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HIGH-TECH YACHT AND SHIP, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-001791 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Hollywood, Florida Apr. 12, 1995 Number: 95-001791 Latest Update: Jan. 08, 1997

Findings Of Fact High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. (Petitioner) is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of retail sales of marine vessels. Also, Petitioner is a registered retail dealer in the State of Florida. The President of Petitioner is its only corporate officer. On or about September 2, 1993, Petitioner, in the capacity of a broker, sold a motor yacht at retail to Regency Group, Inc. (purchaser), through its representative, for $78,000. The motor yacht is described as a 1988, 41' Amerosport Chris Craft, hull Number CCHEU075E788, and called the "Motivator". At the closing of the sale, on or about September 2, 1993, the purchaser refused to pay the sales tax on the purchase, which was $4,680. However, the purchaser agreed to pay the sales tax after being informed by Petitioner that, without the payment of the sales tax, there could be no closing. The purchaser's representative submitted, at closing, a personal check in the amount of $4,680 for the sales tax. All of the necessary documents were completed for ownership and registration to be transferred to the purchaser. Subsequently, Petitioner received notice from its bank that the check for the sales tax had been dishonored by the purchaser's bank. The purchaser's representative had stopped payment on the check. In October 1993, Petitioner submitted its sales and use tax return for the month of September 1993 to Respondent in which the sale of the yacht was reported. Respondent automatically reviews sales and use tax returns. Respondent's review of Petitioner's return revealed a shortage of sales tax collected in the amount of $4,680.. In January 1994, Respondent issued a notice of tax action for assessment of additional tax in the amount of $4,710, plus interest and penalty, to Petitioner. The $4,710 included the loss of Petitioner's collection allowance of $30, which loss resulted from Petitioner's failure to timely remit all taxes due. Having received the notice of tax action, by letter dated January 20, 1994, Petitioner generally informed Respondent of the circumstances regarding the sales tax shortage, including the dishonored check. Petitioner pointed out, among other things, that Respondent had the authority and the means to collect the tax, while it (Petitioner) had limited means, and suggested, among other things, that Respondent cancel the purchaser's Florida registration of the yacht. On or about January 31, 1994, approximately three months after the check for sales tax was dishonored, Petitioner issued a notice of dishonored check to the purchaser, in which Petitioner requested payment of the sales tax. The notice provided, among other things, that Petitioner could seek criminal prosecution and civil action if the monies were not paid to Petitioner. Having not received the $4,680, Petitioner contacted the local law enforcement agency. After investigation, the law enforcement agency informed Petitioner that a civil action would have to be instituted because the purchaser, through its representative, had indicated that it was not satisfied with the yacht. Although Petitioner engaged the services of an attorney for civil action, no civil action was commenced. Additionally, Petitioner did not engage the services of a collection agency for assistance in collecting the sales tax. Subsequent to its notice of tax action, on or about March 12, 1994, Respondent issued a notice of assessment to Petitioner. The notice of assessment provided, among other things, that Petitioner was being assessed taxes in the amount of $4,710, plus penalty and interest in the amount of $2,342.61, totalling $7,052.61. Petitioner protested the assessment. On February 8, 1995, Respondent issued its notice of reconsideration in which Respondent determined, among other things, that the assessment was appropriate and affirmed the assessment of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. The interest accrues at the rate of $1.55 per day. Petitioner has not remitted any of the assessed tax, including interest and penalty, to Respondent. Petitioner has not identified on its federal tax return the noncollection of the sales tax from the purchaser as a bad debt. Sales tax is part of the total sale price for an item. Respondent considers the sales tax as collectable by a seller in the same manner as any other debt owed by a purchaser to a seller. A retail dealer, who is also a seller, is considered to be an agent for the State in the collection of sales tax. The burden of collecting the sales tax is placed upon the retail dealer by Respondent. Some of Respondent's employees have been sympathetic to Petitioner's tax assessment matter. However, none of the employees indicated to or advised Petitioner that Respondent was or is in error.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order affirming the assessment of sales tax against High-Tech Yacht & Ship, Inc. in the amount of $7,052.61, plus interest and penalty. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of August 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of August 1996.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57120.68212.07
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OMNI INTERNATIONAL OF MIAMI, LTD. vs. DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND FINANCE, 83-000065 (1983)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 83-000065 Latest Update: Jan. 09, 1991

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Omni International of Miami, Limited (Omni), is the owner of a large complex located at 1601 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida. The complex is commonly known as the Omni complex, and contains a shopping mall, hotel and parking garage. On July 30, 1981, Petitioner filed two applications for refund with Respondent, Department of Banking and Finance, seeking a refund of $57,866.20 and $4,466.48 for sales tax previously paid to the Department of Revenue on sales of electricity and gas consumed by its commercial tenants from April, 1978 through March, 1981. On November 22, 1982, Respondent denied the applications. The denial prompted the instant proceeding. The shopping mall portion of the Omni complex houses more than one hundred fifty commercial tenants, each of whom has entered into a lease arrangement with Omni. The utility companies do not provide individual electric and gas meters to each commercial tenant but instead furnish the utilities through a single master meter. Because of this, it is necessary that electricity and gas charges be reallocated to each tenant on a monthly basis. Therefore, Omni receives a single monthly electric and gas bill reflecting total consumption for the entire complex, and charges each tenant its estimated monthly consumption plus a sales tax on that amount. The utility charge is separately itemized on the tenant's bill and includes a provision for sales tax. Petitioner has paid all required sales taxes on such consumption. The estimated consumption is derived after reviewing the number of electric outlets, hours of operations, square footage, and number and type of appliances and lights that are used within the rented space. This consumption is then applied to billing schedules prepared by the utility companies which give the monthly charge. The estimates are revised every six months based upon further inspections of the tenant's premises, and any changes such as the adding or decreasing of appliances and lights, or different hours of operations. The lease agreement executed by Omni and its tenants provides that if Omni opts to furnish utilities through a master meter arrangement, as it has done in the past, the tenant agrees to "pay additional rent therefor when bills are rendered." This term was included in the lease to give Omni the right to invoke the rent default provision of the lease in the event a tenant failed to make payment. It is not construed as additional rent or consideration for the privilege of occupying the premises. Omni makes no profit on the sale of electricity and gas. Rather, it is simply being reimbursed by the tenants for their actual utility consumption. If the applications are denied, Petitioner will have paid a sales tax on the utility consumption twice -- once when the monthly utility bills were paid, and a second time for "additional rent" for occupancy of the premises.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's applications for refund, with interest, be approved. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 15th day of April, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of April, 1983.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57212.031212.081
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TRUE BLUE POOLS CONTRACTING, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 10-008807 (2010)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida Sep. 02, 2010 Number: 10-008807 Latest Update: Jan. 20, 2011

