The Issue Whether there is probable cause for Petitioner to bring an action against Respondents for violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act?
Findings Of Fact Respondents sell used cars in Pensacola, about 500 a year. On or about June 19, 1981, when Fannie Mae Tunstall bought a '76 Buick LeSabre from Fairfield Motors, Inc. (Fairfield), she dealt with Elaine Owens Atkins, who is Fairfield's general manager, secretary-treasurer and a six-year employee. The installment sales contract specified an annual percentage rate of 29.64 percent, and was stamped with the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Respondent's Exhibit No. 1. Ms. Tunstall told Ms. Atkins the payments were too much but signed the papers anyway, and did so without reading them, although Ms. Atkins had told her to read them. The payments did indeed prove too much and Ms. Tunstall fell behind. She was 13 days late with a payment in November of 1981, but Ms. Tunstall and Ms. Atkins had discussed the matter and Fairfield agreed to accept the payment late. Fairfield accepted other payments late, but arranged to have Willie Easley (formerly a singer and now a minister as well as a repossessor of cars) take possession of the Quick early in the morning of January 10, 1983, and drive it away. Ms. Tunstall had failed to make the monthly payment due December 30, 1982. Ms. Atkins had telephoned her once and gotten no answer. Later on January 10, 1983, Fairfield agreed to return the car in exchange for December's payment, another payment in advance, a six dollar late fee and a $100 repossession fee. Ms. Tunstall paid the entire balance Fairfield claimed to be owed and retrieved the car. Linda Louise LaCoste and her husband Ronnie have bought several cars from Fairfield, including a 1976 Chevrolet Suburban Mr. LaCoste bought on February 7, 1983, under an installment agreement calling for interest at an annual percentage rate in excess of 30 percent. The "cash price" was $3,459.75, and the "total sale price" was $4,613.15. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. The LaCostes understood from prior dealings that their agreement required Mr. LaCoste to maintain insurance on the vehicle, and Mr. LaCoste contracted with Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) for appropriate coverage. Allstate sent Fairfield a notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium effective 12:01 A.M. April 4, 1983. Petitioner's Exhibit No. 4. At 11:25 A.M. on April 4, 1983, Allstate accepted the premium Ronnie LaCoste offered in order to reinstate the policy, No. 441361747, and Allstate's Chirstine Smith also wrote a new policy to be sure there would be coverage. Ms. Smith told Fairfield that insurance was in force on April 4, 1983. On April 20, 1983, Allstate issued another notice of cancellation for nonpayment of premium on policy No. 441361747, effective 12:01 A.M. May 4, 1983. At ten minutes past three o'clock on the afternoon of May 4, 1983, Mr. LaCoste's Chevrolet Suburban was repossessed at Fairfield's instance on account of the apparent lapse of insurance. Mrs. LaCoste and here sister appeared promptly at Fairfield's place of business and tendered payment due that day. All prior payments to Fairfield were current. When Mrs. Atkins refused payment, Mrs. LaCoste and here sister protested with such vehemence that a Fairfield employee called the sheriff's office. According to Fairfield's contemporaneous records, Fairfield employees ("we") tried to give Mrs. LaCoste a letter "advising vehichle [sic] would be held for 10 days" (i.e., that it would be sold thereafter) but "she refused to accept a copy." Respondent's Exhibit No. 3. At hearing, Ms. Atkins conceded that she had not mailed a copy of the letter to Mr. LaCoste but testified that Mrs. LaCoste accepted a copy after refusing to take it initially. Mrs. LaCoste denied that she ever received the letter, and her version has been credited. On May 7, 1983, Fairfield received another communication from Allstate. Whether insurance coverage in fact lapsed on May 4, 1983 was not clear from the record. On May 17, 1983, Fairfield sold the Chevrolet Suburban for $2,050.00. Carolyn V. Kosmas purchased a 1978 Ford LTD II from Fairfield and made a downpayment of $550.00 on June 2, 1983. Under the terms of the installment sale contract, which called for an annual percentage rate in excess of 29 percent, she was to begin seventy dollar ($70.00) biweekly payments on June 22, 1983. At the time of the sales of the Ford to Ms. Kosmas on June 2, 1983, Fairfield asked for credit information about her fiance as well as about herself. On June 24, 1983, she appeared at Fairfield's place of business and tendered not only the payment due June 22 but also the payment due July 6, a total of $140.00 in cash. Ms. Atkins refused to accept the money, telling her that her references had not panned out, and asked her to surrender the keys to the car and gather up her personal effects. Ms. Kosmas made no secret of her opinion that she was not being treated fairly, but, crying and afraid, eventually agreed to treat the transaction as a rental and accepted a refund of $104.39 on that basis. Ms. Atkins "advised if she gave me another background sheet, that I could verify, I would renegotiate with her," Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, but Ms. Kosmas told Ms. Atkins that she had lost her job at West Florida Hospital and the renegotiation eventuated in the retroactive lease. Respondent Pearl Allen was present on June 24, 1983, and took the car keys from her. It was also he who wrote her on June 27, 1983 that the 1978 Ford LTD II would be privately sold on July 6, 1983. She did not appear when and where she was told the sale would occur. The Ford was in fact sold at auction in Montgomery, Alabama, on July 19, 1983. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5. Mary Lee Hobbs' husband Forace paid Fairfield $800.00 down on a 1977 Oldsmobile 98 on February 27, 1982, agreeing to maintain insurance on the car until paid for, and to pay the unpaid principal balance of $4134.25 over a two and a half year period together with interest at an annual percentage rate of 29.79. Stamped on the contract was the legend, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." In part, the installment sale contract read: * NOTE: DISCLOSURES REQUIRED BY FEDERAL LAW, Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 (reduced in size), has been omitted from this ACCESS Document. For review, contact the Division's Clerk's Office. All payments were current when, at about half past five o'clock on the morning of November 1, 1983, Fairfield's agents used a wrecker to remove the Oldsmobile, damaging the Hobbses' porch in the process. Fairfield acted because it received notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of the insurance policy that Hobbs maintained on the car. Typed on the form notice as the effective date of cancellation was November 29, 1983. Someone has written in ink "should be 10-29." In fact the insurance policy never lapsed. According to Fairfield's records, they received conflicting information, on October 29, 1983, about whether an insurance premium had been paid. The Hobbses' 27-year old "daughter said they p[ai]d--Conway Spence said they did not pay." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. This was the same day Mr. Spence, an insurance agent, erroneously informed Fairfield that the effective date of expiration "should be 10-29." Respondent's Exhibit No. 6. Even after Mr. Spence's error was known to it, Fairfield refused to return the car without payment of a $75.00 "repossession fee," and also refused to let the Hobbs children return with the laundry they were sent to fetch from the trunk of the car. It was the refusal to give up the dirty laundry that sent Mrs. Hobbs to the authorities. Karel Jerome Bell bought a 1977 Delta 88 Oldsmobile from Fair field on July 22, 1982, under an installment sale contract calling for two "pick up notes" to be paid in August of 1982 and biweekly payments of $125.00 thereafter until payments reached a total of $4161.212. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. The "pick up notes," each for $220.00 were due August 7 and 21, 1982, and were not treated as down payments on the installment sale form. After reducing his indebtedness to $1221.21, Mr. Bell fell two payments behind, and Fairfield repossessed the Oldsmobile on July 7, 1983. The same day Fairfield wrote Mr. Bell that it intended to sell his car, but not time or date was specified. On July 8, 1983, Mr. Bell called and asked whether he could continue making payments while the car on the lot. Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Fairfield's Ms. Gilstrap accepted $100.00 from Mr. Bell on July 12, 1983, which she applied to satisfy a reposession fee of $100.00. On the Bell contract, too, had been stamped, "MINIMUM $25 REPO OR COLLECTION FEE." Ms. Gilstrap "told him as long as he paid something something regularly on the account, I felt sure we would hold it for him." Mr. Bell indicated he would pay an additional $125.00 the following Friday and Ms. Gilstrap made a notation to this effect in his file, where she also wrote, "Pls. don't sell he intends to pay for." Respondent's Exhibit No. 7. Mr. Bell had not made any further payment when, on July 30, 1983, without notice to Mr. Bell, Fairfield sold the car for $1,000.00 to a wholesaler. Respondents use form installment sale contracts. A blank form like the one in use at the time of the hearing was received as Respondent's Exhibit No. This was the form used in the Kosmas and LaCoste transactions. The predecessor form used in the Bell, Hobbs and Tunstall transactions was similar in many respects. The earlier form provided, "LATE CHARGES: Buyer(s) hereby agrees to pay a late charge on each installment in default for 10 days or more in an amount of 5 percent of each installment or $5.00 whichever is less." On the reverse, the form provided: ACCELERATION AND REPOSSESSION. In the event any Buyer(s) or Guarantor of this Contract fails to pay any of said installments, including any delinquency charges when due or defaults in the performance of any of the other provisions of this Contract or (c) in case Buyer(s) or Guarantor becomes insolvent or (d) institutes any type of insolvency proceedings or (e) has any thereof instituted against him, or (f) has entered against him any judgment or filed against him any notice of lien in case of any Federal tax or has issued against him any distraint warrant for taxes, or writ of garnishment, or other legal process, or (g) in case of death, adjudged incompetency, or incarceration of the Buyer(s) or Guarantor or (h) in case the seller or the holder of this Contract, upon reasonable cause, determines that the prospect of payment of said sums or the performance by the Buyer(s) or his assigns of this Contract is impaired, then, or in such event, the unpaid portion of the balance hereunder shall, without notice, become forthwith due and payable and the holder, in person or by agent, may immediately take possession of said property, together with all accessions thereto, or may, at first, repossess a part and later, if necessary, the whole thereof with such accessions, and for neither or both of these purposes may enter upon any premises where said property, may be and remove the same with or without process of law. Buyer(s) agrees in any such case to pay said amount to the holder, upon demand, or, at the election of the holder, to deliver said property to the holder. If, in repossessing said property, the holder inadvertently takes possession of any other goods therein, consent is hereby given to such taking of possession, and holder may hold such goods temporarily for Buyer(s), without responsibility of liability therefor, providing holder returns the same upon demand. There shall be no liability upon any such demand unless the same be made in writing within 48 hours after such inadvertent taking of possession. Should this contract mature by its term or by acceleration, as hereinabove provided, then, and in either such event, the total principal amount due hereunder at that time shall bear interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum, which principal and interest, together with all costs and expenses incurred in the collection hereof, including attorneys fees (to be not less than 15 percent of the amount involved), plus appellate fees, if any, and all advances made by Seller to protect the security hereof, including advances made for or on account of levies, insurance, repairs, taxes, and for maintenance or recovery of property shall be due the Holder hereof and which sums Buyer(s) hereby agrees to pay. * * * LIABILITIES AFTER POSSESSION. Seller, upon obtaining possession of the property upon default, may sell the same or any part thereof at public or private sale either with or without having the property at the place of sale, and so far as may be lawful. Seller may be a purchaser at such sale. Seller shall have the remedies of a secured party under the Uniform Commercial Code (Florida) and any and all rights and remedies available to secured party under any applicable law, and upon request or demand of Seller, Buyer(s) shall, at his expense, assemble the property and make it available to the Seller at the Seller's address which is designated as being reasonably convenient to Buyer(s). Unless the property is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, Seller will give Buyer(s) reasonable notice of the time and place of any public or private sale thereof. (The requirement of reasonable notice shall be met if such notice is mailed, postage prepaid, to Buyer(s) at address shown on records of Seller at least five (5) days before the time of the sale or disposition) Expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for the sale, selling, attorneys' fees, supra, incurred or paid by Seller shall be paid out of the proceeds of the sale and the balance applied on the Buyer(s) obligation hereunder. Upon disposition of the property after default, Buyer(s) shall be and remain liable for any deficiency and Seller shall account to Buyer(s) for any surplus, but Seller shall have the right to apply all or any part of such surplus against (or to hold the same as a reverse against) any and all other liabilities of Buyer(s) to Seller. Similarly, the more recent form provides, on the obverse, Late Charge: If a payment is received more than ten (10) days after the due date, you will be charged $5.00 or five (5 percent) of the payment, whichever is less. and on the reverse, has identical provisions on "Acceleration and Repossession" and "Liabilities After Repossession."
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner find probable cause to initiate judicial proceedings against Respondents pursuant to Section 501.207(1), Florida Statutes (1981). DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: William P. White, Jr., Esquire Assistant State Attorney Post Office Box 12726 Pensacola, Florida 32501 Paul A. Rasmussen, Esquire Eggen, Bowden, Rasmussen & Arnold 4300 Bayou Boulevard, Suite 13 Pensacola, Florida 32503 Curtis A. Golden, State Attorney First Judicial Circuit of Florida Post Office Box 12726 190 Governmental Center Pensacola, Florida 32501
Findings Of Fact The Applicant, Protestant, and Department submitted Proposed Findings of Fact pursuant to Rule 3C-9.11, Florida Administrative Code. The Applicant's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings stated in the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law, with the following exceptions: The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 8 is rejected to the extent that it constitutes a legal argument as opposed to a finding of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 11 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument as opposed to a finding of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 15 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. The Protestant's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings stated in the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law, with the following exceptions: The first sentence of Proposed Finding Number 6 is rejected in that it is speculative, constitutes legal argument, and is not supported by competent substantial evidence. The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 6 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law as to the reason why the Protestant's bank charter was granted. The first, third, fourth and fifth sentences of Proposed Finding Number 10 are rejected, as they constitute legal arguments based upon restatement of testimony, as opposed to findings of ultimate fact. The second sentence of Proposed Finding Number 11 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 14 is rejected in that it consists of argumentative references to testimony and not findings of ultimate fact. Proposed Finding Number 24 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument and conclusions of law rather than findings of ultimate fact. The first sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. The second sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it is repetitious and constitutes a conclusion of law. The Fourth sentence of Proposed Finding Number 26 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 27 is rejected in that it constitutes a conclusion of law. Proposed Finding Number 28 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument rather than a finding of ultimate fact. The last sentence of Proposed Finding Number 31 is rejected in that it constitutes legal argument and a conclusion of law. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact are accepted except where they might specifically conflict with the Findings of the Hearing Officer's Report or where they may constitute conclusions of law.
