The Issue The issues presented for consideration by the hearing officer were as follows: Whether the project would adversely the public health, safety, or welfare or the property of others; Whether the project would adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats; Whether the project would adversely affect navigation; Whether the project would adversely affect the fishing or recreational values in the vicinity of the project; Whether the project would be of a temporary or permanent nature; and Whether the project would adversely affect the current condition and relative value of functions being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
Findings Of Fact On February 21, 1985, the Respondent, John Spang, applied to the Department of Environmental Regulations, Department of natural Resources and the Army Corp. of Engineers for permits necessary to construct two docking facilities, one on each side of the east end of Coronado Bridge, commonly known as the "North Bridge" on the Indian River, north in New Smyrna Beach, Volusia County, Sections 55 and 9, Township 17 South, Range 34 East. The proposed docks include a total of 24 boat slips. The proposed docks are within 25 feet of the right-of-way of the Coronado Bridge on both the north and south sides. The proposed docks consist of four piers. The piers, from south to north, are 101 feet, 102 feet, 122 feet and 122 feet in length respectively. See Respondent's Exhibit #2. The piers south of the bridge are 75 to 80 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The piers north of the bridge are 60 to 65 feet from the east edge of the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. The proposed docking facilities shall service commercially zoned properties `to which they shall be attached and, in particular, the Riverview Hotel and Charlie's Blue Crab Restaurant, at the Riverview. The Petitioners, Grover Ryan and Margaret Ryan, own the commercially zoned property adjacent to the subject property to the south, located at 100 West Columbus Avenue, New Smyrna Beach, Florida. The Ryans operate a commercial business. On March 17, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. Panet E. and Jerrie L. Peterson of 200 Canova Drive, New Smyrna Beach, Florida own the real property located on the river adjacent to the Ryans but not adjoining the proposed docking area or the property of the applicant. On April 15, 1986, the Ryans filed a petition for an administrative hearing. On February 14, 1986, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued Permit Number 64-099806-4, to construct the proposed docking facilities, subject to specific modifications and conditions to those applications. Issuance of the permit was based upon the following: The Army Corp. of Engineers assessed the proposed docking facilities and determined that the project will not impede navigation or otherwise cause danger to the health, safety or welfare of vessels and persons traveling in the Intracoastal Waterway. On April 18, 1986, the Army Corp. of Engineers issued Permit No. 85IPL-20644 for construction of piers pursuant to the applicant's proposal for docking facilities. The harbor and dockmaster for the City of New Smyrna Beach determined that the proposed docking facilities would not impede or endanger navigation of the river and Intracoastal Waterway, if pilots entering and leaving the docking area carefully follow the rules of road. Actual testing of the proposed site by the Department of Environmental Regulation revealed no seagrasses or rooted macrophytes which might be destroyed by the proposed docks. Flushing in the river was found to be excellent and would alleviate any short-term turbidity problems and would further mitigate against any pollutants from the docking areas to the extent that no water quality violations were anticipated. The United States Department of Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service determined that the area of the proposed docking facility would not have an adverse affect on the manatee otherwise endanger them. Although the dock will restrict fishing from the bridge between the shore and channel, it will not significantly affect adversely the recreational uses. Generally, bridge fishing is being restricted in Florida due to the hazards to fishermen from traffic. The fishing from boats will be unaffected. There is no marine production in the area. The boat traffic in the vicinity of the proposed docking facility is considered heavy, and there are no restrictions on boating speed. The bridge is raised frequently, but heavy traffic requires boats to wait on weekends. The bridge fenders and concrete abutments of the bridge block the lateral view of boaters as they approach, pass under and leave the Coronado Bridge, and likewise obscures the boats in the bridge area from boaters in the proposed dock area. The closest dock to the south of the proposed docks is owned by the Ryans. Mr. Ryan has used his dock for forty-seven (47) years and uses it to dock his large commercial shrimp boat. Mr. Ryan operates a wholesale/retail seafood store on the property which he owns adjoining the Spang's property. As originally proposed, the southernmost dock sought by the Spang's would interfere with Ryan docking his boat at Ryan's dock. The next dock to the south of the proposed docks and Mr. Ryan's dock is owned by the Petersons. This a forty (40) foot dock which is used for noncommercial purposes. Because it does not protrude as far into the water as Ryan's dock, there is no hazard created by the proposed docks. A conditioned modification to the application was the reduction in size of the southernmost docking facility by 15 feet and the construction of handrails on the outer edges of each dock to prevent mooring of boats along the outer edges. The reduction of the southernmost dock by 15 feet, together with handrails and prevention of mooring of boats on the outside of the docks provided reasonable assurance that there was no impediment to navigation, to include Ryan docking his boat. However, the design of the exits to the two proposed docking areas promotes direct entry at right angles into the Intracoastal Waterway. This is potentially hazardous. Petitioner Ryan has an easement over the Spang property to permit public access to Ryan's property from the right-of-way of the bridge and highway. Spang's restaurant, which has already been built at the site, actually traverses the easement, not the proposed docking facility. The proposed facility does not interfere with the easement the Ryans hold landward of the mean high waterline from the highway right-of-way south to the Ryan's business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue Permit No. 64-099806-4 with the size limitation and requirements for handrails established by the agency and that the layout of the docks be modified as drawn in Appendix B to discourage exiting the docking areas at right angles to the channel of the Intracoastal Waterway. DONE AND ORDERED this 18th day of July 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July 1986. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 86-0992 The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of John Spang: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 2. Rejected. Paragraph 5 of Ryan's proposed findings of fact adopted as more complete and accurate. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 6. 5,6. Adopted and combined as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9. Adopted substantially as Recommended Order paragraph 7. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 8. 10,11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Rejected as conclusion of law and irrelevant because the current proceeding is a de novo proceeding. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9 (b). Irrelevant. Effect on the persons named is not a basis for review. The following action was taken with regard to the proposed findings of fact submitted in behalf of the Ryans and Petersons: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Rejected because the applicants' finding cited 24 which was adopted thereby binding the applicant to the lower number. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 3. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 4. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 5. Adopted in part and included in Recommended Order paragraph 12. 7,8. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 11. 9. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. 10,12. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 13. 11,13. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 11. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 12. Rejected as a list of actors without any conclusion stated. 18,19. Rejected in favor of Recommended Order paragraph 10 which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding fishing. 20,21,22. Rejected in favor of paragraph 9(d) which more accurately summarizes the more credible facts regarding danger to manatees. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16. Rejected as contrary to the facts. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant. The following action was taken with regard to the Agency's proposed findings of facts. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 1. Adopted in part in Recommended Order paragraph 16 and in part in Recommended Order paragraph 10. 1st sentence: Rejected as irrelevant in light of the Agency's subsequent issuance. Remainder: Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(c). Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 16. 5,6. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 14. Adopted generally as Recommended Order paragraph 15. Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(d). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(a). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 9(b). Adopted as Recommended Order paragraph 17. COPIES FURNISHED: Victoria Tschinkel Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mary F. Smallwood, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William F. Hathaway, Esquire Post Office Drawer H New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1586 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hal Spence, Esquire 221 N. Causeway Post Office Box 1266 New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32070-1266
The Issue Whether Respondent's wholesale and retail dealer's licenses should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for two convictions of Possession of Undersized Crawfish Tails, as alleged.
Findings Of Fact I. MGB Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of Florida, owns and operates a seafood dealership known as Gulfstream Seafood at 5300 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida. It holds Retail Seafood Dealer's License No. RC-W3246 and wholesale Seafood Dealer's License No. WD2239 issued by DNR for the 1985-86 license year. (DNR Ex. 1,2) George M. Michael is the president and chief executive officer of MGB. In connection with MGB's application for issuance or renewal of its current seafood dealer's licenses, Mr. Michael executed a required affidavit from the individual responsible for the day-to-day management of the business. By the terms of the affidavit, he pledged himself "to the faithful observance of all . . . laws . . . regulating the . . . possession of fish, seafood, and other saltwater products (DNR Ex.2) On October 21, 1985, following a plea of no contest, the County Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, adjudicated MGB d/b/a Gulfstream Seafood guilty of two counts of Possession of Undersized Crawfish Tails, a violation of Section 370.14, Florida Statutes. MGB was fined $500, in addition to a $20 surcharge and a $25 fine for contempt of court. (DNR Ex.3; Tr.21-22) II. One of these counts alleged that on March 29, 1985, MGB d/b/a Gulfstream Seafood, unlawfully possessed crawfish tails which measured less than five and a half inches lengthwise from the point of separation along the center of the entire tail until the rearmost extremity is reached, contrary to Section 370.14(2), Florida Statutes. Facts Underlying this Violation. On March 29, 1985, Officer Francis Crowley accompanied by another officer of the Florida Marine Patrol entered the premises of Gulfstream Seafood and observed undersized crawfish on pallets in the production area. They were not refrigerated and had not yet been processed. Mr. Michael, who was present, tried to divert Officer Crowley's attention while another individual attempted to wheel the crawfish out the back door. The two officers separated the legal-sized crawfish from the undersized crawfish and weighed each category. There were 254 pounds of undersized crawfish, i.e., crawfish with tails measuring less than five and a half inches lengthwise from the point of separation along the center of the entire tail to the foremost extremity. The number of undersized crawfish involved is unknown. Officer Crowley issued a citation to Mr. Micheal and donated the undersized crawfish to a children's home in Fort Pierce. III. The other count of which MGB was found guilty alleged that on May 17, 1985, MGB again unlawfully possessed 3undersized crawfish in violation of Section 370.14(2), Florida Statutes. The circumstances surrounding this violation including the weight or number of undersized crawfish involved, have not been shown. IV. MGB has 165 employees, a payroll of $127,000 a month, and processes between 10,000 and 15,000 crawfish per month. A suspension of its seafood dealers' license for a month or more would adversely impact its operations. Customers would most likely obtain seafood from other dealers and it would be difficult for MGB to recoup the lost business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing; it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges, and administrative complaint filed against MGB; be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1986.