The Issue Whether Petitioner proved by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent committed a Class II violation as alleged in the Administrative Complaint, by failing to perform cardiopulmonary resuscitation (“CPR”) on a resident at its facility.
Findings Of Fact The undersigned makes the following findings of relevant and material fact: Joint Statement of Admitted Facts Filed by the Parties on February 19, 2021 The Agency completed a complaint survey of Pelican Garden on or about December 4, 2020. The Agency is the regulatory authority responsible for licensure of assisted living facilities (“ALF”) and enforcement of applicable state statutes and rules governing ALFs pursuant to chapters 429, Part I, and 408, Part II, Florida Statutes, and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 59A-36. Pelican Garden was, at all times material hereto, an ALF under the licensing authority of the Agency, and was required to comply with all applicable rules and statutes. The Agency’s surveyor cited Pelican Garden with a Class II deficient practice on or about December 4, 2020. On or about July 24, 2019, R #1 was a resident at Pelican Garden’s facility. Pelican Garden’s procedure for honoring a resident’s Do Not Resuscitate (“DNR”) Order includes circling the “DNR” located on the face sheet (information sheet) if a copy of the DNR is received and is on file at the facility. Pelican Garden’s admission paperwork includes a “Memo” initialed by the resident or representative to acknowledge that the facility has requested a copy of the resident’s DNR Order, if one exists. Pelican Garden’s DNR policy requires that a resident or representative provide the facility with a copy of a DNR Order on yellow paper, and then the facility files the order and places the resident on the Do Not Resuscitate Order (“DNRO”) list. Pelican Garden’s DNR policy requires that if a resident has a DNR on file, the facility will place a “butterfly” on the back of the resident’s door in their room with the resident name on the butterfly to notify staff to not perform life saving measures including but not limited to CPR. R #1’s executed contract, dated November 2, 2018, revealed a DNR form was requested from the resident’s representative as shown by the representative’s initials on the DNR policy and procedure page. R #1’s resident face sheet (Information Sheet), dated November 2, 2018, did not have a circled DNR Order, indicating that the resident did not have a DNR on the date of R #1’s death. R #1 did not have a DNR Order on file with Respondent on the date of R #1’s death. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:24 a.m., R #1 was found unresponsive in the resident’s room, with half of the resident’s body off the side of the bed with her legs on the ground and her head between the grab bar (removeable side rail) and the mattress, by Pelican Garden’s staff members “A,” “B,” “C,” and “D.” On or about July 24, 2019, Pelican Garden’s staff member “C” was instructed by staff member “A” to take R #1’s roommate to the bathroom and then leave the room with the roommate. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:24 a.m., Pelican Garden’s staff members “A,” “B,” and “D” worked to reposition R #1 to begin performing CPR and staff member “A” checked the resident’s pulse, observed the resident was pale and the resident’s skin was cold to the touch and made the determination that the resident had already passed. On or about July 24, 2019, Pelican Garden’s staff member “D” helped reposition R #1 and then left the room. On or about July 24, 2019, Pelican Garden’s staff member “D” was certified in CPR. On or about July 24, 2019, Pelican Garden’s staff members “A,” “B,” “C,” or “D” did not perform CPR on R #1. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:36 a.m., Pelican Garden’s staff member “A” dialed 911 at approximately 7:38 a.m. and, at approximately 7:39 a.m., stated it’s too late for CPR for R #1. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:39 a.m., Pelican Garden’s staff member “A” called Pelican Garden’s Administrator who instructed staff member “A” not to administer CPR to R #1. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:39 a.m., Pelican Garden’s Administrator had no firsthand knowledge of the condition of R #1. On or about July 24, 2019, at approximately 7:42 a.m., the Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”) arrived at Pelican Garden’s facility. On or about June 24, 2019, at approximately 7:45 a.m., the Emergency Medical Technician (“EMT”) pronounced R #1 as dead. Pelican Garden’s staff member “A” received a basic life support CPR and automated external defibrillator (“AED”) certification dated October 5, 2017, with an expiration date of October 2019. Pelican Garden’s staff member “A” was certified to perform CPR at the time of R #1’s death. Pelican Garden submitted a Plan of Correction dated January 22, 2020. Before, during, and after July 24, 2019, Pelican Garden’s policy to respond to an unresponsive resident without a DNR was to start CPR. Pelican Garden retrained staff on the response to an unresponsive resident without a DNR after the December 4, 2019, AHCA survey. On or about July 24, 2019, to December 4, 2019, Pelican Garden had more than one resident who did not