Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida. William Kirschner is Petitioner's owner and chairman of the board. Stacey Interlandi is its President and principal broker. Petitioner is in the mortgage lending and brokerage business. All of the mortgage loans it makes are sold to investors. Petitioner held an active mortgage brokerage business registration (No. HB 592567137 00) issued pursuant to former Section 494.039, Florida Statutes, which was effective from September 1, 1990, until its expiration on August 31, 1992. 2/ It currently holds a mortgage brokerage business license (No. MBB 592567137 000) issued pursuant to Section 494.0031, Florida Statutes. The effective date of this license was September 1, 1992. The license expires on August 31, 1994. From October 1, 1989, through September 30, 1991, Petitioner acted as a seller or assignor of mortgage loans and/or a servicer of mortgage loans. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has made mortgage loans by advancing funds to mortgage loan applicants. With respect to each of these loans, however, the commitment to advance funds was made prior to October 1, 1991. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has sold or assigned mortgage loans to non-institutional investors, but for no monetary gain. Since October 1, 1991, Petitioner has serviced mortgage loans pursuant to agreements into which it entered prior to October 1, 1991. At no time has Petitioner been licensed as a mortgage lender pursuant to Chapter 494, Part III, Florida Statutes. On or about July 31, 1991, the Department sent the following written advisement concerning the revisions made by the 1991 Legislature to Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, to all registered mortgage brokerage businesses, including Petitioner: The 1991 Legislature revised Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, effective October 1, 1991. A copy of the new law is enclosed. Some of the changes which affect mortgage brokerage businesses are: A mortgage brokerage business may not make (fund) loans or service loans. Only mortgage lenders and correspondent mortgage lenders may make (fund) loans. Only mortgage lenders may service loans. A mortgage brokerage business may ONLY act as a mortgage broker. "Act as a mortgage broker" is defined as: "... for compensation or gain, or in the expectation of compensation or gain, either directly or indirectly, accepting or offering to accept an application for a mortgage loan, soliciting or offering to solicit a mortgage loan on behalf of a borrower, or negotiating or offering to negotiate the terms or conditions of a mortgage loan on behalf of a lender." There are no net worth requirements for mortgage brokerage businesses. A principal broker designation form must be completed and maintained in the principal place of business and a branch broker designation form must be completed and maintained at each branch. The required forms will be sent to your office prior to October 1, 1991. To act as a mortgage broker, a licensed individual must be an associate of a licensed brokerage business and is prohibited from being an associate of more than one mortgage brokerage business. "Associate" is defined as: ". . . a person employed by or acting as an independent contractor for a mortgage brokerage business . . ." Under the new law, no fee or notification to the Department is required when a mortgage broker becomes an associate of your business. However, the license of each mortgage broker must be prominently displayed in the business office where the associate acts as a mortgage broker. Note: The Department will discontinue processing change of status requests under the current law effective August 1, 1991. Mortgage brokerage businesses in good standing which hold an active registration are eligible to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the saving clause. The applicant must have: For at least 12 months during the period of October 1, 1989, through September 30, 1991, engaged in the business of either acting as a seller or assignor of mortgage loans or as a servicer of mortgage loans, or both; Documented a minimum net worth of $25,000 in audited financial statements; Applied for licensure pursuant to the saving clause before January 1, 1992 and paid an application fee of $100. Should you meet the above requirements and wish to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the saving clause or if you wish to apply for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to Section 494.0061, please contact the Department for the appropriate application. These applications will be available in early September 1991. THESE CHANGES ARE EFFECTIVE OCTOBER 1, 1991. PLEASE REVIEW THE ENCLOSED COPY OF THE LAW CAREFULLY FOR OTHER CHANGES WHICH MAY AFFECT YOUR MORTGAGE BROKERAGE BUSINESS. As promised, application forms for licensure as a mortgage lender were available the first week of September, 1991. Petitioner requested such an application form on September 18, 1991. The requested form was mailed to Petitioner the following day. On December 31, 1991, Petitioner submitted a completed application for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the "saving clause," Section 494.0065, Florida Statutes. The application was accompanied by an application fee of $100.00 and an audited financial statement reflecting that Petitioner had a net worth in excess of $25,000.00. At the time of the submission of its application, Petitioner had an unblemished disciplinary record.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order granting Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage lender pursuant to the "Saving Clause." DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of November, 1992. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-4313 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of facts proposed by the Department: 1-7. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 8. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law, albeit an accurate one, than a finding of fact. 9-12. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 13. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the law, albeit an accurate one, than a finding of fact. 14-15. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 16. Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 17-21. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 22. Rejected because it is not supported by persuasive competent substantial evidence. 24 6/-39. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 40. Rejected because, even if true, it would have no bearing on the outcome of the instant case.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the Respondents are guilty of the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary evidence received at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact: The Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance, is charged with the responsibility of administering the provisions of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the allegations in this case, Diko Investments, Inc. ("Diko") conducted business as a mortgage broker in Palm Beach County, Florida. At all times material to the allegations in this case, Dieter Kolberg ("Kolberg") was an officer, director, and acted as principal mortgage broker for Diko. Kolberg passed the mortgage broker's examination on May 28, 1985. Diko was issued a license as a mortgage broker with Kolberg as its principal broker on June 26, 1985 (license NO. HB-16568) Prior to May 28, 1985, Diko ran advertisements soliciting investors for mortgage opportunities. These ads included Kolberg's home telephone number. Prior to May 28, 1985, Kolberg/Diko entered into a business relationship with Michael D. Cirullo, a licensed mortgage broker, to "co-broke" mortgage transactions. Pursuant to their agreement, Cirullo represented the borrower/mortgagor while Kolberg obtained and represented the lender/mortgagee. Kolberg and Cirullo solicited and negotiated at least two loans prior to May 28, 1985. Kolberg acted in expectation of being paid as a mortgage broker. Cirullo remitted 50 percent of the commissions earned on these transactions to Diko. Diko stationery included the phrase "Licensed Mortgage Bankers." Neither Diko nor Kolberg has been licensed as a "mortgage banker." In August and September of 1985, investors, Marcel and Ida Barber, responded to a Diko advertisement which offered a 16 percent interest mortgage loan secured by prime residential real estate. The Barbers were interested in a safe, high interest yielding investment and requested more information from Diko. On September 23, 1985, Kolberg wrote to the Barbers to outline the following business policies of Diko: The first objective of the Diko lending program was "The Safety of the Investor's Capital." Any investment was to be secured by a mortgage on prime residential real estate clear of all liens with the exception of a first mortgage where a second mortgage would be given. Investors would be issued mortgagee title insurance to insure against loss due to defects in title to the mortgaged property. Investors would be issued fire and hazard insurance to cover any losses in the event of fire or storm. Subsequent to the receipt of the aforesaid letter, the Barbers decided to invest $25,000 in a mortgage through Diko/Kolberg. This initial transaction proceeded satisfactorily and the objectives addressed in paragraph 10 above were met. In late December, 1985, the Barbers advised Kolberg that they would be willing to invest an additional $50,000 in early January, 1986. The Barbers expected the transaction to be handled in the same manner as their prior investment through Diko. After reviewing two or three loan proposals, the Barbers chose to invest in a loan to Tony Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc. The loan was to be secured by a second mortgage on property at 713-717 "L" Street, West Palm Beach, Florida. The "L" Street property consisted of a 24-unit apartment complex and an adjacent laundry facility. Kolberg accompanied the Barbers to view the property. During discussions with the Barbers regarding the proposed investment, Kolberg made the following false material representations: That the property had a high occupancy; That rental payments were guaranteed or subsidized by a government program; That the asset-to-debt ratio for the property was acceptable; and That a proposed expansion of the laundry facility would further enhance the security of the loan. Financial statements of the borrower (Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc.) did not include all obligations against the "L" Street property. Diko/Kolberg did not give the Barbers an accurate or complete statement of the financial condition of the "L" Street investment. Kolberg knew the information on the statement was incomplete. Diko/Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers the high rate of crime in the area which compromised the security of the "L" Street investment. Kolberg knew of the crime problem in the area. Diko/Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against the "L" Street property. Kolberg knew of the foreclosure action as well as the delinquency on other obligations. Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that he represented, as trustee, a Kolberg family company which would directly benefit from the Barber loan. The Barber loan would satisfy a mortgage held by Kolberg, as trustee, on the subject property, which mortgage was in default and in the process of foreclosure (the Ropet Anlagen foreclosure). Kolberg did not disclose to the Barbers that another mortgage held on the "L" Street property (David Marsh loan) was also in default. A subordination agreement was required to be executed by Marsh in order for the Barber/Medici loan to close. Marsh agreed to subordinate his mortgage position for approximately $3,000 in arrear payments. Marsh was owed approximately $125,000 but chose to subordinate because by doing so he was able to recoup a small amount of what he considered a lost investment. Kolberg knew of Marsh's situation and did not advise the Barbers. The Barber loan to Medici/Automatic Concrete, Inc. closed on January 18, 1986. The Barbers delivered a check for $53,000 payable to the title company chosen by Diko. Neither Diko nor Kolberg gave the title company, Manor Title, closing instructions to protect the lenders' interests. Kolberg did, however, instruct the title company to list expenses relating to the Ropet Anlagen foreclosure against the Medici loan. Proceeds from the closing, in the amount of $50,000 were paid to Kolberg, as trustee for "Ropet Anlagen," and deposited to an account by that name. The name "Ropet Anlagen" translates to "Ropet Investments." Kolberg handles all transactions for this Kolberg family company in the United States. (Kolberg has two sons, Robin and Peter, from a former marriage. The name "Ropet" may derive from their names.) Kolberg's former wife, Patricia Kolberg, owns an interest in Ropet Anlagen. Regular monthly payments were made by Kolberg to Patricia Kolberg on a Ropet Anlagen account. Many of the checks drawn on the Ropet Anlagen account were for personal expenses of Kolberg or his business. The first mortgage on the "L" Street property was 45 days overdue on January 13, 1986. Kolberg knew of this delinquency but did not advise the Barbers. To the contrary, Diko gave the Barbers an estoppel notice from a prior closing showing the first mortgage to be current. The first mortgagee ultimately foreclosed its mortgage and the Barbers lost their entire investment. The Barbers did not receive a fire and hazard insurance policy to cover losses in the event of fire or storm for the "L" Street property. The Barbers did not receive a mortgagee title insurance policy until March, 1986, by which time the first mortgage was further in default. Additionally, the mortgagee policy disclosed a financing statement and a collateral assignment of rents recorded prior to the Barbers' mortgage.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller, enter a Final Order revoking the mortgage broker license issued to Dieter Kolberg and Diko Investments, Inc. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. APPENDIX Rulings on proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Petitioner: Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 are accepted. Paragraph 6 is accepted; however, Kolberg's interest when financing with funds he controlled was only on a temporary, interim basis. The activities were conducted with Diko to receive a commission, therefore requiring a license. Paragraphs 7-15 are accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 12, 13. Paragraphs 17-18 are accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 14, 18, 22. Paragraphs 19-27 are accepted. Paragraph 28 is rejected as immaterial and unnecessary. Paragraphs 29-42 are accepted. The detail of Petitioner's finding is unnecessary to the conclusions reached herein. Paragraphs 43-45 are accepted but unnecessary. Paragraph 46 is accepted. Paragraph 47 is rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Paragraphs 48-52 are accepted. Paragraph 53 is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 54 is accepted. Paragraph 55 is accepted to the extent found in findings of fact paragraphs 20, 21. Paragraphs 56-57 are accepted. Paragraph 58 is accepted to the extent addressed in finding of fact paragraph 21. Paragraphs 59-63 are accepted but unnecessary. Paragraphs 64-65 are accepted. Rulings on proposed Findings of Fact submitted by Respondents: Paragraph 1 is accepted. Those portions of paragraph 2 which set forth Respondent's dates of testing and licensure are accepted, the balance is rejected as an erroneous conclusions of law. Paragraph 3 is rejected as contrary to the weight ofevidence. Paragraph 4 is accepted but irrelevant to the issue. Paragraph 5 is rejected as the transaction was solicited with Kolberg's company, Diko, participating as a mortgage broker. Paragraph 6 is accepted but irrelevant to the issue. Paragraph 7 is rejected as contrary to the weight of theevidence and law. Paragraph 8 is accepted but does not mitigate, as a matter of law, Respondent's improper useage of the phrase. Paragraphs 9-11 are accepted; however the detail of thefindings is unnecessary and immaterial to the issues of thiscause. Paragraphs 12-14 are accepted to the extent addressed in findings of fact paragraphs 12, 13 the balance is rejected as unnecessary and immaterial. Paragraph 15 is rejected as unnecessary, relevant portions having previously been addressed. Paragraph 16 is accepted. Paragraph 17 is accepted but is unnecessary. Paragraph 18 is rejected to the extent it qualifies Barber as a "Sophisticated Investor." The record is clear Mr. Barber was experienced in the laws of France; however, he relied on Kolberg completely as to both transactions which took place in Palm Beach. Moreover, Mr. Barber's useage and understanding of the English language was suspect. He could hardly be considered a "sophisticated investor" in light of the total circumstances. Paragraph 19 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Paragraph 20 is accepted to the extent addressed in finding of fact paragraph 13, the balance is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Moreover, it is found that the only times of capacity occupancy (which were limited) were due to temporary, transient, undesirable tenants who may have directly affected the crime problem. Paragraph 21 is accepted. Paragraph 22 is rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraphs 23-24 are rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Paragraph 25 is accepted but is unnecessary. The crime problem was there prior to closing and was undisclosed to Barber. That it worsened after closing only assured the disclosure should have been made. Paragraphs 26-35 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. Many of the facts asserted here are based on testimony given by Kolberg. Respondents presume that testimony to be truthful, accurate, and candid. I found the opposite to be true. Paragraph 36 is accepted but does not mitigate Respondents' responsibilities to have completed the items at closing. Paragraph 37 is accepted with same proviso as above paragraph 36, ruling #22). Paragraphs 38-39 are rejected. See ruling #21. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41 is accepted but see findings of fact paragraph 21 as to Kolberg's useage of Ropet funds for personal expenses. Paragraphs 42-43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Lawrence S. Krieger, Esquire 111 Georgia Avenue, Suite 211 West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Keith A. Seldin, Esquire 1340 U.S. Highway #1, Suite 106 Jupiter, Florida 33469 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact FHFC administers the Multifamily Mortgage Revenue Bond Program (Bond Program) as set forth in Chapter 420, Part V, Florida Statutes, and related administrative rules. Worthwhile timely filed an application in the 1999 Bond Program cycle which was assigned number 99-040 to finance a development called Heritage Apartments in Collier County, Florida. FHFC initially deemed said application to be incomplete for the reasons set forth in a letter dated February 4, 1999. Worthwhile timely filed a Petition for Formal Hearing challenging FHFC's determination that application number 99-040 was incomplete, which Petition was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) and assigned Case No. 99-1518. Upon further review by FHFC and in consideration of the deposition testimony of FHFC representatives in this cause, the parties stipulate and agree that: Worthwhile's application number 99-040 was not incomplete as initially determined by FHFC; Worthwhile's application number 99-040 is complete and must now be further processed pursuant to appropriate rules and procedures; and If it qualifies after further processing, application number 99-040 is to be funded with the next uncommitted bond proceeds made available to FHFC for allocation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that FHFC enter a Final Order which finds and concludes that: Worthwhile's application number 99-040 was not incomplete as initially determined by FHFC; Worthwhile's application number 99-040 is complete and must now be further processed pursuant to appropriate rules and procedures; and If it qualifies after further processing, application number 99-040 is to be funded with the next uncommitted bond proceeds made available to FHFC for allocation. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: James C. Hauser, Esquire Skelding, Labasky, Corry, Hauser, Jolly & Metz, P.A. 318 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David A. Barrett, Esquire Barrett & Pelham, P.A. Post Office Box 930 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0930 Brad Baker, Executive Director Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Stephen M. Donelan, General Counsel Florida Housing Finance Corporation 227 North Bronough Street, Suite 5000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1329 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire Ausley & McMullen 227 South Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner’s application for licensure as a mortgage broker should be approved.
