The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent, D & S Motors and David R. Blevins, Owner, engaged in the business of operating a recovery agency without appropriate licensure and whether the Respondent employed a person engaged in the repossession business without that employed person being appropriately licensed, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The subject matter of the dispute at issue arose when Daniel F. Lee, Jr. and the Respondent, David R. Blevins, the owner of D & S Motors, entered into an arrangement whereby Mr. Lee worked for Mr. Blevins in his used car sales business; obtaining cars for sale to customers, repairing and otherwise preparing such cars for sale, and selling cars for the Respondent's dealership. Apparently Mr. Lee believed, at least initially, that he had entered into a partnership arrangement with the Respondent to operate D & S Motors. Mr. Lee, however, was paid like an employee during the course of their business relationship and considered himself to be working for Mr. Blevins. Their arrangement was an employer/employee relationship based upon the preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Lee's duties included buying and selling cars, preparing them for sale, and driving the company tow truck. He also engaged in attendance at auctions at which cars were sold or others were purchased for resale. Mr. Lee also performed physical repossessions of automobiles between April and December of 1991. D & S Motors did five or six repossessions for Commercial Credit of Pensacola and would normally charge $125.00 per automobile repossession. Mr. Blevins was aware that Mr. Lee was repossessing automobiles with his company's tow truck because he would give Mr. Lee telephone messages from Commercial Credit of Pensacola when a repossession needed to be done, dispatching Mr. Lee to perform that task. After being paid by Commercial Credit with checks made payable to D & S Motors, Mr. Lee would normally give custody of such checks to Mr. Blevins, who would then split the funds they represented three ways. One third of the funds went to Mr. Blevins' company, one third was paid to Mr. Lee, and one third was applied toward maintenance of the tow truck. On three or four occasions, Mr. Blevins actually rode with Mr. Lee in the tow truck performing repossession attempts. On these occasions, they made only one successful recovery of a vehicle, however. The repossessed vehicles were normally kept at the D & S Motors' dealership lot, and Mr. Blevins sometimes would help perform the inventory of the personal property in the vehicles. On July 31, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $275.00 payable to D & S Motors for the repossession of three vehicles. On August 30, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $100.00 made payable to D & S Motors for one repossession. On December 10, 1991, Commercial Credit of Pensacola issued a check for $125.00 made payable to Danny Lee for one repossession. Keith Prine, the Branch Manager for Commercial Credit of Pensacola, was given a D & S Motors' invoice or receipt signed by Mr. Lee. In January of 1992, Mr. Blevins wrote Commercial Credit of Pensacola concerning a wrecked 1986 Saab automobile, which was then being stored at the D & S Motors' dealership lot. That automobile had been repossessed by Mr. Lee, and Mr. Blevins was aware that Mr. Lee had repossessed that vehicle, at least upon the occasion of its being deposited on the D & S Motors' dealership lot. During the times in question, between April and December of 1991, neither Mr. Blevins nor Mr. Lee held a Class "E" recovery agent license, nor a Class "EE" recovery agent intern license, nor a Class "R" recovery agency license, pursuant to Chapter 493, Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent in violation of the statutory and rule provisions cited above and that an administrative fine in the amount of $500.00 be imposed in accordance with Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)2, Florida Administrative Code, and, as to Count II of the Administrative Complaint, that the Respondent be assessed an administrative fine in the amount of $250.00, in accordance with Rule 1C-3.113(1)(a)9, Florida Administrative Code. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of December, 1992, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of December, 1992. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 92-3555 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-10. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: The Honorable Jim Smith Secretary of State The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Phyllis Slater, Esq. General Counsel Department of State The Capitol, PL-02 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250 Henri C. Cawthon, Esquire Department of State Division of Licensing The Capitol, MS-4 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250 Mr. David R. Blevins D & S Motors 6559 N. Old Palafox Pensacola, FL 32514
The Issue The issues are: (1) whether Petitioner is qualified for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner; and, (2) whether Petitioner is entitled to waiver of the provisions in accordance to Chapter 550, Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Based on the oral and documentary evidence adduced at hearing, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris, submitted an application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license as a greyhound owner on or about February 24, 2005. On his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner accurately reported that he had been convicted of the following three felonies: (1) possession and sale of a controlled substance, (2) trafficking in controlled substance (cannabis) in excess of 100 pounds, and (3) dealing in stolen property. The foregoing felony convictions were in or about 1976, 1984, and 1993, respectively, and were the result of offenses that occurred in Florida. Due to Petitioner's felony convictions, as noted in paragraph 2 