The Issue The issues in this case are whether six outdoor advertising sign permits previously issued to Petitioner should be reinstated; or, if not, whether new permits should be issued for the six advertising facings (two on each of three sign structures) in Clearwater, Florida.
Findings Of Fact In June 1982, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.5 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 6868 issued by the City of Clearwater (the City), on October 22, 1981, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AF604 and AF605 issued by DOT on November 18, 1981. In January 1983, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.4 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number 10406 issued by the City on October 15, 1982, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers A1288 and A1289 issued by DOT on December 20, 1982. On or about July 1, 1984, National lawfully erected an outdoor advertising billboard structure with two advertising facings located adjacent to State Road 60, 0.3 mile east of U.S. 19, pursuant to permit number SN - 24060117 issued by the City on June 6, 1984, and pursuant to state sign permit numbers AM631 and AM632 issued by DOT on January 12, 1984. National maintained the three outdoor advertising billboard structures, containing six advertising faces, as identified in Findings of Fact numbers 1, 2 and 3, above (the "subject sign structures"), in the same condition as they were when erected. Following the lawful erection of the subject sign structures, National paid DOT the required annual permit fees through the year 1995, which allowed National to maintain and operate the subject sign structures through December 31, 1995. In March of 1995, DOT notified National that it was dropping state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory because DOT had no jurisdiction over the segment of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, adjacent to which the subject sign structures were located. The evidence was that DOT did so by serving on National a "Notice of Violation," citing DOT's lack of jurisdiction. The "Notice of Violation" gave National the opportunity to request an administrative hearing to contest DOT's action. National had no reason to question DOT's position on the jurisdictional issue but rather relied upon DOT's determination that DOT did not have jurisdiction in March of 1995. National chose not to request a hearing. The evidence was not clear as to when the DOT lost, or believed it lost, jurisdiction; the evidence also was not clear whether the DOT ever had, or believed it ever had, jurisdiction. At the time DOT dropped state sign permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 from its inventory, DOT did not refund any permit fees to National, including the permit fees which National had paid for the 1995 calendar year. Consequently, permit numbers AF604, AF605, A1288, A1289, AM631, and AM632 were fully paid through December 31, 1995. On November 2, 1995, the section of State Road 60, east of U.S. 19, along which the subject sign structures are located became part of the National Highway System (NHS), and became jurisdictional for the purpose of permitting outdoor advertising billboard structures. On August 26, 1996, Kenneth M. Towcimak, as Director of DOT's Office of Right of Way, issued a memorandum to all District Outdoor Advertising Administrators addressing implementation of outdoor advertising control over roadways which were previously uncontrolled by DOT, and which became designated as part of the NHS on November 28, 1995. The Towcimak memorandum of August 26, 1996, required notification by registered mail, with return receipt requested, to all owners of such outdoor advertising billboard structures, that they must obtain state permits by January 1, 1997. There was no evidence as to whether DOT ever notified National by registered mail, with return receipt requested, that National was required to obtain state permits by January 1, 1997, for the subject sign structures. National filed six applications for the subject sign structures on or about December 29, 1997 (one for each of the two sign facings on each sign structure). On the part of the forms asking for the location of the sign, the six applications described the location of the signs, respectively, as: "Reinstated State Tag # AF 604-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AF 605-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 631-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AM 632-10"; "Reinstated State Tag # AI 288-10"; and "Reinstated State Tag # AI 289-10." The applications contained copies of the permits previously issued by DOT for the operation and maintenance of the subject sign structures, copies of Landowner's permission and copies of City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures. Although the applications included copies of the City building permits for the original construction of the sign structures, DOT knew that the City no longer considered the sign structures to be legal under the City's code. In 1989, the City amended its code to place limitations on the size (height and area) and concentration (one per lot) of signs in the locations of the subject sign structures. The subject sign structures exceeded at least some of the new limitations; however, the code amendment provided for a seven-year "amortization" period, until January 19, 1996, during which the signs would be permitted as legal, non-conforming signs. At the end of the "amortization" period, the signs no longer were legal under the City code. Some of the information on National's six applications was incorrect or incomplete. But all of the incorrect or incomplete information could easily have been remedied, and "incorrect information" is not the real basis upon which DOT gave notice of intent to deny the applications. The real basis for the notice of intent was the illegality of the sign structures under the City code. On or about November 22, 1999, National filed with DOT a Petition for Reinstatement for each of the three signs (each petition seeking reinstatement of the two permits for the two advertising facings for each sign structure) under Section 479.07(8)(b)1-3, Florida Statutes (1999). On January 31, 2000, DOT issued a Notice of Intent to Deny Petition for Reinstatement as to each of the three such petitions filed by National.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Department of Transportation enter a final order denying National's petitions for reinstatement and National's applications for new sign permits. