Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Winter Haven Ski Club, Inc. for a permit to construct a ski slalom course and ski ramp on Lake Silver be DENIED. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 30th of December, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Lake Idelwild is a small, land locked body of water located in Lake County. Its diameter is approximately 2200 feet. DER has assigned a "Class III" designation to the lake based on its recreational character. 1/ Petitioner Bair and the Aarons are lake front property owners and each utilizes the lake for waterskiing. The Moores seek to anchor a ski jump ramp and several floating markers to define a slalom course. These devices would be located generally in front of the Moore property, about 200 feet from the shore. The testimony of Aaron Moore established that the ski facilities are intended only for their personal use. However, since there is public access to this lake, it would not be possible to prevent casual use of such facilities by the general public. The testimony of the DER official who reviewed the application and studied the proposed site, established that virtually no pollution of the water would be caused by the installation of the ski ramp and slalom course. Rather, the placement of such aids to recreation are consistent with the recreational use designation assigned to this water body. The DER investigation determined that no stationary source of pollution will be created by the ski-slalom devices. It was further established that the depth of the lake, which averages 15 feet, and the vegetation along the shoreline, will adequately dissipate turbulence and wave action created by ski boats operated in the vicinity of the ski jump and slalom course. Petitioner is understandably concerned with any increase in boating activity on this small lake. However, problems associated with such increased recreational use are beyond the scope of these proceedings (discussed below).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, Recommended that the Department of Environmental Regulation enter a Final Order dismissing the petition and granting the pending application. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of December, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. T. CARPENTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of December, 1984.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of absence without leave from his teaching duties and misconduct in office, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact During the 1992-93 school year, Respondent was employed by Respondent as a teacher. He was on annual contract with Respondent. During the 1992-93 school year, he taught with a temporary teaching certificate. Respondent was paid $23,635 annually at a rate of $17.23 hourly. The reason that Respondent taught with a temporary teaching certificate was that he had failed to pass both parts of the test that teachers must take in order to be certified. Respondent's temporary teaching certificate was effective only for the 1991-92 and 1992-93 school years and could not be renewed for the following school year. Respondent would thus not have been able to work as a teacher during the 1993-94 school year, after which he could again obtain another two-year temporary teaching certificate while he continued to take the examination. On or about April 8, 1993, Petitioner terminated Respondent after determining that he had been absent without leave from his teaching duties. Respondent was first assigned to Trout Lake in September, 1991. Trout Lake is a residential exceptional student education (ESE) facility operated by Tri-County Addictions, Inc. Consisting of 43 acres, the facility includes residential and school buildings, which are not within sight of each other. It takes about 10 minutes to walk between the residences and school building. Trout Lake serves an average of 18-24 students ranging in age from 13 to 18 years. The students have all been classified as Severely Emotionally Disturbed and often suffer from drug addiction. In general, the students present difficult management problems. Petitioner is contractually responsible for educating the Trout Lake students. Toward that end, Petitioner has routinely assigned one or two teachers to teach the students at the school building located on the Trout Lake campus. Immediate responsibility for the teachers rests with the principal at Avon Park High School, which is about five miles from Trout Lake. During the 1991-93 school years, the principal was Barbara Dean. Given the nature of the students, however, considerable responsibility for the success of Petitioner's involvement with the Trout Lake program rests with Petitioner's District ESE staff. Respondent was certified to teach social studies, not ESE. His orientation at Trout Lake consisted of following around his predecessor for three or four weeks. After the predecessor left, Respondent was by himself for the entire 1991-92 school year. Respondent's schedule at the beginning of the 1992-93 school year required his services from 7:15 am to 2:45 pm. His duties on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday were different from those on Wednesday. Each weekday morning, the students began the day around 7:15 or 7:30 am with about an hour of peer counselling. Respondent actively participated in this activity, which took place at the residence. On weekdays except Wednesdays, the students were divided into two groups. One group went to school in the morning, immediately after peer counselling, while the other group remained at the residence for counselling from the counsellors employed by Trout Lake. In the afternoon, the group that had gone to school went to the residence for counselling, and the group that had remained at the residence went to school. The students who went to school in the morning typically left the residence for school at about 8:30 am. At about 11:30, after four periods of about 45 minutes each of social studies, science and health, mathematics, and English, the morning students rejoined the others at the residence for lunch. At around 12:30 pm, the afternoon students arrived at the school building and attended the same four courses until about 3:30 pm. The Wednesday schedule was different. The Trout Lake counsellors needed one weekday during which they could counsel all of the students together. Thus, on Wednesdays, all of the students went to school in the morning and were taught in classes twice as large as normal. From 11:00 am to about 11:30 am, the counsellors met with various groups. Then, lunch took place at the residence from about 11:30 am to about 12:30 pm. Beginning at about 12:30 pm, the counsellors conducted a staff meeting at which they discussed the students and any problems that they were facing. Respondent typically attended the lunch at the residence each weekday, as well as the Wednesday afternoon staff meeting. Unlike his predecessor, Respondent routinely attended the Wednesday afternoon staff meeting. Respondent believed that his attendance at the meeting helped him