The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner collected and remitted to Respondent the correct amount of sales and use taxes during the audit period from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007, and, if not, what additional amount of tax plus penalty and interest is due.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner True Blue Pools (Petitioner, taxpayer, or TBP) is a domestic corporation headquartered in Miami-Dade County, Florida. TBP services, repairs, and renovates swimming pools and constructed some pools during the audit period. Respondent, Florida Department of Revenue (Respondent or DOR), is the agency of state government authorized to administer the tax laws of the State of Florida, pursuant to section 213.05, Florida Statutes.2 DOR is authorized to prescribe the records to be kept by all persons subject to taxes under chapter 212, Florida Statutes. Such persons have a duty to keep and preserve their records, and the records shall be open to examination by DOR or its authorized agents at all reasonable hours pursuant to section 212.12(6), Florida Statutes. DOR is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers and to request information to ascertain their tax liability, if any, pursuant to section 213.34, Florida Statutes. On November 2, 2007, DOR initiated an audit of TBP to determine whether it was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to DOR. The audit period was from October 1, 2004, through September 30, 2007. On December 15, 2008, DOR sent TBP its Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (NOI), with schedules, showing that TBP owed to DOR additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $113,632.17, penalty in the amount of $28,406.05, and interest through December 16, 2008, in the amount of $34,546.59, making a total assessment in the amount of $176,586.81. On October 26, 2009, DOR issued its Notice of Proposed Assessment. TBP timely challenged the Notice of Proposed Assessment, filing its petition with DOR and requesting an administrative hearing. Subsequent to the petition being filed, additional documentation was provided by TBP resulting in a revision to the tax, interest, and penalty amount due. DOR's revised work papers, dated May 27, 2010, claim Petitioner owes $64,430.83 in tax, $16,107.71 in penalty, and interest through May 27, 2010, in the amount of $27,071.99, with an assessment of $107,610.53. The assessed penalty, $16,107.71, was calculated after 25% of the penalty was waived, pursuant to subsection 213.21(3)(a), Florida Statutes, based on DOR's determination that there is no evidence of willful negligence, willful neglect, or fraud. The audit was conducted to determine liability in four categories: improper sales tax exemptions, unpaid sales taxes for taxable expenses, unpaid use taxes on fixed assets, and unpaid use taxes on taxable materials used to fulfill contracts to improve real property. Sales Tax Exemptions Due to the large volume of invoices and other records, the auditor conducted a random sampling of invoices for three months during the audit period, October 2004, January 2005, and September 2007.3 If no sales tax was collected and the Petitioner claimed that the transaction was exempt from the requirement to pay taxes, the auditor looked for proof that either the TBP customer was an exempt organization, for example, a school or a church, or that TBP had provided its suppliers with a DOR Form DR-13 to exempt from taxes products acquired for resale. In the absence proof of either type of exemption, DOR assumed taxes should have been paid. Using the difference between taxes collected and taxes due for the three months, the auditor determined that the percentage of error was .016521. When .016521 was applied to total sales of $1,485,890.79 for the 36-month audit period, the results showed that an additional $24,548.41 in sales taxes should have been collected from customers, and is due from TBP. Although a business is required to pay taxes for the materials it purchases to use in its business, it is not required to collect taxes from its customers when it enters into lump sum contracts to perform a service for customers. At least one invoice for $9,500.00 that the auditor treated as an improper exemption was, in fact, a partial payment on a lump-sum contract. The invoice referenced a "shotcrete draw," which represented the collection of funds after the concrete part of pool construction was completed. TBP is not required to collect taxes when it uses lump-sum contracts. Other invoices for pool repair and services were also mischaracterized as exempt by the TBP, but it is not clear that all were payments related to lump-sum contracts. DOR's auditor, nevertheless, testified as follows: With the knowledge that I have for True Blue Pools, being a lump-sum contractor, True Blue Pools should not charge their customer any sales tax. Transcript at pages 67-68. DOR concedes that some of TBP's transactions are also exempt from taxes as improvements to real property. In its Proposed Recommended Order, DOR asserted that TBP's use of the term "improvements to real property" is overbroad, but it did not specify how or why this is the case. During cross- examination of the owner of TBP, only one invoice for $500.00 for leak detection on the Delgado property was shown to have been for a service rather than for swimming pool construction. Taxable Expenses DOR audited TBP's purchases of tangible personal property used in the daily operation of its business. The products included chlorine and other chemicals, office supplies, and vehicle parts, expenses, and repairs. The ledger for a 12- month period, calendar year 2006, showed an average monthly additional tax due of $111.18, or a total of $4,002.48 in additional taxes for the 36-month audit period. As noted in Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order, "[t]he representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of all of these items " Fixed Assets TBP's list of fixed assets was taken from the depreciation schedule on Internal Revenue Service Form 4562. The items listed are computer- and software-related. TBP provided no proof that it had paid a use tax. The additional tax due equals $419.94. Petitioner's Proposed Recommended Order includes the statement that "[a]gain, the representative of TBP did not dispute DOR's allegation that no tax may have been paid on the purchase of these items " Taxable Materials Taxable materials, those purchased to fulfill a contract to improve real property, included items used to build, renovate, and repair pools. The items included concrete, meters, drains, and valves. For the 12-month sample period, calendar year 2006, TBP failed to pay taxes on material purchases in the total amount of $168,310.05, or an average of $14,078.96 a month. For the 36-month audit period, the total of the purchases was $506,842.56. With a 6 percent tax due for the state and 1 percent for the county, the total additional tax due on materials is $35,460.00. TBP conceded that it improperly used a resale exemption to purchase taxable materials from suppliers without paying taxes. The materials were used to provide services and were not resold. Acknowledging again that TBP uses lump-sum contracts, this time to support the collection of additional taxes, the auditor testified as follows: And the law states that the taxpayer's [sic] an ultimate consumer of all materials purchased to fulfill a lump-sum contract, and that's what they told me they operate under, a lump-sum contract. Transcript at page 58. At the hearing, TBP used its actual profit and loss statement to show that the cost of goods it sold (general purchases and taxable materials) in the amounts of $18,360.77 in October 2004, $8,519.22 in January 2005, and $4,818.65 in September 2007. Corresponding taxes for each of those months should have been $1,285.25, $596.35, and $337.31, or an average of $739.63 a month, or a total of $26,626.68 for 36 months. The goods that it sold were not at issue in the audit of taxable materials, rather it was TBP's purchases from vendors that should have been taxed that resulted in DOR's audit results. Total Additional Sales and Use Taxes Due The three categories of additional taxes due, $4,002.48 for taxable expenses, $419.94 for fixed assets, and $35,460.00 for taxable materials, equal $39,882.42 in additional taxes due during the audit period. Taxes Paid TBP filed DOR Forms DR-15, monthly sales and use tax reporting forms, and paid sales and use taxes during the audit period. For the sample months used by DOR to examine sales tax exemptions, TBP paid $1,839.10 in taxes in October 2004, $1,672.73 in January 2005, and $1,418.13 in September 2007. Using the three months to calculate an average, extended to 36 months, it is likely that TBP paid $59,712 in taxes. TBP asserted that DOR was required to, but did not, offset the deficiency of $39,882.42, by what appears to be an overpayment of $59,712.00 in sales and use taxes. Other than pointing out that the amount reported on the DR-15s differed, being sometimes more and sometimes less than the amount shown on the profit and loss statements, DOR did not dispute TBP's claim that it had paid sales and use taxes. TBP's representative explained that end-of-the-year adjustments for additional collections or for bad debt could cause the amounts on the DR-15s and profit and loss statements to differ. With regard to the taxes paid, DOR took the following position in its Proposed Recommended Order: Petitioner's DR-15's [sic] for the collection periods October 2004, and January 2005, [and September 2007] (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit 1) do reflect sales tax being collected and remitted to DOR. DOR does not allege that Petitioner never paid tax on its purchases, or made bona fide exempt sales for which no tax was collected. DOR's audit findings identify just those which occurred within the sample period, scheduled in the auditor's workpapers, and applied over the entire audit period. The DR-15s are taken from the sample months selected by DOR within the audit period, and DOR does not address TBP's claim that a set off for taxes paid was mandatory, pursuant to subsection 213.34(4), Florida Statutes. Using the audit schedules, DOR showed credit for taxes paid in the amounts of $20.63 for taxable expenses, $0 for fixed assets, and $24.31 in state taxes and $1.03 for county taxes on taxable materials. The amounts are far less that the $59,712.00 in sales/use taxes TBP showed that it paid during the audit period.

