The Issue The issue is whether Respondent abused its discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an exemption from disqualification for employment in a position of trust.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency charged with protecting vulnerable persons, such as Medicaid recipients and the Medicaid program, and, in that capacity, it maintains discretion to approve or deny requests for exemption from disqualification. Petitioner is seeking to work as a certified nursing assistant. Petitioner’s employment goals require her to have a Level 2 criminal background screening to ensure she does not have any disqualifying offenses to prohibit her from working with AHCA-regulated facilities. Petitioner’s background screening of February 5, 2020, identified the following five criminal offenses: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting executive officer with minor injury. By letter dated February 5, 2020, AHCA notified Petitioner that she was disqualified from employment due to the disqualifying offense of “04/22/2017 Sheriff’s Office San Diego, Obstruct/Resist Exec Off.” The letter also informed Petitioner that she may be eligible to apply for an exemption from disqualification and how to apply. On or around February 7, 2020, Petitioner submitted a request for exemption from disqualification and supporting documentation to AHCA. By letter dated February 18, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption. On April 6, 2020, Petitioner submitted a second Application for Exemption (“exemption package”) to AHCA. Petitioner’s exemption package contained documentation including employment history, education/training, a criminal history report, arrest reports, investigation reports, a California Department of Public Health investigation report, and a 12-month suspension of nurse assistant certification. By letter dated April 7, 2020, AHCA denied Petitioner’s request for exemption, stating Petitioner is not eligible for the exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: ELDER/DEP ADULT CRUELTY, Case number CN3772399 Petitioner contested the denial and requested a formal administrative hearing. AHCA acknowledged the disqualifying offense error in the denial letter of April 7, 2020, and corrected its denial letter. The corrected denial letter dated September 8, 2020, deemed Petitioner not eligible for an exemption based on the following grounds: A disqualifying felony offense(s) and you have not been lawfully released from confinement, supervision, or nonmonetary condition imposed by the court for the disqualifying felony 3 years prior to the date you applied for the exemption. Our records indicate you met the above criteria for the following: Corrected Disqualifying Offense: 04/22/2017 SHERIFF’S OFFICE SAN DIEGO, RESISTING AN OFFICER (California Penal Code section 148,) Case Number CN372399. Hearing At hearing, Petitioner testified about the incident that occurred on April 22, 2017, while working at Fallbrook Skilled Nursing (“Fallbrook”) in California. Petitioner explained that three police officers came to her job at Fallbrook while she was working her shift and asked to speak to her outside the facility about allegations of resident abuse. Petitioner testified she refused to leave the facility upon multiple instructions from the police to leave. Petitioner admitted that after an officer told her several times he was going to arrest her, she told the police “you don’t have a right to arrest me.” Petitioner detailed how she did not allow the police to put handcuffs on her because she believed the reports about her were lies. Ultimately, the incident escalated--Petitioner testified that when she did not allow the police to handcuff her, the three police officers put her on the ground, one put his knee on her back, and she was handcuffed. Petitioner weighed approximately 125 pounds when arrested. After the police got Petitioner outside, the three police officers picked her up, put her in the police car, and took her to jail. Petitioner was charged with: elder abuse/neglect; trespass (refuse to leave property, peace officer’s request); and three counts of obstructing/resisting an officer, all stemming from the same April 22, 2017, incident. The elder abuse and trespass charges against Lalanne were dismissed. On January 30, 2018, Petitioner proceeded to a bench trial before a judge on the resisting an officer charge. At trial, Petitioner was found guilty and convicted of “count 1 PC 148 (a)(1), resisting an officer” in case number CN372399. That same day, the judge sentenced Petitioner to three years’ probation2 and community service for the resisting an officer conviction. Subsequently, the County of San Diego, California, probation department provided Petitioner a certificate of completion for completing her three days of public work service on or about September 13, 2018. Petitioner testified that she made a mistake when she did not listen to the officers and it was a lesson for her. She also testified that she believed there was no harm to the police and her offense is a misdemeanor not a felony. Vanessa Risch (“Risch”), AHCA’s operations and management consultant manager in the Background Screening Unit, testified that because Petitioner’s offense occurred in California, AHCA had to evaluate the nature of the offense, what occurred during the incident, and the final outcome of the case to determine the correlating criminal offense in Florida. Risch testified that she contacted the California Clerk of Courts to validate the outcome of Petitioner’s case and probationary status. Risch testified that, through her investigation, she confirmed that Petitioner’s probation started on January 30, 2018, and terminates on January 30, 2021. Risch also detailed how AHCA converted Petitioner’s California resisting an officer charge to a Florida resisting arrest with violence felony offense, after determining the officers in California had to force Petitioner’s body to the ground after Petitioner did not comply with the officers’ repeated instructions. AHCA concluded that Petitioner’s actions of opposing the three 2 The compelling