have a DNR. Other Material Facts Established at the Hearing Dalia Portugal (“Portugal”) had worked at Pelican Garden for eight years. Marie Andre (“Andre”) is a home health aide. She has worked as a caregiver at ALFs for more than a decade. Mimose Francois (“Francois”) is also a home health aide. Francois had been a caregiver at another facility for 13 years. On July 24, 2019, when Portugal first arrived at work, there had been a shift change of staff at 7:00 a.m. This incident involved a 96-year-old resident at Pelican Gardens ALF. The resident, R #1, had moved into the facility at Pelican Garden in November 2018. The documents revealed that she suffered from a variety of ailments and diseases including: dementia, hypertension, high cholesterol, gastro reflux disease, was a fall risk, had macular degeneration, and was hard of hearing. Pet. Ex.14, at 14b. Shortly after her arrival, at approximately 7:22 a.m., Portugal took a call from R #1’s roommate. She advised her that R #1 was on the floor and she didn’t know how long she had been on the floor. At 7:24 a.m., Pelican Garden’s staff members Portugal, Andre, Francois, and Kerri Conklin arrived at R #1’s room and found her unresponsive. She was positioned with half of her body off the side of her bed. Her legs were on the ground and her head was positioned between the horizontal bedrail and the mattress. Together, Portugal, Andre, and Francois took hold of R #1 and worked to reposition her up on to her bed in an effort to begin performing CPR. Immediately after getting her on the bed the staff made several close observations of R #1. One staff member, Francois, testified that R #1 had no pulse, was pale, was not breathing, her face was smashed, and her body temperature was cold--“cold like ice.” Portugal made similar observations. She stated that R #1’s body temperature was cold--freezing cold--she had no pulse, was pale, not breathing, her nose was tilted to one side, and there was blood on the bed. The other staff member who responded, Andre, testified in a similar fashion. She added that R #1’s face was “smooshed.” After placing her on the bed, Andre said no CPR was conducted because “she was already dead.” When Portugal, Andre, and Francois repositioned R #1 on the bed in order to start CPR, they were unable to lay R #1 flat because her legs were stiff and stuck in the bed side kneeling position in which they found her. The photographs admitted as part of Respondent’s Exhibit A were insightful and provided compelling evidence that when the staff discovered R #1 she was already dead.2 The evidence was overwhelming and without serious dispute that R #1 was dead when she was discovered by the staff on the morning of July 24, 2019. During the course of the hearing the parties and witnesses frequently used the term “unresponsive” to describe R #1’s condition when she was discovered. However, the common understanding and plain meaning of this term in a medical emergency context implies an individual who may be in 2 The photographs also supported the testimony of the aides concerning the condition in which they found R #1. medical distress, but is revivable, i.e., one who does not respond to questions, touch, or neurological or sensory stimulation. Sadly, however, R #1’s cold, pale, lifeless, and stiff body was more than just “unresponsive” when she was first discovered by the staff. The facts, and reasonable inferences from the facts, established that she could not have been revived. She was lifeless and dead. Additionally, the reasonable inferences from the location where she was found, the medical problems she had, and the fact that she had been observed sleeping in bed during a 5:23 a.m. bed check indicate that she had gotten out of bed, attempted to walk somewhere in the room, had fallen near her bed, and severely injured her face during the fall. Resp. Ex. 14, at 14D. She had been dead on the floor long enough when the staff discovered her to cause her body to go cold and begin to stiffen. The clear and convincing evidence established that she was dead and unrevivable when she was discovered by the staff at 7:24 a.m. No amount of cardiopulmonary resuscitation would have revived or aided R #1. Such efforts would have been futile, pointless, and of no use. After the staff called 911 and the facility administrator, EMS arrived at Pelican Garden at approximately 7:42 a.m. Notably, even the EMTs did not attempt to perform CPR on R #1. Approximately three minutes after arriving, the EMTs pronounced R #1 dead. Law enforcement arrived shortly after the EMTs and conducted an investigation. The officers questioned Pelican Garden staff and took several photos of R #1 as she appeared after Pelican Garden staff repositioned her on her bed. The officers noted “a large amount of bloody purge” coming from R #1’s mouth on the right side of the bed, and a small amount of bloody purge on the pillows and the bed on the left side of R #1’s head. Resp. Ex. A at 8.3 After receiving Pelican Garden’s report detailing the circumstances surrounding the death of R #1, the Agency conducted its own survey of the facility on December 4, 2019. The AHCA surveyor spoke to Portugal and Conklin. The AHCA surveyor spoke with R #1’s physician and learned that R #1 had died of a heart attack. The