Findings Of Fact On July 24, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed Respondent's sign opposite Respondent's place of business and apparently on the DOT right-of-way of U.S. 19. Measurements were taken by the inspector to locate the sign with respect to U.S. 19. The right-of-way of U.S. 19 at this location is 100 feet east and west of the centerline of U.S. 19. The right-of- way extends fifty feet west of the western edge of the southbound lane of U.S. 19, thus locating the sign some 12 feet inside the right-of-way boundary. Respondent had been advised by a DOT sign inspector where this portable sign could be legally located and the sign was placed in that location out of the DOT right-of-way. On the day the sign was tagged for being on the right-of- way, the man mowing the grass around Wendy's restaurant adjacent to Respondent's restaurant moved the sign to facilitate the mowing. Respondent's owner had previously told the mower to be sure to return the sign to its authorized location if moved to facilitate mowing but, on this occasion, the sign was not immediately relocated to its authorized location.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the sign located 186 feet West of Mulberry Point, Citrus County, Florida. Petitioner also owns the property on which the sign is located. The sign advertises a community development which Mr. Infantino is developing. The sign is important to his business. The sign is located on a parcel of real estate adjacent to State Road 44. State Road 44 is a Federal Aid Primary Highway and was a Federal Aid Primary Highway prior to sign's erection. The sign was originally erected in 1980 or 1981. Mr. Infantino had the sign erected by a professional sign company. At that time, the area in which the sign is located was zoned commercial by the county. 1/ No state sign permit was obtained by either Mr. Infantino or the company that erected the sign. Mr. Infantino was not aware of the state sign permit requirement and, therefore, the sign has never been permitted in the nine or ten years of its existence. In 1986, the area in which the sign is located was rezoned by the county. The new designation given by the county to the area was Coastal Lakes - 2, an environmentally sensitive area with a primarily residential use. However, the County allowed the sign to remain as a non-conforming structure. The evidence failed to demonstrate whether there were at least three (3) businesses within 1600 feet of Petitioner's development. Additionally, the evidence did not demonstrate that the surrounding area was primarily commercial in its use or was customarily used in a commercial character. 2/ In 1989, after nine or ten years of the sign's existence, an unnamed DOT inspector discovered the sign involved in this case. The late discovery was never adequately explained at the hearing. However, upon its discovery, the sign was determined not to have a state permit. Mr. Infantino was cited for the violation in a Notice to Show Cause issued by the Department. In response to that Notice, Petitioner filed a permit application with Respondent. The application was reviewed and denied primarily because the area in which the sign was located was not currently zoned commercial.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is: RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner's application for a permit to erect and maintain a sign on State Road 44, on real estate located at Section 8, Township 19, Range 21, Parcel 12200, in Citrus County, Florida, be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of February, 1990.
Findings Of Fact On August 4, 1987, a DOT sign inspector observed a sign advertising Respondent's business adjacent to the business and appearing to be on the right- of-way of SR 52 in Pasco County. Measurements were taken from SR 52 to the sign by the inspector. The right-of-way of US 52 extends 50 feet north and south from the centerline of US 52 at this location. From the edge of the pavement of SR 52 the right of way extends 38 feet on the side on which Respondent's sign was located. The sign was measured to be 33 feet from the edge of the pavement. Respondent placed the sign on property thought to be owned by the owner of the building in which the salon is located. There are other structures such as ornamental lamps which are also located on the right-of-way in this vicinity. However, Section 479.11(8), Florida Statutes, does not proscribe the erection of structures other than signs on the DOT right-of-way.
The Issue The issues to be determined are: a) whether Petitioner’s sign for Crestview Paint and Body is located within Department of Transportation’s (“Department” or “Respondent”) right-of-way; and b) whether the sign is entitled to an on-premises exemption from permitting.