above, his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license was subject to denial. Consequently, on February 24, 2005, in addition to his application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license, Petitioner also requested that a waiver be granted so that he could obtain the license. Petitioner's application and his request for waiver did not include any information which would establish his rehabilitation or demonstrate that he has good moral character. As part of the Division's review of Petitioner's request for waiver, on or about April 5, 2005, Mr. Toner interviewed Petitioner. During the interview with Mr. Toner, Petitioner had the opportunity to present information that established his rehabilitation and demonstrated his present good moral character, but he did not produce such information. In light of the information regarding Petitioner's felony convictions, which are undisputed and included in Petitioner's application, Petitioner does not meet the eligibility requirements for the license which he seeks. By Petitioner's own admission, he was convicted of the felony offenses noted in paragraph 2 above. The number of felony convictions and the times that the offenses were committed, show a pattern of serious criminal behavior and recidivism. Petitioner may be rehabilitated and may have present good moral character. However, Petitioner did not testify at the final hearing and presented no evidence that he has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character. Absent from the record is any testimony from Petitioner or from Petitioner's friends, relatives, business associates, employers, or church members regarding Petitioner's good conduct and reputation subsequent to the date of his last felony conviction. In absence of any evidence that Petitioner has been rehabilitated and has present good moral character, the Division has no basis to grant Petitioner a waiver.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order denying Petitioner, Stephen M. Morris', application for a pari-mutuel wagering occupational license and his request for waiver. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Stefan Thomas Hoffer, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202 Stephen M. Morris 162 Warren Avenue New Smyrna Beach, Florida 32168 David J. Roberts, Director Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Josefina Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Centre 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2202
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of pleading nolo contendere to three counts of uttering a forged instrument, three counts of forgery, and three counts of grand theft so as to constitute a demonstrated lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance, in violation of Section 626.611(7), Florida Statutes; willful failure to comply with any provision of this Code, in violation of Section 626.611(13), Florida Statutes; a finding of guilty or pleading of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony involving a crime of moral turpitude, in violation of Section 626.611(14), Florida Statutes, any cause for which issuance of the license or permit could have been refused or denied by Petitioner, pursuant to Section 626.621(1), Florida Statutes; and a finding of guilty of pleading of guilty or nolo contendere to a felony, in violation of Section 626.621(8), Florida Statutes. An additional issue is whether Respondent failed to notify Petitioner of her plea of nolo contendere within 30 days, as required by Section 626.621(11), Florida Statutes. If Petitioner prevails on any of these issues, another issue is the penalty that should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all material times, Respondent has been licensed as a Customer Representative. On February 23, 2001, Respondent pleaded no contest to three counts of uttering a forged instrument--i.e., a bank check--on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 831.02, Florida Statutes; three counts of forgery of a public record on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 831.01, Florida Statutes; and three counts of third-degree grand theft on August 10, 2000, in violation of Section 812.014, Florida Statutes. She also agreed to pay restitution of $1892.87 and court costs. By Community Supervision Order entered February 27, 2001, the court accepted the plea, withheld adjudication, placed Respondent on two years' probation, required Respondent to pay restitution of $1892.87, and required Respondent to pay court costs. Respondent entered the plea of no contest to avoid the expense of a trial. She relied on the advice of her criminal attorney that this disposition of the criminal case would have no effect on her insurance license. She was unaware of her obligation to inform Petitioner of her entry of a no contest plea to these nine charges. Respondent finished paying restitution in March 2003 and has successfully completed her probation. One of her witnesses testified that he has worked with Respondent in the past and is aware of the conduct described above. He testified that he is establishing a new insurance agency in January 2004 and, if her licensing situation permits, he intends to employ her in that office.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating Sections 626.611(14) and 626.621(11) and suspending her Customer Representative license for five months. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of August, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of August, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Mark Casteel, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 R. Terry Butler, Senior Attorney Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Karen Marie Maldonado 701 Southwest Ravenswood West Port St. Lucie, Florida 34983