Recommendation Based upon the forgoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue issue a final order dismissing the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes dated December 15, 2010. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of January, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELEANOR M. HUNTER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 2011.

Florida Laws (10) 120.57212.0506212.06212.12213.05213.21213.34215.26408.0572.011
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HEFTLER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 81-001362 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-001362 Latest Update: Apr. 05, 1982

The Issue Whether the Department of Revenue should assess Heftler Construction Company ("Taxpayer") for Florida corporate income taxes on a claim that: Taxpayer realized a gain under the Florida Income Tax Code when an asset acquired in 1971 (on liquidation of a joint venture) was sold in 1975 in satisfaction of an outstanding debt; and Taxpayer's losses created by the subtraction of foreign source income cannot operate to create or increase the Florida portion of the net operating loss carryover.

Findings Of Fact Formation and Liquidation of Joint Venture; Subsequent Sale of Asset Taxpayer is a New Jersey corporation, authorized to transact business in Florida. Heftler Realty Company ("Realty") is a Florida corporation, and is a subsidiary of Taxpayer. Taxpayer, for all years material to these proceedings, filed consolidated income tax returns with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States ("IRS") . Pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"), Taxpayer included in the income and expenses of its consolidated income tax returns the income and expenses of its operations in Puerto Rico. Taxpayer, for all years material to these proceedings, timely filed with the Department consolidated income tax returns. In 1969, Realty formed a joint venture with a company known as GACL, Inc., for the purpose of developing real property Realty, in accordance with its Joint Venture Agreement with GACL, Inc., prior to 1971, contributed to the joint venture the following assets with the following cost basis to Taxpayer on the date of contribution: ASSET DATE CONTRIBUTED TO JOINT VENTURE COST BASIS TO TAXPAYER ON DATE CONTRIBUTED Cash 3-5-69 $250,000 Land 3-5-69 2,000,000 In 1971, prior to the effective date of the Florida Income Tax Code ("Florida Code"), Chapter 220, Florida Statutes, the joint venture between Realty and GACL, Inc., was liquidated effective as of January 1, 1971. Pursuant to the plan of liquidation, Realty received, in liquidation of the joint venture, the assets as described in the attached Appendix. These assets had a then cost basis to the joint venture as described in the Appendix. The assets acquired by Realty in liquidation of the joint venture were subject to the debts described in the Appendix. Pursuant to the plan of liquidation of the joint venture, Realty agreed to acquire the assets and assume the attendant debts (itemized in the Appendix) as of January 1, 1971. At the time of the liquidation of the joint venture, Realty had a cost basis for its interest in the joint venture of a negative $285,749. (Realty had a negative basis in the assets because it sustained joint venture losses in excess of its contributions to the joint venture.) The net gain to Realty as' reported upon the federal income tax return of Taxpayer, after adjustment for depreciation, as a result of the liquidation was $1,238,37l. In 1971, Realty reduced its tax basis in the assets acquired in the liquidation. This adjustment (reduction) in the tax basis of the assets acquired by Taxpayer occurred prior to the effective date of the Florida Code. An asset acquired by Realty in 1971, pursuant to the plan of liquidation of the joint venture, was conveyed by Realty in 1975 to a creditor of Realty in satisfaction of debt. After adjusting the tax basis of the asset, a comparison of its book basis (to the joint venture) with the tax basis to Taxpayer after liquidation, reflects the following: Adjusted Basis as of Jan. 1, Tax Basis to Tax- Book Basis to payer or After Joint Venture Liquidation Difference 1971 $4,466,764 $3,055,722 $1,411,042 Accumulated Depreciation to Date of Sale (587,212) (414,541) (172,671) Adjusted Basis $3,879,552 $2,641,181 $1,238,371 For purposes of its Federal Income Tax, Taxpayer reported the transaction as a sale and computed the gain thereon as follows: $3,951,708 Expense of Sale $2,713,337 3. Total Gain $1,238,371 Gross Sale Price Cost or Other Basis and (The difference between the gross sales price and the adjusted basis referred to in paragraph 13 of $72,156 is an increase to the price due to escrow funds deposited with a mortgagee and assigned to the purchaser of the asset by Realty without Realty receiving reimbursement.) In computing the Florida income tax, pursuant to the Florida Code, for the fiscal year ending July 31, 1976, Taxpayer took as a subtraction an adjustment on line 8, Schedule II, page 2 of its income tax return. The subtraction was in the amount of the capital gain received upon the sale of the asset received in liquidation in the amount of $1,238,371. Taxpayer subtracted the gain, contending that it was realized prior to the effective date of the Florida Code. When acquired, the asset received in liquidation had a cost basis to the joint venture Of approximately $4,500,000. When the asset was distributed to Taxpayer, after the reduction by Taxpayer to the tax basis referred to in paragraph 11, the basis to Taxpayer of the asset was approximately $3,000,000. The tax basis in the amount of $3,000,000 was evidenced by the debts assumed by Taxpayer upon the liquidation; such assumption of debt is referred to in paragraph 7. Department contends that the gain on the sale of the asset acquired in liquidation was both realized and recognized in 1975 when the property was sold in satisfaction of a debt; it has issued a proposed assessment on that basis. Taxpayer contends that the gain was realized by Taxpayer for federal income tax purposes prior to the effective date of the Florida Code and that only the recognition of the gain occurred after the effective date of the Florida Code. II. 1975 Loss Created by Subtraction of Foreign Source Income; Attempt to Carryover Loss to Subsequent Years Taxpayer, in addition to the adjustment referred to above, in reporting income for its fiscal years ending July 31, 1976, July 31, 1977, and July 31, 1978, deducted a net operating loss carry-forward which included an item of $335,037 from its 1975 return (fiscal year ending July 31, 1976) and an item of $916,030 for fiscal year ending July 31, 1978, represented by a subtraction resulting from income earned in Puerto Rico. The subtraction resulted in losses during each of such years, which losses were carried forward by Taxpayer to the next ensuing year. Department contends that the losses created by the subtraction of foreign source income cannot be carried over to subsequent years to determine income and has issued a proposed assessment on that basis. Taxpayer contends that it is not the intent of the Florida Legislature to tax income derived from sources outside the United States and that the effect of a denial of the subtraction will result in the taxation, by Florida, of foreign source income received by Taxpayer.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department's proposed assessment of Taxpayer for corporate income tax deficiencies be issued. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 21st day of January, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1982.

