The Issue Whether Respondent terminated Petitioner from her employment based on perceived handicap discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was hired by Respondent on March 5, 1991, to work as a server at Respondent's restaurant, Bon Appetit. Shortly thereafter, on or about April 8, 1991, Petitioner was promoted to restaurant manager. During her tenure as restaurant manager, Petitioner was counselled about her appearance and personal hygiene. Additionally, Petitioner had problems with Respondent's performance including balancing the cash and credit card receipts collected during her shifts. Respondent required its managers to notify Respondent in advance of any absence due to a medical condition where possible. In all cases; however, managers were required to communicate with Respondent concerning their absence so that Respondent could schedule and plan for a manager's absence to avoid any disruption in its business and the scheduling of other employees. During her employment as restaurant manager, Petitioner was diagnosed as having "hammer toes". Petitioner was out of work for three weeks to have this condition surgically corrected. This absence was approved in advance by Respondent and Petitioner received full compensation for that medical leave. Following the scheduled three week absence for the surgery, there was an additional two to three week period during which Petitioner reported for work late or would leave early. Respondent considered those late arrivals and early departures to be unexcused absences. Following foot surgery, Petitioner returned to her position as manager with the same pay. Subsequently, during May 1992, Petitioner was out of work for surgery to have an ovarian cyst removed. This absence was approved by Respondent and Petitioner was out of work for five days. During this period of medical leave, Petitioner received her pay and returned to work following surgery. Following the cyst surgery, Petitioner complained of lower back pain which her gynecologist attributed to swelling from the cyst surgery. On May 30, 1992, Petitioner went to the emergency room at Morton Plant Hospital in Tampa suffering from lower back pain. Petitioner contacted restaurant manager, Leo Enciso, and told him of her visit to the hospital and "not to count on her reporting for work that day". Petitioner also informed Enciso that she would call as soon as she had been examined to give an update on her status. Subsequent to her initial phone call to Enciso on May 30, 1992, Petitioner did not speak with Enciso nor did he receive any messages from Petitioner concerning her status from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. Following her treatment in the emergency room at Morton Plant, Petitioner sought treatment on that same date, May 30, 1992 from chiropractor Dr. Lynn Colucci. At that time, Petitioner knew she would be out of work until at least one more day. Petitioner did not communicate that information to Respondent or any of its management personnel. Petitioner's next consultation with her chiropractor to evaluate her condition was June 1, 1992. Following that session, Petitioner was advised that she would be out of work for at least two more days. Petitioner did not communicate this information to Respondent or any of its management staff. Petitioner again met with her chiropractor on June 3, 1992 and was told that she would be unable to return to work until June 8, 1992. Petitioner failed to communicate this information to any of Respondent's management or staff. Kailie Borzoni, Peter Kreuziger and Sharon Verhage, all managerial employees of Respondent, made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Petitioner by phone. Verhage left a message on Petitioner's answering machine but Petitioner did not return her phone call. Petitioner was released to return to work by her treating chiropractor on June 9, 1992. There were no restrictions placed on her when she was released for work and her physician related that Petitioner's back problem had "resolved itself". Petitioner was discharged by Respondent on June 9, 1992, when she reported for work. Peter Krueziger made an independent decision to discharge Petitioner based on what he considered to be poor performance, poor appearance, excessive absences and failing to truthfully advise of her work status and whereabouts from May 30, 1992 to June 8, 1992. When Petitioner was initially employed as a restaurant manager, Respondent's manager, Krueziger, noticed that Petitioner's dress apparel did not meet up to the standards of a "four star" restaurant that Respondent was operating. As a result, Respondent spoke with Petitioner about his expectations with regard to her dress and advised the controller to advance Petitioner some funds to purchase a wardrobe. Respondent sent one of its managerial employees to accompany Petitioner on a shopping trip to upgrade her wardrobe to reflect what Respondent considered to be appropriate dress for a restaurant manager. Respondent's managerial staff noted and complained to Petitioner on several occasions after she was given a new wardrobe, that her attire did not measure up to the standards that they expected of a manager. Negative comments were made about Respondent's stained clothing, her fingernails and her unkempt hair. Petitioner conceded that she had an exceptionally hard time balancing her cash and credit card accounts at the end of each shift. While some managers experience difficulty at the outset of their employment because an antiquated accounting system was being used, they soon became proficient in closing out the cash and credit card accounts following their shift. Respondent discharged Petitioner based on her failure to properly notify it of her absence from work during the period May 30, 1992 through June 8, 1992. Petitioner's medical condition, real or perceived, played no part in Respondent's decision to terminate her.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's petition for relief as she failed to establish that she was terminated from employment because of a perceived handicap. