous condition, that he is mentally ill and that he poses a threat to himself and to the public. Dr. Goetz opined that the Respondent is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients and that his continued practice constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order determining that Benjamin D. Goldberg, D.O., has violated Section 459.015(1)(w), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license (#OS 0004352) to practice as a physician in the State of Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1553 The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 22, 37. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Francesca Plendl, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Benjamin Goldberg, D.O. 1232 South West 8th Place Cape Coral, Florida 33991
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of various deficiencies found during surveys of its adult living facility and, if so, the amount of the administrative fines.
Findings Of Fact Pursuant to a license issued by Petitioner, Respondent owns and operates New Horizon, an assisted living facility in Punta Gorda. The license is a standard license. Violeta Sebastian is the owner and president of Respondent and the administrator of the facility. On July 8, 1998, Petitioner conducted a survey of New Horizon. Petitioner's investigator found several residents sitting in the day room when he arrived at the facility between 9:00 a.m. and 9:30 a.m. Resident Number 3, who is very elderly, remained seated in an over-stuffed chair all morning. When staff helped her to the dining room at around 11:30 a.m., the investigator asked to see her buttocks area and found a Stage 2 pressure sore on the coccyx area. Resident Number 3, who was wearing adult briefs, had also urinated on herself at some earlier point in time. Resident Number 3 required the assistance of two staffpersons to get her to stand; she was unable to assist in this process. She also required the assistance of both staffpersons to walk, and she required complete assistance to change her briefs. The records concerning Resident Number 3 revealed nothing about the existence or treatment of a pressure sore or that staff had notified the resident's physician. An aide knew of the pressure sore for three days, but had not informed the administrator nor commenced treatment. The records also revealed that she was admitted to New Horizon on August 28, 1997, and her health assessment was conducted on September 29, 1997, which was 32 days after admission. A Stage 1 pressure sore is a reddened area. A Stage 2 pressure sore is a reddened area with a blister. A Stage 3 pressure sore occurs when the affected area is open to the muscle. A Stage 4 pressure sore is when the affected area is open to the muscle, bone, and tendon. Stage 2 pressure sores are susceptible to infection and may cause a loss of fluids, including protein, around the wound site. The pressure sore on this female resident was about two centimeters wide. As a result of these findings concerning Resident Number 3, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tags A 006, A 401, A 407, A 409, and A 700. Another investigator asked for the most current Radon test. The last Radon test, which the facility passed, was November 16, 1992, which meant that the facility had not been tested in almost five years and eight months. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 202. The investigator checked the training records for two of four staffpersons and determined that two employees had not received the two hours' required training in resident behavior and handling abuse, neglect, and exploitation. The administrator thought that they had received the required training, but was unable to produce documentation of training. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 504. The investigator checked the training records for four staffpersons and determined that they had not received the required training in assisting residents in the activities of daily living. The administrator said that this was an oversight and would be corrected. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 505. The investigator could not determine who was in charge of medications. However, the administrator and one part-time employee were in charge of medications. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 602. The investigator found a bottle of milk of magnesia in an unlocked refrigerator and a bag of medications in an unlocked kitchen drawer. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 607. The investigator testified as to restraints of a resident found by another investigator in a 1996 survey and found by her in a 1998 complaint investigation. However, her testimony concerning the incident of which she had personal knowledge was vague and provides an insufficient basis on which to fine Respondent. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 709. The investigator examined a ledger maintained by Respondent for one resident who was receiving certain federal benefits in the form of a monthly $35 check. Respondent's records do not document that it supplies the resident quarterly with a copy of this accounting, and staff and the administrator admitted to not supplying quarterly statements to the resident. As a result of these findings, Petitioner cited Respondent for Tag A 102. Petitioner did not produce admissible evidence to show that any violations were repeat violations.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order imposing an administrative fine against New Horizon's Adult Living, Inc., in the amount of $3000. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of April, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of April, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruben J. King-Shaw, Jr., Director Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Karel Baarslag, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration State Regional Service Center 2295 Victoria Avenue Fort Myers, Florida 33901 Violeta D. Sebastian Qualified Representative New Horizon's Adult Living Facility 1391 Capricorn Boulevard Punta Gorda, Florida 33983
The Issue The ultimate issue is whether the application of Petitioner, University Medical Park, for a certificate of need to construct a 130-bed acute care hospital in northern Hillsborough County, Florida should be approved. The factual issues are whether a need exists for the proposed facility under the Department's need rule and, if not, are there any special circumstances which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application notwithstanding lack of need. The petitioner, while not agreeing with the methodology, conceded that under the DHRS rule as applied there is no need because there is an excess of acute care beds projected for 1989, the applicable planning horizon. The only real factual issue is whether there are any special circumstances which warrant issuance of a CON. The parties filed post-hearing findings of fact and conclusions of law by March 18, 1985, which were read and considered. Many of those proposals are incorporated in the following findings. As indicated some were irrelevant, however, those not included on pertinent issues were rejected because the more credible evidence precluded the proposed finding. Having heard the testimony and carefully considered the Proposed Findings of Fact, there is no evidence which would demonstrate the reasonableness and appropriateness of the application. It is recommended that the application be denied.
Findings Of Fact General Petitioner is a limited partnership composed almost entirely of physicians, including obstetricians/gynecologists (OB/GYN) and specialists providing ancillary care, who practice in the metropolitan Tampa area. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 103-104). Petitioner's managing general partner is Dr. Robert Withers, a doctor specializing in OB/GYN who has practiced in Hillsborough County for over thirty years. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 24- 26, 28-29.) Dr. Withers was a prime moving force in the founding, planning and development of University Community Hospital and Women's Hospital. (Tr. Vo1. 1, pp. 26-28, 73; Vol. 4, pp. 547-548.) Petitioner seeks to construct in DHRS District VI a specialty "women's" hospital providing obstetrical and gynecological services at the corner of 30th Street and Fletcher Avenue in northern Hillsborough County and having 130 acute care beds. 1/ (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 34, 74-75, Vol. 5, pp. 678-679, Northside Ex.-1, pp. 1-2, Ex.-4A.) The proposed hospital is to have 60 obstetrical, 66 gynecological and 4 intensive care beds. (Tr. Vol. 8, P. 1297, Northside Ex.-1 Table 17, Ex.-B.) DHRS District VI is composed of Hardy, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee and Polk counties. Each county is designated a subdistrict by the Local Health Council of District VI. Pasco County, immediately north of Hillsborough, is located in DHRS District V and is divided into two subdistricts, east Pasco and west Pasco. If built, Northside would be located in the immediate vicinity of University Community Hospital (UCH) in Tampa, Hillsborough County, Florida. Less than 5 percent of the total surgical procedures at UCH are gynecologically related, and little or no nonsurgical gynecological procedures arc performed there. (Tr. Vol. 4, p. 550.) There is no obstetrical practice at UCH, although it has the capacity to handle obstetric emergencies. The primary existing providers of obstetrical services to the metropolitan Tampa area are Tampa General Hospital (TGH) and Women's Hospital (Women's). (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 79, Northside Ex.-4, Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1074-1075.) TGH is a large public hospital located on Davis Islands near downtown Tampa. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 47-48, Vol. 8, pp. 1356, 1358.) TGH currently has a 35 bed obstetrical unit, but is currently expanding to 70 beds as part of a major renovation and expansion program scheduled for completion in late 1985. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1049, 1095, Vol. 8, pp. 1367-1368, Vol. 10, P. 1674, Northside Ex.- 2, P. 3.) In recent years, the overwhelming majority of Tampa General's admissions in obstetrics at TGH have been indigent patients. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 61, Vol. 8, pp. 1375- 1379; Vol. 9, P. 1451; TGH Ex.-3.) Tampa General's internal records reflect that it had approximately 2,100 patient days of gynecological care compared with over 38,000 patient days in combined obstetrical care during a recent eleven month period. (TGH Ex.-3..) Women's is a 192 bed "specialty" hospital located in the west central portion of the City of Tampa near Tampa Stadium. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 63-64, 66-67; Vol. 10 P. 1564; Northside Ex.-4.) Women's Hospital serves primarily private-pay female patients. (Vol. 1, pp. 79, 88-89; Vol. 6, pp. 892-893.) Humana Brandon Hospital, which has a 16 bed obstetrics unit, and South Florida Baptist Hospital in Plant City, which has 12 obstetric beds, served eastern Hillsborough County. (Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Northside Ex.-2, P. 3; Northside Ex.-4 and Tr. Vol. 1, P. 79; Northside Ex.-4.) There are two hospitals in eastern Pasco County, which is in DHRS District V. Humana Hospital, Pasco and East Pasco Medical Center, each of which has a six bed obstetric unit. Both hospitals are currently located in Dade City, but the East Pasco Medical Center will soon move to Zephyrhills and expand its obstetrics unit to nine beds. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 108- 109; Tr. Vol. 7, P. 1075; Vol. 8, pp. 1278-1281; Northside Ex.-4.) There are no hospitals in central Pasco County, DHRS District V. Residents of that area currently travel south to greater Tampa, or, to a lesser extent, go to Dade City for their medical services. (Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 266-267, 271-272; Vol. 7, p. 1038.) Bed Need There are currently 6,564 existing and CON approved acute care beds in DHRS District VI, compared with an overall bed need of 5,718 acute care beds. An excess of 846 beds exist in District VI in 1989, the year which is the planning horizon use by DHRS in determining bed need applicable to this application. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1046-1047, 1163, 1165-66; DHRS Ex.-1.) There is a net need for five acute care beds in DHRS District V according to the Department's methodology. (Tr. Yolk. 7, pp. 1066, 1165; DHRS Ex.-1.) The figures for District VI include Carrollwood Community Hospital which is an osteopathic facility which does not provide obstetrical services. (Tr. Vol. 1, P. 158; Vol. 7, p. 1138; Vol. 8, P. 1291.) However, these osteopathic beds are considered as meeting the total bed need when computing a11 opathic bed need. DHRS has not formally adopted the subdistrict designations of allocations as part of its rules. (Tr. Vol. 7, pp. 1017-1017, 1019; Vol. 8, pp. 1176, 1187.) Consideration of the adoption of subdistricts by the Local Health Council is irrelevant to this application. 2/ Areas of Consideration in Addition to Bed Need Availability Availability is deemed the number of beds available. As set forth above, there is an excess of beds. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192.) Tampa General Hospital and Humana Women's Hospital offer all of the OB related services which UMP proposes to offer in its application. These and a number of other hospitals to include UCH, offer all of the GYN related services proposed by Northside. University Community Hospital is located 300 yards away from the proposed site of Northside. UCH is fully equipped to perform virtually any kind of GYN/OB procedure. Humana and UCH take indigent patients only on an emergency basis, as would the proposed facility. GYN/OB services are accessible to all residents of Hillsborough County regardless of their ability to pay for such services at TGH. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1469; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1596; Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 582; Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, P. 21.) Utilization Utilization is impacted by the number of available beds and the number of days patients stay in the hospital. According to the most recent Local Health Council hospital utilization statistics, the acute care occupancy rate for 14 acute care hospitals in Hillsborough County for the most recent six months was 65 percent. This occupancy rate is based on licensed beds and does not include CON approved beds which are not yet on line. This occupancy rate is substantially below the optimal occupancies determined by DHRS in the Rule. (DHRS Exhibit 4; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1069.) Utilization of obstetric beds is higher than general acute care beds; however, the rules do not differentiate between general and obstetric beds. 3/ Five Hillsborough County hospitals, Humana Women's, St. Joseph's, Tampa General, Humana Brandon, and South Florida Baptist, offer obstetric services. The most recent Local Health Council utilization reports indicate that overall OB occupancy for these facilities was 82 percent for the past 6 months. However, these computations do not include the 35 C0N-approved beds which will soon be available at Tampa General Hospital. (DHRS Exhibit 4). There will be a substantial excess of acute care beds to include OB beds in Hillsborough County for the foreseeable future. (Baehr, Tr.w Vol. X, pp. 1568, 1594, 1597.) The substantial excess of beds projected will result in lower utilization. In addition to excess beds, utilization is lowered by shorter hospital stays by patients. The nationwide average length of stay has been reduced by almost two days for Medicare patients and one day for all other patients due to a variety of contributing circumstances. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1192; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1102; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1583-84; etc.) This dramatic decline in length of hospital stay is the result of many influences, the most prominent among which are: (1) a change in Medicare reimbursement to a system which rewards prompt discharges of patients and penalizes overutilization ("DGRs"), (2) the adaptation by private payers (insurance companies, etc.) of Medicare type reimbursement, (3) the growing availability and acceptance of alternatives to hospitalization such as ambulatory surgical centers, labor/delivery/recovery suites, etc. and (4) the growing popularity of health care insurance/delivery mechanisms such as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"), preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"), and similar entities which offer direct or indirect financial incentives for avoiding or reducing hospital utilization. The trend toward declining hospital utilization will continue. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1192-98; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1584-86; etc.) There has been a significant and progressive decrease in hospital stays for obstetrics over the last five years. During this time, a typical average length of stay has been reduced from three days to two and, in some instances, one day. In addition, there is a growing trend towards facilities (such as LDRs) which provide obstetrics on virtually an outpatient basis. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1456; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644.) The average length of stay for GYN procedures is also decreasing. In addition, high percentage of GYN procedures are now being performed on an outpatient, as opposed to inpatient, basis. (Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 644, etc.) The reduction in hospital stays and excess of acute care beds will lower utilization of acute care hospitals, including their OB components, enough to offset the projected population growth in Hillsborough County. The hospitals in District VI will not achieve the optimal occupancy rates for acute care beds or OB beds in particular by 1989. The 130 additional beds proposed by UMP would lower utilization further. (Paragraphs 7, 14, and 18 above; DHRS Exhibit 1, Humana Exhibit 1.) Geographic Accessibility Ninety percent of the population of Hillsborough County is within 30 minutes of an acute care hospital offering, at least, OB emergency services. TGH 20, overlay 6, shows that essentially all persons living in Hillsborough County are within 30 minutes normal driving time not only to an existing, acute care hospital, but a hospital offering OB services. Petitioner's service area is alleged to include central Pasco County. Although Pasco County is in District V, to the extent the proposed facility might serve central Pasco County, from a planning standpoint it is preferable to have that population in central Paso served by expansion of facilities closer to them. Hospitals in Tampa will become increasingly less accessible with increases in traffic volume over the years. The proposed location of the UMP hospital is across the street from an existing acute care hospital, University Community Hospital ("UCH"). (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 542.) Geographic accessibility is the same to the proposed UMP hospital and UCH. (Smith, Tr. Vol. III, P. 350; Wentzel, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 486; Peters, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1532.) UCH provides gynecological services but does not provide obstetrical services. However, UCH is capable of delivering babies in emergencies. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 563.) The gynecological services and OB capabilities at UCH are located at essentially the same location as Northside's proposed site. Geographic accessibility of OB/GYN services is not enhanced by UMP's proposed 66 medical-surgical beds. The accessibility of acute care beds, which under the rule are all that is considered, is essentially the same for UCH as for the proposed facility. As to geographic accessibility, the residents of Hillsborough and Pasco Counties now have reasonable access to acute care services, including OB services. The UMP project would not increase accessibility to these services by any significant decrease. C. Economic Accessibility Petitioner offered no competent, credible evidence that it would expand services to underserved portions of the community. Demographer Smith did not study income levels or socioeconomic data for the UMP service area. (Smith, TR. Vol. III, pp. 388, 389.) However, Mr. Margolis testified that 24 percent of Tampa General's OB patients, at least 90 percent of who are indigents, came from the UMP service area. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) The patients proposed to be served at the Northside Hospital are not different than those already served in the community. (Withers, Tr. Vol. II, P. 344.) As a result, Northside Hospital would not increase the number of underserved patients. Availability of Health Care Alternative An increasing number of GYN procedures are being performed by hospitals on an outpatient basis and in freestanding ambulatory-surgical centers. An ambulatory-surgical center is already in operation at a location which is near the proposed UMP site. In fact, Dr. Hyatt, a UMP general partner, currently performs GYN procedures at that surgical center. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 150; Hyatt, Tr. Vol. IV, pp. 644, 646. Ambulatory surgical centers, birthing centers and similar alternative delivery systems offer alternatives to the proposed facility. Existing hospitals are moving to supply such alternatives which, with the excess beds and lower utilization, arc more than adequate to preclude the need for the UMP proposal. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1204, 1205, 1206; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453, 1469; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1154; Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1151, 1154.) Need for Special Equipment & Services DHRS does not consider obstetrics or gynecology to be "special services" for purposes of Section 381.494(6)(c)6, Florida Statutes. In addition, the services proposed by UMP are already available in Hillsborough and Pasco Counties. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1162, 1210.) Need for Research & Educational Facilities USF currently uses Tampa General as a training facility for its OB residents. TCH offered evidence that the new OB facilities being constructed at Tampa General were designed with assistance from USF and were funded by the Florida Legislature, in part, as an educational facility. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1391; Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1453-1455.) The educational objectives of USF for OB residents at Tampa General are undermined by a disproportionately high indigent load. Residents need a cross section of patients. The UMP project will further detract from a well rounded OB residency program at Tampa General by causing Tampa General's OB Patient mix to remain unbalanced. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1458; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) UMP offered no evidence of arrangements to further medical research or educational needs in the community. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1213. UMP's proposed facility will not contribute to research and education in District VI. Availability of Resources Management UMP will not manage its hospital. It has not secured a management contract nor entered into any type of arrangement to insure that its proposed facility will be managed by knowledgeable and competent personnel. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, p. 142.) However, there is no alleged or demonstrated shortage of management personnel available. Availability of Funds For Capital and Operating Expenditures The matter of capital funding was a "de novo issue," i.e., evidence was presented which was in addition to different from its application. In its application, Northside stated that its project will be funded through 100 percent debt. Its principal general partner, Dr. Withers, states that this "figure is not correct." However, neither Dr. Withers nor any other Northside witness ever identified the percentage of the project, if any, which is to be funded through equity contributions except the property upon which it would be located. (UMP Exhibit 1, p. 26; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 134.) The UMP application contained a letter from Landmark Bank of Tampa which indicates an interest on the part of that institution in providing funding to Northside in the event that its application is approved. This one and one half year year old letter falls short of a binding commitment on the part of Landmark Bank to lend UMP the necessary funds to complete and operate its project and is stale. Dr. Withers admitted that Northside had no firm commitment as of the date of the hearing to finance its facility, or any commitment to provide 1196 financing as stated in its application. (UMP Exhibit I/Exhibit Dr. Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 138.) Contribution to Education No evidence was introduced to support the assertion in the application of teaching research interaction between UMP and USF. USF presented evidence that no such interaction would occur. (Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1329.) The duplication of services and competition for patients and staff created by UMP's facility would adversely impact the health professional training programs of USF, the state's primary representative of health professional training programs in District VI. (Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1314-19; 1322-24; 1331-1336.) Financial Feasibility The pro forma statement of income and expenses for the first two years of operation (1987 and 1988) contained in the UMP application projects a small operating loss during the first year and a substantial profit by the end of the second year. These pro formas are predicated on the assumption that the facility will achieve a utilization rate of 61 percent in Year 1 and 78 percent in its second year. To achieve these projected utilization levels, Northside would have to capture a market share of 75-80 percent of all OB patient days and over 75% of all GYN patient days generated by females in its service area. (UMP, Exhibit 1; Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 145, Dacus; Tr. Vol. V, P. 750-755.) These projected market shares and resulting utilization levels are very optimistic. It is unlikely that Northside could achieve these market shares simply by making its services available to the public. More reasonable utilization assumptions for purposes of projecting financial feasibility would be 40-50 percent during the first year and 65 percent in the second year. (Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1700; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, pp. 1578, 1579, 1601.) UMP omitted the cost of the land on which its facility is to be constructed from its total project cost and thus understates the income necessary to sustain its project. Dr. Withers stated the purchase price of this land was approximately $1.5 million and it has a current market value in excess of $5 million. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 139, 140.) Dr. Withers admitted that the purchase price of the land would be included in formulating patient charges. As a matter of DHRS interpretation, the cost of land should be included as part of the capital cost of the project even if donated or leased and, as such, should be added into the pro formas. UMP's financial expert, Barbara Turner, testified that she would normally include land costs in determining financial feasibility of a project, otherwise total project costs would be understated (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, P. 141; Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1215, 1216; Turner, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1714.) In addition, the pro formas failed to include any amount for management expenses associated with the new facility. Dr. Withers admitted UMP does not intend to manage Northside and he anticipates that the management fee would be considerably higher than the $75,000 in administrator salaries included in the application. (Withers, Tr. Vol. I, pp. 143, 144.) Barbara Turner, UMP's financial expert, conceded that the reasonableness of the percent UMP pro formas is predicated on the reasonableness of its projected market share and concomitant utilization assumptions. These projections are rejected as being inconsistent with evidence presented by more credible witnesses. The UMP project, as stated in its application or as presented at hearing, is not financially feasible on the assumption Petitioner projected. VIII. Impact on Existing Facilities Approval of the UMP application would result in a harmful impact on the costs of providing OB/GYN services at existing facilities. The new facility would be utilized by patients who would otherwise utilize existing facilities, hospitals would be serving fewer patients than they are now. This would necessarily increase capital and operating costs on a per patient basis which, in turn, would necessitate increases in patient charges. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 1217-1219; Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1587.) Existing facilities are operating below optimal occupancy levels. See DHRS Exhibit 4. The Northside project would have an adverse financial impact on Humana, Tampa General Hospital, and other facilities regardless of whether Northside actually makes a profit. See next subheading below. The Northside project would draw away a substantial number of potential private-pay patients from TGH. Residents of the proposed Northside service area constitute approximately 24 percent of the total number of OB patients served by TGH. The Northside project poses a threat to TGH's plans to increase its non- indigent OB patient mix which is the key to its plans to provide a quality, competitive OB service to the residents of Hillsborough County. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VIII, P. 1225; Margolis, Tr. Vol. X, P. 1695.) Impact Upon Costs and Competition Competition via a new entrant in a health care market can be good or bad in terms of both the costs and the quality of care rendered, depending on the existing availability of competition in that market at the time. Competition has a positive effect when the market is not being adequately or efficiently served. In a situation where adequate and efficient service exists, competition can have an adverse impact on costs and on quality because a new facility is simply adding expense to the system without a concomitant benefit. (Baehr, Tr. Vol. X, p. 1650.) Competition among hospitals in Hillsborough County is now "intense and accelerating." (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, p. 558.) Tampa General is at a competitive disadvantage because of its indigent case load and its inability to offer equity interests to physicians in its hospital. (Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 945, 947-948); Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, P. 1405.) Tampa General Hospital is intensifying its marketing effort, a physician office building under construction now at Tampa General is an illustration of Tampa General's effort to compete for private physicians and patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1405-1406.) The whole thrust of Tampa General's construction program is to increase its ability to compete for physicians. (Nelson, Tr. Vol. VII, P. 1224; Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, p. 1442.) The Tampa General construction will create new competition for physicians and patients. (Contis, Tr. Vol. VII, p. 1099.) Patients go to hospitals where their doctors practice, therefore, hospitals generally compete for physicians. (Splitstone, Tr. Vol. IV, P. 563; Blair, Tr. Vol. VI, pp. 898, 928.) Because many of the UMP partners are obstetricians who plan to use Northside exclusively, approval of the Northside project would lessen competition. (Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, P. 11.) It is feasible for Tampa General to attract more private pay OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461.) At its recently opened rehabilitation center, Tampa General has attracted more private pay patients. (Powers, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1393-1396.) USF OB residents at Tampa General are planning to practice at Tampa General. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460-1461.) The state-of-the-art labor, delivery, recovery room to be used at Tampa General will be an attractive alternative to OB patients. (Williams, Tr. Vol. IX, pp. 1460- 1461); Popp, TGH Exhibit 18, p.26) IX. Capital Expenditure Proposals The proposed Northside hospital will not offer any service not now available in Tampa. (Hyatt, TGH Exhibit 19, p. 21).
Recommendation Petitioner having failed to prove the need for additional acute care beds to include OB beds or some special circumstance which would warrant approval of the proposed project, it is recommended that its application for a CON be DENIED. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of June, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1985.
