The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent, D & S Motors and David R. Blevins, Owner, engaged in the business of operating a recovery agency without appropriate licensure and whether the Respondent employed a person engaged in the repossession business without that employed person being appropriately licensed, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The subject matter of the dispute at issue arose when Daniel F. Lee, Jr. and the Respondent, David R. Blevins, the owner of D & S Motors, entered into an arrangement whereby Mr. Lee worked for Mr. Blevins in his used car sales business; obtaining cars for sale to customers, repairing and otherwise preparing such cars for sale, and selling cars for the Respondent's dealership. Apparently Mr. Lee believed, at least initially, that he had entered into a partnership arrangement with the Respondent to operate D & S Motors. Mr. Lee, however, was paid like an employee during the course of their business relationship and considered himself to be working for Mr. Blevins. Their arrangement was an employer/employee relationship based upon the preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Lee's duties included buying and selling cars, preparing them for sale, and driving the company tow truck. He also engaged in attendance at auctions at which cars were sold or others were purchased for resale. Mr. Lee also performed physical repossessions of automobiles between April and December of 1991. D & S Motors did five or six repossessions for Commercial Credit of Pensacola and would normally charge $125.00 per automobile repossession. Mr. Blevins was aware that Mr. Lee was repossessing automobiles with his company's tow truck because he would give Mr. Lee telephone messages from Commercial Credit of Pensacola when a repossession needed to be done, dispatching Mr. Lee to perform that task. After being paid by Commercial Credit with checks made payable to D & S Motors, Mr. Lee would normally give custody of such checks to Mr. Blevins, who would then split the funds they represented three ways. One third of the funds went to Mr. Blevins' company, one third was paid to Mr. Lee, and one third was applied toward maintenance of the tow truck. On three or four occasions, Mr. Blevins actually rode with Mr. Lee in the tow truck performing repossession attempts. On these occasions, they made only one successful recovery of a vehicle, however. The repossessed vehicles were normally kept at the D & S Motors' dealership lot, and Mr. Blevins sometimes would help perform the inventory of the personal property in the vehicles. On July 31, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $275.00 payable to D & S Motors for the repossession of three vehicles. On August 30, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $100.00 made payable to D & S Motors for one repossession. On December 10, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $125.00 made payable to Danny Lee for one repossession. Keith Prine, the Branch Manager for Commercial Credit of Pensacola, was given a D & S Motors' invoice or receipt signed by Mr. Lee. In January of 1992, Mr. Blevins wrote Commercial Credit of Pensacola concerning a wrecked 1986 Saab automobile, which was then being stored at the D & S Motors' dealership lot. That automobile had been repossessed by Mr. Lee, and Mr. Blevins was aware that Mr. Lee had repossessed that vehicle, at least upon the occasion of its being deposited on the D & S Motors' dealership lot. During the times in question, between April and December of 1991, neither Mr. Blevins nor Mr. Lee held a Class "E" recovery agent license, nor a Class "EE" recovery agent intern license, nor a Class "R" recovery agency license, pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of the statutory and rule provisions cited above and that an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 be imposed in accordance with Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)2, Florida Administrative Code, and, as to Count II of the Administrative Complaint, that the Respondent be assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00, in accordance with Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)9, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 92-3555 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-10. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esq. General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. David R. Blevins D & S Motors 6559 N. Old Palafox Pensacola, FL 32514
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner; and, (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of the provisions in accordance to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris, submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner on or about February 24, 2005. On his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted of the following three felonies: (1) possession and sale of a controlled substance, (2) trafficking in controlled substance (cannabis) in excess of 100 pounds, and (3) dealing in stolen property. The foregoing felony convictions were in or about 1976, 1984, and 1993, respectively, and were the result of offenses that occurred in Florida. Due to Petitioner's felony convictions, as noted in paragraph 2 above, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, on February 24, 2005, in addition to his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver did not include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he has good moral character. As part of the Division's review of Petitioner's request for waiver, on or about April 5, 2005, Mr. Toner interviewed Petitioner. During the interview with Mr. Toner, Petitioner had the opportunity to present information that established his rehabilitation and demonstrated his present good moral character, but he did not produce such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner's felony convictions, which are undisputed and included in Petitioner's application, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license which he seeks. By Petitioner's own admission, he was convicted of the felony offenses noted in paragraph 2 above. The number of felony convictions and the times that the offenses were committed, show a pattern of serious criminal behavior and recidivism. Petitioner may be rehabilitated and may have present good moral character. However, Petitioner did not testify at the final hearing and presented no evidence that he has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character. Absent from the record is any testimony from Petitioner or from Petitioner's friends, relatives, business associates, employers, or church members regarding Petitioner's good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his last felony conviction. In absence of any evidence that Petitioner has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character, the Division has no basis to grant Petitioner a waiver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris', application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Stephen M. Morris 162 Warren Avenue New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32168 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident insurance adjuster pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042, because Petitioner is on probation and is participating in a pre-trial intervention program; and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to a default license because Respondent did not grant or deny the license within 90 days pursuant to Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2002). On April 3, 2003, Petitioner applied for a license as a resident company employee property and casualty adjuster (resident adjuster license). Petitioner truthfully answered all questions on the application, including those questions pertaining to Petitioner's criminal history and plea of guilty to a felony charge in Georgia. On September 25, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial of Petitioner's license application. Respondent based the denial on the grounds that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime of moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2002), for which denial of his application is mandatory; that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime not involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), for which denial of his application is discretionary; that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(6) and (14) prohibits Respondent from granting the application while Petitioner is on probation or in a pre- trial intervention program; and that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(8) requires Petitioner to wait five years after the plea dated May 14, 2002, before applying for a license. On a date not disclosed in the record, Respondent issued a Second Amended Notice of Denial (the Amended Notice of Denial). The record does not disclose a first amended notice of denial. The Amended Notice of Denial deletes the ground that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime of moral turpitude, but retains the other grounds for denial stated in the Notice of Denial issued on September 25, 2003. On May 14, 2002, Petitioner pled guilty to a single felony charge of possession of cocaine. A Georgia court sentenced Petitioner under Georgia's First Offender Act. If Petitioner successfully completes probation, Georgia will dismiss the felony charge. If Petitioner does not successfully complete probation, the Georgia court may revoke Petitioner's probation, adjudicate Petitioner guilty as charged, and sentence Petitioner to the maximum sentence authorized under Georgia law. When Georgia authorities arrested Petitioner for possession of cocaine on November 4, 2001, Petitioner held a Florida nonresident company all-lines adjuster license pursuant to license number A082918 (a nonresident adjuster license). Petitioner voluntarily cancelled the nonresident adjuster license on October 21, 2002. On January 22, 2003, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner inquiring into the Georgia arrest in accordance with Subsections 626.611(14), 626.621(8), and 626.631, Florida Statutes (2002). In response to the letter from Respondent, Petitioner filed the application for a resident adjuster license that is at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner attached a letter explaining the circumstances of the criminal proceeding in Georgia and three letters of recommendation. The second page of the application that Petitioner submitted notifies Petitioner that Respondent will not consider the application while Petitioner is under probation or in a pre- trial intervention program. In relevant part, the second page of the application provides: NOTE: IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ON PROBATION OR PARTICIPATING