surveyor also spoke with someone at the Medical Examiner’s Office and learned that no autopsy had been performed. The AHCA surveyor did not speak with the EMTs or the police officers that responded to Pelican Garden. The AHCA surveyor completed the investigation and cited Pelican Garden for violating R #1’s resident’s rights by failing to perform CPR when R #1 was found “unresponsive” since R #1 did not have a DNR in place. According to the AHCA surveyor, there are circumstances where it would be inappropriate or unnecessary to perform CPR on a resident who was found unresponsive. Specifically, when staff cannot get to the resident or position the resident for some reason. The surveyor also agreed with counsel that it “wouldn’t make sense” to perform CPR on a resident who, for example, was found decapitated. AHCA’s professional witness, Michelle Dillehay (“Dillehay”), is a nurse consultant employed by AHCA. She was questioned about the general obligation to perform CPR when an individual is found unresponsive and does not have a DNR in place. 3 The contents of the Sebastian police report and photographs are reliable, relevant, and supplement or explain other evidence. As a result, they were admitted and have been considered by the undersigned. See generally §§ 120.569(2)(g) and 120.57(1)(c), Fla. Stat. In her opinion, based on the application of recognized standards within the community, CPR must be initiated on an “unresponsive” individual except in limited circumstances not applicable to this case. She was not questioned, however, using hypothetical questions about the specific circumstances of this case. Likewise, the undersigned was unable to conclude that she was knowledgeable about R #1’s pre-existing medical problems or physical condition, or her appearance at the time of her discovery, or when she was photographed by the police on the bed. More to the point, there was no persuasive evidence that Dillehay had seen or reviewed the police report or pictures of R #1 taken by the Sebastian Police Department. Resp. Ex. A. In short, Dillehay gave a broad opinion without being specifically or thoroughly questioned or briefed about the unique circumstances of this case, or how that might affect her view of the actions taken by the Pelican Garden staff on July 24, 2019. The scope of her opinion was limited and not necessarily specific to the facts of this case. She opined that in those instances where a person does not have a DNR, they must be given CPR when found in an unresponsive state. She went so far as to state that CPR must be initiated even on a dead person. While her testimony was instructive in a very general sense and no doubt sincere, the undersigned affords little weight to it because a broad application of the CPR/DNR requirement explained by Dillehay cannot, or should not, be applied in all cases--especially when a person is discovered dead and in a stiffened, cold, and lifeless state with no pulse or respiration. Otherwise, such a requirement would be unreasonable and lead to absurd results. To the extent Dillehay’s opinion means or suggests that the Pelican Garden staff was required to initiate CPR on R #1 under the facts of this case, it is rejected as unsupported by a reasonable and correct interpretation of the law. Further, it is up to the undersigned to determine the weight and credibility given to an expert’s testimony. Behm v. Div. of Admin., State Dept. of Transp. 336 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1976).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that due to the unique circumstances of this particular case the Agency dismiss the Administrative Complaint filed against Pelican Garden and find that no violation occurred. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of May, 2021, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ROBERT L. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of May, 2021. COPIES FURNISHED: Dwight Oneal Slater, Esquire Cohn Slater, P.A. 3689 Coolidge Court, Unit 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32311 Gisela Iglesias, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Lake Mirror Drive North, Suite 330B St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Richard J. Shoop, Agency Clerk Agency for Healthcare Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Simone Marstiller, Secretary Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 1 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Elizabeth Anne Hathaway DeMarco Agency for Health Care Administration 525 Mirror Lake Drive North, Suite 330C St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Thomas M. Hoeler, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 James D. Varnado, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Mail Stop 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Shena L. Grantham, Esquire Agency for Healthcare Administration Building 3, Room 3407B 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue Whether Respondent is indebted to Petitioners for agricultural products and, if so, in what amount?