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1994. APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Paragraph 3 adopted as modified, paragraph 2 recommended order. Paragraph 4 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 5 recommended order. Paragraph 5, adopted as modified, paragraph 4 recommended order. Paragraph 7, adopted as modified, paragraphs 9 and 10 recommended order. Paragraph 8 rejected, irrelevant. Paragraphs 9 and 10 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence, paragraph 15 recommended order. Paragraphs 11-16 rejected, contrary to the greater weight of evidence. Paragraph 17 rejected, irrelevant and unnecessary. Paragraphs 18 and 19 rejected, conclusionary. COPIES FURNISHED: C. A. Sullivan, Esquire 311 S. Missouri Avenue Clearwater, FL 34616 Charles A. Powell, IV, Esquire Peter W. Zinober, Esquire Zinober and McCrea, P.A. 201 E. Kennedy Blvd., Ste. 1750 Tampa, FL 33602 Sharon Moultry, Clerk Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue In her charge of discrimination Ms. Alexander alleges that her employer created a hostile work environment and unfair conditions of employment when it singled her out as a thief of a stolen purse, denied her overtime, disciplined her for the size of her earrings, and made insulting statements about African Americans. The issues in this proceeding are whether that discrimination occurred, and if so, what relief is appropriate.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the FCHR enter its final order dismissing the complaint by Felicia A. Alexander against Dynair. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of August, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of August, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Felicia A. Alexander Post Office Box 549 Sanford, Florida 32772-0549 Gabriel G. Marrero, Administrator Dynair Services, Inc. Two Red Cleveland Boulevard, Suite 205 Orlando-Sanford International Airport Sanford, Florida 32773 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
Findings Of Fact Respondent is a cooperative association of 54 farm members that is engaged in the State of Florida in the business of harvesting sugar cane and the milling of raw sugar for its members. Respondent is divided for organizational purposes into a mill division and an agricultural division. Petitioner's employment with Respondent was exclusively with its agricultural division. The agricultural division is divided into a harvesting department, a transportation department, and an equipment maintenance and repair department. The equipment maintenance and repair department has a service center, three field operations, a truck and trailer maintenance repair shop, and a machinery maintenance repair shop. There are approximately 300 vehicles owned by Respondent, including large tractor trailers used for hauling sugar cane. Petitioner was initially hired on September 29, 1975, in the transportation department as a tractor-trailer operator. In November 1976, Petitioner was promoted to assistant truck foreman where his primary duty was dispatching trucks to haul harvested sugar cane from the field to the mill. This is a responsible position that involves calculation of the tonnage requirements of the mill which must be coordinated with the availability of product and drivers. In the early 1980's Petitioner began having problems with his immediate supervisor, LaVaughn Milligan. These problems continued to escalate since the supervisor believed that Petitioner was trying to undermine his authority and was making promises to the drivers that he could not keep. By 1985, Mr. Milligan was dissatisfied with Petitioner's job performance and was prepared to recommend the termination of his employment. At all times pertinent to these proceedings, Edward Mayo was the head of Respondent's maintenance and repair department. In 1985, a vacancy occurred in the position as truck and trailer maintenance and repair shop supervisor. There is a conflict in the evidence in that Petitioner testified that Mr. Milligan and Mr. Mayo asked him to accept the transfer, but Mr. Mayo testified that Petitioner requested the transfer. The testimony of Mr. Mayo is accepted as being more credible and it is found that Petitioner asked Mr. Mayo for a transfer to this vacant position. Mr. Mayo was aware of the problems that Petitioner was having with Mr. Milligan, but he decided to transfer Petitioner to this position despite these difficulties. Mr. Mayo recognized that Petitioner's difficulties with Mr. Milligan may have been the result of a personality conflict between the two men and he wanted to give Petitioner the opportunity to prove himself. The position Petitioner assumed in 1985 was the position he held when his employment was terminated. The truck and trailer repair and maintenance shop is responsible for the maintenance and repair of all of Respondent's vehicles and employs approximately 22 mechanics. Respondent was aware that Petitioner had no training or experience as a mechanic, and he was specifically instructed to make no mechanical decisions. Petitioner's responsibilities included the requisitions of parts, supplies, and equipment for his shop and the supervision of mechanic's work schedules. He was to act in a personnel management and administrative capacity. Petitioner satisfactorily performed his duties during his first year in the position. In late 1986, his job performance began to deteriorate and several complaints from different sources were made to Mr. Mayo about Petitioner's poor performance. Mr. Mayo became concerned about Petitioner's job performance and frequently discussed his concerns with Petitioner. Prior to October 1987, Respondent was unaware that Petitioner had a medical problem. Petitioner had been hospitalized in June 1987 while he was on vacation, but Respondent did not learn of that hospitalization until after October 1987. In October 1987, Petitioner was hospitalized for depression and for detoxification from his addiction to antidepressant drugs. Unknown to Respondent, Petitioner had been, for several years, suffering from anxiety, depression, and paranoia. Petitioner had experienced hallucinations and had been treated by several different physicians. He had been taking drugs for his conditions for some eight years, including Ativan, an antidepressant in the benezodiazpine family of drugs, to which he became addicted. Petitioner returned to work following his hospitalization in October 1987. He told Mr. Mayo that his hospitalization was related to the prolonged use of medication. Following return from his hospitalization in October 1987, Petitioner's job performance deteriorated to the point that he was unable to function at work and he could not perform his job. Petitioner had difficulty concentrating, demonstrated a short term memory