Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner was formerly employed by Respondent as a Human Services Worker assigned to the Landmark Learning Center, a residential facility located in Dade County. She began her employment on May 10, 1985. On January 13, 1989, Petitioner received the following memorandum from the Residential Services Director of Facility I at Landmark: In reviewing your time and attendance record from August, 1988, I have observed that you are exhibiting excessive absences and/or tardiness. These frequent absences place an unfair burden on your coworkers and interfere with the operations of this center. Therefore they will no longer be tolerated. Effective on the date you receive this communication, the following restrictions will be in effect: As always, you are expected to have all leave time approved in advance by your immediate supervisor. You are expected to submit a doctor's statement justifying your absence prior to the approval of any sick leave, annual-sick leave, or family-sick leave. You will not be allowed to substitute any other type of leave for these absences. Failure to comply with the above restrictions will result in disapproved leave without pay for the dates in question, and a recommendation for disciplinary action based on absence without authorized leave. In addition a continued pattern of excessive absence could result in disciplinary action for excessive absence/tardiness. All disciplinary [action] will be in accordance with HRS-P-60-1, Employee's handbook. I am confident that you will correct this situation in a satisfactory manner. At no time prior to the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent were the "restrictions" imposed by this memorandum lifted. In early 1990, Petitioner sustained an on-the-job injury. As a result of the injury, Petitioner was on authorized leave from February 25, 1990, until April 4, 1990. When she returned to work on April 5, 1990, Petitioner was assigned to "light duty" in the field office of which Sylvia Davis, a Senior Residential Unit Supervisor, was in charge. Petitioner's working hours were 6:00 a.m. to 2:30 p.m. Petitioner was advised that Roberta Barnes would be her immediate supervisor during her "light duty" assignment. On April 5, 1990, Petitioner worked six and a half hours. She was on authorized leave the remainder of her shift. On April 6 and 7, 1990, she worked her full shift. On April 8 and 9, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work. She telephoned the field office before the beginning of her shift on each of these days and left word that she would not be at work because she was experiencing pain in her lower back and right leg; however, she never received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on these days. April 10 and 11, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. At approximately 11:00 p.m. on April 11, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office and gave notice that, inasmuch as her physical condition remained unchanged, she would not be at work the following day. Petitioner did not report to work on April 12, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office the night before to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on April 12, 1990. On April 13, 14, 15 and 16, 1990, Petitioner did not report to work because she was still not feeling well. She neither telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absences, nor obtained supervisory authorization to be absent on these days. April 17 and 18, 1990, were scheduled days off for Petitioner. Prior to the scheduled commencement of her shift on April 19, 1990, Petitioner telephoned the field office to indicate that she would not be at work that day because she had a doctor's appointment, but that she hoped to return to work on April 20, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work on April 19, 1990. Although she had telephoned the field office to give advance notice of her absence, at no time had she received supervisory authorization to be absent from work on that day. On April 19, 1990, Petitioner was sent the following letter by the Superintendent of Landmark: You have not called in or reported to work since April 12, 1990 and therefore you have abandoned your position as a Human Services Worker II and are deemed to have resigned from the Career Service according to Chapter 22A-7.010(2)(a) of Personnel Rules and Regulations of the Career Service System. Your resignation will be effective on the date that you receive this letter or on the date we receive the undelivered letter advising you of your abandonment. You have the right to petition the State Personnel Director, 530 Carlton Building, Tallahassee, Florida 32304 for review of the facts. Such petition must be filed within twenty (20) calendar days after receipt of this letter. At approximately 12:40 a.m. on Friday, April 20, 1990, unaware that she had been deemed to have resigned her position, Petitioner telephoned the field office to give notice that she would be out of work until after her doctor's appointment on Monday, April 23, 1990. On April 23, 1990, Petitioner again telephoned the field office to advise that she had to undergo further medical testing and therefore would remain out of work until the required tests were performed. Petitioner's call was transferred to Elaine Olsen, a Personnel Technician II at Landmark, who told Petitioner about the letter the Superintendent had sent to Petitioner the previous Thursday. Petitioner received the letter on April 30, 1990. Petitioner did not report to work during the period referenced in the Superintendent's letter because she was not feeling well. She did not intend, by not reporting to work on these days, to resign or abandon her position. It was her intention to return to work when she felt well enough to do so.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Administration enter a final order (1) finding that Petitioner did not abandon her career service position, and (2) directing Respondent to reinstate Petitioner with back pay. DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of May, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of May, 1991.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, pursuant to Rules 22A-7.010(2)(a) and 22A-8.002(5)(a)3, Florida Administrative Code, abandoned her position and resigned from the State of Florida Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein, the Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, was employed by the Respondent, Department, as a Public Assistance Specialist II in the Department's Medically Needy Unit #87 in New Port Richey, Florida. In that assignment, Petitioner's immediate supervisor was Public Assistance Specialist Supervisor Dorothy White. It is established policy at the HRS facility in question for employees who will be absent to notify their supervisors as soon as possible when they know they will be absent. During her employment, Petitioner had received printed copies of this general policy and of the State rules governing the presumption of abandonment of position in cases where an employee is on unexcused leave for three consecutive workdays. On April 13, 1990, Petitioner was overcome with job stress and was admitted to a residential mental health care facility for four days, which was drawn against Petitioner's earned sick leave. Subsequent to her release, she received outpatient psychological therapy at the Center for the Treatment of Depression in New Port Richey, Florida, with Howard L. Masco, M.D., as her treating physician. On April 20 and again on April 25, 1990, Petitioner was advised by White that in order to properly draw against earned sick leave she must provide a doctor's statement that she was disabled and unable to perform her duties and the projected date of her return to work. On April 25, 1990, a doctor's statement was received, but it did not contain a projected date of return. On April 26, 1990, Petitioner applied to draw against the District V Sick Leave Pool, beginning on May 1, 1990 for an indeterminate period of time. This request was denied by the Committee Administrator. On May 9, 1990, White advised the Petitioner, telephonically and in writing, that her request to draw against the sick leave pool was denied. If she was unable to return to work, Petitioner must submit a written request for leave without pay for her current absence from work, with a beginning date of May 4, 1990 and a projected date of return to work. A physician's statement would also be required. After a period of misunderstanding, a written request with a physicians' statement was submitted by the Petitioner and Leave Without Pay was approved on June 18, 1990 retroactive to May 4, 1990. The physician's statement, dated May 18, 1990, stated that Petitioner has been unable to work since her hospitalization on April 13, 1990 and was still unable to work at the present time. Dr. Masco indicated that he was unable to determine when Petitioner would be able to return to work but that the present diagnosis was depression. Petitioner was advised, in writing, that additional leave could not be granted beyond July 17, 1990 and that Petitioner was required to return to work with medical certification at that time as to her ability to perform her assigned job functions. On the dates between July 18 and July 20, 1990, inclusive, Petitioner neither appeared at work nor informed her supervisor or anyone at HRS that she was going to be absent or was medically unable to return to work. No leave was authorized for her. This period constitutes in excess of three consecutive workdays of absence without approved leave. By letter dated July 27, 1990, Petitioner was advised in writing by the District Administrator that her failure to return to work on July 18 and thereafter constitutes abandonment of position. At the hearing, Petitioner attempted to show that her disability continued beyond July 20, 1990 and up to the present day, and that she had no intention of abandoning her position. That in fact she was physically unable to perform her duties due her continuing stress and depression.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding that Petitioner, Emily D. McGee, abandoned her position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services and resigned from the Career Service when, on July 18, 19 and 20, 1990, without authority, she absented herself from her workplace for three consecutive days. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Emily D. McGee Post Office Box 1223 Port Richey, Florida Thomas W. Caufman, Esquire Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 701 94th Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida John Pieno, Jr. Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Linda Stalvey Acting General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 760.10(1), Florida Statutes (2002), by forcing the termination of Petitioner's employment with Respondent because of his gender (male), and/or national origin (Venezuela), and/or his age (37); and because Petitioner alleged that younger, female lifeguards were given better work assignments.