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of April, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of April, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Aileen Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Kelly A. Bennett, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Empire Outdoor Advertising, Inc., is the owner of a sign located on the westbound or north side of Northwest 54th Street approximately 20 feet east of Northwest 12th Avenue, in Dade County, Florida. Northwest 54th Street is also designated as State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is a structure or billboard designed to advertise or inform, and its copy is visible from the main traveled way of the adjacent roadway of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. At the site where the Respondent's sign is located, State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street is a part of the federal- aid primary highway system, and this roadway is open to the public for vehicular traffic. The Respondent's sign is located within 660 feet from the nearest edge of the pavement of State Road 25A. The Respondent's sign is situated within 500 feet from another outdoor advertising structure on the same side of the highway. These two signs face in the same direction and are both visible to westbound traffic on the north side of State Road 25A or Northwest 54th Street. The Respondent's sign has affixed to it copy which advertises Kraft Barbecue Sauce. This structure does not fall within any of the exceptions to the statutory licensing requirements set forth in Section 479.16, Florida Statutes, and it must have a state sign permit. The Respondent has not applied for an outdoor advertising permit from the Department, and no such permit has been issued by the Department for the subject sign.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter its Final Order finding the Respondent's sign which is the subject of this proceeding to be in violation of the applicable statutes and rules, and ordering its removal. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 25th day of January, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 L. Martin Reeder, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 2637 Palm Beach, Florida 33480
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether the Department of Transportation's Notice of Denied Application for an outdoor advertising permit at State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, Leon County, issued to Lamar of Tallahassee on May 30, 2008, should be upheld pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes,1/ or whether the sign should be permitted as a nonconforming sign as defined by Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is a state agency empowered to regulate outdoor advertising signs along the interstate and federal-aid primary highway systems of Florida pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is licensed to engage in the business of outdoor advertising within the state of Florida pursuant to Section 479.04, Florida Statutes. Lamar owns a V-shaped sign located on certain real property at 1940 Thomasville Road in Tallahassee. Thomasville Road is also known as State Road 61. Lamar does not own the real property, but has the right to erect and maintain its sign on the property under a lease that Lamar executed with the landowner in 1998. Lamar's sign was erected in 1998, with the approval of the City of Tallahassee. The sign is located on the southwest corner of the intersection of Thomasville and Betton/Bradford Road, behind the Southern Flooring showroom. The east side of the sign face is within 660 feet of and visible to State Road 61. State Road 61 is a federal-aid highway and thus a "controlled road" subject to the jurisdiction of the Department pursuant to Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes. Therefore, the east side of the sign requires a permit from the Department. The west side is visible only to Bradford Road and does not require a permit from the Department. On February 10, 2008, Lisa Adams, an outdoor advertising inspector conducting an annual inventory on behalf of the Department, identified the subject sign as an unpermitted sign that is visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams completed a Department compliance checklist stating that the sign was possibly illegal because it lacked a Department permit and the east side of the sign was visible from State Road 61. On April 22, 2008, the Department issued a notice of violation stating that the sign was illegal and must be removed within 30 days of the date of the notice, pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. Lamar did not file a request for hearing in response to the notice of violation, and does not contest the notice of violation in this proceeding. On May 16, 2008, Lamar filed an Application for Outdoor Advertising Permit for the sign. The Department reviewed the application and issued a Notice of Denied Application on May 30, 2008. The application was denied because the sign site does not meet the spacing requirements of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes, in that it is closer than 1,000 feet from another permitted sign owned by Lamar. The other permitted sign was built in 1979. The 1,000 foot spacing requirement has been in the statute at all times since the 1998 construction of the sign at issue in this proceeding, meaning that it could never have met the spacing requirement of Section 479.07(9)(a)2., Florida Statutes. Myron Laborde was Lamar Advertising Southeast's regional manager in 1998 when the sign was built. His area of authority included Tallahassee. Mr. Laborde testified that in 1998 the view of the sign from State Road 61 was obstructed by several palm trees, some scrub oaks, and a very tall tallow tree. Some of these trees were removed when Southern Flooring took over and remodeled the old Helms Exterminators building at 1940 Thomasville Road about four years ago. Mr. Laborde testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees, but only "if you . . .turn your head 90 degrees" while driving north on State Road 61. Loyd Childree has been the vice-president and general manager of Lamar of Tallahassee since 2003. Mr. Childree testified that the renovations to the Helms Exterminators building began some time after March 2005, and that the building's size was nearly doubled to accommodate the Southern Flooring showroom. Mr. Childree testified that a lot of trees were removed during the renovation, including palm trees and a "canopy-type tree" about 25 to 30 feet tall with a full crown similar to that of an oak. Mr. Childree testified that the sign is now visible from State Road 61 due to the removal of the trees. Mr. Childree further stated that Lamar markets the sign to advertisers based on the traffic counts from Bradford Road, not those from State Road 61. Ms. Adams, the inspector who identified the possible illegality of the sign, has worked for the Department's contractor, TBE Group, since August 2004. Her job is to conduct an inventory of permitted signs on controlled roads such as State Road 61 and determine which unpermitted signs are visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams inventoried State Road 61 in 2005, 2006 and 2007 without identifying Lamar's sign as an unpermitted sign visible from the roadway. Ms. Adams testified that her predecessor in the position inventoried State Road 61 every year since Lamar's sign was erected and never identified the sign as one visible from State Road 61. Ms. Adams