The Issue Whether Petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes (2017).
Findings Of Fact A Final Order was issued on May 11, 2017, finding that the Board of Psychology relied on an unadopted rule when it denied Petitioner’s application for licensure. Petitioner timely filed a Motion for Award of Attorney’s Fees and Costs under section 120.595(4), with the Division of Administrative Hearings. Prior to any hearing on the motion, the parties reached a settlement in the amount of $25,000 to be paid to Petitioner for fees and costs incurred in the underlying action. The parties agreed to have the matter forwarded to the Board of Psychology for consideration of the settlement, and for authority to have the administrative law judge re-open the file upon approval of the settlement for the purpose of having a final order entered in accordance with the terms of section 120.595(4). The administrative law judge entered an Order Closing File in order to allow the parties to present the proposed settlement to the Board of Psychology, without prejudice for the case to be re-opened should the Board approve the terms of the settlement. The Board of Psychology has approved the settlement at issue in this proceeding, and the parties have requested a final order approving that settlement.
The Issue The issues are whether Petitioner has standing to bring this action, and if so, whether portions of proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 69O-204.030(1)(a), are an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority in violation of Sections 120.52(8) and 120.56, Florida Statutes (2008).
Findings Of Fact OIR is an agency of the State of Florida, created within the Commission in accordance with Section 20.121(3)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2008). OIR is responsible for the administration of laws concerning insurers and other risk-bearing entities, including, but not limited to, viatical settlements. The Insurance Commissioner is head of OIR except for rulemaking purposes. Pursuant to Sections 20.121(1)(c) and 624.308(1), Florida Statutes (2008), the agency head for rulemaking is the Commission. Petitioner is a trade association that represents 12 of the 13 Florida-licensed viatical settlement providers. As an established trade association in the life settlement industry, Petitioner participates in legislative and regulatory matters in all 50 states. Petitioner is comprised of over 160 member companies nationwide. Florida's Viatical Settlement Act, Part X, Chapter 626, Florida Statutes (2008) (the Act), involves the regulation of viatical settlement providers. The Act regulates both viatical settlements and life settlements. Both types of transactions involve the sale of ownership interest in life insurance policies. A viatical settlement relates to the sale of the ownership interest in a life insurance policy by a person who is expected to live for less than two years. A life settlement involves the sale of the ownership interest in a life insurance policy by a person who is expected to live for longer than two years after the date of sale. Viatical and life settlements are regulated in essentially the same manner. Both are included in the definition of "viatical settlement contract." See § 626.9911(10), Fla. Stat. (2008). In a viatical settlement transaction, the "viatical settlement provider" is the purchaser of the ownership interest in a life insurance policy, including the right to receive the policy proceeds upon the death of the insured. See § 626.9911(12), Fla. Stat. (2008). The "viator" is the owner of an insurance policy who sells the ownership interest in the policy. See § 626.9911(14), Fla. Stat. (2008). The "viatical settlement broker" is the agent of the viator. See § 626.9911(9), Fla. Stat. (2008). The broker owes a fiduciary duty to obtain the best price for the insurance policy and typically, solicits bids from multiple viatical settlement providers on behalf of the viator. Id. This controversy involves a challenge to proposed Florida Administrative Code Rule 690-204.030(1)(a), (the proposed rule) which states as follows: 69O-204.030, Forms Incorporated by Reference. Form OIR-A3-1288, Viatical Settlement Provider Annual Report (REV 11/08). * * * Specific Authority 626.9925 FS. Law Implemented 626.9912(2), 626.9912(3), 626.9913(2), 626.9921(3), 626.9921(4) and 626.9928, FS. History-New Petitioner specifically objects to Schedules B and C attached to Form OIR-A3-1288. Schedule B requests the following information on policies purchased for the most recent five years, beginning with the current reporting year: (a) total number of policies purchased (quantity); (b) total gross amount paid for policies purchased (dollars); and (c) total face value of policies purchased (dollars). The information is not limited to policies purchased in Florida. Schedule C requests information relating to a summary of a licensed provider's business in every state, territory or geographical area. The information sought in Schedule C includes the following: (a) whether the provider is licensed/registered in the state; (b) the total number of policies purchased; (c) total gross amount paid for policies purchased; (d) total commissions/compensation paid for policies purchased; and total face value of policies purchased. Respondent also challenges the portion of Form OIR-A3- 1288 (Rev 11/08) that requires providers to annually file supporting documentation demonstrating any change to the provider's "method of operation as described in [the provider's] most recent plan of operations filed with OIR." The form requests this information in Interrogatory 1.