and the counsellors work better together to assist the students. The Wednesday afternoon staff meetings often lasted two or three hours and addressed many issues irrelevant to Respondent. For these reasons, Respondent normally spoke first at the meetings and left when he was finished, after no more than 40 minutes. Wednesday afternoons were Respondent's planning period. When he left the staff meeting, he could engage in planning activities for the remainder of the afternoon. The nature of planning, as well as the limited resources at the Trout Lake school building, demanded that Respondent leave the campus from time to time during his planning time in order to accomplish tasks relevant to his planning duties. Petitioner's witnesses testified that Respondent should have contacted Ms. Dean before leaving the Trout Lake school. In general, these witnesses attributed the authority for this practice to courtesy or professionalism. However, no such practice had existed when Respondent arrived at Trout Lake or during his first year there. Respondent understandably felt isolated at Trout Lake. He received no orientation from Ms. Dean or any of the ESE staff when first assigned to Trout Lake. He had to learn the customs hurriedly from his predecessor, and later from a paraprofessional. In addition, neither Respondent nor Ms. Dunham was able or expected to attend faculty meetings at Avon Park High School. Ms. Lethbridge visited the facility once every week to three weeks. Ms. Lethbridge's supervisor, Connie Tzovarras, visited the Trout Lake only one time between September, 1992, and March, 1993. From September, 1992, through mid-March, 1993, Ms. Dean visited Trout Lake twice. One time, she came when computers had been stolen. The second visit of Ms. Dean was when she evaluated Respondent. Ultimately, Ms. Dean received a letter of reprimand for her supervision of the Trout Lake teachers. Respondent testified that he sometimes left the school early on Wednesday afternoons, during his planning time, to perform school-related duties, such as gathering supplies or meeting with school personnel at other locations. Undoubtedly, these are appropriate activities for which Respondent may leave the campus. Given the customs of Trout Lake, Respondent's past experience during the 1991-92 school year, and the failure of Ms. Dean or any ESE staff to instruct Respondent differently, there was no requirement that Respondent advise anyone at Avon Park High School or the ESE District office of such departures for school business or that he sign out when leaving the campus on school-related business. The absence of a requirement of notice to someone at Avon Park High School or at least signing out before leaving campus on school-related business undermines Petitioner's case. There is considerable evidence that Respondent was not at the school building on Wednesday afternoons. But, with two exceptions, there is no evidence that Respondent ever left the campus on other than school- related matters. Given the remoteness of Trout Lake and its relative lack of on-site resources, Respondent necessarily had to leave the campus to carry out normal planning activities. If Respondent's departures from campus had been accompanied by a violation of some clearly defined policy, it would be reasonable to infer that Respondent was pursuing personal business. However, Petitioner has proved that two of Respondent's absences had nothing to do with school business. Evidently as part of a course that he was taking, Respondent was required to teach reading on two occasions to a group of elementary school students. After having discussed the matter with Ms. Dean, who advised him that he would need to take personal leave if the reading classes took place during the school day, Respondent proceeded on two occasions to visit the elementary school without obtaining leave. On each occasion, Respondent arrived at the Trout Lake school at about 9:15 am and thus was absent two hours without leave. By letter dated March 26, 1993, Petitioner advised Respondent that he was charged with misconduct in office, violation of School Board Policy 2.31, and violation of Section 231.45, Florida Statutes. The letter also cites a violation of Section 231.44, Florida Statutes, for absence without leave. The March 26 letter further informs Respondent that the Highlands County School Board, at its next meeting on April 8, 1993, would consider the recommendation of the Superintendent that Respondent's employment be immediately terminated. In the meantime, the letter states that Respondent was suspended with pay. On April 8, 1993, Petitioner terminated Respondent. Petitioner later advised Respondent that it had determined that he owed the School District over $700 for monies paid for which duties were not performed. Petitioner recovered this sum from Respondent by withholding them from his final paycheck. By letter dated May 19, 1993, Respondent requested a formal hearing on his termination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Highlands County School Board enter a final order terminating Respondent's employment, as of April 8, 1992, and refunding to Respondent the difference between the amount actually withheld and $68.92. ENTERED on December 10, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 10, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-2867 Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Petitioner 1-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22-23: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 24-26: rejected as irrelevant. 27: adopted. 28: adopted only as to the four hours missed when Respondent twice taught reading at an elementary school. 29-30: adopted. 31-33: rejected as unsupported by the necessary weight of the evidence to the extent of the implication that Petitioner proved that Respondent was, on these occasions, not engaged in school- related business. 34-35: rejected as recitation of evidence and subordinate. 36-40: adopted. 41-45: rejected as subordinate. 46 and 48: adopted as to the four hours described above. 47: rejected as irrelevant. 49: rejected as repetitious. 50: rejected as subordinate. 51-55: adopted or adopted in substance. Treatment Accorded Proposed Findings of Respondent 1-8: adopted or adopted in substance. 9: rejected as unsupported by the necessary weight of the evidence and as legal argument. 10-12: rejected as irrelevant. 13-21: adopted or adopted in substance. 22: rejected as recitation of evidence. 23: adopted or adopted in substance. 24: rejected as unsupported by the necessary weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Gavin W. O'Brien Gavin W. O'Brien, P.A. 1806 Manatee Avenue West Bradenton, Florida 34205 Mark S. Herdman Kelly, McKee Post Office Box 75638 Tampa, Florida 33675-0638 Superintendent Richard Farmer Highlands County School District 426 School Street Sebring, Florida 33870-4048 Honorable Betty Castor Commissioner of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