deficit, and lacked energy. Petitioner began making mechanical decisions that he was not qualified to make and which posed a safety hazard. On December 10, 1987, Petitioner met with Dale Stacy, Respondent's Vice President of Agricultural Operations, Ray Campbell, Respondent's Personnel Manager, and Mr. Mayo. Petitioner was advised as to the deficiencies with his job performance. Respondent was willing to assist Petitioner and placed him on sick leave with pay until his doctors certified that it was medically sound for him to return to work. Medical assurances were requested out of a legitimate concern for the safety of Petitioner, Respondent's employees, and the general public. On December 22, 1987, Dr. Adele MacKay, Petitioner's psychologist, informed Respondent's assistant personnel manager that Petitioner was very anxious about being out of work and that she thought it would be best for Petitioner if he were allowed to return to work. Respondent was advised by Dr. Mackay that Petitioner may need support. On December 24, 1987, Petitioner was permitted to return to work. Mr. Mayo, Mr. Campbell, and Mr. Stacy continued to be concerned about Petitioner's ability to safely perform his job, but they also wanted to accommodate Petitioner because he was a long term employee. To achieve these ends, Arnie Raaum, Mr. Mayo's assistant and one of Petitioner's supervisors, was assigned the primary responsibility of monitoring Petitioner's performance to ensure that safety was not compromised and of providing assistance to Petitioner if necessary. In Mr. Raaum's absence, Louis Boglioli, another supervisor in the maintenance and repair department, was to perform these duties. In the absences of both Mr. Raaum and Mr. Boglioli, Mr. Mayo was to perform these duties. Between the time Mr. Raaum, Mr. Boglioli, and Mr. Mayo were assigned these duties and the termination of Petitioner's employment, Mr. Raaum spent considerable time in both monitoring Petitioner's performance and in correcting errors made by Petitioner. This assignment detracted from the ability of Mr. Raaum to perform his regular duties. Petitioner's condition and his ability to safely perform his job continued to deteriorate between December 1987 and December 1988. Despite Mr. Raaum's close supervision, many safety related incidents occurred which were the result of Petitioner's job performance. These incidents were documented in Petitioner's employment file, but there was no injury to any person or significant damage to property. By late 1988, Petitioner's condition had deteriorated to the point where he was unable to perform his job. He was unable to comprehend, remember, or follow instructions. In December 1988, Mr. Mayo, who had been following Petitioner's job performance, determined with Mr. Campbell and Mr. Stacy that Petitioner could not perform his job. Mr. Mayo had lost confidence in Petitioner's ability as a supervisor and felt that safety was being compromised by Petitioner's continued employment. Other job possibilities with Respondent were considered, but each possibility was rejected for legitimate business reasons. Petitioner believed that he had had a "nervous breakdown" and that he was capable of working in a position with less stress than his position as supervisor of the maintenance and repair shop. Because of this belief, Petitioner requested that he be transferred to his former position as an assistant truck foreman. This request was refused because of his previous difficulties in performing that job, because he was not capable of performing supervisory work, and because the position was not vacant. There were no supervisory level positions vacant that Petitioner was capable of filling. Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated on December 28, 1988, and he was given two months severance pay. Petitioner's termination was not a disciplinary matter for willful misconduct. Rather, Petitioner's employment with Respondent was terminated because Petitioner was not capable of performing his job duties.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a Final Order dismissing Petitioner's charge of discrimination against Respondent. DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 19th day of October, 1990. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Petitioner. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-3, 5, and 8 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 4 are rejected as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 6 are rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence and to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 7 are rejected as being contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 8-16 are rejected as being legal conclusions. The following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the Respondent. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 1-5, 7-10, 13, 15-16, 18-20, and 25 are adopted in material part by the Recommended Order. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 6, 11-12. 17, and 21-24 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 14 are adopted in part by the Recommended Order and are rejected in part as being subordinate to the findings made. The proposed findings of fact in paragraph 26 are rejected as being recitation of testimony. The proposed findings of fact in paragraphs 27 and 28 are rejected as being unnecessary to the conclusions reached. COPIES FURNISHED: Isidro M. Garcia, Esquire Law Office of Joseph A. Vassallo, P.A. 3501 South Congress Avenue Lake Worth, Florida 33461 Margaret L. Cooper, Esquire Ruth P. Clements, Esquire Jones, Foster, Johnston & Stubbs, P.A. 505 South Flagler Drive, Suite 1100 Post Office Drawer E West Palm Beach, Florida 33402 Margaret A. Jones, Clerk Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 Dana Baird Acting Executive Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1570 NOTICE Of RIGHT TO SUBMIT EXCEPTIONS All parties have the right to submit written exceptions to this Recommended Order. All agencies allow each party at least 10 days in which to submit written exceptions. Some agencies allow a larger period within which to submit written exceptions. You should contact the agency that will issue the final order in this case concerning agency rules on the deadline for filing exceptions to this Recommended Order. Any exceptions to this Recommended Order should be filed with the agency that will issue the final order in this case.