IN A PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM, YOU MAY WANT TO WAIT TO FILE YOUR APPLICATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT UNTIL YOUR PROBATION OR PRE-TRIAL PROGRAM HAS TERMINATED. (For other than minor traffic violations, the rules of the Department prohibit the approval of licensure for an individual who is currently serving a probationary term or participating in a pre- trial intervention program. . . .) ( emphasis not supplied) After receiving the application for a resident adjuster license, Respondent issued a letter dated April 7, 2003, stating Respondent's intent to deny the application. The letter did not state that Respondent intended to deny the application on the ground that Petitioner violated Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), by pleading guilty to a crime that does not involve moral turpitude. In relevant part, the letter stated: [W]e are in receipt of the certified documents, however, a review of the documents indicate[s] that you are still on probation. The rules of the Department prohibit the approval of licensure for an individual who is currently serving a probationary term. Please write and let us know if we need to close or withdraw your application. The position stated by Respondent in the letter dated April 7, 2003, is substantially similar to that taken by Respondent during the hearing and in its PRO. Respondent does not assert that Respondent should deny the application on the ground that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime for which Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), gives Respondent discretionary authority to deny the application. Respondent's position is consistent with the preponderance of evidence. The preponderance of evidence shows that Petitioner is rehabilitated and has no propensity to commit the crime for which he is under probation in Georgia. Rather, Respondent relies upon a rule that Respondent interprets as imposing specific waiting periods following the plea agreement in Georgia before Petitioner may apply for a resident adjuster license in Florida. Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license on the basis of Respondent's interpretation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(6) as prohibiting Respondent from considering the application of any applicant who is on probation until the applicant has satisfactorily completed the probation. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(8) as requiring Petitioner to wait five years after the plea in Georgia before Petitioner is eligible for licensure in Florida. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(14)(b) as prohibiting Respondent from granting a license application to Petitioner while Petitioner is in a pre-trial intervention program. The enabling legislation for Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042 is Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002). Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Respondent to adopt rules establishing specific waiting periods after Respondent denies, suspends, or revokes Petitioner's license pursuant to specifically enumerated Florida statutes. In relevant part, Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that Respondent: . . . shall adopt rules establishing specific waiting periods for applicants to become eligible for licensure following denial, suspension, or revocation. . . . (emphasis supplied) Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), prescribes a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of any waiting period pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042. The statutory prerequisite is that Respondent must first deny, suspend, or revoke an existing license based on statutory provisions enumerated in the enabling legislation; enumerated provisions that are independent of any waiting periods. Thereafter, Respondent may impose relevant waiting periods to any application that follows the denial, suspension, or revocation of the existing license. Respondent proposes to impose a waiting period against Petitioner without first satisfying the statutory prerequisite of a denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license within the meaning of Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002). The waiting period proposed by Respondent does not follow a denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license. Rather, the proposed waiting period follows a plea entered by Petitioner in Georgia on May 14, 2002. The application for a resident adjuster license that is at issue in this proceeding indicates that no administrative action was ever taken against Petitioner's nonresident adjuster license, and Respondent stipulated that Petitioner answered all questions on the application truthfully. The Florida licensure file that Respondent maintains shows no administrative action against Petitioner's nonresident adjuster license. Respondent proposes to apply a waiting period in a manner that does not follow denial, suspension, or revocation of either the previous nonresident adjuster license or the resident adjuster license that Petitioner seeks in this proceeding. In effect, Respondent's proposed agency action would effectively amend Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), by denying Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license on the basis of a waiting period, rather than on the basis of one of