The Issue The issue for determination is whether DOE properly evaluated the proposals in Bid No. 87-0123 and, if not, what corrective action should be taken. CAB contends that a proper evaluation of the bids would have resulted in a contract award to it. More specifically, CAB claims that it should have received a higher evaluation score in bid items #1 and #4. It also questions the scores received by two other competing firms. DOE contends that its evaluation was proper, the results should be upheld and the contracts be awarded as proposed.
Findings Of Fact The Invitation to Bid and Evaluation Process The purpose for Invitation to Bid No. 87-0123 is stated in the Introduction to that document:
The Issue Should the benefits of the Petitioner, Charles Bullock, under the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan, be forfeited due to his plea of no contest and adjudication of guilt to two felony counts of child abuse?
Findings Of Fact The Collier County Sheriff's Office employed Mr. Bullock as a law enforcement officer from 1994 through 2010. Due to his employment, Mr. Bullock was a member of the Florida Retirement System Investment Plan. Mr. Bullock worked in the sheriff's office's civil process unit. He and the other civil process deputies routinely met for coffee in the afternoon about 2:00 p.m., to discuss business. They usually met at the Starbucks in the Coastland Mall in Collier County. Sometimes they met at other locations to avoid drawing public attention and adverse comments. For the same reason, after some unfavorable television coverage, they often dispersed their cars in the parking lot, instead of parking together. Mr. Bullock usually did not wear a uniform, badge, gun, or anything else identifying him as a Collier County deputy or a law enforcement officer. On at least three occasions between November 2009 and February 2010, while on duty, Mr. Bullock went to the food court bathroom after these meetings. The evidence does not establish that Mr. Bullock was wearing a uniform, badge, gun, or anything else identifying him as a Collier County deputy or law enforcement officer on those occasions. On the first two of those occasions, Mr. Bullock sexually molested a male, under the age of 16, by forcing him to allow Mr. Bullock to perform oral sex. On the third occasion, Mr. Bullock was approaching the male minor by looking under and over the bathroom stall divider, when he was interrupted by a mall employee. The evidence does not establish that the minor knew on any of the occasions that Mr. Bullock was a deputy or law enforcement officer. The evidence does not otherwise establish that Mr. Bullock's position as a Collier County deputy facilitated, contributed to, provided the opportunity for, or otherwise played a role in his ability to commit the acts described on those three occasions. He committed the offenses in a public place during normal operating hours. His position as a deputy did not provide access to the food court bathroom that any citizen would not have had. As a result of the interruption of the third encounter and the information the mall employee was able to provide, law enforcement conducted an investigation of Mr. Bullock's conduct in the mall bathroom. The investigation culminated on April 19, 2010, in a warrant to arrest Mr. Bullock. The warrant charged Mr. Bullock with lewd or lascivious battery (violation of section 800.04(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2010)), a second-degree felony, and official misconduct (violation of section 838.022, Florida Statutes (2010)), a third-degree felony. On March 10, 2014, Mr. Bullock entered a plea of no contest to a different charge based upon his sexual molestation of the male under the age of 16. The offense to which Mr. Bullock entered a plea of no contest was child abuse, a violation of section 827.03, Florida Statutes (2010), a third-degree felony. At the time of his plea and in this proceeding, Mr. Bullock maintained that he was not guilty of the charges, but chose to plead no contest because of concerns that the nature of the charges would inflame jurors. The court adjudicated Mr. Bullock guilty of the charges to which he pled no contest. It imposed a sentence of two years' probation, prohibited contact with the victim, required payment of $151.00 in court costs, and required Mr. Bullock to give up his law enforcement certification. On March 20, 2014, the Board notified Mr. Bullock that his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System were forfeited as a result of his no contest plea to child abuse. This proceeding followed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Respondent, State Board of Administration, enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Charles Bullock, was not convicted of a specified offense as identified in section 112.3173, Florida Statutes, and directing that he not forfeit his rights and benefits under the Florida Retirement System. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN D. C. NEWTON, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of September, 2014.