The Issue Whether Petitioner demonstrated that she was terminated from employment by Respondent, Trend Offset Printing Company (Respondent or Trend), as the result of an unlawful employment practice based on her identification with a protected class, or as retaliation for Petitioner’s opposition to an unlawful employment practice.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is, purportedly, a printing company located in Jacksonville, Florida. Specific information as to the company is limited, since the company did not appear at the final hearing. Based on Petitioner’s testimony, it is inferred that Respondent meets the definition of an employer in section 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. On Saturday, September 28, 2019, the printing plant was open, though the office was closed for the weekend. Petitioner was at work that day. On September 28, 2019, Petitioner had some vegetables that she had placed in a personal refrigerator that she kept at work. She intended to take the vegetables to her aunt. Several of the bags in which the vegetables had been placed had broken open. Therefore, after she clocked out of work, Respondent took a box from a trash receptacle located on the plant floor in which to place the vegetables. Unbeknownst to Petitioner, there was a cell phone in the discarded box. She loaded the box, and took it to her aunt’s house. Upon arrival, Petitioner unloaded the box and, at that time, discovered the phone at the bottom. The screen of the phone was cracked and broken. There was no evidence as to how or when the phone was damaged, nor was there any evidence that Petitioner was responsible for the phone’s condition. Petitioner’s aunt recommended that Petitioner discard the damaged phone. Petitioner, wanting to ensure that the phone was returned to its rightful owner, 1 Section 760.10 has been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of classifications protected from discriminatory employment practices. Ch. 2015-68, § 6, Laws of Fla. regardless of its condition, decided to return the phone on Monday, September 30, 2019, when the office would be open. Upon her return to work on Monday, September 30, 2019, Petitioner immediately turned in the phone to her supervisor, and accurately explained the circumstances of how it came into her possession. On October 2, 2019, Petitioner was presented with a letter of termination from Respondent’s Human Resources Manager, which provided that: After reviewing the pertinent evidence on the evening of Sept 28th, 2019, we have determined to terminate your employment with Trend Offset Printing immediately. Any remaining hours worked and any unused vacation hours will be paid out in full on our next payroll cycle, Oct 11th, 2019. Those worked hours and unused vacation hours will be paid as directed via direct deposit or physical check. I've tried to reach out to you several times but unable to leave a message.[2] Please make arrangements with me to pickup any personal belongings that you may [sic]. If we don't hear from you in a reasonable time your personal belongings will be discarded. The evidence in this case establishes that Petitioner did nothing to warrant her termination. It is unreasonable to think that Petitioner would steal a phone, and then return it at the earliest opportunity. She had no desire or use for a cell phone. She did not try to use it. She had no idea to whom it belonged. That the phone ended up in her possession was entirely accidental. Though there was no evidence as to how or why the phone ended up in the box in the trash, the condition of the phone suggests that it may have been discarded by its owner. In any event, the evidence was persuasive that Petitioner did not intentionally take the phone. 2 The difficulty in reaching Petitioner may have been due to the fact that she did not own a cell phone, did not want a cell phone, and, according to both Petitioner and her sister, did not know how to use a cell phone. The letter of termination was vague, unusually and unnecessarily harsh, and not based on fact. Petitioner testified, for good reason, that “they didn’t treat me fair, at all.” However, Petitioner did not testify or present evidence at the hearing that Respondent’s action was based on discrimination due to race, sex, or age, or was the result of retaliation. As will be discussed herein, the failure to prove discrimination or retaliation based on a protected class or opposition to an unlawful act constitutes a failure to meet the jurisdictional element of an unlawful employment practice complaint.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is 3 Petitioner requested, as relief, that she be reinstated to her previous job with Respondent, because she loved working with her co-workers, who she described as family; and that her name be cleared of the unwarranted allegation of theft. Due to the outcome of this proceeding, the undersigned is unable to recommend Petitioner’s reinstatement. However, this Order is intended, and should be treated, as determining that Petitioner engaged in no theft, or any other conduct vis-á-vis the cell phone, that warranted her termination. RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order dismissing Petitioner, Annette Johnson’s Petition for Relief, FCHR No. 202126948. DONE AND ENTERED this 8th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S E. GARY EARLY Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of July, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Annette Y. Johnson 635 Luna Court Jacksonville, Florida 32205 Trend Offset Printing Company 10301 Busch Drive North Jacksonville, Florida 32218 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue Has Petitioner been the subject of an unlawful employment practice because of his race, American Indian, and if so, what relief is appropriate?