the statutory provisions enumerated in the enabling legislation. Such action would have the effect of enlarging or modifying the specific provisions of Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), that require the imposition of a waiting period to follow Respondent's denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license. Respondent orally advised Petitioner that Respondent was authorized by rule to approve Petitioner's application if Petitioner were successful in terminating the Georgia probation early. However, Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002), required Respondent to approve or deny the application no later than July 2, 2003. Petitioner sought additional time to petition the Georgia court to terminate his probation early. On June 27, 2003, Petitioner signed a "Waiver of Deemer Date" (Waiver) that suspended for 60 days the requirement in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for Respondent to approve or deny the license application within 90 days after receipt of the application. In relevant part, the Waiver stated: I hereby voluntarily and knowingly waive the time requirement regarding final action on my license application as specified in Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, I waive the provision that requires the Department of Financial Services to either approve or deny my pending application for licensure as a company employee property & casualty adjuster within 90 days after receipt of the completed application. This waiver is effective for 60 days. (emphasis supplied) The 60 days in which the Waiver was effective, expired on August 31, 2003. However, approximately six days remained in the 90-day statutory period when Petitioner signed the Waiver on June 27, 2003. The 90-day statutory period expired six days after August 31, 2003, on or about September 6, 2003. Petitioner attended a court hearing in Georgia sometime in August 2003, in an attempt to persuade the Georgia court to terminate Petitioner's probation. Petitioner was unsuccessful and remained on probation at the time of the administrative hearing in this proceeding. Petitioner did not advise Respondent of the outcome of the Georgia hearing until September 4, 2003, when Respondent inquired of the status of Petitioner's application. On September 4, 2003, Respondent had actual notice from Petitioner that Petitioner had been unsuccessful in his attempt at early termination of his probation. Respondent did not issue its Notice of Intent to Deny the license until September 25, 2003. Respondent's letter dated April 7, 2003, provided Petitioner with written notice of Respondent's intent to deny the license application unless Petitioner was successful in obtaining early termination of his probation. Oral communications from Respondent's authorized representative also indicated that Respondent intended to deny the license application if Respondent were unable to license Petitioner temporarily. The author of a cover letter issued with the Waiver on June 26, 2003, stated, in relevant part, that the author did not have an answer to the issue "we discussed" regarding a temporary license. The author indicated that she would contact Petitioner as soon as she had an answer. The record discloses no answer prior to the Notice of Intent to Deny dated September 25, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith Luther Fernandez 605 Casa Park Court M Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Keith Luther Fernandez 3667 Oakhill Drive Titusville, Florida 32780 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether discipline should be imposed against Respondent for operating on an expired public lodging establishment license, an offense which is deemed by rule to constitute operation without a license.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Lakeside is an apartment building with 19 units located at 1048 Northeast 18 Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304- 2408. The Division issued Lakeside a license, numbered 16- 10553-H, to operate as a public lodging establishment. According to information in the Division's official database, as reproduced in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 1/ the "current license expiration date [for Lakeside's license] is December 1, 2000." On July 20, 2000, Division employee Robert Shaw conducted a routine inspection of Lakeside and found the apartment complex to be open and operating. On a Lodging Inspection Report that he prepared on that date, 2/ Mr. Shaw noted two minor violations, neither of which is at issue here. On the same form, Mr. Shaw inscribed the date that Lakeside's license would expire, as shown below, in the blank spaces provided for that purpose in a line that read: REMINDER: Your license expires 12 /01 /00 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Shaw testified, however, that at the time of this inspection, he did not know whether or not Lakeside was licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Lakeside Apartments. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner was convicted of unarmed robbery before the courts of the State of Massachusetts in 1960. The Petitioner has applied for a pardon so that his civil rights can be restored, and it is probable that his civil rights will be restored. Apparently the process for accomplishing a restoration of civil rights is time consuming in the State of Massachusetts. The Petitioner failed to reflect on his application that he was arrested for robbery in 1962. He was not convicted of that crime. It does not appear that the Petitioner deliberately falsified his application.
