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ACKERLEY COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (AZ922-35) vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 93-003303 (1993)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:West Palm Beach, Florida Jun. 14, 1993 Number: 93-003303 Latest Update: Jan. 04, 1994

Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The outdoor advertising sign that is the subject of the instant proceeding (hereinafter referred to as the "Sign") is a billboard with steel "I" beams and iron stringers which sits perpendicular to U.S. Highway 1 approximately 1,800 feet south of Hypoluxo Road and approximately 1,000 feet north of Neptune Drive in Palm Beach County. Petitioner has owned the Sign since about 1978 or 1979, when it purchased the assets of the Sign's previous owner, Outdoor Media. The Sign was originally erected in 1963 by Ferrin Signs, Inc., pursuant to a permit issued by Palm Beach County. In 1967, Ferrin Signs, Inc., obtained a permit from Palm Beach County to perform further work on the sign. Shortly thereafter, Ferrin Signs, Inc., sold the Sign to Outdoor Media. Prior to March of 1970, the land on which the Sign is located was in the unincorporated area of Palm Beach County. In March of 1970, the land was annexed by the Town of Hypoluxo and has been within the Town's jurisdictional boundaries ever since. The Town of Hypoluxo has an ordinance currently in effect that regulates signs within the Town. The ordinance, like its predecessors dating back to 1961, prohibits "off premises signs." It also contains a section dealing with "nonconforming signs," which provides as follows: Signs or sign structures made nonconforming by this sign and signage code shall be governed by the following regulations: A sign existing within the town on or before November 30, 1992, which, because of its height, square foot area, location or other characteristics, does not conform to this article is hereby declared to be a nonconforming sign. A nonconforming sign under this subsection may be allowed to remain in existence, but if destroyed or allowed to deteriorate in excess of 50 percent of the depreciated value of the structure, it may not be replaced. The status afforded signs under this section shall not be applicable to any sign for which no sign permit was ever issued; such signs are deemed illegal signs and are subject to the provisions of this article governing illegal signs. No conforming sign or sign structure shall be permitted to be erected for the same property containing an existing nonconforming sign until the nonconforming sign has been removed or made conforming. An "off premises sign" that does not qualify for "nonconforming sign" status is subject to removal under the ordinance. The Town also has a building code. Under the code, a building permit is required before a sign within the Town may be altered or repaired. No building permit has ever been issued by the Town for any work to be performed on the Sign. On December 27, 1990, the Department issued a Notice of Violation alleging that Petitioner was maintaining the Sign without a state-issued outdoor advertising sign permit, as required by Section 497.07, Florida Statutes. In response to the Notice of Violation, Petitioner advised the Department that it would be filing an application for such a permit. Petitioner filed its application on January 12, 1993. The application was accompanied by, among other things, a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit referred to in Finding of Fact 3 above. The application package, however, contained neither a permit for the Sign issued by the Town of Hypoluxo, nor a statement from any Hypoluxo official indicating that the Sign was eligible for such a permit or was otherwise allowable under the Town's sign ordinance. Accordingly, after receiving the application package, the Department contacted the Mayor of the Town, the Honorable Al Merion, to ascertain the Town's position on the matter. In conjunction therewith, it provided Mayor Merion with a copy of the 1963 Palm Beach County permit that had accompanied Petitioner's application. By letter dated January 25, 1993, Mayor Merion responded to the Department's inquiry. In his letter, he wrote: Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your fax transmittal containing a permit issued by Palm Beach County to the Ferrin Signs, Inc. on January 24, 1963. The permit issued by Palm Beach County is not valid because it is not within their [sic] jurisdiction to issue sign permits for property lying within the territorial boundaries of the Town of Hypoluxo. To the best of our knowledge, the Town of Hypoluxo has no record of a permit being issued to Ferrin Signs Inc. It should be noted that, in the past years, on numerous occasions, the billboard in question has been illegally constructionally altered by virtue of no permit having been obtained from the Town. On or about February 2, 1993, the Department returned Petitioner's application to Petitioner. In the Memorandum of Returned Application that it sent to Petitioner, the Department gave the following reason for denying the application: "local permit not provided for Town of Hypoluxo." Although the Town no longer contends that Palm Beach County was without authority to issue the 1963 pre-annexation permit for construction of the Sign, the Town still takes the position that, because of unpermitted post- annexation repairs and alterations, the Sign is prohibited and subject to removal under the Town's current sign ordinance. 1/