The Issue The issues are: (1) Whether the pool at issue is a special purpose pool, and (2) Whether Petitioner is entitled to a variance to use recessed automatic surface skimmers in the pool at issue.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order denying the variance request of Tamtech Pool Builders and denying special purpose pool status for the pool built by Tamtech Pool Builders. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of February, 1988 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1988. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 87-4443 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Tamtech Pool Builders Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 6(49) and 9(39). Proposed findings of fact 1, 4, and 7 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 2, 5, and 12 are rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. Proposed findings of fact 3, 10, and 11 are rejected as being irrelevant. Proposed finding of fact 8 is rejected as being irrelevant because this action is not a rule challenge proceeding. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1-3(1-3); 5-7(4-6); 9-11(7-9); 12(9); 13(10); 14-34 (10-30); 36-43(31-38); 46-53(40-47); and 56-58(50-52). Proposed findings of fact 4, 8, 44, 45, and 55 are rejected as being irrelevant or unnecessary. 3 . Proposed finding of fact 54 is rejected as being unsupported by the competent, substantial evidence. 4. Proposed finding of fact 35 is subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Margaret Smithson HRS District I Legal Counsel 160 Governmental Center P. O. Box 12836 Pensacola Florida 32576 Mark E. Walker Attorney-At-Law 723 N. Eglin Pkwy., Suite 2 Ft. Walton Beach, Florida 3254 Gregory Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the unlawful employment practice alleged in the Employment Complaint of Discrimination filed with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), and, if so, what relief should be granted.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Black West-Indian male. Respondent is a political subdivision of the State of Florida responsible for operating the public schools in Broward County. Petitioner obtained a temporary teaching certificate from the Florida Department of Education in 2017. In October 2017, Petitioner was hired by Respondent as a teacher at Walker Elementary School. As a new teacher, Petitioner was a contract employee subject to a probationary period of one school year. During the probationary period, Petitioner could be dismissed without cause or resign without breach of contract. Petitioner worked at Walker Elementary School, where he did not have his own classroom, but worked with special-needs children in different classrooms, until the end of the 2017-2018 school year. There were no teaching positions available at that school for the 2018-2019 school year. In August of 2018, Petitioner was transferred by Respondent to Mirror Lake, where he filled a first-grade teaching vacancy. Andrea Gresham was the team leader for first-grade teachers at Mirror Lake. As a new teacher, Petitioner was assigned a mentor to assist him in acclimating to the duties of his position. In addition to being the team leader for all first-grade teachers at Mirror Lake, Ms. Gresham was also Petitioner’s designated mentor. Petitioner reported for work at Mirror Lake on August 7, 2018. At that time, Ms. Gresham took Petitioner on a tour of the campus. She also provided Petitioner with sample lesson plans and homework for the students. Throughout the week, Petitioner prepared for the first day of school for students with Ms. Gresham’s help. These preparations included Ms. Gresham reviewing procedures related to beginning-of-year testing, student homework, teacher planning, and student dismissal at the end of the school day. It was Ms. Gresham’s habit to keep dated notes relevant to her duties as a mentor and team leader. As a best practice, she regularly met with Principal Veliz to discuss the progress of new teachers. Ms. Gresham kept contemporaneous notes of her interactions with Petitioner and kept Principal Veliz advised of her observations. Ms. Gresham observed that Petitioner was not engaged within the team of first-grade teachers and had a difficult time grasping school procedures despite her attempts to guide him. The typical first-grade student is six years old at the beginning of the school year. Given how young these students are, the protocol at Mirror Lake requires teachers to take extra care to ensure that the students are directed to the correct mode of transportation during dismissal. Ms. Gresham explained the dismissal procedures and emphasized their importance to Petitioner on more than one occasion leading up to the students’ first day of school. Each first-grade student is given a lanyard that is color-coded to correspond to that student’s teacher. Teachers are responsible for writing each child’s mode of transportation, as provided to the teacher by the child’s parents, on his or her lanyard every day. At the end of the school day, the children are sorted by their mode of transportation and escorted by a designated teacher or paraprofessional. The students are categorized as: car riders, bus riders, walkers, or attendees of the on-site after-school program. August 15, 2018, was the first day of the school year for students at Mirror Lake. At the end of the school day, Petitioner, along with all of the other first-grade teachers, was responsible for assisting his students in reporting to the appropriate location for their respective modes of transportation. On August 15, 2018, Petitioner and Ms. Gresham were both assigned to the car-rider group. While Petitioner and Ms. Gresham were in the car-rider pickup area, Ms. Gresham became aware that a student was missing when a visibly upset parent exited his vehicle having learned that his child was not present for pick-up. Ms. Gresham sought help from the school resource officer and other teachers in an effort to locate the missing student. Principal Veliz testified credibly that this was the first and last time a student was unaccounted for at dismissal at Mirror Lake. Ms. Gresham asked to see the transportation log that Petitioner had compiled for his students to determine how the child was supposed to go home and where the mistake may have occurred. In reviewing Petitioner’s transportation log, Ms. Gresham noticed that the log had some children’s names listed under two different modes of transportation for the same day. As a result, Petitioner’s transportation log did not add any clarity to the situation. Meanwhile, teachers continued to search the campus for the missing student and the school resource officer escorted the father of the missing student to the office to speak with Principal Veliz. Once the student dismissal process was complete for the day, Principal Veliz convened a faculty meeting. During the meeting, the faculty learned that a second student from Petitioner’s class was missing. Principal Veliz adjourned the faculty meeting and assembled the team leaders in the office to assist in locating the two missing students. Petitioner returned to his classroom and did not join the effort to locate the missing students. The team