The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner is eligible for a Bright Futures scholarship even though he did not take foreign language classes in high school.
Findings Of Fact At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner Daniel B. Gopman ("Gopman") was a fulltime college student enrolled in the Harriet L. Wilkes Honors College of Florida Atlantic University ("FAU"). Respondent Department of Education ("Department") administers the Florida Bright Futures Scholarship Program ("Bright Futures"), among other responsibilities. Before graduating from Dr. Michael M. Krop Senior High School ("Krop") in June 2003, Gopman had applied for a Bright Futures scholarship. Specifically, Gopman had sought a Florida Academic Scholars Award, which is the most generous——and selective——of the several types of scholarship available under Bright Futures. The Department had found him ineligible for a Bright Futures scholarship because Gopman had not earned two high-school credits in a foreign language.1 To his credit, Gopman had taken many academically challenging courses in high school, including honors and advanced placement courses, and had done quite well, despite having a learning disability that had resulted in his being provided special education services pursuant to an individual education plan ("IEP"). He had not, however, taken any foreign language courses in high school. Instead, after graduating from high school (and before beginning his studies at FAU), Gopman successfully completed two courses of Russian at Miami-Dade Community College ("M-DCC"). In the present case, Gopman has suggested that his failure to study a foreign language in high school was due, wholly or in part, to (a) taking the courses prescribed in his IEP, which, coupled with other subjects required for graduation, completely filled his scholastic schedule every semester; and (b) never receiving from school district personnel complete or accurate information concerning the need to take foreign language courses as a condition of qualifying for a Bright Futures scholarship. Lending some support to the first of these purported impediments is a "To Whom It May Concern" letter dated May 30, 2003, which George Nunez, then the principal of Krop, sent to the Department around that time. In this letter, Mr. Nunez urged the Department to grant Gopman an "academic waiver" of the foreign language requirement, arguing that Gopman's failure to take "a second year of a foreign language"——actually, he had not taken even a first year——"was not due to a conscious oversight on [Gopman's] part" but happened because "the mandates of his IEP" had required him to take an "additional elective" instead "of what would have been other academic electives including the second year of his foreign language." Even if scheduling conflicts had made it impossible for Gopman to take foreign language courses in high school, however, and even if he had been given poor advice regarding the requirements for a Bright Futures award (which Mr. Nunez pointedly did not suggest had occurred), Gopman's eligibility to receive a scholarship would be unchanged, for legal reasons that will be discussed below. In any event, though, the evidence in its entirety does not support Gopman's claims in this regard; rather, it disproves them. Based on the greater weight of the persuasive evidence, it is found that Gopman could have taken two foreign language classes in high school, special education services notwithstanding, had he wanted to do that.2 It is found, as well, that Gopman was not misinformed or misled regarding the requirements to qualify for a Bright Futures award. To the contrary, his guidance counselor advised Gopman, in the tenth grade, to start taking foreign language classes soon, while there was still time to complete two years of study before graduating from high school. Gopman told the guidance counselor that, because he planned to attend an out-of-state college, he would not need foreign language credits for admission (as is generally required for admission to a Florida state university) and was not concerned with Bright Futures eligibility.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED Daniel B. Gopman's application for a Bright Futures scholarship be denied because he failed to meet the foreign language requirement, and that the Department enter a final order consistent herewith. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of January, 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of January, 2008.
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner’s Petition for Relief should be dismissed for failure to allege facts sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Florida Commission on Human Relations (the “FCHR”) under section 760.10, Florida Statutes.1 1 Citations shall be to Florida Statutes (2020) unless otherwise specified. Section 760.10 has been unchanged since 1992, save for a 2015 amendment adding pregnancy to the list of classifications protected from discriminatory employment practices. Ch. 2015-68, § 6, Laws of Fla.