Findings Of Fact Mac's Auto & Tool Supply, Inc. (Mac's Auto) is a business which was started by Mr. Ralph G. McGlauthen in approximately 1962. The business specialized in automobile and truck equipment, supply, tools, and custom made hydraulic hoses for machinery. It had been located on State Road 84 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida just west of State Road 7. Due to the construction of an interchange for Florida's Turnpike, State Road 7, and State Road 84, the property Mac's Auto leased was acquired by the Department of Transportation. The business moved to 4225 S.W. 57th Avenue in Davie, Florida. Negotiations for the acquisition of the land in Ft. Lauderdale were initiated in November of 1983. The original location had included a main building, and behind it a number of trailers used to store merchandise. Wooden 2' X 4' frames to which pegboard had been attached were used to organize the merchandise in the trailers. Other merchandise was kept in several small storage sheds. This method of maintaining merchandise could not be continued when the business was moved to Davie. The fire code there required the merchandise be stored or displayed on steel framing, rather than on pegboard supported by 2' X 4' wooden framing. The highway interchange project was a federally aided highway project. Relocation benefits were available to Mac's Auto as a tenant of the property acquired by the Department under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Section 4601 et seq. (Uniform Act) and the implementing regulations of the United States Department of Transportation published at 49 Code of Federal Regulations, Part The value of any fixtures left at the site would be reimbursable in the eminent domain proceeding, not under the Uniform Act. Mac's Auto was paid certain costs connected with its search for a new business location. The Florida Department of Transportation obtained estimates of the charges for relocating the stock to the new business location from two commercial movers. Mac's Tool was not required to use a commercial mover, and Mr. McGlauthen ultimately elected a self move. The cost which is reimbursable to a displaced business for a self move is the lowest commercial estimate. 49 C.F.R. Section 25.303(c). In his letter of September 1, 1989 Mr. McGlauthen sought reimbursement of a $3,200 appraisal fee paid to Richard K. Cohen in October of 1985. Mr. McGlauthen maintains that the money was spent to assess the cost of moving the merchandise of the business. A letter dated February 7, 1986 from Mr. Cohen is the only written work product from Mr. Cohen. That letter is a progress report, which states that Mr. Cohen is preparing the "pricing of all of the fixture and machinery items" and projects a "final sound value" of $140,000 to $150,000. No final report was prepared. On the face of the letter, it appears that Mr. Cohen was not evaluating the cost of a move, but was assessing the actual value of the property itself. Mr. McGlauthen did abandon certain fixtures at the old site, and was paid by the Department for those fixtures. There is insufficient evidence that Mr. Cohen's work was ever completed, or if completed that it related to estimates of the cost of the move. That portion of the claim should be denied. Ultimately, Mac's Auto was paid $45,350 for a self move, based upon the lowest estimate from a commercial mover. Mr. McGlauthen abandoned at the hearing the claim in his letter for $6,000 for storage fees for seven trailers, because that amount had been paid by the Department. Mr. McGlauthen claimed $13,000 as the amount needed to build a mezzanine to hold the merchandise which previously had been stored in four of the trailers parked behind the main building at the old site. There was no documentation or itemization offered at the hearing of the actual expense incurred to build the mezzanine. The proof at hearing was insufficient to establish the amount of the expense. Moreover, the claim is one for improvement to real property, that is, for construction at the new place of business. Costs for improvements to real property are not reimbursable under the Uniform Act. The U.S. Department of Transportation specifically considered and rejected a proposal that physical changes to the replacement site be reimbursed when it adopted the rules implementing the Uniform Act. 50 Fed. Reg. 8955, 8965. (March 5, 1985) (Comments on Section 25.305). All of the expenses which were categorized on Mr. McGlauthen's letter under the heading "Monies Spent On Electric Installation" were paid by the Department, and are no longer an issue. The claims of Mac's Auto for $307.19 for a business license at the new location, $60.00 for a second business license, and $115.00 for an E.P.A. license were not reimbursed, because the Department regarded them as "additional operating expenses . . . incurred because of operating in a new location" which are ineligible expenses under 49 C. F. R. Section 25.305(f). Claims for $500.00 to complete the water hook-up to the water system at the town of Davie and $3,634.98 for a permit to hook-up to the Davie water supply were not reimbursed for the same reason. Since the Department's original denial of these fees, such fees have become payable due to an intervening decision of an intermediate Florida appellate court, Skiff's Workingman's Nursery v. Department of Transportation, 557 So.2d 233 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990), and a consequent change in characterization of those costs as permits "required of a displaced [business] at the replacement location" by the federal agency responsible for overseeing the relocation program established by the Uniform Act. 49 C.F.R. Section 25.303(a)(6). All these items therefore should be reimbursed. The claim for labor costs paid to employees based on time cards, and the claim for reimbursement of 40% of the salary paid to Mr. Isaac Theodore in the amount of $1,072.28 were not adequately explained at the hearing. The explanation of the manner in which the claim for the labor of employees was allocated on the time cards was superficial. There is an insufficient basis in the record to find that the employees were working on the move, rather than on other work, and an insufficient explanation of why this work was not compensated by payment for the self move. No records for Mr. Isaac Theodore could be produced at the hearing. Both of these reimbursement claims should therefore be denied. The claim for $903.46 were materials for air, water, and lines to hook-up to the sewer had no documentary support at the hearing, and consequently there is a failure of proof which requires that this reimbursement claim be denied. A number of other items listed in the claim letter filed by Mr. McGlauthen for Mac's Auto on September 1, 1989 have already been paid by the Department, and therefore need not be reimbursed again. These include $287.60 for installation of the telephone service, $900 for an alarm system, $250 to St. Jean Plumbing, $315 to pay for a carpenter's aid to the plumber and $3.25 in plumbing supplies. Mac's Auto also made several claims for lighting fixtures, including 50 fluorescent fixtures at a total cost of $1,250; four emergency exit lights, at a total cost of $340; and five emergency spotlights at a total cost $450. These claims had been denied by the Department as improvements to real property which were not reimbursable under the Uniform Act. Under regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation published at 49 C.F.R. Section 25.305(j) a displaced person is not entitled to reimbursement for physical changes to the real property at the replacement location, which would include the cost of the lighting fixtures. This claim should be denied.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Transportation reimburse Mac's Auto & Tool Supply, Inc. for all items listed in Finding 8, but that all other claims be denied. DONE and ENTERED this 25th day of June, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of June, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER All findings proposed by the Department have been adopted, except findings 26 and 27. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation 605 Suwanee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Ralph McGlauthern Mac's Auto and Tool Supply 4225 S.W. 57th Avenue Davie, FL 33314 Ben G. Watts, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458 Thornton J. Williams, General Counsel Department of Transportation 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0458
Findings Of Fact According to respondent's stationery, Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, MacTavish Furniture Industries is one of six operating divisions of Aaron Rents, Inc., a (Georgia) corporation headquartered in Atlanta. Respondent regularly employs more than 15 people in Florida: The MacTavish Furniture Industries plant in Quincy has 60 to 100 employees each shift. When petitioner Wayne Warren, who is black, began working for MacTavish Furniture Industries in Quincy, Florida, on April 10, 1981, his job was to place lumber on a conveyor belt. He was paid minimum wage. After four or five years he moved to the warehouse, also known as the "trim and pack" department. Mr. Warren received a raise of $0.25 per hour when he went to work at the warehouse, where his chief responsibility was operating a Zimmerman suction lift. He used a boom to transfer furniture, inter alia, between a conveyor belt and the "finishing line." When the line was not operating, his duties sometimes included packing furniture and cleaning up. If, as sometimes happened, petitioner reported for work intoxicated, singing loudly and getting in fights, he was sent home, and somebody else had to fill in. A drunken lift operator created unnecessary danger. Aside from the suction lift itself, saws, routers, and other equipment in the vicinity posed hazards for a person not fully in command of his faculties. Clarence O'Neal, the black man who was Mr. Warren's immediate supervisor, "eased him out" on several occasions to his sister's house so he could sober up in safety. But on March 27, 1989, petitioner was unwilling to leave work. When Mr. O'Neal saw petitioner (after he heard "a commotion 1,000 feet away"), he ordered that the line be shut down, and directed petitioner to leave. Mr. Warren replied, "Kiss my ass," and Mr. O'Neal discharged him on the spot. Despite this outburst and recurring bouts with alcohol, Mr. Warren was (and remains) popular with his supervisors and co-workers alike, black and white. Several people urged that he be rehired, including Johnny O'Neal, the black finishing foreman who has known petitioner all his life, and Viola Bell. In April of 1989, Hershel Shepard, the white plant superintendent who had hired petitioner originally, agreed to rehire him. At least before his original termination, petitioner's pay and responsibility did not increase as rapidly as some co-workers, but the evidence did not show disparities on account of race. Mr. Warren returned to work at the same wage he had left. Before a plant-wide "blanket" raise of $0.20 per hour in May of 1990, he had already received a raise of $0.25 per hour. As people were clocking in at about 7:25 a.m. on March 26, 1990, Willie Frederick, a night watchman whose shift was ending, concluded that petitioner Warren had been drinking heavily. He had to pay close attention to make out what petitioner was saying, and petitioner "just couldn't balance himself." Another co-worker, Lonnie MacMillan of Gretna, could smell alcohol and told Mr. Warren not to go into the factory in his condition. Petitioner persisted noisily, punching in his time card, and eventually attracting Hershel Shepard, who told him he was "in pretty bad shape" and "better go home and get straightened up." When Mr. Warren insisted he could work, Mr. Shepard asked Mr. Frederick to take him home, and told Mr. Warren to go home so he "wouldn't have to fire him." At this point, Mr. Warren placed his hand on Mr. Shepard's chest and said, "OK, fire me, mother fucker." Mr. Shepard obliged. C. J. Wilford filled the vacancy Mr. Warren's departure created. Like the man who now holds the job, Mr. Wilford, who has since died from a gunshot, was black.