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent from November 26, 2002, until April 17 2003, in the position of deep water lifeguard at Respondent's facility at the Grand Floridian Hotel (Grand Floridian) located in Lake Buena Vista, Florida. He worked in that position until his resignation on April 17, 2003. Petitioner is a Hispanic male, aged 37, and a member of a protected class. Respondent is an employer as defined by the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA). Petitioner was hired for a full-time position to work 40 hours per week. He normally worked a ten-hour shift, four days a week. Petitioner never applied for any other position or promotions during his employment. All full-time lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Respondent and the Services Trades Council Union. A lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian does not have to be a member or pay dues to the union in order to be covered by the terms of the CBA. Petitioner is not a member of the union. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was provided with a packet of materials containing Respondent's employment policies. Respondent had a policy regarding harassment that covered all of its employees and prohibited all types of harassment in the workplace, including any such behavior based on age, national origin, and/or gender. Respondent also has an "equal opportunity" policy that applies to all of its employees. This policy provides that all employees should be treated equally in terms of hours, work location, and scheduling based on seniority. Operations at the Grand Floridian Of the class of lifeguards hired at the same time, Petitioner was the only one assigned to the Grand Floridian. At the time of being assigned to the Grand Floridian, there were approximately 25 lifeguards employed there. The lifeguards at the Grand Floridian are full-time, part-time casual, or part- time regular employees. There are also "college program" lifeguards who perform all of the same duties as the full-time and part-time employees. The starting times for employees are staggered, based on the needs of the area and the time of the year. The main duties of a lifeguard at the Grand Floridian are to ensure safety and guard the pools, clean the pool and beach areas, work the cash register, and operate the marina. The head supervisor of the Grand Floridian lifeguards during Petitioner's employment was Jerry Davis. Davis has been employed with Respondent for nine years. He has served in his current position as the recreation operations manager for six years. His duties in this position include supervising the outside recreation areas, including the pools, boats, and lifeguards at the Grand Floridian. Davis plays no role in hiring the employees that report to him, but rather Respondent's Employee Relations Department is responsible for hiring these employees. Davis has the authority to terminate lifeguards that report to him. Prior to terminating an employee, however, Davis seeks the input of the Employee Relations Department. The evidence is credible that Davis is accessible to his direct reports and makes sure that his office is always open to them. If a lifeguard wants to speak with Davis, he will make himself available to him or her. As a manager, Davis has undergone training from Respondent regarding its equal employment policies and anti- harassment policies. He has also been trained that employees may raise complaints about working conditions with either their manager or the Employee Relations Department. All employees are made aware of these policies and complaint procedures as a part of their orientation program. Under Davis, the next supervisor was Darin Bernhard. Bernhard has been employed with Respondent for eight years and is currently employed as a recreation guest service manager. Until October 2003, Bernhard was employed at the Grand Floridian. In that capacity, Bernhard directly supervised lifeguards, marina employees, and activities' employees. Bernhard had continuous interaction with lifeguards throughout the day while at the Grand Floridian. Bernhard had an open-door policy to all employees and made himself accessible to them. Under Davis and Bernhard, there were three coordinators who served as the immediate supervisors of the lifeguards. The weekly work schedule for lifeguards was posted on the wall every week. Bernhard, along with Respondent's Labor Office, was responsible for preparing this weekly schedule. The factors used in preparing this schedule were a scheduling bid submitted by each employee, scheduled vacations, and operational needs. As for operational needs, Bernhard would try to give a combination throughout the week based on full-time, part-time, and college program employees and avoid having all college program employees on duty at one time, thereby providing more experience on each shift. The CBA contains a provision stating as follows: "The principles of seniority shall be observed in establishing days off and work schedules by department, location, or scheduling pool." As a result, the schedule bids of all employees were considered based on the seniority of the employees. At the time of his hire, Petitioner spoke with Bernhard about special scheduling requests. Specifically, Petitioner asked to receive early shifts and weekends off. He wanted the weekends off due to child-care issues with his son. Bernhard informed Petitioner that he would attempt to work with Petitioner on this, but that he was limited in what he could do based on the seniority requirements set forth in the CBA, as well as the fact that most of the lifeguards preferred to have weekends off. At that point in time, Petitioner had the least amount of seniority of all the full-time lifeguards, since he was the most recently hired employee. Despite the CBA restrictions, Bernhard made every effort to provide Petitioner with at least one day each weekend off and tried to provide him with two, whenever possible. On a regular basis, Petitioner was scheduled to have Saturdays off. In addition, on numerous occasions, he was given Friday, Saturday, and Sunday off from work, in accordance with his special request. At no time during his employment did Petitioner ever complain to Bernhard about not getting enough days off on the weekend. Employees would occasionally complain to Bernhard about the weekly schedule. When he received such complaints, Bernhard would listen to their complaints and not take any adverse action against any employee for complaining to him about scheduling issues. On occasion, lifeguards would be sent home early due to slow business or inclement weather. This decision would be made either by the immediate supervisor on duty or one of the coordinators. The lifeguards would be allowed to volunteer to go home on a "first-come, first serve" basis. No lifeguard, however, was forced to go home early. Similarly, Bernhard did not receive complaints from any lifeguard about being forced to go home early. The coordinators at the Grand Floridian were responsible for making the daily rotation schedules. There were five primary positions that the lifeguards could be assigned to on a daily basis, consisting of two lifeguard positions at the pool, the slide, the marina, and cashier. The coordinators made these assignment decisions based on the people they had available that day. The primary focus was to make sure that all of the areas were properly covered. Such daily rotation assignments were also based on certain needs during particular periods of the day. In addition, certain assignments were given to certain employees if they are more capable of performing the task. It is also not uncommon for the daily rotation to be changed during the day based on unexpected factors, such as absent employees. In terms of shift assignments, an effort is made to make sure that regular employees and college program employees are working together so that the regular employees can provide guidance when needed. During a workday, most of the employees rotate positions every 30 minutes to an hour. The rotation of duties for the lifeguards changed on a daily basis. Petitioner enjoyed working as a lifeguard because he considered himself a stronger lifeguard than others in his department. He also described himself as the "leader of the lifeguards." All lifeguards are trained in the cashier duties, but very few individuals are chosen to actually work as a cashier. These cashiers undergo special training prior to performing these duties. The primary attributes for a cashier are good guest interaction and good phone skills because a cashier is required to interact with guests, both on the telephone and in person. This assignment also differs from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally does not rotate throughout the day to other assignments. It is not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cashier for an entire day. Petitioner was sometimes assigned to work at the marina, but not as a cashier. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about working more at the marina or as a cashier. Each lifeguard at the Grand Floridian was required to complete four hours of in-service training each month, either at his home resort or at another resort. Attendance at these training sessions were tracked on a daily sign-in sheet. If a lifeguard failed to complete his or her in-service training for the month, he would be reprimanded. Davis prepared a reprimand for Petitioner on April 1, 2003. This reprimand was the result of Petitioner's failing to complete his in-service training hours for the month of March 2003. As a result of failing to complete this training, Petitioner received a two-point reprimand for poor job performance. Petitioner did not know when Davis prepared the Poor Job Performance Memorandum dated April 1, 2003. Davis and Petitioner did not see each other between Petitioner's accident on March 30, 2003, and the date Petitioner signed the Poor Job Performance Memorandum on April 9, 2003. At the time that Davis prepared this memorandum, Petitioner had not made any complaints of discrimination or harassment to Davis. The attendance of the lifeguards on a daily basis was tracked by the use of an electronic swipe card. The daily schedule and attendance of the lifeguards was also tracked on a daily sheet completed by the coordinators. This sheet was kept in the managers' office and was forwarded to the Respondent's Labor Office when it was completed. Bernhard usually reviewed these sheets on a daily basis as well. The lifeguards did not have access to these sheets on a daily basis. Under the attendance policy in the CBA, three absences in a 30-day period warranted a one-point written reprimand. An employee had to receive three written reprimands within a 24- month period before he could be terminated for attendance issues. The reasons for an absence did not make a difference for purposes of accruing points under the policy. On March 24, 2003, Petitioner called in sick and did not appear for work. On his way home from work on March 31, 2003, Petitioner was in a car accident in a parking lot on Respondent's property. As a result of that accident, Petitioner's car had to be towed because it was not drivable. Petitioner did not, however, seek medical treatment as a result of the accident. Shortly after the accident occurred, Petitioner contacted Bernhard. He informed Bernhard of the accident and told him that he would not be available for work the next day because his car had been destroyed. He did not inform Bernhard that