evidence at hearing supports Petitioner’s probationary sentence. The undersigned finds that Petitioner failed to testify honestly and forthright regarding her three-year probationary period. First, Petitioner denied knowledge of any probationary period even though probation was listed on the sentencing documents Petitioner presented as Exhibit 1. Also, Petitioner’s Exhibit 3 is from the probation department. Additionally, Petitioner testified that her lawyer told her she had probation, which confirms Petitioner’s knowledge of her probationary period. officers is equivalent to the criminal offense of resisting arrest with violence in Florida. Risch testified that resisting an officer with violence is a disqualifying felony offense. Risch testified further that AHCA ultimately concluded that Petitioner was not eligible to apply for an exemption. Risch explained that Petitioner’s current probationary status prohibited her from being eligible to apply for an exemption because eligibility starts three years after Petitioner’s probationary period for the disqualifying felony offense is terminated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Agency for Health Care Administration, enter a final order denying Shaddainah Lalanne’s, request for an exemption from disqualification. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of December, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JUNE C. MCKINNEY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of December, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Shaddainah Sherly Lalanne Apartment 206 6609 Woods Island Circle Port St. Lucie, Florida 34952 (eServed) Katie Jackson, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 7 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Bill Roberts, Acting General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Shevaun L. Harris, Acting Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact The Respondent was certified by the Commission on January 22, 1981, and was issued certificate number 02-026742. At all times material to the allegations of this case, Respondent has been employed as a law enforcement officer with the City of Pompano Beach Police Department. Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance pursuant to Section 893.03, Florida Statutes. Pursuant to Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, possession of cocaine is a felony. In accordance with a collective bargaining agreement, the Police Benevolent Association, as the bargaining unit for its members, agreed to random drug and alcohol testing for all police officers employed by the City of Pompano Beach Police Department. Pursuant to that agreement, Respondent was requested to, and agreed to submit a urine sample for testing on September 24, 1992. In order to coordinate the testing, the City of Pompano Beach had contracted with a private company, Worker's Compensation Medical Center (WCMC), which was to conduct the collection of urine samples for testing purposes. On the testing dates selected, WCMC employees set up collection facilities at the police station. Ms. Bobkier, a WCMC employee with four and a half years experience, was responsible for collecting the urine sample from Respondent. According to Ms. Bobkier, employees from WCMC set up tables at the police station during the hours of 6:00 a.m. until 6:00 p.m. on September 24, 1992. On that date, Respondent presented for testing, completed the paperwork to accompany the sample, went into the bathroom designated for use, and returned a sample to the collection table. This sample was identified as DO482663-5. As she did with all samples collected that date, Ms. Bobkier then placed the sample into a holding cooler until it was transferred back to the WCMC office. Before transferring the samples back to the office, they were cataloged and inventoried. Once back at WCMC, a courier from the testing center, National Health Laboratories (NHL) picked up the samples at approximately 7:15 p.m. on the evening of September 24, 1992. The courier presumably took the samples to NHL where they were given assension numbers by a NHL employee. Neither the courier nor the "assension" employee testified at the hearing. The assension number assigned to sample DO482663-5 was 3303217-5. According to Dr. Donald R. Stalons, the director of NHL, testing on assension sample no. 3303217-5 was performed on September 24, 1992 at approximately 2:45 p.m. NHL is a clinical laboratory fully licensed by the State of Florida and the federal government and is authorized to perform forensic toxicological testing. According to the test results for assension sample no. 3303217-5, such sample was positive for cocaine metabolite. The "assension number" referred to above was the control number assigned to the sample for testing purposes. The sample retained that number throughout the testing process.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a final order dismissing the administrative complaint. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 29th day of April, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Joyous D. Parrish Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of April, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-3695 Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner: Paragraphs 1 through 12, and 21 are accepted. Paragraphs 13 through 20 are rejected to the extent that they conclude the sample was Respondent's. The Petitioner failed to prove the sample was Respondent's as his sample was not transported to the testing center until approximately 7:15 p.m. on September 24, 1992. The sample tested by NHL purported to be Respondent's sample was tested at 2:45 p.m. that same day. This would be physically impossible. To the extent that the paragraphs correctly outline the testing procedures and results at NHL, they could be accepted but are irrelevant as the sample could not have been Respondent's. Paragraph 22 is rejected as it is not supported by the weight of credible evidence. Paragraphs 23 through 32 are rejected as irrelevant and outside the scope of the administrative complaint. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent: 1. None submitted in a form which can be addressed by either accepting or rejecting a statement of fact. Otherwise, Respondent's proposed findings of fact are rejected as argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard E. Lober Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 W. George Allen One River Plaza, Suite 701 305 S. Andrews Avenue P.O. Box 14738 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent, a certified law enforcement officer, failed to maintain good moral character as alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Petitioner on April 2, 1982, and was issued Law Enforcement and Instructor Certificate Number 124699. Respondent was employed by the Miami Dade Police Department from April 2, 1982, until his employment was terminated as a result of the incident at issue in this proceeding. Respondent had a good record while working for the Miami Dade Police Department. He earned several commendations and received performance evaluations of satisfactory or above. Respondent is the biological father of Shannon Delano, a female born March 10, 1973. Shannon's parents divorced when she was four, and her mother was awarded primary custody of Shannon and of Shannon's twin sister. In 1981, Respondent moved to Florida. As a consequence of the divorce and of Respondent's move to Florida, Shannon seldom saw her father while she was growing up. Shannon maintained periodic telephone contact with him over the years and visited him in Florida in 1992, while she was on Spring break. They had a pleasant visit on that occasion. After he moved to Florida, Respondent married for the second time to a woman named Patrice. Respondent and Patrice had a son named Sean. Shannon joined the United States Air Force on October 15, 1992. Her permanent assignment was as a member of the military police at Langley Air Force Base in Virginia. In 1993, she was temporarily assigned to duty in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a support person for Desert Storm. While in the UAE, Shannon talked to Respondent occasionally by telephone. While she was in the UAE, Shannon and Respondent agreed that she would visit Respondent and Sean when she returned to the United States from the UAE. Respondent and Patrice had divorced by that time and Respondent was living alone in a two-bedroom apartment in Broward County, Florida. Their visit began on January 8, 1994. Respondent paid for Shannon's roundtrip airline ticket from Virginia to Florida. The visit was uneventful until the evening of January 12, 1994. Respondent worked his usual hours on January 12, 1994, and thereafter returned to the two-bedroom apartment at approximately 6:00 p.m. Respondent and Shannon had made plans to go out to eat dinner and then go to a comedy club that night. Respondent and Shannon were alone in the apartment. Respondent and Shannon engaged in a conversation in the living room area of the apartment. Because Shannon thought Respondent was despondent about his child custody fight over his son and his relationship with Shannon's twin sister, she hugged him and began to rub his back. There is a conflict in the evidence as to what happened next. The record establishes clearly and convincingly that Respondent thereafter preformed oral sex on Shannon, that he placed his mouth and tongue in her vaginal area, that he penetrated her vagina with his finger, and that he penetrated her anus with his finger. The conflict is whether Shannon was a willing participant in this sexual encounter. According to her testimony, Respondent forced her to the floor using a police take-down technique; he forcibly removed her clothing, and he held her down with his body and with one arm while he performed the sexual acts on her. She testified that she asked him to stop, but that she was too stunned to physically fight him. Respondent testified that Shannon was a willing participant and that the sexual encounter was consensual. Shannon and her father went to the comedy club that night, she subsequently rode with him on patrol where she met several of his colleagues, and she stayed with him at his apartment until her scheduled return flight to Virginia. Shannon returned to active duty in Langley, Virginia, as scheduled without reporting the incident. Approximately two weeks after the incident, she reported the incident to her superiors. She thereafter contacted the Broward County Sheriff's office, who assigned Detective Deborah Cox to conduct an investigation. As part of her investigation, Detective Cox had Shannon engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. Detective Cox also had Patrice engage in a telephone conversation with Respondent that Detective Cox monitored and taped. In his telephone conversation with Patrice, Respondent categorically denied that he touched Shannon and lamented that he was being falsely accused. Although there are statements made by Respondent contained in his telephone conversation with Shannon that substantiate his position that the sexual encounter was consensual,2 the following excerpts establish that Respondent did what he thought Shannon wanted him to do, not what she consented for him to do: Shannon: I guess I just need to understand why you felt the need to touch me that way. Respondent: I find, to be perfectly honest, I thought you had the need for it, believe me it's nothing I wanted, it's nothing I ever thought about, it's not something I consider to be normal thing between a father and a daughter. Shannon: I mean if I had the need to have that touch, why did it have to come from you, I mean - Respondent: It's something I thought you asked for, or it's something you wanted, believe me it's not something I want to do, it's not something I thought about, something that I looked forward to or thought about afterwards as being something good. Do you think you've had sleepless night over it, I had from that day forward. It's bothered me, it's upset me, it's bothered me a lot since then. I never would have believed that I could have done that , all I've ever tried to be is what you needed at the time. Obviously what you needed or what I thought you needed wasn't what you think you need now. Whether it was or it wasn't then, I really can't tell you. I, from what you said, from what you did, from the way you acted, felt, truly believed that's what you wanted and what you felt you needed. . . . The conflict in the testimony is resolved by finding that while she did not physically resist the sexual encounter, she did not implicitly or explicitly consent to the sexual encounter. Detective Cox turned over the results of her investigation to the State Attorney's office, who prosecuted Respondent on felony charges of sexual battery and on misdemeanor charges of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. Based on the sexual encounter of January 12, 1994, Respondent was convicted of five misdemeanor counts of committing Unnatural or Lascivious Acts. He was acquitted of the felony sexual battery charges.