The Issue Whether the request for an administrative hearing filed on Petitioner’s behalf on November 4, 2014, to contest Respondent’s proposed denial of an application to change ownership of a licensed assisted living facility should be dismissed with prejudice because of Petitioner’s abandonment of its challenge.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the applicant for a change of ownership of a licensed assisted living facility. By Notice of Intent to Deny, Respondent gave Petitioner notice that its application would be denied, subject to Petitioner’s right to contest the denial in an administrative hearing. A timely request for an administrative hearing involving disputed issues of material fact was filed on behalf of Petitioner. However, after filing the hearing request, Petitioner took no further action to avail itself of the hearing it requested. Petitioner failed to comply with requirements specified in the Initial Order, the Order regarding designation of a representative for the corporation, or the Order of Pre- Hearing Instructions. Petitioner failed to appear at a duly- noticed deposition. Petitioner failed to respond in opposition to a Motion to Dismiss that took the position that Petitioner had abandoned its hearing request. And finally, Petitioner failed to appear at the final hearing that Petitioner had requested. Based on Petitioner’s failure to appear and offer evidence, there is no evidentiary basis on which findings can be made regarding whether Petitioner’s application for change of ownership is entitled to approval. Petitioner did, in fact, abandon its hearing request, but did not do so responsibly, with sufficient notice so that costs would not be incurred convening a hearing when Petitioner apparently did not intend to appear. Throughout the pendency of this proceeding, Petitioner has been allowed to operate the assisted living facility for which it applied to change ownership. As of the hearing date, Petitioner still had not relinquished the facility’s operating license. Despite the fact that Petitioner expressed to Respondent that Petitioner did not intend to appear at the hearing it requested, Petitioner only communicated a vague intent to relinquish the license to Respondent at some unspecified point in the future.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration, issue a final order: (a) dismissing with prejudice Petitioner’s request for an administrative hearing; denying Petitioner’s change of ownership application; and imposing such requirements for the orderly transfer of any residents and relinquishment of the assisted living facility license as is necessary or appropriate. Jurisdiction is reserved for consideration of Respondent’s motion for sanctions against Petitioner, which will be resolved by separate final order. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of January, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELIZABETH W. MCARTHUR Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of January, 2015. COPIES FURNISHED: Teresita A. Vivo, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Maritza Perez Guided Management, Inc. 5434 Adams Morgan Way New Port Richey, Florida 34653 Elizabeth Dudek, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Stuart Williams, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed) Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 (eServed)
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent should deny Petitioner's application to be licensed as a resident insurance adjuster pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042, because Petitioner is on probation and is participating in a pre-trial intervention program; and, if so, whether Petitioner is entitled to a default license because Respondent did not grant or deny the license within 90 days pursuant to Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing insurance agents in the State of Florida, pursuant to Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2002). On April 3, 2003, Petitioner applied for a license as a resident company employee property and casualty adjuster (resident adjuster license). Petitioner truthfully answered all questions on the application, including those questions pertaining to Petitioner's criminal history and plea of guilty to a felony charge in Georgia. On September 25, 2003, Respondent issued a Notice of Denial of Petitioner's license application. Respondent based the denial on the grounds that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime of moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 626.611(14), Florida Statutes (2002), for which denial of his application is mandatory; that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime not involving moral turpitude, within the meaning of Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), for which denial of his application is discretionary; that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(6) and (14) prohibits Respondent from granting the application while Petitioner is on probation or in a pre- trial intervention program; and that Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(8) requires Petitioner to wait five years after the plea dated May 14, 2002, before applying for a license. On a date not disclosed in the record, Respondent issued a Second Amended Notice of Denial (the Amended Notice of Denial). The record does not disclose a first amended notice of denial. The Amended Notice of Denial deletes the ground that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime of moral turpitude, but retains the other grounds for denial stated in the Notice of Denial issued on September 25, 2003. On May 14, 2002, Petitioner pled guilty to a single felony charge of possession of cocaine. A Georgia court sentenced Petitioner under Georgia's First Offender Act. If Petitioner successfully completes probation, Georgia will dismiss the felony charge. If Petitioner does not successfully complete probation, the Georgia court may revoke Petitioner's probation, adjudicate Petitioner guilty as charged, and sentence Petitioner to the maximum sentence authorized under Georgia law. When Georgia authorities arrested Petitioner for possession of cocaine on November 4, 2001, Petitioner held a Florida nonresident company all-lines adjuster license pursuant to license number