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order denying Petitioner's application for a state outdoor advertising sign permit. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 4th day of January, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of January, 1994.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57479.07479.105479.15 Florida Administrative Code (1) 14-10.004
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. TRI-STATE SYSTEMS, INC., 84-003972 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-003972 Latest Update: Aug. 06, 1985

Findings Of Fact On October 13, 1981, Henderson Signs filed applications for four permits to erect two outdoor advertising signs in Jackson County, Florida, on the south side of Interstate 10, one approximately 2.65 miles and the other approximately 2.85 miles east of SR 276. These applications were field inspected by the Department's outdoor advertising inspector and by his supervisor, they were approved on or about November 2, 1981, and the Department issued permits for the requested locations to Henderson Signs. Subsequent to the issuance of these permits, Henderson Signs transferred to the Respondent, Tri-State Systems, Inc., all of its interest in the permits which authorized the subject signs to be erected. On or about March 23, 1983, the Respondent filed outdoor advertising permit affidavit forms requesting that the Department issue replacement tags for the subject signs because the tags previously issued had been lost. The Department replaced the older permit tags with new tags numbered AI998-10, AI999-10, AJ001-10 and AJ002-10. A business known as Brooks Construction Company is located within 800 feet of each of the subject sign locations. At various times some construction equipment can be seen parked in the vicinity of Brooks Construction Company. Although the view from 1-10 is partially obstructed by trees, this equipment might be seen from the interstate if one were looking at the right spot. Also, a small on-premise sign is located at this site, but the view of this sign is no better from 1-10 than the equipment is. The business known as Brooks Construction Company is located in a structure that resembles a brick residential building, which is used as a residence. A portion of this residential building is visible from 1-10, but is as obscured from view as the equipment and the sign are. The area where the subject signs are located is rural in nature. There is nothing about the building used by Brooks Construction Company that would indicate to a traveler on 1-10 that anything other than a residence was located at this site, even if the traveler were able to see this building from the interstate. Prior to the transfer of the permits from Henderson Signs to the Respondent, a representative of the Respondent testified that he inquired at the Department's district office in Chipley whether the permits to be purchased from Henderson Signs were valid permits. He further testified that he received assurance from the Chipley district office that these permits were legal permits. This testimony, however, is self-serving and uncorroborated, and thus is not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact. Henderson Signs submitted the applications for the subject permits, and designated thereon that the proposed locations were in an unzoned commercial area within 800 feet of a business. These applications also certified that the signs to be erected met all of the requirements of chapter 479, Florida Statutes. During the summer of 1984, the sites were inspected by the Department's Right-of-Way Administrator who determined that the permits had been issued in error because of the absence of visible commercial activity within 800 feet of the signs. As a result, the Department issued notices of violation advising the Respondent that the subject sign permits were being revoked.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that permit numbers AI998-10, AI999-10, AJ001-10 and AJ002-10, held by the Respondent, Tri-State Systems, Inc., authorizing two signs on the south side of I-10, 2.65 miles and 2.85 miles east of SR 276 in Jackson County, Florida, be revoked, and the subject signs removed. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 6th day of August, 1985, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of August, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Maxine F. Ferguson, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802-2151 Honorable Paul A. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================

Florida Laws (8) 120.57120.6835.22479.01479.02479.08479.11479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. PIER HOUSE INN AND BEACH CLUB, 84-000280 (1984)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 84-000280 Latest Update: Nov. 07, 1984