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order that adopts the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained herein; finds Respondent guilty of failing to maintain good moral character; and revokes his certification as a Law Enforcement Officer and Instructor (Certificate Number 124699). DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of May, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of May, 1999
The Issue At issue is whether the Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint dated October 25, 2000, and if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, Battles was employed as a physical education teacher and head football coach at Gardens. He was popular with students and enjoyed a good relationship with his principal. Battles' first full year as head coach began with the 1997-98 school year. At that time Battles was 33 and was an experienced teacher, having taught in Florida schools for a decade. In the spring of 1998, a 14-year-old ninth grader at Gardens, Stephanie Carbone (Carbone), developed an infatuation with Battles. She confided her crush to one of her classmates and girlfriends, Barbara Borucki (Borucki), who promptly communicated the information to Battles. Very shortly after that conversation, Battles commenced a sexual relationship with Carbone. Their initial sexual contact consisted of kissing and fondling. The relationship continued for under two months. During that time, Battles and Carbone had sexual encounters two or three times a week. Right around the time the relationship began, Carbone volunteered to be a student manager for the football team. Taking advantage of Carbone's fixation on him, Battles facilitated an improper relationship with her by allowing her to volunteer, and assigning her to duties which would involve being alone with him in areas of the school gym which he was able to lock and render inaccessible to third parties. Battles and Carbone engaged in sexual activity in the coach's office, the equipment room, and the shower area of the gym. Their relationship and their encounters, which were clearly and convincingly described at the final hearing by Carbone, are best described as pathetic. The relationship consisted of kissing, groping, fondling, giving and receiving oral sex, digital penetration, or some combination thereof, for periods of short duration during or after the school day, two or three times per week. On one occasion, the two unsuccessfully attempted intercourse. Carbone's memory with respect to minor details of the relationship was imperfect, but not inconsistent with what would be expected of a witness testifying truthfully from memory as to emotionally charged events which occurred three years ago. The undersigned fully credits the testimony of Carbone as to the existence of the relationship, and the nature and frequency of the sexual contact between her and Battles. The undersigned carefully observed Carbone's demeanor under oath. In her direct testimony and on cross-examination, she was unflinching. There is no evidence that she committed perjury for the purpose of harming Battles, or due to a mental illness, nor for any other reason. Carbone was candid and unsparing of herself as she described how she had thought she was in love with Battles, and how she had initially been the aggressor and invited his attentions. When the relationship eventually became known to school authorities, Carbone at first denied its existence, in order to protect Battles. Before, during, and after the relationship began, Battles was well liked by Carbone and by her friends. There is no evidence that Carbone nor any of her friends desired to "set him up." There is no evidence that Carbone has any financial stake in proving the existence of the relationship. Nor is there any plausible explanation of why she would perjure herself in order to injure Battles. Although at some point in the relationship, Carbone came to be uncomfortable, knowing that sex with a teacher was wrong, her testimony clearly and convincingly establishes that she would have kept up her end of the relationship for at least some additional period of time, had she not first been confronted by school authorities. The confrontation came about six to eight weeks into the relationship. Battles was a married man, and at the start of the relationship had instructed Carbone to keep whatever happened between them a secret. Carbone disobeyed that instruction from the start. Instead, she shared their "secret" with one friend at a time. By May 4, 1998, Gardens Principal Paul Houlihan (Houlihan) had heard a rumor that there was an improper relationship between Battles and Carbone. Coincidentally, on that same day, Carbone's mother brought her or Carbone to Houlihan's office. Mrs. Carbone was upset because she had found her daughter off campus in a van with other students. During that meeting, Houlihan asked Carbone about the rumors that she was involved with a teacher. Initially, Carbone denied involvement with Battles by name, even though Houlihan had not mentioned the name of any particular teacher. Houlihan and Carbone's mother did not credit Stephanie's denial, in part because of her demeanor as she denied the allegation, and in part because Stephanie