Findings Of Fact Based upon the oral argument of the parties and the evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings, the following pertinent facts are found: On June 30, 1973, an agreement for purchase and sale was executed between Bayshore 21, Inc., as purchaser, and Arthree, Inc., as seller, for the purchase and sale of real estate commonly known as the Carriage House. This agreement was executed by Bayshore 21, Inc. in its corporate name, and not as a trustee or other representative capacity. The provisions of this agreement were individually guaranteed by Marvin Glick, the president and sole stockholder of Bayshore 21, Inc. The purchase and sale agreement discloses that the total purchase price of the property is $19,500,000, payable by taking subject to a first mortgage held by the Prudential Insurance Company with the remainder, subject to certain prorations, to be paid in cash. An earnest money deposit in the amount of $500,000.00 was placed in escrow by Bayshore at the time of execution of the purchase and sale agreement. Bayshore 21, Inc. represented and warranted in said agreement that it was a corporation duly organized and in good standing with full capacity to make and execute the agreement and to consummate the transaction embodied therein. Further, Bayshore warranted that there was no provision in its charter or bylaws, nor was it a party to any agreement, which would limit or prevent its consummation of the agreement. Also, Bayshore reserved the right to assign it's interests to any other party upon the assignee's assumptions of Bayshore's obligations or to direct Arthree, Inc. that the deed or other closing instruments would run in favor of a designated grantee other than Bayshore. Pursuant to the agreement for purchase and sale described above, Arthree, Inc. conveyed the Carriage House to Bayshore 21, Inc. by warranty deed dated August 17, 1973. There was evidence that the transaction was not closed until August 23, 1973. Bayshore 21, Inc. took title in its own corporate name, and not as a trustee or in a representative capacity. Proper documentary stamps were attached to this document. On either August 22 or 23, 1973, Bayshore 21, Inc. executed a $1,300,000.00 note and mortgage to Commercial Trading Company, Inc. and a $5,000,000.00 note and mortgage to Security Mortgage Investors. These notes and mortgages were in the corporate name of Bayshore 21, Inc. but were guaranteed by the petitioner and Marvin Glick. These guarantees contain language that the mortgagee may proceed directly against the guarantors in the event of default. There was evidence that utilization of Bayshore 21, Inc. to effectuate the loans from Commercial Trading Company and Security Mortgage Investors was required by said mortgagees because of the fact that the then prevailing interest rate levels were in excess of the noncorporate statutory interest limit. On August 23, 1973, a joint venture agreement was entered into between petitioner and Marvin Glick. This joint venture agreement provided that "The parties acknowledge that BAYSHORE 21, INC. has taken title to certain property as trustee for ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK and, upon completion of the financing arrangements, will convey the property to ZUCKERMAN-VERNON CORP. and MARVIN GLICK, a fifty (50 percent) percent interest being conveyed to each party. The property that is the subject of this joint venture is the CARRIAGE HOUSE, located at 54th Street and Collins Avenue, Miami Beach, Florida, each party to this agreement having a fifty (50 percent) percent interest in said property." On August 27, 1973, title to the Carriage House was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Bayshore 21, Inc. to Marvin Glick and petitioner, each to have an undivided fifty percent interest. Minimal stamps were affixed to this document, which bore the notation "No documentary stamps are required on this Deed inasmuch as the Grantor took title solely as Trustee for the Grantees herein." Thereafter, the respondent Department of Revenue assessed the parties to this August 27, 1973 deed for the documentary stamp taxes due, based upon the $18,550,000.00 existing mortgages on the property at the time of the conveyance ($12,250,000.00 to Prudential, $5,000,000.00 to Commercial Trading Company and $5,000,000.00 to Security Mortgage Investors). The delinquent documentary stamp taxes were assessed in the amount of $55,649.70, and a penalty was assessed in a like amount, making the total amount due $111,299.40.
Recommendation Based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that petitioner be assessed the taxes and penalties set forth In the proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, dated April 23, 1975. Respectfully submitted and entered this 30th day of January, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Ed Straughn Executive Director Department of Revenue Room 102, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 Paul R. Lipton, Esquire 17071 West Dixie Highway North Miami Beach, Florida Harold F.X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida
Findings Of Fact By warranty deed dated July 29, 1974 Marco Cove, Inc. conveyed certain property to the Barnett Bank of Naples, Florida as Trustee. At the time of these conveyances the properties were subject to a first mortgage dated September 14, 1971 in an original principal amount of $1,400,000 to AMI Investments, Inc. mortgagee and a second mortgage dated August 24, 1973 in the amount of $130,278 to Joseph R. Lynch, Inc. By quitclaim deed dated November 5, 1974 (Exhibit 8) Donald P. Landis conveyed his interest in Apartment Number C-3 in the condominium here involved to the Barnett Bank of Naples, Trustee. It appears that at the time of the conveyances here involved Marco Cove, Inc. was delinquent on both mortgages, owed materialmen's liens on the property, had sold some of the units to innocent purchasers without giving clear title, and had not placed in escrow the sums so received from these purchasers. Barnett Bank accepted title as trustee, so the various rights of the parties could be resolved without foreclosure proceedings. Although Petitioner contested that Barnett Bank was Trustee for AMI Investments, Inc., Exhibit 10, which was admitted into evidence without objection, clearly shows the bank understood they were trustees for AMI Investments, Inc. and accepted the deeds here involved. At the time of the conveyances the balance owned on the first mortgage was $63,356.16 and on the second mortgage $130,278. Respondent's third Notice of Proposed Assessment (Exhibit 3) assesses documentary stamp taxes and penalties in the amount of $59.25 on each of the three condominium units conveyed to the Trustee and documentary stamp tax and penalty in the amount of $547.88 on the conveyance of the entire condominium for a total tax and penalty of $725.63. No surtax is claimed. The conveyances to the Trustee did not extinguish the mortgages and the Trustee took title to the properties subject to these mortgages. Petitioner has subsequently sold its rights as first mortgagee to a third party for some $66,000.