leaders proceeded to call private daycares to ask if the missing students may have been transported to such a facility by mistake. Through these phone calls, both of the missing students were located at the same daycare. Thereafter, the children were reunited with their parents. Principal Veliz met with the parents of the children who had been mistakenly sent to the wrong location on August 15, 2018. Principal Veliz personally paid for the daycare center’s charges with respect to one of the students who had been inadvertently sent there. Principal Veliz testified that the parents were upset that their children had been misplaced and that the parents of one of the children requested a transfer to another first-grade teacher. Ms. Gresham had the opportunity to examine the lanyard belonging to one of the students who had gone missing during dismissal. She observed that Petitioner had written on the lanyard that the student was to ride the bus that day, although the parents had previously informed Petitioner that the student was to be picked up by car. In conducting a routine observational visit to Petitioner’s classroom during the first week of school, Principal Veliz observed conditions that she considered of urgent concern with respect to Petitioner’s academic practices and overall classroom management. She observed a lack of structure, including students in Petitioner’s class wandering around the room and playing with pencils as though they were swords without any redirection. Principal Veliz also observed that Petitioner was using obsolete and ineffective teaching methods. Principal Veliz contacted the school district’s employee relations and talent acquisition office to discuss Petitioner’s employment status. Principal Veliz was notified that Petitioner was still within his one-year probationary term, and that his employment could be terminated without a formal hearing or progressive disciplinary measures. Principal Veliz made the decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment prior to the end of his probationary status based on his unsatisfactory performance. Principal Veliz obtained a form letter from the school district’s human resources department, which she modified to fit Petitioner’s circumstances. The letter was dated August 23, 2018. The letter stated that Petitioner’s name would be submitted to the next School Board meeting for termination of employment during a probationary period and that Petitioner could choose to resign in lieu of termination. Petitioner chose not to sign the document. Petitioner’s employment was terminated at the next meeting of the School Board.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that FCHR enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2020, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S BRITTANY O. FINKBEINER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of October, 2020. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed) Rudyard Julius 19101 Northwest 11th Street Pembroke Pines, Florida 33029 (eServed) Michael T. Burke, Esquire Johnson, Anselmo, Murdoch, Burke, Piper & Hochman, P.A. 2455 East Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 1000 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304 (eServed) Cheyenne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 4075 Esplanade Way, Room 110 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 (eServed)
The Issue The main issue in this case is whether the Respondent illegally discriminated against the Petitioner’s son in a place of public accommodation in violation of section 760.08, Florida Statutes (2015).1/ In addition, the Respondent has asked that the Petitioner be required to pay its attorney’s fees and costs under section 760.11(6).
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Seal Swim School III, LLC, is a private business in Tampa that offers swim lessons to adults and children for a fee. It has a small retail component that sells some swim accessories and snacks. In addition, it operates a summer camp for children based at a church building near a swimming pool. Participants in the camp engage in various activities at the church building and are driven to the pool in oversized golf carts daily for swimming, including lessons two days a week. Campers bring their own lunch. Enrollment in the Respondent’s swim lessons and summer camp is open to anyone. The Respondent’s policies do not discriminate against anyone on any illegal basis. In particular, the Respondent is not a special needs school or special needs summer camp and is not able to properly deal with all individuals with special needs, but it invites participants with special needs so long as the Respondent can meet the individual participant’s needs. If special needs participants require private swim lessons, the Respondent tries to accommodate them and charges the reduced group lesson rate as a favor in consideration of the difficulties they and their families typically face due to their special needs. The Respondent is not regulated and does not operate as a daycare. The Petitioner’s son is now ten years old. He has autism but is high-functioning. In 2013 and/or 2014 (the evidence was not clear), the Petitioner and his wife signed him up for once-a-week swim lessons. They disclosed their son’s autism, and he was accepted into the class. However, it was determined that he would do better with more individual attention in a quieter pool, so the Respondent accommodated him by giving him a private lesson after the last group lesson of the day, for the reduced group lesson rate. The parents concurred and appreciated the change. The lessons were completed successfully and without incident. Near the end of April 2015, the Petitioner’s wife contacted the Respondent about enrolling her son in the summer camp, starting in June. She discussed his high-functioning autism and also his attention deficit/hyperactive disorder. She referred to his previous swim lessons and noted that he was bigger now and asked if they still would be able to give him swim lessons during camp. The Respondent’s office manager pointed out that the summer camp was not a special needs camp but that her son was welcome to enroll and participate so long as the Respondent was able to meet his needs safely. The office manager mentioned that they might have to assign an infant instructor with a strong personality and offered to discuss it with the camp director. The Petitioner’s wife did not ask for particular accommodations for her son. The office manager followed through on her promise and discussed the Petitioner’s son with the camp director, who then attempted to contact the Petitioner or his wife by telephone to discuss their son’s participation in camp, but she was unable to reach them. The summer camp started on June 8, 2015. The camp director sought out the Petitioner while his wife was registering their son. There began an unfortunate series of misunderstandings and hard feelings on the part of the Petitioner. The Petitioner began to explain his son’s abilities and limitations due to his autism. The camp director said she thought the