The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent should be sanctioned for an alleged violation of Chapters 395 and 401, Florida Statutes (1989).
Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the final hearing and the entire record in this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made. HCA Raulerson is the only hospital in Okeechobee County, Florida. As such, it serves all of Okeechobee County and parts of the surrounding counties. It is a small community hospital that is best characterized as a primary care receiving facility as opposed to a secondary hospital or a tertiary care or trauma center hospital. The Hospital does not provide heart-bypass surgery, cardiac catherization, neuro-surgery services or even obstetrical services (other than the emergency delivery of babies.) The Hospital provided approximately three million dollars in uncompensated care to indigent residents of Okeechobee County in the year preceding the incident involved in this case. Under existing Florida law, a hospital is not required to provide either orthopedic surgery services or peripheral vascular services and there is no requirement for a hospital to have on its medical staff any orthopedic surgeons or peripheral vascular surgeons. The Hospital does not have the angiography equipment necessary for peripheral vascular surgery. As a result, the Hospital does not provide peripheral vascular surgery and there are no vascular surgeons on staff. Such services were not offered at the Hospital for at least several months prior to the incident in question. The Hospital has a single orthopedic surgeon on staff, Dr. Zafar Kureshi. Dr. Kureshi is board certified in orthopedic surgery. He has been engaged in the private practice of medicine in Okeechobee, Florida since October of 1986. While many of Dr. Kureshi's patients are treated at the Hospital, Dr. Kureshi is not employed by or under contract with the Hospital. This arrangement is not unusual since surgeons, including orthopedic and vascular surgeons, do not typically become employees of hospitals or enter into contracts with hospitals. The Hospital has tried to recruit additional orthopedic surgeons and other specialists for its medical staff, but has been unsuccessful. There is a shortage of orthopedic surgeons in Florida, especially in rural areas, and recruiting orthopedic surgeons to such areas is extremely difficult. It is unrealistic to expect that the Hospital would be able to recruit or retain any orthopedic surgeons if it required them to be "on call" at all times. For a short time after he first obtained staff privileges, Dr. Kureshi provided "on call" services for the Hospital's emergency room several nights per month. On those occasions, he treated patients irrespective of their financial status. At the time of the incident in question, however, Dr. Kureshi had ceased providing "on call" services. His decision was consistent with the Hospital medical staff by-laws. The by-laws of the Hospital medical staff state that, if there is only one physician on staff in a specialty, then that specialty does not have to make emergency department call rosters available to the emergency room. Since he was the only specialist on staff in his area of practice, Dr. Kureshi was not required to provide "on call" coverage. Subsequent to the incident involved in this case, Dr. Kureshi, at the request of the Hospital, has voluntarily agreed to be "on-call" several nights per month. Even when Dr. Kureshi is not formally "on call," the emergency room staff often contacts him when a patient presents at the emergency room in need of orthopedic care. On some such occasions, Dr. Kureshi will treat the patient if he was capable of doing so. When an orthopedic patient or a peripheral vascular patient presents at the Hospital and Dr. Kureshi can not or will not treat the patient, the Hospital (1) provides such care as can be rendered by the emergency room physician or others on HCA Raulerson's medical staff, (2) stabilizes the patient for transfer, (3) calls hospitals and their on-call physicians to arrange transfer, and (4) arranges suitable transportation and transfers the patient. In the months preceding the incident in question, the Hospital arranged the transfer to other hospitals of approximately eleven patients who presented at the Hospital's emergency room in need of orthopedic care. Four of those patients were "paying" patients covered by third party insurers, four were covered by Medicare or Medicaid and the remaining three were self-pay patients. There is no indication that financial status and/or the ability to pay in any way influenced the Hospital's actions with respect to these patients. HRS contends that Sections 395.0142, 395.0143 and 401.45, Florida Statutes, require a hospital that provides any given specialty service (e.g., orthopedic surgery services) to arrange 24-hour a day, seven day a week coverage for that service, either by providing coverage through physicians on staff or entering into advance transfer agreements with other hospitals to cover any such patients who may present in need of such services. The Hospital has attempted, but has been unsuccessful in its attempts, to obtain advance transfer agreements from other hospitals regarding the transfer of patients presenting themselves at the Hospital's emergency room in need of orthopedic surgery services or in need of peripheral vascular surgery services. The Hospital has limited bargaining power in attempting to induce other hospitals to enter into an advance transfer agreement. Because the Hospital is a small rural hospital, virtually all the services it offers are already available at the neighboring hospitals which are potential transfer partners. The only advance transfer agreements that the Hospital has been offered would require the Hospital to assume full responsibility for payment for services rendered to transferred patients by the transferee hospital. Those proposals have been rejected because the financial burden of such an arrangement would probably cause the Hospital to close. As of August 24, 1989, the date of the incident which is the subject of the Administrative Complaint in this case, HRS had not notified the Hospital of any rule or policy interpreting Sections 395.0142, 395.0143, and 401.45, Florida Statutes. As of August 24, 1989, HRS had not adopted any rule which stated a specific requirement that hospitals which provide orthopedic surgery must staff or