A082918 (a nonresident adjuster license). Petitioner voluntarily cancelled the nonresident adjuster license on October 21, 2002. On January 22, 2003, Respondent sent a letter to Petitioner inquiring into the Georgia arrest in accordance with Subsections 626.611(14), 626.621(8), and 626.631, Florida Statutes (2002). In response to the letter from Respondent, Petitioner filed the application for a resident adjuster license that is at issue in this proceeding. Petitioner attached a letter explaining the circumstances of the criminal proceeding in Georgia and three letters of recommendation. The second page of the application that Petitioner submitted notifies Petitioner that Respondent will not consider the application while Petitioner is under probation or in a pre- trial intervention program. In relevant part, the second page of the application provides: NOTE: IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY ON PROBATION OR PARTICIPATING IN A PRE-TRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM, YOU MAY WANT TO WAIT TO FILE YOUR APPLICATION WITH THE DEPARTMENT UNTIL YOUR PROBATION OR PRE-TRIAL PROGRAM HAS TERMINATED. (For other than minor traffic violations, the rules of the Department prohibit the approval of licensure for an individual who is currently serving a probationary term or participating in a pre- trial intervention program. . . .) ( emphasis not supplied) After receiving the application for a resident adjuster license, Respondent issued a letter dated April 7, 2003, stating Respondent's intent to deny the application. The letter did not state that Respondent intended to deny the application on the ground that Petitioner violated Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), by pleading guilty to a crime that does not involve moral turpitude. In relevant part, the letter stated: [W]e are in receipt of the certified documents, however, a review of the documents indicate[s] that you are still on probation. The rules of the Department prohibit the approval of licensure for an individual who is currently serving a probationary term. Please write and let us know if we need to close or withdraw your application. The position stated by Respondent in the letter dated April 7, 2003, is substantially similar to that taken by Respondent during the hearing and in its PRO. Respondent does not assert that Respondent should deny the application on the ground that Petitioner pled guilty to a crime for which Subsection 626.621(8), Florida Statutes (2002), gives Respondent discretionary authority to deny the application. Respondent's position is consistent with the preponderance of evidence. The preponderance of evidence shows that Petitioner is rehabilitated and has no propensity to commit the crime for which he is under probation in Georgia. Rather, Respondent relies upon a rule that Respondent interprets as imposing specific waiting periods following the plea agreement in Georgia before Petitioner may apply for a resident adjuster license in Florida. Respondent proposes to deny Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license on the basis of Respondent's interpretation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(6) as prohibiting Respondent from considering the application of any applicant who is on probation until the applicant has satisfactorily completed the probation. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(8) as requiring Petitioner to wait five years after the plea in Georgia before Petitioner is eligible for licensure in Florida. Respondent interprets Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042(14)(b) as prohibiting Respondent from granting a license application to Petitioner while Petitioner is in a pre-trial intervention program. The enabling legislation for Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042 is Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002). Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), authorizes Respondent to adopt rules establishing specific waiting periods after Respondent denies, suspends, or revokes Petitioner's license pursuant to specifically enumerated Florida statutes. In relevant part, Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that Respondent: . . . shall adopt rules establishing specific waiting periods for applicants to become eligible for licensure following denial, suspension, or revocation. . . . (emphasis supplied) Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), prescribes a statutory prerequisite to the imposition of any waiting period pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 69B-211.042. The statutory prerequisite is that Respondent must first deny, suspend, or revoke an existing license based on statutory provisions enumerated in the enabling legislation; enumerated provisions that are independent of any waiting periods. Thereafter, Respondent may impose relevant waiting periods to any application that follows the denial, suspension, or revocation of the existing license. Respondent proposes to impose a waiting period against Petitioner without first satisfying the statutory prerequisite of a denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license within the meaning of Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002). The waiting period proposed by Respondent does not follow a denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license. Rather, the proposed waiting period follows a plea entered by Petitioner in Georgia on May 14, 2002. The application for a resident adjuster license that is at issue in this proceeding indicates that no administrative action was ever taken against Petitioner's nonresident adjuster license, and Respondent stipulated that Petitioner answered all questions on the application truthfully. The Florida licensure file that Respondent maintains shows no administrative action against Petitioner's nonresident adjuster license. Respondent proposes to apply a waiting period in a manner that does not follow denial, suspension, or revocation of either the previous nonresident adjuster license or