Findings Of Fact The outdoor advertising sign which is the subject of this proceeding has been erected on a small parcel of land located approximately one-quarter of a mile west of First Street on Rockland Key, next to the southbound lane of U.S. 1, in Monroe County, Florida. This location is outside the city limits of any municipality. On approximately October 1, 1983, Mr. Frank Toppino, who is not a party to this proceeding and who was not presented as a witness at the hearing, leased the subject property to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club for one year. Under the terms of this lease, the Pier House Inn received the right to use the property for an outdoor advertising structure which the parties to the lease contemplated would be constructed there. The Pier House agreed to pay the sum of $950 to Mr. Toppino as rent for the year. In addition, the Pier House agreed to undertake construction of the sign on the land for the benefit of Mr. Toppino, the lessor, after the lease expires. The PIER House received the right to use this land for one year, and the right to place advertising copy of its choice on the face of the outdoor advertising structure for one year. The lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House Inn covering the subject property was received in evidence. This lease, and the testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn who executed it as lessee, which is detailed above, supports a finding of fact that Mr. Frank Toppino and not the Pier House was the owner of the outdoor advertising structure which is the subject of this proceeding on October 1, 1983. Subsequently, when the Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made his inspection of the subject sign, there was no state outdoor advertising permit affixed thereto, and the Department has not issued any permit for this structure. The sign was erected between two other permitted signs, and it is closer than 500 feet to both of these existing and permitted structures. The sign which is the subject of this proceeding is located adjacent to a federal- aid primary highway outside any incorporated city or town. It is visible from U.S. 1, and it is within 660 feet of the edge of the pavement of this highway. The Department's Outdoor Advertising Administrator made a determination that the Pier House Inn was the owner of the sign in question based upon information contained in a Monroe County Building Permit application, and based upon the hearsay information received during telephone conversations. However, this information is controverted by the direct testimony of the general manager of the Pier House Inn which is itself corroborated by the lease between Mr. Toppino and the Pier House which is in evidence. Thus, the testimony received from the Department's witness is not of sufficient quality to support a finding of fact that the Pier House Inn is the owner of the sign in question. Moreover, the Department has the burden of proof on this issue, and the quantity and quality of the evidence presented on the matter of ownership of the subject sign does not carry this burden.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the violation notice issued on December 12, 1983, to the Pier House Inn and Beach Club, be dismissed, without prejudice to the reinstitution of proceedings in which the violation notice is directed to the actual owner of the sign in question. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered this 23rd day of August, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Haydon Burns Bldg., M.S. 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32301-8064 H. Ray Allen, Esquire 618 Whitehead Street Key West, Florida 33040

Florida Laws (2) 120.57479.07
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs MIAMI OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., 00-001570 (2000)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 11, 2000 Number: 00-001570 Latest Update: Mar. 06, 2001

The Issue Whether the subject outdoor advertising signs are illegal because they were erected without state permits from Petitioner. Whether the subject signs should be removed. Whether Petitioner is equitably estopped to assert that the signs are illegal and should be removed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 95 on Northwest 6th Court, which is between Northwest 75th Street and Northwest 76th Street, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 95 sign. The Interstate 95 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 95. The Interstate 95 sign is located within 147 feet of the right-of-way of Interstate 95. Respondent owns and maintains an outdoor advertising sign located adjacent to Interstate 395 at the corner of Northwest 14th Street and Northwest 1st Court, Miami, Dade County, Florida. For ease of reference, this sign will be referred to as the Interstate 395 sign. The Interstate 395 sign has two facings, each of which is visible from Interstate 395. The Interstate 395 sign is located within 240 feet of the right- of-way of Interstate 395. Eugene A. (Andy) Hancock, Jr., is the President of the corporate Respondent and, at the times pertinent to this proceeding, controlled the activities of Respondent. Mr. Hancock caused the corporate Respondent to lease the respective properties on which the subject signs are located in November 1998. He thereafter caused the corporate Respondent to erect the two double-faced signs at issue in this proceeding. The subject signs were constructed during September and October 1999. Each sign was constructed without a state permit from Petitioner. Each sign is within the permitting jurisdiction of Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that his company did not apply for permits from Petitioner because of a conversation he had with Bernard Davis, a former outdoor advertising administrator for Petitioner. Mr. Hancock testified that Mr. Davis represented to him that his company would not need permits from Petitioner if it had permits from the City of Miami. This testimony is rejected. 3/ Respondent has applied for state sign permits for the subject signs. Permits for these signs have not been issued because of their proximity to existing, permitted signs. 4/

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner enter a final order finding that the subject signs are illegal and must be removed pursuant to Section 479.105, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of February, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 2001.

Florida Laws (5) 120.57479.01479.07479.105479.16
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CROWN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., AND TROPICAL LANDHOLDINGS vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 04-001765 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 28, 2004 Number: 04-001765 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2006

The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.