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. Facts admitted by all parties The water quality standards contained in Rule 17-3.111, Florida Administrative Code will not be violated by this project. There are no aquatic macrophytes located in the area of the proposed project. The proposed project is located within 500 feet of the incorporated municipality of Horseshoe Beach, Florida. The proposed project is located within Class II waters of the State not approved for shellfish harvesting. The project will not adversely affect the conservation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their habitats. The proposed project will be of a permanent nature. The project will not adversely affect or will not enhance significant historical or acheological resources under the provisions of Section 267.061, Florida Statutes. The rest of the findings The Applicant, Dixie County, applied for a dredge and fill permit to construct a dock which would expand the existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach. In accordance with the revised plans dated October 23, 1986, the proposed facility would consist of a pier 6 feet wide and 120 feet long designed to accommodate six boat slips, each 30 feet wide and 40 feet long. The boundaries of the boat slips will be demarcated by pilings set 10 feet apart. Four of the boat slips would be primarily for the use of commercial fishing boats and commercial shrimping boats. The other two boat slips (the two slips closest to the land) would be reserved for the exclusive use of recreational and other small vessels. By adding a catwalk 3 or 4 feet wide down the middle of the two slips reserved for recreational vessels, the usefulness of those slips to recreational vessels would be greatly enhanced and the narrowness of the resulting slips would preclude their use by large vessels. Adding the two catwalks would be a minor addition to the proposed project which would greatly enhance the usefulness of the project and at the same time avoid the possibility that large vessels in the two slips closest to the land would impede ingress and egress at the nearby boat lift, boat fueling facility, and boat ramp. Adding a reasonable number of permanent trash or garbage containers would also enhance the usefulness of the proposed project and minimize the possibility of improper disposal of trash and garbage which is generated by the normal use of a dock by fishermen and boaters. The proposed project site is located in the Gulf of Mexico at Horseshoe Beach, Florida, and would extend into the waters of the Gulf, which is a tidally influenced water body adjacent to Dixie County, Florida. The water along the shoreline of the area is shallow for a considerable distance waterward, except where basins and channels have been dredged. The Horseshoe Beach area is relatively unpolluted. The existing public dock at Horseshoe Beach is used primarily by recreational vessels, but there is also extensive commercial fishing and Shrimping boat activity in the area. The project is located at the mouth of a canal with direct access to the Gulf. Several commercial fishhouses operate from the canal bank, which generates extensive commercial boat traffic past the proposed project site. Large numbers of commercial shrimp boats presently dock along the canal that ends near the proposed project site. The proposed project requires no dredging. The only filling required by the proposed project is the placement of pilings into the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico. Even though the plans do not specify whether concrete or wooden pilings will be used, this lack of specificity in the plans is irrelevant. Regardless of what types of pilings are used on this project, the filling activity will not violate the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17- 3.051(1), Florida Administrative Code. The placement of the pilings will not adversely affect the public health, safety, and welfare. Further, the proposed project will not adversely affect any property interests of the Petitioners within the scope of Chapter 403, Florida Statutes. The Gulf bottom in the area of the proposed project has already been disturbed. The presently existing suspension of particulate material in the water column, a natural occurrence in the area of the project, results in low visibility which means that seagrass beds and other marine vegetation, which provide shelter and detrital deposits for fish and other marine resources, will not grow. Coast Guard regulations prohibit commercial fishing vessels from depositing materials into the water within three miles of the coast line. Commercial fishing vessels must prominently display a sticker reciting that regulation and it is the practice of commercial fishing vessels operating in the vicinity of Horseshoe Beach to comply with this Coast Guard no discharge requirement by cleaning nets and scrubbing decks outside the three mile limit. It is not the practice of Commercial fishing vessels to deliberately discharge diesel fuel, fish parts or other material into the water while docked. Further, the limited number of commercial fishing vessels which could dock at the proposed facility at the same time cannot reasonably be expected to create discharges in amounts creating a nuisance, posing any danger to the public health safety or welfare, or violating the water quality criteria contained in Rule 17-3.051(1), Florida Statutes. Although small amounts of diesel fuel can become mixed with bilge water and be discharged by automatic bilge pumps while commercial fishing vessels are docked, there is no evidence that this would be in amounts Sufficient to create a nuisance or violate water quality criteria. To the contrary, notwithstanding a large amount of commercial boat traffic past the proposed site and notwithstanding the fact that large numbers of shrimp boats dock up the canal from the proposed site, the water in the area of the proposed site has remained relatively unpolluted. The proposed project will not affect the normal wind and wave action in the area of the proposed project. Such wind and wave action presently results in free exchange between the waters of the open Gulf and the waters near the shore. This free exchange of waters means that any pollutant discharges in the area of the proposed project will be diluted and rapidly dispersed into the Gulf of Mexico. There will be no measurable difference in the wind and wave action, or in the water exchange, after the proposed project is built. No harmful shoaling or erosion is expected to result from construction of the proposed project. Any docking structure extending out into the Gulf of Mexico will obviously have some effect on navigation in the area of the dock, but there is no evidence that the proposed dock will present a hazard to navigation or any significant interference with customary navigation patterns. The distance between the nearest channel marker and the waterward end of the proposed project is more than 200 feet. The angle of the proposed dock and its Spatial relation to the main Horseshoe Beach turning basin cause no impediment to navigation. The placement of Coast Guard Safety lights on the dock would minimize any potential for impeding navigation or posing a danger to the public health or safety during hours of darkness.