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties Petitioners are producers and sellers of tomatoes. They own and operate Sunfresh Farms in Florida City, Florida. Respondent is a dealer in agricultural products. The Controversy The instant case involves two separate transactions involving the sale of tomatoes pursuant to verbal agreements between Petitioners (as the sellers) and Respondent (as the buyer). Both transactions occurred in January of 1995. The First Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5270) Under the terms of the first of these two verbal agreements (First Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box (which was the market price at the time). In accordance with the terms of the First Agreement, Petitioners delivered 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 23, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold these 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a local produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to another local produce house. The tomatoes were eventually sold to a company in Grand Rapids, Michigan. On January 28, 1995, five days after Petitioners had delivered the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent, the tomatoes were inspected in Grand Rapids, Michigan. According to the inspection certificate, the inspection revealed: "Decay (3 to 28 percent)(mostly early, some advanced stages);" "Checksum;" and "Average approximately 85 percent light red to red." Petitioners have yet to be paid any of $1,214.40 Respondent owes them (under the terms of the First Agreement) for the 96 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The Second Transaction (Petitioners' Invoice Number 5299) Under the terms of the second verbal agreement at issue in the instant case (Second Agreement), Respondent agreed to purchase from Petitioners, and Petitioners agreed to sell to Respondent (FOB), 132 boxes of ("no grade") cherry tomatoes for $12.65 a box. In accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement, Petitioners delivered 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to Respondent (at Petitioners' loading dock) on January 27, 1995. Respondent accepted the delivery. Respondent sold 84 of these 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes to a Florida produce house, which subsequently sold the tomatoes to a company in Houston, Texas. These 84 boxes of cherry tomatoes were inspected in Houston, Texas, on January 31, 1995, four days after Petitioners had delivered them to Respondent. The defects found during the inspection were noted on the inspection certificate. Petitioners have yet to be paid in full for the 132 boxes of cherry tomatoes they delivered to Respondent in accordance with the terms of the Second Agreement. Respondent tendered payment (in the form of a check) in the amount of $811.20, but Petitioners refused to accept such payment because it did not represent the full amount ($1,669.80) Respondent owed them (under the terms of the Second Agreement) for these cherry tomatoes. (Although they have not endorsed or cashed the check, Petitioners are still holding it in their possession.)
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a final order (1) finding that Respondent is indebted to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20, (2) directing Respondent to make payment to Petitioners in the amount of $2,884.20 within 15 days following the issuance of the order, (3) indicating that the $811.20 check that was previously tendered to Petitioners by Respondent (and is still in Petitioners' possession) will be considered partial payment of this $2,884.20 indebtedness, if Respondent advises Petitioners, in writing, that it desires the check to be used for such purpose and if it provides Petitioners written assurance that the check is still a valid negotiable instrument; and (4) announcing that if payment in full of this $2,884.20 indebtedness is not timely made, the Department will seek recovery from the Farm Bureau, Respondent's surety. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 2nd day of February, 1996. STUART M. LERNER, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 1996.
Findings Of Fact C&D Fruit ordered 100 boxes of squash from Sun Coast Farms to be delivered to a customer in Texas. The agreed price for the squash was $15.35 per box. Upon arrival of the squash in Texas, the customer reported to C&D that the squash did not meet Grade No. l as ordered. C&D contacted George Mason, Complainant's contact on this transaction, and an inspection was ordered. The inspection report from Texas was passed to O'Brian who in turn read the inspection report to Mason via long distance telephone. Mason agreed to have the buyer get what he could for the squash. Upon completion of the transaction, C&D submitted its check to Complainant in the amount of $644. No reference is made that $644 was received by Sun Coast in its Complaint. The inspection certificate (Ex. 2) shows 150 crates of crookneck squash was inspected in wirebound crates "with no distinguishing marks." Complainant contends that it marks all of its boxes with a circle drawn on each end of the box with a "l" inside the circle to indicate Grade No. l. It is doubtful that an agriculture inspector would recognize a "l" in a circle as a grower's distinguishing mark. Many growers who mark all of their boxes do so with a stamp containing their name or the name of their co-op with their co-op number.