Findings Of Fact The Department is an employer as that term is defined in section 760.02(7). The Petition for Relief alleges the following ultimate facts, which are accepted as true for purposes of ruling on the Motion: I believe I have been discriminated against based on my race (Black), sex (male), and age (over 40). I also believe I am being retaliated against for filing a complaint with Florida Commission on Human Relations and in Federal Court. I have been working within the Gadsden County School system since January 2008 as a substitute teacher and have teaching experience. Around or on October 2020, I applied for a Social Studies position and was not offered an interview by the principal because DOE deliberately and maliciously held clearance letter to deny employment. Section 760.10 titled “Unlawful employment practices,” is the statute under which the FCHR exercises jurisdiction of the Petition for Relief. Section 760.10(1)(a) states that it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual “with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.” The Motion states that Petitioner is not, and never has been, an employee of the Department. Respondent’s Chief of Human Resource Management, David Dawkins, conducted a system-wide search and verified that Petitioner has never been employed by the Department. Mr. Dawkins’s affidavit to that effect was attached to the Motion. Mr. Jones did not contest the contents of Mr. Dawkins’s affidavit. The Motion also references section 760.10(5) as a possible avenue under which Mr. Jones might seek relief against the Department. Section 760.10(5) provides: Whenever, in order to engage in a profession, occupation, or trade, it is required that a person receive a license, certification, or other credential, become a member or an associate of any club, association, or other organization, or pass any examination, it is an unlawful employment practice for any person to discriminate against any other person seeking such license, certification, or other credential, seeking to become a member or associate of such club, association, or other organization, or seeking to take or pass such examination, because of such other person’s race, color, religion, sex, pregnancy, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status. In theory, the Department’s alleged “deliberate and malicious” withholding of Mr. Jones’s “clearance letter,” i.e., a Temporary Certificate to teach, could constitute a violation of section 760.10(5). However, the Department pointed out that after Mr. Jones applied for a Florida Educator Certificate, the Department sent him an “Official Statement of Status of Eligibility” on October 12, 2017. A copy of the Department’s letter to Mr. Jones was attached to the Motion. The letter informed Mr. Jones that he was eligible for a Temporary Certificate covering Social Science (Grades 6-12), if he completed the following requirements and documented them to the Bureau of Educator Certification (“BOE”): verification of employment and request for issuance of certificate on the appropriate certification form from a Florida public, state supported, or nonpublic school which has an approved Professional Education Competence Program. results of your fingerprint processing from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement and the FBI. Your employer will assist you in completing the fingerprint process. If your application or fingerprint report reflects a criminal offense or suspension/revocation record, your file will be referred to Professional Practices Services for further review. Issuance of your certificate will be contingent upon the results of this review. The Motion states that Mr. Jones submitted only the results of his fingerprint processing to BOE. Therefore, BOE was legally precluded from issuing a Temporary Certificate to Petitioner. Attached to the Motion was the affidavit of Daniel Moore, Chief of BOE, attesting to the fact that a request for issuance from a Florida public, state supported, or nonpublic school which has an approved Professional Education Competence Program is required in order for BOE to issue a Temporary Certificate. Mr. Moore’s affidavit is confirmed by Florida Administrative Code Rule 6A-4.004(1)(a)2., requiring verification of full-time employment by a Florida school district before a Temporary Certificate may be issued. Mr. Jones did not contest the contents of Mr. Moore’s affidavit. Based on the foregoing, the Motion requests entry of a summary recommended order of dismissal because Mr. Jones’s pleadings and admissions of fact, including those in his response to the Motion, are facially and conclusively insufficient to prove that he was ever an employee of the Department, or that the Department’s failure to issue a teaching certificate to Mr. Jones was based on anything more than the ministerial operation of the Department’s own rule. Mr. Jones’s response to the Motion does not address, and therefore appears to concede, the Department’s statement that he is not and has never been an employee of the Department. Mr. Jones did not allege that he has ever been an employee of, or an applicant for employment by, the Department. Mr. Jones’s response does not address the fact that the Department’s rule forbids it to issue a Temporary Certificate without verification of full- time employment. Rather, Mr. Jones pursues an argument alleging that the denial was somehow based on his criminal record and that denial on that basis is discriminatory because of the disproportionate percentage of African American and Latino citizens who have criminal records in comparison to Caucasians. Mr. Jones claims that the Department’s stated reason for denying him a Temporary Certificate was pretextual and that the actual reason was racial discrimination premised on his criminal record. In a related case, Mr. Jones has alleged that the Gadsden County School Board declined to hire him because of his criminal record, and that this declination was a pretext for discrimination based on race, age, and/or sex. The merits of Mr. Jones’s case against the local school board and its subsidiary institutions are not at issue here. The question in this case is whether the Department had anything to do with Mr. Jones’s failure to gain employment by the Gadsden County School Board. The undisputed facts establish that the Department’s role in this process was purely ministerial. Had Mr. Jones secured employment, the school that hired him would have requested the issuance of a Temporary Certificate by the Department. By operation of rule 6A-4.004(1)(a)2., the Department would have issued the Temporary Certificate. The Department had no role in the decisions of the local school officials to hire or not hire Mr. Jones. It is found that Mr. Jones has not alleged facts sufficient to state a case against the Department under section 760.10, and that he would not be able to prove at hearing that he was ever an employee of the Department, or that the failure to issue a Temporary Certificate to Mr. Jones was anything more than the Department’s following the requirements of its own rule.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Department of Education did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief filed in this case. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of July, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of July, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Tammy S. Barton, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020 Dan Saunders Florida Department of Education Turlington Building, Room 101 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Ronald David Jones 1821 McKelvy Street Quincy, Florida 32351 Paula Harrigan, Esquire Department of Education Suite 1544 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Cheyanne Costilla, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Room 110 4075 Esplanade Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-7020