he had been injured in any way. Petitioner was absent from work on April 1, 2003, because he had no transportation. Petitioner called in his personal absence on April 1, 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, 15, and 16, 2003, and was a "no show" on April 2, 2003. As a result of these numerous absences, Davis made a decision to contact Petitioner by telephone and inquire about the reasons for these multiple absences. Petitioner informed Davis that he still did not have transportation. Petitioner expressed concern to Davis that he was afraid he was going to accrue too many points and get himself terminated. Davis responded to Petitioner that if he did not return to work, he would accrue points under the attendance policy. Petitioner asked Davis if it would be better if he terminated himself or if he was terminated by Respondent. Davis also informed Petitioner that if he terminated himself, at some point he might be able to return to his job at Respondent, though he did not guarantee him that he could simply return. Davis made it very clear to Petitioner that this was a decision he had to make. At the time of Davis' phone call to Petitioner, he had accrued sufficient points under the applicable "attendance policy" set forth under the CBA to warrant giving him a one- point written reprimand. Davis had not been able to give the reprimand to Petitioner, however, because he had not returned to work. At no time had Davis ever informed Petitioner that such a reprimand was waiting for him. In addition, such absences would not have provided a basis for terminating Petitioner at that point in time. Petitioner contacted Davis the following day and informed Davis that he was going to voluntarily resign his employment. Upon learning of this decision, Davis informed Petitioner that he needed to return his uniform and all other of Respondent's property prior to receiving his last paycheck. All employees are required to return their uniform and Respondent's property at the time of resignation. Davis never informed Petitioner that he was being terminated or that he had an intention of terminating him. Similarly, Davis never told Petitioner that he had no option but to resign. Davis had no problem with Petitioner returning to work, provided he could obtain proper transportation. After Petitioner's resignation, Davis completed the required paperwork and indicated that Petitioner should be classified as a "restricted rehire." Davis chose this restriction due to Petitioner's tardiness and attendance issues, as well as his failure to take responsibility to make it to work. This decision to categorize him as a "restricted rehire" was not based on Petitioner's age, national origin or his gender. Petitioner visited Respondent's casting center (human resource department) on June 17, 2003, approximately two months after his resignation, with the intent to reapply for his prior position. Petitioner wanted to return to his same position at the Grand Floridian, working for Davis and Bernhard, as well as working under the same coordinators. On June 17, 2003, Petitioner met with Fernanda Smith, who has served as a recruiter for Respondent for five years. Smith was born in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and is Hispanic. As a recruiter, Smith is responsible for interviewing, selecting, and hiring the strongest candidates for positions at Respondent. She is responsible for hiring employees for all hourly, entry- level positions. The hiring process used by Respondent is the same for both new applicants and former employees of Respondent. That process is set forth in the "Rehire Review" policy given to each recruiter. Once Smith is randomly assigned an applicant, she brings them to her office and reviews their personal data in the computer. She then reviews the application for accuracy and completeness. She also confirms that they are qualified to work in the United States and their criminal background. Smith reviews the conditions of employment with the applicant, including compensation, appearance, ability to attend work and transportation. If the applicant was previously employed by Respondent, Smith also reviews the application for the reasons the employee previously left employment and the applicant's rehire status. The different rehire statuses are "yes rehire," "restricted rehire," and "no rehire." If a former employee has been categorized as a "restricted rehire," Smith then must confirm that the person is currently employed and that he or she has been at that employment for a period of at least six months at the time of re-application. Assuming they can satisfy these requirements, the applicant is required to provide an employment verification letter from their current employer within one week of the interview. At that point, the information is forwarded to a rehire committee for consideration. On June 17, 2003, Smith interviewed Petitioner for potential rehire with Respondent. She recalls that when she met him in the lobby, he was very professionally dressed. Upon entering her office, Smith reviewed the information on Petitioner's application with him. At that point, she noticed that he had a recent date of termination from Respondent and asked him the reasons for his termination. Petitioner responded that he had left his employment because of transportation problems and that he had missed a number of days from work. In reviewing Petitioner's application, she realized that he did not meet the requirements for consideration as a "restricted rehire." First of all, Petitioner did not offer any evidence of current employment at the time of the interview. Secondly, Petitioner had only been gone from Respondent for a period of approximately two months, and thus, did not have the six months of continuous employment to be considered for rehire. Smith shared with Petitioner that he did not meet the minimum requirements for a "restricted rehire." Petitioner had no idea what that designation meant. At that point, Petitioner responded by getting very upset, yelling and screaming at Smith, standing up and pointing his finger at her. He then informed Smith that he was going to sue Respondent for discrimination and left her office. Petitioner did not allow Smith to make any other comments to him. Immediately after Petitioner had left the building, Smith prepared the standard evaluation that she prepares for all applicants she interviews, including the incident that occurred in the interview with Petitioner. If Petitioner had allowed Smith to explain the process and eventually provided the appropriate documentation, he might have been considered for rehire. Based on his behavior in the interview, however, Smith recommended that he not be considered for rehire, particularly for the position of lifeguard where he would be dealing with guests on a regular basis. Allegations of Discrimination Petitioner alleges that one of the coordinators referred to his national origin in a derogatory manner on one occasion. Other than this isolated alleged comment, he stated he never heard anyone else at Respondent make any derogatory comments about his being Hispanic or Venezuelan. Petitioner did not complain about this comment to anyone at Respondent and specifically did not complain to Davis, Bernhard, or employee relations about it. Other than this one comment by an unnamed coordinator, Petitioner offered no evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his national origin. In support of his age discrimination claim, Petitioner alleges that some of his co-workers referred to him once or twice as "old." Petitioner did not offer any evidence that any of his supervisors or coordinators ever used any of these terms in reference to him. Petitioner does not know whether or not he ever discussed his age with other workers. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, he was not the oldest lifeguard working at the Grand Floridian. Penny Ivey and Sherry Morris were both older than Petitioner, and Davis was born on February 5, 1951. At the time of Petitioner's resignation, Davis was 52 years old. Other than these alleged isolated comments, Petitioner offered no other evidence that any actions or decisions were taken against him based on his age. Petitioner claims that one example of gender discrimination was that the rotation schedule was not equal. In particular, he alleges that the "young and beautiful girls" were preferred in the rotation schedules because they were allowed to work in the marina and at the cash register more than males. Petitioner alleges that Jaimy Tully, a 23-year-old female lifeguard, was always late. For example, Petitioner alleges that Tully was late on March 2, 2003, based on the fact that she was supposed to be there at 10:00 a.m. The daily schedule indicates that she arrived for work at 9:30 a.m. In reviewing the document, however, it indicates "S/C" which means that a schedule change was made, and Tully showed up for work half an hour early, not late, and she still worked her scheduled day of ten hours. A schedule change would occur for several reasons, including the need to have certain employees come in early for an in-service session or the personal request of an employee. It sometimes required employees to come in for work early and other times required them to work later. Petitioner similarly alleges that Tully was late on March 22, 2003, and should have been fired for that. In reviewing the daily schedule for that date, however, it is evident that a schedule change was made, and Tully was scheduled to work from 9:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m., a regular 10-hour day, and that she actually worked those hours. Petitioner admitted at the hearing that she was actually early to work and not late. Petitioner alleges that Tully was late again for work on April 7 and April 16, 2003. A review of those daily schedules, however, reveals that Tully had a schedule change on each of those days and that she worked the hours that she was assigned. Of all these allegations of Tully being late to work, Petitioner never complained to anyone about it. Petitioner then alleges that Tully arrived for work early on February 15, 2003, and that she was allowed to work extra hours and earn overtime. On that particular occasion, however, Tully was called in early because she needed to attend an in-service training session that was occurring that day. Petitioner conceded that Tully was not late on that day. Petitioner admitted that both males and females were called in to work additional hours as lifeguards. For instance, Michael Whitt, a male employee, was allowed to start work earlier based on a schedule change on March 4, 2003. Similarly, a schedule change was made involving Whitt on February 25, 2003, and he was required to report to work at 11:40 a.m., not 10:00 a.m., and as a result, was not given any breaks that day. Petitioner never received any discipline as a result of being late to work or for leaving work early. Petitioner claims that he suffered discrimination on January 12, 2003, because Tully was allowed to start work later than he and then was allowed to work as a cashier for the majority of the day. He claims that she should have been on a rotation like him and that she was given more hours than he was. Tully was trained as both a lifeguard and a cashier, but she had more cashier experience than