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent operated a citrus processing facility in Bartow, Florida, and employed in excess 15 employees. Petitioner is a full-blooded American Indian who resides in Lakeland, Polk County, Florida. Bobby Branch, Respondent’s Maintenance Supervisor, hired Petitioner as a Maintenance Mechanic. Petitioner commenced employment with Respondent on August 18, 1997. Petitioner was employed at an hourly rate of $10.50. Petitioner was assigned by Bobby Branch to work under the direct supervision of Garry R. Guard, Lead Plant Mechanic. Petitioner had 37 plus years' experience as a mechanic and 15 years' experience with the citrus industry as a mechanic. Petitioner understood at the time he was hired that he would be on probation for a period of 90 days. Shortly after Petitioner began work, Garry Guard told Petitioner “I don’t want to work with an Indian” and “I’m prejudiced and I don’t give a damn who knows it” or words to that effect. Additionally, Guard let it be known that he would prefer working with a Mexican. Approximately one week after this incident, Petitioner complained to Bobby Branch, Maintenance Supervisor, about Guard’s comment to Petitioner. This is supported by the testimony of Charles Palmer, a former employee of Respondent, that he was aware that Petitioner reported Guard's comment to Bobby Branch. There was no remedial action taken by either Branch or any other management personnel concerning Guard’s comment to Petitioner. Subsequently, Petitioner noticed his work being undone and Guard complaining that Petitioner’s work was not done or that his work was done improperly. Petitioner and William Waples, a former employee of Respondent, worked together on one of those projects, rebuilding and installing a pump. Waples considered Petitioner a good mechanic. Later, after Waples and Petitioner were finished with the pump, Guard was observed taking the pump apart. Subsequently, Guard complained that Petitioner failed to install a specific part in the pump. Waples specifically recalls that particular part being installed by himself and Petitioner. Subsequent to that event, Guard, when questioned by another worker about the pump and the problem with it, was over heard by Waples saying words to the effect that the “Damn Indian did it.” On October 22, 1997, Petitioner filed a complaint with Branch that Guard was purposefully sabotaging his work because of his race. Again, there was no remedial action taken by Branch or any other management personnel. Branch neither personally observed deficient work performance by Petitioner nor personally communicated to Petitioner the need for Petitioner to improve his performance if he were to successfully complete his probationary period with Respondent, notwithstanding Branch’s testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Petitioner was never reprimanded or counseled prior to being terminated. Petitioner was not terminated because of his deficient work performance during his probationary period, but was terminated because of his complaints to Bobby Branch of being discriminated against due to his race, notwithstanding Branch’s testimony to the contrary, which I find lacks credibility in this regard. Petitioner was terminated by Respondent on November 14, 1997. Petitioner claims lost wages at an hourly rate of $10.50 for 40 hours per week for the period from November 15, 1997 to April 24, 1998. There does not appear to be any evidence of a set-off against the claim for lost wages. Although Petitioner was represented by an attorney, there was no evidence presented as to the amount of Petitioner's attorney's fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that Petitioner's Petition for Relief be granted, and as further relief, award Petitioner back wages for the period of November 15, 1997 until April 24, 1998, based on a 40 hour week at an hourly rate of $10.50, and upon motion to the Commission, award reasonable attorney's, in accordance with Section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of August, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6947 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of August, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Merette L. Oweis, Esquire DiCeasure, Davidson & Barker, P.A. Post Office Box 7160 Lakeland, Florida 33897 David J. Stefany, Esquire Allen, Norton & Blue, P.A. South Hyde Park Avenue Suite 350 Tampa, Florida 33606 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations John Knox Road, Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Azizi M Dixon, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Rd, Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149
The Issue Whether Respondent, David Costa Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a McDonald’s (“Costa Enterprises”), discriminated against Petitioner, Labrentae B. Claybrone, in violation of the Florida Human Rights Act; and, if so, what penalty should be imposed?