was the first to use Battles' name. The following day, Houlihan confronted Battles. Battles did not deny the existence of a relationship. Instead, he expressed two thoughts: fear that his wife would leave him on learning of the allegations; and concern for what impact the allegations would have on the football team. Carbone's story is corroborated in some aspects by the testimony of fellow students who had opportunities to observe how Carbone's "volunteer work" for the football team provided cover for her relationship with Battles. For example, classmate Josh Knight (Knight) would on occasion accompany Carbone to the gym and wait with her outside until the football team left, usually to go to the weight room, at which time Battles would wave her in and close and lock the doors behind them. The undersigned carefully observed the demeanor of Knight and each of the other students who testified regarding their observations of Battles and Carbone, as well as about things Carbone had told them about the relationship. Based upon the demeanor of the student witnesses under oath; how they handled themselves during cross-examination; their lack of a financial stake in the outcome; the fact that they had no difficulties with Battles as a teacher and otherwise lacked any apparent motive to harm him; and the lack of any other plausible motive to commit perjury, the undersigned credits the testimony of Carbone's friends as substantially accurate accounts of what Carbone told them contemporaneously during the time she was involved with Battles, as well as their observations of some exchanges between Battles and Carbone which they believe were appropriate to a boyfriend-girlfriend relationship, rather than one of student and teacher. Cross-examination of Carbone and each of Petitioner's other witnesses established that various witnesses had given testimony which Battles contends is in conflict with testimony they had provided on previous occasions. Such alleged conflicting testimony is set forth in Paragraphs 7-19 of Battles' Proposed Recommended Order. Battles contends that allegedly conflicting testimony between witnesses, or in some cases between details testified to by the same witness at different times, effectively discredits the testimony and renders DOE unable to establish its case by clear and convincing evidence. The undersigned has painstakingly reviewed the testimony which Battles argues to be conflicting or impeaching, and deems the conflicts, to the extent any were actually established, to be irrelevant. To take one example, Carbone once testified that Borucki had walked her to Battles' office on the day of her first intimate encounter with Battles. On another occasion, she testified that Knight had walked her to the office that day. Whether she misspoke, or was mistaken, or whether someone else or nobody else had walked her to the office, is insignificant in the context of the entire record. The record as a whole reveals that Carbone was close to and had frequent contact with both Borucki and Knight, and spoke with as well as hung around with both of them often. The discrepancy in her testimony on this point may reflect a confused memory. Or it may have been a misspeak. Or she might have misunderstood the question. The factual resolution of this and other "discrepancies" raised by Battles does not affect the substantive factual issue in this case. In January 2000, Battles was tried, but not convicted, on criminal charges arising out of his alleged relationship with Carbone. Battles testified in the criminal case, and submitted a copy of his testimony as evidence in these proceedings. He was not obligated to testify in these proceedings, and elected not to. No inference for or against him was drawn by reason of this decision. In his criminal court testimony, Battles admitted that Borucki, whom he described as his "good friend" had made him aware that Carbone "liked" him. He claimed that he did not take this information seriously at the time, and promptly forgot about it, and denied the existence of any improper relationship with Carbone. In the course of his criminal trial testimony, Battles admitted that Carbone was accurate in her description of his underwear. He attributed her knowledge to the fact that he bends over a lot and anyone standing nearby would be able to see his underwear when he does. Battles' explanation for why Carbone can describe his underwear is rejected as not credible. A 33-year-old gym teacher would reasonably be expected to be able to conceal his underwear from his students. Given Battles' obvious, overwhelming motive to deny, as he did, the existence of any improper relationship with Carbone, the undersigned concludes that the transcript of Battles' trial testimony, when considered with the other evidence presented by Battles, is insufficient to refute the clear, consistent, and convincing testimony of Carbone as to the existence, nature, and duration of an improper sexual relationship between them. By letter dated May 18, 1998, Houlihan informed Battles that his teaching contract would not be renewed for the 1998-1999 school year.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Respondent Clifford L. Battles is guilty of the violations alleged in Counts 1, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Amended Administrative Complaint; dismissing Count 2 of the Amended Administrative Complaint; and permanently revoking Battles' teaching certificate. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of October, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles T. Whitelock, Esquire Whitelock & Associates, P.A. 300 Southeast Thirteenth Street Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33316 Mark Wilensky, Esquire Dubiner & Wilensky, P.A. 515 North Flagler Drive, Suite 325 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Kathleen M. Richards, Executive Director Florida Education Center Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street Room 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Jerry W. Whitmore, Chief Bureau of Educator Standards Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street Suite 224-E Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by engaging in unsolicited and unwanted sexually or romantically oriented behavior toward a subordinate female employee, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Gary Latham (Latham), has served as a member of the Florida Parole Commission (Parole Commission) since July 24, 1992. Claretha Billingslea Walker started to work for the Parole Commission on May 1, 1991, as an Administrative Secretary to the General Counsel's Office. At all times pertinent to this Complaint, she was known as Claretha Billingslea and will be so referred to for purposes of this Complaint. Effective May 27, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Executive Secretary to Commissioner Judith Wolson. On July 1, 1994, Ms. Wolson became Chairman of the Parole Commission. Ms. Billingslea was promoted to the position of Senior Executive Secretary to the Chairman. When a potential opening arose, Latham and Ms. Billingslea discussed the possibility of Ms. Billingslea accepting a position as the Executive Secretary to Latham. Latham had previously interviewed Ms. Billingslea for an Executive Secretary position in his office approximately two years before. Ms. Billingslea was interested in coming to work for Latham because a number of her duties had been eliminated when Ms. Wolson was made Chairman, but she was concerned about making such a move because she had been with Chairman Wolson's office such a short time. Latham discussed the possibility of transferring Ms. Billingslea to his office with Chairman Wolson and her administrative assistant, Gene Strickland. Both Chairman Wolson and Mr. Strickland agreed that it would be a good opportunity for Ms. Billingslea to learn more about the duties in a Commissioner's office because the work in the Chairman's office was more administrative than that in a Commissioner's office. Neither Mr. Strickland nor Chairman Wolson was dissatisfied with Ms. Billingslea's work. Prior to hiring Ms. Billingslea, Latham also discussed the hiring with his future administrative assistant, Brenda Henry, and with his wife. Effective August 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary to Latham. Because there is only one position of Senior Executive Secretary in the Parole Commission (the Chairman's Secretary) this reassignment was nominally a demotion. It did not act as a demotion, however, because Ms. Billingslea's salary and benefits remained unchanged. In her capacity as Executive Secretary to Latham, Ms. Billingslea reported directly to Latham. As a career service employee, Ms. Billingslea could not be unilaterally fired by Latham, but as her direct supervisor Latham could set the wheels in motion for her termination. Ms. Billingslea understood that the Chairman would have to approve her termination. Latham had the authority to assign tasks to Ms. Billingslea and to grant or deny her leave or flex time. From the start of Ms. Billingslea's employment in Latham's office, Latham engaged in comments and behavior of questionable propriety. He told her that he would not be able to get any work done with such a pretty secretary. Ms. Billingslea took this as a joke. On another occasion, one of Ms. Billingslea's male friends complained to her that Latham had been rude to him when he called. She thought Latham might have been upset that she was receiving too many personal calls, but when she asked Latham about it, he told her no, and said, "I guess I'll just have to get used to guys calling all the time with such a pretty secretary." Latham often stared at Ms. Billingslea, looking her up and down. In describing these looks, Ms. Billingslea stated, "The way he looks at me, it is really weird. And it makes me feel uncomfortable, the way he kind of stares and looks me up and down. It will almost be as if he's going to say something, but he never said anything." Once when he was looking at her in this strange way, Ms. Billingslea asked him whether there was something he wanted to say, to which he responded, "No, that was my sexy look." At the time she took it as a joke. One day Latham told Ms. Billingslea that he had been on his way to a friend's house and had gotten lost and ended up on her street. He said that he had gone by her house and that she had a nice place. He asked her why she kept her blinds closed so tightly. Whenever the Florida Parole Commission denies parole, a "947.18" report is completed, justifying the decision not to grant the parole. Procedurally, the Parole Commission will make a decision to grant or deny parole at a meeting. The case is then assigned to a commissioner to prepare a 947.18 report. The report is prepared in the office of the commissioner and two weeks after the initial consideration the case is placed back on the agenda for review and acceptance of the 947.18 report. At its meeting on September 21, 1994, the Parole Commission denied parole for an inmate who had been convicted of sexually abusing his daughters. Latham had been assigned to prepare the 947.18 report. Ms. Henry drafted the report for Ms. Billingslea to type. The report was very sexually explicit. After the report was typed, Ms. Billingslea took it to Latham for his review. Both Latham and Ms. Billingslea commented that it was an interesting case. Latham closed his eyes and in a low voice began to describe the graphic details of the sexual abuse to Ms. Billingslea. Ms. Billingslea later asked Ms. Henry if the file contained any pictures. On September 27, 1994, Latham went into Ms. Billingslea's office and sat down in front of her desk. He informed her that he had "the hots" for her. He told Ms. Billingslea she had done nothing to make him approach her in this way, but that he did not know what had come over him lately, he had been attracted to a lot of young pretty women, and she was just "such a doll." He told her that he had nasty thoughts about her while he taught Sunday School. When she told him that she could not work for him if she were to be with him sexually, he responded that she wouldn't be working for him that he would be working for her. When she told him that she was not interested, he