provide on-call orthopedic surgery services on a continuous basis, i.e. twenty-four (24) hours per day, 365 days per year or have in place an agreement with another hospital(s) to provide such coverage. HRS contends that this requirement is imposed by the clear language of the statutes. On the evening of August 24, 1989 at approximately 7:45 p.m., K.H., a 28 year old male, presented himself at the Hospital's emergency room for treatment of a shotgun wound to his lower left leg. Dr. Charles Vasser, the emergency room physician on duty when K.H. arrived, stabilized the Patient and provided all the treatment that could be provided by an emergency room physician not trained in orthopedic surgery or vascular surgery. The radiology report prepared at the Hospital diagnosed the Patient's condition as follows: "focal soft tissue injury, with multiple metallic fragments of variable size, super imposed over soft tissues of distal right leg are noted. Comminuted compound fracture of distal tibial shaft, as well as linear fracture through distal fibula at same site, are observed. Findings are due to gun shot injury with residual bullet fragments within soft tissues. Correlation with patient's clinical findings is recommended." Because of the nature of the injury and the extent of the damage to the soft tissue of the Patient's lower leg, Dr. Vasser and the attending staff were concerned about the possibility of vascular damage. They frequently checked and charted the Patient's distal pulses. While the distal pulses appeared normal, the presence of distal pulses does not rule out vascular injury. A vascular injury is possible with a comminuted fracture even when the distal pedal pulses appear normal. A vascular problem is especially likely when the wound was inflicted by a shotgun blast and numerous metallic fragments are involved. After providing initial emergency room services to the Patient, Dr. Vasser felt that the assistance of appropriate specialists, i.e., an orthopedic surgeon and at least a consult with a vascular surgeon, would be required for further treatment. Dr. Vasser called the only orthopedic surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff, Dr. Zafar Kureshi, at 8:50 p.m. Dr. Kureshi was not on call that evening. Based on Dr. Vasser's description of K.H.'s condition, Dr. Kureshi stated that he was not capable of treating K.H. without the backup availability of a vascular surgeon and advised that K.H. should be transferred. This recommendation was made not only because Dr. Kureshi was not on call, but also because Dr. Kureshi was not capable of treating the Patient at an acceptable level of medical care without the availability of a vascular surgeon. As indicated in Findings of Fact 3 above, there are no vascular surgeons on staff at the Hospital and the Hospital does not offer vascular surgery services. In determining whether a patient needs the services of a physician in a particular specialty, the Hospital relies upon the medical judgment of the attending physician and any consulting physician. The Hospital did not and should not have ignored the medical determination made by the emergency room physician, in consultation with Dr. Kureshi, that the Patient, K.H., needed vascular backup in order to be properly treated. With the assistance of emergency technician Wendy Johns, Dr. Vasser began placing calls to other hospitals and their on-call physicians at 9:15 p.m. in an effort to arrange a transfer of the Patient. The first physician contacted through another hospital, Dr. Floyd, indicated that he would be unable to treat the Patient because of the extent of the soft-tissue injuries and the corresponding likelihood of vascular involvement. A number of additional hospitals and physicians were contacted and they also refused to accept the transfer of the Patient. All told, nineteen different physicians and/or hospitals were contacted between 9:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m. A variety of reasons were cited by those who refused to accept the transfer. Many of the reasons given for refusing the transfer were arguably a pretext and/or contravened the language and intent of Sections 395.0142, 395.0143 and 395.0144, Florida Statutes. Several of the doctors who were contacted confirmed that the treatment of the Patient would require the availability of a vascular surgeon as well as an orthopedist. After numerous unsuccessful attempts to transfer the Patient, Dr. Vasser contacted a general surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff, Dr. Husain, at approximately 12:10 a.m. Dr. Vasser and Dr. Husain again contacted Dr. Kureshi. The three physicians concurred that they were unable to treat the Patient because of the need for a vascular backup and the Hospital's inability to provide the necessary vascular backup. After he talked to Dr. Kureshi the second time, Dr. Vasser resumed calling other hospitals and their on-call physicians. The next call was to a vascular surgeon, Dr. Viamentes. Dr. Viamentes was reached through his beeper, but was unable to accept the transfer because he was out of town. At approximately 12:30 a.m., a social worker for the Hospital, Terry Cooper, contacted St. Mary's Hospital in West Palm Beach. After some discussion and deliberation, St. Mary's agreed to accept the transfer of K.H. The Patient was transferred in stable condition via ambulance to St. Mary's Hospital where he arrived at approximately 3:00 a.m. Surgery was initiated at approximately 4:30 a.m. After the Patient was admitted to St. Mary's Hospital, the administration of that hospital filed a complaint with HRS pursuant to Section 395.0142, Florida Statutes. That complaint recites the facts surrounding the transfer of the Patient and the refusal of several other hospitals to accept the transfer. It is not clear whether St. Mary's was questioning the medical necessity of the transfer or simply the refusal of the other hospitals to accept the transfer. HRS initiated an investigation of the transfer of the Patient and submitted the Patient's medical records from both HCA Raulerson and St. Mary's to its expert, Dr. Slevenski, for review. Dr. Slevenski is an emergency room physician who has no specialized training in orthopedic surgery or vascular surgery. Dr. Slevenski testified that he saw no evidence in the Hospital's medical records that a vascular evaluation or consultation was necessary to treat this Patient and that the Hospital inappropriately transferred