USC (1) 23 U.S.C 131 CFR (1) 23 CFR 750.708 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57479.01479.02479.07479.111
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NAEGELE OUTDOOR ADVERTISING COMPANY OF JACKSONVILLE vs. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 79-002103 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-002103 Latest Update: May 21, 1980

Findings Of Fact U.S. 1 is a federal-aid primary highway and, in the vicinity of University Boulevard, is a divided highway, with parkway between north-and- southbound lanes. University Boulevard (SR 109) is not a federal-aid primary highway. Petitioner holds a lease on the property on which the proposed sign is to be erected and, in fact, already has a structure on this site and a permit for a north-facing sign on this structure. The proposed sign meets all DOT requirements except spacing. The structure on which the proposed sign is to be displayed is located on the east side of U.S. 1, 125 feet north of the intersection with University Boulevard. Lamar Dean Outdoor Advertising Company was issued a permit for a 14 by 48 foot sign along the east side of University Boulevard, 150 feet south of the intersection with U.S. 1. This sign faces west. That application for permit (Exhibit 8) shows the type highway to be U.S. 1, a federal-aid primary highway. A sign located on University Boulevard in Jacksonville which was not visible from a federal-aid primary highway would not require a DOT permit. This Lamar structure, which carries a Jack Bush-Toyota South copy, can easily be seen by persons in vehicles travelling on U.S. 1 and it is on the same side of U.S. 1 and within 500 feet of Petitioner's proposed sign. The Department of Transportation's (DOT) inspectors maintain inventories of all permitted signs. The criteria used by all DOT sign inspectors is to log any sign that can be seen and read from the primary highway. Actually, the Jack Bush sign can be seen by both north-and-southbound traffic on U.S. 1 when in the vicinity of University Boulevard but the northbound traffic passes closer to the sign. It is therefore carried by DOT as a south-facing sign.

Florida Laws (3) 479.01479.02479.07
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NATIONAL ADVERTISING COMPANY vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 91-003775 (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tampa, Florida Jun. 18, 1991 Number: 91-003775 Latest Update: Feb. 18, 1992

The Issue Whether Petitioner, National Advertising Company, is entitled to the issuance of a vegetation control permit for its south-facing advertising billboard located West of Interstate I-75, in Lee County, Florida.

Findings Of Fact The Florida Department of Transportation (DOT) is the state agency charged with the duty to administer and enforce the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, which regulates outdoor advertising structures along the state highway system, including interstate highways. Construction of Interstate 75 in the relevant area of Lee County, Florida, was completed and accepted by the DOT on or about February 22, 1979. On March 10, 1980, the Florida Department of Transportation issued an outdoor advertising sign permit to Florida Outdoor for a billboard to be located adjacent to I-75, .25 miles north of the intersection of I-75 and State Road 82 in Lee County. The billboard was constructed and the billboard structure, together with the sign permit, was acquired by Petitioner in May of 1982. Petitioner holds a current valid sign permit, DOT sign permit number AB-118-10, for the above sign. Said sign is a non-conforming sign under the Rules of the DOT and cannot be moved or raised. Petitioner submitted a properly completed application for a vegetation control permit to the DOT on February 4, 1991. Petitioner's sign board does not have five hundred feet of exposure along the interstate highway within a one thousand foot window and is therefore a screened board under the provisions of the DOT's rules. Following review of the application by the District Roadway Maintenance Engineer, it was determined that the area covered by the vegetation control permit was within an area specifically preserved during the construction process which prohibits any pruning, trimming, or removal of trees, shrubs, or vegetation in that area. Based on that determination, the permit was denied.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: A Final Order be entered finding that the vegetation control permit requested by National Advertising Company on I-75 (S.R. 93) in Lee County, Florida, should be GRANTED, pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 14-13, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th December, 1991. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. National Advertising's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance: paragraphs 1,2,3,4 (in part) 5,6 (in part), 8,10. Rejected as irrelevant or immaterial: paragraph 4 (in part-coverage in Preliminary Statement), 6 (in part), 7,9,11. Rejected as a conclusion of law: paragraph 12,13. Department of Transportation's Proposed Findings of Fact: Accepted in substance; Stipulation of Facts; paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Rejected as conclusions of law: paragraphs 1 (in part), 2 (in part). Copies furnished: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Kreuter & Livingston, P.A. 200 East Robinson Street Suite 1150 Orlando, Florida Vernon L. Whittier, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida Ben G. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450 Thornton J. Williams General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0450

Florida Laws (5) 120.57120.68479.01479.02479.07
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OUTDOOR MEDIA OF PENSACOLA, INC. vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 89-003827 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Pensacola, Florida Jul. 18, 1989 Number: 89-003827 Latest Update: Jan. 31, 1990

The Issue The issue is which outdoor advertising signs should be permitted.