Findings Of Fact The parties in the person of their counsel have stipulated to the evidential facts which shall serve as the basis for the determination of the matters in dispute. The stipulation of facts and its attendant exhibits are attached to this Recommended Order and made a part thereof. As can be seen in the examination of the stipulated facts and supporting exhibits, the amount of $940.80 tax due and $940.80 for penalty is the total amount pertaining to certain notes, including notes in the names of Newth and Smith, copies of which notes appear as Exhibits C and D to the stipulated facts. A review of the total audit, Exhibit A in the stipulated facts, reveals that the amount in issue on the notes of Newth and Smith totals $885.75 alleged tax due and $885.75 alleged penalty due. The balance of the $940.80 documentary stamp tax and $940.80 in penalty pertaining to notes of other named individuals have been conceded by the Petitioner as due and owing and are not in controversy through this hearing process. The original notes on the accounts of Newth and Smith were issued in 1969. The Newth note was drawn on September 17, 1969, and the Smith note on April 14, 1969. At the time the notes were issued, national banks were immune from state and local taxes whose categories were not within the purview of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548). Documentary stamp taxes were not one of the classes of taxes enumerated in Section 5219. Consequently, no documentary stamp taxes could be imposed against the notes drawn on accounts in the First National Hank of Pompano Beach because in 1969 it was a national bank, a status which it has continued to hold through the time of these proceedings. The prohibition against documentary stamp taxes being imposed by a state government on transactions between a national bank and its customers existed until December, 1969, at which point Public Law 91-156 was enacted, on December 12, 1969, and it amended Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548) and subsequent to that amendment, Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548 allowed state governments to tax national banks. In particular, the language of that latter provision provided: For the purpose of any tax law enacted under the authority of the United States or any State, a national bank shall be treated as a bank organized and existing under the laws of the State or other jurisdiction within which its principal office is located. This meant that transactions between the customers of a national bank and that bank with took place subsequent to the implementation of Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548 could be taxed pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, by the process of a documentary stamp tax being levied. (The exhibits attached to the statement of facts show that Newth renewed his note with the Petitioner on April 20, 1971, and again on December 31, 1975. Smith renewed his note on June 12, 1973, and on December 31, 1975. Through the renewal process, documentary steep taxes were not paid on $683,000.00 involving the note of Newth and on $15,500.00 involving the note of Smith.) The Petitioner claims that it need not pay the documentary stamp tax and penalty on the Newth and Smith notes, because it is except from the payment of such tax. While the Petitioner agrees with the Respondent that Subsection 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, calls for the payment of documentary taxes on promissory notes and the renewal of those promissory notes, Petitioner believes that Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, exempts it from the necessity to pay documentary stamp taxes and related penalties in the matter of the renewal of the Newth and Smith notes which took place on December 31, 1975. The provision of Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, states: 201.09 Renewal of existing promissory note; exemption.--Then any promissory note is given in renewal of any existing promissory note, which said renewal note only extends or continues the identical contractual obligations of the original promissory note and evidences part or all of the original indebtedness evidenced thereby, not including any accumulated interest thereon and without enlargement in any way of said original contract and obligation, such renewal note shall not be subject to taxation under this chapter if such renewal note has attached to it the original promissory note with canceled stamps of fixed thereon showing full payment of the tax due thereon. Petitioner reads this provision to mean that the prohibition against the State of Florida levying taxes on the transactions that took place on the Newth and Smith notes in 1969, under the protection afforded by Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548); was tantamount to a declaration that full payment of the tax due thereon had been rendered and when the State attempted to impose the documentary stamp tax on the renewals which took place on December 31, 1975, Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, exempted the Petitioner from the payment of that tax. Under this theory, it was only necessary to attach the original promissory note issued in the Newth and Smith matters in 1969 to the renewal notes of December 31, 1975, and even though canceled stamps were not affixed to the 1969 notes, this could be analogous to attaching promissory notes with canceled stamps to renewal note documents. The analogy is supported in the mind of the Petitioner because both in the instance of the latter promissory notes with documentary stamp taxes attached and in the cases of Newth and Smith where original promissory notes were attached without canceled stamps attached; the key point was that under the hypothetical situation of documentary stamp taxes affixed to the original notes or the actual situation in the Newth and Smith cases, both had the real effect or effect in law of providing full payment of taxes due thereon. The perception of the Petitioner does not comport with the basis for the exemption created by Section 201.09, Florida Statutes. That exemption only applies when tax has actually been paid on the original promissory note, which did not occur here, and that failure to pay tax on the original promissory notes precludes any claim for exemption when the notes were renewed. There exists one further possibility open to the Petitioner in its efforts to resist the payment of the documentary stamp tax rate penalty on the notes of Newth and Smith. That possibility resides in the idea that the prohibition against taxing the notes when they were drafted in 1969, such prohibition appearing in the guise of Section 5219 of the Revised Statutes (12 USCA Sec. 548); it would continue to exist for the life of the note making all renewals exempt from taxation. That interpretation does not pass muster when viewed in the light of Title 12 USCA Sec. 3548, which removed future transactions from their exempt status and made them subject to tax by the Respondent. This change in position allowed Subsection 201.08(1), Florida Statutes, to be imposed on the renewals to the promissory notes, which occurred on December 31, 1975. In summary, Petitioner having failed to demonstrate its entitlement to the exemption set out in Section 201.09, Florida Statutes, it is liable in the lull amount claimed for the payment of documentary stamp taxes and penalties in a like amount in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, on all transactions addressed in the audit, which is Exhibit A to the statement of facts.