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend that the Department of Environmental Regulation issue a Final Order in this case granting the permit applied for by Dixie County. It is also recommended that the permit be made subject to the following additional conditions: That one or more Coast Guard safety lights be placed on the proposed expansion to the dock; That catwalks be added down the middle of the two most landward of the proposed boat slips; and That a reasonable number of trash or garbage receptacles be permanently located on the proposed expansion to the dock to minimize the possibility of trash and garbage being thrown overboard. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of October, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of October, 1987. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-1448 The following are my specific rulings on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by all of the parties. The paragraph numbers referred to below are references to the paragraph numbers in the parties' respective proposed recommended orders. Ruling on findings proposed by the Petitioners: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted. Paragraph 3: Accepted. Paragraph 4: First sentence is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than a proposed finding of fact. Second and third sentences are rejected as repetitious Paragraph 5: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 6: Entire paragraph rejected as unnecessary speculative generalizations in light of the other evidence in this case. Paragraph 7: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 8: Entire paragraph is rejected as appearing to be more in the nature of an introduction to a discussion of legal issues than proposed findings of fact. Paragraph 9: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence; construction of the dock may be expected to bring about some changes in the nature of the boat traffic in the immediate area, but nothing of the nature or magnitude suggested by these proposed findings. Paragraph 10: Rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 11: First sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second sentence is accepted in part and rejected in part. Rejected portion is irrelevant. Third sentence is rejected as irrelevant. Fourth Sentence is accepted. Fifth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and as repetitious Sixth sentence is rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Paragraph 12: Entire paragraph rejected as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Rulings on findings Proposed by the Respondent: Paragraph 1: Accepted. Paragraph 2: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 3: First two sentences accepted in substance. Last sentence rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 4: Accepted. Paragraph 5: Accepted. Paragraph 6: Accepted. Paragraph 7: Rejected as unnecessary recitation of opposing party's contentions and not proposed finding of fact. Paragraph 8: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 9: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 10: Accepted. Paragraph 11: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 12: Accepted. Paragraph 13: First sentence accepted in substance. Second sentence accepted in part and rejected in part; rejected portion concerns riparian rights, which are irrelevant to whether this permit should be issued. Paragraph 14: Entire paragraph rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 15: Accepted in substance. Paragraph 16: Accepted. Paragraph 17: Accepted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Frederick M. Bryant, Esquire Moore, Williams & Bryant, P.A. Post Office Box 1169 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 J. Doyle Thomas, Esquire County Attorney Post Office Box 339 Cross City, Florida 32628 Ann Cowles-Fewox, Legal Intern Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Karen Brodeen, Esquire 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was employed by Morrison's Cafeteria, Clearwater, Florida, from July 29, 1981, until August 15, 1981, in the position of salad preparer. Respondent normally has four employees trained as salad preparers and on August 15, 1981, one was on regular leave and the second was on emergency leave. On August 15, 1981, Petitioner served as late salad preparer, i.e., she was scheduled to work the late shift from noon until the cafeteria closed at 8:15 p.m. Respondent's Clearwater cafeteria employs 53 people, with the manager and assistant manager the two top executives at the cafeteria. The manager works Monday through Friday, with Saturday and Sunday off, while the assistant manager works Wednesday through Sunday, with Monday and Tuesday off. On Saturday and Sunday the assistant manager serves as manager of the cafeteria. On Saturday, August 15, 1981, Petitioner wakened with the onset of her menstrual cycle, experiencing cramps and heavy bleeding. She told her husband that she did not feel too well and he replied to the effect that since she had been working every day for the past two weeks she should call Morrison's and tell them she would "appreciate" the day off. She asked him to call Morrison's to tell them she was not coming in but he had to leave for work and did not have time. Around 9:00 a.m. Petitioner called Morrison's. Robert Brown, the manager, had stopped by Morrison's to cash a personal check and took Petitioner's call. She advised Brown that she had cramps and did not feel too well. Brown reminded her that the cafeteria was short two salad preparers, did not have a replacement for her, and suggested she could stop by a drugstore to get medication to alleviate the cramps. She then told Brown that she would come in. She clocked in at approximately 10:30 Saturday morning and left at 2:10 p.m. In her testimony Petitioner stated she talked to the assistant manager, Mr. Dritsos, on the telephone and when she came in she told Mr. Brown she had cramps and was not feeling well, and that Mr. Brown told her to stop by the drugstore