Other Judicial Opinions A party who is adversely affected by this order closing file is entitled to Judicial review pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes. Review proceedings are governed by the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Such proceedings are commenced by filing one copy of a Notice of Appeal with the Agency Clerk of the Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950, and a second copy, accompanied by filing fees prescribed by law, with the District Court of Appeal, First District, or with the District Court of Appeal in the Appellate District where the party resides. The notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that this Order Closing File was filed in the official records of the Department of Management Services and copies were furnished to: Larry D. Scott, Assistant General Counsel, Department of Management Services, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950; Jane M. Letwin, Esquire, 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33312, and Judge Claude B. Arrington, Division of Administrative Hearings, the DeSoto net Building, 1230 Apalachee Parkway, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060, this | a day of Quis, Us? ‘ , 2009. Debbie Shoup Clerk Department of Management Services (850) 487-1082 2 of 2 Jul 11 2009 11:41 a7/11/2889° 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 91/03 STATE OF FLORIDA DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS GLORIA MARSHALL, Petitioner CASE NO: 08-3716 JUDGE ARRINGTON v. DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT. Respondent. / PETITIONER’S AMENDED NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE PETITIONER, GLORIA MARSHALL, through undersigned counsel, hereby files this AMENDED PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE, on the following grounds: 1. Petitioner Marshall is not working for the employer since June of 2008, when she retired after a long career as an employee of the Broward County School Board. Most of the documents to be used in this petition are already in possession of Respondent and the attorney for Petitioner. 2. Petitioner patiently and conscientiously worked as an adult ed teacher from 1981 through 2005, a period of some twenty four years. EXHIBIT att Jul 11 2009 11:41 @7/11/2889 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 62/83 3. In view of the relationship between the Repondent and Petitioner, who has been enrolled several times in the FRS, Petitioner contends that the Respondent exercise its fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of the member by not opposing this dismissal without prejudice. 4. Petitioner contends that no prejudice to Respondent will result. 5. No expenses have been incurred thus far other than the transmission of employment records by the Respondent to undersigned counsel, and those will not change. If a plan has been proposed for the case by Respondent, that plan can be laid aside and will serve the same purpose in the future. 6. In light of the circumstances which prevail, to insist on the prosecution of this petition at this time will not serve the interests of justice. 7. Petitioner has indicated that she is unable to assist in this petition until the month of December 2009. 8, In addition, the goal sought in these proceedings is a very precious one, that is, a pension and social security fund which will influence the comfort or lack thereof of this petitioner’s last years, and is worthy of the Court’s indulgence in acknowledging this dismissal without prejudice. BASED ON THE FOREGOING recitation of facts, Petitioner files this ‘ Amended Notice of Voluntary dismissal without prejudice. Jul 11 2009 11:42 97/11/2009 12:23 9549617454 PACK-SHIP&BEYOND PAGE 43/03 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing has been fax-filed with the Department of Administrative Hearings and e-mailed to 850 922 6312, to Larry Dz. Scott, Esq., Asst. General counsel to DMS, 4050 Esplanade Way, Suite 160, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 Eleventh day of July, 2009. LAW OFFICE OF JANE M. LETWIN Attorney for Petitioner: Florida Bar Number 990329 5426 SW 25" Avenue, Fort Lauderdale Fl 33312 Phone: 954 245 8495: Fax: 954 301 8401 E-mail; Janeletwintv@aol.com By * ou Jane M. Letwin
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Bill A. Corbin, has been a member of the Florida Bar since October, 1972 and has continually engaged in the private practice of law in Blountstown since that time. His present office is located at 305 Fannin Street, Blountstown, Florida. On January 1, 1973, petitioner was retained by the Calhoun County Board of Commissioners to represent the county in the capacity of county attorney. He remained in that position until March 1, 1983, or a period of ten years. During that period of time he was a member in good standing of the Florida Retirement System (FRS) and made the required contributions into the program. From April 1, 1980 until August 26, 1983, Corbin also served as county attorney for Liberty County. When he left the employ of Calhoun County on March 1, 1983, he reenrolled in the FRS effective the same date using his employment with Liberty County as a basis for the continued enrollment. After conducting an audit of petitioner's employment in early 1983, respondent, Department of Administration, Division of Retirement, advised petitioner by letter dated April 22, 1983 that because he failed to comply with current FRS membership requirements, he was being removed from FRS membership effective July 1, 1979. The effect of this action was to leave Corbin with approximately 6 1/2 years of