the Patient to another hospital. Dr. Slevenski's opinions are rejected. Dr. Slevenski erroneously assumed that the Hospital had not attempted to contact an orthopedic surgeon regarding the Patient. In fact, the Hospital contacted Dr. Kureshi, the only orthopedic surgeon on its staff, who indicated he was not qualified to treat the Patient's injury. The evidence established that both the emergency room physician and the orthopedic surgeon who was contacted at home felt that a vascular consult was necessary. These opinions were reasonable under the circumstances. The testimony of Dr. Henderson, the Respondent's expert, is accepted and confirms that the opinions of the emergency room physician and the orthopedic surgeon were reasonable under the circumstances and given the nature of the Patient's injury. There is no evidence that the Patient's care was deficient in any respect at either St. Mary's or the Hospital. The Patient progressed normally and a good result was achieved. In sum, the evidence established that the Hospital secured appropriate treatment for K.H. by providing an on-site emergency room physician and supporting staff who (1) provided immediate emergency care and stabilized the patient for transfer, (2) confirmed with the orthopedic surgeon on the Hospital's medical staff that a transfer was medically necessary, (3) called hospitals and their on-call physicians to arrange the transfer, and (4) arranged suitable transportation and transfer of the patient. The Hospital provided all the care that it could within its service capability. In view of his injury, the Patient's best interests were served by transferring him rather than treating him at the Hospital. The evidence did not establish whether K.H. was a paying or nonpaying patient. The evidence did establish that the decision to transfer K.H. was not based on his financial status.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which dismisses the Administrative Complaint filed against HCA Raulerson Hospital. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 17th day of January, 1991. J. STEPHEN MENTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of January, 1991.
The Issue In DOAH Case No. 02-1421, addressing a survey concluded on October 23, 2001, the issue is whether Respondent Delta Health Group, doing business as Rosewood Manor (Rosewood), violated Rule 59A-4.1288, Florida Administrative Code and should be assessed a civil penalty and costs. In DOAH Case Nos. 02-1905 and 02-4040, addressing the survey of January 22 through January 25, 2002, the issue is also whether Rosewood violated Rule 59A- 4.1288, Florida Administrative Code. In DOAH Case No. 02-1905, the issue is whether a conditional license should issue. In DOAH Case No. 02-4040, the issue is whether civil penalties and costs should be assessed.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the state agency responsible for licensure and enforcement of all applicable statutes and rules governing nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Sections 400.021 and 400.23(7), Florida Statutes. Rosewood is a skilled nursing facility located at 3107 North H Street, Pensacola, Florida, holding license no. SNF1482096, which was issued by AHCA. Although not found in any rule, an unofficial standard in the industry requires that a resident be observed every two hours. This standard, when complied, is usually not documented. On September 11, 2001, AHCA conducted a survey of Rosewood's skilled nursing facility. During the survey AHCA concluded that the facility failed to ensure that a resident's environment remained as free as possible of accident hazards. Specifically, the AHCA surveyors determined that the door to a bio-hazardous storage area had been, either purposely or inadvertedly, propped open instead of being locked, and as a result, a resident entered the area, and injured himself with used hypodermic needles stored therein. Subsequently, on December 6, 2001, AHCA filed a Notice of Intent to Assign Conditional Licensure Status, based on the September 11, 2001, survey. The Notice was dated November 29, 2001. The Notice had attached to it an Election of Rights for Notice of Intent. Prior to December 10, 2001, the Election of Rights for Notice of Intent was returned to AHCA indicating that the factual allegations contained in the Notice of Intent to Assign Conditional Licensure Status were not disputed. On January 30, 2002, ACHA filed its Final Order. This Final Order incorporated the Notice of Intent dated November 29, 2001, and recited, that by not disputing the facts alleged, Rosewood admitted the allegations of fact. However, Rosewood did not admit the facts alleged. Rosewood merely stated that it would not contest the facts. The Survey of September 11, 2001. Resident 1 suffered from dementia, congestive heart failure, and epilepsy. He had a history of psychiatric problems. He was known by the staff to engage in aggressive behavior. Resident 1 was a "wanderer," which, in nursing home jargon, is a person who moves about randomly and who must constantly be watched. On May 24, 2002, Resident 1 attempted to get in another resident's bed and when a staff member attempted to prevent this, he swung at her but missed. On the morning of August 28, 2001, Resident 1 wandered in the biohazard storage room, which was unlocked and unguarded. Resident 1 succeeded in opening a Sharp's container which was used for the storage of used hypodermic needles. His handling of these needles resulted in numerous puncture wounds. These wounds could result in Resident 1 contracting a variety of undesirable diseases. Because he died soon after of other causes it was not determined if he contracted any diseases as a result of the needle sticks. This incident resulted from Rosewood's failure to prevent Resident 1 from wandering and from Rosewood's failure to ensure that harm did not befall their resident. The Survey of October 23, 2001. Resident 1A Resident 1A was admitted to Rosewood on May 31, 2001. At times pertinent he was 87 years of age. He suffered from a urinary tract infection, cardiomyopathy, congestive heart failure, hypertension, degenerative joint diseases, and a past history of alcoholism. On May 16, 2001, he struck a nursing assistant. He was diagnosed by a psychiatrist on October 31, 2001, as having dementia. He was also known by Rosewood staff to be a wanderer. On September 7, 2001, this resident engaged in combat with his roommate. Resident 1A was the