Recommendation It is, accordingly, recommended that the FCHR deny the petition for relief. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of January, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Wayne Warren Route 5, Box 76-B Quincy, FL 32351 Keith C. Groen 1100 Aaron Building 3001 North Fulton Drive Atlanta, GA 30363-0001 Ronald M. McElrath, Exec. Director Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570 Dana Baird, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Bldg. F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1570
The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to an "in lieu" payment under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970 (42 U.S.C. 4622) as implemented by I. M. 80-1-71 and amended by P. M. 81-1.2.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Florida department of Transportation, because of the proposed widening of State Road 61, Thomasville Road in Tallahassee, Florida, notified Petitioner in the spring of 1974 that the property on which the business was located was to be taken by the Respondent for road purposes. Petitioner was offered, but did not accept, relocation assistance to move his business to another location or to reimburse him in the amount that a never would charge. Other relocation assistance by the Respondent to find sites which would be appropriate for Petitioner's business was offered and four such sites were presented to Petitioner. Petitioner found the sites undesirable and has located a site at which he intends to move his business. Petitioner contends that the location on Thomasville Road is a good location; that he acquires "walk-in" business from time to time; that the sign on the building is of a type consistent with the limited type of advertising available to members of his profession and is beneficial to him; that the building he rents on Thomasville Road has additional space in which he at one time did rent to other interests, but which rental possibilities were foreclosed upon the general public knowledge that the Respondent would widen Thomasville Road and in the process remove the rental building. Petitioner operates his business from the location and shows that the operation of his consultant service is his sole business. The Petitioner filed for in lieu payments after refusing to accept relocation assistance for the moving of his business Petitioner contends: that nothing in the Act states or implies that a displaced person is required to accept relocation assistance if it is economically unsound; that the Respondent failed to sustain the burden of proof that Petitioner is not entitled to "in lieu" payment under the Act. Respondent contends: that the Petitioner failed to show he is entitled to "in lieu" payments under the Act; that the losses such as production costs, rental income, and advertising possibilities are not within the contemplation of the Act.
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent is guilty of demonstrating a lack of fitness or trustworthiness to engage in the business of insurance and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact At all relevant times, Respondent has held a 2-20 license as a property and casualty agent. At all relevant times, Respondent was the agent in charge of Carol City; in fact, he was the lone agent employed by the agency. At all relevant times, Respondent was the lone signatory on Carol City's Wachovia banking account described below. Respondent was first issued a 2-20 license in 1993. By Consent Order dated September 25, 2006, and approved October 17, 2006, Respondent agreed to cease and desist from making excess charges for insurance and from selling ancillary products with the informed consent of the insurer, to pay an administrative fine of $3000 and restitution of about $1600 to four customers, and to one year of probation. This is the sole discipline imposed on Respondent's license over 20 years. At all material times, Respondent was an appointed agent with United Auto. In this case, Carol City effectively remitted premiums directly to United Auto or, for customers who chose to finance their premiums, indirectly to United Auto by remitting premiums directly to United Finance, a premium- financing affiliate of United Auto. As relevant to this case, the subject insurance transactions are simple. Customers of Carol City purchase insurance underwritten by United Auto. As an appointed agent of United Auto, Respondent causes United Auto to commit to coverage upon Carol City's receipt of the premium payment from the customer (and the execution of certain documents that are irrelevant to this case). If the customer chooses not to finance the premium, the customer pays the premium to Carol City, which deposits the customer's check and issues a Carol City check in the same amount, net of commission, to United Auto. If the customer chooses to finance the premium, the customer pays the premium downpayment to Carol City, which deposits the customer's check and issues a Carol City check in the same amount, net of commission, to United Finance. United Finance then advances the full premium payment to United Auto and collects installment payments from the insured. At some point, the payment process changed. United Auto and United Finance electronically swept Carol City's bank account for the payments due each company, relieving Carol City of the responsibility of issuing separate checks to each company. This change in payment processing is irrelevant to this case. As detailed below, Carol City issued a number of bad checks to United Auto and United Finance. Respondent's defenses are essentially that Carol City's checks were dishonored because: 1) customers' checks to Carol City were dishonored and 2) the electronic sweeping of the Carol City account did not provide Carol City an opportunity to follow the usual procedure to avoid liability to its insurers when customers' checks to Carol City were dishonored. These defenses find no support in the evidence. First, the evidentiary record includes nine handwritten Carol City checks, corresponding to the nine counts, that failed to clear when presented for payment by United Auto or United Finance. In other words, these transactions occurred before electronic sweeping was implemented, at least by United Auto and United Finance. Second, at all times--both before and after the institution of the electronic-sweeping process--United Auto and United Finance maintained a procedure by which Carol City could void any transaction if the customer's premium-payment check to Carol City failed to clear. In this procedure, as provided by section 626.9201(2)(a), Florida Statutes, the insurance transaction is void ab initio, once the agent provides statutory notice to the customer whose initial premium payment has been dishonored. United Auto requires the agent to send the insurer a copy of the bad check and a copy of the certified notice letter to the customer, after which United Auto will void the policy, and the agency and agent will have no liability to United Auto or United Finance. Respondent testified vaguely that he thought that he had complied with this policy-cancelation process, but clearly he had not. He produced no documentary evidence of his having ever attempted to advise United Auto or United Finance that Carol City's customers had given Carol City bad checks. And Respondent had many months during which he might have advanced this contention, if it had been true. Instead, rather than following the liability-avoidance procedure outlined above or ever advising United Auto or United Finance of dishonored customers' checks, Respondent allowed United Auto's liabilities to these customers to become fixed and allowed Carol City's liabilities toward United Auto and United Finance to remain unsatisfied. By failing to follow the statutory procedure that would have allowed United Auto to relieve itself of liability to any customers who had failed to pay their initial premium, Carol City obligated itself to pay United Auto and United Finance for this coverage that Carol City allowed its customers to obtain, even if they had not paid for it. After becoming dissatisfied with Carol City's instalment remittances of the unpaid balance due from the failure of its checks to have cleared, United Auto and United Finance obtained a judgment against Carol City for an amount probably a little in excess of $10,000. After becoming dissatisfied with Carol City's payments on this judgment, United Auto and United Finance levied on Carol City's office furnishings. After losing possession of its computers and office furniture, Carol City or Respondent promptly satisfied the amount still due on the judgment. The dishonored checks that Carol City issued to United Auto or United Finance, the amounts, the last four digits of the United Auto policies corresponding to these remittances, and the dates of the checks are: Check No. Amount Policy Nos. Date of check 2640 $2233.82 6792 12/27/08 2643 $ 898.60 7231 12/30/08 7155 7060 7232 6707 2650 $ 658.04 7558 1/6/09 7642 7557 7385 7910 2648 $ 151.90 4852 1/5/09 2660 $1788.97 7986 1/17/09 8057 8322 2988 9323 7990 2659 $2197.92 7845 1/19/09 2661 $ 713.57 7989 1/20/09 8810 8433 8694 8056 2663 $ 505.61 9191 1/22/09 9092 9302 9290 2665 $ 176.25 9427 1/26/09 TOTAL $9324.68 The bank records of Carol City for January and February 2009 show a large number of $35 charges for returned checks and overdrafts, as well as a number of returned deposited items. Although it is impossible, on this record, to determine if any of these returned deposits pertain to any of the 29 policy transactions detailed in the preceding paragraph, such a finding would be irrelevant because of Respondent's above- described failure to avail himself of the available policy- cancelation procedure. Likewise, although the imposition of extraordinary $35 charges may explain why specific Carol City checks did not clear, such a finding would also be irrelevant because it would not excuse the dishonoring of Carol City's checks to United Auto and United Finance. Petitioner has proved that Respondent collected initial premiums from Carol City's customers in 29 transactions, caused United Auto to commit to insurance coverage to these customers, and either: 1) Respondent did not remit these successfully collected premiums to United Auto or United Finance or 2) when the initial premium payments by Carol City's customers were dishonored, Respondent failed to take the necessary steps to void the committed insurance coverage and relieve United Auto, Carol City, and himself of any further liability.