creditable service with the FRS rather than almost 10 1/2 years. The proposed agency action triggered the instant proceeding. The position of county attorney in Calhoun County was a regularly established position and has been for some 25 years. The same is true for the county attorney slot in Liberty County. In Calhoun County, Corbin was paid on a monthly basis and had the normal deductions made from his salary. He received the same annual percentage increase in salary as did other county employees. He was also covered under the County's errors and omissions policy, and was eligible for workers' compensation coverage. According to a Calhoun County Commissioner, Corbin received annual and sick leave of one day per month while serving as county attorney. However, unlike other county employees, he was not compensated for unused leave when he terminated employment, and did not have to fill out leave slips as do other employees when taking leave. He also was given stationery, use of a reproduction machine, and clerical help from the county clerk's office when necessary. Corbin's initial employment with Calhoun County was based upon an oral agreement between he and the commissioners. This agreement was later reduced to writing in 1979 in order to comply with concerns expressed by the county's outside auditors. The standard employment contract specified a set fee per month for Corbin to attend regular Board meetings, advise them on legal matters concerning County business, and to prepare resolutions, correspondence and ordinances. Additional services concerning litigation were rendered on either a contingent fee basis or an hourly rate basis. These sums were paid from monies set aside each year by the County for legal services not covered by Corbin's monthly salary. No deductions were taken from payments made to Corbin for these additional services. The contract also provided that either party could terminate the same upon giving thirty days' notice. A similar agreement was executed by Corbin for his employment with Liberty County except that the agreement called for compensation at a rate of $40 per hour. Corbin's normal duties generally included attending two regular board meetings each month which lasted from two to twelve hours each, attending special meetings, handling correspondence, keeping minutes of each meeting, and being on call for requests for advice from Board members. In all, petitioner estimated he spent approximately 30 hours per month on Calhoun County business. Although some of the county work was performed in the courthouse where the boards met, most of it was done in Corbin's law office since he was not provided an office by either county. The members of the Board control petitioner's hours by assignment of the work to be done, including requests for advice, research and opinions, and litigation. The Board determines which cases will be settled, defended or appealed. Corbin is required to accept any case or matter assigned, and does not reject assignments. However, the Boards do not control the day to day methods by which petitioner litigates cases and performs legal judgments. Petitioner does not supervise any employees employed by the County nor does he supervise or direct the activities of any full time or part time assistant county attorneys or legal secretaries. The rule which makes petitioner ineligible for membership in the FRS is Rule 22B-1.04, Florida Administrative Code, which became effective on July 1, 1979. After the rule was adopted, respondent sent a memorandum to all local agencies, including Calhoun and Liberty Counties, requesting that they review those employees that might fall within the "professional" status in order to determine their eligibility under the newly adopted rule. A copy of the rule was also sent to each local agency. The agencies were then required to transmit information on each such employee to the respondent. Thereafter, it began the lengthy process of auditing all reporting units, including the two counties in question. Because respondent is now reviewing over 700 reporting units, the audit process is time-consuming, and has resulted in lengthy delays in removing ineligible employees from FRS.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the petition of Bill A. Corbin to remain in the Florida Retirement System from July 1, 1979 through August 26, 1983 be DENIED. DONE and ENTERED this 18th day of June, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June, 1984.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, Department of Revenue (Respondent or Department), may levy on the Petitioner’s bank account in order to satisfy a tax liability owed to the Respondent. The Respondent asserts the Petitioner, Business Depot-Accounting and Tax Center, Inc. (Petitioner), owes the Department for delinquent sales tax, interest, and penalties.