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Petitioner is liable for overpayment of Medicaid claims for the period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the evidence presented at the hearing, the following relevant Findings of Fact are made: AHCA is the state agency charged with the regulation of the Medicaid program in the State of Florida, and has the authority to perform Medicaid audits and recover overpayments, pursuant to Section 409.913(2), Florida Statutes (2001). Petitioner is a Florida, not-for-profit corporation that was enrolled as a Medicaid provider during the audit period of January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Petitioner was authorized to provide medical services to Medicaid recipients. The selection of records for and the conduct of the audit was not a matter of controversy between the parties. The records in this case were requested within the five-year window for record retention and agency investigation provided by Section 409.913(8), Florida Statutes (2001). Medicaid pays a per diem rate for inpatient hospital care and treatment. This per diem payment covers all services and items furnished during a 24-hour period. The audit in this case dealt exclusively with inpatient services at Florida Hospital Orlando. Deborah Lynn, a medical health care program analyst for AHCA, reviews the agency's inpatient hospital audits. The agency selects a hospital for audit on a random basis, then selects for review, a random sample of that hospital's patients admitted during the audit period. AHCA sends a demand letter to the hospital, which then sends the relevant patient records to AHCA. Florida Hospital Orlando had to be granted a 30-day extension, but eventually provided, to AHCA, all of the requested patient records. The hospital's records were first provided to a nurse consultant, who reviewed the records and made a suggestion as to the number of days for which Medicaid reimbursement should be denied for each patient. The nurse consultant's suggestions were then calculated into an initial overpayment amount and included in the PAAR that was sent to Petitioner on January 20, 2005. Ms. Lynn acknowledged that the PAAR constituted the first notice to Petitioner that AHCA disputed the length of stay for some patients based on medical necessity. After receipt of the PAAR, Petitioner was given the opportunity to examine the days that AHCA preliminarily questioned and to provide additional information in defense of its Medicaid billings. Petitioner did, in fact, submit additional documentation. The records, the additional documentation, and the nurse consultant's recommendations were then forwarded to a peer reviewer; a physician who uses his or her medical expertise to determine the medical necessity of the services provided. In this case, AHCA employed the services of two peer reviewers. Dr. Laura Machado was the peer reviewer for the inpatient medical cases, and Dr. Rahul Mehra was the peer reviewer for the inpatient psychiatric cases. The peer reviewers prepared reports that offered their opinion as to which days of the patients' stays were medically necessary. Ms. Lynn then calculated the amount of the alleged overpayment and communicated that number to Petitioner in the FAAR on August 20, 2005. General issues regarding patient discharge Ms. Lynn emphasized that the peer reviewer's job is simply to determine medical necessity, not to base coverage decisions on the convenience of the patient or provider. She rejected the suggestion that it was any part of the peer reviewer's task to consider what medical facilities and services are actually available in Orlando, at the time that Florida Hospital Orlando is contemplating the discharge of a Medicaid patient. Ms. Lynn reiterated that hospital services under Medicaid are governed by the Hospital Services Coverage and Limitations Handbook, the January 2001 edition, of which sets forth the following "Service Requirements": Medicaid reimburses for services that are determined medically necessary, do not duplicate another provider's service, and are: individualized, specific, consistent with symptoms or confirmed diagnosis of the illness or injury under treatment, and not in excess of the patient's needs; not experimental or investigational; reflective of the level of services that can be safely furnished, and for which no equally effective and more conservative or less costly treatment is available statewide; furnished in a manner not primarily intended for the convenience of the recipient, the recipient's caretaker, or the provider. The fact that a provider has prescribed, recommended, or approved medical or allied care, goods, or services does not, in itself, make such care, goods or services medically necessary or a covered service. Dr. Ross Edmundson, Florida Hospital Orlando's medical director for health care management, agreed that a clinically stable patient can be sent home or to a skilled nursing facility "in the best of all worlds." However, Dr. Edmundson pointed out that a safe discharge plan is the primary consideration for the treating physician, and that a safe discharge plan may render things "medically appropriate" that might not be found "medically necessary" in purely clinical terms. For example, if the Medicaid patient has no home, and the physician knows full well that the patient will be living under a bridge if he is discharged to the street, then it would be grossly negligent to discharge that patient without a plan to get better care. If the patient requires $500.00 worth of medications for the next month, and has no way of obtaining them, it may be grossly negligent for the physician to send that patient out the hospital door. The InterQual Products Group's "ISD" (Intensity of Service, Severity of Illness Discharge Screens) is a nationally recognized set of utilization guidelines that are used by hospitals, Medicare and Medicaid. Dr. Edmundson believed that these discharge guidelines take into account factors beyond the purely clinical: You have to have a discharge treatment plan. If you have a place to follow up, if you have [an] accepting physician, if you have a plan, if you know that they can make it there in the next three days and they require follow up in three days, that is clinically appropriate. If you know that they're going to live in a box and you have no assurance that this patient is going to make it back for any follow up, then that is not a safe discharge plan, it is not medically appropriate. The criteria really has that built in. There are barriers that may prevent the hospital from discharging the patient to an alternative location. Even if the hospital has met the patient's immediate medical needs and the patient's condition is stable, the patient's financial situation may present an obstacle to placement in a skilled nursing facility or to obtaining home health care. Petitioner has access to "a very limited number" of providers who will give follow up care to Medicaid and self-pay patients. Most nursing homes in central Florida have a set number of Medicaid beds for which they will accept patients. Medicaid will not pay a sub- acute facility or a nursing home any additional money for expensive medications, such as intravenous (IV) antibiotics, which further discourages those facilities from accepting patients upon their discharge from the hospital. Florida Hospital Orlando has severe capacity problems. The hospital has about 1,800 beds on its seven campuses, and these beds are almost always full. It is not unusual for the hospital's daytime census to be above 100 percent, with patients backed up in the emergency room waiting for beds to become available. Given the hospital's capacity problems and the low reimbursement rates of Medicaid, there is no motive for Petitioner to keep Medicaid patients in the hospital any longer than is absolutely necessary. Tammy Rikansrud is Florida Hospital Orlando's director of case management, utilization management, and denial management. According to Ms. Rikansrud, the hospital begins discharge planning within 24 hours of a patient's admission, and immediately begins seeking referrals as soon as its knows the patient will be discharged to a sub-acute facility. A major problem is that many facilities limit the number of beds for Medicaid patients, if they accept Medicaid patients at all. Robert Fleener is Petitioner's director of case management. Based on Mr. Fleener's testimony, the impediments to placing a patient in a nursing home from the hospital include rejection of the patient for "payer constraints," meaning that the Medicaid system does not reimburse the nursing home enough to cover its costs. Petitioner seeks placement for its Medicaid patients throughout the state of Florida and beyond, if necessary. Aside from nursing homes, Petitioner uses Shands Teaching Hospital in Gainesville, and long-term acute care hospitals such as those operated by Kindred Healthcare. Petitioner always assesses the practicality of home care for its patients. Petitioner also seeks to place its patients at outpatient clinics when appropriate, but there are few clinics in Orlando, and they are not required to accept Petitioner's discharged patients. The usual practice with ambulatory patients is to discharge them from the hospital, then have them come back on an outpatient basis for follow up treatment. Petitioner always assesses its patients to achieve discharge to the least restrictive setting. If the patient is ambulatory, the hospital will seek to place the patient in an assisted living facility. If the patient is not ambulatory, the hospital will look to a skilled nursing facility that is able to provide the necessary level of service. As also noted by Dr. Edmundson, a patient's need for expensive medicines can make it difficult to place the patient in a nursing home because of reimbursement problems. According to Mr. Fleener, nursing homes look very closely at accepting homeless patients, because they assume that if they accept a homeless person, they will have that patient for the rest of his life. Petitioner has "unavoidable" inpatient days for its Medicaid patients, where the care could have been provided in a nursing home but the hospital was unable to place the patient, due to lack of beds, patient behavior problems, age, or the cost of clinical care. Stephen William Bailey is the clinic coordinator for Petitioner's department of psychiatry. Petitioner has a 76-bed psychiatric inpatient unit and a medical psychiatric unit for patients with a psychiatric diagnosis and co-morbid medical problems. The hospital must obtain state approval to place a psychiatric patient in a nursing home, assuming it is possible to find a nursing home that is equipped to handle psychiatric issues and is willing to take the patient. It is not uncommon for Petitioner to admit a patient with behavior disturbances from a nursing home, stabilize the patient's medications and treatment, then have the nursing home refuse to take the patient back. Petitioner has no incentive to prolong inpatient stays. Patients are waiting to be admitted on a regular basis, and there are, at times, as many as 20 psychiatric patients in the emergency room waiting for admission. Cara Lee Staples is a social worker at Florida Hospital Orlando. She attends treatment team meetings, assesses patients for discharge needs, researches placement availabilities, and meets with families to plan care after discharge. Based on Ms. Staples' testimony, many of Petitioner's Medicaid patients have chronic mental illnesses and often have no involvement with their families. As soon as a patient is admitted, Ms. Staples seeks to obtain a psychosocial history of the patient, which includes where the patient came from and whether the patient can return upon discharge. If the patient cannot return to, for example, the assisted living facility from which he was admitted to the hospital, then Ms. Staples must attempt to find an appropriate placement for the patient so that he may be safely discharged once he is stabilized. According to Ms. Staples, there is a range of alternative placements she may explore, depending on the patient's circumstances. Those persons who do not need structured care may be placed in a boarding home. Those requiring minimal care may be placed in an assisted living facility or a retirement home. The next level of care would be provided by an extended care facility, which Ms. Staples described as an intermediate facility between an assisted living facility and a skilled nursing facility. Other placement options include substance abuse rehabilitation facilities, halfway houses, 28-day programs, and shelters. The hospital faces some placement problems. Assisted living facilities tend not to accept patients with recent histories of drug abuse. Some assisted living facilities will not accept patients who are incontinent and unable to change themselves. Assisted living facilities without locked units will not accept Alzheimer's patients who tend to wander. Nursing homes will often reject young psychiatric patients in need of skilled nursing services because of their age. Nursing homes are generally reluctant to accept Medicaid patients, particularly those who are homeless, because of the difficulty they will face in placing the patient after the need for skilled nursing services has passed. Nursing homes will decline to accept a patient once they learn he is on a psychiatric unit because they "cannot meet their needs," which Ms. Staples described as a global catch-all phrase for their general desire not to accept psychiatric patients. Acute Care Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the acute care inpatient hospital stays of 16 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6, the recipient spreadsheet indicating the dates of the patients' stays, the dates denied by the peer reviewers, and the amount of claimed overpayment. Patient #1 R.B. R.B. was admitted on March 30, 2001, and was discharged on April 8, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, April 6 through 8, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.3 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that R.B. was a 46-year-old female with scleroderma. She was admitted with chest tightness and found to be in near end-stage renal failure. Standard enzyme testing ruled out a heart attack. Her renal function continued to deteriorate and it became clear she would soon need dialysis. R.B. underwent placement of a Tessio catheter on April 3, and arrangements were begun for her to receive dialysis at an outpatient center in her hometown of Pensacola. Dialysis could not be arranged at the outpatient center until after she underwent dialysis at the hospital on April 4 and 5. Dr. Machado agreed that it would not have been safe to discharge her until adequate arrangements had been made for her outpatient dialysis, but that she was medically stable and ready for discharge by April 5 with an outpatient treatment plan in place. The care R.B. received in the hospital after April 5, including two blood transfusions on April 7, could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Petitioner's expert witness, Dr. Yithak Daniel Haim, testified that R.B. was not discharged as scheduled on April 6, because of changes in her mental status. She had nausea and episodes of confusion. On April 7, her medications were reviewed in light of their propensity to cause confusion in persons with poor kidney function. It was thought that her confusion could be due to OxyContin. Dr. Haim also noted that R.B.'s hemoglobin dropped on April 7, and she required a transfusion. Treating physician Dr. Daniel Tambunan confirmed that R.B. was kept in the hospital after April 6 due to her mental status, which developed into hallucinations on April 7. Dr. Tambunan also noted that R.B. had developed tachycardia on April 5 probably due to low hemaocrit, which was measured at 22.3 on April 7. Dr. Haim stated that a normal hematocrit is between 39 and 45. Dr. Haim agreed with Dr. Machado that dialysis can usually be done on an outpatient basis, but that he decided to keep her in the hospital due to the combination of the tachycardia, low hematocrit necessitating a transfusion, and the need to ascertain whether the hallucinations were caused by medications or by the dialysis. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 8 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive transfusions and dialysis on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Machado's testimony ignored R.B.'s hallucinations and the reasonableness of keeping her in the hospital until the treating physician could ascertain their cause. Therefore, AHCA offered no evidence to conflict with the testimony of Dr. Haim that it was medically necessary to keep R.B. in the hospital until her discharge on April 8. Patient #2 F.C. F.C. was admitted on March 5, 2001, and was discharged on March 12, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the admission should be denied and a 23-hour observation should be approved.4 Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.C. was a 43-year-old female smoker with high blood pressure. She was admitted with chest pain for 3 days and by some notes was chronic over the last year. An electrocardiogram (EKG) did not show ischemia, and serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack. A spiral computer tomography (CT) scan was negative for a pulmonary embolism, i.e., a blood clot in the lung. Dr. Machado wrote that F.C.'s vital signs were stable, and that an outpatient work-up of her chest pain would have been appropriate. Instead, she had a stress test on March 7. The results were still "pending," according to a note on March 11. She also underwent work-up of abnormal findings on her abdominal CT/ultrasound, all of which could have been accomplished safely in the outpatient setting. Petitioner's physician expert, Dr. Haim, concurred with Dr. Machado's denial of this admission. The treating physician, Dr. Ashok Khanna, offered plausible reasons for keeping the patient in the hospital, including the fact that F.C. was a drug addict who could not be relied upon to comply with testing required to rule out coronary artery disease on an outpatient basis. However, the greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Machado's denial of the admission. Patient #3 J.C. J.C. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 12, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, July 8 through July 12, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued care on the medical ward. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.C. was a 55-year-old male initially admitted to the psychiatric unit due to depression and suicidal gesture. Psychiatric notes indicate that J.C. complained of three weeks of exertional chest pain and fatigue. On July 6, he was transferred to the medical ward for further evaluation. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack, and he was hemodynamically stable. He underwent a stress test on July 6, with no chest pain and no EKG changes. Dr. Machado concluded that a transfer back to the psychiatric unit or to home would have been appropriate, with follow-up. She believed it was not medically necessary to keep J.C. on the medical ward while awaiting the nuclear images of the stress test, as he was chest pain free and hemodynamically stable after July 7. Treating physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that he was called in on a psychiatric consultation on J.C. while he was in the medical unit. Dr. Allen found that J.C.'s depression was significant and that he would be in need of inpatient psychiatric treatment. Dr. Allen therefore followed J.C. until he was transferred to the inpatient psychiatric unit. The transfer was delayed while the cardiac workup was completed, so that the physicians could be confident that J.C. was medically stable before his transfer back to the inpatient psychiatric unit. Dr. Allen noted that J.C. had a history of depressive disorder and experiencing feelings of helplessness, hopelessness, that his level of depression was significant, and that he had been admitted for a suicidal gesture. Dr. Allen testified that J.C.'s psychiatric symptoms were too marked to be treated on an outpatient basis. Dr. Allen believed that his stay through July 12, was necessary when the combination of the patient's medical and psychiatric conditions are considered. Petitioner's medical expert, Dr. Haim, disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been transferred from the medical ward on July 7, because the results of his cardiac stress test did not come back until July 9. Dr. Haim agreed that J.C. could have then been transferred off the medical ward on July 9. However, there was no bed available on the psychiatric floor on July 9. J.C.'s condition indicated a need for acute psychiatric hospitalization, meaning that he could not be discharged home. Thus, he remained on the medical ward until a psychiatric bed became available. Dr. Haim agreed that this was not strictly a medical reason, but contended that the lack of beds constituted a "reality reason" that justified the full admission. Petitioner's expert psychiatrist, Dr. Alan Berns, agreed with Dr. Allen and Dr. Haim that the full stay was justified. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.C.'s admission. The record established that J.C. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 7. The reason for keeping J.C. on the medical unit after July 7 was administrative convenience, not medical necessity.5 Patient #4 P.C. P.C. was admitted on July 9, 2000, and was discharged on July 17, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, July 11 through July 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that P.C. was a 64-year-old female with a history of leg cellulitis treated with IV antibiotics. She was admitted through the emergency room with increased swelling of her lower left leg, which raised concerns about deep vein thrombosis (DVT), compartment syndrome, or progression of her cellulitis. P.C. also had chronic anemia, which had worsened. DVT was ruled out and she was continued on IV antibiotics. She had a blood transfusion due to her anemia. P.C. declined inpatient gastrointestinal (GI) work for her anemia, so the hospital planned to schedule the GI work after her discharge. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her hospital stay could have been outpatient. She did have one further transfusion of packed red blood cells (PRBCs) on July 12, but she did not need to remain in the hospital for this, as she continued to refuse further workup and was asymptomatic. Dr. Machado testified that the physician's note on July 10 stated that the patient "looks and feels better, no complaints," and that P.C. was sufficiently improved to be discharged on that date. She could have been continued on IV antibiotics at home through home health care, or could have received the treatment at a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Machado acknowledged that the patient received a blood transfusion on July 12, but stated that this could have been provided on an outpatient basis. Blood could have been drawn after the transfusion for lab testing, and there would have been no need to call P.C. back in unless there was a problem with the labs. Dr. Haim testified that P.C. was diabetic, had kidney problems, peripheral vascular disease, and congestive heart failure. As of July 11, the status of her infection had improved, but she was still on IV antibiotics and her hematocrit had dropped. Because P.C. had several chronic medical problems, it was important to raise her hematocrit. She was given the transfusion on July 12, but her hematocrit continued to drop. Dr. Haim testified that this raised intense concerns as to "where is this blood going to." A CAT scan of her abdomen revealed no internal bleeding. Her release was planned for July 15, but blood testing on that date showed that her kidney function had deteriorated. It was feared that one of her IV antibiotics, Vancomycin, was affecting her kidney function. Dr. Haim concluded that her drop in hemoglobin and kidney function necessitated keeping her in the hospital until July 17. J.C.'s treating physician, Dr. Sidiab Elalaoui, testified that he could not have given the patient transfusions in his office. He disagreed with Dr. Machado that J.C. could have been seen in an outpatient setting as of July 11. Dr. Elalaoui noted that J.C. had been getting IV antibiotics at home, but that her condition nonetheless worsened to the point where she had to be brought to the emergency room on July 9. Dr. Elalaoui stated that J.C. did not have a simple infection. She had a bacteremia, a bacteria that went from the skin into the blood of a patient with diabetes and high blood pressure. Dr. Elalaoui could not be sure if her condition was life- threatening, but confidently stated that it was "severe." The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that July 11 through July 17 should not have been denied. Dr. Machado's opinion was supportable regarding the ability of the patient to receive a transfusion and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis. However, Dr. Elalaoui's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, whatever the patient's theoretical ability to receive transfusions and IV antibiotics on an outpatient basis, under the actual circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep J.C. in the hospital through July 17. Patient #5 A.F. A.F. was admitted on November 30, 2000, and was discharged on December 7, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that four days, December 3 through December 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that A.F. was a 32-year-old female admitted with a severe headache and apparent new onset seizures. She underwent a CT scan, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), and an electroencephalogram (EEG), all of which reported negative. She had undergone a lumbar puncture previously for the severe headaches, which was also negative. Dr. Machado concluded that A.F. could have been discharged with oral medications and outpatient follow-up for treatment of her apparent migraine headaches. Instead, A.F. underwent further testing for low back pain, depression, and substance abuse. Dr. Machado believed that the treating physicians allowed the patient's subjective complaints to outweigh the objective clinical findings, noting that A.F. had been seen sitting up and talking on the phone during the time when she was complaining of a severe headache. Petitioner's expert, Dr. Haim, agreed with Dr. Machado that the days denied were redundant. Thus, it is found that the greater weight of evidence supports AHCA's denial of four days of A.F.'s inpatient stay. Patient #6 C.G. C.G. was admitted on May 3, 2001, and was discharged on May 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that eight days, May 5 through May 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted with increasing chest pain and numbness in her left arm. She was found to have a mass in the middle of her chest and possible early superior vena cava (SVC) syndrome. Serial enzymes and a CT scan respectively ruled out heart attack and pulmonary embolism as the cause of her chest pain. She was started on steroids and pain medication, with satisfactory pain relief. Dr. Machado concluded that the remainder of her stay focused on a workup on the mediastinal mass, which could have been done on an outpatient basis. The steroid and pain medications she was receiving through IV, could have been given orally. None of the progress notes documented sufficient evidence for inpatient workup. In her deposition, Dr. Machado explained that the SVC is the large blood vessel that returns blood from the heart to the upper portion of the body. When there is a mass in that area of the chest, it can compress the SVC and cause swelling from the backing up of the blood. Dr. Machado believed that once immediate life-threatening diagnoses such as heart attack and pulmonary embolism were ruled out, and C.G.'s pain was managed with medication, the matter of determining the nature of the mediastinal mass could have been handled on an outpatient basis. Treating physician Dr. Vajihuddin Khan, an internal medicine specialist at Florida Hospital Orlando, testified that he kept C.G. in the hospital until May 14 to complete the workup and perform all the necessary investigations of the mediastinal mass. Dr. Khan noted that C.G. could not have been released and observed daily on an outpatient basis because of transportation or financial problems. The patient lacked outside support. If she had gone out of the hospital with no place to stay and no friends to support her, the workup might never have been completed. C.G. was ultimately diagnosed with Hodgkins lymphoma. Dr. Haim testified that on May 7 the patient was ordered NPO (nothing by mouth) for a biopsy to be performed the next day. She had a swollen face, neck, and arm, with a large, undiagnosed mass in her chest. The chest pain and shortness of breath had not gone away. Dr. Haim believed it would be irresponsible to discharge C.G. in that condition without a diagnosis. The biopsy was performed on May 8 and showed cancer. The pathology report on May 9 was inconclusive, but her physicians knew it was "something bad," either lymphoma or a small cell carcinoma of long standing. Dr. Haim testified that it was important to differentiate the type of cancer because the treatments would be different for each. Therefore, it was necessary to perform surgery to obtain a larger sample of the mass. Dr. Haim noted that the surgery was not performed prior to C.G.'s discharge on May 14, due to the surgeon's unavailability. Dr. Haim agreed that reimbursement for the dates of May 10 through May 14 were "somewhat questionable" because C.G. was, in essence, sitting in the hospital waiting for a surgeon. The record did not disclose why she was forced to wait for a surgeon. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last eight days of C.G.'s admission. The record established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on May 5. Patient # 7 C.G. C.G. was readmitted on May 25, 2001, and was discharged on June 3, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that the last day should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.G. was a 47-year-old female admitted for elective mediastinoscopy to diagnose a mediastinal mass. The procedure was attempted but was unsuccessful due to a large goiter. A thoroactomy was performed that diagnosed lymphoma. C.G. did fine postoperatively but her discharge was delayed after an episode of chest pain, determined to be non-cardiac. When the oncologist saw her on May 30, he felt that she had SVC syndrome and called for an urgent radiation oncology consult. She was started on IV Decadron and improved dramatically by June 2, when she received her first radiation treatment. Dr. Machado saw no reason to keep the patient in the hospital for an extra day, until June 3. Dr. Haim testified that it was reasonable to wait for hours after the radiation treatment to note any improvement or adverse reaction. The greater weight of the evidence supports Dr. Haim's opinion that it was medically necessary to keep C.G. in the hospital through June 3. Patient #8 THE. THE. was admitted on April 3, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that three days, April 6 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of clear documentation showing medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that THE. was a 21-year-old pregnant patient admitted with dehydration from hyper emesis gravid arum (the nausea and vomiting commonly called "morning sickness"). She had lost 14 pounds in the week prior to admission. This was the only abnormal vital sign, as she was not hypertensive or tachycardia and her electrolytes were not abnormal. No blood urea nitrogen (BUN) or cretonne was documented, indicating normal kidney function. She had two previous admissions for hyper emesis. She received sufficient IV hydration by April 4 for a 10 pound weight gain and was documented by nursing notes as feeling better and tolerating oral medications. She did have an increase in vomiting on April 5, but by April 6 this was much less and her weight was stable. Most of her anti-emetics were switched from IV to oral, and her IV was locked off for the remainder of her hospital stay. Her vital signs remained stable throughout her hospital stay, and there were no new labs to document continuing dehydration. Dr. Machado testified that the record showed no treatment after April 6 that necessitated a hospital stay. She believed THE. could have been discharged on April 6, with outpatient oral anti-nausea medications in a trial to see how she would do. Treating physician Dr. Andre Jakubowski testified that he saw THE. in his office on April 2, for an obstetrical visit. She was about 12 weeks pregnant and complaining of nausea, vomiting and the inability to keep down fluids. At her March 26, visit, she had weighed 134 pounds. On April 2, she weighed 120 pounds, a loss of 14 pounds. Dr. Jakubowksi immediately admitted T.H. to the hospital. For the first few days of T.H.'s hospitalization, Dr. Jakubowski gave her IV hydration in order to correct her electrolytes. On April 6, the IVs were discontinued and T.H. was placed on oral medications and food. Between April 6 and 7, she lost two and one half pounds. Dr. Jakubowski testified that he could not send T.H. home because she was still vomiting and was generally "not in good shape." He started her on IV hydration again and adjusted her medications. She began to eat and was able to go home on April 9. Dr. Jakubowski testified that it is not within the standards of practice to discharge a patient who has been taken off IV hydration without observing for 24 hours to be sure the patient is taking food and/or liquids orally and keeping them down. On April 8, the IV hydration was stopped for the second time. This time, T.H. was able to keep down some oral foods and liquids. Dr. Jakubowski watched her for 24 hours, then sent her home on April 9. Dr. Haim testified that laboratory testing is not necessary to document continued dehydration when the patient continues to vomit. With a weight loss of 14 pounds in a woman who was 12 weeks pregnant, this was clearly more than ordinary morning sickness. T.H. could not be discharged when she could not keep food on her stomach. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 6 through April 9 should not have been denied. Dr. Jakubowski's testimony as the treating physician, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that, although T.H. showed some improvement and was taken off IV fluids on April 6, it was reasonable to wait 24 hours to make sure that she could keep down oral nutrition. When she was unable to do so, the IV hydration was resumed and it was reasonable to keep her in the hospital until she was able to keep some food on her stomach. Under all the circumstances, it was medically necessary to keep T.H. in the hospital through April 9. Patient #9 J.H. J.H. was admitted on July 7, 2001, and was discharged on August 7, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 21 days, July 17 through August 7, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that J.H. was a 63-year-old female lung transplant candidate with end-stage pulmonary fibrosis. She was admitted with a cough, low-grade fever, and increased shortness of breath. She also appeared to have a postoperative wound infection from recent vascular surgery in the right groin. A CT scan was negative for pneumonia or pulmonary embolism and her respiratory symptoms stabilized and, fairly quickly, returned to their concededly poor baseline. The infected right groin area was the cause for J.H.'s extended stay. The wound was debrided on July 14, following treatment with IV antibiotics and wound care. The infectious disease consultant agreed on July 16 that home IV antibiotics would be appropriate. However, the patient declined a PICC line (peripherally inserted central catheter, a long–term catheter that is inserted into the arm and threaded into central circulation) due to a past poor experience. She therefore, continued to get IV antibiotics in the hospital until July 26, when she was changed to oral Keflex. Dr. Machado found that the reasons for her continued hospital stay were unclear, except for wound care. On August 3, J.H. left the hospital for a few hours on a day pass. During her stay, she underwent other tests that are required for lung transplant evaluation, but weren't necessary during this hospitalization. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that J.H.'s lung condition stabilized, but the groin became the problem. The treating physician initially thought the problem was fluid collection, but the increased white blood cell count indicated an infection. J.H. was given proper wound care, but Dr. Machado could not see anything done in the hospital during the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay that required an inpatient stay. Dr. Machado concluded that IV antibiotics and wound care could have been given in a sub-acute skilled nursing facility or with home health. Treating physician Richard Young Feibelman is board certified in internal medicine and pulmonary medicine. He is a pulmonary physician, and was J.H.'s primary physician during this admission. In his deposition, Dr. Feibelman testified that he had followed this patient for some time prior to this admission. J.H.'s primary underlying problem was severe and progressing idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis, a scarring debilitation of the lungs causing progressive shortness of breath and requiring increasing oxygen. It typically results in death within two to three years of the diagnosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. had recently been evaluated at the University of Miami for a lung transplant, which she desperately wanted despite the high risk of death associated with this surgery. J.H. had been undergoing workup in Miami, about two weeks before this admission, including a carotid artery angiogram and cerebral angiogram. After the angiogram, she developed a pseudo aneurism or partial false leak of the puncture site from the catheter insertion. She then developed a hematoma in that area, with wound infection and fever that made necessary her admission to the hospital. Dr. Feibelman testified that at the time of admission, it was difficult to tell whether the infection came from her groin, or whether it was a superimposed respiratory infection on top of her underlying pulmonary fibrosis. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was extremely sick, near the end stage of chronic fibrotic lung disease. He stated that this was an important hospitalization, because J.H.'s infection had to be under control to ensure she could make it to Miami, and survive the lung transplant. Before her admission, she was on immunosuppressive therapy, which increases the risk of infection. Dr. Feibelman treated her with IV antibiotics, and he described the wound care as "aggressive," an effort to heal the wound before the lung disease killed her. The wound was debrided, and J.H. was seen by an infectious disease consultant and vascular surgery consultant. There was difficulty with her blood pressure, and an episode of arm and leg numbness that required a neurological consultation to rule out a transient ischemic attack or pulmonary embolus. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was still getting IV antibiotics to almost the end of her hospitalization. She was on high flow oxygen. The pain in her wound was such that she required intravenous morphine to change her dressings. Dr. Feibelman concluded that any additional setback for J.H. would have been fatal. Her disease has a fairly rapid stair- step pattern, in which there is a drop-off, then stabilization, then a further drop-off, then stabilization. Dr. Feibelman stated that J.H. could not afford a further drop-off before her lung transplant. Dr. Feibelman testified that J.H. was allowed to leave the hospital for two hours on a day pass. He stated that this was in all likelihood her last chance to go home, and he thought it was worth letting her go. Dr. Haim disagreed that the last 21 days of J.H.'s stay should be denied, but agreed that the last week or two were debatable, depending on the support system she had at home and the possibility of giving her IV antibiotics at home. Dr. Haim stated that she could have had IV antibiotics at home with a PICC line. However, J.H. had prior poor experiences with PICC lines and told her physicians they were not going to "torture" her again. She would also have needed assistance with her oxygen tanks if she went home. Dr. Haim stated that J.H. needed help with all of her activities of daily living (ADLs), as would any patient requiring six liters of oxygen every day. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last 21 days of J.H.'s admission. Dr. Machado correctly observed that the patient could have received IV antibiotics, oxygen, and wound care in a skilled nursing facility. She conceded that it would have been correct to keep the patient in the hospital if no skilled nursing facility was available. Petitioner offered no evidence that it attempted to place J.H. in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Feibelman's concerns about J.H.'s precarious condition are fully credited, but the record as presented established that C.