Findings Of Fact The Department of Transportation is the state agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising along interstates and federal-aid primary roads in accordance with chapter 479, Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10, and a 1972 Federal- State Agreement. Petitioner, Crestview Paint and Body, owns and operates an auto body repair shop on 956 West James Lee Boulevard in Crestview, Florida, and has maintained that location since 1988. In 2006, Petitioner bought property at 701 South Ferdon Boulevard in Crestview, Florida, including a pre-existing sign for Jet Muffler and a building with four units. Petitioner opened the business location in 2007, and replaced the Jet Muffler sign with one for Crestview Paint and Body. One of the issues of dispute in this matter is whether Petitioner conducted business at the Ferdon Boulevard location. Mr. Lowe, owner of Crestview Paint and Body, testified that the Ferdon Boulevard location was operated as a concierge service for Crestview Paint and Body. Mr. Lowe maintains a business occupational license for the Ferdon location and the license was effective and valid when Respondent issued the Notice on April 17, 2017. While a tax collector print-out reflected the business was closed, the credible evidence supports that the concierge location maintained a valid business occupation license. Mr. Lowe had business cards made with a photograph of the Ferdon Boulevard location showing Hertz and Crestview Paint and Body, and the words “Collision Concierge and Rental Car Center, 701 S. Ferdon Blvd, Crestview, Florida.” Another card read “2 Locations to Serve You Better” with the addresses for Ferdon Boulevard and James Lee Boulevard. The Crestview Paint and Body sign at issue here was located at the Ferdon Boulevard location. It was erected at the same spot as the predecessor sign that advertised the Jet Muffler business and installed under permit No. 2007-0430. Petitioner complied with all Crestview local ordinances required to erect the sign. As the sign was replacing an established sign, it is not clear if the City of Crestview required a survey of the location prior to installation. The sign has been owned and operated by Crestview Paint and Body in its current location for the past 10 years. Wayne Thompson, an employee of Crestview Paint and Body, testified that he works at the Ferdon location periodically. He meets customers at the location as needed, an average of two times per month. An employee was initially assigned to work full-time at the concierge location, but the position was reduced to part-time, and eventually eliminated. Senida Oglesby, a former customer of Crestview Paint and Body, testified that she received concierge service at the Ferdon Boulevard location. She took her vehicle to the location and it was transferred to the main location for completion of service. However, Ms. Oglesby stated she was last at the business approximately 3 to 4 years ago. Mr. Lowe testified that he completed an inspection of a vehicle at the concierge location on an undetermined date. Respondent asserts that its investigator visited the Ferdon Boulevard location on February 7, 2017; April 17, 2017; and May 15, 2017, and observed no business activity and concluded there was no business being conducted on behalf of Crestview Paint and Body at the location. The credible evidence demonstrates that there was no legitimate business activity being conducted on behalf of Crestview Paint and Body at the Ferdon Boulevard location. Ferdon Boulevard is a federal-aid primary highway subject to Department permitting in accordance with chapter 479. Crestview Paint and Body has never requested or received a permit for the display of outdoor advertising at the Ferdon Boulevard location. In 2015, Crestview Paint and Body leased Bay 101 of the Ferdon Boulevard location to a vape and smoke shop. The header signs positioned above the units numbered 101, 103, and 104 had signs for the vape and smoke shop. There was no header sign above unit 102. Mr. Collins placed a Notice sticker on the Crestview Paint and Body sign located at Ferdon Boulevard. On April 18, 2017, a written copy of the Notice was sent to Crestview Paint and Body at the James Lee Boulevard location. In preparing for the hearing, Billy Benson, a Department outdoor advertising field administrator, discovered that the sign appeared to be partially on the property owned by Crestview Paint and Body and partially on the Department’s right-of-way. The Department’s right-of-way is defined in section 334.03(21), Florida Statutes, as land in which the Department owns the fee or has an easement devoted to or required for use as a transportation facility. At the sign’s location, the right-of-way extended 50 feet to the right and 47 feet to the left of the centerline of Ferdon Boulevard. Mr. Collins again visited the Ferdon Boulevard location along with Sam Rudd. Mr. Collins and Mr. Rudd located survey markers to the north and south of the sign establishing the Department’s right-of-way line extending 10 feet beyond the edge of the sidewalk. The front edge of the sign began at two feet beyond the edge of the sidewalk and the back edge of the sign was 12 feet beyond the sidewalk. A survey conducted by a Department survey crew in November 2017, confirmed that 7.8 feet of the sign was located within the Department’s right-of-way and 2.6 feet of the sign was on Petitioner’s property. On September 20, 2017, the Department issued an Amended Notice of Violation–Illegally Erected Sign, noting that in addition to being an unpermitted sign in violation of section 479.105, the sign was located within the Department’s right-of- way in violation of sections 479.11(8) and 