camp probably could accommodate him, but she wanted to make sure the Petitioner understood that safety was paramount. The Petitioner thought she was afraid his son’s autism would be an affirmative danger to the other children. Actually, she was trying to impress on him that there were too many children in camp and too few staff to assign a member of the staff to his son one-on-one, so the camp’s ability to accommodate his son would depend to a large extent on his ability to transition with his group from activity to activity, including to the swimming pool. The Petitioner felt the camp director was being abrupt when she took her leave to attend to the other things she had to do on the first day of camp. However, she encouraged the Petitioner to talk to the camp counselor assigned to his son about his son’s abilities and limitations. The Petitioner did so and felt comfortable that the counselor at least was listening to him. He and his wife finished registration and left the camp building. Later in the morning (the exact time was not clear from the evidence), when it was time for his group to transition to the swimming pool, the Petitioner’s son would not go with them. The deck supervisor in charge at the church building called the camp director, who was at the swimming pool, and explained what was happening. The camp director told the deck supervisor to call the parents to see if they had any suggestions. She tried to call but got no answer. She called the director back, and the director told the deck supervisor to assign a runner to watch the child and to keep trying to call the parents. She called the parents again about a half hour later, and the Petitioner’s wife answered. The deck supervisor explained the situation and asked for suggestions. The Petitioner’s wife had none and put the Petitioner on the phone. When told his son was not transitioning with his group, the Petitioner asked, “well, did you ask him?” and suggested they ask again and try to show him or take him by the hand. The deck supervisor tried again. When the child continued to refuse, the director was called again. The director instructed the deck supervisor to call the parents back to tell them they had to come and pick up their child because she did not have the staff to safely monitor the children in the camp while trying to attend to the Petitioner’s son one-on-one. The Petitioner interpreted this, unfairly and inappropriately, as unfair and rude treatment of him and his family, and as intentional discrimination against his son based on autism, which it was not. Any other child who refused to transition with his or her group would have been treated the same, with or without autism. Angry about the situation, the Petitioner drove to the camp to pick up his son. He became more upset when he found his son waiting by himself to be picked up instead of being with other children. He misinterpreted this as additional mistreatment and discrimination. He filed a charge of discrimination. The FCHR investigated and determined that it had no jurisdiction because the Respondent was not a place of public accommodation. Since the determination did not reach the merits, it may have encouraged the Petitioner to believe he would have a good case on the merits, if there was jurisdiction. The only authority cited by the FCHR in its determination of no jurisdiction was section 760.02(11). The Petitioner, who is not a lawyer, found other authority that he cited in support of an argument for jurisdiction. The Petitioner honestly believed he had a good case on jurisdiction and on the merits. On jurisdiction, he was confused by the plethora a statutes on variations of the subject of the rights of individuals with handicaps and disabilities. His confusion was not dispelled by the FCHR’s determination of no jurisdiction. Although the Petitioner’s adversary attempted to point out the law on the subject, the Petitioner declined to accept the Respondent’s word for it. On the merits, the Petitioner honestly believed his son was being treated rudely and unfairly because of his autism on the day in question. This was an unfortunate misunderstanding, and the Petitioner was unable to accept the Respondent’s explanation of what happened. The Respondent did not prove that the Petitioner’s claim was made in bad faith; that the Petitioner knew it was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless; or that a non-lawyer standing in the Petitioner’s shoes should have known that his claims were frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, based on information he had prior to this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Relief be dismissed, and the Respondent’s request for attorney’s fees be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of March, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of March, 2017.
Findings Of Fact For approximately a year and a half, respondent Crowley and his family have lived on Lake Irma, which lies in Orange County, Florida, and has a surface area of approximately 122 acres. Respondent Crowley is an avid water skier, as are his two sons, the younger of whom, Michael, is a Florida state slalom skiing champion. Mr. Crowley owns lot 168, Barber East, 1507 T. C. U. Boulevard, in Orlando, which has 85 feet of frontage on Lake Irma. The Crowleys have a Ski Nautique motor boat powered by a 255 horsepower engine equipped with a muffler system. The engine discharges exhaust into the air above the water's surface. Even though there is no public access to Lake Irma, there is a lot of boat traffic on the lake. Some ten other families who live on Lake Irma also water ski. A majority of the boats on Lake Irma have engines rated at less than 100 horsepower. The Crowleys are not the only family living on Lake Irma who owns a Ski Nautique, however, nor is their boat the noisiest on the lake. Mr. Bagwell, president of the Lake Irma Association, owns two ski boats. One has a 60 horsepower engine, and the other has a 100 horsepower engine. His next door neighbor has a boat with a 55 horsepower engine and another neighbor has a boat powered by an 85 horsepower engine. There is no commercial boating on the lake, however. Skiing over the deeper portions of Lake Irma does not affect the bottom directly underneath. The wake thrown by ski boats, however, causes waves to wash up on shore up to 100 yards away, with the result that sand becomes suspended in the water. Another consequence of the use of these boats is that oil and gas are introduced into the lake water. Respondent Crowley's testimony to the effect that the Crowleys and their friend, Mr. Terry, would spend no more time skiing on Lake Irma if the ski slalom course should be built, than they spend skiing on Lake Irma at present, went unrebutted. Respondent Crowley plans to try to ski through the slalom course at 30 miles per hour. The fastest speed contemplated for skiing the course is 36 miles per hour. Slalom skiing is particularly demanding and no one person could expect to ski the course for more than twenty minutes or so, without taking a long rest. At present, Mr. Crowley, his two sons, and