Findings Of Fact Escambia County, at all times material to these proceedings, had, in effect, a local ordinance that regulates the location and construction of outdoor advertising signs. The administrative agency of the county that handles enforcement of the ordinance is the county building inspection department. The policy adopted by that department is that an outdoor advertising company first submits to it a request for approval of a site location. The department inspects the location to see whether the location meets the spacing requirements of the ordinance. The building inspection department does not make an effort to determine at that time whether all other requirements for the issuance of a state permit are met. It issues a letter addressed to the Chipley office of the DOT stating whether it approves the proposed site and delivers that letter to the outdoor advertising company applying for the permit. Lamar submitted an application to the county for a site on the east side of Nine Mile Road (S.R. 297), 250 feet south of U.S. 90A, with a drawing showing the proposed sign location. (See, pg. 4; DOT Exhibit 4). The application was approved by the Escambia County building inspection department on January 6, 1989. On February 24, 1989, Outdoor submitted applications to the Escambia County building inspection department for sites on the east side of S.R. 297 (Nine Mile Road), south of U.S. 90A ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1), and on the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). The locations were checked on February 27, 1989 by an employee of the Escambia County building inspections department, who found the sites to comply with spacing requirements and so indicated on the drawing submitted with the applications. However, that employee's supervisor, John Kimberl, found upon checking the records in the department's office that the application of Lamar for the site, 250 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A on the east side of S.R. 297, had been approved. This approval created a conflict with the site applied for by Outdoor on the east side of S.R. 297 ("D" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County approved the application for the south side of U.S. 90A east of S.R. 297 ("C" on DOT Exhibit 1). Escambia County issued two letters, one of which stated that the application was approved and the other which stated that the application was denied because it would be in conflict with the spacing requirements because of a prior application. Both letters identified the sign in question using the same address. Outdoor applied for outdoor advertising permits for sites "C" and "D" to DOT by two separate applications on March 31, 1989. Outdoor attached sketches of both sites and a copy of the approval letter from Escambia County to its applications to the DOT representing to the DOT that the appropriate authorities of Escambia County had approved both sites. This may have been inadvertent and due to Outdoor's practice of proceeding only with letters of approval. The applications submitted by Outdoor were otherwise in order. A field inspection by Phillip Brown of the DOT showed that there would be a conflict between the two locations applied for by Outdoor because they were within 660 feet of each other and outdoor advertising signs would be visible to motorists on both highways. The DOT, therefore, offered Outdoor its choice of the two locations. Outdoor chose the location ("D") on the east side of S.R. 297. The DOT then issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 and gave Outdoor notice that it had denied its other application ("C"). Lamar applied to DOT for an outdoor advertising permit for its location 250 feet south of the intersection on the east side of S.R. 297 initially on January 27, 1989 and again on February 23, 1989. On one occasion, it was rejected because it had the wrong lease attached and on another occasion because the 250-foot distance placed it on property not subject to a valid lease. (See DOT Exhibit 4). After February 23, 1989, this application was amended to 144 feet south of the intersection of S.R. 297 and U.S. 90A and resubmitted with a proper lease. This site was not resubmitted to Escambia County for evaluation, and the original approval letter for the site 250 feet from the intersection was used. (See DOT Exhibit 3). After Lamar's application for permits for the east side of S.R. 297, 144 feet south of U.S. 90A, were rejected as being in conflict with Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 issued to Outdoor, Lamar requested an administrative hearing and alleged that Escambia County had not approved the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297. It is the policy of both the Escambia County building inspection department and the DOT to approve applications for permits in the order in which they were received if the applications are in compliance with the requirements of the statutes, rules and ordinances. It is further the policy of Escambia County not to permit anyone to erect a sign unless they have state permits. In this case, neither Lamar nor Outdoor fully complied with the Escambia County requirements. Outdoor's application for site "D" was not approved by the county and Lamar changed the location of its sign from 250 feet to 144 feet south of the intersection. This new location was not resubmitted for site evaluation. The DOT should have been alerted to the problems of both applications because Outdoor's sketch said the approval was void and the date of the county's letter of approval to Lamar did not change when Lamar's site sketch was changed. Lamar received the approval of Escambia County; but by the time its otherwise valid application was submitted to the DOT, the DOT had issued the permits to Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 and denied Lamar because of spacing problems. The DOT would have rejected the application of Outdoor for the location on the east side of S.R. 297 if Outdoor had submitted to it the proper letter from Escambia County.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the DOT revoke the issued Permit Nos. AY436-35 and AY437-35 because the site upon which the signs were to be erected was not properly approved by the county. The DOT properly rejected Lamar's application because its amended site was not approved by the county. DOT's denial of Outdoor's application for signs at site "C" is not at issue in this case and no recommendation is made regarding it. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Officer Hearings 1550 STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Division of Administrative The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399- (904) 488-9675 Hearings 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ben C. Watts Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thomas H. Bateman, III, Esq. General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Robert P. Gaines, Esq. Beggs and Lane P.O. Box 12950 Pensacola, FL 32576-2950 J. Arby Van Slyke, Esq. P.O. Box 13244 Pensacola, FL 32591 Charles G. Gardner, Esq. 605 Suwannee Street, MS-58 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 31st day of January,