for medication. Petitioner also testified that her husband was present when she called Morrison's on Saturday, but the husband testified he left for work before Petitioner made the call. Both Brown and Dritsos denied Petitioner's version regarding to whom she spoke, and the fact that Saturday is Brown's day off lends credence to Respondent's version of the incident. Additionally, Petitioner's written statement, submitted shortly after the event, is inconsistent with some of her testimony; and, at the hearing, Petitioner's version of her husband's participation differed in several aspects from the testimony of her husband. Petitioner's version of events subsequent to her clocking in is that after she commenced her duties she felt moisture on her leg and went to the restroom to clean up the blood and change pads. She testified she had to go to the restroom two or three times for this problem and that her uniform became bloodstained. She then called her aunt to pick her up and while walking back to the salad department told Dritsos that she had to go home because she could not make it anymore. Dritsos suggested she stay until Mr. Brown got back (Transcript p. 9). Two other employees testified they heard Petitioner ask Mr. Dritsos if she could go home, but neither heard Dritsos's response. Neither of these witnesses nor any others saw any blood on Petitioner's uniform or body or were told by Petitioner that she had any problem other than she was not feeling well. Dritsos denied that Petitioner asked for permission to go home or that he either granted or denied her request to do so. Since Brown had left the cafeteria before these events occurred and was not due back until Monday, it is most unlikely that Dritsos would have suggested Petitioner wait until Brown returned. The most likely scenario is that Petitioner decided to leave, called her aunt to pick her up, told Dritsos she was leaving, proceeded to the time clock, punched her time card, and departed. Petitioner testified that she called Morrison's on Sunday and asked Dritsos what time she should come in. Dritsos denies receiving any communication from Petitioner or seeing her again before this hearing subsequent to her departure on Saturday, August 15, 1981. Petitioner's schedule was posted on the bulletin board at Morrison's, it did not change from day to day, and there was no reason for Petitioner to inquire what time she was scheduled to come to work. Accordingly, her testimony, that not only did she call Dritsos but also that he told her to call back the next day, is not credible. Prior to his departure from Morrison's Sunday night, Dritsos left a note to Brown telling him that Petitioner had walked off the job on Saturday, did not report to work on Sunday, and should be terminated. Brown discussed the case by telephone with Dritsos on Monday after he had read Dritsos's note. Monday was a day off for Dritsos and he was not at Morrison's that day. Brown testified that he received a phone call from Petitioner around 11:00 a.m. on Monday, August 17, inquiring when she should come to work. He told her she was terminated for walking off the job on Saturday and she could stop by to pick up her pay. Brown did not see Petitioner until she picked up her check the next Thursday. Petitioner testified she went in Monday and Brown told her she was terminated because she walked off the job. Petitioner's husband testified that he hired "Georgia Boy" to drive him to Morrison's Monday morning to find out why Petitioner was fired and that he walked up the door but turned around and returned to the car. He testified that Petitioner went into Morrison's on Monday. When asked why he thought on Monday morning that Petitioner had been fired, Mr. Croskey replied that because they would not let her come in Saturday (sic) and wouldn't let her come home Sunday (sic) "I just knew she was fired" (Transcript p. 40). Considering all this testimony, it is concluded that Petitioner did not go to Morrison's on Monday, but called Brown and was told she was fired; that her husband went to Morrison's on Monday to confront the manager with her firing but lost his nerve at the front door and did not enter the cafeteria. Petitioner was a probationary employee, as are all of Morrison's employees for the first 90 days of their employment. Morrison's is a cafeteria whose profitability depends on the efficiency of its operation. It was described in terms of an assembly line where each employee must perform his specific role, otherwise the assembly line loses its efficiency. Each person is trained for his specific job and when one is absent the void has to be filled. If a replacement cannot be brought in, the manager will take the place of one of the servers and have the one he replaced fill in the missing slot. This often requires instructing the person in the new duties while attempting to keep the assembly line moving at the proper tempo. This is one of the reasons for Respondent's rule that an employee may not leave before checkout time without the express permission of the manager (Exhibit 3). Failure to comply with these rules is grounds for dismissal. Morrison's Cafeteria at Clearwater has allowed both male and female employees to leave their jobs if sick. They do not grant permission to leave if the employee is suffering from a hangover caused by overindulgence on payday (or any other day). Mr. Brown has been employed by Morrison's some 25 years and he does not recall a female employee ever before asking to be relieved because of cramps. Petitioner acknowledged that she did not discuss her heavy bleeding with anyone at Morrison's on Saturday, August 15. Since 1976 Morrison's Cafeteria at Clearwater has terminated 65 employees for walking off the job without permission (Exhibit 4). Of these, 41 were males and 24 were females.
The Issue Whether Respondent violated Section 370.142(2)(c), Florida Statutes, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The terms of the settlement agreement between the parties are set forth in the following paragraphs. The parties stipulated to the factual basis alleged in Case No. 97-4209. As set forth in the citation dated August 7, 1997, Respondent Jorge Cabrera (Cabrera) was fishing 130 untagged crawfish traps. This was the second time within a 24-month period that Cabrera was in violation of Section 370.142(2)(c), Florida Statutes. Petitioner, Department of Environmental Protection (Department), agrees to abate the notices that form the basis for Case Nos. 97-4416, 97-4485, and 97-5005 on the following terms and conditions: Cabrera shall immediately pay a fine of $5,000 to the Department. Cabrera shall have his Saltwater Products License (SPL-44525) and all endorsements thereto, C-9049, X-1615, V-7859, ML-887 and RS (current RS expiring June 30, 1999), suspended for five years beginning July 1, 1998, and continuing