testified that she might have seen the sign in a previous year but did not identify it as illegal because she believed it had "on-premise" advertising, i.e., it advertised Southern Flooring. With certain restrictions, a sign erected on the premises of a business establishment that bears advertising for that establishment is exempt pursuant to Section 479.16(1), Florida Statutes. Ms. Adams frankly conceded that she was speculating and that her memory was unclear as to whether she had seen and noted this sign in past years. In any event, Lamar's log of advertisers showed that Southern Flooring never advertised on the sign. Lynn Holschuh is the Department's state outdoor advertising administrator, and had held this position since 1992. Ms. Holschuh testified that State Road 61 has been inventoried by an outdoor advertising inspector every year since Lamar's sign was erected in 1998. None of the inspectors noted the visibility or possible illegality of the sign until Ms. Adams noted the sign on February 12, 2008. Ms. Holschuh lives in Tallahassee and has driven on State Road 61 hundreds of times over the years. In her deposition, she testified that she believed the sign was not visible when it was built, and only became visible from State Road 61 when a third party removed the obstructing trees. The testimony of Mr. Laborde, Mr. Childree, and Ms. Holschuh was credible and uncontroverted as to the history of the sign. It is found that the sign was not visible from State Road 61 when it was erected in 1998, but that it became visible from State Road 61 when trees were removed by the landowner during renovations to the old Helms Exterminators building at some point after March 2005. Lamar's sign, now visible from State Road 61, is subject to the Department's jurisdiction pursuant to Section 479.01, Florida Statutes, because State Road 61, as a federal- aid primary highway, is a "controlled road" under the statute. A sign visible from a controlled road must carry a Department permit. Lamar contends that the facts of this case establish that its sign meets the definition of a "nonconforming sign" set forth in Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes: "Nonconforming sign" means a sign which was lawfully erected but which does not comply with the land use, setback, size, spacing, and lighting provisions of state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance passed at a later date or a sign which was lawfully erected but which later fails to comply with state or local law, rule, regulation, or ordinance due to changed conditions. Lamar's sign was not visible from State Road 61 in 1998 and therefore was "lawfully erected" in terms of the Department's licensing requirements. Lamar contends that the removal of trees by a third party constituted "changed conditions" that rendered the sign out of compliance with state law, and that the sign is therefore a nonconforming sign under Section 479.01(14), Florida Statutes. The Legislature has provided no definition of the term "changed conditions," and the Department has no rule to provide interpretive guidance to the words of the statute. On September 17, 2008, Lamar filed a motion for leave to amend its petition for hearing in this case to challenge the Department's alleged interpretation of the phrase "due to changed conditions" as an unadopted rule. In particular, Lamar alleged that the Department was applying an unadopted rule limiting "changed conditions" to those initiated by a government agency. On September 19, 2008, the Department filed an unopposed motion to remand the case to the agency. The motion was granted on September 22, 2008. In the Florida Administrative Weekly dated November 26, 2008 (vol. 34, no. 48, p. 6228), the Department published a Notice of Development of Proposed Rule, with the following preliminary text of an amendment to Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: 14-10.006 Additional Permitting Criteria. Each application for an outdoor advertising sign permit shall meet the requirements of Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S. In addition, an application must comply with the requirements of the agreement between the state and the United States Department of Transportation referenced in Section 479.02(1), F.S., which have not been duplicated in Sections 479.07(9) and 479.11, F.S., or superseded by stricter provisions in those statutes. The requirements are: through (8) No change. (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means only the actions of a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., which includes for example: Rezoning of a commercial area, reclassifying a secondary highway as a primary highway, or altering a highway's configuration causing a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. (Emphasis added) Ms. Holschuh testified that this draft rule language was written in direct response to Lamar's allegation that the Department's denial of its application was based on an unadopted rule. On December 16, 2008, the Department held a workshop on the draft rule. At the workshop, the Florida Outdoor Advertising Association ("FOAA") submitted the following suggested draft language for subsection (9) of Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.006: (9) The term "changed conditions" referenced in Section 479.01(14), F.S., defining nonconforming signs, means, and shall include, any of the following: An action taken by a governmental entity, as defined by Section 11.45, F.S., such as the rezoning of a parcel of property fro commercial to noncommercial, reclassifying a secondary highway to a primary highway, altering a highway's configuration, or the taking of any other action within the powers of such governmental entity which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction; The action of a third party, who is not the owner of a preexisting sign, relating to modifications to the topography, vegetation, buildings or other physical characteristics of the property upon which the sign is located, or the property surrounding the sign, which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. an act of God which thereby causes a preexisting sign to become subject to the Department's jurisdiction. The Department rejected the FOAA's proposed language, and ultimately abandoned the effort to adopt a rule defining the term "changed conditions." On September 18, 2009, the Department filed a motion with DOAH to reopen this case and proceed to a fact-finding hearing regarding its proposed rejection of Lamar's application. In her deposition, Ms. Holschuh testified that the rulemaking effort was abandoned because the language proposed by the FOAA made it clear that it would be "nearly impossible" to arrive at a definition that would cover "every situation that might arise for when an existing sign might suddenly become visible." Ms. Holschuh testified in deposition that it is now the Department's policy to review these matters on a case-by- case basis. However, she also testified that the Department, as a matter of "policy," continues to limit its consideration of "changed