loser in this contest. When found by staff, his fellow combatant had him in a headlock and was hitting him with a metal bar. The resident suffered facial lacerations as a result. The facility responded to this event by moving Resident 1A into another room. Resident 1A's care plan of September 10, 2001, had a goal which stated that, "Resident will have no further incident of physical abuse toward another resident by next care plan review." On October 4, 2001, the resident entered the room of a female resident and physically abused her. This resulted in this resident's being beaten by the resident with the help of another. Resident 1A suffered cuts and bruises from this encounter. As a result, Rosewood implemented a plan on October 4, 2001, which required that Resident 1A be observed every 15 minutes. Prior to that time he was observed at least every two hours, which is the standard to which Rosewood aspires. Subsequent to this altercation Resident 1A was evaluated by a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist did not recommend additional observation. On October 5, 2001, early in the morning, the resident was physically aggressive to staff and backed a wheelchair into another resident. The other resident struck Resident 1A twice in response. Later in the day, the resident also attempted to touch a female nurse's breasts and to touch the buttocks of a female nursing assistant. The evening of October 21, 2001, Resident 1A was found holding another resident by the collar while another was hitting the resident with his fist. Resident 1A suffered skin tears as a result. There was no documentation that Resident 1A was or was not observed every 15 minutes as required by the care plan of October 4, 2001. He was provided with drugs on October 5, 2001, and October 17, 2001, in an attempt to ameliorate his aggressive behavior; however, the pharmaceuticals provided were unlikely to modify his behavior until four to six weeks after ingestion. On October 31, 2001, Resident 1A was discharged because he was determined to be a danger to others. He died in November 2001. Resident 5 Resident 5 was admitted to Rosewood August 15, 1998. Resident 5 suffered from atrial fibrillation, cardiovascular accident, and pneumonia, among other maladies. Resident 5 was at high risk for accidents. Specifically, he was at risk from falling. In his admissions history dated August 15, 1998, it was noted by Dr. Michael Dupuis that, "If he attempts to stand, he falls." Indeed, the record reveals dozens of falls which occurred long before the survey of October 23, 2001. In response to Resident 5's propensity to fall, Rosewood tried self-opening seat belts while in his wheelchair, placement in a low bed, instituted a two-hour toileting schedule, and attempted to increase the resident's "safety awareness." Rosewood prepared a "Rehabilitation Department Screen" on June 8, 2001, to address the risk. This document indicated that the resident needed assistance with most activities. In the evening of July 28, 2001, Resident 5 was found on the floor of his room. It was believed that he fell when trying to self-transfer from his bed to his wheelchair. He suffered no apparent injury. On August 14, 2001, Resident 5 was found on the floor in the bathroom. He stated that he was trying to get into his wheelchair. He was not injured. On August 29, 2001, Resident 5 was found lying on his side on the floor in a bathroom because he had fallen. He received two small skin tears in the course of this event. On September 12, 2001, Resident 5 was found on the floor holding onto his bed rails. He was on the floor because he had fallen. He told the nurse that he fell while trying to get in bed. He did not suffer any injury during this event. On October 5, 2001, Resident 5 was found lying on the floor in a puddle of blood. He had fallen from his wheelchair. On October 7, 2001, Resident 5 fell in the bathroom while trying to get on the toilet. On October 8, 2001, Resident 5 fell out of his wheelchair and was found by nursing staff lying on the floor in a puddle of blood. This event required a trip to a hospital emergency room. He received three stitches on his forehead and suffered a skin tear on his lower left forearm. On October 14, 2001, Resident 5 was discovered by a nurse to be crawling on the floor. He denied falling and stated that he was just trying to get back in his wheelchair. On October 20, 2001, Resident 5 fell out of his wheelchair. Resident 5's care plan dated September 19, 2001, noted a history of falls and injury to himself and defined as a goal to prevent fall with no report of injury or incidents due to falling by the next review date. Methods to be used in preventing falls included assistance with all transfers, verbally cuing resident not to stand or transfer without assistance, ensurance that a call light and frequently used items were in reach, the provision of frequent reminders, and ensurance that his living areas were kept clean and free from clutter. Rosewood implemented a plan to encourage the resident to ask for assistance when transferring. Subsequent to the June 8, 2001, evaluation, and the September 19, 2001, care plan, which called for a number of interventions, as noted above, Resident 5 continued to experience falls. Resident 5's feisty personality and determination to transfer himself without assistance made it difficult for the facility to guarantee that he did not experience falls. It was noted by Nurse Steele that a care plan requiring one-on-one supervision is not required by AHCA. Nurse Steele, however, opined that perhaps one-on-one supervision would be the only practice which would guarantee that the resident would experience no falls. The Survey of January 22-25, 2002. Resident 12 Resident 12 suffered from osteoporosis, dementia, hyperthyroidism, transient ishemic attacks, urinary tract infection, urinary incontinence, anemia, and hypoglycemia, among other things. Resident 12 was receiving nutrition through a tube so it was necessary to elevate the head of her bed to prevent pneumonia or aspiration. Resident 12, at times pertinent, was immobile and was dependent on facility staff to accomplish all of her transfers and all activities of daily living including turning and repositioning. As evidenced by numerous observations recorded on the "Braden Scale for Predicting Pressure Sore Risk," Resident 12 was at risk for developing pressure sores. Resident 12 was observed by the facility with a pressure