Recommendation It is recommended that the Petitioner, First National Bank of Pompano Beach, be required to pay documentary stamp taxes in the amount of $940.80 and penalties in the amount of $940.80 related to the transactions on these promissory notes set out in the stipulation of facts offered by the parties. DONE AND ORDERED this 15th day of June, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1979. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Culpepper, Esquire 716 Barnett Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Barbara Staros Harmon, Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER =================================================================
The Issue By this petition, American Foam Rubber Distributors, Inc. (AFRD) and Edward Rothbard seek to have the Department of Revenue's assessment for documentary stamp tax and penalties on a transfer of real property by quit claim deed from Edward Rothbard to AFRD set aside. Petitioners contend that the transfer was without consideration and therefore nontaxable under sec. 201.02, F.S. , while Respondent contends that consideration flowed to the grantor by virtue of the grantee making the mortgage payments; and therefore, documentary tax stamps were due on the deed of conveyance computed on the amount of the mortgage at the time of transfer. One witness testified in behalf of Petitioners and four exhibits were admitted into evidence. From the pleadings, interrogatories and evidence presented at the hearing, the facts are largely undisputed and are as follows:
Findings Of Fact Edward Rothbard owns 100 percent of the outstanding stock of AFRD and he has been the sole shareholder and chief executive officer of the company since the company s inception in 1962. On March 9, 1973 the Seaboard Coastline Railroad (SCL) entered into an agreement with AFRD to sell a tract of land in Miami to the latter at an agreed price of $116,978.00 with certain conditions. The principal condition was that the grantee erect a warehouse on the property within one year from the date of the transfer. By deed dated August 23, 1973 the property was conveyed by SCL to Edward Rothbard rather than as per the contract. This deed was apparently delivered in late October, 1973 and the proper documentary stamp tax was paid on this transaction. Mr. Rothbard's testimony that the sole reason for taking the property in his name was to expedite the transaction was not rebutted. In exhibits 1 and 2 copies of letters from SCL dated September 21 and 26, 1973, SCL referred to Rothbard as nominee of AFRD to be grantee of the property. Exhibit 4, the title page of an interim title insurance binder, indicates that the title insurance policy on the property purchased from SCL was intended to be in the name of AFRD. In August, 1974 the building erected on the site for the use and benefit of AFRD was completed and Edward Rothbard mortgaged the property to secure a note in the amount of $550,000.00. His wife also executed the note and mortgage. AFRD occupied the building in September, 1975 and made all mortgage payments to the mortgagee including the first payment. By quitclaim deed executed February 26, 1975 Edward Rothbard conveyed the property here involved to AFRD subject to the mortgage. Minimum documentary tax stamps were placed on this deed. On February 26, 1975 the outstanding balance due on the mortgage was $543,969.59.
Findings Of Fact By warranty deed dated July 9, 1973, Floyd L. and Michael Lewis conveyed the fee simple title to certain realty in North Miami Beach to Petitioners Eugene J. Howard and Herbert Seidel. The purchase price for the property was $405,000. The property sold consisted of a twenty-two (22) unit apartment building with twenty (20) furnished apartments and included storage shed, a pool, patio and dock furniture. The closing statement signed by the sellers and purchasers stated: "Florida documentary stamps - on deed - $1,215.00, Florida documentary surtax - on deed - $132.20." $1,347.20 was credited to the Petitioners Howard and Seidel. Petitioners actually paid $10.85 surtax and $132.20 documentary tax. The 1974 tax assessment of the Dade County Property Appraiser for the property was $241,769.00 realty and $14,500.00 for the personalty. Petitioner contends: That part of the purchase price was applicable to -personal property. That the Hearing Officer should make an allocation of the realty included and an allocation for the personalty included. That the Petitioners believe they are entitled to the equitable defense of laches in that the Respondent did not advise Petitioners of the possible error of miscalculation until approximately two years had passed. That if the stamp tax is found to be due and if a penalty is included, the penalty is "excessive penalty" under the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, and Article I, Section 17, of the Florida Constitution. Respondent contends: That there was an agreement between the Parties, in a signed document that $1,215 in documentary stamps and $132.20 in surtax stamps, reflecting the actual consideration paid for the realty under consideration, would be affixed to the conveyance. That Petitioners failed to fulfill such a an agreement and affixed $132.20 in documentary stamps and $10.85 in surtax stamps to the deed. . That the Department is entitled to the delinquent taxes plus penalty. That the assessment is dated July 9, 1975 and a three- year statute of limitations is applicable. The Hearing Officer further finds: The purchase price for the property under consideration was $405,000. Documentary stamps required on such a purchase were $1,215.; that stamps actually paid were in the amount of $132.20, that $10.85 was actually paid and still due and owing is $121.35. That the Petitioners as well as the Sellers were aware of the proper amount of tax due and signed a receipt reflecting the monies allocable for documentary and surtax stamps. That the Petitioners failed either intentionally or negligently to pay the proper amount of documentary and surtax stamps at the time of recording the deed.