conditions" to actions taken by a governmental entity. The Department bases this limitation on the examples provided by 23 C.F.R. § 750.707(b), defining "nonconforming signs" for purposes of the Federal Highway Administration: A nonconforming sign is a sign which was lawfully erected but does not comply with the provisions of State law or State regulations passed at a later date or later fails to comply with State law or State regulations due to changed conditions. Changed conditions include, for example, signs lawfully in existence in commercial areas which at a later date become noncommercial, or signs lawfully erected on a secondary highway later classified as a primary highway. Ms. Holschuh stated that the Department's policy was applied to Lamar in the instant case, and would continue to be applied in the future unless some "extraordinary circumstance" in a specific case led the Department to revisit the policy. At the final hearing, Ms. Holschuh backed away somewhat from her flat statement that the Department's "policy" was to limit consideration of changed conditions to those caused by government action. She stated that FOAA's proposed rule language caused the Department to reconsider its position that governmental action should be the exclusive reason for granting a permit for "changed conditions," and testified that the Department will consider other circumstances in its case-by-case review of permit applications. Ms. Holschuh testified that, under the facts presented in this case, the Department would deny the permit because there is DOAH case law on point for the proposition that tree removal does not constitute "changed conditions," and because broadening the definition of "changed conditions" to include the situation presented by this case would open up the process to abuse. Ms. Holschuh testified, at more than one point in the proceeding, that the Department would have very likely granted the permit had the trees been removed by the Department rather than the private landowner. She gave no indication that Section 479.105(1)(e), Florida Statutes, or any other statute would prevent the Department from granting the permit for Lamar's nonconforming sign, should the Department find that the sign fell into nonconformity due to "changed conditions." The DOAH case law cited by Ms. Holschuh is Lamar of Tallahassee v. Department of Transportation, Case Nos. 08-0660 and 08-0661 (DOAH September 15, 2008), discussed more fully in the Conclusions of Law below. Ms. Holschuh testified that Lamar's sign is not located in a Department right-of-way and is not a hazard to the public in its current location.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Transportation denying the application of Lamar of Tallahassee for a state sign permit for a location described as State Road 61 (U.S. 319), 168 feet west of Thomasville Road, in Leon County, Florida (Application Number 57155). DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of June, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 2010.
The Issue Whether the structure described in the Department of Transportation's Notice of Violation No. 10B DB 2000 007 (Notice) is in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and therefore subject to removal pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Notice.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the final hearing and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Petitioner is an outdoor advertising company that was formerly known as AK Media. On December 10, 1998, Petitioner (while still known as AK Media) entered into an agreement with NWT Partners, Ltd., the owner of the New World Tower (Building), a "thirty story four (4) sided building" located at 100 North Biscayne Boulevard in Miami, Florida, to lease certain portions of the Building. The lease agreement contained the following provisions, among others: Effective Date. This Lease shall become effective on the later of (x) the date that Tenant provides written notice to Landlord that Tenant has obtained all permits, license and governmental approvals necessary or required to enable Tenant to construct, maintain and operate the Wall Faces and Wall Structures, as hereinafter defined or (y) January 1, 1999 (the "Effective Date"). Tenant shall have ninety (90) days from the date of this Lease to obtain all such permits, licenses and approvals or the Landlord may cancel this Lease. Purpose. The purpose of this lease is for Tenant to construct, maintain and operate painted, printed, illuminated and/or electrical signs on the north and south wall faces of the Building (the "Wall Faces"), and all other uses not inconsistent therewith, including all necessary supporting structures, devices, illumination facilities and connections, service ladders and equipment, and other appurtenances (the "Wall Fixtures"). All construction to the Building, and advertising thereon, including construction drawing and artwork to be furnished by the Tenant shall be subject to Landlord's written approval, which approval shall not be unreasonably withheld. Tenant's Right to Enter and Use. For the duration of this Lease, Tenant shall have the non-exclusive right to enter onto the Property and into the Building and use the Wall Faces for the purposes described in this Lease and any other purposes allowed or required by this Lease and Tenant has the exclusive right to use the Wall Faces Property for advertising. In exercising Tenant's rights hereunder, Tenant may hang or attach the Wall Fixtures to the roof and exterior structure of the Building. Tenant shall maintain the Wall Fixtures at Tenant's cost and expense. Tenant shall pay all utility charges in connection with the operation and maintenance of the Wall Fixtures. Tenant shall be responsible for damage to the Building which is caused by Tenant's operation and maintenance and removal of the Wall Fixtures and shall repair any such damage and restore the Building to the condition it was in immediately prior to such damages at the expiration or termination of this Lease. Term. The term of this Lease is for five (5) years from the "Rent Commencement Date," as hereinafter defined, to the last day of the month during which the fifth anniversary of the Rent Commencement Date occurs (the "Term"). Rent. Tenant shall pay Landlord rent annually, in accordance with the schedule (the "Rent Schedule") set forth on Exhibit "B" hereto, inclusive of all taxes . . . . Contracts. Anything herein to the contrary notwithstanding, Tenant will use its best efforts to obtain contracts (the "Contracts") for advertising on the Building which exceed the amount of the Guaranteed Rent, as set forth on the Rent Schedule. . . . 