Mr. Terry, regularly use the boat for water skiing on Lake Irma. Sometimes they ski in the same pattern over and over again. The Crowleys' boat pulls barefoot skiers at speeds of 32 to 36 miles per hour. These skiers throw a wake comparable to the wake slalom skiers throw. When he is "trick" skiing, Michael is pulled at only 17 or 18 miles per hour, but the resulting wake is larger than the wake slalom skiing creates. While Mr. Crowley belonged, at the time of the hearing, to two ski clubs (and a national skiing association) , he had never invited any other boat owner to launch his boat onto Lake Irma from the Crowley property, and had no intention of ever doing so. The proposed slalom course would consist of a permanent underwater apparatus and 22 removable buoys with diameters of 16 to 21 inches. Attached to each buoy would be a three to five foot length of line fitted with a snap device at the free end. Before slalom skiing sessions, the free ends would be snapped onto the permanent installation so that the buoys would float on the lake surface; after each session they would be removed. The permanent installation contemplates setting 22 screw anchors into the lake bottom. Lines would be tied to the anchors. Styrofoam blocks 10 inches by 10 inches by 14 inches would keep these permanent lines suspended vertically with their free ends three to five feet below the surface of the lake, depending on fluctuations in the water level. The free ends would be equipped with snap devices to which the buoy painters could be fastened. Neither setting the anchors nor fastening and unfastening the removable parts of the gear would create any measurable pollution. Respondent Crowley proposes to construct the slalom course along a portion of the southern shore of Lake Irma, a considerable distance from his home. As proposed, the slalom course would cover an area 285 yards by 25 yards. Respondent Crowley has no proprietary interest in the bottom underneath. He testified that he chose the location for the slalom course with a view towards safety and in the hope of minimizing adverse impacts on lakefront dwellers. Land along the edge of thelake near the slalom course site is relatively undeveloped. Because of the shape of the lake, there are two "blind corners" for skiers, both of which the proposed site would avoid. In choosing the site, respondent Crowley also considered a canal which opens onto the lake, and sought to avoid interfering with boat traffic using the canal. The average draft for the boats on Lake Irma powered by outboard motors is about one and one half feet. People might foul their fishing lines on the submerged styrofoam blocks. Along the shore nearest the proposed site is a littoral botanical community in which marsh grasses and cattails predominate. Cattails and the tuber root system of the marsh grass have a good ability to dampen wave action and hinder erosion. Directly underneath the proposed site, which is 125 feet off shore, the lake is 14 to 17 feet deep. The bottom is mostly sandy with silt and fine mud covering portions of the bottom. Because sunlight does not penetrate to that depth, benthic vegetation is not present. In the past, DER has followed the practice, when permitting docks, of requiring that they be built waterward of the applicant's upland lot and not in front of some other lot DER's proposed findings of fact have been considered in preparation of the foregoing findings of fact. They have all been adopted, in substance, insofar as material.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED That respondent DER deny respondent Crowley's application for a construction permit. DONE and ENTERED this 24th day of April, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Sam Charles Meiner, Esq. Mr. Richard F. Thomson 26 Wall Street R.R. 1, Box 130 Orlando, Florida 32801 Maitland, Florida 32751 Stanley J. Niego, Esquire Mr. & Mrs. Burwell C. Harrison Department of Environmental Route 1, Box 128 Regulation Matiland, Florida 32751 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Carl B. Hatchell Post Office Box 4201 Winter Park, Florida 32793 Mr. Jesse G. Bagwell, Jr. Route 1, Box 126A Maitland, Florida 32751
The Issue The nature of the controversy is set forth in the Order Finding Probable Cause issued by the Commission on Ethics (the “Commission”) on March 9, 2018, which specifically alleged that Respondent, as fire chief, acting city manager, and/or city manager for the City of Madeira Beach (the “City” or “Madeira Beach”), violated section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, by keeping or storing his Jet Ski on a City-owned Jet Ski lift.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this action, Respondent served as fire chief, acting city manager, or city manager for Madeira Beach. Respondent has been either a public officer or public employee in the City continuously since 2011. He previously worked for the City since 2001, except for a two-year period when he worked for the City of Mineola, Florida. Respondent was subject to the requirements of chapter 112, part III, which is referred to as the Code of Ethics for Public Officers and Employees, for any acts or omissions during his tenure as a public officer and public employee. Respondent’s homestead is a condominium in close proximity to City Hall in Madeira Beach, and only 758 feet from the City-owned Jet Ski lifts. Respondent has a personal vehicle, a Jeep, and has exclusive use of a City-owned vehicle. Respondent bought a 20-foot long Yamaha VXR Jet Ski in 2011. Prior to moving the Jet Ski to Madeira Beach, he kept it in Minneola, where he worked as fire chief, on a lift provided by the City of Minneola. Shane Crawford was hired in January 2012 to serve as the Madeira Beach City Manager. He held this position until his termination in June 2017. Mr. Crawford supervised Respondent when he was fire chief, as well as all the City departments, to ensure the laws and provisions of the City Charter were carried out and enforced. Respondent developed a Jet Ski program for water resources in Minneola and stored his Jet Ski on city property. After returning to Madeira Beach from Minneola, Respondent sought to institute “a watercraft rescue-type program.” Respondent requested that the City purchase two Jet Skis, similar to his personal Jet Ski, to be used in the new water rescue program. Mr. Crawford testified that the City was interested in purchasing two, not three, Jet Skis for the program. Had they needed three, he said, they had sufficient funds to purchase a third. The City requested and received an exemption from the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission to allow Jet Skis to be docked on lifts in the water behind City Hall since state rules prohibited craft with propellers or propulsion systems from being docked in the manatee-frequented waters. Shortly after completion of the two Jet Ski lifts, Respondent moved his personal Jet Ski onto one of the two City-owned Jet Ski lifts where it remained for two years, until December 2017. In addition to Respondent’s Jet Ski, one of the City-owned Jet Skis was kept on