sore on the coccyx on December 21, 2001. A care plan had been created on October 12, 2002, providing that she was to be turned every two hours, and was to be provided with a pressure reduction mattress, and was to be kept clean and dry, among other actions. On December 24, 2001, it was noted in a "Data Collection Tool," that the resident's coccyx area was healed. On January 10, 2002, it was noted in Resident 12's care plan that the sore was fully healed. During the survey Nurse Brown on one occasion observed a member of the facility's staff change a dressing over the resident's coccyx, observed the area, and determined that the resident had a pressure sore. A pressure sore is a wound, usually over a bony area, such as the coccyx, which is caused by the weight of the body compressing flesh between the bony area and a bed or chair. Depending on the severity of the sore, pressure sores require a substantial period of time to heal. Pressure sores are graded as Stages I, II, III, or IV, with Stage IV being the most severe. Nurse Brown evaluated Resident 12 as having a Stage II pressure sore during the survey. Nurse Brown observed Resident 12 on two occasions on January 22, 2002; on four occasions on January 23, 2002; on two occasions on January 24, 2002; and on four occasions on January 25, 2002. On each of these occasions Resident 12 was lying on her back with her head elevated. She also observed the resident on several occasions sitting in a wheelchair. A wheelchair does not cause pressure on the coccyx. A "Data Collection Tool" with an assessment date of January 18, 2002, indicated that on January 20, 2002, that there was present on Resident 12, a "coccyx split .25 cm superficial open area, left buttocks 2 cm dark gray rough area." On January 21, 2002, the "tool" noted, "left buttocks 2 cm open area darkened, coccyx split .25 cm remains." A "tool" dated January 25, 2002, noted, "open area on coccyx 2 cm." A "tool" dated February 1, 2002, noted "red area on buttocks" as did a "tool" dated February 8, 2002. A "tool" dated February 15, 2002, noted, "excoriation on buttocks" and on February 22, 2002, the notation was "red area on buttocks." A "Data Collection Tool" dated March 1, 2002, noted, "No open areas." There is nothing in the records maintained by the facility which indicate that subsequent to the healing of the pressure sore on January 10, 2002, another pressure sore developed on Resident 12's coccyx. Nurse Brown was an expert on pressure sores and she saw the area on the coccyx and determined it was a Stage II pressure sore. Thomas Hulsey, also a nurse and also an expert in nursing, observed the wound and concluded that it was merely a skin split or excoriation likely caused by the resident's urinary incontinence. He also observed that after a short passage of time the wound disappeared, which is inconsistent with a pressure sore. Considering the evidence as a whole, it is determined that the redness described subsequent to January 20, 2002, was something other than a pressure sore. The absence of a pressure sore tends, moreover, to indicate that what Nurse Brown observed was not indicative of the general care Resident 12 was typically receiving. Resident 10 Resident 10, a woman 64 years of age, suffered from cardiovascular accident, dysphasia, decubitus ulcers, urinary tract infections, sclera derma, and seizures. She was unable to move any part of her body except for her left arm. Two to three caregivers were required to accomplish transfers. On December 16, 2001, at about 9:45 in the morning, Lula Andrews, a certified nursing assistant, reported finding Resident 10 lying on her side or back on the floor of her room. At 9:10 a.m. Resident 10 had been seen in her bed so she could have been residing on the floor for as long as 35 minutes. Ms. Andrews and two other certified nursing assistants put her back in her bed. Resident 10 weighed about 150 pounds. Ms. Andrews inquired of Resident 10 as to how she came to be resting on the floor and she replied she had, "blackened out." Resident 10 did not receive injuries in connection with this event. The bed was three to four feet above the floor. Ms. Andrews was suspended during an investigation of this incident. Based on the evidence of record it could be deduced that Resident 10 fell from her bed or it could be deduced that Ms. Andrews attempted to transfer Resident 10 without assistance with the result that Resident 10 was dropped or deposited on the floor due to Ms. Andrews' inability to cope with Resident 10's bulk. The evidence of record fails to provide a basis for resolving this question. Neither scenario demands a finding that there was a failure to provide adequate supervision. Resident 16 Resident 16 had a diagnosis of schizophrenia. She also had a seizure disorder, osteoarthritis, and hypothyroidism. She had a care plan addressing her potential to suffer falls. On May 4, 2001, Resident 16 had a grand mal seizure while sitting on a piano stool. The 72-hour report generated by this event noted that she was not injured and refused all medications. On September 29, 2001, Resident 16 had a seizure while sitting on a piano bench. She was playing the piano prior to suffering the seizure. As a result of the seizure she fell backward and bumped her head. She denied experiencing pain from this event. On October 3, 2001, Resident 16 was in the visitor's bathroom, alone, washing her hands. She was upright before the lavatory and when she attempted to sit down in her wheelchair she did not notice that it was not directly behind her. Therefore she missed the seat of the wheelchair and landed on the floor. She sustained no injuries. Nurse Brown opined that had Resident 16 been supervised properly this fall would not have occurred. On December 17, 2001, Resident 16 was sitting on a piano bench when it appeared that she was fainting. One of the staff prevented her from actually falling over. The resident insisted that she was fine. On January 18, 2002, a facility staff person saw Resident 16 about to fall forward from her wheelchair and attempted to catch her before she reached the floor. The staff member was unsuccessful and the resident struck her head on the floor, which resulted in a four-centimeter by four-centimeter bump on her head. Resident 16's care plan required that facility staff closely supervise the resident. The facility also failed to ensure that she received adequate doses, and properly prepared doses of her anti-seizure