Findings Of Fact Mr. Claybrone is an African-American male, approximately 25 years of age. He resides in Fort Walton Beach, Florida, with his mother. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Claybrone was working at one or another of the 21 McDonald’s restaurants operated by Costa Enterprises. Mr. Claybrone presents as a somewhat effeminate person, with braided, colored hair, earrings, polished fingernails, etc. He admits to being either gay or bisexual despite being married to-–but not living with-–a woman. In his Petition for Relief filed at FCHR, Mr. Claybrone refers to humiliation being imposed on him due to his “transgender and sexual orientation.” In March 2015, Mr. Claybrone was hired as a shift worker at the McDonald’s restaurant located inside the WalMart in Destin, Florida (hereinafter the “WalMart McDonald’s”). He had been hired by the general manager of that store, Ligaya Mumford. Mr. Claybrone did not at any time discuss his sexual orientation with his employer or other store personnel. On or around April 28, 2015, Mr. Claybrone thought he heard the general manager, Mrs. Mumford, refer to him as “ma’am.” He said that Mrs. Mumford also made comments about the way he walked and talked and that he reminded her of a female. Mrs. Mumford, whose testimony under oath at final hearing was entirely credible, denies making any such comments to Mr. Claybrone. Rather, Mrs. Mumford remembers talking to a young female employee on that day as they stood at the grill in the restaurant. The young lady was very respectful and always called Mrs. Mumford “ma’am,” so Mrs. Mumford had responded to the employee in kind, calling her “ma’am” as well. Mrs. Mumford believes Mr. Claybrone mistakenly believed she was referring to him when in fact she was not. As to the other comments Mr. Claybrone testified about, Mrs. Mumford categorically denied making them at all. When Mr. Claybrone went home that night and told his mother what he thought had happened, his mother insisted he complain about the comments. Mr. Claybrone says that his mother immediately called Roza Atanasova, general manager of the WalMart McDonald’s and another store known as the Destin McDonald’s. By virtue of her position as general manager, Ms. Atanasova was Mrs. Mumford’s supervisor. Ellie Montero, shift manager at the Destin McDonald’s, later notified Mrs. Mumford that Mr. Claybrone’s mother had called Ms. Atanasova with a complaint. Mrs. Mumford attempted to call Mr. Claybrone and sent him texts asking Mr. Claybrone to call her. He intentionally ignored the calls and texts because he did not want to talk to Mrs. Mumford. When Mr. Claybrone came to work for his next assigned shift, Mrs. Mumford apologized to him for the comment he (thought he) had heard. According to Mrs. Mumford, Mr. Claybrone was a good employee and never gave anyone trouble. He was kind to the customers and worked hard. She had absolutely no problem with Mr. Claybrone being one of her shift workers. Mrs. Mumford is one of Costa Enterprises’ most dependable, respected, and admired workers. She has received numerous citations and awards relating to her work ethics and skills. She is known to help employees in need, lending them her car, loaning money, and providing other assistance. Within a week after the misunderstanding with Mrs. Mumford, Mr. Claybrone heard that another co-employee, Ken Hislop, had mentioned to a fellow worker that he (Hislop) was surprised to hear that Mr. Claybrone had a child because Mr. Hislop presumed Mr. Claybrone was gay. Mr. Hislop cannot fully remember making the comment, but he meant nothing negative about Mr. Claybrone, it was just an observation. When he was advised that Mr. Claybrone was offended, Mr. Hislop offered an apology. He did not feel like the apology was accepted by Mr. Claybrone. Mr. Claybrone did not feel like the apology was sincere. Mr. Claybrone said that he was uncomfortable working with Mrs. Mumford and Mr. Hislop after the alleged slurs. At some point, it was mutually agreed by Mr. Claybrone and Costa Enterprises that Mr. Claybrone would be transferred to a different store, the Destin McDonald’s. Mr. Claybrone was transferred to the Destin McDonald’s and was, at first, a dependable worker. Then he began to be tardy and to miss his shifts, even though the Destin McDonald’s was closer to his home than the WalMart McDonald’s had been. After a while, Mr. Claybrone’s supervisor reduced his weekly hours in an effort to motivate him to do better about his attendance. Mr. Claybrone took offense to the reduction in hours and, after clocking in one day, immediately clocked out, left the store as he cursed loudly, and did not return. Mr. Claybrone effectively abandoned his position. Meanwhile, Mr. Claybrone filed a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations, which ultimately led to the instant action at DOAH. Mr. Claybrone admitted that the alleged discriminatory events all transpired within a few days, no longer than a week in duration.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Costa Enterprises, Inc., d/b/a McDonald’s, did not discriminate against Labrentae B. Claybrone. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of October, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of October, 2016.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Petitioner was discriminated against by being terminated, allegedly on account of her race, and in retaliation for filing a claim concerning discrimination.