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Financial Services enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of violating section 626.611(7) and suspending his license for six months. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of February, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of February, 2013. COPIES FURNISHED: Orrin R. Beilly, Esquire The Law Office of Orrin R. Beilly, P.A. The Citizens Building, Suite 705 105 South Narcissus Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida 33401-5529 David J. Busch, Esquire Department of Financial Services Division of Legal Services 612 Larson Building 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390 Julie Jones, CP, FRP, Agency Clerk Division of Legal Services Department of Financial Services 200 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0390
The Issue Whether the Department of General Services should disqualify as unresponsive Kodak's bid for Classes 11 and 12, Types I, III, IV of Bid No. 402- 600-38-B, Walk-Up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state agency empowered to contract for the purchase, lease, or acquisition of all commodities required by any state agency under competition bidding or by contractual negotiation. On April 26, 1984, the Department issued Invitation to Bid No. 402-600- 38-8 entitled Walk-up Convenience Copiers, Plain Bond Paper. The bid invitation categorized walk-up convenience copiers by type, class, and acquisition plan. The specifications provided for four types and twelve classes of copiers with four acquisition plans--one-year lease, two-year lease, three-year lease, and outright purchase. Kodak responded to the bid invitation on June 26, 1984, by submitting bids on all acquisition plans for the following categories: Type I, Classes 8- 12; Type II, Class 12, Type III, Classes 8-12; and Type IV, Classes 8-12. The Department posted its decision on the Copier Bid on August 9, 1984, at which time the Department indicated its intent to reject all bids submittsd by Kodak on the ground that Kodak's bid contained additional terms and conditions. Addendum A to Kodak's bids contains the language which the Department found to be additional terms and conditions and consists of an explanation of a quantity discount offered by Kodak to all state agencies. Kodak's bids were the lowest bids received by the Department of the two-and three-year lease plans for the following categories: Type I, Classes 11 and 12 Type III, Classes 11 and 12 Type IV, Classes 11 and 12 In addition, Kodak's bids were the lowest bids for the one-year lease plans on Class 12 of Type I, III, and IV. The quantity discount reflected in Addendum A does not affect the bid prices (price per copy made) submitted by Kodak for any of the machine categories or acquisition plans on which Kodak bid and was not considered by the Department in finding Kodak to be the low bidder in those categories specified above. The invitation to bid (ITB) contains general and special conditions. The "general conditions" are conditions that apply to all contracts bid by the state; the "special conditions" are the terms and conditions that apply specifically to the invitation to bid under consideration. The general conditions provide that "[a]ny and all special conditions and specifications attached hereto which vary from these general conditions shall have precedence." Section 4(b) of the general conditions provides: "Under Florida law use of State contracts shall be available to political subdivisions (county, county board of public instruction, municipal, or other local public agency or authority) and State Universities, which may desire to purchase under the terms and conditions of the contract. Such purchases shall be exempt from the competitive bid requirements otherwise applying to their purchases." The special conditions set forth the purpose of the bid as the establishment of "....a 12 month contract for the purchase of Walk-up Convenience Copiers: Plain Bond Paper by all State of Florida agencies and institutions." The purpose provision does not mention political subdivisions. However, several special conditions of the ITB refer to political subdivisions. Under "Estimated Quantities" it states: "It is anticipated that the State of Florida agencies and other eligible users will expend approximately $1,000,000 under any term contract resulting from this bid." Other eligible users include political subdivisions. The condition entitled "Distribution of Literature" provides: "Successful bidder will be required to furnish State agencies and political subdivisions...with descriptive literature..." The condition entitled "Summary of Total Sales" provides that "Total Dollar sales to political subdivisions may be submitted in lieu of the detailed information required for State and university placements." Although political subdivisions may purchase under the terms and conditions of the state copier contract, certain of the special conditions distinquish between state agencies and political subdivisions. As mentioned above, the ITB provides that total dollar sales to political subdivisions may be submitted in lieu of the information required for state and university placement. Further, the ITB requires each bidder to identify its equity accrual plan and sets forth minimum requirements that the plan must meet. One of the minimum requirements refers to State agencies only, directing that "[t]he State shall have the right to transfer the equipment from one State agency to another State agency without the loss of equity accrued." The special condition at issue in this proceeding is entitled" Quantity Discounts". It provides: "Bidder is urged to offer additional discounts for one time delivery of large single orders of any assortment of items." In response to this provision, Kodak included as part of its bid "Addendum A", which reflects the quantity discount offered by Kodak to major customers. The discounts offered by Kodak are based upon the total number of machines installed in state agencies at the time invoices are sent out. If the state has fewer than seventy-five machines installed, it enjoys no discount and pays the full amount indicated on the price sheets submitted in Kodak's bid. If a seventy-fifth machine is installed, the state receives a two percent discount off the bottom line of each monthly invoice on all Kodak machines installed. When the number of Kodak machines exceeds 149 the state receives a three percent discount, and when the number of machines exceeds 199, a four percent discount is applied. When the discount level changes either up or down due to a change in the machine base, Kodak provides 60 days advance written notice prior to applying the new discount level. Kodak's billing system utilizes a computer which tracks the number of machines and applies the quantity discounts. Each individual account or customer has a "custom master" in the computer, which is a computer record consisting of the name of the company, the address, the customer number, and information concerning invoices. The "custom master" is used in billing the customer. When quantity discounts are involved, a master agreement number and/or a common owner number is assigned and that number is placed on each individual custom master in the system that comes under the master agreement. Thus, each individual account has both an individual customer number and a master agreement number. When the computer prepares the bill, it automatically counts the number of machines installed with all customers who share the same master agreement number. Because of the billing system, any machine that is included in the billing is also included in determining the quantity discount. If the machine is not counted in the machine base, the customer is not being charged for the machine. Paragraph II of Addendum A provides: 11. Eligible Users Eligibility under the Quantity Discount Schedule listed below will be exclusively for installations of KODAK EKTAPRINT Copier-Duplicator and Duplicator models within the State of Florida's Government departments, agencies, and State universities. The Quantity Discount Schedule does not apply to installations of KODAK EKTAPRINT Copier-Duplicator and Duplicator models within political subdivisions in the State of Florida (county, county board of public instruction, municipal, or other local public agency or authority). This provision prevents the state from receiving discounts based upon machines purchased by political subdivisions, and also prevents political subdivisions from receiving quantity discount credit for machines placed with state agencies and universities. In other words, the machine base for state agencies and universities would be determined solely by the number of machines installed with state agencies and universities; machines installed within political subdivisions would not be counted in that machine base because political subdivisions would not have