337.407. On September 20, 2017, the parties filed an Agreed Motion for Continuance, based on the recently discovered information and the sudden death of Mr. Lowe’s father. The motion provided: This matter involves an unpermitted sign in Okaloosa County. The department recently surveyed the sign’s location and determined the sign is within the Department’s right of way. Consequently, the department is issuing an amended notice of violation citing section 337.407 and 479.107, Florida Statutes, in addition to the initial reason for the violation based on section 479.105, Florida Statutes. The Department believes it is in the interest of judicial economy to have all charges determined in a single hearing. The Petitioner has indicated additional time will be needed to respond to the notice of violation as amended. Petitioner contends that it objected to the Department’s amendment of the Notice initially filed in this matter. While the Department did not properly file a Motion to Amend its Notice, there was no showing that Respondent was prejudiced by the Department's failure to comply with all requirements of the statute. Assuming arguendo there was prejudice, any prejudice alleged by Petitioner was cured. Petitioner agreed to the continuance, which stated the amendment of the Notice as a basis for the continuance. Further, Petitioner had more than 60 days to conduct discovery regarding the new allegations and had sufficient time to prepare for the hearing.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that Petitioner’s sign was erected and maintained on the Department’s right-of-way. Further, the final order should find that Petitioner is not entitled to an exemption for an on-premises sign. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of February, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of February, 2018. COPIES FURNISHED: Dixie Dan Powell, Esquire Powell Injury Law, P.A. 602 South Main Street Crestview, Florida 32536 (eServed) Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 (eServed) Andrea Shulthiess, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Michael J. Dew, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed) Erik Fenniman, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 (eServed)
The Issue At issue is whether the permits Respondent holds to maintain two outdoor advertising signs should be cancelled, and whether the signs Respondent repaired and reerected following the destruction of the original signs by an Act of God (a hurricane) should be removed, as alleged in the Notices of Violation.
Findings Of Fact The parties Petitioner, Department of Transportation (Department), is a state agency charged with, inter alia, the duty and responsibility to regulate outdoor advertising signs under the provisions of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-10, Florida Administrative Code. Respondent, National Advertising Company, is a corporation engaged in the business of erecting and maintaining outdoor advertising signs. Pertinent to this case, Respondent is the owner and operator of two nonconforming outdoor advertising sign structures located adjacent to the Florida Turnpike (SR 91) in Palm Beach County, Florida. The first structure is a double-faced sign permitted by the Department under Permit Numbers AZ 363 and AE 401 and located .83 miles south of mile post 85, on the west side of the turnpike. The second structure is a single-faced sign permitted by the Department under Permit Number BT 386 and located .7 miles south of mile post 85, on the west side of the turnpike. In October 1999, both the single-faced and double-faced signs were damaged by Hurricane Irene. That damage included the severance of all upright supports (wood poles) for the sign structure, as well as other damage discussed infra. Respondent repaired and reerected the signs. Here, the Department contends the nonconforming signs were "destroyed," as that term is defined by Rule 14- 10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, and may not be replaced. Respondent disagrees that the signs were "destroyed" and is, therefore, of the opinion that they were properly reestablished. The rule regarding maintenance and repair of nonconforming signs With regard to the maintenance and repair of nonconforming signs, Rule 14-10.007, Florida Administrative Code, provides: The following shall apply to nonconforming signs: A nonconforming sign must remain substantially the same as it was as of the date it became nonconforming. Reasonable repair and maintenance, including change of advertising message, is permitted and is not a change which would terminate nonconforming rights . . . . * * * A nonconforming sign which is destroyed may not be reerected. "Destroyed" is defined as when more than 50% of the upright supports of a sign structure are physically damaged such that normal repair practices of the industry would call for, in the case of wooden sign structures, replacement of the broken supports and, in the case of a metal sign structure, replacement of at least 25% of the length above ground of each broken, bent or twisted support. However, in the event that such damage occurs, a sign will not be considered destroyed if the sign owner shows that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign would not exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. The following shall be applicable in determining whether the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign: Structural materials shall not include the sign face, any skirt, any electrical service, electric lighting or other non- structural items. Structural materials shall include any support brackets for the face, any catwalk, and any supporting braces or members of the sign