Recommendation Assess the documentary stamps and the documentary surtax against Petitioners together with applicable penalties. DONE and ORDERED this 9th day of July, 1976, in Tallahassee, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Eugene J. Howard, Esquire 2212 Biscayne Blvd. Miami, Florida 33137 Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The sole issue posed herein is: Whether or not the transfer to Petitioner by individuals Hugh P. Conser, Stewart L. Krug and Sidney Barbane1 of certain real property located in Pinellas County, Florida, on or about October 26, 1974, constitutes a conveyance subject to the Documentary Stamp Tax Act, pursuant to Chapter 201, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact On or about October 26, 1974, the Petitioner received title to certain real property located Pinellas County, Florida, from Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser, the principals in KBC Development Corporation, which was recorded in Official Records Book 4229, page 1052, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. The only consideration, as evidenced by the deeds filed in the case, is that the conveyance was for "good and valuable consideration and ten dollars". This other good and valuable consideration, according to Petitioner and the other record evidence, consisted of the issuance of all one hundred shares of the authorized stock of KBC Development Corporation, Petitioner, as evidenced by the Minutes of the Shareholders Meeting of such corporation which was held on July 18, 1973. (See the minutes reflected in an attachment to Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1.) The issued stock had a par value of $5.00. The corporate entity, KBC, as Petitioner, was formed for the purpose of taking title to the property in question and, as evidenced by the record, had no other assets when the subject property was conveyed. On May 6, 1975, the Florida `Department of Revenue, Respondent, recorded in the office of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County, Florida, a warrant for collection of delinquent documentary stamp taxes in connection with the above-referenced transaction in the amount of $27,599.70, plus an identical amount of penalty, for a total sum of $55,212.40. Said warrant is recorded in O.R. Book 4286, page 31, Public Records of Pinellas County, Florida. Following a conference with the Department of Revenue, the taxes were paid by the Petitioner under protest. That payment set the stage for the Petitioner's filing of the claim for refund with the Respondent, the Comptroller of the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Statutes section 215.26. The Petitioner argues that the only taxable consideration resulting from the subject conveyance was the par value of the stock, of which amount sufficient documentary stamps were affixed to the deeds in question. In support of this position, the Petitioner cites the fact that there are no income tax returns filed by the corporation, FIG; no business activities pursued by the corporation; no bank account of the corporation; and no assets held by the corporation, except as agents for the three individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, all of which were acknowledged by all of the mortgagees. Additionally, the Petitioner urges that the bank and lending institutions involved regarded and held each individual personally liable for the indebtedness in connection with the loans advanced for the property in question. Finally, the Petitioner urges that, based on the conveyance in question, there was no shift in the economic burden to the corporation and, therefore, no taxable transaction occurred when the property in question was conveyed from the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser, to FIG Development Corporation.
Conclusions The documentary stamp tax provided by Florida Statutes section 201.02 is an excise tax imposed on particularly described transactions, and in the case of instruments relating to realty, is based upon the total consideration involved in the transfer or conveyance. Thus, the key point in determining whether documentary stamps are to be affixed to an instrument transferring an interest in realty is in the presence or absence of consideration for the transfer. Rule 12A-4 .14, Florida Administrative Code, describes conveyances not subject to the documentary stamp tax as those "conveyances of realty without consideration, including. . .a deed to or by a trustee not pursuant to a sale . . . ." The facts of this case clearly do not illustrate an express or resulting trust relationship between KBC Development Corporation and its principals, Stewart L. Krug, Sidney Barbanel and Hugh P. Conser. When KBC took title to the property from Krug, Conser and Barbanel, the consideration was $10.00 and other valuable consideration and, based on the face of the instrument, the conveyance was not made to KBC subject to payment of any mortgages, etc., by KPC (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). Section 201.02(1), Florida Statutes (1975). See Florida Department of Revenue v. De Maria, 338 So.2d 838 (Fla. 1976). Additionally, the facts herein reveal that the banks and lending institutions involved in the transaction required the personal guarantees of the individuals, Krug, Barbanel and Conser. No evidence was introduced indicating that Petitioner, KBC Development Corporation, was anything more than an entity whereby the lending institutions had advanced funds for the primary mortgages to Continental Investment and Development Company, which was in no way related to the present corporation, KBC, and that the corporate entity was used to protect the lending institutions from any possible violations of usurious transactions. As stated, the personal endorsements and/or guarantees of the individuals, Barbanel, Krug and Conser, were required by the lending institutions before the primary mortgagee, Continental Investment and Development Company, would be released. Krug, Barbanel and Conser were no more nor less obligated to pay and perform under the obligation, after the conveyance than before. Although there was a change in the form of the obligation, there was no change in the substance. See e.g., Straughn v. Story, 334 So.2d 337 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) cert. discharged 348 So.2d 954 (1977). (See Petitioner's Exhibits 2, 3 and 4.) For all of these reasons, it is the considered opinion of the undersigned that the Respondents have failed to demonstrate that the consideration for the conveyances in question were anything more than the par value of the stock and, accordingly, documentary stamp taxes should only be assessed in the amount of $4.10. Accordingly, I shall recommend that the excess assessments which Petitioner paid under protest be refunded.