Florida Laws (6) 120.57120.68220.02220.11220.13220.14
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T. V. FACTS OF JACKSONVILLE, INC. vs. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 81-000368 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000368 Latest Update: Dec. 28, 1981

Findings Of Fact During the period covered by the tax audit, Petitioner published and distributed free of charge two Jacksonville area editions of a weekly magazine entitled TV Facts. This magazine contains substantial advertising which provides all revenues. In addition to the advertising, television schedules and feature stories are included to interest the general public in the publication. Petitioner obtained a second class postal permit for the magazine, but has never used the mails for distribution. During the period at issue, the magazine was prepared in a three step process. The rough layout without television schedules was prepared by Petitioner and forwarded to Composition Compound, Inc., a Miami company. This company obtained the television schedules and prepared the final layout. Composition Compound then photographed this layout and sent the negatives to Sun 'N' Fun Printing, a Clearwater company. Sun 'N' Fun then printed the magazine and delivered it to Petitioner. Petitioner paid Composition Compound for all services provided by that company and Sun 'N' Fun. Thus, there was no direct business relationship between Petitioner and Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner believed it qualified for the newspaper exemption and was neither charged nor paid any sales taxes until it learned through Respondent's audit of Composition Compound that such taxes were due. Respondent seeks to assess Petitioner sales taxes in the amount of $5,830.56 with penalty of $1,457.64 plus 12 percent interest to the date of payment for the audit period December 1, 1977, through November 30, 1980. Petitioner does not contest these computations, but believes the tax due, if any, should be reduced by the amounts it paid to Composition Compound to cover the sales tax billed by Sun 'N' Fun. Petitioner submitted Sun 'N' Fun invoice (Exhibit 7) to demonstrate that Composition Compound was billed for about $2,700.00 in sales taxes by Sun 'N' Fun for printing Petitioner's magazine between December 29, 1978, and December 29, 1979. Composition Compound separately computed its costs and profits which it billed to Petitioner (Exhibit 6). However, there was no separate brochure of the sales tax shown on the Composition Compound invoices, nor was any additional tax charged on the value added by that company.

Recommendation From the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Respondent enter a final order holding Petitioner liable for $5,830.56 in taxes assessed on December 11, 1980, and for interest computed at the rate of 1 percent per month thereafter until said tax is paid to Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of November, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of November, 1981.

Florida Laws (6) 212.02212.07212.08212.1290.80190.803
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TERRY ERNST AND DONNA ERNST vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 95-000907RU (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Feb. 28, 1995 Number: 95-000907RU Latest Update: Feb. 14, 1997

The Issue Whether the agency has an unpromulgated statement of general applicability that imposed a requirement not specifically required by statute or by an existing rule, and which has been utilized against Petitioners to their detriment.