the master agreement number assigned to state agencies and universities. Although Kodak contends that each political subdivision would be eligible for quantity discounts based upon the number of machines installed within that particular political subdivision, that provision was not included in Addendum A. Kodak did not address political subdivisions in the quantity discount provision because the purpose of the ITB, as stated in the special conditions, was to establish a contract for state agencies and because the quantity discount provision did not specify that any quantity discounts offered must include political subdivisions. After the copier contract is awarded, each eligible user places its orders for copiers from the contract. The orders do not go through the Department, and the Department does not have a system that indicates how many machines are installed in state agencies and universities. Although the Department does not have a system for independently monitoring the number of machines installed, under Kodak's billing system the state may elect to receive a monthly or quarterly printout which lists each machine installed by its purchaser and provides information relating to the machine's location, type, and acquisition plan. In addition, the state may designate a central location to receive copies of all invoices sent out on each machine installed within the state system. The Department determined that Kodak's bids should be disqualified as containing additional terms and conditions. Specifically, the provision of Addendum A excluding political subdivisions from participation in the quantity discount offered and the Department's inability to independently monitor the quantity discount were identified as the additional terms and conditions. If not for Addendum A, Kodak would have been awarded the contract on the categories for which it was the low bidder. Had Kodak failed to provide any quantity discounts it would have been awarded the contract. Had Kodak omitted Addendum A from its bids, but automatically accorded to the state its quantity discount through its billing system, the state would have paid the discounted prices. The inclusion of Addendum A in its bids does not give Kodak an advantage or benefit not enjoyed by other bidders. All bidders were "urged to offer additional discounts...; however, the quantity discounts offered were not considered in determining the low bidder. Therefore, the inclusion of the quantity discount offered by Kodak could not have given it a competitive advantage not enjoyed by other bidders. The inclusion of Addendum A does not adversely impact the interests of eligible users of state contracts. Had Addendum A not been included in Kodak's bids, Kodak would have been awarded the contract in the categories previously specified, and all eligible users would pay the full contract price. Political subdivisions are not adversely affected by the inclusion of Addendum A because they will pay no more than they would have paid had Kodak failed to provide any quantity discounts. State agencies and universities are not adversely affected by the quantity discount offered because they will pay the same or less than they would have paid had Kodak not included Addendum A.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the State of Florida, Department of General Services, award to Eastman Kodak Company the following portions of Bid Number 402-600-38- B: Class 11, Types I, III, IV - two and three year lease. Class 12, Types I, III, IV - one, two and three year lease. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of February, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE A. GRUBBS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 2009 Apalachee Parkway The Oakland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of February, 1985.
Findings Of Fact By letter dated May 31, 1979 Respondent notified Petitioner that it was acquiring part of the property on which Petitioner's office was located and that it would be necessary for him to relocate. At the time Petitioner worked as a real estate appraiser in the office of the Pickens Agency owned by Philip Pickens. Pickens provided work space, telephones, secretary, data bank and supplies. The data bank contained data on real property throughout Florida and was invaluable to the appraisers in getting comparables to use for appraising like property. Due to the acquisition of additional property for the U.S. 90 right-of- way, it was necessary to move the two-story building in which Petitioner's office was located. This required moving out of this building into different quarters. In the building Petitioner's office, located on the second floor, comprised approximately 800 square feet in which he had desk, telephone and work space. The data bank was also located on the second floor. Philip Pickens owned another building in the Immediate vicinity into which Petitioner moved. The data bank was left in the original building which was jacked up in preparation for its move. Thee data bank remained available for use albeit less convenient for those using it. Petitioner had less space in the one-story building into which the Pickens Agency moved and Petitioner's office was located near the back door through which clients visited the Pickens Agency. He shared a telephone with another appraiser and had a smaller desk and less work space. He also experienced interruptions from visitors entering the office through the back door which opened into Petitioner's office space. During the two years immediately preceding the relocation of the office, Petitioner's appraisal work was performed exclusively for DOT. Part of this work was assigned him by the Pickens Agency and in some cases he was contacted directly by DOT for the appraisal . When employed directly by DOT, Petitioner received 50 percent of the appraisal fee and the Pickens Agency received 50 percent. When assigned work by the Pickens Agency, Petitioner received 45 percent of the appraisal fee. During the five months following Petitioner's move into the new quarters his income dropped substantially from what it had been before the relocation. Petitioner filed application for relocation benefits as soon as he moved his office and before any change in income occurred. Normally, there is a lag of three to six months between tile Line the appraisal work is done and payment is received. Petitioner's income during the first nine months of 1980 (January - October) we $10,622.97. For similar periods in 1979, 1978, and 1977 his income was $29,750, $26,382.50 and $22.252.50, respectively. Petitioner testified that he believes the loss of income was due to his inability to turn out as much work in the more restricted space and less privacy in the one-story building than he had before the move. Petitioner moved some 30 yards from his original location kept the same mailing address and the same telephone number. During the latter half of 1979 and the first half of 1980, the Lake City District of DOT had fewer relocation claims than in comparable periods of the two previous years. Relocation claims are related to appraisals which would indicate fewer appraisals were ordered by DOT in Lake City in 1979-80 than in the two previous years. During the period in question, most of Petitioner's work for DOT was generated by the Bartow office. This would require most of Petitioner's appraisal time out of Lake City with the use of the office primarily for the preparation of his appraisal report. No evidence was submitted to show the effect, if any, on the Pickens Agency's business resulting from the move or the business done by the other appraisers who also moved. During the period 1977-1980 the Pickens Agency employed between two and five appraisers and at the time of the relocation employed two appraisers, one of whom was petitioner. (Tr. p. 31). The number of appraisers employed varied with the volume of business coming into the agency. The appraisal work done by the Pickens Agency was statewide and not concentrated in the vicinity of Lake City.
The Issue Dr. Mark H. Feldman maintained a practice in podiatry at 1101 West Broward Boulevard, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A widening and upgrading of Broward Boulevard resulted in a taking of a portion of the building in which Dr. Feldman maintained his practice. Because the widening of this highway was a part of a federal aid project, the doctor became eligible for certain payments to businesses as provided in the manual of Right-of-Way Bureau operating procedures and incorporated by reference into the Florida Administrative Code as Chapter 14-1. The provisions concerning payments to businesses include payment of actual reasonable expenses in moving the business and personal property, direct loss of tangible personal property in moving or discontinuing the business and actual reasonable expenses in searching for a replacement business. Further, in lieu of payment for actual moving and losses as indicated above, a fixed payment may be paid. Dr. Feldman applied for a fixed payment and was denied by the Department of Transportation. The Department of Transportation based its denial on two grounds: Dr. Feldman had already received payments for reasonable expenses, direct less of personal property and discontinuing his business, and for search of a replacement business site; and Dr. Feldman was ineligible for a fixed payment because the doctor maintained a commercial enterprise with more than one establishment, which was not being acquired by the State or the United States and was engaged in the same or similar business. Dr. Feldman asserted that he accepted payment because of the representation of employees of the Department and that he did not maintain two (2) business locations.