Findings Of Fact Tammy King, the Petitioner, became employed by the Respondent in June of 2000. She was employed as an operations manager, supervising the cleaning service work for various customer accounts as well as the people employed to perform the cleaning service work for those accounts. She was employed by the Respondent for approximately one year. The owners of the Respondent company are Linda and Daniel Coley. On October 18, 2000, Ms. King was evaluated by her evaluator and supervisor Christopher Stettner and received an excellent evaluation, which was apparently co-extensive with the end of her probationary period. Gene Janushanis also was in a supervisory capacity over the Petitioner. Mr. Janushanis, in his supervisory role, is the primary focus of the Peititoner's complaint of discriminatory conduct concerning his conduct and attitude toward her. The Petitioner contends, in essence, that Mr. Janushanis refused to allow the Petitioner to discipline black employees and treated her more harshly, with harassment, including cursing at her, and otherwise interfered with her performance of her job. She stated that he treated black employees, including black supervisors in similar positions to the Petitioner, more favorably, as to disciplinary or job performance issues, than he treated the Petitioner. The Petitioner maintains that she had no problems, disciplinary or otherwise, in the performance of her job before Mr. Janushanis was hired as her supervisor and that their numerous altercations commenced shortly thereafter. However, she also developed a difficult relationship with Christopher Stettner, the supervisor who gave her the excellent evaluation at the end of her probationary period. Apparently, their relationship deteriorated soon thereafter and became quite hostile. In fact, Mr. Stettner filed an internal complaint or grievance against the Petitioner concerning alleged harassment of him by the Petitioner. This resulted in the Respondent's scheduling additional "anti-harassment training" for the Petitioner and other employees thereafter. Thus, a hostile relationship with abrasive arguments ensued between the Petitioner and Mr. Stettner, as well as between the Petitioner and Mr. Janushanis, starting in the late part of 2000 and through the first half of the year 2001. Cassey Clark, the Human Relations Director for Respondent, witnessed a number of "very harsh arguments" between Tammy King and office employees or supervisors Dwayne Coley, Chris Stettner, and Gene Janushanis. Both owners and employees witnessed very hostile, violent arguments between Mr. Janushanis and the Petitioner on a number of occasions, sometimes in the presence of customers of the company and generally in the presence of other employees or owners. These altercations included instances where the Petitioner refused to perform directions of her supervisor. Additionally, a substantial number of employees had verbal altercations with the Petitioner concerning receiving credit for, and payment for, the hours they had worked. On a repetitive basis the Petitioner failed to submit correct hours for the payroll and in one case got into a verbal altercation with an employee, Sonya Ross, chased the employee out in the parking lot, and refused to give her her last paycheck, telling her that she would mail the check to her, which was against company policy. The Petitioner exhibited a hostile, threatening attitude and conduct toward employees concerning hours worked and other aspects of her opinion of the way they were performing their jobs, as well as concerning payroll issues. Such instances occurred with at least nine employees. This hostile, threatening attitude and failure to comply with the payroll policies of the Respondent, as well as the several instances of the Petitioner failing to perform as directed by her supervisors, constituted misconduct under the regular policies of the Respondent. These instances of misconduct occurred on a frequent basis through the first half of 2001, including an instance where an employee called to state that she had to be out for two days because her baby was sick with a high fever. The employee followed company policy and provided documentation from the physician involved concerning her need to be off from work. She then called Tammy King to say that she had to go back to the hospital with her child, and Ms. King told her that she would be terminated. The employee then called the owner, Linda Coley, to inform her of the problem because she was afraid of losing her job. Ms. Coley then spoke with Ms. King and reminded her that it was against company policy to terminate an employee if he or she brought proper documentation from the physician or hospital, which was the case. This also was a clear violation of company policy concerning employees and supervisors. These instances of misconduct and the very hostile verbal altercations between the Petitioner and Mr. Janushanis, her branch manager, continued until June of 2001. The Respondent counseled with both the Petitioner and Mr. Janushanis about their conduct and attitude between themselves and toward other employees. Ultimately the decision was made in mid-June 2001 to terminate the Petitioner and Mr. Janushanis as well. On June 22, 2001, the Petitioner was terminated, as was Mr. Janushanis, on the same date. On June 20, 2001, the Petitioner had filed a complaint with the EEOC, by letter, and informed the Respondent of that fact. The decision to terminate the Petitioner, however, had been made prior to the filing of the complaint with the EEOC. The Petitioner has failed to establish that any actions taken by the Respondent toward her were related to her race. The supervisor complained of by the Petitioner was of the same race, white, and there is no persuasive evidence that shows any intent by the owners or management of the company to treat similarly-situated members of another race more favorably. In fact, there was preponderant and substantial evidence of misconduct on behalf of the Petitioner which established a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. Although her initial performance was rated as excellent in the initial months of her employment, the Petitioner failed to continue that level of performance. In fact, her misconduct on the job, including the instances enumerated in the above findings of fact shows that the Petitioner's conduct and performance had deteriorated so that she was not properly performing the various requirements of her employment position, when viewed in the context of regularly- adopted company policy. Upon the Respondent's becoming aware of these conduct shortcomings, and failure to properly perform in her position, as well as the improper conduct by her supervisor, the Respondent did not condone the Petitioner's level of conduct nor that of her supervisor, Mr. Janushanias. Rather, the Respondent sought to assist them in improving their conduct and performance. When these efforts were not successful, the Respondent ultimately terminated both of them.