Findings Of Fact On March 24, 1994, the Department of Revenue (Department) issued a Notice of Reconsideration (NOR) that claimed the Petitioners, Terry and Donna Ernst, had willfully failed to collect sales tax. Petitioners' assertion of an exemption in connection with the sales tax assessment was denied. The NOR provided that the Petitioners are the president and vice- president of Hussh, Inc., a retail apparel store in Palm Beach, Florida and that such company made sales to customers for delivery in the store and for shipment outside of the State of Florida. At issue were the alleged shipments to out of state destinations. Pertinent to this case is the language in the NOR found at page two which provided: Due to the inadequacy and volume of Hussh's records, the auditor sampled the available records, and assessed Hussh for asserted out of state sales that were improperly documented. According to the auditor, many of the sales receipts or invoices of asserted out of state shipments were missing the top portion of the invoice. Significantly, this portion of the invoice would contain the names, addresses, and asserted export destination information on each sale. Other invoices were stamped, "out of state shipped," but no destination information was present on the invoice. [Emphasis added.] The Petitioners maintain that the portions of the NOR emphasized in the foregoing paragraph constitute an agency statement of general applicability and is, therefore, an unpromulgated rule. The Department does not have a rule which lists all documentation which might establish an exemption for sales tax assessment. Similarly, the Department does not have a rule that lists the type of documentation which would be inadequate to establish an exemption for sales taxes. The Department's existing rule, Rule 12A-1.064, Florida Administrative Code, provides, in part: (1)(a) Sales tax is imposed on the sales price of each item or article of tangible personal property, unless otherwise exempt, when the property is delivered to the purchaser or his representative in this state. However, the tax does not apply to tangible personal property irrevocably committed to the exportation process at the time of sale, when such process has been continuous or unbroken. (b) Intent of the seller and the purchaser that the property will be exported is not sufficient to establish the exemption; nor does delivery of the property to a point in Florida for subsequent transportation outside Florida necessarily constitute placing the property irrevocably in the exportation process. Tangible personal property shall be deemed committed to the exportation process if: The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods outside this state using his own mode of transportation. The dealer must retain in his records trip tickets, truck log records, or other documentation reflecting the specific items and export destination; The dealer is required by the terms of the sale contract to deliver the goods to a common carrier for final and certain movement of such property to its out of state destination. Sales by a Florida dealer are exempt when the dealer delivers the merchandise to the transportation terminal for shipment outside this state and secures a dock or warehouse receipt and a copy of the bill of lading. On shipments to points outside the United States, a shipper's export declaration shall also be obtained; [Emphasis added.] Rule 12A-1.093, Florida Administrative Code, requires taxpayers to maintain and preserve records. This rule provides, in part: (2) Each dealer defined in Chapter 212, F.S., each licensed wholesaler, and any other person subject to the tax imposed by Chapter 212, F.S., shall keep and preserve a complete record of all transactions, together with invoices, bills of lading, gross receipts from sales, RESALE CERTIFICATES, CONSUMER EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES and other pertinent records and papers as may be required by the Department of Revenue for the reasonable administration of Chapter 212, F.S., and such books of account as may be necessary to determine the amount of tax due thereunder. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are common terms used in the business community. Each connotes that, at the minimum, certain information will be retained on the face of the document. For example, according to Petitioners' witness, the minimum information expected on a bill of lading would be: the name of the person that the item is being shipped to, the item being shipped, the cost of the shipment, and the terms of the shipment with the value of the item being shipped. Similarly, the minimum information which is expected on an "invoice" would be: a description of the item sold, the amount of the sale, and the name of the person to whom the item was sold. The terms "bill of lading," "dock or warehouse receipt," and "invoice" are not defined by rule. The Department determined whether an exemption was documented based upon the results of this audit.

Florida Laws (4) 120.52120.54120.57120.68 Florida Administrative Code (1) 12A-1.064
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DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE vs. HARRIS CORPORATION, 80-000653 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-000653 Latest Update: Apr. 15, 1981

Findings Of Fact Harris Corporation is a large, multi-national corporation with headquarters in Melbourne, Florida. Harris Corporation conducts its business through several divisions, one of which is Harris Composition Systems Division ("the taxpayer"). The taxpayer is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling computerized printing equipment. On January 28, 1977, the State of Florida, Department of Revenue ("the Department") mailed a letter to the taxpayer, advising that an audit of the taxpayer's books and records be made available. The audit was undertaken by agents of the Department and on June 25, 1979, two Notices of Proposed Assessment (the "notices") were mailed to the taxpayer by the Department. The period covered by the Notices is January 1, 1974 through June 30, 1978. No proposed or actual assessment of the sales and use taxes referred to in the Notices was made by the Department prior to the proposed assessment. After receipt of the Notices, the taxpayer's representatives attended an informal conference with representatives of the Department on September 25, 1979. As a result of that conference the Department issued two Revised Notices of Proposed Assessment. The Revised Notices eliminated January 1, 1974 through May 31, 1974 from the period covered by the Notices but retained the period June 1, 1974 through June 30, 1978. The portion of the sales and use tax assessment proposed in the Revised Notices that is in dispute in this case is the portion that is attributable to the June 1, 1974 through June 30, 1976 period. The tax in controversy is $49,934.01. The Department has developed a form to be signed by taxpayers in situations where the Department believes that the statute of limitations on assessment of sales and use taxes may expire before an assessent can be made. The Department did not request that the taxpayer in this case execute such a form, nor did the Department request in any other manner that the taxpayer waive or extend the statute of limitations applicable to sales and use tax assessments and the taxpayer did not do so. Neither the Department nor the taxpayer instituted any judicial or administrative proceedings for review of the assessment proposed in the Notices or in the Revised Notices prior to the filing of a petition by the taxpayer in this case on March 20, 1980. The Department contends that any delay in issuing the proposed notices of assessment was directly attributable to difficulties encountered in obtaining records in a timely fashion from the taxpayer's parent company, and that the taxpayer should, therefore, be estopped to raise the defense of violation of the statute of limitations. The record in this proceeding does not support such a conclusion. Although there appear to have been some delays in performing the tax audits, the taxpayer was by no means responsible for all of those delays. In fact, the longest such delay, from about December 1, 1977, through May 3, 1978, was occasioned by the Department's own budgetary problems relating to per diem and travel expenses for its auditing team. Although some delays were requested by the taxpayer, they were acquiesced in by the Department in the course of establishing its own priorities in conducting the audit of all of the divisions of Harris Corporation. The record is devoid of any indication that the Department at any point considered any failure of the taxpayer to furnish requested information of sufficient severity to invoke the remedies available to the Department under Section 212.13(1), Florida Statutes (mandatory injunction to require examination of books and records) or Section 212.14(1), Florida Statutes (issuance of estimated tax deficiency together with distress warrant for collection of such taxes).

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Department of Revenue, assessing sales and use taxes against Respondent in the amount of $49,934.01, together with the applicable amount of interest through the date of entry of said Final Order. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 14th day of January, 1981. WILLIAM E. WILLIAMS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of January, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Brian C. Ellis, Esquire 620 Twiggs Street Tampa, Florida 33602 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================

Florida Laws (6) 120.57212.13212.14934.0195.01195.091
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RHINEHART EQUIPMENT COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, 11-002567 (2011)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 18, 2011 Number: 11-002567 Latest Update: Aug. 12, 2014

The Issue The two issues for determination are: (1) whether Rhinehart Equipment Co. (Rhinehart) a foreign corporation domiciled in Rome, Georgia, during the period July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005, had "substantial nexus" with the state of Florida through its advertising, sale, and delivery into Florida of new and used heavy tractor equipment, sufficient to require it to collect and remit sales tax generated by these sales to the Florida tax authorities; and (2) Whether the applicable statute of limitations for assessing sale tax had expired when DOR issued its "final assessment" on September 11, 2009.