9. Ownership/Removal. At all times, Tenant is and shall remain the owner of the Wall Fixtures and all signs and permits of any kind in relation thereto, and has the right to remove the Wall Fixtures at any time. . . . Exhibit "B" Rent Schedule Tenant shall pay annual rent to Landlord in an amount equal to the greater of (x) Fifty-five percent (55%) of the gross revenues attributable to advertisements displayed on the North Wall and the South Wall of the Building less any agency fee or commissions not greater than 16 2/3% to bona fide third parties (the "Net Revenues") associated with such advertisements (the "Percentage Rent") or (y) the minimum guaranteed annual rent (the "Guaranteed Rent") hereinafter set forth as follows: . . . The Landlord may terminate the Lease Agreement upon thirty (30) days prior written notice to Tenant if either Wall is vacant for more than one hundred twenty (120) consecutive days during the Term of the Lease and the Tenant has failed to obtain a contract, before the expiration of such notice period, for advertising on the North Wall or South Wall, as the case may be, pursuant to which the projected Percentage Rent under such contract would exceed the Guaranteed Rent. . . . Subsequently, Petitioner (while still operating under the name AK Media) entered into a "bulletin contract" with New York Outdoor, an advertising agency acting on behalf of Supreme International, in which Petitioner agreed, for a fee, to produce and maintain an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. Supreme International sells "Perry Ellis" and "Perry Ellis for Men" brand fashion apparel. In accordance with the "bulletin contract," Petitioner produced an "outdoor advertising display" for Supreme International on the north wall of the Building. The "outdoor advertising display" that Petitioner produced was a large mural more than 100 feet high and more than 60 feet wide. Such a product is referred to in the outdoor advertising industry as a "wallscape." The "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International consisted of artwork (a picture of a young woman) and print (the words "Perry Ellis for Men") on a "canvass-type" material that was mounted on a "picture frame" support structure attached to the north wall of the Building. It was located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the right-of-way of a roadway, US Highway 1 (also known, in that location, as North Biscayne Boulevard), which is a part of the federal-aid primary highway system. The artwork and print could be seen without visual aid by motorists of normal visual acuity travelling on US Highway 1 in the vicinity of the Building. At no time has Petitioner applied for, or obtained, a permit from the Department authorizing it to erect and maintain a "sign," as that term is used in Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, on the north wall of the Building. Petitioner, however, did seek and obtain a Class II Special Permit from the City of Miami. The permit was granted by the Miami City Commission, through the passage of Miami City Commission Resolution 99- 828, at its October 26, 1999, meeting. The printed agenda distributed in advance of the meeting stated the following concerning the permit for which Petitioner had applied: Consideration of approving Class II Special Permit No. 99-0142 for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard for a sign of a graphic or artistic value. This will allow a mural containing a commercial message. The resolution passed by the Miami City Commission at the meeting read as follows: A RESOLUTION OF THE MIAMI CITY COMMISSION APPROVING THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF CLASS II SPECIAL PERMIT APPLICATION NO. 99-0142, SUBJECT TO THE CONDITION THAT THERE SHALL BE NO WRITING PERMITTED WITH THE MURAL AND OTHER CONDITIONS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE PLANNING DEPARTMENT FOR THE PROPERTY LOCATED AT APPROXIMATELY 100 NORTH BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, MIAMI, FLORIDA, PURSUANT TO SECTION 401 OF ORDINANCE NO. 11000, AS AMENDED, THE ZONING ORDINANCE OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA, AS AMENDED. WHEREAS, the Director for the Department of Planning is recommending approval of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida; and WHEREAS, Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, the Zoning Ordinance of the City of Miami, Florida, requires City Commission approval of the Class II Special Permit as hereinafter set forth; and WHEREAS, the City Commission after careful consideration of this matter, finds the application for a Class II Special Permit does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended, and deems it advisable and in the best interest of the general welfare of the City of Miami and its inhabitants to approve the recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to uphold the issuance of the Class II Special Permit, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department; NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED BY THE COMMISSION OF THE CITY OF MIAMI, FLORIDA: Section 1. The recitals and findings contained in the Preamble to this Resolution are hereby adopted by reference thereto and incorporated herein as if fully set forth in this section. Section 2. The recommendation of the Director of the Department of Planning to issue Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, subject to the condition that there shall be no writing permitted with the mural and other conditions as recommended by the Planning Department, for the property located at approximately 100 North Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, is hereby approved, and the City Commission finds that the issuance of Class II Special Permit Application No. 99-0142, with conditions does meet the applicable requirements of Zoning Ordinance No. 11000, as amended. Section 3. The Resolution shall become effective immediately upon its adoption and signature of the Mayor. Inasmuch as the words "Perry Ellis for Men" were on the "wallscape" that Petitioner produced for Supreme International, this "wallscape" was not in compliance with the condition imposed by the Miami City Commission, in issuing the Class II Special Permit to Petitioner, that there "be no writing permitted with the mural." On February 22, 2000, Bernard Davis, who, at the time, was the Department's District 6 Roadside Outdoor Advertising Administrator, issued a Notice of Violation (Notice No. 10B DB 2000 007) alleging that the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building (described above) was "in violation of Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, which requires a permit for all outdoor advertising signs not exempted by Section 479.16, Florida Statutes" and directing that the sign be removed within 30 days. Petitioner thereafter requested an administrative hearing on the matter. Prior to the hearing, the artwork and print on the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building were changed. As of the date of the final hearing in this case, the "wallscape" on the north wall of the Building contained a picture of a man and part of a woman and the words "Perry Ellis," underneath which was written "www.perryellis.com," Supreme International's website address. The Monday and Tuesday before the final hearing (February 5 and 6, 2001), Mr. Davis' successor, C. Jean Cann, went inside the Building to determine whether Supreme International had an "on-premises presence." On Monday, February 5, 2001, Ms. Cann entered the Building at approximately 1:15 p.m. After obtaining information from the Building's Electronic Directory that "Perry Ellis" occupied room 2128, she took the elevator to the 21st floor. After getting off the elevator, she walked down a hallway, where she saw a paper sign on a door which read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128." When she knocked on the door, no one answered. She waited 10 to 15 seconds and then knocked again, with the same result. She then, unsuccessfully, attempted to open the door. At around 1:45 p.m., she left the Building. Ms. Cann returned to the Building the following day at approximately 11:40 a.m., at which time she spoke to a security guard, who informed her that "Perry Ellis" "was in 2126." She then again went up to the 21st floor, and, on the same door that she had seen the "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2128" sign the day before, she saw a paper sign that read "Perry Ellis/Supreme International, Incorporated, 2126." Her knocks on the door, like those of the previous day, went unanswered, and she was again unable to open the door. At around 12:00 noon, she exited the Building. At no time during either of her two visits was Ms. Cann able to ascertain what, if any, business activity Supreme International was engaging in inside the Building.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order finding that the "wallscape" on the north side of the Building is a "sign" that was erected and is being maintained without the Department-issued permit required by Section 479.07(1), Florida Statutes, and that it therefore is a public and private nuisance that must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105(1), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of March, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of March, 2001.
Findings Of Fact On November 4, 1982, the Petitioner, Enterprise Outdoor Advertising, Inc., submitted applications for permits for two signs facing Interstate No. 4 (hereafter I-4) near the intersection of I-4 and 50th Street in Tampa, Florida. The specific location of the proposed signs is described as: Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/W Interstate I-4 50th Street and I-4 Sec. 205 E/B .02 F/E Interstate I-4 50th Streetand I-4 Both applications were disapproved by the Department of Transportation on November 9, 1982. The two signs for which Petitioner sought permits were to be located on a piece of property owned by Mr. E. B. Rood (hereafter referred to as Rood property). The Rood property is located adjacent to I-4, east of 50th Street, which runs north and south. The west facing sign application (see Respondent's Exhibit 11) was denied by the Department of Transportation because of a conflicting existing sign, Permit No. 7716-12, held by Foster and Kleiser, Intervenor. Permit No. 7716-12 was for a westerly facing sign physically located on the Rood property, pursuant to a lease between Intervenor and E. B. Rood. (See Respondent's Exhibit 4.) On November 3, 1982, Mr. E. B. Rood provided written notice to Foster and Kleiser that he was cancelling the lease. By the terms of the lease, the Foster and Kleiser sign then had to be removed within 30 days. On November 9, 1982, when the Petitioner's application was denied, the sign erected pursuant to Permit No. 7716-12 was still physically standing on the Rood property. Sometime prior to December 3, 1982, the sign was removed by Foster and Kleiser and the Department of Transportation was notified that the sign had been dismantled. (See Respondent's Exhibit 9.) Subsequent to dismantling its west facing sign, the Intervenor, Foster and Kleiser, applied for and received a permit for a westerly facing sign on a piece of property adjacent to I-4 just west of 50th Street and the Rood property. This second piece of property, located west of the Rood property, is referred to as the Bize property. At the time Foster and Kleiser applied for the westerly facing sign permit on the Bize property, there were no pending applications for a conflicting sign, and the previous conflicting sign on the Rood property had been dismantled. The application filed by Petitioner for a permit for an easterly facing sign on the Rood property was denied because of a conflicting permit, No. AG558- Permit AG558-12 was for a sign on the Bize property which would face east adjacent to I-4. At the time of Petitioner's application on November 4, 1982, no sign had actually been erected pursuant to Permit No. AG558-12. Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued to Foster and Kleiser in February, 1982, pursuant to an application accompanied by a written lease containing the purported signature of Mr. John T. Bize, the named lessor. (See Respondent's Exhibit 6.) Mr. John T. Bize died on January 1, 1977, and, therefore, was deceased on February 19, 1982, the date of the lease submitted by Foster and Kleiser with its application for Permit No. AG558-12. The only witness signature appearing on the lease was that of Thomas Marc O'Neill. Mr. O'Neill did not observe or witness the lessor sign the lease and felt, at the time he signed, that he was witnessing the signature of Ronald L. Westberry, who signed the lease on behalf of Foster and Kleiser. At the time he signed as a witness, Mr. O'Neill was and continues to be an employee of Foster and Kleiser. Subsequent to its disapproval of Petitioner's application for an easterly facing sign permit, the Department of Transportation was informed by Petitioner of the invalid lease on which Permit No. AG558-12 had been issued. By letter dated November 17, 1982, the Department notified Foster and Kleiser of the invalid lease and gave Foster and Kleiser 30 days within which to correct the problem. On November 22, 1982, the Department received a new lease for the Bize property and sign permit AG558-12. The new lease contained the following addendum: Effective date of lease shall be the of [sic] closing of purchase of said property or erection of signs, which- ever is first. There was no further evidence of the actual effective date of the lease. The Department of Transportation has a policy of requiring, with an application for a sign permit, a lease or other written evidence that the landowner has given permission to use his property for outdoor advertising purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a Final Order denying the Petitioner's two applications for outdoor advertising sign permits. DONE and ENTERED this 20 day of June, 1983, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARVIN E. CHAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of June, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael A. Houllis, Esquire 10525 Park Boulevard North Seminole, Florida 33542 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Steven L. Selph, Esquire Post Office Drawer 1441 St. Petersburg, Florida 33731 Mr. Paul Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether DOT should void outdoor advertising permits Nos. AT402-35 and AT403-35?