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner be refunded the amount of taxes and penalties it paid to the Respondent, Department of Revenue, under protest, over and above the amount it should have paid on the par value of the stock of KBC Corporation when the abovedescribed conveyance was made during October, 1974. RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building MAILING ADDRESS: 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Donald R. Hall, Esquire Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road Clearwater, Florida 33518 Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire Assistant Attorney General The Capitol, Room LL04 Tallahassee, Florida 32304 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA KBC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. CASE NO. 76-1596 GERALD LEWIS, as COMPTROLLER OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AND DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, Respondents. / NOTICE TO: DONALD R. HALL, ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER GOZA, HALL & PEACOCK, P.A. 100 NORTH BELCHER ROAD CLEARWATER, FLORIDA 33518 CECIL L. DAVIS, JR., ESQUIRE ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENTS ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL THE CAPITOL LL04 TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32304 You will please take notice that the Governor and Cabinet, acting as head of the Department of Revenue at its meeting on the 12th day of June, 1979, approved the Respondent's Substituted Order, in lieu of the Division of Administrative Hearing's Recommended Order dated April 3, 1979. A copy of the Respondent's Proposed Substituted Order is attached. This constitutes final agency action by the Department of Revenue. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE STATE OF FLORIDA ROOM 104, CARLTON BUILDING TALLAHASSEE, FLORIDA 32301 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Notice was furnished by mail to Donald R. Hall, Esquire, Goza, Hall & Peacock, P.A. 100 North Belcher Road, Clearwater, Florida 33518, Attorney for Petitioner; by hand delivery to Cecil L. Davis, Jr., Esquire, Assistant Attorney General, The Capitol LL04, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, Attorney for Respondents and James E. Bradwell, Esquire, Hearing Officer, Division of Administrative Hearings, Department of Administration, Room 530, Carrolton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304, this 14th day of June, 1979. JOHN D. MORIARTY, ATTORNEY Attachment STATE OF FLORIDA
Findings Of Fact The facts in this case are derived from the exhibits submitted into evidence at the hearing and the testimony of petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. The pertinent documents show that a portion of a lot located in the toxin of St. Cloud, Florida, owned by Garold D. Doak, Sr. and Susan E. Doak, his wife, was mortgaged by the Doaks to Peachtree Mortgage Corporation on December 28, 1972, in the amount of $16,850.00. On January 4, 1973, Peachtree Mortgage Corporation assigned the Mortgage to the Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan association of Brooklyn, New York. On February 6, 1976, a lis pendens was filed against the property by the assignee of the mortgage in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Osceola County, Florida, incident to an action to foreclose the mortgage. On March 15, 1976, the Doaks executed quitclaim deeds on the property to Stephene J. Houseman. On April 6, 1976, a final judgement of foreclosure was entered in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit in favor of Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association of Brooklyn, New York. (Exhibit 1-6) On April 27, 1976, Houseman executed a quitclaim deed on the property to petitioners. On April 30, 1976, the Thorntons conveyed their interest in the property by warranty deed to Jaiies Francis Wiczorek and Shirley Lillian Wiczorek, his wife. The deed recited that it was subject to the outstanding mortgage to Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association with a principal balance of sec. 16,224.52 which the grantees agreed to assume and pay. The deed further recited a consideration of $4,000.00 and documentary stamp tax in an appropriate amount was paid based on a consideration which included the cash payment and the mortgage amount. On July 30, 1976, the mortgage in question was satisfied. (Exhibits 8-10) Only minimal documentary stamp tax of thirty cents was paid on the quitclaim deed from Houseman to petitioners. Respondent issued a notice of proposed assessment of additional documentary stamp tax in the amount of $48.60, surtax in the amount of $17.60, penalties in like amounts, and interest thereon, for a total of $158.51, on March 21, 1977. The proposed assessment was based on consideration stated to be the existing mortgage on the property in the amount of $16,224.52. On April 29, 1977, petitioners filed their petition for an administrative hearing, challenging the proposed assessment on the grounds that there was no evidence to show the taxable consideration as found by respondent. By an amended and revised notice of proposed assessment, dated April 29, 1977, the amount for documentary surtax, penalty and interest thereon was deleted leaving only the sums relating to documentary stamp tax, penalty, and interest in the amount of $102.30. (Exhibit 8) Petitioner H.R. Thornton, Jr. took the quitclaim deed in question to cancel a $100.00 debt owed him by Houseman. He had no intent to make the mortgage payments or payments or pay any other consideration for the transfer. (Testimony of Thornton)
Recommendation That petitioners be held liable for payment of documentary stamp tax, penalty and interest under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, as modified herein with respect to the penalty. Done and Entered this 29th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Daniel C. Brown, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304 H. R. Thornton, Jr., Esquire Post Office Box 345 St. Cloud, Florida 32769
The Issue The issue for consideration in this case is whether deeds by property owners which convey unencumbered real property to a corporation solely owned by them, are subject to a documentary stamp tax imposable under Section 201.021(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12B-4.013(7), Florida Administrative Code.