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence presented at the final hearing and the entire record of this proceeding, the following findings of fact are made: Daniel D. Goldberg, either as an individual or as owner, currently holds, or held at all times material to this proceeding, the following licenses issued pursuant to chapter 493: Class "EE" recovery agent intern license, number EE 9200054, a renewal license 2/ which expires December 30, 1995; Class "R" recovery agency license, number R 9200003, which was issued December 13, 1993, and expires December 13, 1995; Class "C" private investigator license, number C 0000984, a renewal license which was to expire March 11, 1995; Class "D" security officer license, number D 9111909, a renewal license which was to expire August 6, 1995; Class "M" private investigative/security agency manager's license, number M 9100061, a renewal license which was to expire September 6, 1995; Class "A" private investigative agency license, number A 0001510, which was issued March 31, 1995. Counts I and II: Engaging in the business of performing repossessions without a Class "R" license and performing repossessions without a Class "E" license or a valid Class "EE" license. Bradford Gray, a Class "E" licensee, sponsored Mr. Goldberg as a Class "EE" recovery agent intern from April 1992, to August 22, 1993. Mr. Gray's sponsorship allowed Mr. Goldberg to perform repossessions under Mr. Gray's direct supervision and control. When Mr. Gray terminated his sponsorship, Mr. Goldberg was no longer authorized to perform repossessions even though he retained his Class "EE" intern's license. Mr. Gray notified the Department on the appropriate form of the date his sponsorship of Mr. Goldberg terminated; the form was received by the Department on September 3, 1993. The Department sent Mr. Goldberg a letter dated November 23, 1993, notifying him that he was no longer sponsored by a licensed Class "E" recovery agent and that he was not authorized to work as a recovery agent intern until the Department received notification that he had a new sponsor. On February 16, 1994, Mr. Goldberg was personally advised by Fred Speaker, supervisor/investigator for the Department's West Palm Beach regional office, that he did not have a valid recovery agent's license because he lacked a sponsor. From on or about September 16, 1993, until on or about December 30, 1993, Mr. Goldberg performed repossessions for Motor World, a used car dealer located in Plantation, Florida. Mr. Goldberg performed these repossessions as an independent contractor of Motor World, not as an employee. He was paid an agreed amount for each motor vehicle he repossessed. Mr. Goldberg submitted requests for payment to Motor World on September 16, September 28, October 11, November 10, November 24, December 3, December 10, December 23, and December 30, 1993; the vehicles which Mr. Goldberg repossessed and for which he claimed payments were identified on each request. Payment was made by check, drawn on the account of Motor World and made payable to "Daniel Goldberg"; the checks were endorsed by "Daniel Goldberg." Mr. Goldberg also performed two repossessions for Motor World on January 7, 1994. "Daniel Goldberg Recovery," owned by Daniel David Goldberg, was issued a Class "R" recovery agency license by the Department on December 13, 1993. At some point in time after December 13, 1993, when Daniel Goldberg Recovery was licensed and had the appropriate insurance and federal tax identification number, Motor World began doing business with the agency and paying it rather than Mr. Goldberg for the repossessions. On February 17, 1994, Bradford Gray notified the Department that, as of February 16, 1994, he was again acting as Mr. Goldberg's sponsor and would supervise him as a recovery agent intern until Mr. Goldberg was issued his Class "E" recovery agent's license. From on or about September 16, 1993, until on or about December 30, 1993, Mr. Goldberg performed repossessions for consideration, without being properly licensed. Impersonating a law enforcement officer. In January 1994, Peter Tuttle owned a blue, 1985, two- door Ford Mustang, which he had purchased from and financed with Motor World. On January 7, 1994, Mr. Goldberg approached Mr. Tuttle at his place of employment. Mr. Goldberg identified himself as "Detective Goldberg" and opened his wallet, showed Mr. Tuttle a badge, folded his wallet, and put it back in his pocket. Mr. Tuttle did not get a good look at the badge because Mr. Goldberg opened and closed his wallet quickly, but the badge was metal and appeared to Mr. Tuttle to be a police officer's badge. Mr. Goldberg told Mr. Tuttle that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident involving Mr. Tuttle's car and that he needed to see the car to check for damages. Mr. Goldberg also told Mr. Tuttle that concealing mortgaged property was a crime and that he could be arrested and go to jail if the case ended up in court. Mr. Tuttle told Mr. Goldberg that he did not know the location of his car because he could not keep up with the payments and had lent the car to his uncle, John Talirico, who had been driving it for several months. Because Mr. Tuttle thought Mr. Goldberg was a police officer on