Findings Of Fact The parties set forth an extensive set of stipulated facts in the Prehearing Stipulation filed prior to the commencement of the hearing. The stipulated facts describe the activities of Richard Eric Watts (Petitioner) on behalf of Frederick M. Larry in relation to a $50,000 investment of Mr. Larry's funds with D. F. Owen, Inc., in May 1985. At approximately the same time as the Larry investment was made, the Petitioner contracted with D.F. Owen to act as an investment adviser for a fee of $33,500. The stipulated facts describe the activities of the Petitioner on behalf of Cynthia Halabrin Trust. The Petitioner was the trustee for the trust, which was a residence. During a period of time that the residence was under renovation, the Petitioner allowed Mr. Larry to reside without payment to the trust. The stipulated facts describe the activities of the Petitioner regarding the unregistered operation of "Watts Investment Management, Inc." during 1985 and the subsequent registration of the entity in 1986. The stipulated facts describe the activities of the Petitioner regarding his employment as a broker for Paine Webber from 1982-1985, and the failure to obtain approval for outside employment activities while working for the investment firm. The stipulated facts describe the legal action taken by Cynthia Halabrin Raybuck against the Petitioner and Paine Webber related to the activities of the Petitioner as trustee of the Halabrin trust. The parties settled the case through arbitration. The stipulated facts address the creation of "Danbury Mortgage Company," and describe the preliminary activities of the unlicensed entity. The facts also identify the Petitioner's association with the Paradigm Mortgage Company, based in Jacksonville, Florida. For purposes of this Recommended Order, all stipulated facts set forth in the prehearing stipulation filed by the parties are adopted and incorporated herein. On or about August 29, 1996, the Petitioner filed an application with the Department of Banking and Finance, Division of Finance (Department) seeking licensure as a mortgage broker. The Petitioner’s application disclosed that in 1989 he was denied admission to the Florida Bar. In January 1989, the Petitioner was notified by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners (“Board”) of their intent to deny his application for admission to the Florida Bar. A hearing was conducted in June 1989 regarding the denial. The Petitioner was represented by legal counsel and testified under oath at the hearing. On August 31, 1989, the Board of Bar Examiners denied Petitioner’s application for admission. Based on the facts set forth in the Board's order, the Board concluded that the Petitioner “engaged in acts to serve his own interest to the detriment of others, violated registration laws, neglected payment of student loan obligations and issued numerous worthless checks.” The Board also determined that the Petitioner provided misleading testimony at his Bar hearing and failed to disclose material information on his application. Although at the formal administrative hearing the Petitioner attempted to explain the circumstances under which the Board's determination occurred, the testimony at hearing and the stipulated facts support the findings made by the Board. Upon the filing of the Petitioner's application for licensure as a mortgage broker, the Department undertook a review of the application. Based on the review, the Department determined that the Petitioner had held himself out for business as a mortgage broker without an appropriate license. In December 1995, the Petitioner registered the name "Danbury Mortgage Corporation" with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations. In January 1996, the Petitioner established a business location for Danbury Mortgage Corporation. The Petitioner listed the business under the "mortgage brokers" section of the Sarasota Yellow Pages. At no time was the Danbury Mortgage Company licensed by the Department of Banking and Finance. At the hearing, the Petitioner suggested that no mortgage business had been conducted by Danbury Mortgage Company. The Petitioner asserted that he had affiliated with another company (Paradigm) and that the other company was handling the registration of his office as a Paradigm branch. The evidence establishes that the Petitioner was involved in completion of at least one mortgage loan application on behalf of Paradigm Mortgage Company without appropriate licensure. The Paradigm "branch" office was located in the same building as Danbury Mortgage Company, and shared the Danbury telephone number. Based on a cryptic telephone message received by the Petitioner from a Paradigm supervisor, the Petitioner assumed that he was licensed. The Petitioner did not return the telephone call and made no credible attempt at determining whether he was licensed prior to acting on behalf of Paradigm Mortgage Company.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department enter a Final Order denying the application of Richard Eric Watts for licensure as a mortgage broker. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _ _ WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Hooper, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Richard E. Watts, pro se 1345 Main Street, Suite C-4 Sarasota, Florida 34236 Pamela R. Jacobs, Esquire Regional Counsel Department of Banking and Finance 1300 Riverplace Blvd, Suite 640 Jacksonville, Florida 32207
Findings Of Fact At the time of CMNI's application, Mr. Giunta was president of CMNI and, as such, exercised primary control over the day-to-day activities of CMNI (Tr.12). Mr. Giunta is also the president of Christian Investors Network, Inc. (CINI), and exercised similar control over the activities of that corporation (Tr. 11-12). Mr. Giunta, CMNI, and CINI have never been licensed as mortgage brokers by the Department (Tr. 12-13). CINI, with the knowledge and approval of Mr. Giunta, placed advertisements in the St. Petersburg Times (Tr. 13). One such advertisement appeared in St. Petersburg Times edition of April 20, 1986, under the heading "Loan Information." That advertisement stated "Major Real Estate Financing" and "Residential Real Estate." (Exhibit 1). Sometime in the middle of 1986, Paul Mark called Mr. Giunta in response to an advertisement in the St. Petersburg Times. Mr. Mark was seeking a mortgage loan or loans to build several houses on real estate he owned and so informed Mr. Giunta, who indicated to Mr. Mark that he could arrange a mortgage loan for Mr. Mark (Tr. 28-29). Messrs. Mark and Giunta met shortly after the telephone call. Mr. Mark handed Mr. Giunta a package of documents including a site plan, survey, credit information and a completed mortgage loan application. Mr. Giunta again stated that he would have no problem arranging a mortgage loan for Mr. Mark and requested a fee for such service in the amount of $300.00 (Tr. 30-31). After the meeting, Mr. Mark sent to Mr. Giunta a check made out to Mr. Giunta in the amount of $300.00, together with a letter dated July 16, 1986, confirming that Mr. Giunta would secure mortgage financing (Tr. 31-33); Exhibit 3). In October of 1986, Clifford Clark called Mr. Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a mortgage loan to refinance a certain parcel of property owned by Mr. Clark. Mr. Giunta stated that he could arrange mortgage financing for Mr. Clark at an interest rate of approximately ten percent (Tr. 48-49). After the telephone contact, Messrs. Clark and Giunta met and Mr. Giunta had Mr. Clark fill out a residential loan application (Exhibit 7). Mr. Clark provided Mr. Giunta with originals of his deed to the property and other real estate related documents. Mr. Giunta indicated that he could obtain mortgage financing for Mr. Clark and requested a fee of $250.00, whereupon Mr. Clark gave Mr. Giunta a check for that amount (Tr. 49-51). In early 1986, Robert Miraglia called Mr. Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a second mortgage. Mr. Giunta arranged to meet with Mr. Miraglia to discuss the requested loan. In August of 1986, Russell Foreman contacted Gerald Giunta in response to a newspaper advertisement, seeking a mortgage loan to refinance his home (Exhibit 5). On August 26, 1986, Mr. Foreman met with Mr. Giunta and at Mr. Giunta's request gave him copies of his deed, a survey of the lot, the mortgages to be satisfied and other real estate related documents. Mr. Giunta assured Mr. Foreman that there would be no problem in obtaining a mortgage loan and requested a fee of $200.00. Mr. Foreman wrote a check for that amount and gave it to Mr. Giunta (Exhibit 5). Mr. Giunta never informed Messrs. Mark, Clark, Miraglia and Foreman that he was not a licensed mortgage broker. In approximately April of 1986, Mr. Giunta met with Mr. Arthur M. James, Area Financial Manager for the Department's Tampa Regional Field Office. At that meeting, Mr. James explained to Mr. Giunta that he could not offer to arrange or negotiate mortgage loans on behalf of clients and collect a fee for such service without first becoming licensed by the Department as a mortgage broker (Tr. 84). At some point prior to May 8, 1986, Mr. Giunta was contacted by the Department and informed of the statutes and regulations applicable to advertising his services in the area of real estate financing (Exhibit 2; Tr. 23-24). At some point in 1987, CMNI, with the knowledge and approval of Giunta, listed "Christian Mortgage Network, Inc." in the yellow pages of a local telephone book under the heading of "Mortgages." (Exhibit 1; Tr. 15).