medicine. Resident 20 Resident 20, during times pertinent, was a man of 96 years of age. He had a history of seizure disorder, depression, vascular dementia, gastro esophageal reflux disease, peptic ulcer disease, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoporosis. He entered the facility on January 22, 1995. On September 7, 2001, Resident 20 had a physical encounter with Resident 1A, who was his roommate. Resident 20 was found holding Resident 1A in a headlock and was pounding Resident 1A with a metal seat spine. As a result, Resident 1A received cuts and bruises. The facility was negligent in permitting Resident 20 access to the metal seat spine which could be used as a weapon. The facility staff determined that Resident 20 was very territorial and that the appropriate solution would be to assign him a room so that he could be alone. Nevertheless, on November 10, 2001, a roommate was assigned to Resident 20. The resident complained and the new roommate was moved to another room. Resident 20's care plan was not revised to reflect his territorial nature. On December 28, 2001, another resident was moved into Resident 20's room. On January 2, 2002, Resident 20 told a nursing assistant that the new roommate was wearing his, Resident 20's, clothes. The nursing assistant pacified Resident 20 and left the room. Shortly thereafter Resident 20 attacked his new roommate with a reach/grab device causing the new roommate to receive a cut. One of the surveyors, Nurse Salpetr opined that the nursing assistant was derelict in leaving Resident 20 alone with his new roommate. As a result of this incident Resident 20, pursuant to the Baker Act, was sent to a psychiatric hospital for evaluation.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered dismissing, DOAH Case Nos. 02-1421, 02-1905, and 02-4040. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Lori C. Desnick, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Fort Knox Building, III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 R. Davis Thomas, Jr., Esquire Broad & Cassel 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 400 Post Office Box 11300 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lealand McCharen, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Fort Knox Building III Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Valda Clark Christian, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Rhonda M. Medows, M.D., Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Building, Suite 3116 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue In DOAH Case No. 04-0025, the issue is whether the Agency for Health Care Administrative (AHCA) correctly assigned conditional licensure status to Lady Lake NH, L.L.C., d/b/a/ Lady Lake Specialty Care Center (Lady Lake) for the period of August 26, 2003, through October 3, 2003. In DOAH Case No. 04- 1065, the issues are as follows: (a) whether Lady Lake committed a violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.25, as it relates to care of patients with or who develop pressure sores; (b) whether Lady Lake committed a violation of 42 C.F.R. Section 483.75, as it relates to clinical records; and (c) if so, what, if any, penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact AHCA is the agency that is responsible for licensing nursing homes and for enforcing Chapter 400, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 59A-4. This includes enforcement of federal nursing home regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations specifically referenced in this case. Lady Lake owns and operates Lady Lake Specialty Care Center (the facility), a 120-bed skilled nursing facility located in Lady Lake, Florida. The facility operates under license # SNF130470994. At all times material here, the facility was licensed under AHCA's authority. Accordingly, the facility was required to comply with all applicable statutes, rules, and regulations. The facility is a long-term care provider under Medicaid and Medicare. As such, it is subject to federal regulation relating to compliance with 42 CFR Section 483. AHCA has the statutory authority and mandated duty, pursuant to Section 400.23(7), Florida Statutes, to evaluate all nursing homes facilities periodically (at least every 15 months). After each such evaluation, AHCA must assign a licensure status of "standard or conditional" to each licensee. On or about August 26, 2003, AHCA conducted a monitoring survey at the facility. As a result of the survey, AHCA cited the facility for a quality of care deficiency. AHCA based the deficiency upon finding of an alleged lack of proper care of one male resident (hereinafter referred to as "the resident"). More specifically, the citation was for an alleged violation of 42 CFR Section 483.25(c), which pertains to quality of care as it relates to pressure sores. A violation of 42 CFR Section 483.25(c) is commonly referred to as a Tag F-314 deficiency. AHCA determined that the scope of the Tag F-314 deficiency was isolated. AHCA also determined that the nature of the Tag F-314 deficiency was a Class II violation. Pursuant to leave granted, AHCA also charged Lady Lake with violating 42 CFR Section 483.75(l)(1), and/or Section 400.141(21), Florida Statutes, by failing to properly document treatment and care. This violation is commonly referred to as a Tag F-514 deficiency. AHCA determined that the scope of the Tag F-514 deficiency was isolated. AHCA concluded that the Tag F-514 deficiency was a Class II violation. AHCA assigned conditional licensure status to the facility for the period August 26, 2003, to October 3, 2003. AHCA seeks to impose an administrative fine in the amount of $2,500 for the Tag F-314 deficiency and $2,500 for the Tag F-514 deficiency. Lady Lake admitted the 81-year-old resident to the facility on July 31, 2003. At that time, the resident was severely contracted and bedridden. He had much comorbidity, including but not limited to, severe dementia, severe cardiac disease, peripheral vascular disease, end-stage Parkinson's disease, incontinence, cancer, and diabetes mellitus. The resident was non-verbal, non-ambulatory, and emaciated. The resident's records include a Transfer Summary from the Marion County Hospice, dated July 30, 2003. The Transfer Summary indicates that the resident's legs were contracted, that his skin was intact, and that he was using a low-air mattress. When the resident was a patient at the Marion County Hospice, he suffered