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on July 16. Patient #10 C.J. C.J. was admitted on March 31, 2001, and was discharged on April 9, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that six days, April 3 through April 9, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that C.J. was a 67-year-old female admitted with abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting, two days after a colonoscopy. She also had poorly controlled diabetes. The nausea and vomiting resolved quickly after admission, and she was hemodynamically stable throughout her stay. A CT scan of the abdomen and pelvis was performed, which showed a large pelvic mass (likely the recurrence of a previous cancer) with accompanying hydronephrosis (swelling of the kidney caused by obstruction of urine flow). The gastroenterologist cleared C.J. for discharge on April 2. The remainder of her stay involved consultations with urology and oncology specialists regarding the pelvic mass, which could have been accomplished in the outpatient setting. She did not have a ureteral stent (a surgical device implanted to hold the ureter open so that urine can flow freely from the kidneys to the bladder) placed until April 6. Dr. Machado wrote that it was unclear from the notes what was keeping her in the hospital after April 6. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that C.J. should have been discharged on April 3 with arrangements for an outpatient workup of the pelvic mass, which was likely a recurrence of the cancer that C.J. had ten years previously. Dr. Machado testified that the placement of the stent was necessary, either during the hospitalization or as an outpatient, and noted that if it had been an emergency, the stent would have been placed sooner in C.J.'s stay. The stent was actually placed one week after C.J.'s admission. Treating physician Dr. Alan Varraux, a specialist in pulmonary medicine, testified that C.J. was weak and somewhat frail, but underwent a colonoscopy because of gastrointestinal symptoms. The procedure caused her much nausea and vomiting. Her complaints and Dr. Varraux' concerns about dehydration led to her hospitalization on March 31. On admission, she was kept NPO and IV fluids were started. She was allowed to start eating on April 1. A GI specialist saw her on April 2 and performed an upper GI endoscopy and a colonoscopy. A consulting oncologist saw the patient on April 3. Dr. Varraux stated that an X-ray showed hydronephrosis, a blockage of the ureter system causing urine to back up into and dilate the kidney. The stent could not be placed on an outpatient basis because C.J. was a debilitated, immuno-compromised cancer patient who could be killed by a urinary tract infection. She was a high risk patient and needed to be cleared by a urological specialist before discharge. The urologist planned to place the stent on April 6, after which C.J. could be discharged if all went well. Dr. Haim testified that the stent was actually placed on April 7 and that C.J. needed to stay in the hospital for an additional 24-to-48 hours to ensure that she had adequate urine output, and that her fever was going down, and that her subjective feelings were improved. After reviewing the depositions of Dr. Varraux and Dr. Haim, Dr. Machado testified that she saw no reason to change her opinion. Dr. Machado stated that the medical record showed C.J.'s cancer was 10 years prior to this admission. This led Dr. Machado to disagree with Dr. Varraux's assumption that C.J. was immuno-compromised and unable to fight infections normally. Dr. Machado also did not see anything in the medical record to support the concerns about a urinary tract infection. C.J.'s urinalysis was normal on admission. There was glucose in her urine, which was consistent with her diabetes. On April 3, her white blood count was normal, indicating that if there was an infection, it had been treated adequately. No culture or urinalysis was performed on that date. Dr. Machado opined that the patient's low grade fever throughout her stay was not a reason to keep her in the hospital, as evidenced by the fact that she was still running a low grade fever on the day she was discharged. She was treated with antibiotics that can be given orally, but that they chose to give via IV. Dr. Machado could find no notes from the primary treating physician from April 6, until his discharge note on April 9. Dr. Machado found nothing in the medical record to support the view that the stent had to be placed in the hospital. The stent certainly needed to be placed, to allow urine to drain properly from the kidney. However, this is not always an inpatient procedure. Dr. Machado noted that the urologist's post-operative orders were written as outpatient orders. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of C.J.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.J. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on April 3. Patient #11 G.M. AHCA Exhibit 6 indicates that G.M. was admitted on July 6, 2000, and was discharged on July 20, 2000. However, Dr. Machado noted that the records provided by the hospital indicate that this patient was admitted directly to a rehabilitation facility, and was never an acute medical admission. Therefore, Dr. Machado determined that the entire 14-day stay should be denied. Dr. Haim testified that his own abbreviated notes show that the patient came into the hospital, was in respiratory failure, had shortness of breath, coded with cardiac arrest, and was intubated. However, the lack of medical records provided by the hospital to AHCA require that Dr. Machado's denial determination be sustained. Patient #12 N.P. N.P. was admitted on January 8, 2000, and was discharged on January 14, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that two days, January 13 through January 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that N.P. was a 46-year-old male with cardiomyopathy and poorly controlled diabetes. He was admitted with increasing shortness of breath, fever, cough, and chest pain. He was started on antibiotics, diuretics, and respiratory treatments, and his symptoms improved rapidly. Serial enzyme tests ruled out a heart attack and his chest pain was not thought to be cardiac in nature. On January 11, his IV medications were changed to oral, and it was felt he was near ready for discharge. Though he felt better, his oxygen saturations were slow to improve and he was still saturating in the high 80's on room air, which was not his baseline. Dr. Machado found it reasonable to monitor him for one more day in the hospital to see if this would improve before sending him home with oxygen. The saturations stayed the same the following day, and he continued to feel better. Dr. Machado concluded that discharge would have been safe on January 12, with home oxygen and close outpatient follow-up. Dr. Haim testified that N.P. could have probably been discharged on January 13 on oxygen, with outpatient follow-up. He noted that N.P. was started on a new medication on January 12, and that it is reasonable to keep the patient for an additional 24 hours to gauge his response. However, Dr. Haim also noted that the medication was a diuretic, not an antibiotic. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last two days of N.P.'s admission. The record, as presented, established that N.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on January 13. Patient #13 T.S. T.S. was admitted on September 18, 2001, and was discharged on October 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that 12 days, October 4 through October 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 55-year-old man with cirrhosis and a history of drug abuse and hypertension. He was admitted for treatment of a non-healing venous ulcer that had failed outpatient therapy. T.S. was also experiencing uncontrolled pain despite oral pain medications. He was started on broad-spectrum antibiotics and underwent debridement of the wound on September 21. Plans were made to discharge him to a skilled nursing facility for several weeks of wound care and IV antibiotics. On September 22, his pain continued to be poorly controlled. On September 25, he had a fever of 101 degrees and diarrhea, which prompted further work- up. Cultures of the wound continued to show a polymicrobial infection that also had a fungal component. Oral Sporanox was added to his medications to address the fungal component. On September 27, a pain management consultation was requested due to his continued uncontrolled pain, mostly during dressing changes. T.S. was placed on a Dilaudid PCA (patient controlled analgesic) pump, which did control his pain. During this time, T.S. had waxing and waning mental status due to the pain medications. Because of T.S.' increasing lethargy, the PCA was discontinued on October 3, and T.S. was thenceforth maintained on oral medications. The patient also had chronic anemia on admission that slowly worsened during his stay. He was found not to be acutely bleeding and was transfused PRBCs with improvement in his hematocrit level. Dr. Machado agreed that it would have been difficult to discharge T.S. to a skilled nursing facility for dressing changes and IV antibiotics if he was unable to tolerate dressing changes without a PCA pump for pain. Therefore, she would allow the hospitalization through October 3, when T.S. was switched to oral pain medications and could have gone to a skilled nursing facility. Treating physician Dr. Pradeep Vangala testified that he saw T.S. in his office, prior to his hospital admission. T.S. came in with what appeared to be cellulitis in his legs, and was treated with oral antibiotics. When the condition failed to respond to treatment, Dr. Vangala admitted T.S. to the hospital. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. was kept in the hospital after October 4 because his cellulitis had not resolved and the patient was not stable enough to be changed to oral antibiotics. Dr. Vangala testified that it was not a simple decision to send T.S. home with IV antibiotics because of complicating issues. Secondary to his cirrhosis, T.S. had significant edema in most of his body in general, and his legs in particular. Dr. Vangala stated that T.S. required close observation of his skin integrity and his cellulitis, and that his cirrhosis was the cause of the edema. Though T.S. had a lot of excess fluid, most of it was in the subcutaneous tissues rather than the blood vessels. This means that his fluid status had to be closely monitored, because of the danger that he might become intravascularly volume depleted, which could affect renal function. Dr. Vangala stated that the cirrhosis had altered T.S.'s mental status for a significant portion of his stay, and that an acutely confused patient is not a candidate for discharge because he is not able to follow discharge instructions. T.S. also had significant anemia, which meant that his hemoglobin had to be watched. Dr. Haim testified that during all 12 days denied by Dr. Machado, T.S. was still running a fever and had a depressed mental status. He was still receiving IV medications, and had a significant swelling of the abdomen that required drainage. His mental status was abnormal, and physicians were having a very difficult time titrating his pain medications. A neurologist was called in on October 4 because of T.S.'s impaired mental status. The gathering fluids in his body were causing swelling and making it difficult for him to breathe. Dr. Haim testified that the IV antibiotics that T.S. was receiving after October 4 had to be closely supervised, though he conceded that a skilled nursing facility could handle their administration. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last twelve days of T.S.'s admission. Dr. Machado's opinion that the medications administered via IV after October 4 could have been given outside of the inpatient hospital setting was uncontradicted. Dr. Vangala's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that T.S. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on October 4. Patient #14 & 15 (two denials) F.T. F.T. was admitted on March 27, 2000, and was discharged on May 13, 2000. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that: March 27 through April 4, should be approved for treatment of coagulopahty, subdural hematoma, and evaluation of the patient's near-syncopal episode; April 14 through May 7, should be approved for chemotherapy and treatment of neutropenic fever; and that April 5 through April 13 (nine days) and May 8 through May 13, (five days) should be denied because the treatment during those periods could have been administered on an outpatient basis. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that F.T. was a 49-year-old female with metastatic breast cancer admitted with a coagulopathy and near-syncope (almost fainting). She was found to have new subdural hematomas and a new pathologic fracture of the left femur. Her coagulopathy was reversed and she was evaluated by neurosurgery and radiation oncology. No surgery was recommended. She began palliative radiation therapy to the brain and left femur on March 29. She remained hemodynamically and neurologically stable, and neurosurgery signed off on the case on April 4. Her pain responded well to radiation. Between April 4 and April 14, F.T.'s hospital care involved continued radiation therapy and the biopsy of a left auxiliary lymph node (on April 11) to determine the receptor status of the breast cancer, which would enable the oncologist to decide if chemotherapy would be of benefit. Dr. Machado concluded that this evaluation and the radiation therapy could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, F.T. began chemotherapy over two days and very soon began experiencing fever and neutropenia (an abnormally low level of neutrophils, the white blood cells produced in the bone marrow) and then respiratory distress. She was started on IV antibiotics and IV diuretics. She was also started on a feeding tube due to poor oral food intake. The fevers and neutropenia were resolved by April 25, but she continued to decline, with increased shortness of breath requiring more diuresis to clear fluid from the lungs. It became evident she was deteriorating and her feeding tube was discontinued by May 4. By May 8, comfort measures only were initiated, and evaluation for inpatient hospice care was requested. In her deposition, Dr. Machado testified that between April 4 and April 14, F.T. was receiving radiation as her main treatment, as well as further evaluation to determine whether anything more could be done for her cancer. Everything she received during this period, including the lymph node biopsy, could have been done on an outpatient basis. On April 14, she started chemotherapy, which was reasonable to perform in the hospital. By May 8, the medical chart notes indicate the initiation of "comfort only" measures. At that point, she could have been sent home with hospice care or to a hospice house. Dr. Machado conceded that some patients do receive inpatient hospice care, but she testified that this should have been done in a hospice bed, not an acute care medical bed. Dr. Haim testified that during the period of April 5 through April 13 F.T. was receiving radiation to the fractured femur and awaiting a lymph node biopsy. The initial pathology report did not have sufficient material for receptor studies, so a surgical biopsy would need to be performed. On April 5, the hospital social worker was awaiting orders to transfer F.T. back to the nursing home from which she had been admitted. However, F.T. had an episode of nausea and vomiting. Dr. Haim stated that nausea and vomiting in a patient who has metastasis is extremely serious because it could indicate more brain swelling or bleeding in the brain. She was started on IV Decadron, a steroid given to combat nausea and vomiting in chemotherapy patients. Dr. Raul Castillo, F.T.'s oncologist, met with a pathologist on April 7 to discuss the need for an open biopsy of F.T. On April 8, F.T. was receiving radiation and was started on a new chemotherapy drug, IV Aredia. She was monitored closely for side effects. Pain management was a persistent problem. On April 10, she was given the open biopsy under a local anesthetic. On April 13, an orthopedist saw her and ordered a specially fitted brace, because she had difficulty sitting due to her spinal problems. Dr. Haim concluded that, because of all the treatments F.T. was undergoing, including IV chemotherapy, it was mandatory for her to stay inpatient from April 5 through April 13. She could not get the chemotherapy in a non-acute care facility. The hospital was the only place she could get IV Aredia, the brace hadn't arrived until April 13, and she had multiple problems that required monitoring, including advanced cancer and bleeding in the brain. Dr. Haim did not believe that a skilled nursing facility had the capacity to handle F.T. As to F.T.'s second stay, Dr. Haim testified that from May 8 to May 13 F.T. was very weak. Her abdomen was markedly distended, which could have meant that her bowels weren't working well. The abdomen was X-rayed. Her platelet count was dangerously low. An oncology note dated May 9 stated that she was a full code (meaning that all resuscitative efforts must be attempted), by her own choice. Her full code status forced the doctors to plan the performance of tests on her abdomen. On May 10, F.T. voluntarily changed her instructions to DNR (do not resuscitate). Comfort measures were instituted and hospice was consulted. However, when the hospice nurse arrived, F.T. was out having an ultrasound preparatory to having the abdominal fluid drained. The hospice decided not to see her, because she was getting a procedure. The hospice nurse never saw the patient on that day. F.T. was admitted to hospice on May 13. The oncologist, Dr. Castillo, testified that his medical group first saw F.T. in March 2000. F.T. had been diagnosed with breast cancer in 1988, and treated in Puerto Rico, with a left mastectomy and chemotherapy. After she completed the chemotherapy, she had radiation. She indicated that in December 1999, she was told she had metastatic cancer in her bones. In 2000, she developed pain over her hips and legs. She had a fracture over her left femur and a prosthesis over her left leg. She had been taking Coumadin, and Dr. Castillo became involved when F.T. presented with bleeding secondary to Coumadin toxicity. Dr. Castillo described this as a very complex and emotional case in which a few strands of information had to be pieced together to determine the best case management. F.T.'s case history was incomplete because she spoke only Spanish, creating a big language barrier with most of the hospital staff. Dr. Castillo speaks Spanish, and was able to get a "full but scattered history" from F.T. F.T. had metastatic disease. Dr. Castillo testified that it is extremely important to determine if the patient has an estrogen receptor or hormonally positive tumor. Patients who are hormonally sensitive have a much higher probability of responding positively to therapy. To make things more difficult, F.T. developed a subdural hematoma, for which the medical team had to correct her coagulation. Dr. Castillo testified that they felt uncomfortable discharging F.T. while treatment planning was underway. Because of her previous exposure to chemotherapy and radiation, F.T. was at high risk for complications such as the sepsis that eventuated. Dr. Castillo emphasized that this was a complex case, and that the treatment team lacked all the information necessary to make rapid and clear decisions. One event followed another, and the team concentrated on trying to catch up and get the patient somewhat stable. Dr. Castillo stated that a problem with treating a patient this sick on an outpatient basis is the lack of supervision by a specialist. Such a patient will not have access to a site where she is going to get one-to-one care from the oncological standpoint. Dr. Castillo agreed that radiation is commonly done on an outpatient basis, but he noted that this was a patient who had bleeding on the brain and was getting radiation to the brain. If she was in a skilled nursing facility and had a subdural hematoma, she would probably have died on her way to the hospital. Dr. Castillo stated this his group's philosophy is to discharge a patient when they consider the patient stable, and not to leave a patient in the hospital for a mere workup. However, this was a patient who could become a neurosurgical emergency case at any moment. Dr. Castillo concluded that he would not have done anything different in the management of this patient. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that April 5 through April 13 and May 8, through 13 should not have been denied. Dr. Castillo's testimony as the treating oncologist, in combination with Dr. Haim's expert testimony, credibly established that F.T.'s condition was so precarious that her entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #16 J.Y. J.Y. was admitted on March 3, 2001, and was discharged on March 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Machado determined that five days, March 16 through March 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Machado's peer review report stated that T.S. was a 39-year-old female admitted due to swallowing a dental appliance that had become lodged in her esophagus. She underwent an endoscopy on March 3, and the foreign body was removed with some difficulty. Her esophagus was perforated due to the foreign body. She began having fever and pain. A CT scan on March 6 showed extensive edema and air tracking compatible with esophageal perforation. She was kept NPO, hyperalimentation (feeding tube) was started, and IV antibiotics were continued. Clinically, she improved and conservative treatment was continued, as the patient wished to avoid surgery. Dr. Machado believed that it was still prudent to monitor and treat the patient in the hospital, due to the possibility of serious complications from this type of injury. A barium swallow was performed on March 12, which showed that a leak persisted in the esophagus. Because she was clinically so much better, it was decided to repeat the CT scan of the neck on March 14 to check for improvement. The scan showed that soft tissue gas and swelling had decreased considerably. By March 16, her IV antibiotics were discontinued and it was decided to give her a trial of fluids by mouth. She was hemodynamically stable and afebrile. Dr. Machado concluded that she should have been discharged with home health and hyperalimentation, with an outpatient swallowing study and close follow-up, rather than waiting in the hospital until March 19. Dr. Haim testified that the March 12 barium swallow results led to J.Y.'s being kept on no food by mouth and total parenteral nutrition (TPN, another term for a feeding tube). On March 16, J.Y. was noted to be clinically stable, but her liver function tests were noted to be high. Dr. Haim noted that the TPN itself could be causing the liver problems, so there was a GI consult. The gastroenterologist recommended a change of antibiotics as a possible solution to the increase in her liver enzymes. Contrary to Dr. Machado's statement, no trial of fluids by mouth was done on March 16. As of March 17, J.Y.'s orders were still nothing by mouth and TPN, and her liver enzymes continued to rise. On March 18, there were no major interventions and J.Y. was scheduled for a swallow study. Her liver enzymes were noted to be decreasing for the first time. Her swallow study results were pending on March 19. Also on March 19, a pulmonary note indicated phlebitis in J.Y.'s arm, in the area of the IV feeding. An order to replace the PICC line was written. On March 20, J.Y. was started on an oral diet and her PICC line was replaced. The gastroenterologist recommended a liquid diet for several weeks. On March 21, the patient was discharged home on IV TPN and a liquid diet. Dr. Haim concluded that the acute care setting was required for the denied days. Treating surgeon Dr. Stephen Huber testified J.Y. came in having swallowed her partial plate, which had become lodged in her esophagus. The emergency room physicians could not get it out, and so J.Y. was taken to surgery. Dr. Huber kept her NPO because he was afraid she might have torn her esophagus. He placed her on IV antibiotics and ordered a swallow study, which revealed a small leak. Dr. Huber called in an infectious disease specialist to manage J.Y.'s antibiotics because he was worried about contamination from the leak spreading into her neck. She was started on IV feedings and the medical team watched for an abscess to develop in her neck. A few days later, another swallow study was performed, which indicated the leak was smaller but still persistent. J.Y. was kept NPO and kept on IV antibiotics. A third swallow study showed the leak had resolved, and she was started on regular food the next day. Once she was cleared by all her specialists, she was discharged from the hospital. Dr. Huber testified that he kept J.Y. in the hospital after March 16 mainly to watch her. Even after the last swallow study, there was still a small leak in the esophagus. J.Y. had not eaten for a couple of weeks, but she was getting better clinically, and Dr. Huber decided to feed her. He started with clear liquids, then advanced her diet slowly over the next few days. Dr. Huber testified that J.Y. had to be watched for fevers and neck swelling caused by her eating, and that he could not evaluate her progress if she was at home. J.Y. did not speak English, and there would have been difficulty monitoring her condition if she were not under direct observation. Seeing her on an outpatient basis might prove harmful if she developed an abscess in her neck, or sepsis. J.Y. remained on IV antibiotics until she was discharged. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last five days of J.Y.'s admission. Dr. Huber's concerns were genuine, but mostly consisted of monitoring actions he wished to perform as a precaution, rather than acute care needs. The record as presented established that J.Y. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the medical unit on March 16. Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital Stays By the time of the hearing, the psychiatric inpatient hospital stays of 13 patients remained at issue. The findings below are set forth in the order that the patients were listed in AHCA Exhibit 6. Patient #1 H.A. H.A. was admitted on February 20, 2001, and was discharged on February 26, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Rahul Mehra determined that three days, February 23 through February 26, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.A. was a 57-year-old female with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act on February 20, for reasons unclear in the medical record. As of February 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms may have persisted, but these symptoms appeared to be baseline. As of February 23, she did not need 24-hour nursing care. She was discharged on the same dose of anti-psychotic medication she was taking upon admission. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of February 23, outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Generally the Medicaid standards for whether a patient requires an inpatient psychiatric bed are as follows: whether the patient is actively suicidal or homicidal; whether the patient is so acutely psychotic that her ability to care for herself is impaired; whether the patient is physically aggressive or manic; and whether the patient is having a "complicated withdrawal" from alcohol or drugs that might cause a seizure or other acute health problem. Dr. Mehra testified that it was appropriate to admit H.A. because of her family's concerns that she might have a handgun and was threatening self-harm. At admission, she was having some psychotic symptoms, displaying disorganized thoughts. However, as of February 23, she was no longer actively suicidal or homicidal, which was the reason she was admitted. She did have psychiatric symptoms, such as visual and auditory hallucinations, but these seemed to be her baseline level of functioning. No changes were made to her medications. Dr. Mehra's recommendation would have been to transfer H.A. to an outpatient setting or a nursing home. Petitioner's psychiatric expert, Dr. Alan S. Berns, testified that H.A. was admitted through the emergency room for increasing auditory hallucinations and religious preoccupation. She had a history of non-compliance with her outpatient treatment, mood swings, and unpredictable impulse control. She denied hallucinations, but was noted to talk to herself as a religious preoccupation. The diagnostic impression was of acute exacerbation of chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia, and rule out schizoaffective disorder. The psychosocial note on admission stated that the patient is talking to God and dead relatives. The emergency room nursing notes stated that the patient wanted to hurt an unidentified person with a handgun. She was labile, crying and laughing. H.A. had been admitted to Lifestream, a mental health center in Lake County, three times since November 2000. She had a history of "cheeking" her medications. She required assistance with her ADLs and ate poorly. The social worker reported that she did not attend group therapy sessions, and that she heard God talking to her all the time. By February 24, H.A. showed an improved mood and affect, with no overt agitation. She was observed talking to herself and appeared to be responding to internal stimuli. She also demonstrated some looseness of association. On February 25, she denied auditory or visual hallucinations and any suicidal or homicidal ideations. However, she remained seclusive, with pressured speech and a depressed, blunted affect. She refused to participate in groups. She was discharged on February 26 with improved mood and affect, no evidence of delusions, and denied hallucinations and suicidal or homicidal ideations. She was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and discharged with prescribed Seroquel and Paxil, the same medications she was taking on admission. Dr. Berns concluded that H.A. warranted another day or two past the February 23 discharge authorized by Dr. Mehra. The nursing notes from February 23 show the patient alert and oriented times three (time, place and person), and indicate that she was cooperative, pleasant, and denied suicidal ideation. However, H.A. also stated that God talks to her and she sees the Holy Spirit. On February 24, she was still exhibiting some looseness of association, indicating that her thinking was not organized, which could in turn affect her ability to perform her ADLs. At this point, she did not appear a danger to herself in terms of intentionally inflicting harm. Dr. Mehra agreed that the symptoms cited by Dr. Berns, such as looseness of association, loose thoughts and disorganization, can be indicative of the need for a longer inpatient stay. However, loosening of associations is a common finding in a patient with schizophrenia, which is a lifelong disorder. Looseness of association in a schizophrenic patient does not, in and of itself, invoke the Medicaid guidelines that the patient is acutely and gravely psychotic. Dr. Mehra reasoned that if her acute condition had been such a great concern, then her antipsychotic medication could have been increased to effect a change in the observed loosening of associations. Her subtherapeutic dosage was never changed during her inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that just having loosening of associations is not sufficient, under the Medicaid guidelines, to continue an inpatient level of care. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of H.A.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.A. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on February 23. Patient #2 T.E. T.E. was admitted on March 19, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 25 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. However, in his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that he now agreed with the hospital that the entire stay should be approved.6 Patient #3 S.G. S.G. was admitted on October 25, 2001, and was discharged on November 1, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, October 28, through November 1, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.G. was a 42-year-old male with diagnosis of schizophrenia admitted, involuntarily under the Baker Act from Orange County Jail, for psychotic symptoms and homelessness. The patient had a previous admission to Florida Hospital Orlando's psychiatric unit, having been discharged on October 8, 2001. Dr. Mehra found that as of October 28, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient's psychotic symptoms were still present but improved. The patient was cooperative, directable, and interacting with some peers. His delusions appeared to be chronic. He did not require seclusion or restraints and was not a management problem on the unit. His vital signs, appetite, mood and sleep were stable. Placement became an issue during his inpatient stay. Dr. Mehra concluded that the appropriate level of care as of October 28, was outpatient, with closely supervised living arrangements. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that S.G. was admitted with auditory hallucinations and delusions, reaching the level of psychotic behavior. During his stay, S.G.'s speech and thought became more organized. His psychotic symptoms became less intrusive. By October 28, he was not a danger to himself or others and was ready to move into a sub-acute setting. Dr. Mehra conceded that S.G. was probably still delusional on October 28, but noted that his delusions were probably chronic and at this time were not interfering with his ability to perform his ADLs. Treating physician Dr. Rex A. Birkmire testified that S.G. was initially very psychotic, delusional, and disorganized. He had not been taking his prescribed medications. S.G. thought that one of the his nurses was the Queen of England. He heard voices and had a religious preoccupation about Satan, aliens and dragons. Staff at the jail believed S.G. needed a higher level of care, and therefore had him admitted to the hospital under the Baker Act. Dr. Birkmire testified that as late as October 31, S.G. was still so psychotic, he thought the medication Artane was a "gasoline pill." His conversation continued to be irrelevant and rambling. He said that "people see the smell but they don't see me." On October 31, S.G. was so disorganized that he could not identify the medications he would need to stay stable, and hospital staff felt he could not maintain his basic ADLs. Dr. Birkmire noted that by October 28, S.G. was "passively compliant" with his medications, meaning that he would take them when the nurses gave them to him. Dr. Birkmire stated that S.G. could have been managed in a skilled nursing facility with a 24-hour nursing staff. Dr. Berns testified that S.G.'s prior admission on October 8 raised questions as to the adequacy of his prior treatment, his compliance upon discharge, and his stress level during the interval between admissions. The notes for the current admission stated that S.G. was readmitted due to medication noncompliance. The admission note stated that the patient was psychotic and disorganized, with jumbled thoughts, and had ideas of reference as to the television, i.e., that it was sending him special messages. S.G. was reported to be hyper-religious, and carried a Bible. He had a history of hearing voices and was diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia. A note from Dr. Luis Allen stated that on October 28 the patient was still "very loose," meaning his thoughts were disorganized and psychotic. Hospital staff reported that S.G. remained delusional, and there was concern from the social worker that he might be responding to internal stimuli. On October 29, a note reported that S.G. was psychotic and manic, though starting to make more sense. On October 30, the notes stated that S.G. was still rambling and tangential, and that his ADLs were not good. Staff was concerned that S.G. was not committed to taking medication as an outpatient. Dr. Birkmire recommended the decanoate form of antipsychotic medicine, a long-acting intramuscularly administered form. Dr. Berns stated that some of these medications can be injected such that a dose can last from two- to-four weeks, which can improve patient compliance. A November 2 note from an advanced registered nurse practitioner stated that the patient seemed confused when given discharge instructions to follow up at Lakeside Alternatives. Dr. Berns testified that such confusion can be a red flag that the patient is not ready for discharge. Dr. Berns stated that S.G.'s chronic schizophrenic condition could deteriorate if he were discharged without being well stabilized and not committed to following through with his medications. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was appropriate, and that he might have kept S.G. in the hospital even longer if he appeared confused on the day of discharge. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the psychotic symptoms, including delusions that his nurse was the Queen of England, did not mean that S.G. must remain in the hospital. Dr. Mehra stated that the note in the chart that the patient believed Artane was a "gasoline pill" was not necessarily a delusion, but could have been an uneducated patient's way of saying that the pill peps him up. Dr. Mehra argued that if the medical concern was persistent psychotic symptoms so severe that he needed hospitalization, then the medical team needed to make dosage adjustments. However, no such adjustments were made after October 26. Dr. Mehra's opinion remained that S.G. did not meet Medicaid guidelines as of October 28. The patient was cooperative on the unit, not a management problem. He could live outside the hospital and still have delusions that someone was the Queen of England. Dr. Birkmire testified that S.G. was rambling, disorganized, and thought the nurse was Queen even after October 28, but that does not necessarily mean he should be in the hospital. Dr. Mehra pointed out that plenty of people walking the street have schizophrenia, are psychotic, and ramble. Dr. Mehra stated that one possible reason S.G. was kept in the hospital was concern as to where he would go upon discharge, because he came from jail and was homeless. Dr. Mehra testified that Medicaid does not cover the period of time when someone is needing placement. Dr. Mehra agreed that S.G. showed psychotic symptoms, but stated that the psychotic symptoms should affect the patient's ability to function in order to justify inpatient treatment. This patient was taking his medications, eating, participating in activities on the unit, and was directable. He did not require any means of seclusion or physical restraints and did not demonstrate aggressive behavior. Dr. Mehra agreed with Dr. Berns that it is a concern any time a patient is readmitted, because it speaks to the chronic nature of schizophrenia and psychoses, and how the symptoms persist over a period of time. "Loose" symptoms probably continued until the day he left. Dr. Mehra also agreed with Dr. Berns that schizophrenics can stabilize and have their thoughts become more organized, depending on the patient and his response to medications. One patient can be loosely organized and live on the street, and another may regain full control of his thoughts. However, Dr. Mehra saw no reason to amend his original opinion. A patient with loose thinking, who is psychotic and disorganized, may need hospitalization, if he is not taking his medicine, not eating, not sleeping appropriately, or is being aggressive. Otherwise, those symptoms may be as good as things are going to get for this patient, given that he has been in jail, has had frequent inpatient hospitalizations, and is homeless. Again, Dr. Mehra noted that S.G. remained in the hospital for several days with no changes to his medications. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of S.G.'s admission. The record as presented established that S.G. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on October 28. Patient #4 C.M. C.M. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 10, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 6 through March 10, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that C.M. was a 16-year-old male admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act from the Orange County jail, where he was banging his head on the wall. Hospital records indicated concerns by hospital staff that C.M. was malingering in an effort to avoid his pending legal woes. Dr. Mehra found that, as of March 6, C.M. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient should have been discharged to the juvenile detention center, with psychiatric consultation. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the hospital had a range of diagnoses for this patient, from "malingering," meaning that he was intentionally inventing his symptoms, to a concern about schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra's review of the hospital records led him to conclude that C.M. was malingering, based primarily on C.M.'s statement to his grandmother that he would get himself placed in the psychiatric unit anytime he went to jail. The record stated that C.M. said the devil was telling him to kill himself, but the physician and staff all thought C.M. was malingering. C.M.'s statement about killing himself led to no increase in precautions, and his medications were not increased until the next day. By the end of C.M.'s hospitalization, the physician was talking about tapering the boy completely off of Respiradol, an anti- psychotic, and was convinced that C.M. was feigning his symptoms. Attending physician Scott D. Farmer7 contended that C.M. remained very dangerous on March 6, because he was still complaining of command hallucinations. "Command hallucinations" cause the patient to believe there are voices telling him to act in a dangerous way, and are recognized as a "unique risk factor" justifying inpatient care. On March 6, C.M. was hearing the voice of his grandfather reassuring him, but he was also hearing the voice of the devil telling him to kill himself. Dr. Farmer testified that patients have been known to kill themselves when they have persisting command hallucinations, and this was a patient who bangs his head against a brick wall. This was an indication that his medications had not been properly adjusted, and that they could not be so adjusted on an outpatient basis. Dr. Farmer's opinion was that it was "ludicrous" to think this patient could be placed in a more complex environment and get better. To discharge C.M. on March 6, would have constituted "abandonment." Dr. Farmer contended that it is a "glib assumption" to say that C.M. was faking his illness, and it is not within the spirit of psychiatry to prejudge that a patient is falsifying his expressed distress. The tradition in medicine is to compassionately adjust medication to remedy the symptom complex, which in this case pointed toward schizophrenia. Dr. Farmer stated that the faking allegation is "a reflection of the lowest form of psychiatric practice. It is a departure from the Hippocratic oath to do no harm. It is an assumption that you can climb inside of somebody else's head and then make conclusions that are a distinct departure from what the patient is saying." Dr. Farmer pointed out that C.M. had been treated at least once for a prior suicide attempt. He also pointed out that a "first break" psychotic episode is the best opportunity for treatment to have a favorable impact in the case of a patient with command hallucinations. Subsequent episodes require more aggressive treatment and higher doses of medications. C.M. was being treated with antipsychotic and antidepressant medications. On March 6, he was taking Wellbutrin, an antidepressant that has the lowest likelihood of triggering manic-type symptoms, and Risperdal. His medications were increased on March 6 and March 7. On March 8, C.M. was still responding to internal stimuli, carrying on a conversation with an internal voice. Dr. Farmer agreed that C.M. was stabilized by March 9 and should have been discharged on that date rather than on March 10. Dr. Berns noted the suspicions of malingering, but also considered that jail staff could not handle C.M., that he appeared to be in imminent danger of harming himself, and he had been treated for at least one suicide attempt in the past. These factors raised concerns as to how much of C.M.'s behavior was malingering and how much indicated genuine illness. Dr. Berns was influenced by the fact that C.M. requested an increase in his dosage of Risperdal, which is not a medication that can be abused or used for intoxication. Dr. Berns acknowledged that C.M. lost some credibility with his statement that he would continue getting Baker Acted if incarcerated. He also acknowledged that C.M.'s age and impulsiveness made it harder to determine the extent of his malingering, but that there was undoubtedly some malingering present in this case. Dr. Berns concluded, as did Dr. Farmer, that C.M. could have been discharged a day or two earlier than March 10. Dr. Mehra replied that it was the treating physician, Dr. Birkmire, who concluded that C.M. was malingering. The auditory hallucinations on March 6 were not sufficient to keep him in the hospital where the treating physician and the medical team believed he was making up the symptoms. Nothing in the testimony of Dr. Farmer or Dr. Berns caused Dr. Mehra to change his opinion. Both doctors referred to this patient's having a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra called this a "serious and unusual diagnosis" for a 16-year-old, similar to a diagnosis of cancer in that the patient will have to live with it for the rest of his life. Dr. Mehra would expect that such a diagnosis would have led the treatment team to meet with C.M.'s family to offer the appropriate treatment planning and education regarding schizophrenia, but the record indicated that no such meeting occurred. Dr. Mehra believed that there was cause to admit C.M. for evaluation, because he was only 16 years old. Even if it turned out he was malingering, it was prudent to admit him for four days to evaluate him. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of C.M.'s admission. The record as presented established that C.M. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 6. Patient #5 L.M. L.M. was admitted on May 16, 2001, and was discharged on May 22, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, May 20 through May 22, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Florida Hospital Orlando did not contest Dr. Mehra's denial of three days for this admission. Patient #6 H.P. H.P. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 14, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that four days, March 10 through March 14, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that H.P. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for "suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations." As of March 10, H.P. was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that the patient no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care and could have gone back to the skilled nursing facility on March 10. Outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that H.P.'s improvement was such that she could have been discharged on March 10. There was no deterioration in her condition after March 10. She denied suicidal or homicidal ideations, hallucinations, and delusions throughout the day. Dr. Mehra noted that H.P. was HIV-positive and obese, and would therefore chronically be at risk for suicidal ideation. She had been hospitalized many times for suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations. H.P. claimed to have jumped from a five-story building when she was 18 years old. Dr. Mehra did not think H.P. was schizophrenic, though her attending physician was concerned about major depression with psychotic features. Attending physician Dr. Luis Allen testified that H.P. was admitted from a skilled nursing facility. She had had multiple psychiatric hospitalizations, and on this admission was presenting with psychotic symptoms, hearing voices and having suicidal thoughts. Dr. Allen conceded that there was one day during her stay when H.P. reported not having suicidal thoughts, but he added that these thoughts resumed the next day. Given that H.P.'s history made her a higher risk for suicide, Dr. Allen felt that he had to ensure she was stable psychiatrically before she could return to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that the March 7 admission note indicated that H.P. had a history of depressive disorder and multiple psychiatric admissions to Florida Hospital Orlando. H.P. reported insomnia and auditory hallucinations, which were mostly command and derogatory hallucinations, voices calling the patient "stupid" and a "dummy" and saying that she should kill herself. H.P. had a history of several suicide attempts and had been taking Risperdal, Prozac, and Remeron. She reported suicidal thoughts, but no plan, and was alert times three. The admitting diagnosis was major depressive disorder, recurrent with psychotic features, and rule out mood disorder secondary to medical condition with depressive-like features. Dr. Berns agreed that the March 10 notes showed that H.P. was depressed with blunted affect, and that she denied suicidal ideation. On March 11, the notes indicated that H.P.'s mood was improved, that she slept better during the night, that her suicidal thoughts were significantly decreased, and that she was compliant with her medications and reported no auditory hallucinations or delusions. However, the attending physician continued to note that she was depressed and hopeless, and the social worker reported that H.P. discussed having no desire to live any more and be a burden to her children. On March 13, her behavior was improved, she had a very good appetite, and she had no hallucinations, delusions, or suicidal thoughts. On March 14, she denied suicidal ideation and hallucinations and was discharged back to the skilled nursing facility. Dr. Berns testified that H.P.'s stay was necessary, and disagreed that she could have been discharged to a skilled nursing facility on March 10. She had a previous suicide attempt, and she had suicidal thoughts and heard voices telling her to harm herself. Dr. Berns agreed that many people express thoughts such as those H.P. expressed to the social worker on March 11, but Dr. Berns pointed out that many people do not also have previous attempts or voices telling them to kill themselves. H.P. was showing improvement by March 11, but her symptoms were still present. Dr. Berns did not agree with Dr. Mehra that suicidal ideation, without the means to carry out a plan, is never sufficient to keep a patient in the hospital. Dr. Berns stated that if the patient is having thoughts of suicide and staff is documenting that the patient is helpless and hopeless, the suicide risk may be sufficient to hospitalize the patient, particularly where there have been previous hospitalizations and suicide attempts. After reviewing the testimony of Dr. Allen and Dr. Berns, Dr. Mehra maintained his opinion that H.P. should have been discharged on March 10. Dr. Mehra pointed out that no physician saw the patient on March 10, probably because it was a Saturday.8 Regardless of the day of the week, if the patient's condition is so acute that it is necessary to hospitalize her with a risk factor of attempted suicide, then she should be seen by a doctor. The unit notes for March 10 indicate she was showing no evidence of psychoses or suicidal ideation. Dr. Mehra noted that even H.P.'s mental status exam at the time of admission showed no active suicidal plan. If the patient is sick enough to be in the hospital, then she should have been seen by a physician. Dr. Mehra concluded that there appeared no need for H.P. to be seen by a doctor on March 10. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last four days of H.P.'s admission. The record as presented established that H.P. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 10. Patient #7 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 2, 2001, and was discharged on March 15, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that ten days, March 5 through March 15, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 46-year-old female admitted from a skilled nursing facility under the Baker Act for being "suicidal." As of March 5, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. She needed intensive outpatient treatment to address her depressive symptoms, eating issues, and possible addiction to narcotics. J.R. refused to see a chronic pain specialist while in the hospital. Dr. Mehra's report also raised a "serious quality of care concern" in the fact that the patient was immediately referred for electroconvulsive therapy ("ECT") treatment based on "unclear, poorly documented reasons." The physician's decision to use ECT was based purely on the patient's report, without documentation, of failed past treatments. The patient reported that she had not had psychotherapy in years. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the admitting concern was that the patient was suicidal in her skilled nursing facility, and Dr. Allen had her Baker Acted into the hospital. Dr. Farmer performed the psychiatric evaluation on admission and stated that the patient was not actively suicidal, not psychotic, and was angry with Dr. Allen for Baker Acting her. Dr. Farmer diagnosed J.R. with major depression and anorexia nervosa. Dr. Mehra concluded that J.R. should have been discharged on March 3, because the initial admission evaluation did not establish medical necessity for an inpatient psychiatric hospitalization. Dr. Mehra testified that it was difficult to determine why the patient was at this level of care because Dr. Farmer found that J.R. was not suicidal, actively suicidal with a plan, or psychotic, had no form of auditory or visual hallucinations, and was not manic or involved in a complicated withdrawal. Dr. Mehra stated that, while he did not come out and say that J.R. should not have been Baker Acted, Dr. Farmer did repeatedly note the patient's anger at being Baker Acted, which is highly unusual in a psychiatric evaluation report. Dr. Mehra also observed that the Baker Act documents were not dated, and, thus, there was no way of saying they were completed on the day of J.R.'s admission. A Baker Act is an involuntary commitment of a patient, and it involves a patient's rights. Dr. Mehra stated that because the papers must be completed within a specified period of time of having face-to- face contact with the patient, they must note the date and time. The failure to fill out the papers completely causes a concern about the appropriateness of the patient's admission. Dr. Mehra believed that the indication for ECT was not clear. There are specific criteria to initiate a patient on ECT, and the medical record here did not support it. One of the ECT criteria is that the patient must have failed a minimum of three antidepressants at adequate doses for an adequate length of time. The only documentation in the record was the patient's own report that medications had not worked. There was no objective data in the record regarding her medication history. Dr. Mehra found it very significant that J.R. had no prior psychiatric hospitalizations, especially in the context of her being given ECT. There was not adequate medical confirmation that she had failed previous antidepressant therapy. Dr. Mehra noted that J.R. had a history of a cervical spinal fusion and issues of lumbar back pain, which should have raised concerns about inducing a grand mal seizure by way of ECT. Dr. Mehra saw no MRI or CAT scan of the brain, which is usually done prior to the administration of ECT in order to rule out a mass in the brain. Dr. Allen testified that J.R. had a history of recurrent depression with psychotic features and an eating disorder. During her initial visit to the skilled nursing facility, she was found to be anxious, depressed, and experiencing some suicidal thoughts, and was referred for inpatient treatment. She had experienced significant weight loss and had issues of untreated depression. ECT was initiated and performed three times a week. Dr. Allen conceded that ECT may sometimes be done on an outpatient basis, but stated that J.R.'s history of psychiatric symptoms and the low level of support she had in the community necessitated inpatient placement. She was at a nursing home and would have had to be transported at 5:30 every morning for the treatment. There was no transportation available for her to come in as an outpatient. Dr. Allen also felt that she needed to remain inpatient because of the confusion and disorientation that she was developing with each treatment. Dr. Allen stated that the primary reason for keeping J.R. as an inpatient was to give the ECT treatment. He decided to complete the course of ECT treatment and discharge her back to the nursing home. Dr. Farmer was the second opinion doctor who actually performed the ECT treatment. Dr. Allen stated that ECT is usually reserved for patients who are considered treatment intolerant or "refractory" to treatment, with a history of failing different trials of medications or having developed side effects, or patients who had a very high risk of suicide. With J.R., it was not clear how much the eating disorder was playing into her depression, but Dr. Allen believed that her inner functions were clearly deteriorating, as evidenced by the fact that she was in a nursing home at age 45. The ECT was to address her primary mood symptoms and appetite. At the nursing home, she was only eating percent of her meals. She was eating 50 percent of her meals when she left the hospital, and she continued to show improvement at the nursing home. Dr. Berns testified that J.R. showed a history of cervical spinal cord injury. J.R. was a nurse, and an aggressive patient had caused her injuries when she worked in the emergency room. She had a history of anorexia, depression, and alcohol abuse. She was agitated in the emergency room during admission. J.R. claimed she had had trials on all available antidepressants, which were only partially helpful or failed. She had insomnia and took Klonopin for restless legs. On admission, she was also taking OxyContin, Wellbutrin, Flomax, Trazedone, and Zofran. Her mental status examination indicated lethargy and monotone speech. She was depressed, helpless, and hopeless, but denied suicidal ideation. J.R. stated that she had an overdose of medications at age 16. On March 5, she was withdrawn, depressed, and complained of anergia (lack of energy) and anhedonia (inability to experience pleasure). She also complained of dizziness. She showed the same symptoms on March 6, hopeless and helpless but denying suicidal thoughts. She again complained of feeling weak and dizzy, and she had low blood pressure, 73 over 53. Because of concerns that her medications may have been the cause of her medical complaints, the treatment team decided to withhold all psychiatric medicines and initiate ECT. J.R.'s first ECT treatment was on March 7. On that date, she was depressed, withdrawn, had anergia, but no suicidal thoughts. Her dose of Klonopin was lowered. On March 8, her mood was depressed and she showed anergia, anhedonia, and a variable appetite. A trial of a new anti-depressant, Remeron, was commenced, and J.R. was given an Ambien sleeping pill at bedtime. Her blood pressure was still low, 70 over 50, and the treatment team decided to withhold the OxyContin. J.R. refused to see the psychiatrist and stayed secluded in her room. By the second ECT treatment on March 9, J.R.'s mood was improving and her blood pressure was up to 90 over 57. ECT was scheduled for three days during the next week. On March 10, J.R. complained of depression and suicidal thoughts, and stayed alone in her room most of the day. On March 11, she again stayed secluded in her room, depressed and with flat affect. On March 12, she slept fairly well and ate 75 percent of her meals. Her mood was improving and suicidal thoughts decreased. She had ECT in the morning then rested in bed most of the day. She was depressed and anxious, with poor insight and judgment. On March 13, her mood was improving and she denied suicidal ideation. J.R. was more goal oriented and showed less psycho- motor retardation. She was scheduled for discharge on March 14, after her ECT treatment. She had the treatment, but her discharge was placed on hold because the skilled nursing facility did not want to accept her. Dr. Berns was not sure why the facility did not want to take J.R. back, unless they considered her a problem patient or didn't want to handle a depressed patient. Such problems can hold up discharge. Dr. Berns testified that it would not be acceptable to discharge this patient to the street, and that the length of stay was medically necessary. Dr. Mehra countered that feeling depressed, helpless and hopeless is not enough to justify an inpatient admission. On J.R.'s mental status exam upon admission, Dr. Farmer documented no suicidal ideation, no psychotic symptoms, and patient anger at being Baker Acted. She was given ECT for reasons that Dr. Mehra thought were not very well documented in the medical record. Dr. Mehra stated that it is a complex question as to whether giving her the ECT treatment is reason enough for an inpatient admission. J.R. was taking a heavy narcotic medication, OxyContin, which can make one depressed, withdrawn, and isolative. Dr. Mehra could find in the medical record no real theory as to why J.R. was still taking these medications. For reasons unclear to Dr. Mehra, there seemed to be an immediate desire to give her ECT. Dr. Mehra believed that March 2, should be authorized just to see what was going on with her, given that she had been Baker Acted by a physician. However, as far as the record indicated, J.R. had no history of inpatient psychiatric treatments. Dr. Mehra found it very unusual that ECT treatments would be given on a patient's first inpatient stay. ECT is routinely performed on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that where patient compliance is a problem, it may be proper to keep the patient in the hospital. However, this did not seem to be the case with J.R. One of the cornerstones of the decision process leading to ECT is a documented failure of past antidepressant therapy, and Dr. Mehra found no such documentation in the medical record. Lack of support in the community or transportation problems are not reason enough, standing alone, to keep someone in the hospital. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last ten days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #8 J.R. J.R. was admitted on March 16, 2001, and was discharged on March 27, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that six days, March 21 through March 27, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that J.R. was a 24-year-old male with a diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder, who was admitted for symptoms of agitated, psychotic behavior. As of March 21, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. J.R. may have still been psychotic, but the symptoms had improved. The patient's vital signs, sleep, and appetite had stabilized. He no longer needed 24-hour psychiatric nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of March 21. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that J.R. met discharge criteria on March 21, and could have gone into a sub- acute setting such as a skilled nursing facility or group home. Dr. Mehra could not recall whether there was a problem with bed availability in the skilled nursing facility, but added that after a patient meets discharge criteria, it is not Medicaid's responsibility to pay for a longer hospital stay while the patient awaits placement. Once the schizophrenic's acute crisis is resolved, he no longer meets the criteria for medical necessity. Dr. Birkmire was the treating physician, and his notes indicated compliance and improvement on March 20, and 21. J.R. was having some religious preoccupation, which was probably a baseline issue for him. Religious preoccupations in people with schizophrenia are sometimes chronic and never go away. Dr. Mehra testified that being psychotic and having auditory hallucinations do not alone establish grounds for remaining inpatient. Such symptoms are consistent with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, which is chronic. Dr. Mehra stated that J.R. would probably display these symptoms no matter how long he was kept in the hospital. Dr. Mehra testified that there is a vast difference between J.R.'s having an auditory hallucination and his having a command auditory hallucination to harm himself or someone else. Treating physician Dr. Birkmire testified that J.R. was very disorganized on admission, with a grandiose religious preoccupation that indicated he was in a manic stage. J.R. was also sexually inappropriate with some of the other patients and staff. On March 21, he was inappropriate, grandiose, and sexually preoccupied. On March 22, he was still very psychotic, hearing the voice of Britney Spears, with whom he had delusions of being married. He had sexually explicit conversations with other patients and staff. On March 23, he was severely agitated, requiring staff intervention. He was illogical and bizarre, talking to himself in the hallway, reporting that he heard voices and remaining delusional. He was hearing the voice of the devil and having paranoid thoughts about people around him. On March 24, he was unchanged, still delusional and still hearing voices, though they were becoming less intense and he was becoming less manic. Dr. Berns testified that schizoaffective disorder is an illness with symptoms of psychosis in the absence of symptoms of a mood disorder such as mania or depression. It is a chronic mental illness. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Mehra that the presence of a chronic illness is not grounds for hospitalization. It is only when the condition becomes acute, where the patient presents a danger to himself or others, that an inpatient psychiatric hospital may be the option. J.R.'s admission note stated that he was previously hospitalized in January 2001, for agitation, bizarre delusions, and concerns about violent behavior. He stated dead people were talking to him. On March 17, the psychiatrist noted marked auditory hallucinations, grandiosity, paranoid delusions, and tangential thought processes. The plan was to keep him on Risperdal, an antipsychotic, and Lithium, which is a mood stabilizing, anti-manic medication. Dr. Berns testified that the usual practice with these medications is to start with a low dose and build it up slowly and gradually. If the patient is in the hospital, the physician can be more aggressive because he can closely monitor blood work and vital signs. Lithium takes seven to ten days to build up to a therapeutic level. The medical notes from March 22 showed that J.R. remained psychotic, had auditory hallucinations, had delusional thoughts regarding Britney Spears and Judy Garland, was responding to internal stimuli, and was sexually preoccupied. On March 23, he was agitated and illogical with bizarre ideation. On March 24, he continued to report auditory hallucinations and was labile and agitated about his upcoming discharge. On March 25, he was still having auditory hallucinations, but less of the manic behavior. On March 26, there was some improvement in his mood and his auditory hallucinations were resolving, but he was still having problems in a group situation. Dr. Berns noted that on March 17, J.R. tried to kiss a nurse, then called her a "bitch with an attitude." There were concerns about his impulse control and potential for committing a sexual offense if released before he was fully stabilized. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of hospitalization, because J.R. had shown poor impulse control and sexually inappropriate behavior on admission, had been admitted two months earlier, and there were concerns about psychosis and violent behavior. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of J.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that J.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 3. Patient #9 N.R. N.R. was admitted on March 4, 2001, and was discharged on March 16, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that three days, March 13 through March 16, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that N.R. was a 21-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for psychotic agitation and delusions. The authorization was based on the patient's presenting symptoms, diagnosis of intrauterine pregnancy, and a positive test for syphilis. As of March 13, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her vital signs, sleep, and appetite were stable. She was taking prescribed medications and following unit rules. Her psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. She appeared to have support from her mother. Dr. Mehra concluded that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that the physician's note of March 13 stated that N.R. had no recent episodes of bizarre behavior, and no episodes of agitation or aggressive behavior. The physician progress notes for March 14 say the same thing. N.R.'s initial evaluation was for a psychotic disorder, and she was diagnosed with schizophrenia, a chronic condition. Dr. Mehra noted that the hospital did not obtain N.R.'s previous psychiatric history and that her mother could have been contacted about N.R.'s medical records. The treating physician, Dr. Allen, testified that N.R. was psychotic and grandiose on admission, and was noted at the jail to be head-banging, smearing feces, and playing in the toilet. She was pregnant with an unknown gestational age, and had a positive Rapid Plasma Reagin ("RPR") test for syphilis. She needed a lumbar puncture to determine if she had some form of neurosyphilis or another disorder that could influence her psychiatric behavior. Dr. Allen testified that she lacked the social network for the lumbar puncture to be done on an outpatient basis. He conceded that on March 13 she was compliant with her medication, but stated that she was still disorganized. The initial RPR was performed on March 4, but it took an additional ten days for the lumbar puncture to be successfully performed. One puncture was performed on March 10, but the specimen was not good, so another puncture was performed on March 14. Dr. Allen testified that the lumbar puncture requires the patient to remain very quiet in a hunched position as the needle is going through her back. An agitated, restless patient could cause problems. N.R. needed to be stabilized before the puncture could be performed. N.R. was found positive for syphilis and was discharged to her mother's home rather than to the jail. A visiting nurse went to the home to give the treatments. Dr. Allen explained that N.R. was not released to her mother between lumbar punctures because the mother had a history of depression, according to the history provided by N.R., which Dr. Allen conceded may not have been accurate. Dr. Allen also noted that N.R.'s mother was very difficult to contact. Dr. Berns testified that N.R. was psychotic on admission. At the jail, she was stripping off her clothing and hearing voices telling her that her husband was messing around with other women. She was hitting her head against the wall to get rid of the voices. Dr. Berns concluded that the length of stay was medically necessary and reasonable. N.R. was a pregnant female from the jail, psychotic, with self-destructive behavior. Her physician wanted to be extra careful in view of N.R.'s being pregnant. She was placed on antipsychotic medication. N.R. was eventually going back to the jail, and they wanted to stabilize her condition as much as possible, because the jail is a very stressful place to be. Dr. Berns agreed that, as of March 13, N.R.'s psychosis had decreased and she was not an immediate danger to herself or others. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last three days of N.R.'s admission. The record as presented established that N.R. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on March 13. Patient #10 R.S. R.S. was admitted on May 19, 2001, and was discharged on May 30, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 22 through May 30, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 38-year-old female diagnosed with schizophrenia who was admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for worsening of her psychotic symptoms. As of May 22, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was still psychotic but the symptoms were not worsening and appeared to be at baseline, given that they remained unchanged even at discharge. After May 22, the record disclosed no evidence that R.S. required seclusion or emergency treatment orders to force her to take medications. She voluntarily took medications and followed unit rules, and no longer needed 24-hour nursing care. Dr. Mehra concluded that sub-acute treatment was the appropriate level of care as of May 22. Dr. Mehra testified that his main concern with the length of R.S.'s stay was that she persisted with active psychotic symptoms even up to the day of discharge. There was not much difference in her symptoms between May 22 and May 30. After May 22, she received no medication on an "as needed" ("PRN") basis and required no seclusion or restraints. Despite her other noted symptoms, if she was not having command hallucinations telling her to hurt herself, she could have been treated as an outpatient. Dr. Mehra agreed that if she expressed a desire to hurt herself after May 22, then any such days should be authorized. Dr. Mehra did not have the benefit of R.S.'s past medical records and stated this made it difficult to determine if R.S. was a patient whose baseline level of functioning is so low that she could never care for herself. He agreed that the attending physician had the advantage of having seen the patient in person. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that R.S. had just been discharged from a medical psychiatric unit but had to be readmitted on a Baker Act because she was not taking her medications and was psychotic again, hearing and responding to voices and unable to communicate in a meaningful manner to staff. On May 22, she was noted as unchanged from admission, still psychotic, disorganized, hearing voices, depressed, and oriented only to person and place, not date and time. She was secluded in her room, not going to any treatment groups. Dr. Birkmire testified that his greatest concern was that R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications and would not be not able to care for herself. On May 23, she remained regressed, bizarre and psychotic. She was "dirty and careless" in her ADLs, and was complaining of suicidal command ideations, voices telling her to hurt herself by taking an overdose. On May 24, she was showing mild signs of improvement and was a little less reclusive and bizarre. She was still hearing voices and claimed they were telling her to be a friend to everybody, but she also admitted to suicidal ideations. On May 25, R.S. was still psychotic with suicidal ideations, disorganized, and paranoid. By this time, the voices were telling her to do more good things than bad, but she needed more time to stabilize on her medications. She was still dirty and careless in her appearance, and depressed with a flat affect. On May 26, she showed further mild improvement, was less paranoid, and reported that the voices were less intense. She remained in her room most of the time, and her ADLs were still careless. On May 27, R.S. was now oriented to person, place and time. The treatment team still thought she would stop taking medications on release, and made, further, two more medication changes. On May 28, the hallucinations had resolved. She was more logical and organized and less paranoid, though her ADLs were still poor. By May 29, she was safe to go home, but her appearance was still disheveled, she had poor concentration and hygiene, still heard voices, and was depressed and anxious. She went to group therapy, but was distracted by auditory hallucinations. Dr. Birkmire believed that May 29 or May 30, would be an appropriate discharge date. Dr. Berns testified that R.S.'s diagnosis was schizophrenia. He acknowledged that R.S.'s suicidal ideations on May 22 did not indicate a plan. However, in the hospital setting, a patient may not always reveal her plans for fear of prolonging the hospitalization. On May 23, she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Berns found this very serious, because patients have been known to hoard medications in the hospital in order to take an overdose. After reciting the same day-by-day review conducted by Dr. Birkmire, Dr. Berns concluded that he concurred with the length of stay. Noting that she was still psychotic, mumbling and hallucinatory at the time of discharge, Dr. Berns testified that he did not necessarily agree that R.S. should have been released even on May 30. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he agreed with many of the concerns expressed by Dr. Birkmire, but did not see them evidenced in the medical record. Dr. Birkmire testified that as of May 22, R.S. was so psychotic and disorganized that she would probably not take her medications after discharge. Dr. Mehra agreed this is grounds for keeping someone in the hospital, but did not see this concern noted in the medical record. Dr. Mehra also found nothing in the medical record to indicate she was having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself with a plan to overdose. Dr. Mehra stated that the record did show that on May 23 she was regressed, bizarre and psychotic, but he noted that those symptoms were also present at the time of R.S.'s discharge. However, the psychiatry unit patient notes do indicate that R.S. told a student nurse on May 23, that "she was having suicidal ideations and a plan to overdose." The other notations cited by Dr. Birkmire, with the exception of the May 22 notation regarding staff's suspicions regarding R.S. medication compliance, were all found in the psychiatry unit patient notes. It must be concluded that Dr. Mehra simply overlooked this section of the record, and that if he had seen that the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns, Dr. Mehra would have authorized the full stay for R.S. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that May 22 through May 30, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's reason for denying these days was not that he disagreed with Dr. Birkmire's concerns regarding the patient, but that he could not find those concerns reflected in the record. In fact, the record supported Dr. Birkmire's concerns and rendered R.S.'s entire inpatient stay medically necessary. Patient #11 D.T. D.T. was admitted on May 9, 2001, and was discharged on May 21, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that nine days, May 12, through May 21, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care.9 Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that R.S. was a 14-year-old female with an extensive psychiatric history who was voluntarily admitted from a community mental health center for mood swings, violent tendencies, and a report of auditory hallucinations. As of May 12, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. The patient was taking her medications, following unit rules, and participating in activities. The patient's sleep, vital signs, and appetite were stable. Dr. Mehra concluded that she did not require 24-hour nursing care as of May 12 and that outpatient was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that D.T. was admitted for mood swings, a history of violence, and some personality issues. She was diagnosed as bipolar, though Dr. Mehra was not clear as to what features led to that diagnosis. She was also diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder. Further, she was diagnosed under Axis II of the DSM-IV, which includes personality disorders. Dr. Mehra found this significant because personality disorder symptoms are treated differently than bipolar disorder. Dr. Mehra found no indication in the record that D.T.'s history records were ordered or reviewed for purposes of continuity of care and current treatment. She was admitted and served on the inpatient unit, and her medications were continued: such as Wellbutrin, Topamax, and Risperdal. She was started on Geodan, an antipsychotic, which was then changed to Seroquel, and then back to Risperdal. Dr. Mehra concluded that D.T. met discharge criteria as of May 12. Nothing remarkable happened between May 12, and the date of her discharge. She continued to have some difficulties on the unit, but nothing that warranted inpatient care. She could have been sent to outpatient and returned to foster care. Given her documented history, return to a stable group home or foster home would be appropriate to help her engage with her symptoms. For someone with a personality condition to be on an inpatient psychiatric unit can worsen the symptoms. Dr. Mehra believed that D.T. needed an environment with a lot less stimulation and less potential for her to become agitated and act out. Dr. Mehra acknowledged that the records do show serious medication side effects on May 15, such as akathisia, but he stated that people have these symptoms frequently as outpatients. Dr. Mehra was curious as to why D.T. was on three different antipsychotic drugs. Three different psychotropic medications is a concern because there is insufficient clinical and medical data to use them in children when the diagnosis is not clear. They have potential long-lasting side effects, such as tardive dyskinesia, where the patient develops permanent tic- like movements of the lips, mouth and jaw. Cogentin is a medication for side effects from antipsychotics, and its use caused Dr. Mehra to question whether research was done as to whether this child had been on such medications before. Dr. Mehra stated that such research is essential, especially when the patient starts showing side effects. Treating physician Dr. Scott Farmer testified that all of the denied dates represented necessary periods of care to stabilize D.T. and make her discharge safe. On May 15, she was still experiencing severe mood swings and dissociative symptoms, which Dr. Farmer described as "a watershed between normal and neurotic." In a spectrum moving toward psychosis, dissociative thinking has features of both psychotic and neurotic thinking. Dr. Farmer explained that if a physician has a patient in his office who is disassociating, the physician must watch the patient until the patient has demonstrated several hours of improved functioning. If a patient drifts into a dissociative state during psychotherapy and becomes agitated, the patient requires hospitalization. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. could not have been released on May 15. She was still requiring Haldol due to episodes of anger, and due to her inability to recognize people who are caring for her and distinguish them from threats. Her agitation was so extreme that Dr. Farmer had to change the dose of Haldol. This was complicated by the fact she was having side effects of the antipsychotic medication. Akathisia is an acute dystonia, a side effect of these powerful medications. It is a restlessness, an inability to sit still. The patient wants to stretch her legs and flex her muscles to relieve tension that feels like an unrelenting, very slowly developing cramp. Dr. Farmer testified that akathisia is not as dramatic as other side effects because it looks like the disease itself: the patient is restless, can't sit still, and wants to walk around. There is a ramping up in the intensity of treatment for akathisia, culminating in Propranolol, which itself causes 40 percent of users to have a new onset of major depression within a year. Dr. Farmer stated that D.T. was so resistant to taking medications that at times intramuscular medications were required. Geodon was the medicine initially chosen to treat D.T.'s psychotic features because it has the least likelihood of causing weight gain. By May 15, Dr. Farmer had deemed it a failure and was in the process of replacing it with Seroquel. On May 16, D.T. remained actively psychotic with visual and auditory hallucinations, side effects of the medication. Dr. Farmer testified that the dosages of medicine that could possibly make the hallucinations go away, had the side effect of incapacitating her. D.T. could not sit in group and match her mood and comments to the group process. She was too lethargic to function. Dr. Farmer believed that as of May 16, D.T. could not be anywhere but an acute care setting, with nurses and physicians monitoring her response to medications. On May 17, D.T. reported seeing what she described as flashing lights. She moved out of her lethargy into accelerated speech. She was irritable and paranoid, different from the day before when she appeared overdrugged and lethargic. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to the Seroquel, active symptoms of delusional, confused and agitated behavior. Seroquel was discontinued and a new antipsychotic, Restoril, was introduced. On that day, D.T. was noted to be crying and hallucinating. She saw a man in her room and held so fast to the idea of being in danger that she required additional medication, Ativan PRN, to make her relax. On May 19, her Risperdal had to be further adjusted because she was overly sedated. She was disheveled, easily agitated, and still required PRN medications in addition to her standard medicines. On May 20, she remained labile, easily upset and crying. Dr. Farmer concluded, by stating, that this case involved a very complex juggling of medications to get control of auditory hallucinations with other medications striving to compensate for side effects. Dr. Berns testified that D.T. had an extensive psychiatric history and was admitted for mood swings, violent tendencies, and report of auditory hallucinations. The admissions note stated that D.T. was depressed and angry, "ready to kill everybody." She was having problems with flashbacks regarding her history of fights with her father, and was fearful that her mood changes and lability would cause her to lose her foster placement. She had been in foster care since January 2001. D.T. had a history of arrests for fighting, breaking and entering, grand theft auto, and battery. She had a decrease in appetite with a four-pound-weight-loss in the past week. She said that she felt paranoid a lot, and she overreacted to intrusions into her physical space. She heard voices with command features telling her to cut her arms instead of battering her father, and admitted to some prior plans of killing her father. The May 15 notes showed severe mood swings and unspecified dissociative symptoms. She received Haldol for anger episodes. Dr. Farmer discontinued Geodon and began Seroquel, another antipsychotic also used in the treatment of bipolar disorder. She was also given Cogentin intramuscularly, because she had tremors and akathasia. On May 16, D.T. was anxious with sleep disturbance, undescribed auditory and visual hallucinations, and said she was lethargic. On May 17, she was reporting flashbacks about "angel trumpet," which may have been a psychedelic drug. She was observed to have accelerated speech, irritable, perseverant and loquacious. Dr. Farmer raised the level of the Seroquel. D.T. was incoherent from midnight to 6:30 a.m., with auditory and visual hallucinations. She was seeing people, carrying on conversations, making and unmaking her bed, trying to open a window, and mumbling. At times she was manic, hyper-verbal, crying and laughing. She said she was high on her medications. The Cogentin was discontinued. They raised the Seroquel and put her on intramuscular injection of Ativan. On May 18, she had a severe reaction to Seroquel. She was delusional, confused and agitated, but showed no aggression. Dr. Farmer stopped the Seroquel and started Risperdal. She hallucinated seeing a man in her room. On May 19, she was anxious and irritable, having non-command hallucinations. Her Risperdal dosage was increased. On May 20, she was upset and emotional. She requested Haldol and Ativan to calm herself down. On May 21, she was organized, with no flight of ideas or loose associations, and was discharged. Dr. Berns noted that Dr. Mehra found that by May 12, D.T.'s sleep, vital signs and appetite were stable, that she was following unit rules of participating in activities, and that she was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic or in withdrawal. Dr. Berns disagreed with this assessment. On May 16, D.T. still had active psychotic symptoms. On May 17, she was paranoid and irritable, carrying on conversations with unseen people. On May 18, she had visual hallucinations. On May 19, she was disheveled and easily agitated. On May 20, she was labile, and very easily upset. Dr. Berns agreed with Dr. Farmer that the entire stay was medically necessary. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that he was aware of Dr. Farmer's statement that on May 15 D.T. was still experiencing severe mood swings and disassociative symptoms, "which are a watershed between normal and neurotic." Dr. Mehra did not know what that means in terms of the issues in this case, because disassociation is not sufficient to warrant keeping her in the hospital. Visual and auditory hallucinations, in and of themselves, are not sufficient to keep her in the hospital unless they are command hallucinations. Dr. Mehra pointed out that the treating physician's own discharge summary stated that D.T. has personality issues of concern. "Personality issue" means that a lot of the symptoms do not necessarily indicate a major, Axis I diagnosis such as schizophrenia or major depression, but are more about the patient's character and how she relates to people. Dr. Farmer noted on May 16 that, due to side effects of medication, D.T. was lethargic and could not function. Dr. Mehra stated that this might be sufficient to keep her in the hospital, though, again, the treating physician must keep the treatment options in mind and distinguish between someone with a personality disorder who is experiencing hallucinatory symptoms and someone who is schizophrenic. Dr. Mehra was concerned that the physicians were injecting this 14-year-old child with potent anti-psychotic medications and that she was having an adverse reaction. He was further concerned that she was not having much of a response to the medications, which Dr. Mehra found would not be unusual if the diagnosis were inaccurate. Based on the documentation in the record, Dr. Mehra could not be sure that D.T. had a true psychotic disorder that would respond to anti-psychotic medications. Because D.T. was in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services, Dr. Mehra believed there was "a great likelihood" that she had been physically and/or sexually abused. Many of her symptoms would be easier to understand in the context of past abuse rather than as a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr. Mehra found the record confusing as to the rationale for this hospitalization. In the admission mental status exam, the physician documented no well formulated plan for the patient to harm herself. No psychotic symptoms were noted in the admission mental status exam. However, because the patient was presenting with symptoms such as auditory hallucinations, Dr. Mehra authorized and approved a three-day evaluation period. Dr. Mehra stated that he would authorize less time for an adult, but with a child it is important to take sufficient time to obtain a good history. What confused Dr. Mehra was that the medical record showed no clear documentation of collateral information regarding D.T.'s past to understand why she may be disassociating or having mood swings. The greater weight of the evidence supports AHCA's denial of the last six days of D.T.'s admission. The record as presented established that D.T. ceased to meet the criteria for inpatient admission in the psychiatric unit on May 12. However, as stated in note 10, AHCA's recovery is limited to May 14 through May 21. Patient #12 S.T. S.T. was admitted on March 7, 2001, and was discharged on March 17, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that eight days, March 9 through March 17, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that S.T. was a 34-year-old female admitted, involuntarily, under the Baker Act for violent, agitated, self-harming behavior in a community services van. The patient had a history of moderate mental retardation, cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, and abnormal EEGs. The patient was prescribed Haldol PRN, but required none on March 9, 10, or 11. As of March 10, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, grossly psychotic, or manic. Later in her hospitalization, the patient did require Haldol/Ativan PRN on several days, though no adjustments were made to her routine antipsychotic doses. Dr. Mehra noted that the only adjustment made to S.T.'s psychotropic dosing was on March 8, when her Depakote was increased. Dr. Mehra also noted that the patient was allowed to sign a voluntary consent for treatment, when her legal guardian should have been involved in the consent process. Dr. Mehra found in the record no informed consent for psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra found that the diagnostic studies performed on S.T. could have been done on an outpatient basis. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of March 10, outpatient treatment with a return to the group home setting was the appropriate level of care. Dr. Mehra testified that S.T. was admitted through the emergency room under the Baker Act when she became violent and agitated in a van operated by Spectrum Community Services, the group home where S.T. lived. Her admitting diagnosis was mental retardation in the moderate range, as well as organic mood disorder. Dr. Mehra found no physician's notes in the record for March 8 or 9, which indicated that S.T. must not have many problems. The nurse's notes for March 9 indicated that S.T. was sleeping through the night. The unit notes from three different shifts on March 9 indicated that her behavior was under control and that she denied hallucinations. All of the above findings in the record, coupled with a lack of physician notes, led Dr. Mehra to conclude that S.T. should be discharged. Dr. Mehra stated that everything relative to making a medical decision must be documented in the record. If something is not in the record, then a peer reviewer must assume it did not happen. In this connection, Dr. Mehra noted there was no indication in the record that the hospital contacted S.T.'s group home for a treatment history and status before initiating invasive diagnostic procedures. On March 8, S.T. had a fall on the unit, hitting and cutting her head on the cinderblock wall. Dr. Mehra stated that a patient with cerebral palsy and mental retardation, who is having acute psychological problems and has fallen, is a grave concern, yet he could find no record that she was seen by a physician on March 9. He did find a March 9, note calling for a consultation with Dr. Henry Comiter regarding S.T.'s fall, but no actual physician's visit on that date. The record indicated that S.T. was placed in restraints on March 13 and engaged in threatening behavior on March 14. However, Dr. Mehra noted there had been no such incidents on March 11 through 12. He testified that, if a patient with these underlying medical and psychiatric conditions is kept long enough, she will probably act out. The incident on March 13, alone, was not enough to keep her without getting a legal guardian involved to continue her voluntary legal status in the hospital. This was a great concern to Dr. Mehra because the hospital appeared to be relying on a voluntary consent form signed by S.T. on March 10. S.T. was mentally retarded and possibly incompetent to admit herself to the hospital. Treating physician Dr. Farmer described S.T. as a 34- year-old mild-to-moderately retarded woman living in a group home. The incident that led to her admission was her deteriorated impulse control, agitation, and aggression directed toward the van and toward the staff and other peers during a van ride on an outing. She struck at her peers and the van driver, bit herself on the hands and arms, and stated that she wanted to hurt herself. S.T. was already scheduled to have an outpatient neurology consultation in late March with Dr. Comiter, out of concern for a seizure disorder that was not adequately managed. Because of her agitation, S.T. was sent to the psychiatric unit, which began the process of adjusting her medications. The adjustments were ongoing on March 8. She was seen by Dr. Comiter on March 8, as indicated by a consultation note in the record.10 Dr. Comiter ordered an EEG and CT scan of the head. The CT brain scan was scheduled for March 9, but S.T. was too agitated to undergo the procedure. On March 10, S.T. remained agitated. She refused a shower and was generally careless with regard to her ADLs. On March 11, Dr. Farmer reduced S.T.'s dosage of Ativan in order to calm her and make her more manageable for the CT scan. On March 12, she was less agitated, but not calm enough for the CT and EEG to be completed. She was too agitated to go for the CT study, but too fatigued from the medications to be functional on the psychiatric unit. The reduction in her Ativan dosage did enable her to respond more promptly to questions. On March 13, staff attempted to transport S.T. in the van for her EEG, but she began swinging her arms and had to be placed in seclusion and restraints. On March 14, Dr. Farmer characterized S.T. as naïve regarding her manic grandiosity, unable to recognize that her reactions are disproportionate to the circumstances. Her vocal volume was threatening and her intrusiveness was with ominous import, but she believed she was justified in her reactions. She was paranoid and misreading the likelihood of danger and pain, and so was attempting to intimidate people away from her. By this time, Dr. Farmer believed that she was reacting well to the adjusted medications. However, when the medications got her to the point at which she was not threatening others, she began having balance problems and falling again. On March 15, the medications had slowed S.T.'s psychomotor skills, and she was not assaultive. She was taking her medicines by mouth. S.T. was beginning to return to baseline and Dr. Farmer began considering discharging her back to the group home. She was denying any suicidal or homicidal ideation and denying hallucinations. She was able to be redirected from biting her hand, which was a continuing problem for S.T. She was able to participate in group therapy without disruption, though her ADLs remained careless. On March 16, she remained restless, distractable, impulsive, and aggressive, though the hospital did manage to complete the EEG on that date. The EEG showed no evidence of a seizure disorder. On March 17, S.T. was discharged back to the group home. Dr. Farmer concluded that it was in the best interest of S.T.'s care to keep her through March 17. It was best to accomplish all the needed adjustments to her anticonvulsant medications on an inpatient basis, especially since there were no EEG results until March 16. Those results could have required further adjustments, and Dr. Farmer believed that relying on the group home to make the changes in her medications might not work and could result in her readmission. Dr. Berns agreed with the length of stay because the attending physicians were not only trying to make sure that S.T. was no longer suicidal, they were trying to decrease her agitation and aggression while completing important diagnostic tests. Dr. Berns thought that authorizing her stay only through March 10 would be premature. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that March 10 through March 17, should not have been denied. Dr. Mehra's opinion in this instance was at least partly based on a misreading of the record, i.e., that S.T. was not seen by a physician on March 8 or 9. Dr. Mehra's concerns regarding S.T.'s consent to treatment are serious, but cannot be resolved on this record and do not appear relevant to the question of the medical necessity of S.T.'s hospital stay. Dr. Farmer's testimony as the treating psychiatrist credibly established that S.T.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Patient #13 W.W. W.W. was admitted on June 17, 2001, and was discharged on June 28, 2001. Peer reviewer Dr. Mehra determined in his report that five days, June 23 through June 28, should be denied due to lack of medical necessity for continued inpatient care. Dr. Mehra's peer review report stated that W.W. was a 43-year-old female admitted to the psychiatric unit after an intentional overdose of psychotropic medications. Dr. Mehra wrote that his authorization was based on continued documentation of the patient's having command auditory hallucinations to hurt herself. As of June 23, the patient was not actively suicidal, homicidal, psychotic, manic, or in complicated withdrawal. Her sleep, appetite, and vital signs were stable. She was not a management problem on the unit. Dr. Mehra concluded that, as of June 23, the patient no longer required 24-hour nursing care and that outpatient treatment was the appropriate level of care. In his deposition, Dr. Mehra testified that W.W. was on the medical floor, then transferred to the psychiatric floor after two days. On discharge, her Axis I diagnosis was alcohol abuse, history of cocaine abuse, and rule-out schizoaffective disorder. The hospital's discharge summary stated that the reason for admission was severe depression, no psychotic features, and having suicidal thoughts. She was integrated into the milieu of the inpatient psychiatric unit and prescribed antidepressant medication. Dr. Mehra believed W.W. should have been discharged on June 23. He stated that, even on the psychiatric unit's admission mental status exam, dated June 17, Dr. Allen noted that W.W. was slightly more cooperative than on the previous day's consult, meaning that Dr. Allen probably saw her on the medical floor after her overdose. Dr. Allen noted there was no active suicidal ideation with a plan. Dr. Mehra testified that this admission psychiatric exam, standing alone, would indicate that W.W. did not need to be admitted at all. However, the totality of her presentation and history showed numerous overdoses on psychotropic medications. Based on her history and the mental status exam showing her mood was still depressed, her admission through June 22 was approved. Attending physician Dr. Birkmire testified that, in the weeks before the overdose, W.W. described becoming increasingly depressed with feelings of helplessness and hopelessness. Her history showed at least eight or nine other psychiatric hospitalizations. She indicated a history of being sexually abused by her father at age 12. Her admitting diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, depressed, subtype provisional, depressive disorder not otherwise specified, alcohol abuse and history of cocaine abuse. W.W.'s global assessment of functioning ("GAF") upon admission was 35. Dr. Birkmire testified that a GAF below 50 indicates that a patient should be in a residential program, at least, and that a GAF below 40-to-45 indicates the patient should be on an inpatient unit. On June 23, the medical notes show she was still somewhat confused. Her mood had improved but she still had suicidal ideations. The hospital was holding her in part to see if the blood test for syphilis was negative. She felt better but complained about mood swings. On June 24, a Sunday, there were no notes. Dr. Birkmire explained that the physicians who take rounds on the weekends are required to see each patient on either Saturday or Sunday, but not both days. On June 25, W.W. was less psychotic. Her auditory hallucinations were present but decreased, and she was taking her medications. On June 26, she continued to have auditory hallucinations. She was disorganized, paranoid, and isolating herself. She reported fear in being released because she might make another suicide attempt. She was given Ativan PRN to treat reported anxiety. On June 27, her mood was euthymic (normal, neither depressed nor highly elevated in mood). She showed no psychotic symptoms, denied suicidal ideations, and felt safe for discharge. However, hospital staff said that W.W. still seemed to be responding to voices. Dr. Birkmire stated that he had reservations about releasing W.W. on June 27 because she seemed to be telling the staff she was doing better than she really was. The voices had played a role in her suicide attempt, and, thus, the knowledge that she was still hearing them would be a strong factor in deciding to keep W.W. hospitalized. In Dr. Birkmire's opinion, W.W.'s problems could not be addressed in a skilled nursing facility. Dr. Birkmire testified that, with the exception of psychiatrists who perform peer reviews and medical authorizations, there is not one psychiatrist in the country who would say that a patient should not be in an acute care setting unless she has a definite plan for suicide or the means to complete the plan. Dr. Birkmire stated that no doctor is going to risk his license in that fashion. Whole books are written on how to perform a suicide assessment, and the assessment is based on much more than what the patient tells the physician. It is based on the patient's history, her degree of hopelessness, degree of disorganization, degrees of psychosis, and her access to the means of doing the suicide. Dr. Birkmire stated that one of the best predictors of suicidality is past attempts. Dr. Berns testified that W.W.'s history of multiple psychiatric hospitalizations indicated a probability of chronic illness. He stated that the number of prior hospitalizations automatically raises the question of past suicide attempts, and noted that her history indicated three attempts prior to this one. She was diagnosed with "depressive disorder" but not otherwise specified, as well as alcohol and cocaine abuse. She took an overdose of Haldol, Cogentin, and Sinequan. Dr. Berns explained that Sinequan is an older antidepressant, a tricyclic, with which a higher number of suicides occur. Thus, an overdose of this medication is more serious than overdoses of other medicines. There were concerns about neurosyphilis because she had a positive RPR. Her physicians were concerned that inadequate treatment for this condition would complicate her psychiatric course as well as cause physical complications leading to dementia and death. Dr. Berns concluded that W.W.'s stay was medically necessary. Her physicians were trying to stabilize her condition and treat a gradual illness that can become fatal. In response, Dr. Mehra testified that the evaluation for neurosyphilis on June 23 and 24, was not, standing alone, a ground for keeping the patient in the hospital. Dr. Mehra also stated that the suicidal thoughts, hallucinations, and psychotic disorganized paranoia are not grounds to keep the patient in the hospital, unless she was actively suicidal with a plan and unless her psychoses were causing imminent danger to herself or others, or she was aggressive or noncompliant. W.W. was taking her medications, eating, and sleeping and was not requiring seclusion or restraints on the unit, which meant that she was, at some level, functioning. Dr. Mehra was adamant that Medicaid and InterQual guidelines require more than a suicidal ideation; they require a plan. The greater weight of the evidence supports Petitioner's position that June 23 through June 28, should not have been denied. Dr. Birkmire's testimony as the treating psychiatrist, as well as Dr. Berns' expert testimony, credibly established that W.W.'s entire inpatient stay was medically necessary. Summary of Findings At the time of the hearing, AHCA sought from Petitioner overpayments in the amount of $198,582.54 for 29 patients who stayed at Florida Hospital Orlando between January 1, 2000, through December 31, 2001. The findings of fact above upheld AHCA's denial of days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 16; and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11. The findings of fact above found that the greater weight of the evidence supported Petitioner's position that AHCA should not have denied the days for the following: Acute Care Inpatient Hospital patients 1 (2 days x reimbursement rate of $1,168.38 = $2,336.76), 4 (6 days x $1,206.42 = $7,238.52), 7 (1 day at $1,168.38), 8 (3 days x $1,168.38 = $3,505.14), 14 (9 days x $919.27 = $8,273.43), and 15 (5 days x $919.27 = $4,596.35); and Psychiatric Inpatient Hospital patients 10 (9 days x $1,168.38 = $10,515.42), 12 (8 days x $1,168.38 = $9,347.04), and 13 (5 days x $1,168.38 = $5,841.90). The total dollar figure for days that should not have been denied is $52,822.94, reducing the total overpayment due AHCA from Petitioner to $145,759.60.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order revising its Final Agency Audit Report as directed herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of March, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 2007.
The Issue Whether the application of Petitioner Naples Community Hospital, Inc. for a Certificate of Need to add a total of 35 beds to Naples Community Hospital and North Collier Community Hospital should be approved based on peak seasonal demand for acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict.
Findings Of Fact Naples Community Hospital, Inc., ("NCH") holds the license for and operates Naples Community Hospital ("Naples"), a 331 bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, and North Collier Community Hospital ("North Collier"), a 50 bed acute care hospital. NCH also operates a 22 bed comprehensive rehabilitation facility and a 23 bed psychiatric facility. NCH is owned by Community Health Care, Inc., "(CHC"). Both Naples and North Collier are located within Agency for Health Care Administration ("ACHA") district 8 and are the only hospitals within subdistrict 2 of the district. Naples is located in central Collier County. North Collier is (as the name implies) located in northern Collier County approximately 2-3 miles from the county line. NCH's primary service area is Collier County from which approximately 85-90 percent of its patients come, with a secondary service area extending north into Lee County. Neither Naples nor North Collier are teaching hospitals as defined by Section 407.002(27), Florida Statutes (1991). NCH is not proposing a joint venture in this CON application. NCH has a record of providing health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. NCH proposes to provide health care services to Medicaid patients and the medically indigent. Neither Naples nor North Collier are currently designated by the Office of Medicaid as disproportionate share providers. NCH has the funds for capital and initial operating expenditures for the project. NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. The costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable. The Agency for Health Care Administration ("AHCA") is the state agency charged with responsibility for administering the Certificate of Need program. Southwest Florida Regional Medical Center ("Southwest") is a 400 bed for-profit acute care hospital located in Fort Myers, Lee County. Lee County is adjacent to and north of Collier County. Southwest is owned by Columbia Hospital Corporation ("Columbia"), which also owns Gulf Coast Hospital in Fort Myers, and two additional hospitals in AHCA District 8. Southwest's primary service area is Lee County. Although Southwest asserts that it would be negatively impacted by the addition of acute care beds at NCH, the greater weight of the credible evidence fails to support the assertion. The primary market services areas of NCH and Southwest are essentially distinct. However, the facilities are located in such proximity as to indicate that secondary service areas overlap and that, at least during peak winter season periods, approval of the NCH application could potentially impact Southwest's operations. Southwest has standing to participate in this proceeding. Southwest offered evidence to establish that it would be substantially affected by approval of the NCH application. The NCH length-of-stay identified in the Southwest documents is inaccurate and under-reports actual length-of-stay statistics. The documentation also includes demographic information from a zip code (33912) which contributes an insignificant portion of NCH patients, and relies on only two years of data in support of the assertion that utilization in the NCH service area is declining. Southwest's chief operating officer testified that he considers Gulf Coast Hospital, another Columbia-owned facility, to offer more competition to Southwest that does NCH. Further, a physician must have admitting privileges at a hospital before she can admit patients to the facility. Of the physicians holding admitting privileges at Southwest, only two, both cardiologists, also have admitting privileges at NCH. Contrary to Southwest, NCH does not have an open heart surgery program. Accordingly, at least as to physician-admitted patients, approval of the NCH application would likely have little impact. On August 26, 1991, NCH submitted to AHCA a letter of intent indicating that NCH would file a Certificate of Need ("CON") application in the September 26, 1991 batching cycle for the addition of 35 acute care beds to the Naples and North Collier facilities. The letter of intent did not specify how the additional beds would be divided between the two facilities. The determination of the number of beds for which NCH would apply was solely based on the fact that the applicant had 35 observation beds which could be readily converted to acute care beds. The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH and are currently staffed. The costs involved in such conversion are minimal and relatively insignificant. Included with the letter of intent was a certified corporate resolution which states that on July 24, 1991, the NCH Board of Trustees authorized the filing of an application for the additional beds, authorized NCH to incur related expenses, stated that NCH would accomplish the proposed project within time and budget allowances set forth in the application, and that NCH would license and operate the facility. By certification executed August 7, 1991, the NCH secretary certified that the resolution was enacted at the July 24, 1991 board meeting and that the resolution did not contravene the NCH articles of incorporation or bylaws. Article X, Sections 10.1 and 10.1.3 of the NCH bylaws provides that no CON application shall be legally effective without the written approval of CHC. On September 26, 1991, NCH filed an application for CON No. 6797 proposing to add 31 acute care beds to Naples and 4 acute care beds to North Collier. The CON application included a copy of the NCH board resolution and certification which had been previously submitted with the letter of intent as well as the appropriate filing fee. NCH published appropriate public notice of the application's filing. As of the date of the CON application's filing, CHC had not issued written approval of the CON application prior to the action of the NCH Board of Directors and the filing of the letter of intent or the application. On October 2, 1992, four days prior to the administrative hearing in this case, the board of CHC ratified the actions of NCH as to the application for CON at issue in this case. The CHC board has previously ratified actions of the NCH in such fashion. There is uncontroverted testimony that the CHC board was aware of the NCH application and that no reservation was expressed by any CHC board member regarding the CON application. Although NCH's filing of the CON application without appropriate authorization from its parent company appears to be in violation of the NCH bylaws, such does not violate the rules of the AHCA. There is no evidence that the AHCA requested written authorization from the CHC board. After review of the application, the AHCA identified certain deficiencies in the application and notified NCH, which apparently rectified the deficiencies. The AHCA deemed the application complete on November 8, 1991. As required by statute, NCH included a list of capital projects as part of the CON application. The list of capital projects attached to the application was incomplete. The capital projects list failed to identify approximate expenditures of $370,000 to construct a patio enclosure, $750,000 to install an interim sprinkler system, $110,000 to construct emergency room triage space, and $125,000 to complete electrical system renovations. At hearing, witnesses for NCH attempted to clarify the omissions from the capital projects list. The witnesses claimed that such omitted projects were actually included within projects which were identified on the list. When identifying the listed projects within which the omitted projects were supposedly included, the witnesses testified inconsistently. For example, one witness testified that the patio project was included in the emergency room expansion project listed in the application. Another witness claimed that the patio enclosure was included in an equipment purchase category. Based on the testimony, it is more likely that the patio enclosure was neither a part of an emergency room expansion nor equipment purchase, but was a separate construction project which was omitted from the CON application. Similarly inconsistent explanations were offered for the other projects which were omitted from the capital projects list. The testimony was not credible. The capital projects omitted from the list do not affect the ability of NCH to implement the CON sought in this proceeding. The parties stipulated to the fact the NCH has sufficient financial resources to construct and equip the proposed project. As part of the CON application, NCH was required to submit a pro forma income statement for the time period during which the bed additions would take place. The application failed to include a pro forma statement for the appropriate time period. Based on the stipulation of the parties that the costs and methods of the proposed construction are reasonable, and that NCH has adequate resources to fund the project, the failure to include the relevant pro forma is immaterial. Pursuant to applicable methodology, the AHCA calculates numeric acute care bed need projections for each subdistrict's specific planning period. Accordingly, the AHCA calculated the need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2 for the July, 1996 planning horizon. The results of the calculation are published by the agency. The unchallenged, published fixed need pool for the planning horizon at issue in this proceeding indicated that there was no numeric need for additional acute care beds in district 8, subdistrict 2, Collier County, Florida, pursuant to the numeric need methodology under Rule 59C-1.038 Florida Administrative Code. The CON application filed by NCH is based on the peak seasonal demand experienced by hospitals in the area during the winter months, due to part-time residents. NCH asserts that the utilization of acute care beds during the winter months (January through April) results in occupancy levels in excess of 75 percent and justifies the addition of acute care beds, notwithstanding the numerical need determination. Approval of the CON application is not justified by the facts in this case. The AHCA's acute care bed need methodology accounts for high seasonal demand in certain subdistricts in a manner which provides that facilities have bed space adequate to accommodate peak demand. The calculation which requires that the average annual occupancy level exceed 75 percent reflects AHCA consideration of occupancy levels which rise and fall with seasonal population shifts. The applicant has not challenged the methodology employed by the AHCA in projecting need. Peak seasonal acute care bed demand may justify approval of a CON application seeking additional beds if the lack of available beds poses a credible threat of potentially negative impact on patient outcomes. The peak seasonal demand experienced by NCH has not adversely affected patient care and there is insufficient evidence to establish that, at this time, such peak demand poses a credible threat of potential negative impact on patient outcomes in the foreseeable future. There is no dispute regarding the existing quality of care at Naples, North Collier, Southwest or any other acute care hospital in district 8. The parties stipulated that NCH has the ability to provide quality of care and a record of providing quality of care. In this case, the applicant is seeking to convert existing beds from a classification of "observation" to "acute care". The observation beds NCH proposes to convert are equipped identically to the acute care beds at NCH. Approval of the CON application would result in no net increase in the number of licensed beds. NCH offered anecdotal evidence suggesting that delays in transferring patients from the Naples emergency room to acute care beds (a "logjam") was caused by peak seasonal occupancy rates. There was no evidence offered as to the situation at the North Collier emergency room. The anecdotal evidence is insufficient to establish that "logjams" (if they occur at all) are related to an inadequate number of beds identified as "acute care" at NCH facilities. There are other factors which can result in delays in moving patients from emergency rooms to acute care beds, including facility discharge patterns, delays in obtaining medical test results and staffing practices. NCH asserted at hearing that physicians who refer patients to NCH facilities will not refer such patients to other facilities. The evidence fails to establish that such physician practice is reasonable or provides justification for approval of CON applications under "not normal" circumstances and further fails to establish that conditions at NCH are such as to result in physicians attempting to locate other facilities in which to admit patients. The rule governing approval of acute care beds provides that, prior to such approval, the annual occupancy rate for acute care beds in the subdistrict or for the specific provider, must exceed 75 percent. This requirement has not been met. Applicable statutes require that, in considering applications for CON's, the AHCA consider accessibility of existing providers. The AHCA- established standard provides that acute care bed accessibility requirements are met when at least 90 percent of the residents in an urban subdistrict are within a 30 minute automobile trip to such facilities. At least 90 percent of Naples residents are presently within a 30 minute travel time to NCH acute care beds. The number of acute care beds in the subdistrict substantially exceed the demand for such beds. Additional beds would result in inefficient utilization of existing beds, would further increase the current oversupply of beds, would delay the time at which need for additional beds may be determined and, as such, would prevent competing facilities from applying for and receiving approval for such beds. The financial feasibility projections set forth in the CON application rely on assumptions as to need and utilization projections which are not supported by the greater weight of the evidence and are not credited. Accordingly, the evidence fails to establish that the addition of 35 acute care beds to NCH facilities is financially feasible in the long term or that the income projections set forth in the CON application are reasonable. As to projections related to staffing requirements and costs, the beds are existing and are currently staffed on a daily, shift-by-shift basis, based on patient census and acuity of illness. There is reason to believe that the staffing patterns will remain fairly constant and accordingly the projections, based on historical data, are reasonable. Generally stated, where there is no numeric or "not normal" need for the proposed addition of 35 acute care beds in the relevant subdistrict, it could be predicted that the addition of acute care beds would exacerbate the oversupply of available beds and could cause a slight reduction in the occupancy levels experienced by other providers. In this case, the market service areas are sufficiently distinct as to suggest that such would not necessarily be the result. However, based on the lack of need justifying approval of the CON application under any existing circumstances, it is unnecessary to address in detail the impact on existing providers. The state and district health plans identify a number of preferences which should be considered in determining whether a CON application should be approved. The plans suggest that such preferences are to be considered when competing CON applications are reviewed. In this case there is no competing application and the applicability of the preferences is unclear. However, in any event, application of the preferences to this proposal fail to support approval of the application.