Findings Of Fact By Warranty Deed dated April 30, 1991, W. Dewey Kennell sold eight condominium apartments, units 1731, 1733, 1735, 1737, 1741, 1743, 1745 and 1747, in Baywood Colony Southwood Apartments IV, a condominium, to Kurt Rabau and Ronald Rabau, his son, residents of Germany. The Rabaus purchased the properties as an investment in rental property for income. At the time of the sale, the property was subject to mortgages totaling $250,000, which the Rabaus paid off on May 24, 1994. Sometime after the purchase, the Rabaus were advised to incorporate and hold title to the properties in a corporate capacity to protect themselves against personal liability. Thereafter, on September 14, 1994, the Rabaus formed Kuro, Inc., the Petitioner herein, to take and hold title to the properties, with Kurt Rabau and Ronald Rabau each owning 50% of the corporate stock. There were no other owners of stock in the corporation. On October 12, 1994, the Rabaus transferred all eight properties to Kuro, Inc. Kuro, Inc. had no assets other than the eight apartments, and did no business prior to the transfer of those apartments to it. Consequently, the stock of Kuro, Inc. was valueless prior to the receipt of the transferred apartments. The corporation’s federal tax form relating to transfer of property to a corporation, the “Corporation’s Statement on Transfer of Property Under Code Section 351” reflects that the Rabaus “transferred the jointly owned property [described therein] for which Kuro Inc. issued the stock”. From the evidence presented it is clear that the Kuro Inc. stock was issued in exchange for the contribution of the apartments to the corporation. Other documents in the corporation’s 1994 tax return indicate that the property was valued at fair market value at the time of transfer to the corporation, and the transferee’s, (corporation’s) adjusted basis was identical after the transfer. Each of the Rabaus received 500 shares of the corporation’s stock which was valued at $618,642. Of that amount, $617,642 was considered additional paid-in capital. There was no additional property received or possessed by the corporation. A minimal documentary stamp tax was paid by the parties at the time the eight Warranty Deeds for the apartments were transferred to the corporation. The consideration reflected on the face of each deed was “...the sum of $10.00 and other valuable consideration.” Subsequent to the transfer, the Department conducted an audit of the Clerk of Circuit Court in Sarasota County and, on November 10, 1994, issued a Notice of Intent to Make Documentary Stamp Tax and Discretionary Surtax Audit Changes, by which it indicated its intent to impose a documentary tax of $4,207.00 on the transfers, a 50% penalty of $2,103.50, and interest totaling $38.73 through November 10, 1994, with additional interest to accrue at the rate of 1% per month, prorated daily ($1.38), until date of payment. Thereafter, on March 27, 1995, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment to Kuro, Inc., and Petitioner timely filed a protest. Subsequent to that action, on January 11, 1996, the Department issued its Notice of Decision sustaining the proposed assessment, penalty and accrued interest, and Petitioner requested formal hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a final order imposing a tax in the amount of $4,207.00 with interest from date of filing at 1 percent per month based on the amount of tax not paid to date of payment. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6947 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: C. Samuel Whitehead, Esquire 2199 Ringling Boulevard Sarasota, Florida 34237 James F. McAuley, Esquire Office of the Attorney General The capitol - Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Linda Lettera General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1011
Findings Of Fact In time sequence, the following transactions took place: a. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, executed a contract with Willow Industries, Inc., a New York corporation, on August 14, 1973, for the purchase of properties located in Manatee County, Florida. Conquistador Estates, Inc., a Florida corporation, for profit, was incorporated under the laws of the State of Florida on September 25, 1973. Petitioner, Myron Friedman, borrowed $650,000 from Franklin National Bank of Long Island, New York, on October 29, 1973. Mr. Friedman executed a personal note to the Florida National Bank on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman made a loan to Conquistador Estates, Inc. in the amount of $400,000 to purchase the Manatee County property on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. purchased the properties described in the contract from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. executed a mortgage to Myron Friedman in the amount of $400,000 on October 30, 1973, in exchange for the herein before mentioned loan of $400,000 on October 29, 1973. Myron Friedman assigned the herein before mentioned mortgage to Franklin National Bank as security for the personal loan of $650,000 on October 30, 1973. Conquistador Estates, Inc. deeded the properties acquired by it from Willow Industries, Inc. to Myron Friedman on May 28, 1974. Additional facts: The notes and the mortgage herein described are still in existence. Conquistador Estates, Inc. is still a viable corporation although it owns no property and Myron Friedman is the sole stockholder. There were no payments made to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, as required by the terms of the promissory note of Conquistador Estates, Inc. to Myron Friedman. In an Audit of documents recorded in the office of the Circuit Clerk in and for Manatee County, Florida, Respondent, Department of Revenue, determined that insufficient documentary stamps and documentary surtax stamps were affixed to the warranty deed dated May 28, 1974, between Conquistador Estates, Inc. and Petitioner, Myron Friedman, an individual. Subsequent to the audit, the Respondent issued a "Proposed Notice of Assessment of Tax and Penalty Under Chapter 201, Florida Statutes, documentary surtax in the amount of $439.45, pursuant to Section 201.021, Florida Statutes, and penalties in the amount of $1,639.14 pursuant to Section 201.17, Florida Statutes. Attached to the said notice was "Schedule A," an explanation of the basis for the demand for additional documentary stamp tax and documentary surtax. It explained that the warranty deed to Petitioner, Myron Friedman, individually, from Conquistador Estates, Inc., satisfied the existing mortgage and which rendered the mortgage unenforceable as to the original mortgagor, Conquistador Estates, Inc., and cited Department of Administration Rule 12A-4.13(2) Florida Administrative Code. "Defaulting Mortgagor: Where a mortgagor, in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness, conveys the mortgaged premises to the mortgagee, documentary stamp taxes are due on the transaction." Petitioner, Myron Friedman, contends: That Conquistador Estates, Inc. was just a nominee used for the purpose of securing a mortgage loan; That he is the sole owner of the corporation; That there was no conveyance in full or partial satisfaction of the mortgage since he is the sole owner of the corporation, and he is the grantee and that, therefore, no documentary stamp tax or surtax or penalty is due; That the mortgage itself is assigned and is still in existence. The Respondent contends: That the clear wording of statute, Section 201.02(1), F.S., controls the transaction which was a conveyance by warranty deed; That because the corporation, Conquistador Estates, Inc. has no assets and made no payments to Petitioner, the conveyance by warranty deed was in full satisfaction of the mortgage indebtedness and canceled the written obligation of the corporation to pay $400,000, the unpaid portion of the obligation secured by the mortgage. The Respondent further contends that the partial indebtness of the corporation itself to Petitioner was canceled.