the lifts behind City Hall. The other was kept on a boat trailer at the Fire Department. Respondent testified that the two City-owned Jet Skis were rotated so that one was always in an area protected from the water and outdoor elements in order to increase the longevity of the watercraft. The two Jet Skis were on a five-year replacement plan, depending on their usage and condition. The City-owned Jet Ski lifts are public property. Respondent was aware of Ordinance 2016-04, Chapter 78, Section 78-40, which restricts private use of public property. Ordinance 2016-04 was adopted by the Madeira Beach Commission on April 12, 2016, and reads, in part: “No person shall secure, tie, dock, or anchor any boat or vessel of any kind to any public property . . . except docks or boat launching ramps,” except under specified conditions, none of which are applicable here. This ordinance was in effect for most of the time Respondent stored his personal Jet Ski on the City-owned Jet Ski lift. This prohibition includes the City’s Jet Ski lifts and prohibits an individual from using City property for personal use. Respondent violated this ordinance by storing or docking his personal Jet Ski on the City’s Jet Ski lifts. Respondent was aware that “John Joe citizen” could not keep his personally-owned Jet Ski on the City lift as he did. On one occasion, Respondent charged the City for fuel for his personal Jet Ski, but the rest of the time “all expenses and operational issues were furnished [by Respondent].” Respondent recommended the purchase of the two Jet Skis as an inexpensive way for the City to provide water rescue operations. One was to be used in the intercoastal waterway and the other on the Gulf side of Madeira Beach. After some period of time, a decision was made not to use a Jet Ski on the Gulf side of Madeira Beach due to the rough conditions compared with the calmer intercoastal side. Respondent attempted to justify the use of one of the City-owned Jet Ski lifts for his personal craft so it could be used to supervise the training of new fire fighters who would use the Jet Skis for water rescues. Respondent made the decision to use the three Jet Skis for training. The city manager, Mr. Crawford, allowed this to happen because his philosophy was to allow his department heads, like Respondent, to have free reign in running their departments. Respondent believed that Mr. Crawford was aware that Respondent’s Jet Ski was on the lift and that one of the City-owned Jet Skis was kept on the trailer by the fire department. Mr. Crawford, however, testified he would never have allowed the personal Jet Ski to be kept on the City’s lift because that was “flat out against the ordinance.” Respondent told Mr. Crawford the City was saving money and preserving the Jet Skis by rotating the two City-owned craft on and off the lift while his personal craft stayed out in the elements at all times. Respondent said this would prolong the life of the two Jet Skis and have his ready for use in training throughout the year. Thirteen members of the Madeira Beach Fire Department required annual training. Respondent told Mr. Crawford the City was saving man hours and keeping down costs through rotating the Jet Skis. The City could train two firefighters at a time, which expedited the process and reduced the downtime in manpower. In theory this sounded practical, but the evidence of the amount of use of Respondent’s Jet Ski did not demonstrate great cost savings. Respondent claimed the annual savings by using his Jet Ski, along with the two City-owned craft, was $4,000-$6,000 per year, based upon a per-hour cost to run a Jet Ski of about $100. The issue of him keeping his personal Jet Ski on the City-owned lift did not become a problem prior to August 29, 2017. This became an issue after Mr. Crawford was terminated as city manager, due to a change in the composition of the Madeira Beach Commission. Respondent became the acting city manager and agreed to remove his personal Jet Ski from the City-owned lift. Respondent testified that his keeping the personal Jet Ski on the lift only became an issue after he became the acting city manager and some city residents wanted Mr. Crawford back in the job. At a meeting of the Madeira Beach Commission on August 29, 2017, one Commissioner, Terry Lister, said he believed Respondent’s Jet Ski should not be kept on the City-owned lift. The Mayor and another Commissioner did not have a problem with him keeping the Jet Ski on the City’s lift. Respondent testified that he could have kept his Jet Ski on his girlfriend’s property at no cost, and he only kept it on the City lift to help out with water rescue training. Respondent also testified he could not keep his Jet Ski at his condominium free of charge. He also could not keep it trailered there in the parking lot since that would violate the rules of his condominium association. The monthly cost to keep his Jet Ski on a trailer in dry storage at the Madeira Beach Marina is $140. A wet slip to store Respondent’s 20-foot-long Jet Ski would be $180 per month. Respondent’s Jet Ski hour meter indicated the craft was operated only 20 hours over the course of the two years his Jet Ski was available for use by the Madeira Beach Fire Department and kept on the City-owned lift. Some of those hours were attributable to Respondent’s personal use, although not quantified by Respondent, and the Jet Ski was available for his personal use during non-working hours, whether he actually used it regularly or not. Respondent testified that he removed his Jet Ski from the City list “[w]hen I became aware that this was going to be a huge issue during the time when I was the acting city manager and one of the commissioners made a comment about it.” The Jet Ski remained on City property for four months following the City Commission meeting where he said he would remove it to avoid any controversy. Once he removed his Jet Ski from City property, Respondent moved it to his girlfriend’s home in Palmetto, Florida, in Manatee County, more than 30 miles from Madeira Beach.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Ethics enter a final order requiring Respondent to make restitution to the City of Madeira Beach in the amount of $2,320, plus a civil penalty of $2,000 for a total of $4,320. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT S. COHEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of November, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Millie Wells Fulford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Elizabeth A. Miller, Esquire Office of the Attorney General Plaza Level 01, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Andrew J. Salzman, Esquire Unice Salzman Jensen, P.A. Patriot Bank Building, Second Floor 1815 Little Road Trinity, Florida 34655 (eServed) C. Christopher Anderson, III, General Counsel Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed) Virlindia Doss, Executive Director Florida Commission on Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 (eServed)
The Issue Whether just cause exists for Petitioner to suspend Respondent for 10 days without pay.