the majority of the other lifeguards. She also had good guest-interaction and cash- handling skills, and thus, she was placed as a cashier more than most of the other lifeguards. The cashier assignment also differed from the other assignments in that the employee assigned to this position normally did not rotate throughout the day, and it was not uncommon for the same employee to serve as a cahier for an entire day. Petitioner never spoke with any of his supervisors or coordinators about serving as a cashier, nor did he ever complain to Bernhard about any of his daily assignments. He alleges that the woman and the "young girls" were always placed at the marina. When asked to identify "these girls," he stated he was referring to Mindy and Matt, a male employee. In particular, Petitioner testified that on December 25, 2002, Matt served in the marina for three consecutive rotations on that particular day. He also points out that Matt had a longer break than he did on that particular day. There was no pay differential between employees who were assigned to work at the marina and those who worked at the pool. Similarly, there was no pay differential between employees working as a cashier and those at the pool. Petitioner never made any complaints to Davis about his weekly schedule or his daily rotation assignments. Similarly, Petitioner never complained to Davis about any disparate treatment or harassment based on his age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner never raised any complaints about discrimination or any other working conditions with Bernhard. Bernhard never made any derogatory comments to him or about him. Bernhard does not give any preference to any employees based on age, national origin, or gender. Petitioner was aware that there was an Employee Relations Department located at the casting center, but never complained to them about his working conditions or alleged discrimination.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order which DENIES Petitioner's Petition for Relief and dismisses his complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of April, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of April, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Fernando J. Conde 4732 Olive Branch Road Apartment No. 1205 Orlando, Florida 32811-7118 Paul J. Scheck, Esquire Shutts & Bowen, LLP 300 South Orange Avenue, Suite 1000 Post Office Box 4956 Orlando, Florida 32802-4956 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact On July 9, 1986 Petitioner, a Clerk Typist Specialist employed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, signed a receipt acknowledging that she had received a copy of the Department's Employee Handbook which contains the information that an employee who is absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization may be considered to have abandoned his or her position and thereby to have resigned. On September 3, 1987 Petitioner telephoned her supervisor to advise him that she had an interview scheduled and that she would be at work by 9:30 a.m. She, however, thereafter failed to appear at work and failed to make any further contact with her supervisor on September 3, 4, 8, 9, 10, and 11, 1987. On September 11, 1987 by certified letter the Department advised Petitioner that, as of the close of business on September 9, she was deemed to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service due to her unauthorized absence for three consecutive workdays, i.e., September 3, 4, and 8, 1987.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered deeming Petitioner to have abandoned her position and to have resigned from the Career Service. DONE AND ORDERED this 30th day of November, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: Ruby Holloway-Jenkins 649 West 4th Street Riviera Beach, Florida 33404 K. C. Collette, Esquire District IX Legal Counsel 111 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Adis Vila, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner was denied reasonable accommodation for his disability by Respondent in violation of the Pinellas County Code, Chapter 70 (“Chapter 70"). Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from his position as a bus operator by Respondent because of his disability in violation of Chapter 70.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Richard Mastromarino, is a resident of St. Petersburg, Pinellas County, Florida. Respondent, Pinellas Suncoast Transit Authority, is publicly funded transit agency and is an employer under Pinellas County Code, Chapter 70. Petitioner was employed by Respondent from May 7, 1979, until June 10, 1997, as a bus operator. The position of bus operator requires a commercial driver’s license. After experiencing vision problems, Petitioner visited his primary physician in February 1997. The primary physician diagnosed Petitioner with diabetic retinopathy and referred him to an ophthalmologist. After his diagnosis, Petitioner informed his immediate supervisor of his condition and availability to do light-duty work, and requested a medical leave form to take with him to his appointment with the ophthalmologist. On March 3, 1997, Petitioner visited ophthalmologist Dr. William T. Cobb, who confirmed the diagnosis of diabetic retinopathy, a condition that causes the blood vessels in the retina of the eye to excrete liquid and blood, thus impairing vision. Dr. Cobb informed Petitioner that as a result of his diabetic retinopathy, his vision was insufficient to drive any vehicle, including PSTA buses. In a Progress Report dated March 3, 1997, Dr. Cobb indicated that Petitioner “works as a bus driver and his occupation is threatened by his ocular disease.” Dr. Cobb also completed Petitioner’s medical leave form entitled Certification of Health Care Provider. On the form, Dr. Cobb described Petitioner’s vision as “limited to less than required for driving a bus.” The form also inquired whether Petitioner was able to perform any one or more of the essential functions of his job. In response, Dr. Cobb indicated that Petitioner was “unable to see to drive.” With regard to the probable duration of Petitioner’s incapacity, Dr. Cobb stated that the duration was “unknown.” Petitioner was referred by Dr. Cobb to Dr. W. Sanderson Grizzard for laser surgery. The first of several surgeries were performed in May and June of 1997. During this time, Petitioner was extremely concerned about the outcome of the surgeries. He understood from his physicians that there was a chance that his visual limitations could worsen and that there was a possibility that he might lose his eyesight altogether. Therefore, his immediate goal was to obtain medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) in order to have the surgeries performed. He also desired light-duty work in order to stay employed while he scheduled the surgeries. He was hoping that when his surgeries were complete, he could discuss his future with PSTA as far as which other jobs he could perform. He estimated that he would be able to discuss future work with PSTA in August or September of 1997. This information, however, was not conveyed to PSTA. Petitioner’s inquiries to his immediate supervisor regarding light-duty were referred to Gail Bilbrey, Benefits Specialist. Bilbrey administers a program instituted by Respondent, although not in writing, that assigns eligible employees on workers’ compensation leave to available temporary, part-time light-duty positions that accommodate their physical restrictions. In administering the program, Bilbrey reviews the medical documentation of an employee on workers’ compensation leave and determines if an existing position is vacant within one of several PSTA departments that the employee may be able to perform given the employee’s physical limitations. Because the positions available under this program are existing positions and are part of a bargaining unit of a labor union, light-duty assignments are not created for individual employees. Light- duty positions are extremely limited in number and are often not available for all employees injured on the job. The purpose of PSTA's light-duty program is to save costs of workers' compensation injuries by utilizing employees on workers' compensation leave, whom PSTA is required to pay, in vacant light-duty positions. Temporary light-duty positions, thus, are given to employees on workers' compensation by PSTA. The intent of the program is for the employee to occupy the position only on a temporary basis; thus, light-duty assignments are only granted to employees who are expected to return to work in their regular job. Since Petitioner was not on workers' compensation leave and was not expected to return to his bus-driving job, Petitioner was not eligible for a light-duty assignment. Even if Petitioner had qualified for light-duty, no light-duty positions were available at PSTA at the time of his request. Petitioner was informed of the lack of light-duty work during several conversations with Bilbrey. In response to his request, Bilbrey also prepared a memorandum dated April 23, 1997, indicating that no light-duty was available at that time. The main light-duty positions available at PSTA involved money-counting and ride surveying. Petitioner’s vision impairment prevented him from performing the functions of ride surveying, which includes observing passengers boarding and exiting PSTA buses at each bus stop and recording the results in writing. The money-counting light-duty position required the use of money-counting machines, checking bills, handling coins, and delivering/picking up tickets and money at Respondent’s remote terminals. Despite his vision limitations, Petitioner claims to have been aware of several full-time positions that he alleges he would have been able to perform in June 1997. First, Petitioner claims to have been able to perform the position of fueler/cleaner, which requires a valid Florida Class “B” Commercial Driver’s license, with passenger endorsement and air brakes, the ability to clean buses, and the ability to check coolant and oil levels. However, Petitioner had relinquished his commercial driver’s license in 1997, his physicians had stated he could not drive a bus, and, as observed by Bilbrey, his vision was insufficient to perform the job duty of checking coolant and oil levels. Two other positions became available at PSTA during the time in question which Petitioner now contends he would have been able to perform with adaptive equipment. First, the position of Customer Service Representative was posted by PSTA in early March 1997. This position involves selling tickets and passes, giving route and scheduling information to the public, and delivering supplies to three of Respondent’s remote locations. In 1997, maps and route schedules were not computerized and involved reading very small print. In addition, if Petitioner had qualified for and had been awarded the position, as the least senior Customer Service Representative, Petitioner likely would have been assigned as a “floater,” requiring Petitioner to be able to “float” between different remote terminals at different times to relieve other Customer Service Representatives. The shift of Customer Service Representatives begins at 6:00 a.m., prior to regular bus service. Given the fact that Petitioner was unable to read the fine print of