official business, he telephoned his uncle, and Mr. Goldberg spoke with him. After this telephone conversation, Mr. Goldberg left the premises. Later in the day on January 7, 1994, Mr. Goldberg telephoned Claudio DeBonis, an automobile mechanic who worked for Bullard Enterprises in Pembroke Park. He identified himself to Mr. DeBonis as ""Detective" so-and-so" 3/ and indicated that he was calling in reference to a hit-and-run accident involving a vehicle in Mr. DeBonis's shop. Mr. DeBonis gave Mr. Goldberg the address of the repair shop. When Mr. Goldberg arrived at the shop, located at 2690 South Park Road, Pembroke Park, Florida, he walked up to Mr. DeBonis, pulled out his wallet, flashed his wallet open and shut so quickly that Mr. DeBonis was not sure whether there was a badge in the wallet, and identified himself as ""Detective" so-and-so." Mr. Goldberg told Mr. DeBonis that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident involving a blue Mustang. Although Mr. DeBonis asked Mr. Goldberg for a business card, Mr. Goldberg did not give him one. Mr. Goldberg located the blue Mustang in the shop, looked it over, and found a small scratch on the fender. He told Mr. DeBonis he had to take the car, but Mr. DeBonis objected. Mr. Goldberg then began speaking on what appeared to be a two-way Motorola radio, asking for the "BSO" and the "DMV." Mr. DeBonis believed these references were to the Broward County Sheriff's Office and to the Department of Motor Vehicles. Although Mr. DeBonis initially thought Mr. Goldberg was a police officer, he became suspicious when Mr. Goldberg said he needed to take the car and went upstairs in the shop to call the sheriff's office. Before his call could get through, he saw Mr. Goldberg pushing the Mustang through the alley, with a woman in the driver's seat steering the car. Mr. DeBonis and Mr. Goldberg had a brief altercation when Mr. DeBonis tried to stop Mr. Goldberg from removing the car from the shop's premises. When Mr. DeBonis was told by a sheriff's deputy, who arrived after the car had been pushed into the street, that Mr. Goldberg was repossessing the vehicle, that he had the proper paperwork, and that there was nothing Mr. DeBonis could do, Mr. DeBonis turned and walked away. Mr. Goldberg impersonated a law enforcement officer in these two incidents in order to gain access to the motor vehicle he sought to repossess. He identified himself to Peter Tuttle as "Detective" Goldberg and displayed a metal badge to Mr. Tuttle in such a fashion that Mr. Tuttle reasonably believed that Mr. Goldberg was a law enforcement officer. By telling Mr. Tuttle that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident involving Mr. Tuttle's 1985 Mustang and that he needed to see the car in furtherance of this investigation, Mr. Goldberg intended to further convince Mr. Tuttle of his official status so Mr. Tuttle would divulge the whereabouts of his car. Mr. Goldberg represented himself in virtually the same way to Claudio DeBonis. He identified himself as a "Detective" and flashed his wallet open and shut in a manner calculated to convey the impression that he was carrying a badge. Mr. Goldberg told Mr. DeBonis that he was investigating a hit-and-run accident involving the blue Mustang which had been left for repairs at the shop where Mr. DeBonis was employed. By such conduct, he intended to give Mr. DeBonis the impression he was a law enforcement officer on official business in order to convince Mr. DeBonis to give him access to the blue Mustang. Conviction in New Jersey of a crime of the fourth degree. On June 21, 1994, a Judgment of Conviction was entered in the New Jersey Superior Court, Essex County, Law Department - Criminal, finding Mr. Goldberg guilty of the offense of transport of a firearm under statute 2C:39-5b, identified in the judgment as a crime of the fourth degree. Mr. Goldberg was placed on one year's probation, to be transferred to Florida, and the court recommended that "any right to carry firearm in Florida be continued."
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of State, Division of Licensing, enter a Final Order Finding Daniel D. Goldberg guilty of violating section 493.6118(1)(g), Florida Statutes, and imposing a $300 administrative fine pursuant to rule 1C- 3.113(2)(k), Florida Administrative Code; Finding Daniel D. Goldberg guilty of violating section 493.6118(1)(I), Florida Statutes, in two separate incidents occurring on January 7, 1994, and imposing a $1,500 administrative fine pursuant to rule 1C-3.113(2)(m), Florida Administrative Code, and section 493.6118(2)(c), Florida Statutes; Placing Mr. Goldberg on probation for a period of two (2) years, upon such conditions as the Department deems appropriate, pursuant to rule 1C- 3.113(2)(k) and (m), Florida Administrative Code, and section 493.6118(2)(d), Florida Statutes; and, Dismissing Count VIII of the Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 2d day of October 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. PATRICIA HART MALONO Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2d day of October 1995.
The Issue Whether the Respondent failed to make a reasonable accommodation in order to allow the Petitioner to perform his job functions and thereby committed an unlawful employment practice constituting discrimination that is prohibited by the Florida Civil Rights Act.