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: K. Jeffrey Reynolds, Esquire 924 N. Palafox Street Pensacola, Florida 32501 Banks T. Smith, Esquire Hall, Smith & Jones Post Office Box 1748 Dothan, Alabama 36302 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Conclusions The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that it is a public employer within the meaning of Section 447.203(2) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that the Charging Party is now and has been at all times material herein, an employee organization within the meaning of Section 447.203(10) of the Act. The complaint alleges, the Respondent admits and I find that on or about December 2, 1976, the Public Employees Relations Commission issued a certification certifying the Charging Party as the exclusive bargaining representative for the public employees in the following unit: INCLUDED: Patrolmen, Patrolmen 1st class, Master Patrolmen, Evidence Technician, and Traffic Enforcement officer. EXCLUDED: All other employees of the Ocala Police Department including Sergeants who are shift commanders. The pleadings establish that during 1972, the Respondent, by and through its City Council, promulgated a City Ordinance (Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code) which regulates labor relations for its employees. Chapter 13B has remained in full force and effect and has never been approved by the Public Employees Relations Commission pursuant to Section 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Among other things, the ordinance provides that: "Solicitation for membership in a labor organization or the collection of dues therefor, or other internal affairs of a labor organization shall not be con- ducted by employees on working time, or on city premises. Labor organization literature, pamphlets, handbills and the like shall not be distributed in the work areas of the city premises at any time." (See Section 13B-8.) A summary review of the parties' joint exhibits demonstrate that Chapter 13B attempts to regulate nearly all aspects of a collective bargaining relationship. In PERC v. The City of Naples, 327 So.2d 41 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1976) the court determined that an entity may not assume jurisdiction of a public employee bargaining procedure until PERC has approved that procedure. In this case, no such approval has been granted by PERC as it is required pursuant to 447.603, Florida Statutes (1975). Further comparison of the provisions of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code and Chapter 447, Florida Statutes, lends support to the conclusion that Respondent's employees' collective bargaining rights are not on a parity with those rights guaranteed them by Chapter 447, Florida Statutes. For example, 13B-1(c) of the ordinance defines "supervisor" and section 13B-1(b) defines "employee". Supervisors are excluded from the definition of employee and thereby from collective bargaining whereas Chapter 447 contains no definition of supervisor and the Commission consistently determines that supervisors are entitled to protections guaranteed by Chapter 447. See CWA and Hillsborough County Hospital and Welfare Board, case no. 8H- RC-752-0175, 2 FPER 46 (1976); Hillsborough County PBA and Florida State Lodge, FOP and City of Tampa, 2 FPER 72 (1976). Additional distinctions are found respecting the definition of confidential employees and the determination by despondent in its code of "bargainable" subjects. It was noted that Respondent does not consider itself required to negotiate with respect to wages, hours and terms and conditions of employment. See the May Department Stores Co., 191 NLRB 928 (1972). While Chapter 447 vests all authority respecting appropriate unit placement of employees with PERC, Chapter 13B-2(b)(1) authorized Respondent's City Manager to make such determinations. A further examination of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code reveals that it makes a striking distinction between the authority guaranteed employees respecting the proper bounds for solicitation-distribution rules. Chapter 447.509, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part that during an employee's lunch hour, an employer may not restrict solicitation and distribution whereas Chapter 13B of the Respondent's Code restricts solicitation and distribution during working time and on the premises of the City, making no exception or distinction for lunch breaks and therefore Respondent's maintenance of such provisions amounts to unlawful interference, restraint and coercion within the meaning of Section 447.501(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Although the Respondent defends in part on the fact that no employee had been disciplined for violating the above referenced rules, legions of cases have held that the maintenance, without enforcement of an overly broad solicitation-distribution rule constitutes an unfair labor practice. (See for example Essex International, Inc., 211 NLRB 934, 86 LRRM 1411; Dreis and Krump Manufacturing, Inc., 221 NLRB 309, 90 LRRM 1647 (1975).
Recommendation Having found that the Respondent has violated the Act as stated above, I shall therefore recommend that it be ordered to: A. Post at its facilities, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are usually posted, on forms to be provided by the Commission, a notice substantially providing: that it will not in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce its employees in the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed them under the Florida Public Employees Relations Act; that it will upon request of the above-named employee organization, rescind the applicability of Chapter 13B of the Ocala Code as it relates to the regulation of organizational rights of employees, without having been first approved by the Commission. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Seymour H. Rowland, Jr., Esquire 105 Legal Center 19 N.W. Pine Avenue Ocala, Florida 32670 Jane Rigler, Esquire Staff Attorney Public Employees Relations Commission 2003 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 300 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald D. Slesnick, II, Esquire 2540 N.W. 29th Avenue Miami, Florida 33142