Recommendation RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered DENYING the application of Naples Community Hospital, Inc., for Certificate of Need 6797. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of March, 1993 in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-1510 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the parties. Petitioner The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 3-4, 6-8, 16-20, 29-36, 38, 41, 44, 47, 49-61, 80, 88, 95-96, 100, 104, 108, 117-119, 122-125, 127, 134-138. Rejected as unnecessary. 15. Rejected as irrelevant. Peak seasonal demand is accounted for by the numeric need determination methodology. There is no credible evidence which supports a calculation of three years of four month winter occupancy to reach a 12 month average occupancy rate. 21-27, 37, 42-43, 62-64, 66, 97, 99, 101-103, 105-107, 109, 120-121, 126. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence. 28. Rejected as not supported by the greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence and contrary to the stipulation filed by the parties. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the transfer of patients from emergency room to acute care beds is delayed due to numerical availability of beds. Rejected as not supported by greater weight of credible and persuasive evidence which fails to establish that the alleged lack of acute care beds is based on insufficient number of total beds as opposed to other factors which affect bed availability. Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence Rejected as immaterial and contrary to the greater weight of the evidence which fails to establish reasonableness of considering only a four month period under "not normal" circumstances where the period and the peak seasonal demand are included within the averages utilized to project bed need. 86. Rejected as cumulative. 114. Rejected as unsupported hearsay. Respondent/Intervenor The Respondent and Intervenor filed a joint proposed recommended order. The proposed order's findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 6, 45, 51, 53, 59-67, 69-70, 94-113. Rejected as unnecessary. 16. Rejected as to use of term "false", conclusion of law. 58. Rejected as not clearly supported by credible evidence. 71-93, 114-124. Rejected as cumulative. COPIES FURNISHED: Douglas M. Cook, Director Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 W. David Watkins, Esquire Oertel, Hoffman, Fernandez, & Cole Post Office Box 6507 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-6507 Edward G. Labrador, Esquire Thomas Cooper, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D.C. Newton, II, Esquire Aurell, Radey, Hinkle, Thomas & Beranek Monroe Park Tower, Suite 1000 101 North Monroe Street Post Office Drawer 11307 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Which, if any, of the four certificate of need applications for short-term psychiatric beds in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 9 should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Description of the Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") is the agency charged under Chapter 381, Florida Statutes (1991), to make decisions regarding certificate of need ("CON") applications. HRS issued its intent to approve the CON applications of Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc. ("Glenbeigh"), for 45 beds, and Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc. ("Boca"), for 15 beds, pursuant to a published fixed need for 67 beds for HRS District IX. HRS also issued its intent to deny the CON applications of Wellington Regional Medical Center, Incorporation ("Wellington") to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds, and Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership ("Savannas") to convert 20 substance abuse beds to 20 short term adult psychiatric beds and to add 10 new short term adult beds. District IX includes Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Okeechobee and Indian River Counties. As a result of Glenbeigh's Notice of Withdrawal filed on April 6, 1993, CON No. 6438 is no longer under consideration in this case. Boca is an existing 394-bed acute care hospital, located one mile north of the Broward County line, and is the applicant for CON No. 6442, to convert 15 medical/surgical beds to 15 adult psychiatric beds, and to delicense an additional 6 medical/surgical beds. Wellington is an existing acute care hospital in Palm Beach County, with 104 acute care medical/surgical beds and 16 substance abuse beds, and is the applicant for CON No. 6441 to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds. Savannas is an existing 70 bed child/adolescent and adult psychiatric and substance abuse hospital in St. Lucie County, about 40 miles north of Palm Beach, and is the applicant for CON No. 6444, to convert its 20 substance abuse beds to 20 adult short-term psychiatric beds, and to add 10 new adult short-term psychiatric beds. Lake Hospital and Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches ("Lake"), at the time of hearing, was a 98-bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital, with 46 adult psychiatric beds, 36 child/adolescent psychiatric beds and 16 substance abuse beds, located in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, between Boca Raton and West Palm Beach. The parties stipulated that Lake had standing to challenge the Boca application. Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, Inc., d/b/a Humana Hospital Palm Beaches ("Humana") is an existing 250-bed acute care hospital, with 61 adult and 27 child/adolescent psychiatric beds, and is a Baker Act receiving facility, located directly across the street from Glenbeigh in Palm Beach. Florida Residential Treatment Centers, Inc., d/b/a Charter Hospital of West Palm Beach ("Charter") is an existing 60-bed psychiatric hospital with 20 beds for children and 40 beds for adolescents, located approximately 15 minutes travel time from Glenbeigh. Martin H.M.A., Inc., d/b/a SandyPines Hospital ("SandyPines") is an existing 60 bed child and adolescent psychiatric hospital, and a Baker Act receiving facility, located in Martin County, less than one mile north of the Palm Beach County line. By prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that the statutory review criteria applicable to the CON application of Boca are those listed in Subsections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (d), (f), (i) - (l) and (n). If Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) is applicable, the parties stipulated that the disputed criteria are those in Subsections 4.g. and 5.g. Background and Applicability of HRS Rules and Florida Statutes Rule 10-5.011(o) and (p), Florida Administrative Code, was in effect at the time HRS published the fixed need pool and received the applications at issue in this proceeding, the September 1990 batching cycle. The rule distinguished between inpatient psychiatric services based on whether the services were provided on a short-term or long-term basis. Similarly, Rule 10- 5.011(q), Florida Administrative Code, distinguished between short-term and long-term hospital inpatient substance abuse services. On August 10, 1990, HRS published a fixed need pool for 19 short-term psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, with notice of the right to seek an administrative hearing to challenge the correctness of the fixed need pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 32, Florida Administrative Weekly. On August 17, 1990, HRS published a revised fixed need pool for a net need of 67 additional short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, based on the denial of a certificate of need application, subsequent to the deadline for submission of the August 10th publication. The local health plan formula, which has not been adopted by rule, allocates 62 of the additional 67 beds needed to the Palm Beach County subdistrict. The revised pool publication did not include notice of the right to an administrative hearing to challenge the revised pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 33, Florida Administrative Weekly. There were no challenges filed to either the original or revised fixed need pool numbers. On December 23, 1990, HRS published new psychiatric and substance abuse rules, subsequently renumbered as Rule 10-5.040 and 10-5.041, Florida Administrative Code. These new rules abolished the distinction between short- term and long-term services, and instead distinguished psychiatric and substance abuse services by the age of the patient. Pursuant to Section 14 of the new psychiatric rule, that rule does not apply to applications pending final agency action on the effective date of the new rule. HRS will, however, license any applicant approved from the September 1990 batching cycle to provide services to adults or children and adolescents, using the categories in the new rule, not based on the distinction between short and long term services which existed at the time the application was filed. Approved providers will receive separate CONs for adult and child/adolescent services. Rule 10-5.008(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that the fixed need pool shall be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least 15 days prior to the letter of intent deadline and . . . shall not be changed or adjusted in the future regardless of any future changes in need methodologies, population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors which would lead to different projections of need, if retroactively applied. Humana, Lake, Charter and SandyPines allege that HRS incorrectly determined need under the old rule, by failing to examine occupancy rates pursuant to that rule. The rule provided, in relevant part, No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. (Emphasis added.) Rule 10-5.011(o)4(e), Florida Administrative Code. HRS' expert witness, Elizabeth Dudek, testified that the fixed need pool for 67 additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds was calculated pursuant to the formula in Rule 10-5.011(l)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Dudek also testified that since calculation resulted in a positive number, according to HRS policy, the publication of the fixed need pool indicates that the occupancy prerequisites must have also been met. To the contrary, the State Agency Action Report and the deposition of Lloyd Tribley, the HRS Health Facilities consultant who collected the data to support the publication of the fixed need pool, indicate that he did not determine existing occupancy separately for adults and for children/adolescents, as required by subsection (e) of the old rule. Rather, he determined, pursuant to subsection (f), that overall occupancy rates for licensed short-term psychiatric beds exceeded 75 percent. With the August 10, 1990 publication of the need for 19 additional short-term inpatient psychiatric beds, HRS provided a point of entry to challenge the published need, including the agency's apparent failure to make a determination of existing occupancy rates for separate age categories. No challenge was filed. In the August 17, 1990 publication, HRS failed to provide a point of entry, when it added 48 more beds to the pool as a result of the issuance of a final order denying a prior CON application. The August 10th publication of numeric need, according to HRS' representative should have been based on an analysis of separate and combined occupancy rates. There was no challenge to that publication, therefore the number of beds in the fixed need pool is not at issue in this proceeding. Like and Existing Facilities Humana, Lake and Charter assert that, as a result of the new rule abolishing separate licensure categories for short-term and long-term beds, all psychiatric providers within an applicant's service district are like and existing facilities. These parties also assert that there was not, even under the old rule, any practical difference between these categories of providers, particularly for children/adolescents. In support of this position, the evidence demonstrated that the average lengths of stay in short-term and long- term adolescent psychiatric beds in 1989 were 48.1 days and 53.02 days, respectively. In 1990, the average lengths of stay in short and long-term beds were 41.8 days and 41.9 days, respectively. The parties asserting that the effect of the new rule is to create an additional group of like and existing providers point to HRS' response to the application of Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach, Florida ("Indian River"). According to the testimony of HRS expert witness Elizabeth Dudek, Indian River was another District 9 applicant in this same batching cycle. Indian River applied for a CON to convert long-term psychiatric beds to short- term psychiatric beds. HRS denied the CON application of Indian River because, under the new rule, which had taken effect before the decisions on the batch were made, Indian River would receive a new license permitting it to treat psychiatric patients regardless of their projected lengths of stay. Glenbeigh asserted that the numeric need for 67 additional short term psychiatric beds cannot be challenged in this proceeding based on the failure of any party timely to challenge the August 10, 1990, publication of need. Similarly, Glenbeigh asserted that the comparison of "like and existing" facilities must be limited to those used in the inventory to compute need. Glenbeigh relied generally on Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(o), the old rule governing short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services, for the proposition that "like and existing" in Subsection 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is equivalent to the inventory of licensed and approved beds for short term psychiatric services, which was used in the computation of need. However, the rule also provides, in a list of "other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a certificate of need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds," the following, Applicants shall indicate the availability of other inpatient psychiatric services in the proposed service area, including the number of beds available in crisis stabilization units, short term residential treatment programs, and other inpatient beds whether licensed as a hospital facility or not. In light of the rule directive that the consideration of like and existing services is not limited to licensed provider hospitals, Glenbeigh's assertion that the statutory review criteria is more restrictive and limited to the licensed and approved beds that were used to compute numeric need is rejected. The like and existing facilities are the hospitals or freestanding facilities which are authorized to provide the same psychiatric services, as the applicants seek to provide as a result of this proceeding. It was established at hearing that the following list of District 9 facilities provide psychiatric services comparable to those which the three remaining applicants seek to provide in these consolidated cases: DISTRICT 9 Hospital PSYCHIATRIC BEDS SUBSTANCE ABUSE BEDS Adult Child and Adult Child and Adolescent Adolescent Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Bethesda Hospital 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Charter Palm (IRTF) 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Fair Oaks 36 0 49 0 14 0 3 0 Forty Fifth Street 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Glenbeigh Palm Beach 0 0 0 0 30 0 30 0 Humana Palm Beach 61 0 27 15 0 0 0 0 Humana Sebastian 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Indian River Mem. 16 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 J.F. Kennedy Mem. 14 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 Lake Hospital 46 0 36 0 16 0 0 0 Lawnwood Regional 36 Res. Treat. Palm 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 (IRTF) 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 Sandy Pines 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Savannas 35 0 15 0 20 0 0 0 St. Mary Hospital 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wellington Regional 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Vol. 16, No. 52, Florida Administrative Weekly, (December 28, 1990) (Humana Exhibit 26). Need For Additional Beds An analysis of need beyond that of the numeric need, requires an analysis of the availability and accessibility of the like and existing facilties. One reliable indicator of need is the occupancy levels in the like and existing facilities. In addition to providing guidelines for the publication of need, Rule 10-5.011(o)(4)(e) also mandates a consideration of occupancy levels to determine if applicants are or are not required to demonstrate "not normal circumstances" necessitating the issuance of a CON. For all child/adolescent psychiatric programs in District 9, the expert for Lake and Humana calculated total average occupancy rates at 57.6 percent in 1988, 64.2 percent in 1989, and 53.2 percent in 1990. In support of the accuracy of the expert's calculations, the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4) shows occupancy at 46.80 percent in general hospitals, 88.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as short term and 38.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as long term. In addition, during this same period of time, average lengths of stay in District 9 child/adolescent beds also declined by approximately 10 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, new short term psychiatric beds should not normally be approved when the child/adolescent rate is below 70 percent. In the new rule, child/adolescent beds should not normally be approved if occupancy is below 75 percent. Therefore, under either rule, applicants who will be licensed for child/adolescent beds, must demonstrate not normal circumstances for their CON applications to be approved. The expert for Lake and Humana, also computed the adult occupancy rates for 1988-1990 in District 9 as follows: 1988- 66.5 percent; 1989 - 73.1 percent; 1990 - 68.5 percent. The occupancy rates for adult beds for the 12- month period ending March, 1990 was 70.6 percent and 69.2 percent for the twelve months ending June, 1990. In evaluating the accuracy of the expert's calculations of occupancy rates for adult beds, a comparison can be made to the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4). Occupancy rates were 57.75 percent in general hospitals and 79.45 percent in specialty hospitals. This data does not include Indian River Memorial or Lawnwood Regional which were also listed on the December 1990 inventory of licensed adult beds, nor St. Mary's Hospital which was listed as having 40 approved adult beds. The comparison indicates the accuracy of concluding that the highest occupancy level for District 9 adult psychiatric beds during the period 1988 to 1990 was approximately 70 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, 75 percent occupancy is required before new adult beds can be approved unless there is a not normal circumstance. Boca's Proposal Boca Raton Community Hospital ("Boca") is a 394-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations, which proposes to convert 21 of its medical/surgical to 15 adult psychiatric beds and to delicense an additional 6 acute care beds. Boca's CON would be conditioned on the provision of 10.8 percent total annual patient days to Medicaid patients and a minimum of 5 percent gross revenues generated, or 2 percent total annual patient days to medically indigent patients. Boca has proposed this alternative so that, if it fails to provide direct care to indigents, it may donate the revenues to further the objectives of the state and district mental health councils. Boca Raton Community Hospital Corporation has control and manages the Boca's property, policies and funds. The Boca Raton Community Hospital Foundation raises funds for Boca and has the funds necessary to accomplish the proposed project at a cost of $932,531. Boca's application asserts that a not normal circumstance exists in the need to serve Medicaid patients in the district, and that a need exists to serve geriatric psychiatric patients in an acute care hospital, due to their general medical condition. Medicaid reimbursement for psychiatric care is only available in acute care hospitals. Boca Historically serves in excess of 70 percent Medicare (geriatric) patients. In 1990, 72 percent of Medicaid psychiatric patients residing in Boca's service area sought psychiatric services outside District 9, as compared to the outmigration of 14.7 percent Medicare patients, and 11 percent commercial insurance patients. Boca supported its proposed 10.8 percent Medicaid CON condition, with evidence that 10.8 percent of all psychiatric discharges in its market area were for Medicaid patients. Boca's opponents dispute the claim that a disproportionate outmigration of District 9 Medicaid patients is, in and of itself, a not normal circumstance. Using the travel time standard for inpatient psychiatric services of 45 minutes under average driving conditions, the opponents argue that District 10 facilities should be considered as available alternatives to additional psychiatric beds in District 9. In fact, the parties stipulated that there are no geographic access problems in District 9. In contrast to the opponents position, Subsections 381.705(a), (b)(, (d), (f) and (h), Florida Statutes (1991), indicate that need, available alternatives and accessibility are evaluated within a district, as defined by Subsection 381.702(5). Therefore, using the statutory criteria as indicative of the situation which is normal, the disproportionate outmigration of medicaid patients can be considered a not normal circumstance with a showing of access hardships for this payor group. Boca's opponents also assert general acute care adult beds are adequate. In August 1991, the occupancy rate was 56.9 percent in the 171 licensed adult psychiatric beds in District 9 general acute care hospitals which are eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Finally, Boca's opponents argue that Boca historically has not, and will not serve Medicaid patients in sufficient number to alter the outmigration. In 1990, Boca reported 671 Medicaid inpatient days from a total of 99,955. That is equivalent to 92 of the 16,170 admissions. Because Boca has a closed medical staff, only the psychiatrists on staff would be able to admit patients to a psychiatric unit. From the testimony and depositions received in evidence, Boca's psychiatrists who discussed their service to Medicaid patients treated less than 12 Medicaid patients a year. One psychiatrist, who had previously treated Medicaid patients at a mental health center, has been in private practice since 1983-84, but was not sure he had treated a Medicaid patient in his private practice and has received a new Medicaid provider number a few weeks prior to hearing. One Boca psychiatrist does not treat Medicaid patients on an inpatient basis. Two other Boca psychiatrists reported seeing 10 and "a couple" of Medicaid patients a year, respectively. The latter of these described the Medicaid billing procedure as cumbersome. Given the unavailability of Medicaid eligible beds in the District and the nature of the practices of its closed staff of psychiatrists, Boca has failed to establish that its CON application will alleviate the outmigration for psychiatric services of District 9 Medicaid patients. This conclusion is not altered by the subsequent closure of Lake's 46 adult psychiatric beds, because Medicaid reimbursement would not have been available at Lake which was not an acute care hospital. In fact, HRS takes the position that there are no not normal circumstances in this case. Wellington's Proposal Wellington, a 120 bed hospital in West Palm Beach, Florida, proposed to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds which, if approved, will be licensed as adult psychiatric beds. Wellington's acute care beds are only 28 percent occupied. Wellington is located in the western portion of Palm Beach County, where no other inpatient psychiatric facilities are located. Wellington is a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"), accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations (JCAHO) and the American Osteopathic Association (AOA), and offers clinical experience for students of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine (SECOM). Internships and externships for osteopathic students are also provided at Humana's psychiatric pavilion. Wellington proposes to fund the total project cost of $920,000 from funds available to UHS and intends to become a Baker Act receiving facility. Wellington is not a disproportionate share hospital, and projects 1 percent Medicaid service in its payor mix. Wellington proposes to serve adult psychiatric patients in 15 beds, and projects 53.3 percent and 70 percent occupancy in those beds in years one and two, but does not make a third year projection of at least 80 percent occupancy as required by Paragraph 4(d) of Rule 10-5.011(o). Because the average annual adult occupancy rate in the district is less than 75 percent, any applicant proposing to serve adults must demonstrate that a not normal circumstance exists for approval of its CON application. In addition, there appears to be no shortage of psychiatric beds in acute care hospitals in District 9. See Finding of Fact 39, supra. Not Normal Circumstance Wellington has not alleged nor demonstrated that any of the factors related to its current operations, location or proposed services are not normal circumstances in support of its CON application. Absent the showing of a not normal circumstance, Wellington's proposal cannot be approved, pursuant to Paragraph 4(e) and Rule 10-5.011(o), Florida Administrative Code. Savannas Proposal Savannas Hospital Limited partnership d/b/a Savannas Hospital ("Savannas") is a JCAHO accredited 70 bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital located in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida, approximately 40 miles north of Palm Beach. Savannas, a Baker Act facility, proposes to convert all 20 of its licensed substance abuse beds to psychiatric beds and to add 10 new psychiatric beds, at a total project cost of $1,444,818. Savannas also proposes to commit to providing 7 percent indigent care. While not specifically describing its circumstances as not normal, Savannas does indicate that it is (1) the only applicant in the northern sub- district of District 9, and (2) could readmit to a segregated unit low functioning neurogeriatric patients of the type it previously served. Savannas also indicated that Medicare reimbursement is not available for patients who have substance abuse, rather than psychiatric primary diagnoses. As a freestanding provider, Savannas is not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Savannas demonstrates what services it would provide, if its CON is approved, but fails to identify a need for the services by District 9 psychiatric patients. Within the northern sub-district, the only other facility in St. Lucie County, Lawnwood, reported an occupancy rate of 65 percent in 1989. AHCA also argued that the substance abuse beds at Savannas are needed and should not be converted to psychiatric beds. That position is supported by the fact that Savannas substance abuse beds had a higher occupancy level than its psychiatric beds in 1989. Savannas' application and the evidence presented do not support the need for the services proposed by Savannas, nor does Savannas assert that any not normal circumstances exist.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Certificate of Need Number 6438 to Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6442 to Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6441 to Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc.; and Certificate of Need Number 6444 to Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of June 1993. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June 1993. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Humana Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 3-6. Issues not addressed. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 10. 11-12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. 13-15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 & 29. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 22. Issue not addressed. 23-24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12 and Conclusions of Law 4. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12 and 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 38-47. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 44 and 47. Issue not addressed. Rejected in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. 52-54. Adopted in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. 55-57. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 54 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 54, 55 and 57. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 74-75. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 27. 76-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 28. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 82. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 39. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27, 29 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 95-99. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 102-114. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. 121-122. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 4 and 47. Issue not addressed. Irrlevant. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 47 and 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 15. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Lake Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 43. 11-12. Issues not addressed. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27-43. 20-21. Issues not addressed. 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 25-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 29-31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 32. Rejected in relevant part in Finding of Fact 13. 33. Issue not addressed. 34. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 35. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 36-37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 38-39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 40. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 41. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 30. 42-43. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 46-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 49-52. Issues not addressed. 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 42. 54-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusions of Law 4. 58-59. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in Conclusions of Law 4. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 17. 65-66. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47, 48, 49, 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 84-89. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 92-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 37. 100-102. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 111-113. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Issue not addressed. 128-132. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 133-135. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32 and 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. 150-151. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 152-156. Issues not addressed. 157-158. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 159. Adopted in Findings of Fact 48 and 49. 160. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 161. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 162. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 163. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 164. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 165. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 166. Charter Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 1. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Adopted. 4-10. Accepted in Preliminary Statement. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 12-15. Issues not addressed. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 18-19. Issues not addressed. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 21-25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. 26-38. Issues not addressed 39-40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 43-44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adoped in Conclusion of Law 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Issue not addressed. 52-53. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 54-55. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 58-73. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 78-79. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 86-94. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. 99-101. Issues not addressed. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 103-134. Issues not addressed. 135. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 136-140. Issues not addressed. Boca Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 14. Adopted. 15-16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 18. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 19. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 23. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 26-27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 28-30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 34. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 36. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 37-42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 43-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. 53-54. Rejected in Finding of Fact 30. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 64-65. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 35 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 34. Issue not addressed. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Issue not addressed. Adopted. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 81-82. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25 and 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 89-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Sandy Pines 1. Issue not addressed. 2-3. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 4. Issue not addressed. 5. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 6-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 9-13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 20-24. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 26-29. Issues not addressed. 30. Adopted. 31-33. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 42, 43, 48, 49 and 54. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Issue not addressed. 39-40. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 41-42. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 17. 46-47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 26. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 7. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 62-64. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 67. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. 68-69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. 70. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 71. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in 72. Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26 and 73. 38. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 74-75. Not legible. 76. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 77-80. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 81. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 82-83. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 84-95. Issues not addressed. Wellington 1-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 8-10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 46. 21-22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 31-32. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted. Issue not addressed. 36-37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 38-42. Issues not addressed. 43. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 42 and 47. 44-63. Issues not addressed. 64-65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 66-67. Issues not addressed. 68. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 69-91. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. 94-103. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 1 and 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 106-111. Issues not addressed 112. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 113-115. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Savannas Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 30-33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 35-37. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Issue not addressed. 40-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 54. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. 44-48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50. 49-51. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted. Adopted. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50 Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Issue not addressed. 60-61. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 62-63. Issues not addressed. 64. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 65-66. Issues not addressed. 67. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 68-70. Issues not addressed. 71. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. 72-77. Issues not addressed 78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 79-100. Issues not addressed. HRS Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 16 and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 10-11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 16-17. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32, 46 and 52. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 22. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 23-33. Issues not addressed. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 35-36. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 32. 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 40, 41 and 42. 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 41. Issue not addressed. 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 44. Issue not addressed. 45-46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 44. 49. Issue not addressed. 50. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 52. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 53-54. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 55. Issue not addressed. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 58. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 59-61. Issues not addressed. 62-64. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50 and 51. 65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 65. 66-68. Issues not addressed. 69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 52. 70-71. Issues not addressed. 72. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 73. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 74. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 75-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 78-80. Issues not addressed. 81-82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 83-89. Issues not addressed. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cooper, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William B. Wiley, Esquire McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 James C. Hauser, Esquire Foley & Lardner Post Office Box 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire David C. Ashburn, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire C. Gary Williams, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire John F. Gilroy, III, Esquire Haben, Culpepper, Dunbar & French, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles H. Hood, Jr., Esquire MONACO, SMITH, HOOD, PERKINS, ORFINGER & STOUT 444 Seabreeze Boulevard, #900 Post Office Box 15200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
The Issue Whether a certificate of need to construct a 60-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital should be granted to CPC and whether a certificate of need to construct a 24-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric hospital should be granted to Apalachee?