Recommendation Assess the documentary stamp and the documentary surtax against Petitioner, Myron Friedman. Do not assess penalties for failure to pay tax required, inasmuch as it is apparent that the taxes which were paid were paid in good faith and that the taxes which were due and owing were not paid because of a misunderstanding of the requirements of Chapter 201, F.S. DONE and ORDERED this 28th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 28th day of May, 1976. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert H. Carr, Esquire Post Office Box 3798 Sarasota, Florida 33578 Patricia Turner, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue in this unadopted-rule challenge is whether Respondent, in connection with the administration of the stamp tax, has formulated a statement of general applicability for allocating undifferentiated, lump-sum payments made in purchase- and-sale transactions involving joint real estate/personal property transfers; which meets the statutory definition of a rule but has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure; and, as used by Respondent, has the effect of creating an entitlement to collect tax on 100% of the undifferentiated consideration.
Findings Of Fact On February 23, 2015, Petitioner 1701 Collins (Miami) Owner, LLC ("Taxpayer"), a Delaware limited liability company, entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") to sell a going concern, namely a hotel and conference center doing business in Miami Beach, Florida, as the SLS Hotel South Beach (the "Hotel Business"), to 1701 Miami (Owner), LLC, a Florida limited liability company ("Purchaser"). Purchaser paid Taxpayer $125 million for the Hotel Business. The Hotel Business comprised two categories of property, i.e., real estate ("RE") and personal property ("PP"). The PP, in turn, consisted of two subcategories of property, tangible personal property ("TPP") and intangible personal property ("ITPP"). It is undisputed that the property transferred pursuant to the Agreement included RE, TPP, and ITPP. The sale closed on June 5, 2015, and a special warranty deed was recorded on June 8, 2015, which showed nominal consideration of $10. Pursuant to the Agreement, Taxpayer was responsible for remitting the documentary stamp tax and the discretionary surtax (collectively, "stamp tax"). Stamp tax is due on instruments transferring RE; the amount of the tax, payable per instrument recorded, is based upon the consideration paid for RE. Stamp tax is not assessed on consideration given in exchange for PP. The Agreement contains a provision obligating the parties to agree, before closing, upon a reasonable allocation of the lump-sum purchase price between the three types of property comprising the Hotel Business. For reasons unknown, this allocation, which was to be made "for federal, state and local tax purposes," never occurred. The failure of the parties to agree upon an allocation, if indeed they even attempted to negotiate this point, did not prevent the sale from occurring. Neither party declared the other to be in breach of the Agreement as a result of their nonallocation of the consideration. The upshot is that, as between Taxpayer and the Purchaser, the $125 million purchase price was treated as undifferentiated consideration for the whole enterprise. Taxpayer paid stamp tax in the amount of approximately $1.3 million based on the full $125 million of undifferentiated consideration. Taxpayer paid the correct amount of stamp tax if the entire consideration were given in exchange for the RE transferred to Purchaser pursuant the Agreement——if, in other words, the Purchaser paid nothing for the elements of the Hotel Business consisting of PP. On February 6, 2018, Taxpayer timely filed an Application for Refund with Respondent Department of Revenue (the "Department"), which is the agency responsible for the administration of the state's tax laws. Relying on a report dated February 1, 2018 (the "Deal Pricing Analysis" or "DPA"), which had been prepared for Taxpayer by Bernice T. Dowell of Cynsur, LLC, Taxpayer sought a refund in the amount of $495,013.05. As grounds therefor, Taxpayer stated that it had "paid Documentary Stamp Tax on personal property in addition to real property." Taxpayer's position, at the time of the refund application and throughout this proceeding, is that its stamp tax liability should be based, not on the total undifferentiated consideration of $125 million given in the exchange for the Hotel Business, but on $77.8 million, which, according to the DPA, is the "implied value" of——i.e., the pro-rata share of the lump-sum purchase price that may be fairly allocated exclusively to——the RE transferred pursuant to the Agreement. Taxpayer claims that, to the extent it paid stamp tax on the "implied values" (as determined in the DPA) of the TPP ($7 million) and ITPP ($40.2 million) included in the transfer of the Hotel Business, it mistakenly overpaid the tax.1/ On February 23, 2018, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Refund Claim Changes, which informed Taxpayer that the Department planned to "change" the refund amount requested, from roughly $500 thousand, to $0——to deny the refund, in other words. In explanation for this proposed decision, the Department wrote: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the [special warranty deed] was recorded. Please provide supporting information regarding allocation of purchase price on or around the time of the sale." This was followed, on April 2, 2018, by the Department's issuance of a Notice of Proposed Refund Denial, whose title tells its purpose. The grounds were the same as before: "[The DPA] was produced 3 years after the document was recorded." Taxpayer timely filed a protest to challenge the proposed refund denial, on May 31, 2018. Taxpayer argued that the $125 