a number of pressure sores on his feet and legs and at least one Stage III pressure sore on his coccyx. These pressure sores developed at the hospice even though the resident received appropriate care because they were unavoidable given his physical condition. The resident was at "high risk" for pressure sores. He scored a "9" on the Braden Scale for evaluating such risks. A score below "12" is a "high risk" patient. Pressure sores are classified as follows: (a) in Stage I as a persistent area of skin redness (without a break in the skin) that cannot be blanched and which does not disappear within 30 minutes when pressure is relieved; (b) in Stage II as a partial loss in the thickness of skin layers that presents clinically as an abrasion, blister, or shallow crater; (c) in Stage III as a loss of a full thickness of skin layers, exposing the subcutaneous tissues and presenting a deep crater with or without undermining adjacent tissue; and (d) in Stage IV as missing a full thickness of skin and subcutaneous tissues, exposing the muscle and/or bone. Upon admission to the facility, the resident had a red area on the plantar region of the foot below and toward the outer aspect of the great right toe. This red area was a pressure sore in the initial stage with undetermined damaged below. In fact, the resident could have suffered pressure trauma during transit from the hospice to the facility, causing damage to the foot. The facility's Assistant Director of Admissions (ADON) instructed the admission nurse to document the resident's pressure sore so that the facility would not be blamed. However, the admission nurse did not record the red area as a Stage I pressure sore. Instead, she noted that there was no skin impairment with the exception of a reddened area on the outer aspect of the right great toe. She also noted that sheepskin heel protectors were in place. The first charge nurse to attend the resident on the day of his admissions made the same observations. There is no way to determine at the time of a Stage I pressure sore how much underlying tissue has been damaged and how large the wound may become. A wound may look very small, but within a short period of time become huge because there is underlying tissue damage. Additionally, a reddened area on one spot may surface as an open area somewhere else due to underlying tissue damage. The damaged tissue must be removed before new tissue can fill the wound. Tissue damage equates to tissue death. A pressure sore may unavoidably escalate to a Stage III or Stage IV due to tissue damage beneath the skin. This is especially true in cases where the patient, such as the resident here, has severe peripheral vascular disease and lack of adequate blood supply. The healing of the resident's pressure sore was negatively impacted by its location on the foot. The resident's peripheral vascular disease caused a decreased amount of blood circulation to the foot. Further, the resident was not active and therefore was not achieving a good heart rate, which meant that the cardiac output was low. Cardiac output is important in providing blood with oxygen, hemoglobin, and red blood cells to the wound to assist in the healing process. Between the time that the resident was admitted and August 7, 2003, there was no physician order for specific treatment of the reddened area on the resident's foot. There is no persuasive evidence that any such treatment was required. The Weekly Skin Review dated August 7, 2003, identified the damaged tissue on the resident's foot as a pressure sore. The August 7, 2003, Skin Grid indicates that it was a new site of skin impairment that was not present on admission. The pressure sore was documented as a new site of skin impairment because it was no longer just a reddened area typical of Stage I, but had progressed to Stage II, clearly visible as a black/blue area, 3 cm by 3 cm, with no depth or drainage. On August 7, 2003, the resident's doctor ordered a skin preparation to be applied to his right plantar foot region three times daily. At that point in time, the nurses transferred the order to the Treatment Administration Record (TAR), which is just one of the places that the facility uses to document treatment. On the day it was ordered, the treatment was rendered to the resident one time. This is most likely because the facility had to secure the doctor's order and receive the product from the pharmacy before treatment could begin. On August 8, 2003, the nurses on two shifts recorded the skin preparation treatment on the TAR. On August 9 and 10, 2003, all three shifts noted the skin preparation treatment on the TAR. On August 11, 2003, two nurses noted the skin preparation treatment on the TAR. The third nurse presented credible testimony that she provided the treatment even though she did not record it on the TAR. On August 11, 2003, the doctor issued an order for the pressure sore to be cleaned daily, treated with TAO, and covered with non-stick telfa. The TAR reflects that the nurses changed the dressing once on August 12, once on August 14, twice on August 15, once on August 16, twice on August 18, and once on August 20. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the facility's staff complied with the doctor's orders even through they did not always document their treatments. On August 13, 2003, the Weekly Skin Review identified no new areas of skin impairment. The August 14, 2003, Skin Grid notes that the Stage II pressure sore had not changed in size, but was pink in color. On August 20, 2003, the Weekly Skin Review identified no new areas of skin impairment. The August 20, 2003, Skin Grid notes that the Stage III pressure sore had not changed in size or color but had some drainage and minimal odor. On August 21, 2003, the resident's doctor issued an order for the pressure sore to be treated twice a day with Santyl in the middle and TAO on the edges then wrapped with curex until healed. The facility's staff complied with the doctor's orders and recorded the treatments on the TAR twice a day until the doctor discontinued them on August 27, 2003. The resident was placed on the facility's Magnolia Wing. The facility usually places Medicare patients on this wing. The nurses on the Magnolia Wing use Medicare documents such as the forms for Daily Skilled Nursing Notes (DSNN). Because the resident was a private-pay patient, the nurses were not required to document his condition on the Medicare forms on a daily basis. In