structure. The value of the structural materials in the sign immediately prior to destruction shall be based on the cost of all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, and the cost of such materials shall be based on normal market cost as if purchased new on or about the date of destruction, without regard to any labor costs or special market conditions. The materials to be included in the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign shall be all materials that would be used to return the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction and shall not include any material that is repaired on-site, but shall include any material obtained from a source other than the sign itself, whether used, recycled, or repaired. The repairs to the sign shall be with like materials and shall be those reasonably necessary to permanently repair the sign in a manner normally accomplished by the industry in that area. The cost of such materials shall be as described in paragraph (1)(d)2 . . . . Here, with regard to the signs at issue, the proof is uncontroverted that all the upright supports of both sign structures were so severely damaged as to require replacement. Consequently, it has been shown that the signs were "destroyed" unless Respondent can establish "that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign . . . [did] not exceed 50% of the value of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction." The replacement materials costs to reerect the double-faced sign The value of the "instructional materials" in the double-faced sign immediately prior to destruction, based on all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, consisted of 10 wooden poles (upright supports) at $156.98 each; 28 wooden stringers (14 stringers per face) at $8.97 each; 2 galvanized steel catwalks (one on each side of the sign) at $1,400.00 each; and various angle steel supports for the catwalks, the value of which was not established of record. So configured, the value of the structural materials in the double-faced sign prior to destruction, excluding the value of the angle steel supports, totaled $4,620.96. The materials cost to reerect the sign (by returning the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction) consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each and 28 wooden stringers at $8.97 each, a total cost of $1,820.96. Excluded from the materials cost to reerect the sign was the value of the catwalks and angle steel supports which were recycled from the sign itself and, as necessary, repaired on-site. Comparing the value of the structural materials of the double-faced sign immediately prior to destruction (at least $4,620.96), with the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign, but excluding materials recycled on-site ($1,820.96), demonstrates that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign did not exceed 50 percent of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. Consequently, under the provisions of Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the double-faced sign is not considered destroyed, and was properly reerected. The replacement materials costs to reerect the single-faced sign The value of the "structural materials" in the single- faced sign immediately prior to destruction, based on all structural materials contained in the sign as it was configured just prior to damage, consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each; 14 wooden stringers at $8.97 each; 1 galvanized steel catwalk at a minimum value of $700.00; 5/ and various angle steel supports for the catwalk, the value of which was not established of record. So configured, the value of the structural materials in the single-faced sign prior to destruction, excluding the value of the angle steel supports and valuing the catwalk at $700.00, was $2,395.38. The materials costs to reerect the sign (by returning the sign to its configuration immediately prior to destruction) consisted of 10 wooden poles at $156.98 each, 14 wooden stringers at $8.97 each; and 1 galvanized catwalk at a minimum value of $700.00, a total cost of $2,395.38 (provided the value of the catwalk, as offered by Respondent, is accepted). Excluded from the materials costs to reerect the sign was the value of the angle steel supports which were recycled on-site. Comparing the value of the structural materials of the single-faced sign immediately prior to destruction ($2,395.38), with the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign, but excluding materials recycled on-site ($2,395.38), demonstrates that the replacement materials costs to reerect the sign exceeded 50 percent of the structural materials in the sign, immediately prior to destruction. Consequently, under the provisions of Rule 14-10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code, the single-faced sign was destroyed, and was could not properly be reerected.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered which adopts the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; which dismisses the notices of violation with regard to the double- faced sign (DOT Case Nos. 99-0263 and 99-0293, DOAH Case Nos. 99-4905T and 00-0134T); and which sustains the notices of violation with regard to the single-faced sign (DOT Case Nos. 99-0264 and 00-0026, DOAH Case Nos. 99-4906T and 00-0826T), cancels the single-faced sign permit, and orders the removal of the reerected single-faced sign. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of June, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The despot Building 1230 Appalachia Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNOCO 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of June, 2000.