through the end of the 2002/2003 license year. It is specifically recognized by the parties that the SPL and endorsements currently held by Cabrera remain active until and through the close of business hours (5:00 p.m.) June 30, 1998. The parties agree that the license is suspended for five years, but that at the end of the five-year period, Cabrera is otherwise eligible to reapply for an SPL and the endorsements currently held on the 1997/1998 SPL license, which are the Restricted Species (one-year eligibility remaining), Crawfish, Blue Crab, Stone Crab, and Marine Life endorsements. In this case only, as part of the parties' settlement agreement, the Department agrees that the statutory requirements for renewal of the Crawfish and Stone Crab endorsements and specifically the currently mandatory every September 30-renewal-application deadline for the Stone Crab renewal are tolled during the suspension period. The qualifying period for the RS endorsement is tolled only as to the time currently remaining for requalification on the existing license, which would be one year remaining eligibility. Upon renewal of the SPL with endorsements application for the 2002/2003 license year, eligibility and time remaining will resume from what Cabrera had at the time the suspension became effective. The time periods tolled begin to run again on July 1, 2002, whether the SPL holder has applied for reactivation of his SPL with endorsements or not. Specifically, if there is no application for an SPL with RS endorsement within one year of July 1, 2002, the one year's eligibility remaining from the 1997/1998 license expires. Any time that has expired after July 1, 2002, counts, and the time remaining to requalify for the RS will be whatever time remains from the one-year eligibility which begins to run on July 1, 2002, and expires on June 30, 2003. For example, if the application is received by the Department in September 2002, the applicant would have only nine months of RS eligibility remaining. Under current license application procedures, the earliest reapplication that may be submitted will be in April 2002 for the 2002/2003 license year. Cabrera shall have only until the close of the current year transfer-period to transfer his lobster-trap certificates. Any certificates not transferred are subject to forfeiture if they are not maintained pursuant to Section 370.142, Florida Statutes, during the license suspension period. All fines and fees must be paid to the Department before the transfers can be made. The Department will expedite the providing of forms, processing, and record activity, and Cabrera will expedite submittal of completed application(s) to allow reasonable time to accomplish any transfers or other record activity prior to the close of the transfer period. All traps (lobster and stone crab) must be removed from the water by the end of the fishing season. Any of Cabrera's traps that may become subject to disposition under the trap retrieval program (Section 370.143, Florida Statutes) must be handled as appropriate, even if the circumstances occur after the time the license suspension becomes effective. The parties agree to bear their own costs and attorney's fees associated with these proceedings. The parties agree that breach of the settlement agreement between the parties will revive all rights and remedies available to the non-breaching party that the party had against the other prior to entering into the settlement agreement.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered which incorporates the provisions of the Settlement Agreement between the parties. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of April, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of April, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Kathy Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 F. Perry Odom, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 M. B. Adelson, IV, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 John A. Jabro, Esquire 90811 Overseas Highway, Suite B Tavernier, Florida 33070
Findings Of Fact Background On July 7, 1989, respondent, Florida Marine Fisheries Commission (Commission), duly noticed proposed rule 46-31.002 in volume 15, number 27, of the Florida Administrative Weekly. The notice also advised all interested persons that a public hearing would be held on August 3, 1989, before the Commission on the proposed rule. On August 3-4, 1989, the Commission held a public hearing at which time it considered the proposed rule. During the course of this hearing, the Commission approved the proposed rule with certain changes. These changes, as well as the complete rule text, were duly noticed in volume 15, number 35, of the Florida Administrative Weekly on September 1, 1989. Petitioner, Concerned Shrimpers of America, Inc., Florida Chapter, by petition filed with the Division of Administrative Hearings on July 28, 1989, timely challenged the proposed rule pursuant to Section 120.54, Florida Statutes, as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Petitioner and Intervenors Petitioner has, pursuant to stipulation of the parties, standing to contest the validity of the proposed rule. Intervenor, Center for Marine Conservation, Inc., is, pursuant to stipulation of the parties: ... a non profit environmental protection and education organization incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia and authorized to do business in Florida. It has in excess of 7,000 members throughout the state. Its major purpose is the protection of marine wildlife for this and future generations, including sea turtles, for the benefit of the species, the corporation and its members... Members of the organization observe, study and photograph sea turtles for educational and recreational purposes and their demise or decline from the failure to require the use of TED's will severely hamper and diminish these activities to their detriment. The organization and its members are further concerned with the total marine ecosystem that could be severely damaged should top order predators such as the sea turtle become extinct or their populations be severely diminished.... Intervenor, Florida Audubon Society, is, pursuant to stipulation of the parties: ... a non profit Florida corporation with over 35,000 members within the state whose main purpose is to protect Florida's natural outdoor environment and wildlife, including the marine environment and sea turtles, for the benefit of the organization and its members. The members of the organization observe, study and photograph sea turtles for educational and recreational purposes and their demise or decline from the failure to require the use of TED's will severely hamper and diminish these activities to their detriment. The organization and its members are further concerned with the total marine ecosystem that