Findings Of Fact Introduction. CPC. Community Psychiatric Centers, Inc., a proprietary corporation, was formed in 1968 by the merger of 2 existing psychiatric hospitals. It now consists of 24 psychiatric hospitals, two of which are located in Florida, and two subsidiary corporations. On December 16, 1983, CPC submitted to the Department an application for a certificate of need to construct and operate a 60-bed inpatient psychiatric hospital. The 60-beds are to consist of 15 beds for adolescents, 20 beds for adults in an open unit, 10 beds for adults in an intensive care unit and 15 beds for geriatric patients. Apalachee. Apalachee is a not-for-profit corporation. It began approximately 30 years ago as a small clinic. It was incorporated as the Leon County Mental Health Clinic in the 1960's and later changed its name to Apalachee Community Mental Health Services, Inc. Apalachee presently serves over 7,000 clients a year, has a $6,500,000.00 budget and 300 employees. It provides services to 8 north Florida counties: Gadsden, Liberty, Franklin, Leon, Wakulla, Madison, Jefferson and Taylor. Apalachee provides specialized continuums of care for substance abuse, children and geriatrics and basic generic services, including a 24-hour, 365 days-a-year emergency telephone and/or face-to-face evaluations. It also provides a full range of case management, day treatment and residential care primarily aimed at the acute and chronically mentally ill and specific programs for children, such as an adolescent day treatment program and an adolescent residential facility. Apalachee's residential programs include a program called Positive Alternatives to Hospitalization (hereinafter referred to as "PATH"). Apalachee also operates an 8-bed non-hospital medical detoxification program in conjunction with PATH. This program is operated in the same building as PATH. It also operates 3 group homes (an adult, an alcohol abuse and an adolescent half-way house) with 10 clients each (these houses will be expanded to 16 clients each), a geriatric residential facility with 60 to 70 beds and cater Oaks, a long-term residential treatment facility for adolescents. On November 15, 1983, Apalachee applied to the Department for a certificate of need for 24 short-term inpatient psychiatric beds. In its application filed during the final hearing of these cases, Apalachee proposed to construct a facility to house the 24-beds adjacent to its current "Eastside" facility. Its Eastside facility currently houses Emergency Services, PATH and its non-hospital medical detoxification programs. All adult mental health programs of Apalachee will also be located on the site in order to consolidate the full continuum of adult psychiatric care provided by Apalachee. Statutory Criteria. The following findings of fact are made as they pertain to the criteria included in Section 381.494(6)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes (1983), and Section 10-5.11(25), F.A.C. The Need for Psychiatric Services Florida State Health Plan and the District 2 Health Plan. General. The Florida State Health Plan is outdated and the District 2 Health Plan does not contain specific goals as to the need for short-term psychiatric care for District 2, the District the facilities would be constructed in. CPC and Apalachee did, however, address both plans, to the extent applicable, in their applications. The relationship of "need" to these plans, as agreed to by the Department, is not relevant to this proceeding, however. CPC also indicated that it evaluated local bed need by studying socioeconomic, population and employment data and by interviewing local practicing psychiatrists. CPC concluded that additional services were needed and filed its application. Although the Florida State Health Plan and the District 2 Health Plan do not address the question of need, need as determined under the Department's rules is crucial. Section 10-5.11(25), F.A.C., provides that a favorable need determination will "not normally" be given on applications for short-term psychiatric care facilities unless bed need exists under paragraph (25)(d). Under Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C., bed need is to be determined 5 years into the future by subtracting the number of existing and approved beds in the District from the number of beds for the planning year based upon a ratio of .35 beds per 1,000 population projected for the planning year. The population projection is to be based on the latest mid-range projections published by the Bureau of Economic and Business Research at the University of Florida. The Department has projected a need for 185 total short-term psychiatric beds for District 2 for 1989. There are 82 currently licensed and 35 approved short-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Therefore, for 1989 there is a net short-term psychiatric bed need projected of 68 beds. Based upon the projected population of District 2 for 1990 (537, 567), which is 5 years from 1985, the total bed need is 188 beds. The net bed need for 1990 is 71 beds (188 total beds less 117 licensed and approved beds). The Department did not use this figure because the calculation for bed need for 1990 will not be made by the Department until July of 1985. Pursuant to Section 10-17.003, F.A.C., the total projected short-term psychiatric bed need for District 2 is allocated among 2 subdistricts. Subdistrict 2 consist of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties. CPC's and Apalachee's proposed facility will be located in Subdistrict 2. Subdistrict 2 is the same area designated by CPC as its "primary" service area. This rule, which is to be "used in conjunction with Rule 10-5.11(25)(c)(d)(e)" allocates the 1988 short-term inpatient psychiatric and substance abuse projected bed need as follows: Subdistrict 1: 75 Subdistrict 2: 104 Total 179 Because the projected bed need for Subdistrict 2 under this rule is based upon 1988 projections, it is clearly in conflict with the requirement of Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C., that bed need is to be projected 5 years into the future. The total bed need projected for the District for 1988 is 179 beds; for 1990, the total is 188 beds. Based upon the allocation of total bed need in Section 10- 17.003, F.A.C., the net bed need for Subdistrict 2 for 1988 is 44 beds: 104 total beds less 60 licensed and approved beds in Subdistrict 2. If it is assumed that the 9 additional total beds projected for 1990 should be allocated to Subdistrict 2, the net bed need for 1990 in Subdistrict 2 would be 53 beds (100 beds less 50 licensed and approved beds). No evidence was presented, however, to support the assumption that all 9 additional total beds will be allocated to Subdistrict 2. It is more likely that only 1 or 2 additional beds will be allocated to Subdistrict 2. Based upon the foregoing, the total net bed need for District 2 projected to 1990 is 71 beds and for Subdistrict 2 it is between 44 and 53 beds. CPC. CPC attempted at the hearing to show that its proposal is consistent with the bed need for District 2 as determined under Section 10-5.11(25)(d)(3), F.A.C. In the alternative, CPC has attempted to prove that there is a sufficient need in District 2 for additional short-term psychiatric beds based upon other methodologies and the state of psychiatric care currently being provided in Subdistrict 2. Sources of referral to the proposed CPC facility, according to Mr. John Mercer, will include physicians, the judiciary and legal system, the school system, employers and law enforcement. Referrals are inspected by Mr. Mercer based upon his conversations with physicians (Mr. Mercer did not interview persons from the other referral sources) , his personal experience and the fact that there will be a community relations or marketing position at the proposed facility. Local psychiatrists did testify that they would refer patients to CPC if its facility is approved. They did not, however, testify that they would refer all of their patients to CPC. They also testified that the CPC facility is needed. The local psychiatrists did not, however, indicate that they were aware of all of the facts as established during the proceeding. CPC, in its application, projected, based upon conversations with local physicians, that the facility will serve most of the area designated by the Department as District 2. District 2 is subdivided by CPC into a primary service area, consisting of Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties, and a secondary service area, consisting of Clay, Calhoun, Gulf and Jackson Counties in Florida and several counties located in extreme southwest Georgia. In Mr. Mercer's opinion, the proposed facility will serve persons from southwest Georgia; specifically, Brook, Decatur, Grady, Seminole and Thomas Counties. Mr. Mercer's opinion was based upon the availability of services in Georgia and conversations he had with Tallahassee physicians. Mr. Mercer's opinion, however, has been given little weight in determining the need for additional short-term psychiatric beds in District 2 based upon the testimony of Jay D. Cushman, an expert in health planning and development. Mr. Mercer's opinion that southwest Georgia residents will use the proposed CPC facility implies that there may be a need for additional short-term psychiatric beds. Mr. Mercer, however, failed to consider travel time and barriers to travel, patient origins or the effect, if any, of outmigration--the number of persons in District 2 who may leave the District for treatment outside the District. Although Mr. Mercer's conversations with local physicians are relevant and of some supportive weight, the local physicians' opinions should have been supported with other evidence. They were not. CPC, in its exhibit 3, projected a bed need of 14.67 beds attributable to southwest Georgia. This figure was arrived at by first assuming a bed need in the area of .35 beds per 1,000 population (119,051). This results in a gross bed need in southwest Georgia of 41.67 beds. From the gross number of beds, 27 existing beds were subtracted to arrive at a net bed need in District 2 attributable to southwest Georgia residents of 14.67 beds. No evidence supporting a conclusion that such a bed need exists in District 2 was presented at the hearing other than Mr. Mercer's opinion that the proposed facility will serve residents from southwest Georgia. It is therefore concluded that there is not a need for 14.67 beds in District 2 attributable to southwest Georgia residents. In its application, CPC projected a need for an additional 195 short- term psychiatric inpatient beds for District 2. This figure was based upon an average of bed need projected by using three different bed need methodologies. The three different methods resulted in a projected bed need of 64 beds, 266 beds and 255 beds. Application of the method which resulted in a bed need of 266 was modified during the hearing. The modification resulted in a bed need of 75.8 beds. Therefore, the bed need based upon the average of all 3 methodologies, as amended would be 131.6 beds. The three methods used by CPC in its application are different than the method used by the Department. None of the methods, based upon Mr. Cushman's testimony, are sound; they are structurally unsound, applied in an unsound manner or both. Under Method I, CPC starts with a projected short-term psychiatric bed need of 1988 of 44 beds, the net bed need as determined in Section 10-17.003, F.A.C. This figure is then increased by 9.44 beds for in-migration and 11 beds attributable to an adjustment for "desired occupancy level." As clearly established by Mr. Cushman's testimony, neither of the adjustments are sound. The projected bed need of 64 beds for 1988 pursuant to method I is therefore not a reliable figure. Pursuant to Method II, as modified during the hearing, CPC projected a bed need of 75.8 beds. Method III resulted in a projected net bed need of 255 beds. These projections are based upon a projected average length of stay of 30 days. No evidence was presented to support this projection; in fact, it is unrealistic when compared with the average length of stay of 16 days at similar facilities in Florida. CPC's Florida facilities have also not been able to achieve an average length of stay of 30 days. These formulas are also unrealistic because population figures used were for all of District 2. But existing beds taken into account only included the beds in Subdistrict 2. Finally, occupancy was not taken into account in either of the methods. CPC's Methods II and III are not sound, based upon the foregoing. Apalachee. Apalachee's application is for only 24 inpatient psychiatric beds, which is well below the bed need projected under the Department's methodologies for the District and the Subdistrict. Apalachee has projected that its proposed facilities will serve persons in the 8 counties it currently serves. These counties are the same counties which make up Subdistrict 2. Apalachee has not assumed that any patients will come from outside of the Subdistrict. Apalachee has shown that the patients who will use its facility are clients within its own present system, based upon historical data. This historical data establishes that an average of 10 to 12 Baker Act patients have been admitted to Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric facility during past years. These persons would be admitted to Apalachee's new facility. Additional patients would consist of Apalachee clients which Tallahassee Memorial's facility will not admit and clients currently going into other Apalachee programs. Accessibility to Underserved Groups. CPC is willing to provide care for Baker Act patients. It has been projected that 5 percent of the proposed facility's patient days will be attributable to Baker Act patients. CPC is also willing to treat Medicaid patients and has again projected that 5 percent of the facility's days will be attributable to Medicaid patients. In addition, CPC has projected that 5 percent of its gross revenue will be set aside for the care of indigent patients which consist of those persons who are unable, at the time of admission, to pay all or a part of the charges attributable to their care. Indigent care may not be provided, however, if the facility is losing money. The provision of indigent care is based upon a CPC policy which was recently agreed upon and applies to new CPC facilities. The policy does not apply at the two existing CPC Florida psychiatric hospitals since they were established before the policy was adopted. Pursuant to the Florida Mental Health Act, Chapter 394, Part II, Florida Statutes, the Department's district administrator designates a facility in the district as the public receiving facility for Baker Act patients. In Subdistrict 2 of District 2, Apalachee has been designated as the public receiving facility. Apalachee is therefore responsible for ensuring that emergency care, temporary detention for diagnosis and evaluation and community inpatient care is available to Baker Act clients. As the public receiving facility in Subdistrict 2, Apalachee will clearly serve Baker Act patients. It has projected that in the first year of operation 40 percent (39.7 percent in the second year) of its patients at the new facility will be indigent and that the indigent patients will be primarily Baker Act patients. Seventy percent of Apalachee's clients are persons who need some type of financial assistance; Medicare, Medicaid and Baker Act. Apalachee has proposed to continue to serve these persons in the new facility. Apalachee's purpose in requesting a certificate of need is to allow Apalachee to provide a continuum of care for more Apalachee clients. In the past, Apalachee has experienced difficulty in obtaining inpatient care for certain Baker Act clients. Additionally, even though those problems have been minimal in the past year, there are some Baker Act clients who need inpatient care who are not appropriate patients for Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric hospital. These patients are sometimes violent and "acting out." Although Tallahassee Memorial is providing adequate care for most Baker Act patients, some Baker Act patients are not admitted. Additionally, removal of Baker Act patients who are admitted by Tallahassee Memorial from Tallahassee Memorial's facility, as discussed infra, will improve the quality of care at Tallahassee Memorial. The cost of providing inpatient care to Baker Act patients will be less if Apalachee is granted a certificate of need for the requested 24 beds. At present, because of limited Baker Act funds, some Baker Act clients who need inpatient care are placed in other programs. With reduced cost for inpatient care, these clients will be able to receive the inpatient care they need. Additionally, Apalachee will serve forensic clients -- those mental health clients with criminal charges. A full-time forensic psychologist has been provided by Apalachee at the Leon County jail to facilitate this type service. The psychologist also evaluates for Baker Act qualification. According to the Director of the Leon County jail, persons in the jail with psychiatric problems are placed in a single "bull pen." Apalachee's work with forensics has been helpful. Like and Existing Psychiatric Services. The only "like and existing" psychiatric health care services in Subdistrict 2 are provided by Tallahassee Memorial. Tallahassee Memorial is a not-for-profit corporation. It currently owns an existing 60-bed short-term inpatient psychiatric facility located in Subdistrict 2. The facility is operated as a separate department of Tallahassee Memorial. Tallahassee Memorial's psychiatric facility has been continuously operated by or for Tallahassee Memorial since 1979. It was initially known as Goodwood Manor. In 1983, however, the management of the facility was taken over by, and its name was changed to, Behavioral Medical Care (Tallahassee Memorial's facility will be hereinafter referred to as "BMC"). From 1977 to 1979, the facility was owned and operated by Tallahassee Psychiatric Center, Inc., which failed for financial reasons. Prior to 1977 Tallahassee Memorial operated a small psychiatric unit as pert of its hospital. The occupancy rate at BMC for the 12-month period ending September, 1984, was 37 percent. The occupancy rate since 1979 has been consistently low and is low at the present time. There are a number of reasons for the low occupancy rate: a) The physical location and physical plant of BMC. BMC is located in a 2-story building near Tallahassee Memorial. BMC occupies the top floor of the building and a nursing home is located on the first floor. In order to get to BMC, it is necessary to travel through the nursing home. Also, the building is surrounded by a parking lot so there is inadequate outdoor and recreational space around the facility. The facility, which was originally designed as a nursing home, presently consists of one closed unit and one open unit. Patients of all ages and with various problems have to be housed in these 2 units together. Because of the physical plant, patients cannot be separated into adult, adolescent and geriatric units. There also is not enough space for therapy rooms and common areas. b) The reputation of the facility. The reputation in the community of Goodwood Manor has carried over to BMC. The facility is perceived by some as a "crazies place," a place "where violent people go." This reputation is partly attributable to the lack of credibility that psychiatry as a discipline enjoys. It is also partly attributable to the operation of BMC as Goodwood Manor prior to 1982 when Behavioral Medical Care took over management of BMC. c) The type of programs offered. To date, no program has been separately offered and provided or adolescents, children, substance, alcohol and drug abuse patients, or geriatrics. Basically only one structured program has been provided which has been more suited to adult psychotic patients. Closely related to this problem is the fact that BMC has had a poor patient mix. This has been caused in part by the physical plant and in part by the type of patients BMC has had to take in. Some of those patients have been suffering from problems other than psychiatric problems, i.e., persons suffering from DT's, which is a medical disorder, and persons suffering from organic problems which cause behavioral difficulties. d) Marketing. There has been a lack of an effort to market the availability of the facility. e) Training. The programs offered are not as advanced because of the lack of necessary training. f) Practice patterns. Practice patterns of psychiatrists in the community have contributed to the low occupancy. Because there are only a few psychiatrists in the area and the fact that the Tallahassee Memorial facility has primarily been involved in crisis intervention, the average length of stay (6 to 7 days) is much lower than the average length of stay in other parts of the country. This average length of stay has also, however, been caused by the shortage of Baker Act funds. Closely related to this problem is the fact that there are a large number of nonphysicians providing mental health services in Tallahassee who do not admit patients to the hospital and a large number of health maintenance organizations. g) Communication. The low occupancy rate has also been caused, at least in the minds of Drs. Speer, Sebastian and Moore, by the lack of solicitation of their input into the operation of the facility. At least partly because of the problems at BMC, a few patients have been referred to facilities outside of District 2 for care. Tallahassee Memorial has committed itself to eliminating the low occupancy rate at BMC. In 1982, the administration of Tallahassee Memorial felt it had to decide whether it was going to make a commitment to the facility or get out of psychiatric care. It opted for the former. After making the commitment, 2 primary actions were taken. One was to contract for the services of Behavioral Medical Care; the other was to apply for a certificate of need to replace its 60-bed facility with a new one. Behavioral Medical Care is a joint venture formed by 2 corporations, Comprehensive Health Corporation and Voluntary Health Enterprises. Comprehensive Health Corporation is the largest private provider of chemical dependency rehabilitation services in the country. Voluntary Health Enterprises is an affiliate of Voluntary Hospitals of America which services 70 of the nation's largest not-for-profit hospitals, including Tallahassee Memorial. Behavioral Medical Care was formed to provide the highest quality, lowest cost psychiatric and chemical dependency rehabilitation programs possible. Behavioral Medical Care provides consultation services and/or actually carries out programs and is now providing 20 different programs at 16 different facilities. Of these 20 programs, 5 to 8 are psychiatric programs. The first consultation concerning the psychiatric program at Tallahassee Memorial began in the late winter or early spring of 1983. This consultation was provided by Dr. Russell J. Ricci, now chairman of the board and medical director of Behavioral Medical Care. Dr. Ricci reviewed the status of Tallahassee Memorial's program at that time and recommended significant changes be made in 2 phases: one phase to begin immediately and the second to begin after construction of a new psychiatric hospital. Tallahassee Memorial agreed with Dr. Ricci's proposal and contracted with Behavioral Medical Care to carry out the proposal. Behavioral Medical Care began BMC with an orientation period during which time the existing staff was analyzed, new staff members were hired and the entire staff was trained to implement the new program. During this period, admitting physicians were invited to participate in the implementation program. A new inpatient psychiatric program at BMC was then begun. The program was established to achieve the following goals: to restore patients to their optimum mental health; to make patients as comfortable as possible; to maintain the patients' sense of dignity and self worth; to maintain modern and efficient treatment modalities through research and education; to provide maximum freedom of patients to interact with family and community; and to educate the community. The program was established along interdisciplinary lines and is basically an adult program. It includes individual and group therapy, lectures and seminars, social and nursing assessments, physical examination and psychological testing. The ultimate program provided for a patient, however, depends upon the treatment plan prescribed by the attending physician. The program is, however, limited because of the type of patients at BMC and especially because of the physical plant, which consists of only an open unit and a locked unit. Separation of patients for specialized treatment based upon other factors, such as age, is not achievable in the existing facility. The program at BMC is an adequate program but can be improved. The program is, however, intended only as an interim type program. Treatment of geriatrics and adolescents is available but specialized programs for these groups are not available. Dr. Sebastian agreed that since Behavioral Medical Care had begun managing BMC, the programs had improved. Dr. Moore testified that BMC had attempted to change. As part of the interim program, BMC has established more restrictive admission guidelines; not based upon ability to pay but upon clinical needs. Attempts have been made to eliminate psychotics, geriatrics and persons with significant medical problems. These restrictions on admission are designed to limit admission to persons who will benefit from the new program and are consistent with the existing physical plant. The existing staff, established by Behavioral Medical Care, is adequate. Training of the staff began during the orientation period at BMC and continues today. Educational activities have also been directed toward the medical profession in the community in order to gain more credibility for the discipline of psychiatry. Other steps to improve BMC which have been or will soon be taken include the reclassification of BMC as a department of Tallahassee Memorial and the initiation of a crisis intervention and liaison service in the emergency room of Tallahassee Memorial's main hospital. This new service in the emergency room is designed to identify persons being admitted to the hospital with a need for psychiatric services. As a department, BMC conducts formal monthly meetings of physicians at which input into the operation of BMC may be made. Input by psychiatrists is therefore possible at BMC. The second phase of the changes recommended by Dr. Ricci will begin after completion of the second action to be taken by Tallahassee Memorial as part of its commitment to a psychiatric program: the construction of a new 60- bed facility. Tallahassee Memorial filed an application to replace its present facility with a new 64-bed facility. That application was ultimately granted but for only 60 beds. An application to build another facility considered at the same time was denied. As a result of the issuance of the certificate of need to Tallahassee Memorial, construction of a new psychiatric facility has begun and should be completed in the summer of 1985. The total cost of this new facility is $7,225,000.00. This amount, plus the cost of new programs and staff, has been committed by Tallahassee Memorial to BMC. The facility, a two-level structure, is being constructed on a wooded, sloping site next to the present building BMC is located in. Each level will have 30 beds. It will be a state-of-the-art facility and was designed by architects who specialize in the design of psychiatric facilities. The building was designed with input from the medical staff and Behavioral Medical Care. It is being constructed to accommodate separate psychiatric programs and allows flexibility to accommodate changes in the type of programs offered. Once the new facility is completed, BMC will initiate the second phase of Dr. Ricci's proposal. This phase will consist of the implementation of separate specialized psychiatric programs not available at BMC today. Dr. Ricci has recommended the offering of adult, adolescent, geriatric and chemical dependency programs. Tallahassee Memorial has decided to add an adult program, an adolescent program and will probably add a geriatric program. Other programs, such as a chemical dependency program will be considered. The geriatric program will be added if there are a sufficient number of patients in need of such a program admitted to BMC. Based upon the testimony of Dr. Sebastian, there are a sufficient number of patients who need a geriatric program. Assuming that Dr. Sebastian is correct, a geriatric program should be added to BMC. Even if a separate program is not added, geriatric psychiatric services will be available at the new facility. The construction of the new facility will not eliminate all of the problems which have contributed to the low occupancy at BMC. Phase 2 of Dr. Ricci's proposal to Tallahassee Memorial and the other actions which Tallahassee Memorial has indicated they plan to take should, however, eliminate or at least reduce most of the problems. Dr. Sebastian testified that there will not be enough open space around the new facility The new facility will, however, have 2 open court yards, woods on 3 sides of the building and a greenhouse. The reputation of BMC as being a "crazies place" should be improved with the opening of the new facility and the providing of new, more advanced programs. Efforts to educate the medical community will also help. Also, if Apalachee is granted its certificate of need, the elimination of some of the Baker Act patients cared for by BMC who will be cared for by Apalachee should help improve the reputation of BMC. Finally, BMC has already taken some steps to improve its reputation by initiating an interim program, hiring new staff and limiting its admissions. Instituting specialized programs will also help alleviate the low occupancy problem at BMC. The new facility will allow BMC to establish programs which are needed by allowing the separation of patients which could not be accomplished in the existing facility. Again, eliminating some Baker Act patients will help reduce the problems created by the poor patient mix at BMC. Efforts are being made to market BMC's services. Establishing a liaison in Tallahassee Memorial's emergency room, which is planned, should contribute to increasing occupancy. Tallahassee Memorial projected that sizeable numbers of patients in the general hospital need psychiatric services. This program could reach those patients. BMC, however, needs to institute marketing efforts to reach the general public. Formal training of the staff at BMC was started with Behavioral Medical Care's orientation phase and has continued since that time. Not much can be done directly by BMC to improve the practice patterns of psychiatrists in the community. The new facility and improved programs may help. Transfering Baker Act patients to a new facility operated by Apalachee should allow for more economical treatment of those patients and thus allow for longer lengths of stay. Providing specialized programs also should promote longer lengths of stay. Converting BMC to department status and the holding of monthly meetings of admitting physicians has improved the ability of psychiatrists in the community to have a voice in the operation of BMC. Not enough of an effort is being made in this area, however. Three psychiatrists testified about the lack of solicitation of their input. They are obviously dissatisfied. Despite this fact, Dr. Brodsky, the Medical Director of BMC, testified that BMC was working cooperatively with psychiatrists in the community. In the undersigned's opinion, BMC, Tallahassee Memorial and the psychiatrists in the community need to continue to work toward resolving their differences and to work together to improve the occupancy and the psychiatric care provided at BMC. The perceived effect of CPC's proposal and Apalachee's proposal of the various witnesses was mixed. Drs. Speer, Sebastian and Moore all testified that they supported the CPC proposal. Dr. Speer indicated that she supported CPC's proposal over that of Apalachee and that she thought there was a need for CPC. Dr. Speer's opinion was based almost exclusively on a brochure provided to her by CPC. She did not have any familiarity with existing CPC hospitals. She also had only "some familiarity" with Apalachee's programs. The only reason Dr. Speer specifically gave for supporting CPC was the amount of effort CPC had exerted to solicit physician input and the need for cohesiveness among psychiatrists which she felt was promoted by support of the CPC proposal. Dr. Sebastian testified that he supported the CPC proposal because a new hospital would promote competition which would in turn improve the quality of care. Dr. Moore testified that he was familiar with CPC's and Apalachee's proposals and that he supported CPC's. He also stated that the addition of another psychiatric hospital would improve the availability of medical care because of competition. Dr. Moore also testified that a new facility was needed to provide care for the "private segment" which he described as "those people who choose not to go to the local mental health center for treatment, those people who choose to go to psychiatrists for treatment. " Dr. Brodsky testified that the addition of a new facility to the community might improve BMC because of the added competition. Mr. Honaman and Dr. Ricci both agreed that, if CPC's proposal was approved, a new facility could have an adverse impact on BMC which has been operating at a loss of $300,000.00 a year. Dr. Ricci explained that in order to have specialized programs a hospital must have a sufficient number of patients who need the specialized program. Because of the low occupancy rate at BMC, there is concern as to whether a sufficient number of patients will be available to warrant the specialized programs BMC plans to start if the CPC proposal is approved. Apalachee's proposal will not adversely effect BMC. In fact, Mr. Honaman and Ms. Pamela McDowell, both of whom testified on behalf of Tallahassee Memorial, indicated that if Apalachee's facility was approved BMC's ability to provide quality care would be enhanced. Tom Porter, testifying on behalf on the Department, indicated that CPC's and Apalachee's proposals should both be denied because of the low occupancy at BMC and the adverse effect approval of either proposal would have on BMC. Mr. Porter's opinion, however, was based only upon his review of the Petitioners' applications. Mr. Porter made no independent studies as to the impact of the proposals on BMC and was not aware of most of the evidence presented at the hearing. The Ability of the Applicant to Provide Quality of Care. CPC. The services to be available at or provided by the proposed CPC facility include psycho-physiological diagnosis and evaluation, emergency service, milieu therapy (immersion into the clinical environment for structured daily treatment), individual and group therapy, family therapy, occupational therapy, an adolescent school program, a partial hospitalization program, aftercare, community education and related medical services (which will be provided by contracting with other area health care providers). Actual programs to be provided at the facility are to be developed by the physicians who join the medical staff of the facility with the assistance of CPC which has developed model programs which may be used. The staffing projections for the facility are adequate. The manpower projected can provide quality of care and will comply with the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals. CPC's experience in operating its 24 existing psychiatric facilities and its philosophy that it will provide quality of care support a finding that CPC does have the ability to provide quality of care. 1/ CPC's proposed physical facility is designed to provide quality of care. The facility will be located in northeast Tallahassee. It will be constructed on a little less than one acre of a 10-acre parcel of land which CPC has a contract to purchase for $400,000.00. Part of the remaining 9-plus acres will be used for parking and recreational space and a substantial portion will be left in its natural state as a buffer. The hospital building itself will consist of a one-story structure with a separate section for each category of proposed beds, a lobby, business and general offices and storage rooms. One section will be used as a 20-bed open adult unit. Another section will be used as a 10-bed adult intensive care unit. This section will be locked. A nursing station will separate the adult intensive care unit and the open adult unit and is designed for visibility down the halls of both units. Two seclusion rooms will be located at the nursing station also to allow for observation from the nursing station. The location of the nursing station will reduce staff responsibility thus reducing the cost of operating the facility. The other two units will consist of a 15-bed adolescent open unit and a 15-bed geriatric unit. These units will be separated by a nursing station designed in the same manner as the nursing station separating the adult units. These units will also be separated by a locked door. There will also be a support structure built next to the hospital which will contain a kitchen, dining hall for all patients, 4 classrooms, 4 multi-purpose rooms, an occupational therapy room and a half-court gymnasium. There is no covered access from the main building to the support structure. The floor plan for the facility is similar to the floor plans used for other CPC hospitals. Therefore, the design costs of the facility will be less than for a new one-of-a-kind facility. Apalachee. In order to ensure quality of care, Apalachee has established a Quality Assurance Committee. Additionally, Apalachee is inspected by the Department and is accredited by the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals. No evidence was submitted which raises any question as to Apalachee's ability to provide quality of care. The existing building to which Apalachee's proposed facility will be added is located at Apalachee's Eastside facility. Eastside is located on 10 acres of land in northeast Tallahassee. Eastside presently consists of a building in which PATH, the detoxification program and emergency services is located. The building has 12 semi-private rooms and 24 beds. The new facility will be added to the existing building. A total of 13,000 square feet will be added. It will consist of an 18-bed open unit and a 6-bed closed unit. Also to be located at the Eastside facility is a 16-bed long-term adolescent psychiatric hospital which the Department has indicated it will approve. If this facility and the proposed 24-bed facility are built, Apalachee will have a total of 96 beds providing a variety of services. The Availability and Adequacy of Other Psychiatric Services. Apalachee currently provides a wide range of psychiatric health services in Subdistrict 2, including a crisis stabilization unit and short-term residential treatment programs. These services have been used as an alternative to inpatient care in some cases. CPC gave no consideration to these programs in its application. Apalachee did consider these programs and showed that its proposal would compliment its existing programs. As suggested by CPC in its proposed recommended order, Apalachee's existing programs are not a substitute for acute inpatient psychiatric services. Joint, Cooperative and Shared Psychiatric Services. CPC. CPC's operation of 24 psychiatric hospitals provides the potential for joint, cooperative or shared health resources in the operation of its proposed facility. Very little evidence was presented, however, that such potential would be realized if CPC's proposed facility is approved. Evidence was presented that model programs will be "available" for use in developing programs for the proposed facility. CPC also showed that standardized equipment selection and purchasing, and standardized floor plans would be used in establishing the facility. This will effect the short-term financial feasibility of the proposal. Apalachee. By placing the facility at the same location of other Apalachee programs, Apalachee will be able to share some services among programs and thereby reduce costs. For example, kitchen and dining services, staffing, security, purchasing, and maintenance and administrative services will be shared. The integration of Apalachee's existing programs with the proposed facility will promote a continuum of care and thus improve the quality of care. The Need for Research and Education Facilities. 106. Apalachee currently provides training to practitioners pursuant to an agreement with the School of Social Welfare at Florida State University. It also provides internship programs for psychology majors at Florida State University and nursing students at Florida State University and Florida A&M University. It is probable, therefore, that the new facility will be available for training purposes. No proof was offered, however, that indicates there is a need for training programs not being currently met which will be met if either of the proposed facilities is approved. Availability of Resources. 107. Health manpower and management personnel are available to staff the CPC or the Apalachee proposal. CPC and Apalachee also have adequate funds to build the proposed facilities. The adequacy of funds to build and operate the facilities is discussed further, infra. The Immediate and Long-Term Financial Feasibility of the Proposal. CPC. The projected cost of CPC's facility was $5,086,000.00. This amount will be increased for inflation if the facility is delayed another year. CPC will contribute 20 percent of the projected cost of the facility in the form of cash and liquid assets CPC has on hand. Eighty percent of the projected cost will constitute debt of the facility to CPC payable at a 12 percent interest rate over a 20-year period. The immediate financial feasibility of CPC's proposal has clearly been shown. In its application, CPC projected that its facility would generate a net income after taxes in each of the first 2 years of its operation. In its proforma, patient revenues were based upon the following charges per patient day: Adolescent $225.00 Adult, I.C.U. 215.00 Adult Open Unit 210.00 Geriatric 200.00 These projected rates were based upon a 1985 opening date. The rates will therefore be higher if the facility opens in 1987, but, according to Mr. Mercer, the bottom line profitability of the facility will not change. The projected rates, according to Mr. Mercer, are based upon rates charged at other CPC hospitals in Atlanta, New Orleans, Jacksonville and Ft. Lauderdale and interviews with Tallahassee physicians. According to Alton Scott, an expert in health care finance and financial feasibility, the proposed rates are considerably lower than the average rate at CPC's Jacksonville and Ft. Lauderdale hospitals, which was $240.00 for their fiscal year ending in 1984. Mr. Scott did not indicate that he considered the rate at CPC's Atlanta or New Orleans facility, however, which Mr. Mercer also considered in projecting rates for the proposed facility. Mr. Scott's testimony, however, raises a question as to the reasonableness of the proposed facility's rates. CPC's projected gross patient revenue is based upon an occupancy rate of 53 percent in the first year of operation and 75 percent in the second year. CPC projects $2,476,160.00 of gross patient revenue in the first year (an average $212.00 per day rate x 11,680 patient days) and $3,597,075.00 of gross patient revenue in the second year (an average $219.00 per day rate x 16,425 patient days). CPC's average occupancy rates are directly related to the number of admissions and the average length of stay of a patient. In support of the number of admissions projected by CPC, CPC offered the 3 need methodologies discussed, supra. Those methodologies have, however, been rejected as unsound. CPC's admission rates are based only on an assumed census. The assumed census is based upon conversations with physicians and the corporate experience of CPC. Although conversations with physicians and the corporate experience of CPC should be considered, these factors should be considered as support for other evidence as to possible admissions which has not been presented by CPC. What physicians have told Mr. Mercer is not alone sufficient to support assumed admissions. There is no guarantee that local physicians will refer clients only to CPC's facility or that their case load will remain the same. CPC's corporate experience as to length of stay does not add much support since the overall corporate experience of CPC's facilities for the year ending November 20, 1983, shows that the overall occupancy (excluding its Valley Vista facility) was 56.3 percent. This rate of occupancy is well below CPC's projected second year occupancy rate for the Tallahassee facility. The occupancy rate of CPC's Ft. Lauderdale and Jacksonville hospitals was 50.6 percent and 60 percent respectively, which is low for the State. Of all of CPC's psychiatric hospitals only 1 has an occupancy rate over 80 percent. Another problem with CPC's projected occupancy rate is that CPC has projected that 5 percent of its patient days will be attributable to Baker Act patients and 5 percent will be attributable to Medicaid Patients. In order for the proposed facility to receive Baker Act patients it will be necessary that it enter into a contract with Apalachee. No evidence was presented that such a contract could be obtained from Apalachee. As to the percentage of Medicaid patients, it is clear that CPC would not be entitled to receive reimbursement from Medicaid for these patients since its facility will be a free-standing facility and Medicaid does not reimburse for inpatient psychiatric services at free-standing hospitals. Based upon these facts, it appears that the assumption of CPC that a total of 10 percent of its patient days will be attributable to Baker Act and Medicaid patients is of questionable validity. Mr. Mercer's testimony that, even without the Baker Act and Medicaid patients, the projected occupancy could be met is illogical. If the projected revenue attributable to Baker Act and Medicaid patients is eliminated along with the projected expenses attributable thereto, CPC still projected a net after tax profit for its first two years of operation. CPC offered no evidence, however, sufficient to conclude that its projections as to occupancy of other types of patients can be achieved. CPC's projected average length of stay of 30 days is also suspect. It is not consistent with the average length of stay locally, in Florida, nationwide or in CPC's experience. Based upon the foregoing, CPC's projected occupancy levels are not realistic. This directly effects the projected revenues for the proposed facility. Salary and other expenses projected for the facility are also questionable. Nonsalary expenses are significantly lower than CPC's existing Florida facilities which are the lowest in Florida. Salary expenses, projected 2 years in the future, are also lower than present salary levels at CPC's Florida facilities. Again, the salary levels at CPC's 2 Florida hospitals are among the lowest for the 10 Florida facilities providing similar services. These low salaries are also based upon projections for a project which will not open for 2 more years. Despite this fact, they are lower than current salaries at CPC's existing Florida facilities and salaries being paid locally. Apalachee. The projected cost of the addition of the 24-bed facility to Apalachee's existing PATH and detoxification facility is $1,114,339.00. Apalachee will provide $114,339.00 of the necessary funds from its operating fund and the remaining $1,000,000.00 will be obtained from the sale of industrial revenue bonds. The bonds will be 15-year bonds, with a 7 year balloon and were projected at a 10.75 percent annual interest rate (75 percent of the Chase Manhattan Bank prime interest rate). First National Bank has committed to purchase $3,000,000.00 of industrial revenue bonds, which includes the $1,000,000.00 for this project. The immediate financial feasibility of Apalachee's proposal has clearly been shown. In projecting its gross charges for the first 2 years of operation, Apalachee has predicted an occupancy rate of 62.5 percent in the first month of operation increasing to 87.4 percent in the last month of operation of the second year. Gross charges are projected at $1,557,940.00 the first year (6,385 patient days x $244.00 per day rate) and $1,883,648.00 the second year (7,358 patient days x $256.00 per day rate). Apalachee' s projections are reasonable. Although it will be a free-standing psychiatric facility, Apalachee will be able to receive some Medicaid funding under the Department's "centers and clinics" option. Apalachee's projections as to gross charges, deductions from gross charges, and operating expenses are reasonable. Based upon its projections, Apalachee will realize a profit from the new facility in each of its first 2 years of operation. Competition. CPC. The addition of CPC's facility will promote competition in Subdistrict 2, as testified to by Dr. Brodsky, the Medical Director of BMC, among others. Because of the low occupancy at BMC, however, such competition at this time would be harmful. Apalachee. Apalachee's proposed facility will not compete with BMC. Although Apalachee's facility will initially reduce BMC's occupancy, removing the patients Apalachee will serve from BMC will improve the quality of care provided at BMC. Construction. CPC Construction and related costs of the CPC facility will consist of the following: Parking $27,500.00 Project development costs 22,000.00 Architectural/engineering fees 135,000.00 Site survey and soil investigation report 25,000.00 Construction supervision 10,000.00 Construction manager 4,000.00 Site preparation 100,000.00 Construction 3,000,000.00 Contingency 100,000.00 Inflation 270,000.00 These costs are all adequate to cover the cost of these items. These amounts will also be adequate even if construction does not begin until the end of 1985. The projected cost of equipment and furnishings was $500,000.00. This amount is adequate to equip the facility properly. In fact, the projected cost is probably substantially overstated. 2/ Although CPC failed to list in its application all of the equipment and furnishings (only major movable equipment was listed) necessary to equip the facility, adequate equipment and furnishings will be provided. Apalachee. The projected cost of constructing Apalachee's facility consists of the following: Architectural/engineering fees Site survey and soil investigation $75,740.00 report 2,000.00 Construction 876,620.00 Contingency 43,831.00 Inflation 26,298.00 These amounts are sufficient to construct the facility. The cost per square foot of the construction will be $60.00. The cost of equipment needed to equip the new facility is projected at $53,850.00. This amount is adequate for the purchase of the equipment listed in Apalachee's application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the certificate of need application filed by CPC, case number 84-1614, be denied. It is further RECOMMENDED: That the certificate of need application, as amended, filed by Apalachee, case number 84-1820, be approved. DONE and ENTERED this 10th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of April, 1985.