Findings Of Fact Dr. Mark H. Feldman maintained a practice in podiatry at 1101 West Broward Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A portion of the building in which Dr. Feldman maintained his practice was taken by the State under a construction project, which was partially federally funded, to widen Broward Boulevard. As a result of this taking, it was necessary for Dr. Feldman to move his practice. Dr. Feldman became eligible for certain payments to businesses required to move because of such construction. Dr. Feldman asserted that prior to receipt of the Department's notice, he engaged in discussions with representatives of the Department regarding his options. Dr. Feldman requested consideration for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses, which resulted in a preliminary investigation by the Department of Transportation. This investigation revealed that in addition to maintenance of his practice at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Dr. Feldman also was listed in the telephone directory and in the building directory as maintaining offices at 7301 North University Drive, Tamarack, Florida. This second location was not affected by any taking. Based upon this information, the Department made a determination that the doctor was not eligible for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses because Dr. Feldman's business affected by the taking was part of a commercial enterprise having at least one other establishment which was not being acquired by the State or the United States and which was engaged in the same or similar business. See Right-of-Way Bureau Operating Procedures Manual, 4.3.7E(1)(b). Based upon this initial denial, and having received notice that he could only be guaranteed 90 days' occupancy, Dr. Feldman applied for actual expenses, which were paid. Thereafter, Dr. Feldman submitted his application for fixed payment in lieu of actual moving expenses, which was denied on the basis that he had received actual moving expenses. Approximately one year prior to the announcement by the Department of the incipient taking of the property of 1101 West Broward Boulevard, Dr. Feldman had been in practice with another podiatrist, Harry Westridge. Dr. Westridge originally maintained his practice at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Dr. Westridge had joined Dr. Feldman's practice at 7301 North University Drive in Tamarack several years ago. In April of 1977, Dr. Westridge purchased Dr. Feldman's practice at North University Drive. As a part of their agreement, Dr. Feldman took over the lease and personal property located at 1101 West Broward Boulevard. Further, as a part of their agreement, Dr. Feldman agreed to permit Dr. Westridge to utilize his name in conjunction with the Tamarack practice. Both doctors explained that this was because Dr. Westridge was a newcomer to the area and was purchasing the "good will" in Dr. Feldman's practice, and it protected Dr. Feldman's investment if Dr. Westridge was unable to meet his obligations under the purchase agreement. However, both doctors testified that subsequent to Dr. Westridge's purchase of the practice Dr. Feldman did not maintain regular office hours at the Tamarack address, did not regularly see patients at the Tamarack address, and had seen approximately twelve (12) patients at the Tamarack address between April of 1977, and April of 1978. This included consultations and referrals to Dr. Feldman by Dr. Westridge. The nature of his surgical practice in podiatry prevented Dr. Feldman from waiting to move his practice until the Department of Transportation took his property where he was located. Further, Dr. Feldman could not afford to move his practice without assistance. Dr. Feldman only applied for payment of his actual expenses, which he received, when he was initially told he did not qualify for in-lieu of payment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Department of Transportation pay Dr. Feldman a fixed payment in lieu of actual expenses and offset any amounts paid to Dr. Feldman against the fixed payment. DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of November, 1979, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dr. Mark H. Feldman 6468 Racket Club Drive Lauderhill, Florida 33319 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Primary Service Area (PSA) The proposed association will be located in the Paddock Plaza adjacent to the Paddock Mall Regional Shopping Center, both of which are currently under construction. The site is in the vicinity of the intersection of Southwest 27th Avenue and State Road 200 in the southwest portion of Marion County. The PSA encompasses the southwestern portion of Marion County, including a part of Ocala which is a concentrated residential community. Beyond the city limits, there are schools, recreational areas, an airport, horse farms, a community college, and light industrial type firms in the surburban area. The proposed site is located in the northeastern part of the PSA. The PSA is in a developmental stage with current plans of residential and commercial development which should make the area the fastest growing sector in Marion County. The home offices of Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Association and Midstate Federal Savings and Loan Association, and a satellite office of the latter association are located near the northeast boundary of the PSA some three miles from the proposed site. The northern and eastern boundaries of the PSA follow well-defined highways. The southern boundary follows the Marion County line, and the western boundary is drawn due north from the intersection of State Road 200 and the Marion County line. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Standards (a) Public convenience and advantage. One commercial banking facility, the main office of Citizens First Bank of Ocala, is located in the northeast corner of the PSA approximately two and one-half miles from the proposed site. It provides full banking services to its customers. Two savings and loan associations have received approval to operate in the PSA. One will be a branch of Midstate Federal Savings and Loan Association which will be located at the Paddock Mall adjacent to the proposed site. The other will be a limited facility of the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Mid-Florida (Volusia County) which will he situated approximately 11.3 miles south of the proposed site in a residential community. Neither of these approved institutions have commenced operations. The proposed site is readily accessible from all sectors of the market area. State Road 200 is a primary artery for northeast/southwest travel. Southwest 27th Avenue is a primary north/south thoroughfare. There are numerous other feeder streets which connect with those two roads to bring traffic to the new mall and plaza area. In addition, Interstate Highway 75 intersects State Road 200 approximately one mile southwest of the proposed site. An extension to Southwest 17th Street is currently proposed which would provide direct access from the northeast to the proposed site. The location of the proposed association at a large regional shopping center will provide an opportunity for residents of the PSA to combine shopping and financial business. This will be facilitated through the utilization of a drive-in facility at the site. Ample parking will be provided in the plaza area, and the network of roads in and around the shopping center will facilitate use of the applicant's services. It will provide a convenient location to conduct savings and loan business for residents and businessmen in the southwestern portion of the county without the necessity of traveling to the more congested downtown area of Ocala. The fact that the proposed association will be a home office rather than a branch office will tend to attract a greater number of individuals within the PSA than a satellite office, and undoubtedly will induce persons outside the PSA to use the institution's services. In 1960, the City of Ocala had a population of 13,598. It increased 66.1 percent to 22,583 by 1970. The 1978 city population was estimated to be 32,652, a 44.6 percent increase over 1970. An April 1, 1979 estimate placed the population at 34,034. In 1960, Marion County had a population of 51,616. It increased 33.7 percent to 69,030 in 1970 and was estimated at 102,722 in 1978, an increase of 48.8 percent over 1970. The population was estimated to be 106,852 in April 1979 and is scheduled to reach 164,400 by 1990. It is estimated that the population of the PSA was about 7,700 in 1960 and increased to 10,500 or 36.4 percent by 1970. It is now estimated to be some 17,000 and projected to reach over 19,000 by 1982. This projection is based on the area's recent growth history, current housing developments in the area, and projected growth within Marion County. The 45 to 64 year group of the population of Marion County has shown a modest increase since 1960 from 21 percent to 22.6 percent in 1978. At that time, the state percentage was 22 percent. Those 65 years of age and over in Marion County increased from 10.6 percent in 1960 to 15.7 percent in 1978. This was lower than the statewide average of 17.5 percent in that category. It is anticipated that those 45 years and older will continue to show a steady increase in the future due to the fact that most of the county increase in population has been due to continuing in-migration of retirees. These individuals normally bring cash assets which are available for deposit in savings and loan associations, and they ordinarily would have no prior connection with other banks or savings and loan associations in the immediate area. The per capita personal income in Marion County in 1969 was $2,646 and increased to $5,157 in 1977. Per capita personal income in Florida in 1977 was $6,697. In 1969 the mean family income of residents of Ocala was $9,775, as compared with $8,062 in Marion County and $10,120 throughout the State of Florida. It is estimated that the current mean family income in Ocala is approximately $17,506, as compared to $14,438 in the county and $18,123 in the state. The unemployment