could be severely damaged should top order predators such as the sea turtle become extinct or their populations be severely diminished.... Intervenor, Greenpeace-U.S.A., is, pursuant to stipulation of the parties: ...headquartered in Washington, D.C., [and] is the United States office of Greenpeace, an international environmental organization with offices in over twenty countries and approximately two and one-half million supporters worldwide. Greenpeace- U.S.A has more than one million supporters in this country, including over 60,000 who live in the State of Florida. Greenpeace- U.S.A. has two offices in Florida, located in Ft. Lauderdale and Jacksonville Beach.... On behalf of its members and threatened and endangered species, Greenpeace-U.S.A. places special emphasis on the preservation of marine species and the marine environment and has worked extensively for the protection of threatened and endangered marine animals. The sea turtle campaign is one of the principal campaigns of the organization.... For the past five years, Greenpeace-U.S.A. has operated the Beach Patrol Project. The Project seeks to maintain protected nesting areas for threatened and endangered sea turtles in the coastal areas of the southern United States. Based in the Jacksonville Beach office, the Project places approximately 250 Greenpeace-U.S.A. volunteers on Florida beaches every year. The Beach Patrol Project has also contributed to the conservation effort in its documentation and identification of species of sea turtles which have been stranded and washed ashore.... Intervenor, Florida League of Anglers, Inc., is a party of unknown capacity, origin, or interest. No evidence was presented on its behalf to demonstrate that its substantial interests would be affected by the proposed rule. The proposed rule The proposed rule at issue in this case prohibits the use of any trawl (net) in state waters that does not have a qualified turtle excluder device (TED) installed therein, as well as the possession aboard any vessel in state waters of a trawl rigged for fishing that does not have a qualified TED installed in it. Excepted from the rule, under specified conditions, are test nets, roller frame trawls, trawls used for experimentation purposes authorized by the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), and trawls operated on the inside waters of the state. The purpose of the proposed rule is to protect sea turtles from extinction, primarily the endangered Kemp's ridley turtle, by reducing the incidental catch and mortality of sea turtles in shrimp trawls. 1/ Currently, five species of sea turtles occur in state waters. These species are the Atlantic green turtle (Chelonia mydas mydas); Atlantic hawksbill turtle (Erelmochelys imbricata imbricata); Atlanta ridley turtle (Lepidochelys kempi), also known as the Kemp's ridley; Leatherback turtle (Dermochelys coriacea); and Loggerhead sea turtle (Caretta caretta). Persuasive proof demonstrates that the incidental catch and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp trawls is a significant source of mortality for the species, and that absent the elimination of that mortality factor the green turtle, hawksbill turtle, Kemp's ridley turtle, leatherback turtle, and loggerhead turtle are threatened with extinction. 2/ Use of the TEDs mandated by the proposed rule will substantially reduce the incidental capture of sea turtles by shrimp trawls, and thereby eliminate shrimp trawls as a significant source of mortality for the species. Currently, the proposed rule permits the use of any one of six TEDs approved by the NMFS, which have demonstrated a turtle exclusion rate of at least 97 percent. The rule also permits the use of any TED that may subsequently be approved by the NMFS as demonstrating a turtle exclusion rate of at least 97 percent. 3/ The rule challenge In challenging the proposed rule, petitioner does not question the need for the rule to protect the sea turtles from extinction, nor the effectiveness of the TED to eliminate a significant threat to the survival of the species. Rather, petitioner contends that: (1) the Commission exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority, which will be discussed in the conclusions of law, infra; (2) that the Commission materially failed to follow the applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in section 120.54 by failing to notify the Small and Minority Business Advocate, the Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Office, and the Division of Economic Development of the Department of Commerce at least 21 days prior to the public hearing on the proposed rule, as well as by failing to prepare an adequate economic impact statement; and, (3) that the proposed rule contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented because the Commission failed to consider the "best information available" concerning the sociological implications of the proposed rule on shrimp fisherman, and because the proposed rule is inconsistent with the federal regulations regarding the mandatory use of TEDs. Notice regrading the impact of the proposed rule on small business Section 120.54(3)(b), Florida Statutes, mandates that where, as here, the proposed rule will affect small business, that "the agency shall send written notice of such rule to the Small and Minority Business Advocate, the Minority Business Enterprise Assistance Office, and the Division of Economic Development of the Department of Commerce not less than 21 days prior to the intended action." Here, the proof demonstrates that the Commission held its public hearing on the proposed rule, and approved it, on August 3-4, 1989, but that it did not provide written notice to the previously mentioned agencies until July 21, 1989, a date less than 21 days before the public hearing. While the Commission failed to accord the named agencies with the minimum 21-day notice mandated by section 120.54(3)(b), the proof fails to demonstrate that such failure constituted a material failure to follow the applicable rule making procedures. Here, the agencies never objected to the inadequacy of the notice; the agencies have never requested an opportunity to present evidence and argument or to offer alternatives regarding the impact of the proposed rule on small business; and there was no showing that the Commission's failure to accord the agencies the full 21-day notice impaired their ability to, or influenced their decision not to, participate in the rule making process. In sum, petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Commission's failure to accord 21 days notice to the named agencies resulted in any incorrectness or unfairness in the proposed adoption of the rule. The economic impact statement Pursuant to the provisions of Section 120.54(2)(b), Florida Statutes, the Commission prepared an economic impact statement