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency charged with the responsibility of collecting sales and use tax owed to the State of Florida. See § 213.05, Fla. Stat. (2006). At all times material to the allegations of this case, the Petitioner was responsible for collecting and remitting to the Department sales and use tax. The return forms itemizing information for these payments require the taxpayer, Petitioner, to represent gross sales, exempt sales, as well as other data that the Department uses to compute the amount that must be remitted to the state. In this case, after extensive communications with the Petitioner, the Department determined that $10,524.20 was owed for taxes, penalties, and interest. This amount was calculated based on estimates of the delinquency. A Notice of Final Assessment dated August 28, 2006, was issued by the Department to the Petitioner that outlined the amounts claimed to be owed. On or about September 27, 2006, the Petitioner responded to the notice and, under oath, represented that the tax returns were filed. The Department took the Petitioner’s representations into consideration and re-calculated the tax liability owed by the Petitioner. Currently, the Department asserts that the Petitioner’s delinquent amount is $278.46. Accordingly, when that amount remained unpaid, the Department sought a tax warrant, gave notice of its intent to levy on the assets of the Petitioner, and provided notice that it intended to collect monies against the Petitioner’s bank account at Regent Bank. The Department issued a Notice of Freeze to the Regent Bank that instructed it not to transfer, dispose of, or return assets belonging to the Petitioner. The Department also gave notice to the Petitioner of its intent to levy on the bank account with a formal Notice of Intent to Levy. The Petitioner challenged the notice by seeking an administrative hearing. The Petitioner did not appear at the hearing and did not offer any evidence in support of its challenge. The Petitioner’s letter dated September 28, 2006, was not submitted within twenty days of the issuance of the Notice of Final Assessment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order sustaining the Notice of Intent to Levy against the Petitioner’s assets in the amount of $278.46 to satisfy the liability owed by the Petitioner to the Department. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of May, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. Parrish Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of May, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: S. G. Ross Business Depot-Accounting & Tax Center, Inc. 4611 South University Drive, Suite 455 Davie, Florida 33328 John Mika, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General The Capitol, Plaza Level 01 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street The Carlton Building, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 501 South Calhoun Street The Carlton Building, Room 104 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
The Issue Whether the Petitioner abandoned his position or resigned from the Career Service System.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner received an approved education leave of absence without pay from his Career Service position at Hendry Correctional Institution from August 29, 1986, until May 15, 1987. The purpose of the leave was to allow the Petitioner to obtain a master's degree in library science through a government sponsored, professional training grant program. As a condition of the grant program, the Petitioner agreed to return to Hendry Correctional Institution following the completion of his degree. The anticipated completion date was May 15, 1987. If there was no vacancy on staff at that time, the Petitioner agreed to accept employment first in another state correctional institution library in Florida. If no vacancies were located in state correctional institutions, the Department of State, Division of Library Information Services, would assist him in finding suitable employment in other Florida libraries. On May 5, 1987, and June 26, 1987, the personnel manager at Hendry Correctional Institution wrote to the Petitioner to inquire whether he intended to return to the institution. The Petitioner did not reply to the inquiries. On June 30, 1987, the personnel manager at another correctional institution in Florida wrote to the Petitioner and offered him employment as a Librarian II. The Petitioner counteroffered with a conditional acceptance of employment if he could begin work on September 1, 1987. The personnel manager wrote to the Petitioner to determine why the counteroffer was made. The Petitioner had no further contact with the institution. Upon completion of the master's degree course work, the Petitioner wrote to various persons involved in the grant administration and attempted to demand unilateral changes in the terms and conditions of the agreement which would inure to his benefit. All of these attempts to change the terms of the contract were unsuccessful. The Petitioner accepted employment in another state sometime between May 1987 and September 27, 1987, the date he wrote to Respondent about his new job. The letter was received by the Bureau of Personnel on October 15, 1987. In the same letter, the Petitioner acknowledged that he had breached the terms of the professional training grant program. He offered to repay the grant by making monthly installments of $50.00 toward the outstanding balance. On October 21, 1987, Hendry Correctional Institution sent the Petitioner a letter which stated he had been deemed to have abandoned his position at the institution and resigned from the Career Service system effective October 21, 1987.
The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Petitioner is entitled to purchase a retirement service credit for approximately three and one-half years pursuant to Section 121.011(3)(e), Florida Statutes. The record in this cause consists of all documents filed in this cause either with the Hearing Officer or with the Division of Retirement, including all documents received in evidence at the hearing as exhibits. After review of the record in this case, the Division accepts all the findings of fact as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order. However, the Division is unable to accept all of the conclusions of law as set forth by the Hearing Officer in his recommended order.