Findings Of Fact On March 20, 1987, (T. 12) DOT issued advertising sign permits to respondent, Nos. AT 402-35 and AT 403-35, authorizing construction of a metal outdoor advertising sign "monopole" 43 feet high with sign boards facing north and south, less than a tenth of a mile south of Alternate U.S. Highway 90, a "federal aid primary road" (T. 11), immediately west of State Road 297 in Escambia County. DOT's Exhibit No. 1. In May of 1988, Outdoor Media, Inc., applied for a permit to construct an outdoor advertising sign at a site five or six hundred feet east of the intersection of State Road 297 and Alternate U.S. Highway 90. Because the site proposed by Outdoor Media, Inc., is visible from and lies within 660 feet of the main traveled way of Alternate U.S. Highway 90 and because it lies within 1,000 feet of the site on which DOT had authorized Salter to erect signs, DOT denied Outdoor Media, Inc.'s, application. When Philip N. Brown, who works in DOT's outdoor advertising section, reported that no sign had ever been built at the site for which Salter had obtained permits Nos. AT402-35 and AT403-35, DOT notified Salter of its intent to void and revoke the permits. DOT's Exhibit No. 2. Some time after June 19, 1988, more than 18 days after DOT sent Salter notice of its intent to void the sign permits, Salter erected a wooden sign on the site. On March 10, 1988, Salter had obtained a building permit from Escambia County for the metal monopole structure, but, because more than 180 days had elapsed without any call for inspection, Escambia County declared the building permit null and void on September 23, 1988.
Findings Of Fact This proceeding was initiated when the Department notified the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, that its permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 were being revoked because the Respondent no longer had permission of the property owner to maintain a sign there, as required by Section 479.07(7), Florida Statutes. Permits numbered AD089-10 and AD090-10 authorized an outdoor advertising sign on U.S. 98, 100 feet west of Hickory Avenue in Bay county, Florida. The record owner of the property where the above permits authorized the Respondent to locate a sign is E. Clay Lewis III, Trustee, who took title by deed in 1977. By letter dated August 9, 1985, the property owner notified the Respondent that the subject property was being sold, and that the Respondent had 30 days to remove the sign from the property and cancel the outdoor advertising permits for this sign. By letter dated October 17, 1985, the property owner advised the Department that the Respondent no longer had a valid lease for the site where the subject permits authorized a sign, and that the signs had been removed. Documents marked Exhibits 1-3 reflect the foregoing, as does the testimony of the Department's outdoor advertising inspector. This evidence was received without objection from the Respondent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permits numbered AD089-10 and Ad090-10 held by the Respondent, Headrick Outdoor Advertising, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 31st day of July, 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 William G. Warner, Esquire P. O. Box 335 Panama City, Florida 32402 Bobbie Palmer, Esquire P. O. Box 12950 Pensacola, Florida 32576 Hon. Thomas E. Drawdy Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301 A. J. 8palla, Esquire General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Bldg. Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Petitioner, National Advertising Company, is entitled to the issuance of a vegetation control permit for its south-facing advertising billboard located West of Interstate I-75, in Lee County, Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system, including interstate highways. Construction of Interstate 75 in the relevant area of Lee County, Florida, was completed and accepted by the DOT on or about February 22, 1979. On March 10, 1980, the Florida Department of Transportation issued an outdoor advertising sign permit to Florida Outdoor for a billboard to be located adjacent to I-75, .25 miles north of the intersection of I-75 and State Road 82 in Lee County. The billboard was constructed and the billboard structure, together with the sign permit, was acquired by Petitioner in May of 1982. Petitioner holds a current valid sign permit, DOT sign permit number AB-118-10, for the above sign. Said sign is a non-conforming sign under the Rules of the DOT and cannot be moved or raised. Petitioner submitted a properly completed application for a vegetation control permit to the DOT on February 4, 1991. Petitioner's sign board does not have five hundred feet of exposure along the interstate highway within a one thousand foot window and is therefore a screened board under the provisions of the DOT's rules. Following review of the application by the District Roadway Maintenance Engineer, it was determined that the area covered by the vegetation control permit was within an area specifically preserved during the construction process which prohibits any pruning, trimming, or removal of trees, shrubs, or vegetation in that area. Based on that determination, the permit was denied.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding that the vegetation control permit requested by National Advertising Company on I-75 (S.R. 93) in Lee County, Florida, should be GRANTED, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-13, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th December, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. National Advertising's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4 (in part) 5,6 (in part), 8,10. Rejected as irrelevant or immaterial: paragraph 4 (in part-coverage in Preliminary Statement), 6 (in part), 7,9,11. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 12,13. Department of Transportation's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance; Stipulation of Facts; paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Rejected as conclusions of law: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Copies furnished: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Kreuter & Livingston, P.A. 200 East Robinson Street Suite 1150 Orlando, Florida Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450
The Issue The issue is which outdoor advertising signs should be permitted.