the resident adjuster license that Petitioner seeks in this proceeding. In effect, Respondent's proposed agency action would effectively amend Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), by denying Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license on the basis of a waiting period, rather than on the basis of one of the statutory provisions enumerated in the enabling legislation. Such action would have the effect of enlarging or modifying the specific provisions of Subsection 626.207(1), Florida Statutes (2002), that require the imposition of a waiting period to follow Respondent's denial, suspension, or revocation of an existing license. Respondent orally advised Petitioner that Respondent was authorized by rule to approve Petitioner's application if Petitioner were successful in terminating the Georgia probation early. However, Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002), required Respondent to approve or deny the application no later than July 2, 2003. Petitioner sought additional time to petition the Georgia court to terminate his probation early. On June 27, 2003, Petitioner signed a "Waiver of Deemer Date" (Waiver) that suspended for 60 days the requirement in Subsection 120.60(1), Florida Statutes (2002), for Respondent to approve or deny the license application within 90 days after receipt of the application. In relevant part, the Waiver stated: I hereby voluntarily and knowingly waive the time requirement regarding final action on my license application as specified in Section 120.60(1), Florida Statutes. Specifically, I waive the provision that requires the Department of Financial Services to either approve or deny my pending application for licensure as a company employee property & casualty adjuster within 90 days after receipt of the completed application. This waiver is effective for 60 days. (emphasis supplied) The 60 days in which the Waiver was effective, expired on August 31, 2003. However, approximately six days remained in the 90-day statutory period when Petitioner signed the Waiver on June 27, 2003. The 90-day statutory period expired six days after August 31, 2003, on or about September 6, 2003. Petitioner attended a court hearing in Georgia sometime in August 2003, in an attempt to persuade the Georgia court to terminate Petitioner's probation. Petitioner was unsuccessful and remained on probation at the time of the administrative hearing in this proceeding. Petitioner did not advise Respondent of the outcome of the Georgia hearing until September 4, 2003, when Respondent inquired of the status of Petitioner's application. On September 4, 2003, Respondent had actual notice from Petitioner that Petitioner had been unsuccessful in his attempt at early termination of his probation. Respondent did not issue its Notice of Intent to Deny the license until September 25, 2003. Respondent's letter dated April 7, 2003, provided Petitioner with written notice of Respondent's intent to deny the license application unless Petitioner was successful in obtaining early termination of his probation. Oral communications from Respondent's authorized representative also indicated that Respondent intended to deny the license application if Respondent were unable to license Petitioner temporarily. The author of a cover letter issued with the Waiver on June 26, 2003, stated, in relevant part, that the author did not have an answer to the issue "we discussed" regarding a temporary license. The author indicated that she would contact Petitioner as soon as she had an answer. The record discloses no answer prior to the Notice of Intent to Deny dated September 25, 2003.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a Final Order granting Petitioner's application for a resident adjuster license. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of August, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 2004. COPIES FURNISHED: Keith Luther Fernandez 605 Casa Park Court M Winter Springs, Florida 32708 Keith Luther Fernandez 3667 Oakhill Drive Titusville, Florida 32780 Dana M. Wiehle, Esquire Department of Financial Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0333 Honorable Tom Gallagher Chief Financial Officer Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300 Pete Dunbar, General Counsel Department of Financial Services The Capitol, Plaza Level 11 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0300
The Issue The issue in this case is whether discipline should be imposed against Respondent for operating on an expired public lodging establishment license, an offense which is deemed by rule to constitute operation without a license.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. Lakeside is an apartment building with 19 units located at 1048 Northeast 18 Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33304- 2408. The Division issued Lakeside a license, numbered 16- 10553-H, to operate as a public lodging establishment. According to information in the Division's official database, as reproduced in Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 1/ the "current license expiration date [for Lakeside's license] is December 1, 2000." On July 20, 2000, Division employee Robert Shaw conducted a routine inspection of Lakeside and found the apartment complex to be open and operating. On a Lodging Inspection Report that he prepared on that date, 2/ Mr. Shaw noted two minor violations, neither of which is at issue here. On the same form, Mr. Shaw inscribed the date that Lakeside's license would expire, as shown below, in the blank spaces provided for that purpose in a line that read: REMINDER: Your license expires 12 /01 /00 Petitioner's Exhibit 2. Mr. Shaw testified, however, that at the time of this inspection, he did not know whether or not Lakeside was licensed.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Division enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Lakeside Apartments. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of January, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of January, 2001.