Findings Of Fact During 1984 Philip Dennis on his own behalf and on behalf of Medi Fund Inc. negotiated in Florida with William Kickliter for the purpose of arranging a mortgage loan. During those negotiations Respondent Dennis represented to Kickliter that both he and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. In his stated capacity as a mortgage broker, Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Kickliter whereby Kickliter would obtain a mortgage loan from Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., for financing an ongoing business. Respondent Dennis signed the agreement between Kickliter and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., pursuant to which Kickliter gave to Respondent Dennis a refundable advance fee of $1,500 by check made payable to Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. No mortgage loan was ever consummated. When Kickliter made demand on Respondent Dennis for the return of his monies, Respondent Dennis sent to Kickliter a post-dated check for only $850 with a notation on that check that it was allegedly for full payment of the refundable advance fee. When Kickliter deposited that check, the check "bounced." Respondent Dennis then stopped payment on the check. Kickliter's refundable advance fee has never been refunded to him by either Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund, Inc. In 1983 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Robert N. Goldstein to secure financing so that Goldstein's company Hospitality Consultants, Inc., could acquire a hotel. Respondent Dennis drafted and presented to Goldstein and Goldstein's partner Thomas Palumbo an agreement between Respondent Dennis and Hospitality Consultants, Inc., whereby Respondent Dennis would seek mortgage funding for the corporation. In that agreement Respondent Dennis designated himself as "the broker", a designation which matched his oral representations to Goldstein that he was a mortgage broker licensed in the State of Florida. Respondent Dennis executed that agreement on March 11, 1983, on his own behalf. In 1985 Respondent Dennis negotiated in Florida with Bryan Miller of Deco Redevelopment Corp. to secure real estate mortgage loan financing for hotels located in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., drafted an agreement whereby Respondent Medi Funds Inc. would secure financing for real estate renovation and new construction of a hotel complex to be built in Miami Beach. Respondent Dennis entered into that agreement on behalf of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. Pursuant to, that agreement, Miller paid to Respondent Dennis on behalf of Respondent Medi Funds Inc., the sum of $5,000 as a refundable advance fee. Neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Funds Inc. has arranged any mortgage loan to Deco Redevelopment Corp. Furthers the $5,090 Refundable advance fee paid to Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund Inc. has never been refunded. In 1985 Respondent Dennis while in Florida negotiated with Millie Bulkeley of Arizona for mortgage loan financing for a mobile home park in Arizona. Thereafter Respondent Dennis drafted and entered into an agreement with Bulkeley whereby Respondent Medi Fund Inc., would secure real estate financing for her. Pursuant to that agreement Bulkeley deposited into Respondent Dennis's bank account in New York $20,000 as a refundable advance fee. No financing was ever secured for the project by Respondent Dennis or Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and the refundable advance fee has never been refunded. During 1983, 1984, and 1985 Respondent Dennis represented himself as being an officer of Respondent Medi Fund Inc. and misrepresented to persons both orally and in writing that both Respondent Dennis and Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., were mortgage brokers licensed by the State of Florida. During the time period of December 1982 up to and including May 2, 1986, neither Respondent Dennis nor Respondent Medi Fund, Inc., has been a licensed mortgage broker. By Order entered April 16, 1986, in this cause Petitioner was awarded certain costs against Respondent Medi Funds Inc., as a result of Medi Fund, Inc.'s, refusal to engage in discovery. Those reasonable costs are $45 for the attendance of the court reporter, $318.10 for the travel expense incurred by Petitioner's attorney, and $1,275 as an attorney's fee for Petitioner's attorney. The Order of April 16, 1986, also required Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to return to Petitioner the witness fee and mileage fee paid to it before its non-appearance at its scheduled deposition.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondents Philip Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc., guilty of the allegations contained within the Cease and Desist Order filed herein ordering Respondents Dennis and Medi Fund, Inc. to forthwith and immediately cease and desist from any further violations of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, requiring Medi Funds Inc. to return to the State of Florida the witness fee and mileage paid to it pursuant to the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein and requiring Respondent Medi Funds Inc. to pay to the State of Florida the sum of $1,638.10, as further required by the April 16, 1986 Order entered herein. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 29th day of August 1986 at Tallahassee Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald Lewis, Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Deborah Hoffman, Esquire Thomas E. Glick Esquire Office of Comptroller 401 N.W. 2nd Avenue, Suite 870 Miami Florida 33128 Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Medi Funds Inc., a Florida Corporation c/o Philip Dennis 2124 Northeast 167 Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160
The Issue Whether the license of Respondent should be suspended for violation of the Mortgage Brokerage Act, Chapter 494, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Irving Zimmerman holds Mortgage Brokerage Registration No. 90-3337. An Order of Emergency Suspension of License was issued by the Department of Banking and Finance dated March 24, 1975 and served on Respondent Irving Zimmerman by certified mail. Said Emergency Order is now in effect: Through his attorney, Milton R. Wasman, Respondent Zimmerman requested this formal administrative hearing. The attorney for Respondent, Mr. Milton R. Wasman, called the undersigned Hearing Officer on the day immediately preceding this hearing, that is June 23, 1975, requesting that the hearing be postponed because of a physical disability of said attorney. Said request was denied because of the late hour of request and because of grievous inconvenience to the parties and to the witnesses that had been subpoenaed. Said request was denied orally by telephone to Respondent's attorney whereupon said attorney requested that the transcript of the proceeding be made available. Said attorney was assured that he could view the transcript upon his request when it was available. Upon request of William Corbett, Counsel for the agency, authorization was given to take the deposition of witness Joseph M. Magill, a witness who could not attend the hearing. Said deposition is filed with this record. The attorney for Respondent Zimmerman, Mr. Wasman appeared in behalf of the Respondent at the taking of said deposition in Miami, Florida on July 18, 1975. The following instruments were made part of the record: Summons dated March 24, 1975; Order of Emergency Suspension of License filed March 24, 1975; Petition for Hearing filed by Respondent's attorney; Deposition of witness for the agency, Mr. Joseph M. Magill; Transcript of record of this hearing and also transcript of record at the taking of deposition. On or about July 10, 1974, Mr. Leonard G. Pardue issued a check in the amount of $7,500 payable to "State Farm Mortgage Co., escrow account" for the purpose of making a mortgage loan to Hans G. and Ann M. Widenhauser. Subsequently, after the Widenhausers decided not to make this loan, the Respondent contacted Mr. Pardue and attempted to negotiate a substitute loan to Alan and Marcia Hollet. After that loan did not close, Mr. Pardue, by his attorney, Mr. Roger G. Welcher, wrote several letters to Respondent which demanded a return of the $7,500 to his client. Mr. Pardue filed a civil suit against Respondent to recover said funds; however, as of the date of the hearing, the Respondent has failed or refused to return the money. Mr. Bernard Supworth made a mortgage loan to Robert E. and Madeline Pope in June of 1972, through the Respondent as broker. The monthly payments were made to Respondent who in turn was supposed to remit the funds to Mr. Supworth. Subsequently, on or about January 25, 1974, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth that the mortgage was being paid off and Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction thereof to Respondent. Later, Mr. Supworth learned that the Pope mortgage had been paid off in July, 1973, and that a check had been issued by Dade Federal and Savings & Loan Association on July 9, 1973, payable to State Farm Mortgage in the amount of $3,544.98. Notwithstanding such payment in full on the Pope mortgage in July, 1973, Respondent continued to remit monthly payments on it to Mr. Supworth. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to receive any monthly payments after the mortgage had been satisfied and to date has not received all of his money on the Pope transaction. Respondent Zimmerman negotiated another mortgage loan to Mr. Supworth to James and Phyllis Lowe, as borrowers in the amount of $4,600 to be paid in the amount of $97.74 per month. These payments were to be paid by the Lowes to the Respondent, who was to remit said payment to Mr. Supworth. Thereafter, on or about November 21, 1973, Respondent advised Mr. Supworth, by memorandum, that this mortgage must be paid off. Thereupon, Mr. Supworth executed and delivered a Satisfaction of Mortgage to Respondent. He continued to receive monthly payments from Respondent on the Lowe mortgage up until January, 1975. Mr. Supworth later learned that the Lowe mortgage had been paid in full to Respondent in October, 1973. Mr. Supworth had not agreed to this transaction. On or about August 15, 1973, Mrs. Judith Valenza made a mortgage loan at the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Later Mrs. Valenza negotiated a mortgage loan through Respondent, as broker, to pay off the existing mortgage to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. Pursuant to that transaction, Mrs. Valenza closed said loan through Respondent, as broker. Thereafter, a check was issued on "Irving Zimmerman Trust Account" in the amount of $3,510.78, and payable to the Commercial Bank of Kendall. The check was returned because of "insufficient funds". As of the date of the hearing, the Commercial Bank of Kendall had not received payment of said check from Respondent. On or about January 28, 1975, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph M. Magill executed a note and mortgage in the amount of $3,500 in favor or Helen R. Stahl, as trustee, at the offices of Respondent. Respondent failed to account for or deliver money to the person entitled thereto, on demand failed to disburse funds in accordance with the agreement, and failed to keep funds in a trust account.