the maps and schedules in a timely fashion and because transportation to deliver supplies, to float between terminals, and to report to work at 6:00 a.m. prior to bus service would have been a significant issue, Petitioner would not have been able to perform the job of Customer Service Representative. Also, in June 1997, the position of Clerk Risk Management became available. Petitioner had limited computer and clerical experience. Therefore, because this position requires extensive typing, computer work, and proofreading, Petitioner did not qualify for the position due to his limited vision and lack of computer experience. Petitioner was unable to perform these functions. After several surgeries, Petitioner's vision has stabilized but he is still legally blind by Social Security disability standards. Regardless of whether Petitioner would have been qualified, Petitioner did not apply for a request consideration for any of these positions or provide any documentation to Respondent indicating his ability to perform these jobs. Instead, in May 1997, Petitioner applied for long-term disability benefits. He completed the application in Bilbrey’s office with the aid of a magnifying glass. Attached to the application for long-term disability benefits was an Attending Physician’s Statement dated April 30, 1997, which was also provided to Respondent by Petitioner. On the form, Dr. Cobb indicated that the approximate date Petitioner would be able to resume any work was “indefinite” and that his prognosis for work was secondary to vision. Petitioner was granted and accepted long-term disability benefits. Pursuant to the long-term disability policy, Petitioner was found totally disabled and could not work. In addition, in April 1997, Petitioner requested an extended leave of absence beyond his FMLA leave that was due to expire in June 1997. However, when applying for the extended leave of absence, Petitioner was unable to specify a time frame in which he would be able to return to work. In fact, in a letter dated May 28, 1997, provided to Bilbrey on June 9, 1997, in support of Petitioner’s request for extended leave, Dr. Grizzard indicated that he “would expect [Petitioner] to not be able to work for at least 3 months.” Because Petitioner’s physicians were not able to provide a specific date when he could return to work, Petitioner’s request for extended leave was denied in accordance with Respondent’s policy. Thereafter, since Petitioner had exhausted all FMLA leave, was unable to perform the essential functions of his job as a bus operator, even with reasonable accommodations, and was unable to provide a definite date of return, Petitioner was terminated from his position as a bus operator on June 10, 1997, in accordance with PSTA policy. After his termination, Petitioner filed a grievance wherein he again requested an extended leave of absence until September 9, 1997, so that he could concentrate on his surgeries and to determine if he would be able to return to work at PSTA. A grievance hearing before Executive Director Roger Sweeney was held on June 30, 1997. At that hearing, Petitioner did not request light-duty assignment or reassignment to a new permanent position. Petitioner’s grievance was denied since Petitioner was unable to perform the duties for which he was hired, had been absent from employment with PSTA in excess of three months, had exhausted all FMLA leave, and was unable to provide a definite date of return. Following the grievance hearing, Petitioner was referred by the Division of Blind Services to Abilities of Florida for vocational rehabilitation training in January 1998. An assessment of his abilities indicated that Petitioner had limited keyboarding, computer, and clerical experience and was unable to score high enough on the 10-key calculator test to qualify for clerical training. Approximately three years after his termination, Petitioner also requested an evaluation to determine whether he could count money. In an informal test, Petitioner counted $55 in petty cash. However, no vocational report was ever provided to PSTA by Petitioner. The evidence fails to prove that Respondent’s employment decisions toward Petitioner were based upon or influenced by his disability.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s Charge of Discrimination be dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of April, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of April, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Craig L. Berman, Esquire Berman Law Firm, P. A. 360 Central Avenue Suite 1260 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 William C. Falkner, Esquire Pinellas County Attorney's Office 315 Court Street Clearwater, Florida 33756 Stephanie N. Rugg City of St. Petersburg 175 Fifth Street, North St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Alan S. Zimmet, Esquire Zimmet, Unice, Salzman & Feldman, P.A. Two Prestige Place 2650 McCormick Drive, Suite 100 Clearwater, Florida 33759
Findings Of Fact The parties stipulated that respondent, Lavern W. Burroughs, began work with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) on July 1, 1987, and that she was not present for work on July 22, 25, or 26 of 1988. Between March 3, 1988, and July 7, 1988, Ms. Burroughs, a clerk typist, was absent on fourteen occasions. Each time "LW" was entered beside her name on an attendance and leave sheet. "LW" is used when an employee has used up all sick and annual leave, but is nevertheless authorized to take leave. The designation LW means leave without pay, but it does not indicate whether leave was authorized or unauthorized. In December of 1987, Ms. Burroughs had received a "conference letter," HRS' Exhibit No. 1, after discussing her attendance problems with Mr. Weston and his immediate supervisor, Mr. Mathis. On April 15, 1988, Mr. Weston sent her a letter in 4 which he reprimanded her for being absent without leave. HRS' Exhibit No. 2. The letter stated: It is hoped that you will view this disciplinary measure in a constructive manner and there will not be a recurrence of this nature. However, you are cautioned that further offenses of this standard will result in more stringent disciplinary measure of a ten (10) days suspension without pay up to dismissal. Mr. Mathis testified that the ordinary practice, if petitioner's absenteeism had been handled as a career service matter, would have seen a ten (10) day suspension as HRS' next response, in the event of another unauthorized absence; and that dismissal would not have occurred, unless the ten (10) day suspension failed to cure the problem. On Thursday, July 14, 1988, Ms. Burroughs went to work, as it turned out, for the last time. The next morning she called in, shortly after 9:00 o'clock, to report that she had received notice of judicial proceedings designed to foreclose on her house. Unable to reach Mr. Weston, she asked for his supervisor, Mr. Mathis. Unable to reach him, she spoke to Ms. Evan Gibson, Mr. Mathis' secretary, and told her that she would not be coming to work. Ms. Gibson said she would relay the message. Ms. Burroughs left for Georgia in an effort to obtain money from a cousin with which to retain a lawyer to represent her in the foreclosure proceedings. The next Monday, July 18, 1988, Ms. Burroughs' daughter, Sheronda, telephoned HRS' Jacksonville offices. Apparently she spoke to Mr. Weston when she reported that Ms. Burroughs had trouble with her eye. On July 20, 1988, Ms. Burroughs telephoned herself. Again unable to reach Mr. Weston, she ended up telling Ms. Gibson that her eye was running and painful. Also on July 20, 1988, she visited the Riverside Clinic, received a prescription for erythromycin, and filled it that day. A nurse filled out a form employee's medical excuse saying that Ms. Burroughs had been under the care of a doctor at the clinic "and may return to work on 7/21/88." Joint Exhibit No. 1. Mr. Weston has never denied an employee's request for sick leave. Ms. Burroughs had been granted sick leave on more than three occasions and had produced a doctor's statement on each occasion. On Thursday, July 21, 1988, Ms. Burroughs called and spoke to Mr. Weston. In a telephone conversation that lasted perhaps two minutes, she told him about the problem with her eye, and also spoke to him about the threatened foreclosure. She did not say when she would return to work, but it was clear that she was not coming in that day. After Mr. Weston responded, "Okay," his only contribution to the conversation, Ms. Burroughs said goodbye and hung up. She did not explicitly ask for leave, even as she had never done before. Her eye stopped running on July 25, 1988, a Monday. On July 26, 1988, Ms. Burroughs set out for work, having spent, she testified, all her money, except for a quarter she had with her, on gasoline, for transportation to and from work that week. When her car overheated on 1-495 she was obliged to cut her journey short. She used her only quarter to telephone her brother's house, where a sister also lived. She asked this sister to call work to tell them what had happened. Instead, a friend, Wanda Stewart, learned the circumstances from Ms. Burroughs' sister, and made the telephone call to report why petitioner would not be in that day. Anna Williams, who worked in Mr. Weston's unit last summer, took the call. Because he was not in the office, she relayed the message to Mr. Mathis' secretary. When Ms. Burroughs' called herself, on July 27, 1988, she was informed she no longer had a job.
The Issue Is the Petitioner handicapped? Was the Petitioner capable of performing her duties satisfactorily? Did Respondent take adverse personnel actions against the Respondent? Were the adverse personnel actions which were taken against the Petitioner based upon her disability? Did the Respondent have a legitimate nondiscriminatory basis for taking the adverse actions against Petitioner? Were the reasons articulated by the Respondent pretextual? Did the Respondent provide reasonable accommodations for the Petitioner? To what relief is the Petitioner entitled if she prevails? Are the Petitioner's rights limited by her status as a non-tenured employee on annual contract status? Is the Petitioner entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys fees?