(d) attached to the Annual Report. The challenged portions of the Annual Report, incorporated by reference in the proposed rule, require viatical settlement providers to disclose detailed information regarding their nationwide and international business activities. The information, in a publicly available form, involves transactions not subject to Florida regulation. On September 26, 2008, a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking relative to the Viatical Rule was published in Volume 34, Number 39, Florida Administrative Weekly. The notice indicated that a public hearing would be held on October 29, 2008. On October 29, 2008, as indicated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, a public hearing was held. Written comments from the industry were received both prior to and immediately after the public hearing. Based upon comments from the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (JAPC) dated October 22, 2008, a Notice of Correction was filed in Volume 34, Number 46, Administrative Law Weekly, on November 14, 2008. The notice reflected that the agency head for rulemaking was the Commission. On December 24, 2008, a Notice of Change was published in Volume 34, Number 52, Florida Administrative Weekly. The notice was based upon comments from JAPC, as well as comments at the October 29, 2008, public hearing. On January 13, 2009, the hearing for final adoption of proposed Florida Administrative Code Rules 69O-204.010, .020, .030, .040 and .050, was held before the Commission. Following some discussion, the Commission approved the proposed rules for final adoption. The Commission met all applicable rulemaking publication and notice requirements, as set forth in Chapter 120, Florida Statutes (2008). Petitioner does not challenge the proposed rule pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(a), Florida Statutes (2008). Petitioner does not challenge the proposed rule as imposing excessive regulatory costs, pursuant to Section 120.52(8)(f), Florida Statutes (2008). The proposed rule imposes requirements on Florida licensed viatical settlement providers. Those requirements do not appear significantly different than those required in a number of other states. Florida licensed viatical settlement providers would be subject to administrative penalties if they did not comply with the proposed rule. See § 626.9913(2), Fla. Stat. (2008).
Conclusions THIS CAUSE came before the BOARD OF MEDICINE (Board) pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(4), Florida Statutes, on August 5, 2011, in Jacksonville, Florida, for the purpose of considering a Settlement Agreement (attached hereto as Exhibit A) entered into between the parties in this cause. Upon consideration of the Settlement Agreement, the documents submitted in support thereof, the arguments of the parties, and being otherwise full advised in the premises, the Board rejected the Settlement Agreement and offered a Counter Settlement Agreement which was accepted on the record by the parties. The Counter Settlement Agreement incorporates the original Settlement Agreement with the following amendments: 1. The costs set forth in Paragraph 3 of the Stipulated Disposition shall be set at $6,697.92. 2. The requirement for community service set forth in Paragraph 7 of the Stipulated Disposition shall be deleted. 3. The requirement for the continuing medical education (CME) in Paragraph 8 of the Stipulated Disposition shall be deleted. 4. Respondent’s license is permanently restricted as follows: Respondent is prohibited from engaging in telemedicine to treat citizens of the United States. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Settlement Agreement as submitted be and is hereby approved and adopted in toto and incorporated by reference with the amendments set forth above. Accordingly, the parties shall adhere to and abide by all the terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement as amended. This Final Order shall take effect upon being filed with the Clerk of the Department of Health. DONE AND ORDERED this | yh day of _( gus’ F BOARD OF MEDICINE 2011. Executive Director For GEORGE MAS, M.D., Chair CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Final Order has been provided by U.S. Mail to FRANK C. PIERRE, M.D., 10175 Collins Avenue, Suite 808, Bal Harbour, Florida 33154; to Anthony C. Vitale, Esquire, Law Center at Brickell Bay, 2333 Brickell Avenue, Suite A-1, Miami, Florida 33129; to Allen R. Grossman, Esquire, Grossman, Furlow & Bayo, LLC, 2022-2 Raymond Diehl Road, Tallahassee, Florida 32308; and by interoffice delivery to Veronica Donnelly, Department of Health, 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin #C-65, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3253 this | aay of wot 2011. Mabie I abatio, Deputy Agency Clerk