fact, the nurses were not required to fill out the DSNN at all. They were only required to chart his progress on a weekly basis or when there was a significant change that required charting. The use of the DSNN was at the facility's discretion. Under the facts of this case, the nurses were not expected to check off every box on the DSNN that was relevant or to write a comment on each shift. They were expected to "document by exception," noting anything on their shift that was out of the ordinary for the resident. It is acceptable practice in long-term care nursing to "chart by exception" as it would be insurmountable to chart every thing that a resident does on a daily basis. While the records reflect that some nurses charted routine care of the resident, that charting is indicative of the nurses' training or experience in another setting. The facility's system of documentary communication included, but was not limited to, Nurse's Notes, TAR, and Medication Administration Record (MAR). Other documentary forms were used for skin assessments and wound care treatment. The facility's staff also communicated with each other about the resident's condition by conducting shift-change meetings and nurses' rounds and by checking the dates and nurses' signatures on bandages. These methods of communication met the community standard for good nursing. The nurses and their assistants were not required to document every time they turned and repositioned the resident because it was not an "activity of daily living" for charting purposes. The nurses noted on the TAR that the resident needed to be turned every two hours. They made this notation merely as a reminder to turn the resident. There was no doctor's order to accomplish this task. There was a bear symbol on the resident's door to remind the staff that he needed skin precautions, including turning and repositioning. In any event, turning and repositioning the resident would have had no effect on the foot wound because his foot was not on the bed. Reviewing the MAR, TAR, Nurses' Notes, and DSNN together, there is consistent documentation of treatment being rendered in accordance with the doctor's orders. There is no persuasive evidence that any lack of documentation in the resident's medical records adversely impacted the resident's health and welfare or constituted a deficiency. Lady Lake substantially complied with the requirement to document the care and treatment of the resident. The resident was admitted to the facility on a pressure reduction mattress. The facility provided him with a low-air mattress on August 21, 2003. His mattress was upgraded on two occasions. Providing a long-term care patient like the resident with a pressure-relieving mattress is such a routine intervention that it does not require charting or a doctor's order. Regardless of the type of mattress provided, it did not impact the pressure sore because the resident's foot did not rest on the mattress. On August 26, 2003, AHCA's surveyor asked to observe the resident's wound. A nurse removed the dressing from the resident's foot. AHCA's surveyor had to pry the resident's right foot from where it pressed against his left leg in order to observe the Stage III pressure sore on the ball of the resident's right foot. The wound was crater-like, with irregular edges that were red and meaty looking. The surveyor was unable to determine its depth due to what appeared to be drainage. The bandage could not be reapplied because the nurse assisting the surveyor did not have a key to the medication cart. On August 26, 2003, the wound was covered with a slimy or gelatinous material, which could be attributed at least in part to the Santyl treatment. Santyl is a collagenase debriding agent that dissolves necrotic tissue without causing any harm to the new healing tissue. The use of Santyl can cause a wound to appear gelatinous and green or brown. It would not have been appropriate, at the time of the survey, to remove the gelatinous material from the wound to determine its depth. Because healing starts at the base of the wound, it should not be forcibly cleaned or rubbed. A wound can be left undressed for a period of time if it has not dehydrated. There was no evidence that the resident's wound became dehydrated on August 26, 2003, or at any other point in time. The resident's pressure sore never became infected. An infection would have been likely if he had not received appropriate treatment for the wound. The surveyor did not see any pillows on the bed or in the resident's room. However, the greater weight of the evidence indicates that the resident would have had many more skin problems if the facility staff had not been turning and repositioning him with pillows every two hours. Without pillows, the facility's staff would not have been able to position the resident on his back to feed him. The staff used pillows to separate the resident's legs to relieve the pressure on the foot to the extent possible. Repositioning with pillows is a standard procedure in long-term care facilities. The bandage on the pressure sore acted as padding to eliminate any friction on the pressure sore. The resident's pressure sore never progressed to Stage IV, which requires exposed bone or muscle. The only record of a Stage IV pressure sore is found in the Minimum Data Set (MDS). It is necessary to record a pressure sore as Stage IV on the MDS when it has a blister and the depth cannot be determined. Furthermore, there is no difference in the care rendered to a patient with a Stage III or Stage IV pressure sore. The resident's pressure sore changed to a Stage II before he was transferred out of the facility. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the resident's ability to reach his highest practicable mental, physical and psychosocial well-being was not compromised by Lady Lake in regard to the quality of care provided or in regard to documenting his condition.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That AHCA enter a Final Order dismissing the Administrative Complaints in both cases. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen L. Goldsmith, Esquire Goldsmith, Grout & Lewis, P.A. 2180 North Park Avenue, Suite 100 Post Office Box 2011 Winter Park, Florida 32790-2011 Tom R. Moore, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308-5403 Charlene Thompson, Acting Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Station 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