Findings Of Fact The Parties Rhinehart Equipment Co. (“Rhinehart”) is a retail heavy equipment dealer located in Rome, Georgia, and does not own or maintain a showroom or office location in Florida or directly provide financing to any Florida resident for any of its sales. Rhinehart does not provide Florida customers with any after-sale services such as assembly, technical advice, or maintenance. Rhinehart does not have any employees residing in Florida. Respondent is an agency of the State of Florida charged with the regulation, control, administration, and enforcement of the sales and use tax laws of the state of Florida embodied in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes, and as implemented by Florida Administrative Code Chapter 12A-1. Background In early March 2005, the Department received an anonymous tip pursuant to section 213.30, Florida Statutes. The caller alleged that Rhinehart was selling equipment to Florida residents without including sales and use tax in the sales price and was delivering the equipment to Florida customers using its own trucks. The tipster also alleged that Rhinehart was advertising in a commercial publication Heavy Equipment Trader, Florida Edition. By letter dated March 31, 2005, Respondent contacted Rhinehart and advised that its business activities in the state might be such as to require Rhinehart to register as a “dealer” for purposes of assessing Florida sales and use tax, and that it could be required to file corporate income tax returns, potentially subjecting it to liability for other Florida taxes. Included with this letter was a questionnaire for Rhinehart to complete and return to the Department "to assist us in determining whether Nexus exists between your company and the State of Florida." On May 2, 2005, Rhinehart, without the advice of counsel, responded to the Department’s inquiry by returning the completed questionnaire, which was signed by its president, Mark Easterwood. By letter addressed to Mr. Easterwood dated May 4, 2005, the Department advised that it had determined that Rhinehart had nexus with the state of Florida and that therefore Rhinehart was required to register as a dealer to collect and remit Florida sales and use tax. According to the letter, the Department's determination was "based on the fact that your company makes sales to Florida customers and uses the company's own truck to deliver goods to customers in the State of Florida." By application effective July 1, 2005, Rhinehart registered to collect and/or report sales and use tax to the state of Florida, In a letter dated June 8, 2005, the Department invited Rhinehart to self-disclose any tax liability that it may have incurred during the three-year period prior to its registration effective date, to wit, July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005 (the audit period). Specifically, the letter stated: At this time, we would like to extend an opportunity for you to self-disclose any tax liability that you may have incurred prior to your registration effective date (for the period July 1, 2002, through June 30, 2005). This Self-Disclosure Program affords you an opportunity to pay any applicable tax and interest due for the prior three-year period (or when Nexus was first established) without penalty assessments. In response to the Department's June 8, 2005, letter, Rhinehart's legal counsel sent a letter dated August 8, 2005, requesting a meeting or conference call to discuss a "few legal issues" concerning the Department’s determination regarding nexus. Thereafter, Rhinehart began filing the required tax returns relating to its Florida sales, noting in writing by cover letter that the returns were being filed “under protest.” Rhinehart began collecting and remitting sales and use tax starting in July 2005. However, Rhinehart declined to provide any information regarding sales made prior to July 1, 2005. On September 30, 2005, Rhinehart's legal counsel sent the Department a detailed protest letter and advised that, in Rhinehart's view: (1) the Department had not established “substantial nexus” with Florida as interpreted under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution; and (2) Rhinehart was not required to register as a Florida dealer for sales and use tax purposes. On May 23, 2008, the Department issued a "Notice of Intent to Make an Assessment," and on September 11, 2009, a "Notice of Final Assessment," for the audit period. The assessment totaled $354,839.30, which was comprised of $229,695.00 in taxes and $125,144.30 in interest. The assessment was calculated by Respondent using Rhinehart’s sales tax returns filed from July 2005 through March 2008. The Notice of Final Assessment advised Rhinehart that the final assessment would become binding agency action unless timely protested or contested through the informal protest process, or by filing a complaint in circuit court or petition for an administrative hearing. Rhinehart unsuccessfully sought to resolve the matter through informal review and then ultimately filed its petition seeking an administrative hearing to challenge the Department's September 11, 2009, assessment. Based on sales records and other information provided by Rhinehart, on March 9, 2011, the Department revised its September 11, 2009, assessment. The revised assessment totaled $380,967.89, which included the past due sales and use tax liability, and interest accrued through that date. Rhinehart's Florida Activities Rhinehart produced records of its sales to Florida customers during the audit period. Those records reflected sales to 116 different Florida customers as follows: one sale in the second-half of 2002; 12 sales in 2003; 84 sales in 2004; and 19 sales thorough June 2005. The total value of the merchandise sold to Florida residents was $2,928,981.00. The majority of Rhinehart's sales during the audit period were "sight unseen" by the customer, and were negotiated by telephone. Numerous hurricanes made landfall in Florida during the 2004 and 2005 hurricane season. Since 2005, Rhinehart’s sales to Florida customers have substantially dropped, with no sales occurring in some quarters. During the audit period Rhinehart accepted a number of trade-ins toward the purchase of new equipment. The records showed trade-in transactions as follows: none (0) in 2002; five (5) in 2003; eleven (11) in 2004; and none in 2005. Concurrent with the delivery of the new equipment purchased from Rhinehart, used equipment taken in trade was transported by Rhinehart employees using Rhinehart transport equipment back to Rhinehart’s location in Georgia. In these instances, the trade-in equipment remained with the Florida customer following negotiation of the sale and prior to Rhinehart physically taking possession of it. During the audit period the equipment accepted as trade-ins had a total value of $168,915.00. The valuation of trade-in equipment was done based on a customer’s representations (i.e. sight unseen, with no Rhinehart employee personally inspected the equipment) and pursuant to industry guidelines. Rhinehart’s drivers would deliver the purchased equipment, load any trade-in equipment, and return to Georgia, if possible, on the same day. To the extent that the Department of Transportation regulations mandated that they cease driving in a given day, the drivers would rest in the back of their trucks for the required amount of time, sometimes overnight, and then complete their journey back to Georgia. Rhinehart's dealership is located approximately 300 miles north of the Florida state line. Sales invoices reflect that Rhinehart's customers were located throughout the state of Florida, as far south as Miami on the east coast and Naples on the west coast. During the audit period, Rhinehart placed advertisements with with the Trader Publishing Company, located in Clearwater, Florida. The Trader Publishing Company is the publisher of the Heavy Equipment Trader magazine which is distributed in Georgia, Alabama, Florida, and Tennessee. Trader Publishing Company publishes a "Florida Edition" of the magazine which is directed to potential heavy equipment customers located in Florida. Stipulated Exhibit 19 consists of advertising invoices for advertisements placed by Rhinehart in the Florida Edition of Heavy Equipment Trader magazine during the audit period. These invoices establish that Rhinehart regularly and systematically purchased advertising for its products which was targeted toward potential customers located in Florida.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Revenue: Confirming that substantial nexus existed during the audit period and that Petitioner was therefore subject to the taxing authority of the state of Florida; Confirming that the assessment at issue is not time- barred; Allowing Petitioner a reasonable period of time to determine whether any of the sales it made during the audit period would have qualified as exempt sales pursuant to section 212.08(3) and if so, to obtain the required certifications from the purchasers; and Imposing on Petitioner an assessment for the unpaid taxes, with accrued interest, for all sales during the audit period not qualifying for exemption. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S W. DAVID WATKINS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2012.