Findings Of Fact Miami-Dade County is a political subdivision of the State of Florida. The Respondent, Miami Dade County Consumer Service, is a department of Miami-Dade County. The Petitioner, Carlos A. Mangual, is an employee of Miami-Dade County, Florida (the County). He currently is employed as the security manager for the Port of Miami. The Petitioner has held his current position since April of 2001. Prior to his current position, the Petitioner was a Parks and Recreation Security Supervisor for the County. As a supervisor he was eligible to participate in seminars and training meetings that were geared toward making supervisors aware of personnel rules and regulations. During his employment with Parks and Recreation, the Petitioner attended a meeting regarding the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Mr. Collins is the County's Employee Relations ADA specialist who was the guest instructor for the supervisor's certification program. Mr. Collins met the Petitioner at the ADA meeting and discussed with the Petitioner whether the Petitioner's weight (and size) would be considered a disability under the ADA provisions. Subsequently, while employed with the County, the Petitioner was involved in an automobile accident that resulted in a knee injury. The Petitioner has undergone two surgeries to correct the damaged knee. Because the knee has adversely affected the Petitioner's gait, he also suffers back pain from the incident. The knee injury, resultant back pain, and residual physical impairments have caused the Petitioner to receive a workers' compensation overall impairment rating of 8 percent. For purposes of this case, the Respondent does not challenge such impairment. Subsequent to the accident and knee injury, the Petitioner applied for a position with the Respondent. Such position, Consumer Protection Inspector/Officer, required the Petitioner to attend to office duties for approximately 1-2 hours per day and to "be on the road" the rest of the time. Consequently, while working as a Consumer Protection Inspector, the Petition logged anywhere from 100 to 200 miles per day in a County-owned vehicle. The Petitioner began his probationary status with the Respondent in January 2000. During the probationary period, the Petitioner received monthly job performance evaluations. After approximately 5 months and while still during his probationary status, the Petitioner was not retained as a Consumer Protection Inspector. Instead, he was returned to the Parks Department where he continued employment with the County until he began his current position with the Port. The Petitioner considered the return to Parks a "demotion" based upon his alleged disability. It is undisputed the Petitioner requested a larger vehicle during his tenure with the Respondent. The Petitioner maintained the mileage logged in small vehicles was damaging to his knee and uncomfortable. The Petitioner claims he was entitled to an accommodation under the ADA because of his alleged disability. During his time with the Respondent, the Petitioner did not make a formal request for an accommodation. In fact, the credible evidence supports a finding that the Petitioner obtained the form but did not file it with supporting medical documentation as advised by the County's ADA specialist. The Petitioner maintains that the small vehicle assigned for his use required him to frequently stop and stretch. Such stops were necessary because the interior of the vehicle did not allow for an extension of his leg. There is no evidence that the employer refused to allow the Petitioner to make such stops or that the Petitioner was adversely evaluated because of the stops. During the Petitioner's probationary period, the Respondent did not have a larger vehicle readily available to assign to the Petitioner. Vehicles that might have become available would have been assigned based upon seniority with the Respondent. The Petitioner went back to Parks prior to such vehicles becoming permanently available to the Respondent. The Petitioner's impairment rating has not affected his abilities to walk every day, to drive to and from his place of employment, to shop, to engage in leisure activities, or to go to a gym once a month for workouts. There is no evidence of any life activity that Petitioner cannot perform as a result of his knee impairment. The Petitioner was fully able to perform the functions of his job. The Petitioner performed his job with the Respondent even when using a small vehicle. The Respondent never refused a request for an accommodation from the Petitioner. The Petitioner's informal inquiry regarding how to seek an accommodation was never formally filed. The Petitioner's size as well as any knee impairment contributed to the uncomfortable nature of the small vehicle used by the Respondent. This was especially true when the Petitioner was required to share the vehicle with another employee.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing the Petitioner's complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of May, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of May, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos A. Mangual 1290 Northeast 135th Street North Miami, Florida 33161 Consumer Services Miami Dade County 140 West Flagler Street, Suite 901 Miami, Florida 33128 Eric A. Rodriquez, Esquire 111 Northwest 1st Street, Suite 2810 Miami, Florida 33128-1993 Ana M. Urrechaga, Esquire Urrechaga, P. A. 8603 South Dixie Highway, Suite 209 Miami, Florida 33143