rate in Marion County in January 1980 was 6 percent whereas the rate in the State of Florida was 5.2 percent. Residential building permits issued in the City of Ocala in 1975 rose from 156 units for a total of 3.5 million dollars to 511 permits in 1979 for a total of 10.7 million dollars. For Marion County, 872 permits were issued in 1975 for a total of 14.3 million dollars and 1,706 in 1979 for a total of 44.5 million dollars. It is currently estimated that the median value of owner occupied housing units in Ocala is $32,775 and $26,173 in Marion County. Local Conditions There are seven commercial banks with approval to operate a total of 18 offices in Marion County. In June 1975, the commercial banks headquartered in Marion County held combined time and savings deposits of some 104 million dollars and by mid-1979, such deposits totaled over 176 million dollars, an increase of about 69.5 percent. From December 1978 to December 1979, time and savings deposits in those banks rose from 161.4 million dollars to 199.8 million dollars, an increase of 23.8 percent. Total deposits in all Marion County Banks increased from 204.8 million dollars in 1975 to 304.9 million in 1979, a 48.9 percent increase. There are currently 16 savings and loan association offices approved for operation in Marion County. Three of the associations have their home office in Ocala. These are Fidelity Federal, Mid-State, and United Federal of Ocala. Fidelity Federal operates a total of five offices within the county, one of which is not yet open. Mid-State Federal has seven offices approved within the county and its office in the PSA is not as yet open. United Federal, an association which opened in January 1979, has its only office within the county. Both First Family Federal (Lake County) and First Florida Federal Savings and Loan Association (Alachua County) have recently received approval to operate branch offices within Marion County. First Federal of Mid-Florida (Volusia County) has received approval to operate an office in the southern part of the PSA but has not yet opened. In 1975, savings and loan associations headquartered in Marion County reported combined savings of $162,177,000. By the end of June 1979, their combined savings totaled $312,508,000, an increase of 92.7 percent. The combined savings accounts of the three Marion County associations totaled $312,508,000 in midyear 1979, as compared to June, 1975 savings of $162,177,000, representing an increase of $150,331,000 or 92.7 percent, during the subject four-year interval. Mid-State Federal, with an office approved at the Paddock Mall, held June, 1979 savings of $207,770,000, and those accounts represented an increase of $96,475,000, or 86.7 percent, over its savings reported June, 1975. First Federal of Mid-Florida, a Volusia County association with an office approved in the PSA, had June, 1975 savings of $199,843,000, and those savings increased by $150,637,000, or 75.4 percent, to reach a total of $350,480,000 in June, 1979. The smallest savings and loan association in Marion County is United Federal, which opened in 1975. In June, 1975, it reported savings of $6,881,000, and its midyear 1979 statement showed savings of $27,830,000. United Federal, operating only one office in Ocala, had growth in savings of $20,949,000, or 304.5 percent, during the stated interval. In the opinion of the applicant's economic consultant, approval of the applicant's application would not have an adverse effect on the other financial institutions in the area due to the steady growth of the community and anticipated growth in the future. He further is of the opinion that the proposed savings and loan association will be able to successfully operate in the PSA in view of the presence of the Paddock Mall and the general growth of population and business establishments in the area. He feels that the current national economic situation will not have a great impact on a new institution which will be able to obtain variable interest rates. He further sees an advantage to the fact that the proposed association will be the first state chartered capital stock form of organization in Marion County, and that it will provide an opportunity for public purchase of shares in the association. During the first three years of operations, the applicant projects its net profits at $75,648 for the first year, $88,335 for the second, and $103,340 for the third. These amounts were arrived at by including known cost items and estimating various income and expense amounts. The applicant anticipates acquiring accounts from new residents of the PSA and those current residents who may wish to transfer savings accounts from commercial banks in the Ocala area due to convenience and the higher rate of interest paid by savings and loan associations. The applicant does not anticipate the acquisition of a significant number of customers from existing savings and loan associations in the area. It also will look to employees at the new shopping mall who may utilize the conveniently located new institution for savings transactions. The applicant intends to compete vigorously for new business with these individuals and from those who presently do not have accounts in any existing associations. The applicant estimates that the institution will attain savings of five million dollars at the end of the first year, $9,500,000 at the end of the second year, and $14,500,000 at the end of the third year of operation. In arriving at those estimates, consideration was given to past experience of existing association offices in the Ocala area, and that of established associations in similar competitive situations. The eight organizers of the proposed association will also serve as the directors. They represent a diversity of occupations, including businessmen, attorneys, real estate broker, a physician, and a dentist. All but three reside in the Ocala area. All have been residents of Florida for over a year and none has been adjudicated a bankrupt or convicted of a criminal offense involving dishonesty or breach of trust. Their employment and business histories show responsibility in the handling of financial affairs. One of the proposed directors has served as an attorney to a large savings and loan association in Miami Beach, and is a member of the board of directors of Barnett Bank of Miami. Another serves as legal counsel for a local bank in Ocala. The proposed officers of the association have not been named as yet. The proposed association will be capitalized at $2,000,000. This capital will be divided into common capital of $1,000,000 in surplus and reserves of $1,000,000. The association intends to issue 200,000 shares of stock with a par value of $5.00 and the selling price of $10.25, plus a $.25 share organizational expense fund contribution. The proposed directors of the association have subscribed to 25,000 shares each. This is a preliminary stockholder list and it is the intention of those individuals to redistribute the stock to a minimum of 400 persons in accordance with FSLIC requirements. It is the organizers' intention to acquire pledges from 700 persons for the deposit of $1,000,000 in withdrawable savings accounts. It is intended that the majority of the stock will be sold to persons residing in Marion County, and the organizers anticipate no difficulty in this respect. (Testimony of Starke, Hastings, Bitzer, Berman, Casse, Hicks, Williams (Deposition - Exhibit 5), Broad (Deposition - Exhibit 6), Carter, Exhibits 1-3) Name As heretofore found above, the applicant amended its application to change the proposed name to Allstate Savings and Loan Association. Although the descriptive word "Allstate" is not used in the corporate name of any other savings and loan association in this state, the Office of the Comptroller received a letter, dated February 22, 1980, from Allstate Savings and Loan Association, Glendale, California, an affiliate of Sears Roebuck and Company, objecting to the use of the word "Allstate" in that the public may be misled to believe that the proposed association is in some way affiliated with Sears Roebuck and Company. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Site and Quarters. As heretofore found, it is the organizers intention to locate the proposed association in the Paddock Plaza, adjacent to the Paddock Mall, a new shopping center to be constructed in Ocala. The applicant has an option to lease 5,000 square feet of space for a period of fifteen years for a rental price of $12.00 per square foot for 2,000 square feet and $10.00 per square foot for 3,000 square feet, plus common area maintenance. The option provides that on the fifth year of tenancy, the total annual rental will be increased by the cost of living as determined by the consumer price index. The leased area will include a two-car drive-in facility. There will be adequate parking at the site. The applicant plans to sublease 2,000 square feet of the leased premises on a short-term basis to reduce operating costs in the initial years of operation. An appraisal of the proposed association quarters establishes that the proposed leased premises are suitable for a savings and loan association and that the lease price compares favorable to current leasing arrangements for similar business property. (Testimony of Starke, Exhibit 1) Proposed Findings of Fact filed by the parties have been fully considered and those findings which have not been adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, or unsupported in fact and are specifically rejected. Some of the proposed findings state conclusions which properly should be considered by the Comptroller. Pursuant to Section 120.57(1)(b)(12), Florida Statutes, this REPORT does not include conclusions of law and recommendations. DONE and ENTERED this 25 day of April, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 101 Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald A. Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William L. Lyman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Daniel Hicks and Randolph Tucker, Esquires Post Office Drawer 1969 Ocala, Florida 32670 Merritt C. Fore, Esquire Post Office Box 1507 Ocala, Florida 32670