Findings Of Fact Escambia County, at all times material to these proceedings, had, in effect, a local ordinance that regulates the location and construction of outdoor advertising signs. The administrative agency of the county that handles enforcement of the ordinance is the county building inspection department. The policy adopted by that department is that an outdoor advertising company first submits to it a request for approval of a site location. The department inspects the location to see whether the location meets the spacing requirements of the ordinance. The building inspection department does not make an effort to determine at that time whether all other requirements for the issuance of a state permit are met. It issues a letter addressed to the Chipley office of the DOT stating whether it approves the proposed site and delivers that letter to the outdoor advertising company applying for the permit. Lamar submitted an application to the county for a site on the east side of Nine Mile Road (S.R. 297), 250 feet south of U.S. 90A, with a drawing showing the proposed sign location. (See, pg. 4; DOT Exhibit 4). The application was approved by the Escambia County building inspection department on January 6, 1989. On February 24, 1989, Outdoor submitted applications to the Escambia County building inspection department for sites on the east side of S.R. 297 (Nine Mile Road), south of U.S. 90A ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1), and on the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). The locations were checked on February 27, 1989 by an employee of the Escambia County building inspections department, who found the sites to comply with spacing requirements and so indicated on the drawing submitted with the applications. However, that employee's supervisor, John Kimberl, found upon checking the records in the department's office that the application of Lamar for the site, 250 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A on the east side of S.R. 297, had been approved. This approval created a conflict with the site applied for by Outdoor on the east side of S.R. 297 ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County approved the application for the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County issued two letters, one of which stated that the application was approved and the other which stated that the application was denied because it would be in conflict with the spacing requirements because of a prior application. Both letters identified the sign in question using the same address. Outdoor applied for outdoor advertising permits for sites "C" and "D" to DOT by two separate applications on March 31, 1989. Outdoor attached sketches of both sites and a copy of the approval letter from Escambia County to its applications to the DOT representing to the DOT that the appropriate authorities of Escambia County had approved both sites. This may have been inadvertent and due to Outdoor's practice of proceeding only with letters of approval. The applications submitted by Outdoor were otherwise in order. A field inspection by Phillip Brown of the DOT showed that there would be a conflict between the two locations applied for by Outdoor because they were within 660 feet of each other and outdoor advertising signs would be visible to motorists on both highways. The DOT, therefore, offered Outdoor its choice of the two locations. Outdoor chose the location ("D") on the east side of S.R. 297. The DOT then issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 and gave Outdoor notice that it had denied its other application ("C"). Lamar applied to DOT for an outdoor advertising permit for its location 250 feet south of the intersection on the east side of S.R. 297 initially on January 27, 1989 and again on February 23, 1989. On one occasion, it was rejected because it had the wrong lease attached and on another occasion because the 250-foot distance placed it on property not subject to a valid lease. (See DOT Exhibit 4). After February 23, 1989, this application was amended to 144 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A and resubmitted with a proper lease. This site was not resubmitted to Escambia County for evaluation, and the original approval letter for the site 250 feet from the intersection was used. (See DOT Exhibit 3). After Lamar's application for permits for the east side of S.R. 297, 144 feet south of U.S. 90A, were rejected as being in conflict with Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 issued to Outdoor, Lamar requested an administrative hearing and alleged that Escambia County had not approved the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297. It is the policy of both the Escambia County building inspection department and the DOT to approve applications for permits in the order in which they were received if the applications are in compliance with the requirements of the statutes, rules and ordinances. It is further the policy of Escambia County not to permit anyone to erect a sign unless they have state permits. In this case, neither Lamar nor Outdoor fully complied with the Escambia County requirements. Outdoor's application for site "D" was not approved by the county and Lamar changed the location of its sign from 250 feet to 144 feet south of the intersection. This new location was not resubmitted for site evaluation. The DOT should have been alerted to the problems of both applications because Outdoor's sketch said the approval was void and the date of the county's letter of approval to Lamar did not change when Lamar's site sketch was changed. Lamar received the approval of Escambia County; but by the time its otherwise valid application was submitted to the DOT, the DOT had issued the permits to Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 and denied Lamar because of spacing problems. The DOT would have rejected the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 if Outdoor had submitted to it the proper letter from Escambia County.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the DOT revoke the issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 because the site upon which the signs were to be erected was not properly approved by the county. The DOT properly rejected Lamar's application because its amended site was not approved by the county. DOT's denial of Outdoor's application for signs at site "C" is not at issue in this case and no recommendation is made regarding it. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Officer Hearings 1550 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Hearings 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ben C. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Robert P. Gaines, Esq. Beggs and Lane P.O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 J. Arby Van Slyke, Esq. P.O. Box 13244 Pensacola, FL 32591 Charles G. Gardner, Esq. 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 31st day of January,