The Issue Whether the Department should issue certificate of need number 4502 to construct and operate a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Leon County, Florida, to HCAC?
Findings Of Fact HCAC is a corporation formed by Anthony Estevez for the purpose of developing and operating a long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. The facility was to be known as HCAC psychiatric Hospital of Leon County. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of the stock of HCAC. The Department is the state agency in Florida authorized to issue certificates of need for long-term psychiatric facilities. TMRMC is a general acute care hospital located in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. TMRMC operates a free- standing short-term psychiatric facility in a two-story, approximately 45,000 square foot, structure located within a block and a half from the main hospital. TMRMC's psychiatric facility is licensed for sixty beds. At present, forty-five of its beds are actually open, with fifteen beds in each of three units. One unit is available for adult patients (including geriatric patients), one is available for adolescent patients and one is available for an open adult unit. The other fifteen beds are available but are not staffed because of a lack of patients. Apalachee is a private, non-profit corporation. Apalachee provides comprehensive community mental health services to Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties. Apalachee was established consistent with State and federal guidelines to provide a variety of mental health Services. On March 17, 1986, a Letter of Intent was filed with the Department notifying the Department of Mr. Estevez's intent to apply for a certificate of need in the March 16, 1986, batching cycle. This Letter of Intent was filed within the time requirements of Florida law. On April 15, 1986 Estevez filed an application for a certificate of need for a comprehensive, free-standing, ninety-bed long-term psychiatric facility to be located in Leon County, Florida. Leon County is located in the Department's District 2. District 2 is made up of Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Jackson, Jefferson, Holmes, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor, Wakulla and Washington Counties. Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties make up Subdistrict 2B. The other Counties make up Subdistrict 2A. HCAC's application was filed with the Department and the District 2 local health council. In a letter dated May 15, 1987, the Department requested additional information from HCAC. The information requested by the Department was provided by HCAC on or about June 19, 1986 and June 23, 1986. On September 23, 1986, the Department issued a State Agency Action Report partially approving HCAC's certificate of need application. HCAC was notified of the Department's decision and was issued certificate of need #4502 by letter dated September 30, 1986. HCAC had sought approval to construct a ninety-bed facility providing specialty long-term psychiatric services for the chronically mentally disturbed; patients with a ninety-day average length of stay. The facility was to provide care to adolescents, adults and geriatrics. Certificate of need #4502 authorized HCAC to construct a fifty-bed long-term adult, geriatric and adolescent psychiatric hospital in Leon County. The Department approved the facility because of its perception that there is no long-term psychiatric facility serving the geographic area proposed by HCAC to be served. By letter dated November 13, 1987, the Department issued an amended certificate of need #4502 to HCAC restricting the services to be provided to adult and geriatric long-term psychiatric services. HCAC intends on using thirty-six beds for adults and fourteen beds for geriatric patients. HCAC did not contest the Department's reduction in the size of the approved facility or the limitation of the scope of services to adult and geriatric patients. At the formal hearing HCAC presented evidence to Support the approved fifty-bed facility Serving only adults and geriatrics. HCAC has not contested the Department's decision to only partially approve HCAC's application. Supporting documentation took into account the smaller size of the approved facility. No substantial change in the scope or emphasis of the facility was made by HCAC other than the elimination of adolescent Services. HCAC has projected an average occupancy rate of 80 percent for the third year of operation. Because of the failure to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds for District 2, HCAC has failed to prove that this projection is reasonable. As of the date of the Department's initial decision and at the time of the formal hearing of these cases Rivendell Family Care Center (hereinafter referred to as "Rivendell") an eighty-bed long-term-psychiatric free-standing hospital located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida, had been open for approximately six weeks. Rivendell's occupancy rate at the time of the formal hearing was approximately twenty-four percent. Long-term psychiatric services mean hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of ninety days. Long-term psychiatric services may be provided pursuant to the Department's rules in hospitals holding a general license or in a free-standing facility holding a specialty hospital license. Generally, the chronically mentally ill constitute an under-served group. In order to provide a complete continuum of care for the mentally ill, in-patient hospital treatment, including twenty-four hour medical care and nursing services and intensive resocialization or teaching of resocialization skills, should be provided. The Department has not established a standard method of quantifying need for long-term psychiatric beds in Florida. The Department's approval of the additional long- term psychiatric beds and facility at issue in this proceeding and the Department's and HCAC's position during the formal hearing that there is a need for HCAC's facility was based generally upon their conclusion that there is a "lack of such a facility to serve the geographic area." During the formal hearing, the Department further justified the need for the facility as follows: Basically it was felt that given the geographic distance or distances between this area, the eastern portion of District II, and the closest facilities, meaning licensed hospitals or facilities authorized by a Certificate of Need to offer long-term adult psychiatric services in a Chapter 395 licensed hospital, that there probably should be one here of a minimal size because we were not firm in, or in surety of the number of patients who might need the service in this area. But we thought that there should be at least a minimally sized long-term psychiatric hospital in this area to serve this area. HCAC and the Department failed to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. At best, HCAC and the Department have relied upon speculation and assumptions to support approval of the proposed facility. In order to prove need, the characteristics of the population to be served by a proposed health service should be considered. A determination that there is a need for a health service should be based upon demographic data, including the population in the service area, referral sources and existing services. HCAC and the Department did not present such evidence sufficient enough to Support the additional fifty beds at issue in this proceeding. HCAC did not use any need methodology to quantify the gross need for long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Nor did HCAC or the Department present sufficient proof concerning existing services, the population to be served, the income or insurance coverage of the Service area population or actual service area referral patterns. In its application. HCAC premised its proposal, in part, on the assumption that "the Leon County area is an undeserved area with residents being referred to facilities long distances away." HCAC exhibit 2. The evidence does not support this assumption. HCAC also premised its proposal upon its conclusion that it would receive patient referrals from existing institutions. The evidence failed to support this conclusion. HCAC also premised its proposal upon the fact that long-term psychiatric services have been designated as a licensure category by the Department. This does not, however, create a presumption that there is a need for such services in a particular area. Based upon the evidence presented at the formal hearing concerning one methodology for quantifying the need for long-term psychiatric beds, there may already be a surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Such a surplus of beds may exist whether State hospital beds and ARTS and GRTS program beds are considered. The methodology is based upon national length of stay data for 1980 which was obtained from the National Institute of Mental Health. The methodology did not take into account more current data or Florida specific data. Therefore, use of the methodology did not prove the exact number of long- term psychiatric beds needed for District 2. Although the weight of the evidence concerning the use of the methodology failed to support a finding as to the exact number of long-term psychiatric beds needed in District 2, its use was sufficient to support a finding that there may be a surplus of beds already in existence. The methodology further supports the conclusion that HCAC and the Department have failed to meet their burden of proving that there is a need for the proposed facility. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether long-term inpatient psychiatric services, other than those provided at State hospitals, are "within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's [District 2] population." The closest long-term inpatient psychiatric facility [other than a State hospital], Rivendell, is located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. This facility is located in Subdistrict 2A. There is no facility located in Subdistrict 2B. Rivendell is located on the western edge of Subdistrict 2B, however. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this facility is not within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of District 2's population. On page seven of the State Agency Action Report approving Rivendell, the Department indicated that "[t]he proposed location insures that 90 percent of the District I and District II population will have access within two hours travel time." This determination was made prior to the initial approval by the Department of HCAC's proposed facility. If the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee (hereinafter referred to as "Chattahoochee"), which is located in District 2, is taken into account, long-term psychiatric services are available within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for a least 90 percent of District 2's population. Chattahoochee provides long-term inpatient psychiatric hospital care to indigent and private pay patients. The quality of cafe at Chattahoochee is good and a full range of therapeutic modalities typically available at other psychiatric hospitals are available. HCAC and the Department have suggested that there is need for the additional fifty beds at is sue in these cases because of their conclusion that 90 percent of the population of District 2 is not within two hours under average travel conditions of long-term psychiatric services. The failure to prove this conclusion further detracts from their position as to the need for the proposed facility. HCAC exhibit 8 is a copy of the goals, objectives and recommended actions contained in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan relating to mental health facilities. The evidence in this proceeding failed to support a finding that HCAC's proposed facility will enhance these goals, objectives and recommended actions. Goal 1 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[e]nsure the availability of mental health and substance abuse services to all Florida residents in a least restrictive setting." Objectives 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4, and the actions recommended to achieve these objectives are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Objective 1.3 provides that additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not be approved in any district which has "an average annual occupancy of at least 80 percent for all existing and approved long-term inpatient psychiatric beds." Goal 2 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[p]romote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Goal 3 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[d]evelope a complete range of essential public mental health services in each HRS district." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. The Florida State Plan for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services does not specifically deal with private long-term psychiatric services. Instead, it relates specifically to treatment in the state mental health treatment facilities. The applicable district mental health plan does not specifically address long-term psychiatric services. The plan does, however, recommend that new facilities should indicate a commitment to serving the medically indigent. HCAC has agreed to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care. HCAC's commitment to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care is consistent with this objective. Mental Health District Boards have been abolished. The District 2 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Planning Council, however, has published the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 1986-89 Provisional District Plan. It is acknowledged in this Plan that deinstitutionalization and the provision of the least restrictive means of treatment should be promoted. The use of long- term psychiatric inpatient beds does not promote this philosophy. If a patient is not admitted as part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC and cannot pay the $10,500.00 per month admission charges, HCAC will not admit the patient. Additionally, if a patient is admitted and runs out of funds to pay the daily charges and is not part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment, the patient will be transferred to another facility. HCAC's facility will be accessible to all residents who can pay for their services or who are part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC. The provision of 5.6 percent indigent care is adequate. HCAC will provide non- discriminatory health care services, to those indigent patients who are covered by HCAC's 5.6 percent commitment. The Counties which make up Subdistrict 2B, other than Leon County, are below the average national and State poverty levels. In most of the Counties, twenty percent of the population have incomes below the poverty level. HCAC has not managed any type of psychiatric hospital and currently has no employees. The proposed facility is to be managed by Flowers Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Flowers"). Flowers is a psychiatric management company that has been in operation since 1984. Mr. Estevez owns fifty-one percent of the stock of Flowers and is the Chairman of the Board. Flowers is operating five Psychiatric/substance abuse facilities: three hospital based and two free-standing pychiatric/chemical dependency facilities. The staff and faculty of Flowers has a strong background in the management of psychiatric facilities. Flowers has no experience in the management of a long-term psychiatric facility. Mr. Nelson Elliot Rodney, Flowers' Regional Vice President, will be ultimately responsible for the management of the proposed facility. The administrator of the facility will report to Mr. Rodney. Mr. Rodney will seek to implement the goals outlined in HCAC's certificate of need application for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney has not designed a psychiatric hospital. Nor has Mr. Rodney worked at or administered a long- term psychiatric hospital. The overall treatment plan as presented in HCAC's certificate of need application and as presented at the formal hearing lends itself to the development of a good program for long-term psychiatric care. HCAC has associated itself with experts in long-term psychiatric care in order to develop a detailed plan specifically addressing the treatment needs of long-term psychiatric patients. HCAC has the ability to, and will, provide good quality patient care. Apalachee provides certain programs in Subdistrict 2B which provide alternatives to long-term psychiatric hospitalization: the Geriatric Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "GRTS") and the Adult Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "ARTS"). Apalachee's GRTS program, which serves Individuals fifty-five years of age and older, contains a residential component with a total capacity of Seventy geriatric beds. A wide variety of services are provided as part of the GRTS program, including day treatment and case management components. When Apalachee's ARTS program is fully implemented there will be a total of one hundred sixty-three beds available for the care on long-term mentally ill adults and geriatrics within Subdistrict 2B. The ARTS program serves adults who are eighteen to fifty-four years of age. Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs do not provide the identical services provided in a free-standing long-term psychiatric hospital. The programs do provide some identical or similar services, and, to that extent, the programs complement the continuum of psychiatric care available. To the extent that they provide the same type of services, Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs serve as alternatives to HCAC's proposed facility. There is a national shortage of registered nurses. This shortage is particularly acute with regard to psychiatric nurses. TMRMC has a current shortage of three registered psychiatric nurses, three part-time psychiatric registered nurses, seven flex positions for psychiatric nurses, one full- time nurse technician position and one mental health worker. TMRMC has had difficulty, despite adequate efforts to recruit, recruiting for its psychiatric facility since it opened. It has never been fully staffed with psychiatric nurses. There is also a shortage of occupational therapists. TMRMC has had an occupational therapist vacancy for seven months. Mr. Rodney will be responsible for the recruitment of the necessary personnel for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney indicated that he would utilize recruitment methods similar to those used by TMRMC. Mr. Rodney will also use his experience and contacts in the Dade County, Florida area. HCAC's salary package is reasonable and HCAC will provide adequate in- service training programs. Although HCAC will have difficulty in attracting qualified staff, just as TMRMC has had, it will be able to obtain adequate staff for the proposed facility. HCAC may do so, however, at the expense of existing health care providers. Apalachee provides the following programs in District 2: Wateroak--A sixteen-bed long-term psychiatric hospital for the treatment of children and adolescents. It is a licensed Specialty hospital; In November of 1987, Apalachee began construction of an acute care facility, which will provide inpatient short- term psychiatric services; Case Management Services--Case management services, which include supportive counseling, medication therapy, assistance with transportation and home visitation, are provided to the chronically mentally ill on an outpatient basis. The Services are to be provided where the patients reside; Hilltop--A sixteen-bed residential treatment center. Hilltop is a group home living facility for adults eighteen to fifty-four years of age; Chemical Dependency Program--Individual, group and family counseling and educational services on an outpatient basis for Individuals with suspected substance abuse problems; Emergency Services--Year-round, twenty-four hour a day telephone or face-to-face evaluations to persons with an acute disturbance or who are in need of evaluation for determination of the proper level of care; PATH--Positive Alternative to Hospitalization Program, a crises stabilization unit developed as an alternative to short-term psychiatric care; PPC--Primary Care Center, a nonhospital medical detoxification unit providing short-term detoxification care to alcohol abusers; Gerontological Programs--Made up of the GRTS program and an outpatient component. Through the outpatient component, Apalachee uses its outpatient clinics in each County in its service area to provide linkage for therapy and medication and supportive counseling to geriatrics; ARTS Program; and Designated Public Receiving Facility--Apalachee is the designated public receiving facility for Subdistrict 2B. It screens and evaluates every person admitted to Chattahoochee. Apalachee's adult mental health programs which are available to indigent patients, directly impact both long and short-term hospital utilization, lowering such utilization. For example, before establishing the services provided to suspected substance abusers, many patients were placed in long-term psychiatric hospitals. Referrals to TMRMC of patients under the Baker Act have been reduced from an average of fifteen to eighteen patients per day to an average of one-half to one person per day. There has also been a decrease in admissions to Chattahoochee since Apalachee established the GRTS and ARTS programs. At the time of the formal hearing of these cases TMRMC had a census of only twenty-eight adult patients in its short-term psychiatric facility. TMRMC's census has been low for the past two years. TMRMC's short-term psychiatric facility is operating at a loss. Any further loss of patients would have a serious impact on the facility. From October 1, 1986 to July 31, 1987, TMRMC lost $127,337.00 on its short-term psychiatric facility. For the twelve-month period from October 1, 1986 to October 1, 1987, it is reasonably estimated that TMRMC will lose $139,722.00. TMRMC would like to open the fifteen-bed unit (which is presently closed) of its short-term psychiatric facility. It must increase its census before it can do so. It has been attempting to increase its census by sending out mail-outs and newsletters, sponsoring educational programs advertising, inviting health care professionals to the facility and initiating clinical affiliations with university programs. Rivendell is an eighty-bed long-term psychiatric facility. Forty of its eighty beds are licensed for adults and geriatric patients. The other forty beds are licensed for children and adolescent patients. Rivendell's census at the time of the formal hearing of these cases was six to eight patients. Chattahoochee has a total of 823 long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics. There are no like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics located in Subdistrict 2B. The only like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics available to residents of District 2 are located in Subdistrict 2A at Rivendell. The proposed HCAC facility will result in increased competition in District 2. This increase in competition will have an adverse impact on suppliers of inpatient psychiatric services. Admissions to the proposed facility will likely include patients who would be more appropriately hospitalized in a short-term facility. Although HCAC has no plans to admit short-term patients and will attempt to prevent such admissions, mental health professionals cannot accurately predict the length of a patient's stay upon admission. The determination will often require an in- hospital evaluation of the patient. Therefore, patients more appropriately treated in a short-term facility such as TMRMC will end up spending some tide in HCAC's proposed facility. TMRMC will lose patient days if the HCAC facility is constructed. This will adversely affects TMRMC's occupancy rate, which is already low, and cause further losses in revenue. Given the surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2 and the low occupancy of short-term beds in Subdistrict 2B, it will difficult for HCAC to continue in existence without admitting short-term psychiatric patients. The operation of the proposed HCAC facility will also adversely affect the availability of nurses to staff Apalachee's acute care facility and other Apalachee operations and TMRMC's ability to staff its short-term psychiatric facility. Even the loss of one more full-time registered nurse at TMRMC could cause critical staffing problems. Because of the lack of need for fifty additional long-term psychiatric beds in District 2, HCAC's proposed facility would also have an adverse affect on Rivendell. The proposed facility will provide internships, field placements and semester rotations for psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses and counselors. The facility will work closely with community agencies and community personnel in developing, operating and providing resources for training for community groups, patient groups and personnel. In- service training will be open to selected professionals in the community. HCAC's proposed facility will have a positive effect on the clinical needs of health professional training programs and schools for health professions in District 2. The-total estimated cost of the proposed project approved by the Department is $4,108,000.00. HCAC plans on financing 100 percent of the cost of the project with a mortgage loan at 13 percent interest. Mr. Estevez has had experience in obtaining financing for health care and other commercial projects. In 1987 alone, Mr. Estevez was personally involved in over $20,000,000.00 of financing. Short-term financial feasibility means the ability to successfully fund a project to ensure that the project will succeed in the short-term. To achieve short-term financial feasibility, there must be sufficient funds to cover any losses incurred during the initial operating period and to cover any short fall in working capital necessary to fund the project. NCNB, a financial institution with which Mr. Estevez has had, and continues to have, a long and profitable association, has indicated interest in financing the proposed project. A financing letter to this effect has been provided. Although the letter does not specifically refer to the proposed project, the weight of the evidence supports a finding that NCNB would be willing to finance the project. In light of Mr. Estevez's experience in obtaining commercial financing and his relationship with NCNB, it is reasonable to conclude that 100 percent financing of the project can be obtained at 13 percent interest. The proposed project will have a negative cash balance at the end of its first and second year of operation. Given Mr. Estevez's commitment to the project, sufficient funds for capital and operating expenses will be available to cover these negative cash balances. Although Mr. Estevez did not provide a separate audited financial statement, the weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Estevez has the ability to provide the necessary capital. In the short-term, HCAC's proposal is financially feasible. HCAC has projected that it will operate at an average length of stay of ninety days. It will charge an all-inclusive $350.00 per day for its long- term psychiatric services, including all ancillary services. Initially, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicaid of 30 percent; Medicare of 20 percent; and insurance and private pay of 50 percent. HCAC was informed by the Department that Medicaid reimbursement was not available for psychiatric services in private free-standing psychiatric hospitals. Consequently, HCAC modified its payor mix by eliminating Medicaid from its payor mix. At the formal hearing of this case, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicare of 3.3 percent; indigent of 5.6 percent; and insurance and private pay of 91.1 percent. Medicare reimburses for psychiatric care in a limited fashion. That is why HCAC reduced its projected Medicare reimbursement to 3.3 percent of its total revenue. Medicare patients generally use the majority of their lifetime reserve Medicare reimbursable days for other types of care, including short-term psychiatric care and acute care. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care generally have a poor work history because of their illness interferes with their ability to obtain and maintain employment. Patients have few economic resources of their own. A patients family structure is often disorganized as a result of the patient's episodes of illness. These episodes strain the family relationship. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care are often unable to pay for needed services and their family members are either unable or unwilling to support the person. There is no facility in Florida with a payor mix of 91 percent insurance and private pay. HCAC's projection of 91.1 percent insurance and private pay is not a reasonable projection. This finding of fact is based upon the high poverty levels within Subdistrict 2B, the lack of need for additional long-term psychiatric beds and the failure to prove that insurance benefits for long-term care are available in District 2. The State of Florida, Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan does not provide coverage for specialty hospitals, such as HCAC's proposed facility. The State of Florida provides 42 percent of the employment in Leon County. Insurance provided by other employers in the area limits coverage for inpatient psychiatric care to thirty to thirty-one days. These benefits are often exhausted before long- term care becomes necessary. In order to achieve a 91.1 percent insurance and private pay payor mix, 80 percent to 100 percent will have to be private pay patients. Such a high percentage of private pay patients is not reasonable. The effective buying income in Leon County in 1986 was approximately $22,600.00. In District 2 it was $18,700.00. Madison County and Jefferson County are among the counties heading Florida's poverty rate. Taylor County is the ninth poorest county in the State. HCAC has projected a 95 percent occupancy rate for its proposed facility within six months of its opening. HCAC has failed to prove that this occupancy rate can be achieved. In light of the high poverty rate in the area, the lack of need for long-term psychiatric services and the inability of patients to pay for such services, this projected occupancy rate is not reasonable. In light of HCAC's failure to prove that there is a need for the proposed facility or that its payor mix is reasonable, HCAC has failed to demonstrate that its occupancy projection is achievable. HCAC has projected that 7.3 percent of its gross revenue will be deducted as revenue deductions. Included in this amount are contractual allowances, charity care and bad debts. Medicare reimburses hospitals for total costs rather than revenue or charges. HCAC, therefore, gas projected approximately $6,000.00 for the first year and $24,000.00 for second year as contractual allowances. HCAC's projection of deductions from revenue are not reasonable. Bad debt of 1.6 percent is unreasonable compared to the experience at other long- term psychiatric facilities in Florida. The $350.00 all-inclusive charge is not reasonable. This charge will not be sufficient to cover the proposed facility's costs. HCAC's projected costs for "Supplies and other" and for taxes are reasonable. HCAC has failed to prove that its proposed facility is financially feasible in the long-term. The projected and approved cost of construction is $3,965,456.00. HCAC has indicated that the facility will consist of two, one-story buildings connected by a hallway. The facility will have approximately 40,563 gross square footage. The actual site for the project has not been selected or purchased. The floor plan calls for twenty-five, semi-private rooms for patients. The patient-care building will contain four independent and secure living/program areas connecting to a central core which will contain an atrium open to the outdoors. There will be approximately 811 gross square feet per bed, which is adequate. The proposed design is reasonable. The projected completion forecast of HCAC is reasonable. The projected costs of completing the building are reasonable. The building will be built by Project Advisers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "PAC"). PAC is a health care, commercial and residential construction company. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of PAC. Since 1978, PAC has been involved in the construction of St. John's Rehab Center and Nursing Home, South Dade Nursing Home, Hialeah Convalescent Center, South Dade Rehab Hospital and two psychiatric/chemical dependency hospitals for Glenbeigh Hospital. Generally, there are no differences in the construction requirements between short-term and long-term psychiatric facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department enter a Final Order denying the application of HCAC for a certificate of need to construct and operated a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4373 and 864374 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact it has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommend Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. HCAC's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 5-6. The third through fourth sentence are hereby accepted. 1 and 6. 3 1 and 39. 4 6 and 9 5 7. 6 8-10, 34 and 97. 7 11. 8 11, 14 and 76. The last Sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence 6. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10 10 and 69. 11 Hereby accepted. 12 39-40. 13 These proposed findings of fact are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. They deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. 14 42. 15-19 Although these proposed findings of fact- are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the-evidence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are hereby accepted. Although the proposed finding of fact contained in the first sentence is generally true, it is cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The rest of the proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. These proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23-26 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 27 Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that HCAC will be able to achieve its plans. 28-33 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 34 43. 35 51. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 36 52. 37 53. 38 69-70. 39 72. 40 73. 41 74. 42 67. 43 68. 44 34 and 37. 45 104. 46. The first sentence is law. The last sentence is accepted in 105. 47 97 and 99-100. 48 101. 49 103. 50 102. 51 Hereby accepted. 52-53 These proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given other evidence. 54 78. 55 79-80. 56 79. 57-58 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings of fact do not support HCAC's projected utilization. Irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 65 92. 66 93. 67 94. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 68 95. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. HCAC's proposed facility and TMRMC are not comparable. 71-75 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 54 and 59. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 79-83 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 84-85 Statement of law. Hereby accepted. 6 and 25. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 88-90 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 91-92 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 93 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. 94-95 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. The first sentence is a conclusion of law. The second sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is irrelevant. 13. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. Irrelevant. 100-102 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. 44. The last sentence is irrelevant. 47. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 16. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 108 15. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. See 23. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusions of law. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 114 34. 115 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115a 30. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115b-e 30. The next to the last sentence of e is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115f Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 116-117 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 118 Hereby accepted. 119-120 35. 121 Irrelevant. 122 33. 123-124 Irrelevant. 125-129 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 130 3. 131 Hereby accepted. 132 64. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 133 See 49 and 65. 134 54. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Hereby accepted. 2-3 8-9. 4 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5 13 and 25. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusion of law. 8 31. 9 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10-12 Irrelevant. 13 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 14-16 Conclusions of law. TMRMC's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1, 6 and 9-11. 2 See 6 and 9. 3 6-10. 4 76. 5 77-78. 6 79. 7 79-80. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 81. 10 82-83. 11 34 and 36. 12 36. 13 6. 14-15 39. 16 41-42. 17 2. 18 3. 19 4 and 6. 20-21 54. 22 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 23 54. 24 46 and 54. 25-26 54-55. 27-29 54. 30 54-55. 31 44-45, 47 and 54. 32 Hereby accepted. 33 54-55. 34 55. 35 Irrelevant. 36 56. 37 58. 38 49. 39 48. 40 50. 41-44 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 45-46 65. 47-48 57. 49 58. 50 63-64. 51 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 52 63-64. 53 63-64. 55 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 56 65. 57 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 58 25 and 59. 59 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 60-62 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 63 25 and 59. 64-68 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 69 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 70-71 27. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 74 18 and 96. Irrelevant. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 77-81 Although generally true, these proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 82 Hereby accepted. 83 84. 84 Hereby accepted. 85-86 Irrelevant. 87 See 69 and 72. 88 94. 89 Hereby accepted. 90 74. 91 94. The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 92-93 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-96 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 97 19. 98-99 18. Hereby accepted. Irrelevant. Hereby accepted. 103 19. 104 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 105 20. 106 21. 107 Hereby accepted. 108-110 See 23. 111 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 112 85. 113 86. 114 88. 115 89. 116-118 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 119 91. 120 90. 121 96. 122-126 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 127 Hereby accepted. 128-129 Irrelevant. 130 22. 131 97-98. 132 99. 133-139 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 140 95. 141 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 142 97. 143-146 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Apalachee's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 6 and 8-9 2 4. 3(a)-(i)(1) 54. 3(i)(2) 44-45. 3(j) 44 and 54. 3(k) 54. 4 3. 5 1. 6 104. 7 39 and 41. 8 27 and 60. 9 25 and 59. 10(a) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10(b) 27. 10(c) 26. 10(d) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 13. 12(a) 81. 12(b) 82-83. 13 6 76 and 87. The second, third, fifth- eighth sentences, the Second Paragraph and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 71 and 74. Other than the first two Sentences of the first Paragraph and the first two sentences of the third Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(a) 90. The Second Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(b) 88. 16(c) 94. 16(d) 76 and 95. Other than the first three sentences of the first Paragraph and the last Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 17 48-49 and 65. The Sixth and eighth Sentences and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 44-47 and 54. The last Sentence of the first Paragraph and the last four Sentences of the last Paragraph are irrelevant. 19 62. 19(a) 3, 23, 56-57 and 64. The Second and third Paragraph are Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(b) 63. The Second Paragraph is Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(c) Cumulative and unnecessary, 19(d) 25, 59, 62 and 66. 19(e) 65. 20 Not Supported by the Weight of the evidence or Cumulative and unnecessary, 21 39 and 41. The last Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Darrell White, Esquire Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (the "Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10131 filed by The Shores Behavioral Hospital, LLC (hereinafter “The Shores”) to establish a 60-bed adult psychiatric hospital and CON Application No. 10132 The entity is a limited liability company according to the Division of Corporations. Filed March 14, 2012 2:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings to establish a 12-bed substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds pursuant to CON application No. 10131. The Agency preliminarily approved CON Application No. 10131 and preliminarily denied CON Application No. 10132. South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Regional Hospital (hereinafter “Memorial”) thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary approval of CON 10131, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). The Shores thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Agency’s preliminary denial of CON 10132, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”). Upon receipt at DOAH, Memorial, CON 10131, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0424CON and The Shores, CON 10132, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0427CON. On February 16, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order of Consolidation consolidating both cases. On February 24, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based on _ the _ parties’ representation they had reached a settlement. . The parties have entered into the attached Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1). It is therefore ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Agency will approve and issue CON 10131 and CON 10132 with the conditions: a. Approval of CON Application 10131 to establish a Class III specialty hospital with 60 adult psychiatric beds is concurrent with approval of the co-batched CON Application 10132 to establish a 12-bed adult substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds in one single hospital facility. b. Concurrent to the licensure and certification of 60 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 12 adult substance abuse beds and 30 adolescent residential treatment (DCF) beds at The Shores, all 72 hospital beds and 30 adolescent residential beds at Atlantic Shores Hospital will be delicensed. c. The Shores will become a designated Baker Act receiving facility upon licensure and certification. d. The location of the hospital approved pursuant to CONs 10131 and 10132 will not be south of Los Olas Boulevard and The Shores agrees that it will not seek any modification of the CONs to locate the hospital farther south than Davie Boulevard (County Road 736). 3. Each party shall be responsible its own costs and fees. 4. The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this 2. day of Meaich~ , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELIZABETH DEK, Secretary AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