The Issue Whether the Respondent is in violation of Section 479.07, Section 479.11(5) and Section 479.11(1), Florida Statutes, which statutes provide that permits must be obtained from the Florida Department of Transportation before an outdoor advertising sign is erected and which prohibits the erection of an outdoor advertising sign within 660 feet within the nearest edge of the right of way of all portions of the interstate system or the federal primary aid system and which is placed on the inside of a curve or in any manner that may prevent persons using the highway from obtaining an unobstructive view of approaching vehicles.
Findings Of Fact Subject sign was erected without a permit in 1973 and was nailed to a tree. The sign is located in a zoned residential area approximately ten feet from the nearest edge of the right of way of a federal aid primary highway, State Road 61.
Recommendation Remove subject sign and remove any re-erection of subject sign. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of May, 1976. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Bennett, Esquire Office of Legal Operations Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 C. A. Miller Auto Truck Service 806 Westway Road Tallahassee, Florida
The Issue The issue is whether a billboard structure is in compliance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency responsible for regulating outdoor advertising signs located within 660 feet of the nearest edge of the State Highway System, interstate, or Federal-Aid Primary system in accordance with Chapter 479, Florida Statutes. Lamar is in the business of providing outdoor signs for entities wishing to advertise. Lamar owns the sign at the northeast corner of the intersection of Betton Road and Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. The sign was built in 1980 and rebuilt in June 1997. The sign has two sides. One side faces Betton Road, and is visible only to persons on Betton Road. The Department does not assert that a permit is required for that side. The other side of the sign, facing to the west, is within 660 feet of Thomasville Road, which is also referred to as State Route 61, and is visible from Thomasville Road. In 1974, State Route 61 was known as U. S. Highway 319. It was a Federal-Aid Primary route. On June 24, 1974, a road denominated Capital Circle located on the outskirts of Tallahassee, was designated U.S. Highway 319. Thomasville Road although no longer a part of U.S. Highway 319, continued to bear the name State Route 61 and remained a Federal-Aid Primary route. In 1983 the Federal Highway Administration listed both Capital Circle and State Route 61 as Federal-Aid Primary routes. In 1991, the Federal Highway Administration created the National Highway System and ceased using Federal-Aid Primary designations. State Route 61, also known as Thomasville Road, nevertheless remained a Federal-Aid Primary road for outdoor advertising classification purposes at all times pertinent to this case. For federal highway identification purposes, the road is currently in the Surface Transportation Program. Prior to May 23, 1996, Lamar held an outdoor advertising permit pursuant to Section 479.07, Florida Statutes, for this sign. The sign was assigned tag number BG 518-35. On May 23, 1996, the Department issued a "Notice of Violation--Signs for Which Permits Have Been Issued," addressing permit number BG 518-35. This notice indicates that it was sent to Lamar via registered mail, return receipt requested. It informed that the sign was in violation of Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, or Florida Administrative Code Chapter 14-10 because the sign: "May not be maintained without permission of the person lawfully controlling site (479.11(9), FS)." On July 31, 1996, in a letter signed by District Outdoor Advertising Manager Vicki L. Davis, the Department notified Lamar that, because the Department had received a statement of loss of landowner's permission for the sign bearing tag number BG 518-35, Lamar was required to remove the sign. The Department included a "certificate of cancellation" with the letter. Lamar admits that it voluntarily canceled its permit for the sign in August 1997. Subsequently, the sign remained with its permit tag attached, unmolested by the Department for approximately 11 years. In January 1997, Lamar acquired a separate monopole structure bearing two signs with tag numbers BN 504 and BN 505. These signs are less than 200 feet to the north of the subject sign. During a 2007 inspection, an agent for the Department observed the subject sign. It still bore tag number BG 518-35. On March 14, 2007, the Department issued the "Notice of Violation-Illegally Erected Sign" addressed above. As noted before, the violation was based on the sign's having no permit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation enter a final order finding that the sign is a public or private nuisance and requiring that it be removed as provided in Subsection 479.105(1)(a), Florida Statutes, and dismissing case number 08-1137. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S HARRY L. HOOPER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2008. COPIES FURNISHED: Gerald S. Livingston, Esquire Pennington, Moore, Wilkinson, Bell & Dunbar, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Second Floor Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-2095 Susan Schwartz, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 James C. Myers, Clerk of Agency Proceedings Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Alexis M. Yarbrough, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Stephanie Kopelousos, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 57 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Carter Signs is in the business of outdoor advertising which includes the installation, repair and maintenance of signs, billboards, or displays on real property. Pursuant to a twenty-year term lease that began on March 1, 1988, the Petitioner has leased the real property described as: Strap No. 344525-00- 00002.000 lying east of 1-75, in Lee County, Florida. The lease describes the specific intended use of the real property under the lease. The lessee has agreed to use and occupy the premises solely for the purpose of outdoor advertising. The real property is located in Lee County, Florida, within 660 feet of Interstate Highway 75, a highway in the interstate highway system. The property is approximately 1.5 miles south of the Daniel Road interchange on the east side of the highway. The Lee County Comprehensive Plan, which has been enacted by the county, designates the area in which real property is located as "Airport Commerce." Under the plan, this land is approved for "mixed use developments consisting of light manufacturing or assembly, warehousing and distribution facilities; offices; ground transportation and airport related interconnection activity; and hotels/motels, meeting facilities and other hospitality services." The Petitioner's application to Lee County for a permit to erect the proposed sign on the property was approved. The county permit shows that the property is zoned "agricultural." If the "agricultural" zoning classification is violated, the county permit becomes void. The application for permit to the Department was denied because Section 479.111(2), Florida Statutes, allows signs within a controlled portion of an interstate highway only if the sign is within a commercial-zoned area, an industrial-zoned area, a commercial-unzoned area or industrial-unzoned area. In this case, the proposed sign was to be placed in an agriculturally zoned area.
Findings Of Fact On 30 April 1976 Salter Advertising Company's application to locate a sign facing north on Salter-owned property off the I-110 near the intersection of Scott and Alcaniz Streets, Pensacola, Florida, was approved (Exhibit 1). By application dated 12 November 1976 Salter requested authorization to erect a sign at the same location facing south (Exhibit 8). This application was disapproved by the District sign inspector on December 20, 1976. What happened to the original of Exhibit 8 was not disclosed at the hearing. On a duplicate original of this application, which was introduced as Exhibit 9, the disapproval on the duplicate original application was erased or whited-out and under date 5-2-77, this application was approved by the District Sign Coordinator, the supervisor of the inspector who had disapproved Exhibit 8. The copy introduced as Exhibit 8 differs from Exhibit 9 in several respects. In the first place it is a carbon copy of what appears to have been the original of Exhibit 8. The "received" stamps dated November 24, 1976, December 13, 1976, and December 21, 1976, appear at different places on Exhibits 8 and 9; Exhibit 8 contains a "returned" stamp with date of 11/15/76 which does not appear on Exhibit 9; Exhibit 9 contains a "received" stamp dated April 29, 1977 which does not appear on Exhibit 8; and Exhibit 9 shows sign to be facing both S and W, while Exhibit 8 shows sign facing S only. The reason given for disapproving Exhibit 8 contained in letter dated January 31, 1977, (Exhibit 5), was that there was inadequate space to place a sign at the location proposed because of the City of Pensacola's setback line 50 feet from the center line of Alcaniz Street. This same condition exists respecting the application approved in Exhibit 1. Accordingly, no sign has been erected at the location despite the approval of the South and West facing sign approved in Exhibit 9. In November of 1976 Respondent contacted Petitioner's sign inspector for Pensacola and arranged to meet at the site of the sign proposed in Exhibits 2 and 4. The property at this location was for sale and Respondent wanted to know if it was suitable for a sign. At this time it was customary for the official who approved the application to go to the site before the application was submitted and advise whether or not an application for a sign at the location would be approved. At the on-site meeting the inspector advised Respondent that approval for the intended sign would be forthcoming. Respondent then purchased the property, submitted the application for sign approval and erected the sign at a cost of some $12,000. The testimony, that it was customary for an applicant after receiving on-site approval, to erect the sign before receiving formal approval of its application for sign permit, was not rebutted. The sign erected by Respondent is located approximately 300 feet from the site for which Salter received approval of its application in Exhibits 1 and The I-110 is part of the interstate system.