Florida Laws (2) 120.57479.07
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CROWN OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, INC., AND TROPICAL LANDHOLDINGS vs DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 04-001766 (2004)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 28, 2004 Number: 04-001766 Latest Update: Jan. 23, 2006

The Issue The issue in these causes is whether denial of Petitioners' outdoor advertising sign site permit applications by Respondent were correctly determined under Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), on the basis that the sign sites were unzoned commercial/industrial areas; and on the basis that within attending factual circumstances, the sign site did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial areas as defined in Subsection 479.01(23), Florida Statutes (2003).

Findings Of Fact Based upon the observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying; documentary materials received in evidence; evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57, Florida Statutes (2003); and the entire record of this proceeding, the following relevant and material findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, Tropical Landholdings, a Florida Corporation, was created in 1998 and purchased approximately 700 to 800 acres of land comprised of residential multi-family and commercial properties along Interstate 75 (I-75) in Punta Gorda, Florida. On September 8, 2003, Petitioner, Crown Advertising, Inc., of Belleview, Florida, submitted three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications to the Department for review. On September 23, 2003, the Department denied the three outdoor advertising sign site permit applications for the following reasons: (1) the sign sites were not permitted under the local land use designation of site (§ 479.111(2), Fla. Stat. (2003)); and (2) the sign sites did not qualify as unzoned commercial/industrial area. § 479.01, Fla. Stat. (2003). The sign site permit application forms used by Petitioners in these causes were composed and authorized by the Department. The form required the applicant to obtain and provide information regarding the proposed sign site, what is proposed to be constructed on the site, and where the proposed construction is to occur. The sign site permit applications also required the applicant to secure information from the appropriate local zoning official of the future land use designation and the current zoning of the proposed sites enacted by the local government's Comprehensive Plan and land use development regulations. This form required information from the local government as to whether the applicant is or is not in compliance with all adopted local ordinances. Permission to erect an outdoor sign structure on the identified sign site is subject to approval by the City. Petitioners complied with the requested information. The local government, the City of North Port, approved the three sign site permit applications in question and granted Petitioners permission to erect three outdoor billboard signs. This local grant of approval was then subjected to concurring approval by the Department. After receiving the sign site permits that were approved by the City, the Department engaged the services of a consultant to conduct on-site review and identification of: (1) the local government's designation for each proposed sign site; (2) the permitted uses of each proposed sign site (local drainage facilities, pipeline corridors, underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs); and (3) a review of adjacent and surrounding parcels. The consultant reported to the Department the factual circumstances attendant the three locally approved sign sites. It should be noted that the consultant did not render an opinion regarding the Department's approval or denial of the sign site permit applications. The sign sites in question were zoned under the local "land use designation" of the City of North Port's Ordinance 02-46, Section 53.146 (Ordinance 02-46), as a "utility industrial corridor." The zoned land was composed of strips of land measuring 25 to 70 feet in width on the west side and 160 to 170 feet in width on the east side. The "permitted governmental uses" of a parcel zoned as a "utility industrial corridor," included such uses as underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising signs. Ordinance 02-46, under the title "Prohibited Uses and Structures," specifically prohibits "all commercial and industrial uses." Based upon a review of all information provided by Petitioners, the local government, and its consultant, the Department first determined the three sign sites on which the subject signs were to be erected and located, prohibited commercial or industrial uses. The Department then determined, based upon an analysis of the materials provided by its consultant and the City of North Port, the three sign sites in question had not been zoned for commercial or industrial uses as a part of the local government's comprehensive zoning plan. Based upon (1) the prohibition of commercial or industrial uses and (2) no commercial or industrial zoning of the sign sites, the Department concluded these three sign sites were zoned "primarily to permit outdoor advertising," a prohibited function. The denials were required. Under the local land use designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included local drainage facilities and a pipeline corridor. Under