million consideration, which Purchaser paid for the Hotel Business operation, necessarily bought the RE, TPP, and ITPP constituting the going concern; and, therefore, because stamp tax is due only on the consideration exchanged for RE, and because there is no requirement under Florida law that the undifferentiated consideration exchanged for a going concern be allocated, at any specific time, to the categories or subcategories of property transferred in the sale, Taxpayer, having paid stamp tax on consideration given for TPP and ITPP, is owed a refund. The Department's tax conferee determined that the proposed denial of Taxpayer's refund request should be upheld because, as he explained in a memorandum prepared on or around December 27, 2018, "[t]he taxpayer [had failed to] establish that an allocation of consideration between Florida real property, tangible personal property, and intangible property was made prior to the transfer of the property such that tax would be based only on the consideration allocated to the real property." The Department issued its Notice of Decision of Refund Denial on January 9, 2019. In the "Law & Discussion" section of the decision, the Department wrote: When real and personal property are sold together, and there is no itemization of the personal property, then the sales price is deemed to be the consideration paid for the real property. [2] Likewise, when the personal property is itemized, then only the amount of the sales price allocated for the real property is consideration for the real property and subject to the documentary stamp tax. The first of these propositions will be referred to as the "Default Allocation Presumption." The second will be called "Consensual-Allocation Deference." The Department cited no law in support of either principle. In its intended decision, the Department found, as a matter of fact, that Taxpayer and Purchaser had not "established an allocation between all properties prior to the transfer" of the Hotel Business. Thus, the Department concluded that Taxpayer was not entitled to Consensual-Allocation Deference, but rather was subject to the Default Allocation Presumption, pursuant to which the full undifferentiated consideration of $125 million would be "deemed to be the consideration paid for the" RE. Taxpayer timely requested an administrative hearing to determine its substantial interests with regard to the refund request that the Department proposes to deny. Taxpayer also filed a Petition to Determine Invalidity of Agency Statement, which was docketed under DOAH Case No. 19-3639RU (the "Rule Challenge"). In its section 120.56(4) petition, Taxpayer alleges that the Department has taken a position of disputed scope or effect ("PDSE"), which meets the definition of a "rule" under section 120.52(16) and has not been adopted pursuant to the rulemaking procedure prescribed in section 120.54. The Department's alleged PDSE, as described in Taxpayer's petition, is as follows: In the administration of documentary stamp tax and surtax, tax is due on the total consideration paid for real property, tangible property and intangible property, unless an allocation of consideration paid for each type of property sold has been made by the taxpayer on or before the date the transfer of the property or recording of the deed. If the alleged PDSE is an unadopted rule, as Taxpayer further alleges, then the Department is in violation of section 120.54(1)(a). The questions of whether the alleged agency PDSE exists, and, if so, whether the PDSE is an unadopted rule, are common to Taxpayer's separate actions under sections 120.57(1) and 120.56(4), respectively, because neither the Department nor the undersigned may "base agency action that determines the substantial interests of a party on an unadopted rule." § 120.57(1)(e)1., Fla. Stat. Accordingly, the Rule Challenge was consolidated with Taxpayer's refund claim for hearing. It is determined that the Department, in fact, has taken a PDSE, which is substantially the same as Taxpayer described it. The undersigned rephrases and refines the Department's PDSE, to conform to the evidence presented at hearing, as follows: In determining the amount stamp tax due on an instrument arising from the lump-sum purchase of assets comprising both RE and PP, then, absent an agreement by the contracting parties to apportion the consideration between the categories or subcategories of property conveyed, made not later than the date of recordation (the "Deadline"), it is conclusively presumed that 100% of the undifferentiated consideration paid for the RE and PP combined is attributable to the RE alone. According to the PDSE, the parties to a lump-sum purchase of different classes of property (a "Lump—Sum Mixed Sale" or "LSMS") possess the power to control the amount of stamp tax by agreeing upon a distribution of the consideration between RE and PP, or not, before the Deadline.2/ If they timely make such an agreement, then, in accordance with Consensual-Allocation Deference, which is absolute, the stamp tax will be based upon whatever amount the parties attribute to the RE. If they do not, then, under the Default Allocation Presumption, which is irrebuttable, the stamp tax will be based upon the undifferentiated consideration. The Department has not published a notice of rulemaking under section 120.54(3)(a) relating to the PDSE. Nor has the Department presented evidence or argument on the feasibility or practicability of adopting the PDSE as a de jure rule. It is determined as a matter of ultimate fact that the PDSE has the effect of law because the Department, if unchecked, intends consistently to follow, and to enforce compliance with, the PDSE. Because, in the Department's hands, the PDSE creates an entitlement to collect stamp taxes while adversely affecting taxpayers, it is an unadopted rule.