Findings Of Fact The facts which the Department asked Respondents to admit by Petitioner's Second Request for Admissions (Pet. Ex. 3) and Paragraphs 1-32 and each odd-numbered paragraph from 33-117, inclusive, of Petitioner's First Request for Admissions (Pet. Ex. 2) are conclusively established. Rather than recite all of those undisputed facts as findings, this Recommended Order will summarize those facts as necessary and make additional findings on the relatively few disputed issues of fact which were raised during the final hearing. The Financial Transactions Between February 1, 1980, and October 31, 1982, Davide, Inc., brokered 43 real estate mortgage loans which consisted of a wraparound second mortgage securing a promissory note in an amount equal to (1) the amount of "new money actually advanced to the borrower out of the wraparound mortgagee's pocket, plus the amount of the principal balance remaining on the first mortgage. There was no evidence how the interest rate on any of the 43 wraparound mortgage loans compared to the interest rate on the corresponding first mortgage loan. All 43 loans included, as an addendum to the wrap- around mortgage, the following agreements between the wrap- around mortgagee and the borrower: Mortgagor shall pay the taxes and insurance deposits required by Senior Mortgagee. The Mortgagor shall comply with all of the terms and provisions of the Senior Mortgage other than with respect to the payments of the principal and interest due. If the Mortgagor shall fail to so comply with all of the terms, provisions and conditions of the Senior Mortgage so as to result in a default under it (other than with respect to pay ments due upon the note secured by the Senior Mortgage) that failure on the part of the Mortgagor shall constitute a default under this mortgage and shall entitle the Mortgagee, at its option, to exercise any and all rights and remedies given the Mortgagee in the event of a default under this Mortgage. The Mortgagee agrees to pay to the holder of the Senior Mortgage the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage together with all interest accruing under it as and when required by the terms of the Senior Mortgage; therefore, by paying the constant monthly installments each provided to be paid from the date of funding this mortgage to and including the date the Note secured hereby becomes due at which time the Mortgagee's payment obligation shall terminate. At such time of termina tlon of the Mortgagee's obligation, the balloon balance due upon [sic] the Note secured hereby shall be credited for an amount aggregating the principal then owing upon the Senior Mortgage plus all sums which were paid as principal to the Senior Mortgage by the Mortgagee. All those payments provided to be paid by the Mortgagee pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3 above shall be made by the Mortgagee before the expira tion of the applicable grace periods provided for those payments as contained in the Senior Mortgage. The Mortgagee does not assume any of the obligations of the Mortgagor under the Senior Mortgage except as provided above with respect to principal and interest payments due after this mortgage has been funded. If the Mortgagee shall default in making any required payment of principal or interest under the Senior Mortgage, the Mortgagor shall have the right to advance the funds necessary to cure that default and all funds so advanced by the Mortgagor, together with interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum shall be credited against the next installment(s) of interest and prin cipal due under the Note secured by the mortgage. The Mortgagor and the Mortgagee covenant and agree not to enter into any agreement with the holder of the Senior Mortgage modifying or amending any of the provisions dealing with payment of princi pal or interest under the Senior Mortgage without the prior written consent of the other. All 43 loans are short-term loans which are designed, by their terms, to become due before the first mortgages were, by their payment terms, to be paid in full. The loan application statements and closing statements related to each of the 43 wraparound mortgage loans show the first mortgage balance as, respectively, part of the amount of the loan and part of the disbursements to the borrowers. But both make clear that those items which refer to the amount of the balance on the first mortgage which the wraparound mortgagee agreed, in the addendum, to pay during the life of the wraparound mortgage. The first mortgage balances were not paid off by the wraparound mortgagee, nor was cash in the amount of the first mortgage balance disbursed to the borrower out of the wraparound mortgagee s pocket. In each of the 43 wraparound mortgage loans, the mortgage brokerage fee or commission would exceed the maximum allowable by law if computed only on the "new money," but would not exceed the maximum allowable by law if computed on the total face amount of the promissory note secured by the wraparound mortgage. If they were excessive fees, the total amount of the excess would be $22,508.29, and the Department's report of examination (Pet. Ex. 1) would identify the amount of the excess that should be refunded to each borrower. Finally, the mortgage brokerage fee actually charged on each of the 43 loans much more closely approximates what would be the maximum fee if computed on "new money" than what would be the maximum fee if computed on the face amount of the promissory note secured by the wraparound mortgage. B. The Department's Actions The Department apparently has not had the occasion to apply the law, which is now codified as Section 494.08(3), Florida Statutes (1983), and the Department's rules promulgated under it, to precisely the financial transactions shown by the evidence in this case. But since at least 1973, the Department consistently has interpreted the law and rules in various cases involving wraparound mortgages as requiring the maximum mortgage brokerage commission or fee to be computed on the new money" rather than on the total amount of the promissory note secured by the wraparound mortgage. In 1979, the Department considered two similar financial transactions: One was a specific refinancing wraparound second mortgage in which the wraparound mortgagee was obligated to make payments due on the first mortgage "out of sums paid hereunder"; the other was the generic purchase money wraparound second mortgage transaction in which the seller/wraparound mortgagee remains liable on the first mortgage. The Department concluded that, in both cases, the maximum fee should be computed on the "new money." The conclusion in the latter case was based upon the complete absence of any assumption by the wraparound mortgagee of a preexisting indebtedness of the borrower on the first mortgage. In the case of a purchase money wrap- round second mortgage, the wraparound mortgagee always was and simply remains liable on the first mortgage. The conclusion in the former case is based upon a determination: (1) that the wraparound mortgagee's assumption of the obligation to pay the first mortgage was not unconditional, but rather was conditioned upon the wrap- around mortgagee's receipt of payments on the wraparound mortgage; and (2) that the first mortgagee acquired no cause of action against the wraparound mortgagee. The Department acknowledged at the time that its interpretation was based upon the two sets of facts under consideration and that the Department was not foreclosing the possibility of reaching the opposite conclusion on other sets of facts. In recent years, Department personnel consistently have advised mortgage brokers of its position regarding computation of maximum fees on wraparound mortgage loans, as summarized above. Department personnel have on occasion attended meetings of Florida mortgage brokers in Miami and elsewhere in which the subject has been discussed and the Department's position publicly stated. There is no evidence whether Davide or any representative of Davide, Inc., attended any of those meetings or became aware of the Department's position before June, 1982. Although Davide attended the final hearing, he did not testify. In June, 1982, the Department and Respondents began communications regarding the maximum brokerage commission or fee on wraparound mortgage loans. The Department advised Respondents that it believed the maximum fee should be computed on the "new money." C. Respondents' Response Since approximately May 5, 1981, Respondent had relied on advice of counsel that the maximum mortgage brokerage commission or fee should be computed on the entire face amount of a wraparound mortgage. Counsel qualified his opinion, acknowledging that there was no judicial construction of the statute and that his interpretation could be wrong. Counsel's opinion did not mention, and apparently did not even consider, any Department rule interpreting the statute. Rather, the opinion was based primarily upon counsel's assessment that any other interpretation of the statute would render it unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous. On or about September 27, 1982, Respondents' counsel wrote a letter to the Department and seemed to agree that Respondents would conduct an audit and refund any excess fees charged on the wraparound mortgages. The Department completed its audit on December 3, 1982, and sent Respondents a copy on December 13, 1982. The audit specified alleged excess fees charged on the 43 wrap- around mortgages and on seven straight" mortgages. (Pet. Ex. 1) Respondents' counsel responded by January 10, 1983, letter, again seeming to indicate that Respondents agreed to refund excess fees "as applicable." But by January 20, 1983, letter, Respondents' counsel again wrote the Department to advise that Respondents would refund excess fees on the seven "straight" mortgages, but not on the 43 wraparound mortgages. Based on the above facts, I find that the Department did not mislead Respondents concerning the Department's position. Specifically, Respondents were not misled by the erroneous reference in Rule 3D-40.00(3), Florida Administrative Code, to Section 494.08(4), instead of Section 484.08(3), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED THAT: Petitioner, Department of Banking and Finance, enter a final order requiring Respondents, Davide & Associates, Inc., and Salvatore G. Davide, to refund to each of the first 43 borrowers identified in the report of examination (Pet. Ex. 1) as "Mortgagor(s)" the amounts identified therein as "Overcharge" to the borrower. RECOMMENDED this 5th day of March, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Walter W. Wood, Esquire Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Herman T. Isis, Esquire Post Office Box 144567 Coral Gables, Florida 33114 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of March, 1984.