Florida Laws (14) 120.569120.57120.68212.02212.0596212.06212.08212.18212.21213.30220.23570.0272.01195.091
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VENICE NH, LLC, D/B/A SUNSET LAKE HEALTH AND REHAB CENTER vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 14-000024 (2014)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jan. 07, 2014 Number: 14-000024 Latest Update: Sep. 03, 2014

The Issue The issue in this case is whether a tax on a warranty deed is an allowable property cost, as claimed in Petitioner’s Medicaid cost report.

Findings Of Fact Venice operates Sunset Lake, a licensed nursing facility that participates in the Florida Medicaid program as an institutional provider. AHCA is the agency responsible for administering the Florida Medicaid program. On or about June 1, 2005, Venice (or an affiliate, which need not be distinguished from Venice for purposes of this proceeding) purchased the nursing facility that is now known as Sunset Lake from Bon Secours-Venice Healthcare Corporation. Venice filed its initial Medicaid cost report with AHCA for the fiscal period ending December 31, 2005. The initial Medicaid cost report for a nursing facility is used to set the per diem rates at which the Medicaid program will reimburse the facility, both retroactively for the initial period of operations, and prospectively until the next cost report is filed and used to set a new per diem rate. AHCA contracted with an outside auditing firm to audit Venice’s initial cost report. The auditing firm produced an audit report, which identified proposed adjustments to Venice’s cost report. The audit report was reviewed by AHCA analyst Steven Diaczyk before it was finalized and sent to Venice. Venice initially contested 17 adjustments in the final audit report. Before the final hearing, Venice withdrew its challenge to 16 of the 17 adjustments. The only remaining dispute to be resolved in this proceeding is whether audit adjustment number four, which disallowed $49,540.00 of costs in the category of “Property Taxes – Real Estate,” should be reduced by $12,203.80. The disallowed $12,203.80 represents one-half of the tax assessed pursuant to section 201.02, Florida Statutes (2005),1/ on the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake real property (including the land, land improvements, and the building) to Venice. Venice claimed one-half of the tax on its cost report because that is the amount paid by Venice; the other half was paid by the seller. Venice contends that this tax is an ad valorem tax and/or a property tax,2/ which is an allowable property cost on the Medicaid cost report. AHCA contends that the tax on the warranty deed is an excise tax, not a property tax, and, therefore, not an allowable property cost. The audit report did not explain the reason for disallowing the $12,203.80 tax, as part of the $49,540.00 adjustment. Instead, the audit report explained the entire $49,540.00 adjustment as necessary to “disallow unsupported costs,” suggesting a lack of documentation. However, no non- hearsay evidence was offered at hearing to prove that Venice failed to give the auditors sufficient documentation of the costs disallowed in adjustment number four. At least with respect to the disallowed $12,203.80 item, sufficient documentation was offered at hearing to support the cost as an actual cost incurred by Venice. The question is whether the documented cost is allowable as an ad valorem tax or property tax, as Venice claims. Documentation for the $12,203.80 tax on the warranty deed is found in the buyer/seller closing statement and on the face of the warranty deed. The closing statement sets forth the total purchase price of $7,500,000.00, which is also the amount of a mortgage loan from Bank of America. The closing statement allocates the total purchase price to the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), the building ($2,513,250.00), FFE--furniture, fixtures, and equipment ($992,250.00), and personal property ($3,021,000.00). The closing statement also shows a separate category called credits and/or prorations, to appropriately account for items accruing over the calendar year. The first line item in this category is for “Ad Valorem Taxes.” If ad valorem taxes were due for calendar year 2005, they would have been prorated. However, the amount is shown to be zero. As confirmed at hearing, no ad valorem taxes were due for the Sunset Lake property in 2005, because as of January 1, 2005, the property was owned by a not-for-profit entity, making the property exempt from ad valorem taxes. The second line item in this category, for “Non-Ad Valorem Assessments,” for which there was no exemption, shows a total amount for 2005 of $8,235.29, which was prorated to credit the buyer for $3,270.65. The closing statement proration had the effect of charging the seller with its share of the assessments for the part of the year prior to closing.3/ A separate category on the closing statement addresses “Recording Fees.” The first line item in this category is for “Transfer Tax-snf [skilled nursing facility].” The taxable amount is shown as $3,486,800.00. The tax of $24,407.60 is split equally between buyer and seller, with $12,203.80 charged to each. The next line is for “Stamp Tax on mtg. [mortgage].” The taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, the amount of the mortgage loan. The tax of $26,250.00 is charged to the buyer. Another line item is shown for “Intangible Tax on mtg.” Again, the taxable amount is shown as $7,500,000.00, and the tax of $15,000.00 is charged to the buyer. The top right corner of the warranty deed conveying the Sunset Lake property contains the following printed or stamped text in the space marked “(Space reserved for Clerk of Court):” RECORDED IN OFFICIAL RECORDS INSTRUMENT # 2005117710 7 PGS 2005 JUN 01 05:01 PM KAREN E. RUSHING CLERK OF THE CIRCUIT COURT SARASOTA COUNTY, FLORIDA MMARSH Receipt#635187 Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60 [Bar/Scan Code with instrument number] As Venice’s representative confirmed, the reference on the face of the warranty deed to “Doc Stamp-Deed: 24,407.60,” affixed by the clerk of the court in the official records entry, means that a documentary stamp tax on the deed in the amount of $24,407.60 was paid. Because the tax was split between buyer and seller, Venice actually paid $12,203.80. Although the closing statement shows that the tax at issue was called a transfer tax and categorized as a “recording fee,” and not an “ad valorem tax,” Venice contends here that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was an ad valorem property tax, because the tax was assessed on the value of the property. As Venice summarized its position: That irrespective of whether the transfer tax is called an excise tax, a doc stamp tax or any other type of tax, the fact that it is based solely on the value of the assets makes it an ad valorem tax, which is considered by the state of Florida in all cases under Medicaid cost reporting purposes [sic] as a property tax. (AHCA Exh. 3, p. 14). AHCA disagrees. AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax on the deed is an excise tax, assessed on the consideration for the property transferred by the deed. The parties do agree that the documentary stamp tax rate, applied to either the value of the property or the consideration for the property, was 70 cents per $100.00.4/ The parties also agree that the “property” at issue, which was conveyed by the warranty deed, includes the land, land improvements, and the building. That being the case, it appears from the closing statement that the “taxable amount” used to determine the documentary stamp tax on the deed (referred to as the “transfer tax-snf”) was the sum of the purchase price allocations for the land ($477,000.00), land improvements ($496,500.00), and the