The Issue Should certain outdoor advertising signs owned by Respondent, Lamar East Florida (Lamar) be removed as a result of notices of violations brought by Petitioner, Department of Transportation (the Department) against Lamar?
Findings Of Fact Lamar is licensed pursuant to Chapter 479, Florida Statutes, to conduct the business of outdoor advertising. The Department regulates the outdoor advertising business in accordance with that law. In 1964, outdoor advertising signs that are the subject of the proceeding were constructed along US Highway 1 in Volusia County, Florida. Subsequently, in 1971, outdoor advertising signs which are the subject of the proceeding were constructed along Interstate 95 in Volusia County, Florida. The signs in both places are subject to permits issued by the Department to Lamar. The signs were legally erected but became nonconforming based upon their spacing in relation to other permitted outdoor advertising signs. The Lamar signs and their spacing are described as follows: Permit No. BN674-55, East of Interstate 95, 3.183 miles north of NEB790079 Hull Road is 881 feet from a permitted sign to the north. Permit No. BJ689-55, East of Interstate 95, 2.588 miles north of NEB790079 Hull Road is 343 feet from a permitted sign to the north. Permit No. BN681-55, East of US Highway 1, 0.088 miles north of Pine Tree Drive is 216 feet from a sign under Permit No. BU855. Permit No. BN682-55, East of US Highway 1, 0.027 miles north of Hull Road is within 332 feet of a permitted sign to the north. Permit No. BV232-55, East of US Highway 1, 0.0129 miles north of Pine Tree Drive is 216 feet from a permitted sign to the north. Each of the Lamar signs is within 660 feet of the first named highway or interstate, within Volusia County, Florida. Lamar owns and maintains the outdoor advertising signs that have been identified. On June 19, 1998, under dry weather conditions, a series of lightening strikes started a wildfire in a remote swampy area. Before the fire ended in July of 1998 its dimensions were extensive. The wildfire burned in Volusia and Flagler counties, Florida, west of Daytona Beach and Ormond Beach, Florida, and extending into the city of Ormond Beach. Eventually, it consumed the Lamar signs that have been described to the extent that the up-right wooden supports of each of the signs were substantially burned. This destruction took place on July 1, 1998. The degree of destruction was within the definition of "destroyed" set out in Rule 14- 10.007(1)(d), Florida Administrative Code. Before their destruction the signs had been lawfully permitted by the Department. Interstate 95 and US Highway 1 had been closed to the public before the Lamar signs were "destroyed." The attempt by Lamar to gain access to the outdoor advertising signs was not successful because of the road closures by government authorities. Following their destruction, Lamar re-erected the structures by reinstalling the signs at the same locations using substantially the same type of materials as had been previously found in the structures being replaced. None of the materials used to re-erect the signs were part of the sign structures immediately before the destruction of the original signs by the wildfire. When re-erected the signs were the same size, shape, and height of the destroyed signs. Lamar does not own the property where the signs are located. Lamar operates pursuant to agreements with property owners by which Lamar has the right to maintain the signs. Upon the expiration or termination of the agreements with the property owners, Lamar may remove all of its sign materials from the properties and absent an agreement no longer maintain the signs. Lamar has no other business interest in the properties where the signs are located. The purpose of the outdoor advertising signs is to lease advertising space to third parties for advertising purposes which generates income to Lamar. Each outdoor advertising sign in question provides that income. The suppression effort directed to the fire was limited due to the remoteness of the swampy area in which the fire originated and a paucity of manpower and equipment. As a consequence, the firefighting effort did not begin in earnest until June 20 or 21, 1998. The fire was combated through efforts of the Florida Department of Agriculture, Division of Forestry and other national, state, and local firefighting organizations. The fuel for the fire, that is, bushes and trees, was dry. The weather conditions were highlighted by low relative humidity and a very high dispersion index. The smoke from the fire rose in the atmosphere and carried its embers from the west to the east. The fire came out of the Hull Cypress Swamp and the embers picked up by the wind crossed fire control lines and continued to spread to the east. Eventually, the two main fingers of the fire burned together on July 2, 1998. Before it was suppressed the fire, known as the Rodeo Road Fire, would consume 61,500 acres. The progress of the fire is depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1, a map of the area in question, to include the area in which the subject signs were located. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3 portrays the location of the signs more precisely. More specifically, the conditions in the swamp were extremely dry at the time the fire commenced as evidenced by the available dry fuel load in the swamp, which fuel load would normally be wet. Under wet conditions the fire would either not have burned or would have meandered. Given the dry conditions in the swamp in June 1998, there was a lot more fuel available to burn. East of the swamp the land that was burned was constituted of pastures, range land, and forest lands. Some areas had been subjected to prescribed burning to control available fuel loads in an incidence of wildfire but other areas had not been subjected to prescribed burning before the wildfire. Had property owners in the area affected by the wildfire conducted prescribed burning before that event it would have reduced the fuel load available for incineration. In some places in the advance of the wildfire the fuel loads were heavy, in other places less so, in that the property was constituted of pastures. In addressing the fire, the firefighters' priorities, in turn, included their safety; the safety of the public; the protection of property, to include structures; and finally the protection of resources such as timberland. By their efforts in addressing this incident the firefighters managed to save homes and businesses by creating defensible space around those structures against the on-set of the fire. The area of defensible space necessary is at least 30 feet, which reduces the chance of direct flame impact on the structure. Another technique that was employed to address the consequences of the wildfire was backfiring or imposition of the "black line concept." This is a nationally recognized firefighting technique. It is used when a fire is burning in an area that is inaccessible or has a potential to overrun a fire control line in a setting in which unburned fuel exists between the main fire and the control line. The unburned material is then deliberately burned before the main fire reaches that area to protect the control line from the main fire. The backfire is best employed when the weather conditions are conducive to its use, including wind direction and levels of humidity. During the time that the Rodeo Road Fire took place the use of backfires was not especially successful due to the dryness of the fuels. In the course of the Rodeo Road Fire, Georgia Pacific now known as the Timber Company, used a backfire to protect its property against the northward and eastward progress of the wildfire. The backfire was lit on June 28, 1999. The backfire by the Timber Company did not control the wildfire. It was successful on the west flank of the wildfire but unavailing on the east flank where the backfire by the Timber Company intersected the wildfire and the wildfire continued its eastward progress which had already begun. The setting of the backfire by the Temper Company was an appropriate tactic. Its outcome was inconsequential when considering the progress of the wildfire and its eventual destruction of the signs. Nor is the decision of a California fire crew to use a backfire to protect itself and its equipment found to have meaningful significance in promoting the forward progress of the wildfire to the east where the wildfire would destroy the signs. The backfire lit by the fire crew occurred on July 1, 1998. Backfiring to secure safety is an approved tactic for firefighters in making an independent judgment to protect their lives.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That a final order be entered which revokes the sign permits that have been described and requires the removal of those signs within 30 days of the entry of the final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative this 21st day of October, 1999. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert M. Burdick, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Aileen M. Reilly, Esquire Livingston & Reilly, P.A. Post Office Box 2151 Orlando, Florida 32802 Pamela Leslie, General Counsel Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Thomas F. Barry, Secretary Attention: James C. Myers, Clerk Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458