The Issue Whether Respondent discriminated against Petitioner on the basis of his age and handicap in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act of 1977 and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Harold Asher (Asher), was born on January 13, 1929, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 63 years old. Respondent, Barnett Banks, Inc. (BBI), is a holding company that owns and controls numerous banks in Florida and Georgia. The banks in Florida owned by BBI are located in three geographical regions: the north region, the central region, and the south region. In the south region there are nine banks: Barnett Bank of Key West, Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami), Barnett Bank of Broward (Fort Lauderdale), Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Barnett Bank of Martin County, Barnett Bank of Treasure Coast, Barnett Bank of Lake Okeechobee, Barnett Bank of Naples, and Barnett Bank of Lee County (Fort Myers). Each bank has branches. Barnett Banks, Inc. is an employer subject to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes. Harold Asher was hired by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County in 1983, at the age of 54 as a loan review officer and was later promoted to Vice President/Loan Review. His job responsibility was to review loans which had been granted by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. A loan review is an evaluation of the portfolio after a loan is made to insure that the loan was properly approved, that the analysis done to support the sources of repayment was adequate, that the loan is collectible, that the risk factors associated with the loan is in line with policy and regulatory standards, and that the loan is properly underwritten. The loan review is memorialized on a line or summary sheet. While employed by Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher had several supervisors, including Ken Parrish, Art Kite, James Kammert, Noel Coan, and Martin Streischek. Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County used a rating system of one to five in evaluating its employees, which equated as follows: 1.0 to 1.49 means fails to meet minimum position accountabilities; 1.5 to 2.49 means with few exceptions, meets position accountabilities; 2.5 to 3.49 means meets position accountabilities; 3.5 to 4.49 means exceeds position accountabilities; and 4.5 to 5.0 means significantly exceeds position accountabilities. In March, 1988, James Kammert rated Asher's performance as 3.0. On January 1, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher's performance for 1988 as 3.70. In June, 1989, Art Kite rated Asher as meeting or exceeding in the key result areas (KRAs) of Asher's position. On January 1, 1990, Art Kite performed an evaluation of Asher's performance for 1989 and rated him 3.45. On January 18, 1991, Neal Coan rated Asher's performance for 1990 as 3.0. While working for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, Asher was never disciplined. Prior to 1991, BBI and its banks had a dual system for loan reviews. Some of the banks such as Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, had set up loan review sections which operated at the bank level only. The staff of these sections would report directly to the bank. BBI had a loan review section for each of its regions. The BBI regional loan review sections would review loans in each of the banks located in that particular region. In January, 1991 a decision was made by BBI to consolidate the loan reviews at the holding company level. On-site teams were established in Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and Palm Beach. A travel team reviewed loans at all the banks including the banks which had on-site teams. As a result of the consolidation, the local banks eliminated their loan review departments and the staff comprising those particular departments were terminated from their positions. At the time of the decision to consolidate, Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County's loan review section consisted of one secretary and three loan officers, one of whom was Asher. The three loan officers interviewed for positions with BBI. Asher and Steven Clapp were hired by BBI. Asher was 61 years of age when he was hired by BBI on January 1, 1991, as the on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. His office was located on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. Part of Asher's duties included supervising Mr. Clapp. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at Barnett Bank of South Florida (Miami) was Barry Goldberg, who was born on September 24, 1962. The BBI on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Broward County was Mark Tavoletti, who was born on December 19, 1961. Although the same methods were used to review loans for BBI as were used to review loans for Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County, there were some changes. Computers were used more at BBI. Instead of traveling to the 45 branches of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach to review loans, Asher received the files through the interoffice mail. BBI loan reviews focused more on a loan instead of the work of the loan officer. Monthly reports were required by BBI. BBI report formats differed from those of Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County. Asher no longer selected the loans to be reviewed. BBI selected the loans using specific criteria established by BBI. Asher reported to Scott Bechtle. While working with Mr. Bechtle, Asher did not receive any criticism or disciplinary action. In July, 1991, Edward Angulo (Angulo) took over Mr. Bechtle's position as the Regional Credit Review Director for the south region. Asher, Mr. Goldberg, and Mr. Tavoletti began reporting to Angulo. Angulo's primary duty was to review the line sheets that were generated by the on-site groups and the travel team. From July, 1991 to the end of December, 1991, Angulo met with Asher approximately three to five times and talked with Asher numerous times on the telephone. Angulo reviewed all the line sheets that were generated by Asher and Clapp during that six-month period. In reviewing the work done by the Palm Beach on-site group, Angulo noted that generally the line sheets did not have sufficient quantifiable information, did not contain information supported by an independent evaluation, and contained deficiencies regarding underwriting. He would make comments concerning these problems and call Asher to discuss them. Some times Asher would not provide additional information requested by Angulo or would provide it in an unsatisfactory manner. During the last six months in 1991, Angulo spent more time in connection with the Palm Beach loan reviews than he did with the other loan review teams because of the problems the Palm Beach team was having. Angulo sat in with Asher during an exit meeting with bank management wherein Asher appeared indecisive and unprepared, forcing Angulo to take over and conduct the meeting in its entirety. Angulo completed a performance evaluation on Asher for the period 1/91 to 12/91. Asher was evaluated on nine KRAs: 1) supervise staff, 2) analyze specific loans, 3) determine quality of credit analyses, 4) evaluate underwriting standards, 5) insure accuracy of CSS, 6) evaluate overall credit administration, 7) evaluate loan approval process, 8) prepare reports and exit meetings, and 9) train junior officers. Each KRA was weighted and rated on a scale of one to five, with one being the lowest rating and five being the highest. For KRAs 1, 5, and 9, Asher was rated as 3, which meant that his performance met expectations. For KRAs 2, 3, 7, and 8, Asher received a rating of 2, which stood for approaches expectations. In the KRA concerning evaluating underwriting standards, Asher received a rating of 1, which meant that Asher's performance failed to meet expectations. Angulo noted on the evaluation that Asher needed to improve his performance in the following areas: technical/analytical, independent/inquisitive attitudes, and judgement/decisiveness. Asher's total weighted rating was 2.25, which equates to an overall rating of 2. At the time of the evaluation, Asher and Angulo understood that Asher's position was a Review Officer III. Asher had been performing the work of a Review Officer III. Accordingly, Angulo evaluated his work using the standards for Review Officer III, and evaluated the work actually performed by Asher. However, at the hearing it was revealed that Asher had been a Review Officer II at the time of his employment with BBI and held that position until his termination. On or about April 1, 1992, Angulo met with Asher and discussed Asher's performance since January, 1992. Angulo cited a problem that had occurred concerning a review of Southside Investors which had been done by Asher's subordinate, Steven Clapp. Angulo had discussed with Asher several inconsistencies or omissions in the report relating to potential underwriting problems and asked Asher to have the deficiencies cleared up. As of April 1, 1992, the deficiencies had not been resolved. Angulo also discussed with Asher problems dealing with the adequacy of supervision of report preparation and the conduct of exit meetings with bank management. Deficiencies in