for the proposed rule. The economic impact statement was prepared by Robert Palmer, the Commission's economic analyst, an expert in economics. Petitioner challenges the adequacy of the economic impact statement (EIS) prepared for the proposed rule by contesting its accuracy in some respects, its failure in other respects to address the costs to the agency for implementation of the proposed rule, and its failure to address the cost and economic benefit to persons directly affected by the proposed rule. Here, while it is arguable that the Commission's EIS could have been more thorough in some respects, the proof fails to demonstrate any material error that impaired the fairness of the rule making proceeding or the correctness of the Commission's decision to approve the proposed rule. Rather, the proof demonstrates that where errors or omissions occurred in the EIS that the Commission was supplied with the correct information at the public hearing, their impact was of de minimis import, or the costs and benefits were speculative or incapable of estimation. Compliance with statutory standards Pertinent to this case, Section 370.027(1), Florida Statutes, contemplates that the Commission will, in exercising its rule making authority, apply the policy and standards set forth in Section 370.025, Florida Statutes. In this regard, section 370.025 provides: The Legislature hereby declares the policy of the state to be management and preservation of its renewable marine fishery resources, based upon the best available information, emphasizing protection and enhancement of the marine and estuarine environment in such a manner as to provide for optimum sustained benefits and use to all the people of this state for present and future generations. All rules relating to saltwater fisheries adopted by the department pursuant to this chapter or adopted by the Marine Fisheries Commission and approved by the Governor and Cabinet as head of the department shall be consistent with the following standards: The paramount concern of conservation and management measures shall be the continuing health and abundance of the marine fisheries resources of this state. Conservation and management measures shall be based upon the best information available, including biological, sociological, economic, and other information deemed relevant by the commission. Conservation and management measures shall permit reasonable means and quantities of annual harvest, consistent with maximum practicable sustainable stock abundance on a continuing basis. When possible and practicable, stocks of fish shall be managed as a biological unit. Conservation and management measures shall assure proper quality control of marine resources that enter commerce. State marine fishery management plans shall be developed to implement management of important marine fishery resources. Conservation and management decisions shall be fair and equitable to all the people of this state and carried out in such a manner that no individual, corporation, or entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges. Federal fishery management plans and fishery management plans of other states or interstate commissions should be considered when developing state marine fishery management plans. Inconsistencies should be avoided unless it is determined that it is in the best interest of the fisheries or residents of this state to be inconsistent. (Emphasis added). Petitioner's final challenge to the validity of the proposed rule is its contention that the Commission's action in approving the proposed rule contravenes the provisions of section 370.025 because the Commission failed to consider the "best information available" concerning the sociological implications of the proposed rule on shrimp fishermen, and because the proposed rule is inconsistent with the federal regulations regarding the mandatory use of TEDs. Petitioner's contentions are not persuasive. First, with regard to petitioner's contention that the proposed rule contravenes section 370.025(2)(h) because it is inconsistent with the federal regulation regarding the mandatory use of TEDs, the proof demonstrates that, due to the presence of sea turtles in state waters all year round, mandating the use of TEDs at only particular times of the year along certain areas of the coast, as the federal regulations do, would not achieve the Commission's preservation goal, and therefore would not be in the best interest of the sea turtles or residents of the state. Therefore, the Commission's action was not inconsistent with section 370.025(2)(h) Second, with regard to petitioner's contention that the proposed rule contravenes section 370.025(2)(b) because it failed to consider the best sociological information available, section 370.025(2)(a) is informative since it mandates that any rule of the Commission be consistent, before all else, with the following standard: The paramount concern of conservation and management measures shall be the continuing health and abundance of the marine fisheries resources of this state. Faced with persuasive proof that the incidental catch and drowning of sea turtles by shrimp trawls was a significant source of mortality for the species, and that absent the elimination of that mortality factor the species inhabiting state waters were threatened with extinction, the Commission reasonably concluded that it had two options to protect the sea turtles: to prohibit shrimp trawling in state waters or mandate the use of TEDs and permit shrimp trawling to continue. 4/ Such being the options, very little, if any, sociological information was necessary to support the Commission's conclusions that the mandatory use of TEDs, as opposed to a prohibition on shrimp trawling in state waters, would be the least disruptive management measure to the sociological structure of the shrimp fishing community. While almost irrelevant to the instant case, the proof does, however, demonstrate that the Commission had before it the pertinent sociological information it needed to appreciate the impact of the proposed rule on the shrimp fishery community. Such information included an appreciation of the fact that the shrimping community constitutes a societal segment, or self-contained entity, that is in large measure divorced from society in general; that unique familial relationships exist within the shrimp fishing community; that the mandatory use of TEDs had led to a feeling of uncertainty among shrimp fishermen concerning the continued survival of the industry; and that should shrimp fishermen experience significant losses as a consequence of the mandated use of TEDs that they may be forced from the shrimp fishing business, and their community and family relationships disrupted. Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission's action was consistent with section 370.025(2) (b).