Findings Of Fact The School Board is a duly-constituted school board charged with the duty to operate, control, and supervise the public schools within Broward County, Florida. At all times material to this case, Respondent was employed by the School Board as a kindergarten teacher at Park Lakes Elementary School (“Park Lakes”), a public school in Broward County, Florida. The proposed discipline is based upon conduct occurring on Thursday, May 15, 2014, during the 2013-2014 school year. During the 2013-2014 school year, Kerlaine Louis was a paraprofessional assigned to Respondent’s class. On May 15, 2014, Respondent and Ms. Louis took thirteen of Respondent’s kindergarten students to the City of Lauderhill Mullins Park Pool Facility (“pool facility”) to participate in a water-safety class.1/ To get to the pool facility on May 15, 2014, Respondent, Ms. Louis, and the thirteen students rode together on a standard Broward County school bus. The bus picked up Respondent, Ms. Louis, and the thirteen students from Park Lakes at approximately 11:00 a.m. Respondent and Ms. Louis loaded the students onto the school bus at that time. Approximately 10-15 minutes later, the bus arrived at the pool facility with all of the thirteen students present. The bus drove directly from the school to the pool facility, and dropped Respondent, Ms. Louis, and the thirteen students off in front of the building where the pool facility is located. The pool is located behind the building. The thirteen students were scheduled to start their water-safety class at 11:30 a.m. The class was scheduled to end at 12:00 p.m. However, due to bad weather, the class was canceled. Respondent learned of the cancellation of the class after arriving at the pool and exiting the school bus with the children. Because the class was canceled, Respondent, Ms. Louis, and the thirteen students gathered in the patio area located in the back of the pool facility (behind the building and near the pool), where they waited under a covered patio area for the school bus to return to pick them up and bring them back to the school. Respondent brought some paperwork with her to work on at the pool facility. While waiting on the bus to return, the students interacted with each other. During this time, Ms. Louis spent most of her time pre-occupied with an exceptional student in the class who is autistic.2/ No lifeguards were on duty or in close proximity to the students and nobody was in the pool. While waiting for the bus to return to the pool facility, Respondent left the patio area and went inside the building. Respondent returned to the patio area in the back of the pool facility after being gone approximately five minutes. As she returned to the patio area, Respondent saw the bus coming around the front of the building. The bus returned to the pool facility at approximately 12:00 p.m. to pick up Respondent, Ms. Louis, and the thirteen students. Respondent gathered the children to walk them to the area where they would board the bus. Because it was raining, Respondent, Ms. Louis, and many of the children quickly boarded the bus. Shortly thereafter, the bus departed for the return trip to Park Lakes. However, by the time the school bus returned to the school at approximately 12:30 p.m., only Respondent, Ms. Louis, and eleven of Respondent’s students were on the bus. Two of Respondent’s students were left behind at the pool facility, unsupervised after Respondent and Ms. Louis left the pool facility without checking to see that all of the students were accounted for. Respondent did not realize that two of her students had been left behind at the pool facility until sometime after returning with the other students to her classroom at Park Lakes.3/ The two students that were left behind at the pool facility had gone to the bathroom. The bathroom is located along an exterior corridor of the building. Taking attendance and conducting a “head-count” of kindergarten students is an essential duty of a kindergarten teacher. Taking attendance and conducting a “head-count” of kindergarten students is required of all kindergarten teachers at Park Lakes at every transition point during a field-trip. A transition point occurs whenever there is movement of the children. Taking attendance and conducting a “head-count” of Respondents’ students who were participating in the water-safety class at every transition point was necessary to insure that all of Respondents’ students who were participating were accounted for and remained safe. The responsibility for that task fell on Respondent. Respondent was expected to take attendance and conduct a “head-count” of the students taking the water-safety class as they were leaving the classroom; as they were exiting the school; as they were boarding the bus; and while they were in route to the pool facility. Respondent was also expected to take attendance and conduct a “head-count” of the students taking the water-safety class when they exited the pool facility; as they boarded the bus to return to the school; while they were on the bus in route back to the school; and upon the students’ return to the school after departing the bus. At hearing, Respondent acknowledged that she failed to take attendance or conduct a “head-count” of her students prior to boarding the bus at the pool facility to return to the school. Furthermore, Respondent acknowledged at hearing that she failed to take attendance or conduct a “head-count” of her students while on the bus during the return trip to the school, or at the school after returning to the school. At hearing, Respondent conceded that she “dropped the ball” by failing to take attendance and conduct a “head-count” of her students before getting on the bus at the pool to return to the school, on the bus during the return trip to the school, and when she returned to the school. Had Respondent taken attendance and a “head-count” of her students while at the pool facility just prior to boarding the bus to return to the school, or while on the bus before leaving the pool facility, she would have discovered that two of the students were missing, and the children would not have been left behind at the pool facility. Respondent was visibly upset and remorseful of her conduct at the hearing. Within five minutes after the school bus departed to return to the school, April Nixon, a lifeguard at the pool facility who was inside the building, encountered the two children standing in an interior hallway of the pool facility. Ms. Nixon immediately called Park Lakes to report that the two students had been left behind; she locked all of the doors, and she remained with the students from the point she discovered them until two Park Lakes employees came to pick them up at approximately 1:25 p.m., and return them to the school. Significantly, for several minutes after the bus departed to return to the school, the two students were unsupervised, and their physical health and safety were in jeopardy. They could have easily wandered into the pool and drowned; walked further outside of the facility where they could have been kidnapped; or walked into a large lake, which is located very close to the perimeter of the pool facility-- accessible through a short walk through an unlocked door. Respondent failed to make reasonable effort to protect the two students from conditions harmful to their physical health and safety by failing to take attendance and conduct a “head- count” of the students in her class on multiple occasions on May 15, 2014, including: 1) when the students exited the pool facility to return to the bus; 2) as they boarded the bus at the pool facility to return to the school; 3) while they were on the bus in route back to the school; and 4) upon the students’ return to the school after departing the bus. Respondent’s conduct on May 15, 2014, also demonstrates incompetency due to inefficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Broward County School Board enter a final order suspending Respondent without pay for 10 days. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of January, 2015.