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent failed to maintain the good moral character requisite to continued certification as a law enforcement officer in violation of Section 943.13(7), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is Richard Campbell, holder of Law Enforcement Certificate Number 89955 and Instructor Certificate #130914. Campbell had worked with the Florida State Seminole Boosters for several years as an assistant to George Brand, Assistant Director Of Concessions. Most of Campbell’s duties had to do with the distribution and transportation of money. On the night of October 9, 1993, after the football game between Florida State University and the University of Miami, Campbell receipted for 37 bags of money from the counting room at Doak Campbell Stadium. The bags were placed in his vehicle, a mini-van. Campbell drove his vehicle to the bank, followed by another officer in another vehicle. At the bank, the other officer, Mark Edenfield, stood guard while Campbell transferred the money bags to the night depository. Edenfield, at Campbell’s suggestion, looked in Campbell’s car to insure that there were no money bags inadvertently left in the vehicle. As documented by bank records, upon removal of the bags from the night depository by bank employees the following Tuesday, October 12, 1993, only 36 money bags were discovered. Brand testified at the final hearing that Campbell told him that he, Campbell, would replace the missing funds, estimated at approximately 1500 dollars, to escape prosecution although he, Campbell, was not guilty. Campbell never made such payment and, in the absence of corroborative evidence, Brand’s testimony concerning such a statement by Campbell, is not credited. A subsequent criminal investigation of the theft was undertaken by the University Police Department and the Leon County Sheriff’s Department. Ultimately, the Office of the State Attorney declined to file criminal charges against Campbell in connection with the missing money bag.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing the Administrative Complaint.DONE AND ENTERED this 12th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mark E. Taps, Esquire Stephanie Johnson, Esquire Legal Services of North Florida, Inc. 2119 Delta Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32302-4220 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Division of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Petitioner meets the qualifications prescribed by Chapter 475, Florida Statutes for licensure as a real estate salesman?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the record evidence, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a 1986 graduate of Florida State University. He has a degree in urban politics and real estate. In November, 1989, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty in Palm Beach County Circuit Court to two counts of burglary of a dwelling, one count of petty larceny, and one count of dealing in stolen property. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on five years probation, which, the court specified, was not subject to "early termination." In addition, Petitioner was ordered to pay $360.00 in restitution and $265.00 in court costs. These crimes were all committed in June, 1989, after Petitioner had returned to Palm Beach County from a two or three-month vacation in Colorado. The two counts of burglary involved the same dwelling: the townhouse that Petitioner had lived in, with others, prior to his Colorado vacation. The lease to the townhouse, which was in the name of one of his roommates, had expired before his return from vacation. Contrary to the instructions of the landlord, Petitioner entered the dwelling on at least two separate occasions after coming back from Colorado in order to retrieve personal belongings that remained in the townhouse. The stolen property involved in the dealing in stolen property charge was a stereo that belonged to Petitioner's friend. Petitioner tried to pawn the stereo for $45.00. The petty theft charge involved the taking of ten CD's that were on top of a CD player located in a bar in the vicinity of the townhouse. Since these incidents, Petitioner has not run afoul of the law. Petitioner presently owns and operates the South Florida Adventure Club, a business which plans and organizes social activities for single professionals. In his spare time, he serves as an advisor to two youth groups. Petitioner is still on probation. He has paid in full the restitution ordered by the court. His court costs, however, have not yet been paid in full. He still owes $50.00.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order finding that Petitioner is not qualified for licensure as a real estate salesman because of his criminal record and denying his application for licensure based upon such a finding, without prejudice to Petitioner filing a subsequent application supported by a showing that, "because of the lapse of time and subsequent good conduct and reputation, or other reason deemed sufficient, it appears . . . that the interest of the public and investors will not likely be endangered by granting" the application. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 5th day of September, 1991. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of September, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the findings of fact proposed by Respondent: 1. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. 2-4. Rejected because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 5. First sentence: Rejected because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer; Remaining sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 6-10. Rejected because they are more in the nature of summaries of testimony than findings of fact based upon such testimony. 11. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a statement of the case than a finding of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Greg Allen Hinds 2016 Broward Avenue # 3 West Palm Beach, Florida 33407-6112 Joselyn M. Price, Esquire Assistant Attorney General 400 West Robinson Street Suite 107, South Orlando, Florida 32801 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