became defensive, stating that he had a lot of political power. His last words to her in that encounter were, "I might not be able to keep my hands to myself." Later the same day, as Ms. Billingslea was preparing to leave work, Latham asked her to stay late. Over and over, he asked her to stay and "be with him," initially standing behind her chair, preventing her from pushing back. Ms. Billingslea took Latham's remarks and actions on September 27 as an invitation to a sexual or romantic relationship, which she had neither solicited or encouraged. Ms. Billingslea did not misunderstand Latham or his intentions. Ms. Billingslea was afraid that her rejection of Latham's advances would cost her her job. She believed that Latham could cause her to be fired. On September 28, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was ill. She called her doctor's office and requested that the doctor call in a prescription for her to a local pharmacy. The doctor's office did call in a prescription. Ms. Billingslea advised Latham that she felt ill to which Latham responded that she had just "better be to work." Ms. Billingslea took this remark as an admonishment not to take sick leave. On October 3, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was late for work. She had tried to call the office to advise that she would be late but no one answered the telephone. On October 3, 1994, Latham expressed concern to Ms. Billingslea that she was abusing or not accurately reporting her leave time. Ms. Billingslea perceived that Latham's attitude toward her became cool after their conversation on September 27. Although Latham had never said anything to Ms. Billingslea about being tardy or being absent from work prior to September 27 because he did not think that it was a big deal, he began to voice his dissatisfaction with her work hours after she had spurned his advances. Ms. Billingslea went to the Parole Commission's personnel officer, Frank Trueblood. She wanted to take time off from work to look for another job and asked Mr. Trueblood if there was any type of leave request that she could take which could not be denied by Latham. Mr. Trueblood questioned Ms. Billingslea about the underlying nature of her problems and she told him about Latham's actions. Ms. Billingslea did not want to create a problem but wanted to find another job. Mr. Trueblood told Ms. Billingslea that she could file an informal complaint against Latham and that it would remain confidential. On October 5, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed an informal complaint against Latham. About 5:00 p.m. that day she met with Chairman Wolson, Mr. Strickland and Clay Phillips to discuss the situation. Chairman Wolson told Ms. Billingslea that she would be transferred to another section. Ms. Billingslea did not display eagerness to file a formal complaint against Latham. Latham saw Ms. Billingslea in Chairman Wolson's office and after Ms. Billingslea had left, he asked to speak with Chairman Wolson. Latham wanted to know what was going on but Chairman Wolson would only tell him that Ms. Billingslea was being transferred to Clemency and that Murlene Amison would be transferred to his office as his secretary. At first Latham was upset at the news of the transfer and told Chairman Wolson that it would be setting a dangerous precedent to make the transfer. Latham told Chairman Wolson that he would like to "save face" in the matter and be the one who would offer the transfer to Ms. Amison. Latham then became exuberant about the transfer, closing his fist, punching up with it in a victory signal and saying "yes." He left Chairman's Wolson's office. A few minutes later, Latham returned to Chairman Wolson's office and told her that he thought he had figured out what had happened. He said that Ms. Billingslea had been sexually harassing him and that he had talked with her and explained that he did not want to have an affair with her. This was the first time anyone at the Parole Commission had heard Latham's claim of sexual harassment by Ms. Billingslea. On October 6, 1994, Ms. Billingslea filed a formal complaint against Latham. Latham tried to find out from Mr. Trueblood whether Ms. Billingslea had filed a sexual harassment complaint against him but Mr. Trueblood would not tell him. Effective October 7, 1994, Ms. Billingslea was reassigned to the position of Executive Secretary for the Clemency Section. On October 7, 1994, Latham called Mr. Strickland to his office and thanked Mr. Strickland for the personnel move, indicating that it had "sav[ed] his butt." Latham asked Mr. Strickland to close the door and then told him that he had been attracted to Ms. Billingslea but nothing had happened, and now, because of the move, nothing would happen. Latham wanted to know what was on the paperwork regarding the transfer. Mr. Strickland told him that it indicated a lateral transfer. Latham knew that it was wrong for a supervisor to invite a subordinate employee into a sexual or romantic relationship. Since she has been at the Parole Commission, Ms. Billingslea has never received formal discipline relevant to any fact or issue in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Gary Latham violated Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, and recommending a civil penalty of $4,000 be imposed and public censure and reprimand. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of January, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of January, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3717E To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Advocate's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 2: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 3-5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted. Paragraphs 7-8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted. Paragraph 10: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 11: Accepted. Paragraphs 12-19: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: Rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 21: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-25: Accepted. Paragraphs 26-30: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 31: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 32-33: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 34: Accepted. Paragraph 35: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 36: Accepted. Paragraph 37: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 38: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 39-45: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 46-59: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60: Rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 61-64: Accepted in substance. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: The first two sentences are accepted. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 5-6: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 7: Accepted. Paragraph 8: The third and fourth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The remainder is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: The last sentence is accepted. The remainder is accepted in substance. Latham voiced his concerns after the conversation that he had with Ms. Billingslea on September 27. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 12-13: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 14: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 18: Rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The last sentence is accepted in substance except the portion about sexual innuendo. The evidence did establish that he did make sexual innuendos to Ms. Billingslea. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. The second sentence is accepted to the extent that he never directly asked Ms. Billingslea for sex, but he did imply that he wanted a romantic liaison when he asked her to stay after work and be with him. The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the record. Latham did tell Ms. Billingslea that he had a lot of political influence. Paragraph 21: The first sentence is rejected as argument. The second sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that that is what she thought at the time the incident occurred but later she realized that it was not a joke. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham denied the incidents but rejected to the extent that it implies that the incidents did not happen. Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, I find that the incidents did happen. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 22: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 23: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 24: The first sentence is accepted in substance as that is what Latham testified but rejected to the extent that it implies that the conversation did not take place. Accepted in substance that Latham got lost while going to a fund raiser but rejected that he did not go by her house and that he did not comment that she had a nice house and that her blinds were shut. Paragraph 25: The first two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. The third sentence is rejected as unnecessary. The last two sentences are rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraph 26: The first four sentences are accepted in substance. The last two sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraphs 27-28: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is accepted in substance as that was Latham's testimony but rejected to the extent that it implies that he did not describe the graphic sexual details of the case. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence based on the credibility of the witnesses. The fourth sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham made a comment to Ms. Henry that Ms. Billingslea was interested in the case. The last sentence is accepted in substance. Paragraph 30: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 31: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraph is rejected. Paragraph 32: Accepted that Latham disputes Ms. Billingslea's allegations but rejected that Latham's version is credible. Paragraph 33: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 34-37: Having judged the credibility of the witnesses, the paragraphs are rejected. Paragraph 38: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that Latham did not intentionally restrain Ms. Billingslea but rejected to the extent that it implies that Latham was not asking Ms. Billingslea to stay after work for the purpose of seeking sexual gratification or favors. The remainder is rejected as subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 39: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The last sentence is rejected as not supported by the evidence. Paragraphs 40-41: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 42: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 44: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 45: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 46: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 47: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 48-49: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 50: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 51-53: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 54: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 55: Rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 56: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 57: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The third sentence is accepted as that is what Latham said but rejected as being true. Given other witnesses accounts of Ms. Billingslea's appearance on that date, it is inconceivable that Latham could not have known that she was not sick. The last two sentences are subordinate to the facts found. Paragraph 58: Rejected as constituting argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Mark Herron, Esquire Post Office Box 10555 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2555 Virlindia Doss Advocate For the Florida Commission on Ethics Department of Legal Affairs PL-01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bonnie Williams Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