Findings Of Fact Dr. Tony Mason was employed by the School Board of Leon County, Florida, as the Coordinator for Diagnostic Services on January 2, 1986. As is done with all employees of the School Board, she was recommended for employment by the board by her immediate supervisor, Dr. Ruth Mitchell. Dr. Mitchell supervised from four to six coordinators of units similar to the Diagnostic Services during Petitioner's tenure with the Respondent. Each of these units was headed by an individual who was not handicapped and who had an educational background similar to that of the Petitioner. The position requirements for the position of Coordinator for Diagnosis Services were a background in physiology, social work, or a related field as well as educational and administrative background or experience. Dr. Mason holds the following degrees: Bachelor of Arts and Social Studies, English and Speech, Masters Degree in Counselling and Physiology, a doctorate in Administration and Supervision, and an Educational Specialist degree. She was employed by the U. S. Department of Education for several years in an administrative capacity. The Petitioner was well qualified for the position of Coordinator of Diagnostic Services Unit. At the time the Petitioner was hired she was handicapped. Her primary impairment is cerebral palsy. The Petitioner has suffered from this condition since the age of three. This condition is readily apparent from talking with and observing the Petitioner. The Petitioner also has had a partial gastrectomy. This latter condition is not observable. During her employment, she advised her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, of the nature, symptoms, and problems associated with both conditions. Both impairments significantly limit Petitioner's major life activities. Cerebral palsy, a neuromuscular disease, impedes Petitioner's ability to walk, and causes her to speak slowly. In addition, her speech is distorted although very understandable. A partial gastrectomy is a surgical removal of a portion of one's stomach. Both of the Petitioner's disabilities are negatively impacted by extreme stress. Extreme stress causes the Petitioner's muscles to contract and lock causing intense pain. Inordinate stress causes the Petitioner to "dump" requiring her to go to the nearest restroom as quickly as she can. Both the Petitioner's disabilities are not affected by normal, everyday stress. There was no evidence presented that the Petitioner's disabilities in any way impaired her intellectual capacity or mental abilities. The Petitioner had never been terminated or asked to resign from any position prior to working for the Respondent. While working for the Federal Department of Education and completing her doctorate in 13 months, both of which are stressful activities, the Petitioner did not suffer stress induced impacts on her disabilities. The Petitioner performed the duties of Coordinator for Diagnostic Services for almost two years without difficulty. As Coordinator for Diagnostic Services, Dr. Mason was responsible for the administration of this unit which employed eight social workers and ten physiologists. They were responsible for testing students within the school district and preparing reports based upon their testing to determine the eligibility of the students for participation in various educational programs. The Diagnosis Services Unit (DSU) also employed two secretaries and, at various times during the Petitioner's employment, additional interns and part-time employees. The Petitioner was also responsible for preparing staff papers on matters related to Diagnosis Services for presentation to the School Board together with budget requests, schedules, preparations of grants, and other special reports which were from time to time requested by the Superintendent, Deputy Superintendent, or Petitioner's immediate supervisor. To assist her in the preparation of these reports, the Petitioner was initially assigned a secretary. This secretary also filed the unit's paperwork and generally assisted the Petitioner. The work load of the DSU was consistently high as the unit was responsible for evaluating approximately 2,000 students each year. There has been a steady increase in the work load of the DSU since 1976, and the work load continued to increase through the period of the Petitioner's tenure at the DSU and thereafter. The DSU had suffered from high work load and limited resources prior to and during the Petitioner's employment in the unit. A psychologist working in the unit testified that she suffered severe depression as a result of the stress created by the workload in the Unit. For assistance in preparing reports, the DSU could send draft reports to the word processing unit. However, the word processing unit was slow and not suited to the particular needs of the DSU because the word processing personnel were not familiar with the technical terminology used in the psychological and social work reports, and did not accurately transcribe the material which the DSU sent to them. This resulted in reports having to be returned to the word processing center for corrections. Because the Petitioner's unit was only third in order of priority for using the word processing center, the DSU's turn-around time was lengthy. One school psychologist had to wait an entire summer to receive materials she had sent to the word processing center, and then found it necessary to return them for corrections. The lack of adequate secretarial support adversely impacted the work of the DSU and the Petitioner's personal performance. Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's immediate supervisor, forbade the Petitioner to use her secretary for typing Petitioner's written reports because of the backlog in the unit. The Petitioner was forced to print her own work by hand. This was slow and adversely affected by her disability. Because the Petitioner could not use the secretaries who were assigned to and physically located in her unit, the Petitioner had to walk to the word processing center, where obstructions and uneven steps in the area of the unit's office made Petitioner's walking more difficult. This caused further delay. The practice of assigning short suspense projects made the absence of adequate secretarial support worse. The Petitioner paid for secretarial services to prepare various reports for the Respondent paying in one year over $900.00 for secretarial support to meet the demands of her job. The Petitioner made verbal requests for a secretary to her supervisor, Dr. Mitchell, and these requests were denied. The Petitioner made requests to the Superintendent and other members of the School Board Staff, and caused a letter to be written by her physician to the Board explaining the need for secretarial assistance as a reasonable accommodation for her disability. Although the Respondent denies that Petitioner made a request for a secretary as a reasonable accommodation for her disability, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, a memorandum to William Wolley from the Petitioner dated May 4, 1989, which specifically addressed other issues references the aforementioned physician's letter as follows: There is also a letter from a physician earlier relative to that issue in requesting some reasonable accommodation in terms of secretarial assistance that was an attempt to get my Secretary III reinstated . . . [.] The Respondent never assigned a secretary to assist the Petitioner in doing her work although the timeliness of the Petitioner's work was the primary complaint regarding the Petitioner. The school board's yearly payroll was in excess of $110 million. The salary for a secretary varied between $15,000 and $20,000 a year. At the time of Petitioner's employment, the Petitioner walked without the use of a walker although she walked slowly and with some difficulty. The Petitioner wanted to postpone using a walker to assist her in walking because use of a walker causes certain muscles to become dysfunctional and atrophied. Although the Petitioner had a walker in her office restroom and in her car, she avoided use of a walker wherever possible because, as stated above, they can cause the muscles to become dysfunctional, and because they can cause the individual to trip by catching on the uneven surfaces. In late spring or summer of 1988, Dr. Mitchell, the Petitioner's supervisor, told the Petitioner that she wanted the Petitioner to use a walker around the office complex. Dr. Mitchell made the Petitioner's use of a walker a condition of continued employment after Petitioner fell outside the Board's offices when she tripped over an uneven joint in the sidewalk and landed on a piece of broken curbing. A coworker, who is an R.N., was aware of how Petitioner felt about being asked to use a walker and explained to Dr. Mitchell that victims of cerebral palsy strive to maintain the maximum independence and postpone the use of such devices. Dr. Mitchell advised the coworker that if Petitioner wanted to work for the Respondent that she would have to use the walker. The Petitioner felt that Dr. Mitchell's demand was unwarranted, improper, not in her best interest, and refused to use a walker in the absence of a physician's recommendation. The Respondent never referred Petitioner to a physician for evaluation. Subsequent to Dr. Mitchell's demands that the Petitioner use a walker and Petitioner's refusal, Dr. Mitchell made derogatory comments to staff about how slow Petitioner walked. At this time, the professional relationship between Dr. Mitchell and the Petitioner became strained. Dr. Mitchell arranged to have a study done in early 1988 by Case Management Services Inc. Dr. Mitchell requested that Dr. Mason participate in this study which was presented to Dr. Mason as an assessment of the work environment of the board offices; however, the report prepared by the consultant appears to address not the work area, but Dr. Mason personally. The purpose of this report was to support Dr. Mitchell's demand that Dr. Mason use a walker. Notwithstanding the findings by the consultant that there were architectural and facilities maintenance problems which posed a danger to the handicapped, the consultant's first recommendation primarily addressed Dr. Mason's use of a quad-cane (walker). The second recommendation, "occupational therapy evaluation to determine means for enhanced functioning among campus architectural problems," appears to be limited to the Petitioner. In the spring of 1989, Dr. Mitchell gave Petitioner her first unsatisfactory annual performance evaluation. In addition, Dr. Mitchell only extended Dr. Mason's service contract for three months beyond the existing contract and denied Dr. Mason an increase in salary. Dr. Mason appealed Dr. Mitchell's evaluation and Dr. Mitchell reevaluated Dr. Mason's performance as satisfactory. Dr. Mitchell told Dr. Mason that this was the last time she would amend her evaluation of Petitioner pursuant to an appeal. Although not readily apparent from the file, Dr. Mason's employment contract was extended for an entire year and pursuant to that contract she was evaluated again in June of 1990. At that time, Dr. Mitchell evaluated Dr. Mason as unsatisfactory and extended her contract for only three months. During the year 1989-90, Dr. Mitchell documented every instance in which Dr. Mason appears to have departed from school board procedure or failed in any way to meet Dr. Mitchell's expectations. Dr. Mitchell contacted other supervisors of other activities within the school system and requested that they provide her with any information related to the failure of DSU to meet their expectations. See the memorandum of Dr. Mitchell to Beverly Blanton dated June 19, 1989. Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to perform additional work unrelating to any specific program or project, and announced her intention to attend Dr. Mason's staff meetings, to hold weekly meetings to review Dr. Mason's logs and summaries of activities, and to work with Dr. Mason on staff development. (See memorandum Dr. Mitchell to Dr. Mason dated April 10, 1989, subject: Suggestions for improvement in evaluation.) These requirements, placed upon Dr. Mason under the guise of improving her performance, formed the basis for additional criticism of Dr. Mason while at the same time taking up more of her time and undercutting Dr. Mason's authority with her subordinates. Dr. Mitchell also requested access to Dr. Mason's medical records, a request she did not make of any other employee. Dr. Mitchell demonstrated an amazing lack of tact with Dr. Mason. Dr. Mitchell advised Dr. Mason on one occasion when Dr. Mason was hospitalized for burns suffered in an accident while on school business that Dr. Mason had picked an extremely bad time to be injured, and when Dr. Mason was recuperating at home from a severe fall, Dr. Mitchell threatened to bring a television crew to Dr. Mason's house for an interview if Dr. Mason could not come to work. One of the major complaints against Petitioner by Dr. Mitchell was the quality of the reports provided by Dr. Mason's unit to Ray King. A complete file of these reports was provided to Dr. Mitchell by Mr. King's staff as a result of a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell. (See Tab 6, Respondent's Exhibit 3.) The first of these 103 reports is dated May 18, 1988 and the last of these dated December 15, 1989. There were 97 reports returned from Mr. Ray's to Dr. Mason's section between 5-18-88 and 4-20-89. There were six reports returned from Mr. Ray's section after 4-20-89. Contrary to the assertions made by Respondent, the number of reports kicked back by Mr. King during the period following Dr. Mason's initial unsatisfactory evaluation were significantly reduced. The Respondent attempted to justify its denial of a secretary as a reasonable accommodation to Dr. Mason by stating that it was having fiscal problems, and by providing Dr. Mitchell with a computer. Because of Dr. Mason's handicap, she is unable to utilize a computer to prepare her own work. Further, notwithstanding Dr. Mason's inability to use a computer, Dr. Mitchell required her to be conversant in the operation of a computer so she could utilize the computerized data base. Contrary to the Respondent's assertion that Dr. Mason was only required to be knowledgeable about the computer's capabilities, Dr. Mitchell required Dr. Mason to demonstrate use of the computer to her secretary, and was harshly critical of Dr. Mason's inability to do so. Although additional memoranda purportedly documenting additional failings on the part of Dr. Mason and the DSU were introduced, Dr. Mason's explanations are adequate, and these secondary reasons for the adverse personnel action are not meritorious. Because of budgetary constraints in 1990, Dr. Mason's requests for authorization to fly to St. Petersburg to make a presentation at an educational conference was denied. Dr. Mason was told to drive to the conference or not to attend because attendance at the conference was not a part of her normal duties and responsibilities. Presentations at such conferences are considered professionally beneficial both to the individual and to the board. However, Dr. Mason admitted that she had not requested air travel as reasonable accommodation due to her handicap which makes long trips by car very painful and debilitating. On September 22, 1990, the Petitioner received a memorandum from Dr. Mitchell that her contract would not be renewed, and that Petitioner should leave all records in her office.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth herein, it is, RECOMMENDED: The Respondent reinstate the Petitioner to a position comparable to the position from which she was terminated (or in which the Respondent denied the Petitioner employment), The Respondent pay the Petitioner backpay, to include insurance and retirement benefits less $25,241, in accordance with this order, The Respondent pay the Petitioner's reasonable attorney fees and costs, and The Respondent be enjoined from further discrimination against the Petitioner. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1993. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-6043 Proposed findings of both parties were read and considered. The following states which of those findings were adopted, and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Findings: Para 1-9 Adopted. Para 10 Irrelevant. Para 11-14 (1st sentence) Adopted. Para 14 (2d sentence) Contrary to best evidence. Para 15,16 Adopted. Para 17 Irrelevant. Para 18-42 Adopted. Para 43 Subsumed in 44. Para 44-45 Irrelevant. Para 49-54 Adopted. Para 55 Irrelevant. Para 56-80,82 Adopted or Subsumed. Para 81 Irrelevant. Para 83-92 Irrelevant. Para 93-99 Adopted. Para 100-118 Adopted. Respondent's Findings: Para 1-3 Adopted. Para 4-5 Irrelevant. Para 6 Contrary to best evidence. Para 7-11 Irrelevant. Para 12-13 Contrary to best evidence. Para 14 Irrelevant. Para 15 Contrary to best evidence. Para 16-17 Irrelevant. Para 18,19 Contrary to best evidence. Para 20, 21 The letter was not considered. Para 22-24 Contrary to best evidence. Para 25-27 Adopted. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathryn Hathaway, Esquire 924 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Leslie Holland, Esquire Suite 800 2800 Biscayne Boulevard Miami, Florida 33167 Deborah J. Stephens, Esquire Graham C. Carothers, Esquire 227 South Calhoun Street Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard Merrick, Superintendent Leon County School Board 2757 West Pensacola Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304-2907 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4113
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Respondent at the commencement of the 1975- 1976 school year as an industrial arts teacher at the B. F. James Adult Education Center. During the first days of the 1975-1976 school year, Petitioner was employed as a substitute teacher. On November 17, 1975, however, Petitioner entered into a written agreement with Respondent entitled "Contract for Part-Time Instruction." Pursuant to the terms of the contract, Petitioner was to be paid an hourly salary of $8.82 per hour. The contract further provided, in pertinent part, that: The number of hours of instruction will be based upon the courses offered for which the instructor is qualified, and assignment to teach such courses will be made by the county superintendent of schools through his designated adminis- trative representative. This appointment is contingent upon minimum enrollment and attendance in the course assigned. This contract may be cancelled at any time by either party upon ten days written notice. . . (Emphasis added.) During the 1975-1976 school year, Petitioner worked at least seven and one-half hours per day, five days per week, 12 months per year. Petitioner worked a regular day schedule with additional but irregular work performed at night. Like full-time teachers on an annual contract, Petitioner received his pay on a monthly basis. However, as indicated above Petitioner was paid an hourly salary, whereas teachers on either annual or continuing contracts were paid according to a salary schedule negotiated between Respondent and the Broward County Classroom Teachers Association, Inc. In addition, as earlier indicated, Petitioner's work hours were on an "as needed" basis, depending upon student enrollment, the nature of courses offered, and funding for particular programs of instruction. Full-time teachers on annual or continuing contracts were employed on the basis of a school year of not less than 196 days. During the course of the 1975-76 school year, Petitioner inquired of his immediate supervisor concerning the possibility of receiving an annual contract. The supervisor, in fact, recommended Petitioner for such a contract, but that recommendation was not acted upon favorably by Respondent. The record in this cause reflects only that there was "some problem" with Petitioner's personnel file which led to Respondent's decision not to offer an annual contract to him during the 1975-1976 school year. Respondent was again recommended, in a subsequent school year, by his immediate supervisor for an annual contract for 70 percent of a full school day, but again that recommendation was not acted upon favorably. Petitioner continued employment with Respondent during the 1976-1977, 1977-1978, and 1978-1979 school years. During each of those years, Petitioner continued to work at least seven and one-half hours per day, five days per week, 12 months per year. After the initial contract between Petitioner and Respondent for the 1975-1976 school year, however, Petitioner never received another written contract. He did, however, inquire on several occasions concerning his right to receive an annual contract. Respondent, however, never offered Petitioner annual contract status. Respondent classifies the contractual status of its instructional employees as either "annual," "continuing," or "part-time." Part-time employees, unlike annual contract and continuing contract employees, have not been given written employment contracts for at least the last five years. Recommendations to employ part-time instructional employees originate with Respondent's school principals, who transmit their recommendations to the Superintendent. The Superintendent, in turn, recommends the employment of part- time employees to the School Board. Part-time employees are recommended by the Superintendent and voted upon by the Board en masse in June of each year for employment during the following school year. As many as 1,200 to 1,500 part- time employees may be recommended for employment at one time. Once the School Board approves the Superintendent's recommendations concerning the hiring of part-time employees, those persons approved are thereafter available to principals to be hired at any time during the ensuing school year. Respondent places no limits on the amount of time part-time employees may work, notwithstanding their part-time designation, so long as students, courses, and course funding are available. When a course offered by Respondent and taught by Petitioner or other instructional employees similarly situated did not generate sufficient enrollment or failed to receive funding, the course was discontinued and the instructional employee's employment ceased. Sometime during the 1978-1979 school year, Petitioner met with his immediate supervisor to discuss his continued employment with Respondent. Ultimately, Petitioner received a letter advising him that his employment would be terminated at the conclusion of the 1978-1979 school year. Prior to his termination, Petitioner had never been advised, in writing, of any deficiencies in his job performance.