building ($2,513,250.00).5/ The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was based on the consideration for the property stated in the closing statement.6/ Venice asserts that the documentary stamp tax was based on the “assessed value of the property (land, land improvements and the building) [of] $3,486.750.00[.]” (Venice PRO at ¶ 24, n. 1). However, Venice offered no evidentiary support for this assertion. The amount Venice calls the “assessed value” is actually the amount of the total purchase price allocated in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. In contrast, the “assessed value” for this property in 2005, according to the Sarasota County Tax Collector’s bill, was $3,724,300.00. The documentary stamp tax on the warranty deed was not based on the assessed value of the property. Venice also contends that subsequent action by the Department of Revenue supports Venice’s position that the documentary stamp tax on the deed was based on the value of the property and not on the consideration for the property. Venice offered in evidence portions of correspondence between representatives of Venice’s parent company with the Department of Revenue in 2008 that resulted in a determination that Venice owed additional documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed. According to Venice, “the Department [of Revenue] did not agree with the value of assets that Venice had reported and paid taxes on.” (Venice PRO at ¶ 32). Contrary to Venice’s characterization, the portions of correspondence with the Department of Revenue in evidence confirm that the documentary stamp tax on the Sunset Lake warranty deed was based on the consideration for the real property (i.e., the land, land improvements, and the building). The Department of Revenue sought additional information from Venice to establish what the consideration was. The Department of Revenue “Official Request for Information” form asked for “Total Consideration (Purchase/Transfer Price)” for the property conveyed by warranty deed. The form completed on Venice’s behalf reported that the consideration was $3,486,750.00--the purchase price allocation in the closing statement to the land, land improvements, and the building. Along with the completed form, a letter of explanation on Venice’s behalf (with attachments not offered in evidence) went into great detail in an attempt to justify these purchase price allocations, and ended on the following note: We are hopeful that the enclosed documentation and the foregoing explanation of the purchase price allocations will provide sufficient information for the Department to determine that the correct amount of documentary stamp taxes was paid on each of the deeds, based in each case on the agreed consideration paid for the respective real estate assets. Thus, from the evidence offered by Venice, the focus of the Department of Revenue inquiry, as well as the Venice response to the inquiry, was entirely on the consideration paid for the property. The fact that the Department of Revenue ultimately determined that Venice owed more documentary stamp taxes on the warranty deed than was paid is not evidence that the tax was assessed on the “value” of the real property, as Venice argues. Instead, the material suggests that the Department of Revenue disagreed with what Venice contended was the total consideration and/or with Venice’s allocation of the total purchase price to the real property (the land, land improvements, and the building) and to the other assets acquired in the transaction, including furniture, equipment, and personal property. Venice also takes the position that the tax on the warranty deed is an allowable cost pursuant to two provisions in the federal Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM), which is one of the sources used to determine allowable costs. First, PRM section 2122.1 provides the “general rule” that “taxes assessed against the provider, in accordance with the levying enactments of the several States and lower levels of government and for which the provider is liable for payment, are allowable costs.” Next, PRM section 2122.2 provides in pertinent part: Certain taxes . . . which are levied on providers are not allowable costs. These taxes are: * * * C. Taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations, such as taxes on the issuance of bonds, property transfers, issuance or transfer of stocks, etc. Generally, these costs are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset. They are not, however, recognized as tax expense. Venice contends that the documentary stamp tax paid on the warranty deed must be allowed because it is a tax that meets the general rule in section 2122.1, and it is not an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). The documentary stamp tax paid by Venice on the warranty deed satisfies the general elements of section 2122.1; AHCA does not contend otherwise. Instead, AHCA contends that the documentary stamp tax must be considered an excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). AHCA is correct that the documentary stamp tax on warranty deeds transferring real property is essentially a transfer tax. However, it is not a tax in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. An example of such a tax would be the documentary stamp tax that Venice paid on the mortgage on Sunset Lake, because it was a tax in connection with the financing for the property. Venice correctly points out that, grammatically, section 2122.2(C) suggests that the only taxes excluded under that subsection are taxes in connection with financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. The use of the phrase “such as” suggests that everything that follows that phrase must be considered an example of what precedes the phrase. AHCA acknowledges that consideration of the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C) alone would support Venice’s interpretation. However, AHCA’s expert testified, reasonably and without contradiction, that Venice’s interpretation would render the phrase “property transfers” meaningless. As AHCA’s expert explained, a tax on a property transfer is not a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations. Therefore, despite the grammatical structure, taxes on property transfers must be considered a separate type of excluded tax under section 2122.2(C). As further support for this interpretation, AHCA’s expert pointed to the second sentence, providing that the excluded costs referred to in the first sentence “are either amortized over the life of the securities or depreciated over the life of the asset.” AHCA’s expert explained that taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would all be amortized, whereas taxes on property transfers would be depreciated over the life of the depreciable assets transferred (i.e., the land improvements and the building). Venice relies solely on the grammatical structure of section 2122.2(C), offering no response to AHCA’s reasoning for interpreting the subsection in a way that is contrary to the meaning suggested only by grammatical structure. Venice did not explain how a tax on property transfers could be considered a tax on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations (so as to give meaning to the phrase “property transfers”), nor did Venice explain when taxes on financing, refinancing, or refunding operations would be depreciated over the life of the asset (so as to give meaning to that phrase in the second sentence).

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a Final Order disallowing $12,203.80 claimed as a property tax expense in Venice’s initial Medicaid cost report. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of July, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of July, 2014.

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