Findings Of Fact As a teacher with the Orange County School Board (the School Board") since 1967, Petitioner is a member of the Florida Retirement System. Petitioner was so employed in 1978 and was a member of the Florida Retirement System at that time. In January, 1978, Petitioner was on approved personal leave for her wedding. Her husband lived in Arkansas. Petitioner requested and was granted a leave of absence to join her husband in Arkansas for the balance of the school year. Petitioner and her husband intended to return to Orlando, Florida before the beginning of the next school year. Petitioner's husband intended to accept a position with a veteran's clinic in the Orlando area. Petitioner intended to resume employment with the School Board. On January 16, 1978, Petitioner properly submitted a written request for a leave of absence. The leave requested was limited to the remaining term of the school year which ended in June, 1978. The request asked for a teaching assignment in the event the request was denied. On February 14, 1993, the School Board granted Petitioner's request for a leave of absence. The School Board's written authorization was issued on a standard approval form used by the School Board for such authorizations. The one page form consisted of standard boiler plate language except for three blanks in the first paragraph stating the date of approval, the reason for the leave, and the expiration date for the leave. The boiler plate language in the standard form included the following statement: . . . A teacher who desires to return to employment at the expiration of the leave period must notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1 of the school year for which the leave was granted. . . . Petitioner notified the Superintendent in writing of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner's written request on January 16, 1978, was addressed to the School Board. The relationship of the School Board and Superintendent is that of principal and agent. Petitioner's written request expressly provided that the leave period was limited to the remainder of the school year and that Petitioner wanted a teaching assignment if the request for leave of absence was denied. The requirement for notice prior to March 1, 1978, was based on the Master Agreement, Article IX, Section L, entered into by the School Board and the teacher's union. No similar requirement appears in Respondent's rules. Florida Administrative Code Rule 60S-2.006(1)(a) requires only that: . . . A leave of absence must be authorized in writing by a member's employer prior to or during the leave of absence. Petitioner's leave of absence was authorized in writing by Petitioner's employer during her personal leave. Early in February, 1978, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Royce B. Walden, Associate Superintendent of the School Board, and informed him that she desired to return to her employment at the beginning of the next school year; in the Fall of 1978. Mr. Walden did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her intent to return to employment. Later in February, 1978, Petitioner traveled to Orlando. While in Orlando, Petitioner telephoned Mr. Walden and again stated her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. The Associate Superintendent did not indicate to Petitioner that she had failed to provide timely written notice of her desire to return to employment. In May, 1988, Petitioner moved back to Orlando. Petitioner again telephoned Mr. Walden. Petitioner was informed for the first time during that telephone conversation that there may not be a teaching position available for her at the beginning of the next school year. The reason stated by the Associate Superintendent was that Petitioner had failed to notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. Petitioner immediately wrote a letter on May 25, 1978, restating her desire to return to employment at the beginning of the next school year. On the same day, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner stating that the School Board would not automatically assign Petitioner to an employment position for the 1978-1979 school year. The reason stated in Mr. Walden's letter was that Petitioner failed to comply with the requirement that she notify the Superintendent in writing by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. On July 11, 1978, Mr. Walden issued a letter to Petitioner purporting to terminate her as an employee of the School Board. The reason given for the purported termination was that Petitioner had failed to give written notice to the Superintendent by March 1, 1978, of her desire to return to employment. The letter purporting to terminate Petitioner contained no notice of Petitioner's rights to challenge the School Board's proposed action, including the right to a proceeding under Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. After informing Petitioner of the purported termination and the reason, the letter stated: . . . Should you wish to return as an employee with the School Board of Orange County, we invite you to communicate with us in the near future. Please accept our sincere appreciation for your contribution to the educational program for children in the Orange County Public School System. 1/ Shortly after July 11, 1978, the School Board sued Petitioner for repayment of funds allegedly advanced to Petitioner for a paid sabbatical in 1973. The litigation culminated in a settlement agreement and Petitioner's reinstatement to her employment for the 1981-1982 school year with credit for nine years of service. Petitioner has been continuously employed by the School Board since that time and has maintained her continuing contract status with no loss in seniority. The settlement agreement did not pay Petitioner any back compensation and did not address Petitioner's fringe benefits, including the right to purchase the retirement service credit for the period of January, 1978 through the date of her reinstatement. Petitioner must pay the total cost of providing the retirement credit into the Retirement System Trust Fund. The economic burden of the retirement service credit falls solely on Petitioner. Petitioner's purchase of the retirement service credit will not result in any adverse economic impact on the School Board, Respondent, or the State of Florida. The proposed purchase price for the retirement service credit is sound for actuarial purposes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order allowing Petitioner to purchase the retirement service credit at the statutorily prescribed purchase price. RECOMMENDED this 26th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of July, 1993.