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent abandoned his position in the career service employment system of the State of Florida in the manner envisioned by Rule 22A-7.010, Florida Administrative Code, and therefore, whether that employment position is any longer available to him.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Thomas J. Atwell, was employed by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles in its regional office in Tampa, Florida. Most of his employment duties were located in the Clearwater, Florida, area. His duties involved inspection of mobile homes at sites where those homes were manufactured. His immediate supervisor was Melvin Hinson, Sr., the Assistant Regional Administrator of the Division of Motor Vehicles Regional Office in Tampa, Florida. On October 19, 1988, the Petitioner injured his back while on duty in the process of jumping to the ground from the door of a mobile home he was inspecting. He was placed on disability leave and received worker's compensation benefits as a result of the injury which occurred within the course and scope of his employment. Sometime after being placed on disability leave, he began a course of treatment at Shands Hospital in Gainesville, Florida. At about the same time, he encountered marital discord with his wife, became separated from her, and moved to Tallahassee, Florida, to live with relatives. Upon arriving in Tallahassee, he began to be treated by Dr. Charles Wingo, who became his treating physician for worker's compensation purposes. Dr. Wingo ultimately notified his employer that he could return to light-duty work in a sedentary capacity, sitting and standing, without doing any carrying, if such work were available to him. This notification was by letter dated October 2, 1989. The Respondent, as a result of this communication, issued a letter to the Petitioner on November 3, 1989 advising him that he should report to the Tampa Regional Office of the Division of Motor Vehicles on November 13, 1989 to begin light-duty employment. The letter stated that the Petitioner would be "assisting in answering the telephone, filing, making xerox copies, and performing other light duties that may be assigned by your supervisor." According to the testimony of Buck Jones, the Respondent had a genuine need for someone to perform these duties and it was a true open position in the Tampa Regional Office. The Respondent did not have a need for someone to perform such light duties in the Tallahassee area, however. Indeed, there is no regional office in Tallahassee, with the closest regional office being in Ocala, Florida. In any event, a few days after the November 3, 1989 letter, the Petitioner telephoned Buck Jones, the Chief of the Bureau for Mobile Home and Recreational Vehicle Construction. The Petitioner told Mr. Jones that he could not get the required medical treatment in Tampa. Mr. Jones told the Petitioner that he would investigate the matter of the availability of medical treatment in Tampa. The Respondent later confirmed that medical treatment was indeed available in the Tampa area, which was suitable for the Petitioner's condition. On November 16, 1989, Mr. Jones wrote the Petitioner another letter stating that medical treatment was available in Tampa and requiring him to report for duty at the Tampa office on November 20, 1989. The letter also expressly stated that should the Petitioner fail to report for duty within three (3) days of that date, November 20, 1989, he would deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the Department. The letter invited the Petitioner to contact Mr. Jones should he have any questions about the matter. The Petitioner never contacted Mr. Jones before his employment reporting date of November 20, 1989. He did not report for work on November 20, 1989, as ordered, or at anytime thereafter. Around November 3, 1989, the Petitioner had called Mr. Hinson to discuss his worker's compensation case and his job and was told by Mr. Hinson that he should be contacting the Tallahassee office because he had already been told to call "headquarters." On November 27, 1989, the Respondent notified the Petitioner that he had been absent without authorized leave for three (3) consecutive workdays and was, therefore, deemed to have abandoned his position and resigned from the career service.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration declaring that the Petitioner, Thomas J. Atwell, has abandoned his employment position and resigned from the career service. DONE AND ENTERED this 23rd day of August, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-7058 Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-15. Accepted. Accepted, but not material to resolution of disputed issues. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Leonard R. Mellon Executive Director Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Enoch Jon Whitney, Esq. General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0500 Thomas J. Atwell, pro se 2320-J Apalachee Parkway Box 455 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Michael J. Alderman, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Neil Kirkman Building, A-432 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0504
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Juvenile Welfare Board of Pinellas County (Petitioner) should have treated John Bucci as a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System from April 1984, through July 1988, and therefore, should be required to submit retroactive adjustments for retirement and social security based upon his earnings during this period.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is an independent taxing district created by Special Act in 1945 to provide funding in Pinellas County for services to children. It timely filed a request for hearing on the Respondent's decision to consider John Bucci a mandatory member of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from April 1984, through July 1988. The position of the Petitioner is that John Bucci was an independent contractor, and therefore, should not be considered a mandatory member of the FRS. Bucci worked as a janitor for the Petitioner between April 1984, and July 1988. He opened the building in the morning, deactivated the building alarm, made coffee, cleaned the employee restrooms, emptied waste baskets, vacuumed and dusted. From time to time, he also painted and made minor repairs in the building, and took mail to the post office when directed to do so. While Bucci did not receive daily assignments, his duties were routine and had been worked out with representatives of Petitioner when he was initially employed. If there were problems with his cleaning, he would be told to reclean an area, and he was expected to take care of the problem as soon as possible. The Petitioner provided Bucci with all supplies and equipment necessary to do his job. While he worked with the Petitioner, Bucci did not have a written contract, but rather, he had an annually renewable verbal contract. He was paid on an hourly basis, and submitted a monthly record of hours worked each day, which was reviewed and approved for payment by Petitioner. Bucci received annual increases from the Petitioner, but did not negotiate these increases. The Petitioner simply gave him what it considered to be a cost of living increase each year. According to Petitioner, Bucci was not in an established position, and therefore, did not receive fringe benefits. At the time, Bucci was the only person working with the Petitioner which it considered to be an independent contractor. Subsequent to his leaving, Petitioner bid, and now has a written contract for janitorial services with an agency in Pinellas County that offers employment opportunities to retarded citizens. That agency provides all equipment and supplies necessary for janitorial duties. After several counseling sessions with Carole Gunnels, Petitioner's operations manager at the time, Bucci was terminated because of continued problems with his work. Thereafter, it was determined by the Division of Unemployment Compensation, Department of Labor and Employment Security, that he qualified for unemployment benefits. The Comptroller's Office of the State of Florida has issued Memorandum No. 7 (1988-89) regarding determinations of a person's status as an independent contractor or employee. In pertinent part, that Memorandum sets forth twenty factors to be considered in determining if sufficient control is present to establish an employee-employer relationship, and states: The Internal Revenue Service has provided guidance in making this determination in Revenue Ruling 87-41. It provides generally, that the relationship of employer and employee exists when the person or persons for whom the services are performed have the right to control and direct the individual who performs the services, not only as to the result to be accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control of the employer not only as to what shall be done but as to how it shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually direct and control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient if the employer has the right to do so. The Respondent has adopted Rule 22B-6.001(15), Florida Administrative Code, which defines the term "independent contractor" as an individual who: agrees to provide certain services; works according to his own methods; is not subject to the control of his employer, except as to the results of his work; and does not receive the fringe benefits offered by the employer. A consultant or independent contractor usually: is compensated from another salaries and wages account; does not earn annual or sick leave; and may frequently do a majority of his work in his own office rather than on the employer's premises. In order to determine if Bucci should have been considered to be an employee of the Petitioner, rather than an independent contractor, the Respondent provided Petitioner with a copy of its Employment Relationship Questionnaire, which Petitioner completed on or about April 10, 1989. The information provided by Petitioner on this Questionnaire indicates that Bucci was required to follow regular routines or schedules, the Petitioner could change the methods by which he performed his work or otherwise direct him in the performance of his duties, the work was to be performed by Bucci personally, the Petitioner could discharge him at any time, and he could quit at any time. It was also indicated that Bucci was not filling a regularly established position, but was retained under an oral contract to perform personal services. Bucci did not work full-time with the Petitioner. Rather, he worked an average of between 4 to 5 hours a day with the Petitioner. On rare occasion during the time he was employed with the Petitioner, he did take other part-time cleaning jobs with other employers. However, he did not have any occupational license as a janitorial service, did not advertise as such, had no yellow page listing for janitorial services, and did not have any equipment or supplies necessary to carry out his duties, other than what Petitioner provided him. The characteristics, terms and conditions of Bucci's employment with the Petitioner from April 1984, through July 1988, support the Respondent's determination that he was an employee, rather than an independent contractor, and that he was, therefore, a mandatory member of the FRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent enter a Final Order concluding that John Bucci was a mandatory member of the FRS, and as such denying Petitioner's request for relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of November, 1989 in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of November, 1989. APPENDIX (DOAH CASE NO. 89-4067) Rulings on the Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected as purely procedural matters and not a relevant proposed finding of fact. 3-4. Rejected in Findings of Fact 2-5, 8-10. The Respondent did not timely file Proposed Findings of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Terry A. Smiljanich, Esquire P. O. Box 1578 St. Petersburg, FL 33731 Stanley M. Danek, Esquire General Counsel's Office 440 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Aletta L. Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550