governmental uses designation of Ordinance 02-46, the City of North Port's permitted uses included underground communication cables, electric transmission lines, and outdoor advertising. However, Ordinance 02-46 specifically prohibits all commercial and industrial uses under the governmental uses designation. When questioned by Petitioners, Ms. Holschuh testified "that the Department's intent was to allow [sign] permits whenever possible and never prohibit the installation of billboards." From this specific statement of testimony, Petitioners argued that "implementing the intent the Department must look beyond the labels of the zoning and look at the actual primary uses allowed under those designations." (Emphasis added.) Ms. Holschuh disagreed with Petitioners' characterization of the Department's procedures and convincingly maintained that the Department based its denials on "sign site zoning" and factors considered for determining an "unzoned commercial/industrial area" as defined by statute. Continuing with its argument, Petitioners conclude "[T]he department . . . appears to be in conflict with Judge Barbara Staros' decision of February 16, 2004, in a rule challenge proceeding, where she analyzed the Sign Permit procedure under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes." In her Final Order, Administrative Law Judge Barbara Staros made a Finding of Fact in paragraph 30, stating: Once the local government zoning official certifies that the proposed sign identified in the application is in compliance with the comprehensive plan adopted pursuant to Chapter 163, the Department does not go behind that certification to look factually at whether the zoning action was consistent with the comprehensive plan. Page 13. The procedures followed by the Department in this proceeding complied with Judge Staros Finding of Fact in paragraph 31, where she wrote: The Department uses the application and the information contained therein to determine whether a proposed sign location falls within the definition of a "commercial or industrial zone." If it does, [fall within] then the Department determines whether those designations were adopted as part of the local government's comprehensive planning efforts or were "primarily" adopted to permit outdoor advertising signs on that location. Page 30. Based upon it's receipt, review, and analysis of the specific facts provided by all parties of interest, the Department determined the sites where the signs were to be erected prohibited commercial or industrial use. The Department factually determined that no local zoning identified the sites as commercial or industrial. The Department concluded correctly and in accord with Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052 that these three sign sites were zoned by the City of North Port, the local governmental entity, "primarily to permit outdoor advertising" contrary to sign site permit procedures under Section 479.07, Florida Statutes (2003). Based upon the evidence of record and considering the size of the sign site, the local government's zoning of the site, designated uses of the site, and prohibited uses on the site, denial of the sign applications was correctly determined pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052. Based on the testimonies of Ms. Holschuh and James Duff, who testified regarding his ownership, property taxes paid, and the investors' inability to use the property in question to their economic advantage, Petitioners failed to carry the burden of producing a preponderance of credible evidence to establish that the Department incorrectly and/or wrongfully denied Petitioners' applications for three sign site permits pursuant to Subsection 479.111(2), Florida Statutes (2003), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-10.0052.

USC (1) 23 U.S.C 131 CFR (1) 23 CFR 750.708 Florida Laws (6) 120.569120.57479.01479.02479.07479.111
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION vs. FOSTER AND KLEISER, 79-001678 (1979)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 79-001678 Latest Update: Jan. 14, 1980

Findings Of Fact There is no dispute regarding the facts here involved. SR 60 is a federal aid primary highway and the signs are located within the city limits of Tampa, Florida. No permit has been issued and the sign structure is located 150 feet from a permitted sign. Accordingly the signs violate the spacing requirements of the statutes. This is really the only issue here involved; however, both parties presented evidence and Respondent submitted a proposed recommended order on whether or not an application for a permit for these signs should be approved. Resolving this issue would be premature and result in an advisory opinion. However, to preserve the evidence and save having to repeat the hearing when, and if, Respondent submits an application for a permit the following is submitted. The signs in question were erected within the city limits of Tampa in 1974. At the time these signs were erected no state permit was required. In 1976 an application was submitted for a permit for these signs. This application was returned to the applicant to resubmit on new forms and be sure to complete the application (Exhibit 2). The permitted sign, from which the instant sign is not the required spacing, is located on the right of way of the cross town expressway, and when construction starts, this sign will be removed.

Florida Laws (2) 479.03479.07
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