Conclusions By individual letters dated March 31, 2010, the Agency for Persons with Disabilities (APD) advised Petitioner Angels of America that it intended to deny for various reasons its applications to renew the licenses of seven group homes it operated. Petitioner requested an administrative hearing and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAK). Prior to the hearing, the parties entered into settlement negotiations and on October 5, 2010, APD advised the Administrative Law Judge that the parties had reached an agreement. On October 8, 2010, DOAH entered an Order Closing File relinquishing jurisdiction to APD for the entry of a Final Order consistent with the Settlement Agreement. THEREFORE, upon consideration of the Settlement Agreement approved by the parties on October 4, 2010, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that: APD-11-4858-FO | 1 Filed June 16, 2011 1:13 PM Division of Administrative Hearings 1. The Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is attached hereto, is hereby adopted; and 2. The parties shall adhere to and be governed by the terms and conditions of said Settlement Agreement. DONE AND ORDERED, this 16" day of June, 2011, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. Funnoon - AMNQUDD _A Percy W Mallison, Jr, Esquire Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 APD-11-4858-FO | 2 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE Copies provided to: Jeffrey C. Marty, Esq. T. Shane DeBoard, Esa. Post Office Box 3159 Department of Children and Family Zephyrhills, Florida 33539 Services 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1114 Orlando, Florida 32801 APD Area 13 Office | HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of this Final Order was provided to the above- named individuals at the listed addresses, by U.S. Mail or electronic mail, this 16th day of June, 2011. Percy is Mallison, Jr., Agency Clerk Agency for Persons with Disabilities 4030 Esplanade Way, Suite 380 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0950 APD-11-4858-FO | 3
The Issue Whether there is probable cause for Petitioner to bring an action against Respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Respondents sell used cars in Pensacola, about 500 a year. On or about June 19, 1981, when Fannie Mae Tunstall bought a '76 Buick LeSabre from Fairfield Motors, Inc. (Fairfield), she dealt with Elaine Owens Atkins, who is Fairfield's general manager, secretary-treasurer and a six-year employee. The installment sales contract specified an annual percentage rate of 29.64 percent, and was stamped with the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Ms. Tunstall told Ms. Atkins the payments were too much but signed the papers anyway, and did so without reading them, although Ms. Atkins had told her to read them. The payments did indeed prove too much and Ms. Tunstall fell behind. She was 13 days late with a payment in November of 1981, but Ms. Tunstall and Ms. Atkins had discussed the matter and Fairfield agreed to accept the payment late. Fairfield accepted other payments late, but arranged to have Willie Easley (formerly a singer and now a minister as well as a repossessor of cars) take possession of the Quick early in the morning of January 10, 1983, and drive it away. Ms. Tunstall had failed to make the monthly payment due December 30, 1982. Ms. Atkins had telephoned her once and gotten no answer. Later on January 10, 1983, Fairfield agreed to return the car in exchange for December's payment, another payment in advance, a six dollar late fee and a $100 repossession fee. Ms. Tunstall paid the entire balance Fairfield claimed to be owed and retrieved the car. Linda Louise LaCoste and her husband Ronnie have bought several cars from Fairfield, including a 1976 Chevrolet Suburban Mr. LaCoste bought on February 7, 1983, under an installment agreement calling for interest at an annual percentage rate in excess of 30 percent. The "cash price" was $3,459.75, and the "total sale price" was $4,613.15. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. The LaCostes understood from prior dealings that their agreement required Mr. LaCoste to maintain insurance on the vehicle, and Mr. LaCoste contracted with Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for appropriate coverage. Allstate sent Fairfield a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium effective 12:01 A.M. April 4, 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. At 11:25 A.M. on April 4, 1983, Allstate accepted the premium Ronnie LaCoste offered in order to reinstate the policy, No. 441361747, and Allstate's Chirstine Smith also wrote a new policy to be sure there would be coverage. Ms. Smith told Fairfield that insurance was in force on April 4, 1983. On April 20, 1983, Allstate issued another notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium on policy No. 441361747, effective 12:01 A.M. May 4, 1983. At ten minutes past three o'clock on the afternoon of May 4, 1983, Mr. LaCoste's Chevrolet Suburban was repossessed at Fairfield's instance on account of the apparent lapse of insurance. Mrs. LaCoste and here sister appeared promptly at Fairfield's place of business and tendered payment due that day. All prior payments to Fairfield were current. When Mrs. Atkins refused payment, Mrs. LaCoste and here sister protested with such vehemence that a Fairfield employee called the sheriff's office. According to Fairfield's contemporaneous records, Fairfield employees ("we") tried to give Mrs. LaCoste a letter "advising vehichle [sic] would be held for 10 days" (i.e., that it would be sold thereafter) but "she refused to accept a copy." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. At hearing, Ms. Atkins conceded that she had not mailed a copy of the letter to Mr. LaCoste but testified that Mrs. LaCoste accepted a copy after refusing to take it initially. Mrs. LaCoste denied that she ever received the letter, and her version has been credited. On May 7, 1983, Fairfield received another communication from Allstate. Whether insurance coverage in fact lapsed on May 4, 1983 was not clear from the record. On May 17, 1983, Fairfield sold the Chevrolet Suburban for $2,050.00. Carolyn V. Kosmas purchased a 1978 Ford LTD II from Fairfield and made a downpayment of $550.00 on June 2, 1983. Under the terms of the installment sale contract, which called for an annual percentage rate in excess of 29 percent, she was to begin seventy dollar ($70.00) biweekly payments on June 22, 1983. At the time of the sales of the Ford to Ms. Kosmas on June 2, 1983, Fairfield asked for credit information about her fiance as well as about herself. On June 24, 1983, she appeared at Fairfield's place of business and tendered not only the payment due June 22 but also the payment due July 6, a total of $140.00 in cash. Ms. Atkins refused to accept the money, telling her that her references had not panned out, and asked her to surrender the keys to the car and gather up her personal effects. Ms. Kosmas made no secret of her opinion that she was not being treated fairly, but, crying and afraid, eventually agreed to treat the transaction as a rental and accepted a refund of $104.39 on that basis. Ms. Atkins "advised if she gave me another background sheet, that I could verify, I would renegotiate with her," Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, but Ms. Kosmas told Ms. Atkins that she had lost her job at West Florida Hospital and the renegotiation eventuated in the retroactive lease. Respondent Pearl Allen was present on June 24, 1983, and took the car keys from her. It was also he who wrote her on June 27, 1983 that the 1978 Ford LTD II would be privately sold on July 6, 1983. She did not appear when and where she was told the sale would occur. The Ford was in fact sold at auction in Montgomery, Alabama, on July 19, 1983. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Mary Lee Hobbs' husband Forace paid Fairfield $800.00 down on a 1977 Oldsmobile 98 on February 27, 1982, agreeing to maintain insurance on the car until paid for, and to pay the unpaid principal balance of $4134.25 over a two and a half year period together with interest at an annual percentage rate of 29.79. Stamped on the contract was the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." In part, the installment sale contract read: * NOTE: DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 (reduced in size), has been omitted from this ACCESS Document. For review, contact the Division's Clerk's Office. All payments were current when, at about half past five o'clock on the morning of November 1, 1983, Fairfield's agents used a wrecker to remove the Oldsmobile, damaging the Hobbses' porch in the process. Fairfield acted because it received notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of the insurance policy that Hobbs maintained on the car. Typed on the form notice as the effective date of cancellation was November 29, 1983. Someone has written in ink "should be 10-29." In fact the insurance policy never lapsed. According to Fairfield's records, they received conflicting information, on October 29, 1983, about whether an insurance premium had been paid. The Hobbses' 27-year old "daughter said they p[ai]d--Conway Spence said they did not pay." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. This was the same day Mr. Spence, an insurance agent, erroneously informed Fairfield that the effective date of expiration "should be 10-29." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Even after Mr. Spence's error was known to it, Fairfield refused to return the car without payment of a $75.00 "repossession fee," and also refused to let the Hobbs children return with the laundry they were sent to fetch from the trunk of the car. It was the refusal to give up the dirty laundry that sent Mrs. Hobbs to the authorities. Karel Jerome Bell bought a 1977 Delta 88 Oldsmobile from Fair field on July 22, 1982, under an installment sale contract calling for two "pick up notes" to be paid in August of 1982 and biweekly payments of $125.00 thereafter until payments reached a total of $4161.212. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. The "pick up notes," each for $220.00 were due August 7 and 21, 1982, and were not treated as down payments on the installment sale form. After reducing his indebtedness to $1221.21, Mr. Bell fell two payments behind, and Fairfield repossessed the Oldsmobile on July 7, 1983. The same day Fairfield wrote Mr. Bell that it intended to sell his car, but not time or date was specified. On July 8, 1983, Mr. Bell called and asked whether he could continue making payments while the car on the lot. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Fairfield's Ms. Gilstrap accepted $100.00 from Mr. Bell on July 12, 1983, which she applied to satisfy a reposession fee of $100.00. On the Bell contract, too, had been stamped, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Ms. Gilstrap "told him as long as he paid something something regularly on the account, I felt sure we would hold it for him." Mr. Bell indicated he would pay an additional $125.00 the following Friday and Ms. Gilstrap made a notation to this effect in his file, where she also wrote, "Pls. don't sell he intends to pay for." Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. Bell had not made any further payment when, on July 30, 1983, without notice to Mr. Bell, Fairfield sold the car for $1,000.00 to a wholesaler. Respondents use form installment sale contracts. A blank form like the one in use at the time of the hearing was received as Respondent's Exhibit No. This was the form used in the Kosmas and LaCoste transactions. The predecessor form used in the Bell, Hobbs and Tunstall transactions was similar in many respects. The earlier form provided, "LATE CHARGES: Buyer(s) hereby agrees to pay a late charge on each installment in default for 10 days or more in an amount of 5 percent of each installment or $5.00 whichever is less." On the reverse, the form provided: ACCELERATION AND REPOSSESSION. In the event any Buyer(s) or Guarantor of this Contract fails to pay any of said installments, including any delinquency charges when due or defaults in the performance of any of the other provisions of this Contract or (c) in case Buyer(s) or Guarantor becomes insolvent or (d) institutes any type of insolvency proceedings or (e) has any thereof instituted against him, or (f) has entered against him any judgment or filed against him any notice of lien in case of any Federal tax or has issued against him any distraint warrant for taxes, or writ of garnishment, or other legal process, or (g) in case of death, adjudged incompetency, or incarceration of the Buyer(s) or Guarantor or (h) in case the seller or the holder of this Contract, upon reasonable cause, determines that the prospect of payment of said sums or the performance by the Buyer(s) or his assigns of this Contract is impaired, then, or in such event, the unpaid portion of the balance hereunder shall, without notice, become forthwith due and payable and the holder, in person or by agent, may immediately take possession of said property, together with all accessions thereto, or may, at first, repossess a part and later, if necessary, the whole thereof with such accessions, and for neither or both of these purposes may enter upon any premises where said property, may be and remove the same with or without process of law. Buyer(s) agrees in any such case to pay said amount to the holder, upon demand, or, at the election of the holder, to deliver said property to the holder. If, in repossessing said property, the holder inadvertently takes possession of any other goods therein, consent is hereby given to such taking of possession, and holder may hold such goods temporarily for Buyer(s), without responsibility of liability therefor, providing holder returns the same upon demand. There shall be no liability upon any such demand unless the same be made in writing within 48 hours after such inadvertent taking of possession. Should this contract mature by its term or by acceleration, as hereinabove provided, then, and in either such event, the total principal amount due hereunder at that time shall bear interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum, which principal and interest, together with all costs and expenses incurred in the collection hereof, including attorneys fees (to be not less than 15 percent of the amount involved), plus appellate fees, if any, and all advances made by Seller to protect the security hereof, including advances made for or on account of levies, insurance, repairs, taxes, and for maintenance or recovery of property shall be due the Holder hereof and which sums Buyer(s) hereby agrees to pay. * * * LIABILITIES AFTER POSSESSION. Seller, upon obtaining possession of the property upon default, may sell the same or any part thereof at public or private sale either with or without having the property at the place of sale, and so far as may be lawful. Seller may be a purchaser at such sale. Seller shall have the remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code (Florida) and any and all rights and remedies available to secured party under any applicable law, and upon request or demand of Seller, Buyer(s) shall, at his expense, assemble the property and make it available to the Seller at the Seller's address which is designated as being reasonably convenient to Buyer(s). Unless the property is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, Seller will give Buyer(s) reasonable notice of the time and place of any public or private sale thereof. (The requirement of reasonable notice shall be met if such notice is mailed, postage prepaid, to Buyer(s) at address shown on records of Seller at least five (5) days before the time of the sale or disposition) Expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for the sale, selling, attorneys' fees, supra, incurred or paid by Seller shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale and the balance applied on the Buyer(s) obligation hereunder. Upon disposition of the property after default, Buyer(s) shall be and remain liable for any deficiency and Seller shall account to Buyer(s) for any surplus, but Seller shall have the right to apply all or any part of such surplus against (or to hold the same as a reverse against) any and all other liabilities of Buyer(s) to Seller. Similarly, the more recent form provides, on the obverse, Late Charge: If a payment is received more than ten (10) days after the due date, you will be charged $5.00 or five (5 percent) of the payment, whichever is less. and on the reverse, has identical provisions on "Acceleration and Repossession" and "Liabilities After Repossession."
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against Respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Paul A. Rasmussen, Esquire Eggen, Bowden, Rasmussen & Arnold 4300 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 13 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