these areas had been pointed out in Asher's 1991 annual performance evaluation. Since that evaluation, a monthly report by Steven Clapp had to be amended because of his erroneous conclusion that the bank's overall underwriting and lending practices were inadequate. The incorrect finding was not corrected until a draft of the report was reviewed by the regional office. As the on-site manager, Asher should have reviewed Mr. Clapp's report and caught the error before it was sent to the regional office. Angulo also pointed out to Asher that his performance at exit meetings with bank management still lacked decisiveness, resulting in the need for frequent changes in reports. As a result of the continued deficiencies in Asher's performance since his 1991 performance evaluation, Angulo felt that Asher needed technical training, improvement in supervisory skills, and familiarization with BBI policies and procedures. To assist Asher in reaching an acceptable level of performance, Asher was moved from his on-site manager position to Barnett Banks, Inc.'s Credit Review Office travel team on or about April 1, 1992. There was no decrease in salary, benefits, or pay grade. Additionally, Asher was placed on a 90-day probationary period. In mid-April, 1992, Asher wrote Ken Veniard, a Senior Vice President, stating that he disagreed with Angulo's evaluation and felt that the negative comments were "based on factors totally unrelated to performance, such as age, personality, or simply the lack of complete information." Asher requested to be considered for a transfer. Veniard received the memorandum on April 29, 1992. On or about April 1, 1992, Jack Shoben, a credit review officer with BBI since 1989, was moved into the position of on-site manager for Credit Quality Review at the Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County at the Datura Street location. Jack Shoben was born on October 1, 1947, and as of April 1, 1992, he was 44 years old. Angulo chose Shoben as the on-site manager because of Mr. Shoben's qualifications and experience. After Mr. Shoben became on-site manager, the work product from the on-site team at Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County began to improve; thus Angulo did not have to spend as much time on the Palm Beach site as he had when Asher was on-site manager. William Westland, who was born on October 26, 1927, was Asher's supervisor on the travel team. During Asher's first two weeks on the travel team, he worked in Broward County. His performance was satisfactory. The third week on the travel team was spent in Miami, where Asher was required to review real estate loans. Mr. Westland noted that Asher needed some training in the real estate loan area. On May 10, 1992, shortly after Asher returned from Miami, he suffered a brain seizure and was hospitalized for two days. Six weeks after his seizure, Asher returned to work. As a result of Asher's seizure, his doctors prohibited Asher from driving for at least six months and possibly longer and required his work-related travel to be kept to an absolute minimum, which included avoiding long travel trips of any type. An essential requirement for the position that Asher held on the travel team was that he be able to travel to the different banks in the south region to conduct loan reviews. Asher was aware that extensive travel was a requirement of his job and so advised his doctor by letter dated July 3, 1992. When Asher returned to work, he was temporarily placed on the on-site review team at Palm Beach under the supervision of Jack Shoben. Steven Clapp who had been at Palm Beach on the on-site review team was transferred to the travel team. Asher's probationary period was extended to August 7, 1992. The temporary placement was to accommodate Asher's non-travel status until December 31, 1992, and after such time Asher's continued employment was contingent upon his satisfactory completion of the probationary period and his ability to meet the requirements of all credit review officers of his level, which included travel. During June 1992 until Mr. Asher's termination, Jeff Asher, his son, often drove Asher to Barnett Bank's offices on Datura Street in West Palm Beach. He also drove him home from that location during the same time. Jeff Asher also drove Asher to and from branch locations within Palm Beach County during the same period. A memorandum dated July 28, 1992, was sent from Ken Veniard, Angulo's supervisor, to BBI Credit Quality Staff, stating that although BBI was committed to maintain the on-site loan review teams, that all on-site staff would be required to travel and assist the travel team as necessary. On August 7, 1992, Asher's probationary period lapsed. There was no evaluation of Asher's performance at that time. In August, 1992, Steven Clapp was transferred to the BBI office in Jacksonville to fill a position for which he had posted. The position on the travel team that Mr. Clapp had filled in Asher's absence was held open for Asher in the event that his travel restrictions would be lifted in January, 1993, thereby enabling him to return to his position on the travel. In November, 1992, Asher, Sarah Ketchum, Jack Shoben, and Angulo participated in a teleconference, at which time Angulo advised Asher that if Asher's doctor did not approve a full time travel schedule in January, 1993, Asher's employment with BBI would be terminated effective as of December 31, 1992. On December 28, 1992, Asher visited his doctor, who continued the travel restrictions. On December 30, 1992, Asher, Jack Shoben, Joan Slaughenhaupt, and Angulo participated in a teleconference. Asher stated that his travel restrictions had not changed. Angulo advised Asher that his employment would be terminated effective December 31 due to his inability to travel. Mr. Asher's employment ended on December 31, 1992. On January 1, 1992, the on-site teams in Miami and Fort Lauderdale were each reduced from three to two on-site personnel. The Palm Beach on-site team was reduced to one one-site person, Jack Shoben, who was the only loan review officer there from January 1, 1993 to December 31, 1993. In January, 1994, all on-site positions were eliminated. Mr. Asher's salary at the time of his termination was $47,339.96 annually. In the spring of 1993, Asher and his wife went to Huntsville, Alabama, traveling by automobile two days each way. In June, 1993, all Asher's travel restrictions were lifted. Prior to his driving restrictions being lifted, Asher began driving short distances in his neighborhood. In January, 1994, BBI made an offer of reinstatement to Asher, whereby he would have been reinstated as a Credit Review Officer II on the regional travel team with the same salary, same seniority, and same salary grade level as when he was terminated on December 31, 1992. In addition, a procedure was implemented whereby Asher could report directly to Janice Gurny, Director of Human Resources for BBI in the Jacksonville office, any complaints regarding harassment on the part of his supervisors. Asher received the offer but did not contact anyone at BBI regarding the offer of reinstatement. Asher did not take the offer because it was a Credit Review Officer II position (he was under the impression he was a Credit Review Officer III at the time of his termination); he felt the environment was hostile; and he had his house on the market to sell.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order denying the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1994, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-5815 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraphs 3: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The second sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The third sentence is accepted to the extent that Petitioner received two letters which advised him of his increase in salary and thanked him for his hard work and professionalism and advised him that the bank was glad that he was on the team. Paragraph 4: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 5: The first three sentences are accepted in substance. The last sentence is accepted to the extent that the methods to review loans were basically the same but rejected to the extent that the only changes were in the format of the loan review reporting process. Paragraphs 6-7: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 8: The third, fourth, and fifth sentences are rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 10-11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: The last sentence is rejected to the extent that it implies that Asher was rated on work for which he was not performing. He was doing the job of a level III but his personnel file reflected that he officially was placed in a level II position. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 14-16: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 17: The first sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 18: The first, second, sixth, and tenth sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The third, fourth, fifth, eighth and ninth sentences are accepted in substance except as to the reference to the placement on the travel team as a demotion. The seventh sentence is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The second sentence is accepted. The last sentence is rejected as recitation of testimony. Paragraphs 20-23: Rejected as recitation of testimony and constituting argument. Paragraph 24: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 25: The first, second, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The fifth, sixth, and seventh sentences are rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The eight sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The ninth sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence in that the charge against Asher was his failure to catch Mr. Clapp's errors before the report left the Palm Beach office. The last sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 26: The first sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. The second sentence is rejected as not supported by any evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first, third, and fourth sentences are accepted in substance. The second and fifth sentences are rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 30: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 31: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 32: Rejected as mere recitation of testimony. Paragraph 33: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 34: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 35: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 36: The first and second sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 37: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 38: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 39: Rejected as constituting argument. Paragraph 40: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 41: Accepted. Paragraphs 42: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 43: The first sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence as it applies to the time period from June, 1992 to June, 1993. The second sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 44: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraphs 2-13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 13: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 14: The first sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as constituting argument. Paragraphs 17-18: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 19: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraph 20: The first sentence is accepted. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as unnecessary. Paragraphs 21: The sixth sentence is rejected as constituting argument. The remainder of the paragraph is accepted in substance. Paragraphs 22-24: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 25: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The third sentence is rejected as not supported by the greater weight of the evidence. The remainder of the paragraph is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraphs 26-27: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 28: The first sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of the sentence is rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 29: Accepted in substance. Paragraphs 30-34: Rejected as subordinate to the facts actually found. Paragraph 35-39: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: James E. Moye, Esquire Patrick J. Kennedy, Esquire 201 East Pine Street, Suite 710 Orlando, Florida 32801 Richard Tannenbaum, Esquire Shea & Tannenbaum 204 Brazilian Avenue, Suite 210 Palm Beach, Florida 33480 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Dana Baird General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent was issued Mortgage Broker License No. 3082 on September 3, 1974 by Petitioner. Respondent conducted certain transactions under its Mortgage Broker License during the period from September, 1973 until April, 1974. Respondent found client investors who had funds which they wished to invest in mortgages which would pay a greater return in interest than the average land mortgage. The transactions involved the purchase of a promissory note from a land development corporation secured by a mortgage deed on land ostensibly owned by the developer, in which the latter reserved the right and was authorized to convey the premises to a purchaser under an installment land contract subject to the lien of the mortgage. The deed further provided that the developer would deliver to a bank as an escrow agent a copy of any such agreement for deed and a quitclaim deed which would be held in escrow unless a default was established under the mortgage deed. What the investor would receive in such cases would be the developer's assignment of an agreement for deed collateralized by the mortgage deed. The issuance of these high interest notes were for the purpose of enabling the development company to make certain improvements on the land which they were obligated to do under sales contracts. In the transactions in question, Respondent dealt through Financial Resources Corporation of Ft. Lauderdale, Florida to which he remitted the investors funds, less an amount retained for fees or commissions. The land developer/borrower would then issue the note and mortgage in the face amount of the total investment made by the investor. The detailed procedure was that when an investor inquired concerning such mortgages, Respondent would determine from Financial Resources Corporation if any were available. It was the practice of Respondent's President then to look at the land development, determine if, in fact, the land was in development and had streets and the like, and to read pertinent documents concerning the development. He would then proceed to accept the full sum of the investment from the investor pursuant to an agreement by which the investor, in consideration of the stated sum, would authorize Respondent to use its best efforts to secure collateralized promissory notes at a minimum percentage of interest on the declining balance with principal and interest payable monthly if held to maturity. Respondent would then deposit the investor's check, usually on the same day as received, and then in several days send a notice to Financial Resources Corporation authorizing it to prepare and execute a self-amortizing monthly principal and interest promissory note with quitclaim deed in the amount of the investment, together with a check representing the proceeds of the Investment less the Respondent's fee or commission, and a sum for intangible tax on the transaction. Financial would thereafter return to Respondent a copy of the note and mortgage in exchange for the funds remitted. The recorded mortgages would be sent to Respondent within a month or so thereafter. Respondent had no agreements in writing with the land developer, nor with Financial Resources Corporation. Respondent claimed that its fees for services were set by Financial Resources Corporation which usually amounted to about 12 percent of the face amount of the investment, but which was sometimes more and frequently less than that authorized under the applicable statutes and regulations. Respondent did not maintain an escrow bank account and all funds received from investors were deposited into the corporate bank account of the firm. Respondent's agreements with investors set no specific term or period of time in which the secured promissory notes were to be obtained although its president would customarily tell investors that it would take some time for the transaction to be consummated, and that they could not expect to receive the recorded mortgages right away (testimony of Mr. Montague, Petitioner's Exhibits 2-10). Respondent discontinued transactions as described above in April, 1974 because he was dissatisfied with the business. He had been informed that certain lands under some of the mortgages had not been sold until after the mortgage had been executed and that this was in violation of State law. In the fall of that year, he received a memorandum from the State Comptroller on the subject of escrow accounts, dated October 11, 1974, which warned mortgage brokers in the state concerning the practice of remitting investors' funds to land developers in anticipation of receiving a recorded mortgage and note (testimony of Mr. Montague, Respondent's Exhibit 9). In 1975,a financial examiner from Petitioner's office was sent to the office of Respondent to examine his books and records. Pursuant to that examination, it was determined that Respondent had committed various violations of Chapter 494, F.S. on certain transactions. The following findings of fact are made with respect to the transactions in question: Allegation: That Respondent took and received deposits of money from Robert E. Creighton, Hazel R. Hardesty, J. Wilfred Caron, Rose A. Hoadley, Margaret A. Gregory and Willard A. Kotthaus, in the regular course of business, and failed to immediately place such said funds in an escrow or trust account as required by Section 494.05(1) , F.S. As heretofore stated, the Respondent did not maintain an escrow trust account with respect to any of the above-stated transactions. The above- mentioned individuals had authorized Respondent to disburse the funds immediately upon receipt (testimony of Mr. Montague, Supplemented by Exhibits 3- 8). Allegation: Respondent failed to maintain adequate records in violation of Section 494.06(3), F.S., in that its files contained no written agreements on transactions with Della W. Shaw, Lantana Sheet Metal and A.C. Inc., and another transaction with Lantana Sheet Metal. The agreement between Della Shaw and Respondent, although not present in Respondent's file at the time of examination of its records by Petitioner's representative, had been executed on October 15, 1975, and presently is contained in the records of the Respondent. It had been taken out temporarily by one of Respondent's associates who also had Della Shaw as a client. Respondent had entered into two transactions with the trustee of the pension fund and profit sharing plan of Lantana Sheet Metal, one for ten thousand dollars from the pension fund and one for three thousand dollars from the profit sharing plan. At the time of these investments there were written contracts which were executed by the parties. The books and records of both the pension fund and the profit sharing fund were maintained at Respondent's office by a firm which administered both plans. The agreements pertaining to the Lantana transactions were requested and withdrawn from Respondent's files by the trustee of the Lantana funds. Consequently, they did not appear in the records of the corporation at the time of examination by Petitioner's representative (Petitioner's Exhibits 2 and 4; Respondent's Exhibit 10). Allegation: Respondent failed on numerous loan purchase agreements to establish the term for which the agreement was to remain in force before the return of the deposit for nonper- formance could be required by the investor, in violation of Chapter 3-3.06, F.A.C. The transactions in question did not involve applications for mortgage loan, but agreements to purchase secured promissory notes. Respondent's clients were investors/purchasers, not borrowers (testimony of Mr. Montague; Petitioner's Exh. 2-10). Allegation: Respondent charged and accepted fees or commissions in excess of the maximum allowable in violation of Section 494.08(4), F.S., and Chapter 3-3.08(3) and (4), F.A.C., on trans- actions involving Rosa Eichelberger, overcharge of $10.90, Lantana Sheet Metal, overcharge of $62.60; Lantana Sheet Metal, overcharge of $10.91; Rose A. Hoadley, overcharge of $9.10; and Margaret A. Gregory, overcharge of $9.10.