The Issue DOAH Case No. 04-0262: Whether Respondent, West Florida Landscaping & Landscaping, Inc. ("West Florida Landscaping"), owes Petitioner, South Florida Sod, Inc. ("South Florida Sod"), $29,360.80 for the sale of sod during the months of July and August 2003. DOAH Case No. 04-0306: Whether Respondent, West Florida Landscaping, owes Petitioner, Bayside Sod, Inc. ("Bayside Sod"), $18,750.68 for the sale of sod during the month of October 2003.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners, South Florida Sod and Bayside Sod, are producers of agricultural products as defined by Subsection 604.15(5), Florida Statutes (2003). Both Petitioners grow and sell sod. South Florida Sod is located in Arcadia, Florida. Bayside Sod is located in Sarasota, Florida. Respondent, West Florida Landscaping, located in Plant City, Florida, is a dealer in agricultural products as defined by Subsection 604.15(1), Florida Statutes (2003). At the time of the transactions in question, West Florida Landscaping was licensed as a dealer in agricultural products supported by a surety bond provided by Old Republic Surety Company. West Florida Landscaping began purchasing sod from South Florida Sod in early 2003. The sod was purchased by a man named Dallas Justice. Bryant McCall, vice president of South Florida Sod, testified that Robert Owens, the owner of West Florida Landscaping, told him that Mr. Justice worked for him and would do the ordering for West Florida Landscaping. The initial purchases were cash transactions. At some point during the course of dealings, Mr. Owens contacted South Florida Sod to request a line of credit. Mr. Owens completed a credit application, and thereafter West Florida Landscaping purchased sod on credit. Mr. McCall testified that West Florida Landscaping was never a model credit customer. He had to "hound" West Florida Landscaping to pay its bill. However, up until July and August 2003, West Florida Landscaping always paid the bill, though often well after payment was due. From July 11 through August 27, 2003, Mr. Justice placed 43 orders for sod with South Florida Sod in the name of West Florida Landscaping. The sod was picked up at South Florida Sod's place of business by truckers sent by Mr. Justice. The total price for all these orders was $29,360.80. Invoices for each of these orders were sent to West Florida Landscaping, which neither paid them nor disputed their validity. Mr. McCall contacted Mr. Owens about payment of the invoices. Mr. McCall testified that Mr. Owens stated that he had been out of town during the period of the unpaid invoices. Mr. Owens told Mr. McCall that upon returning, he discovered that Mr. Justice was defrauding him. Mr. Justice was ordering the sod and completing the work for West Florida Landscaping projects, but was also collecting the customers' payments and keeping the money for himself. Mr. Owens did not fire Mr. Justice or turn him over to law enforcement authorities because he wanted Mr. Justice to work off the debt. Mr. Owens promised Mr. McCall that he would make good on the debts incurred by Mr. Justice with South Florida Sod. Mr. McCall testified that a payment schedule was established, but that Mr. Owens did not observe it, forcing South Florida Sod to file a Producer Complaint. As of December 5, 2003, the balance owed South Florida Sod by West Florida Landscaping was $29,360.80. West Florida Landscaping began purchasing sod from Bayside Sod on a cash basis sometime in the middle of 2003. A man named "Gene," later identified as Dallas Justice, ordered the sod on behalf of West Florida Landscaping. Bayside Sod sold 11 truckloads of sod to Mr. Justice and was paid cash. On October 1, 2003, Bayside Sod first extended credit to Mr. Justice at his request. Between October 2 and October 22, 2003, Mr. Justice took delivery of 23 orders for various amounts of sod worth $18,750, with Florida sales tax. None of these deliveries was paid for by Mr. Justice or West Florida Landscaping. Paul Bispham, owner and president of Bayside Sod, testified that he spoke with Mr. Owens on December 13, 2003. Mr. Owens assured Mr. Bispham that he and Mr. Justice would pay the debt. Benjamin Strong is a field superintendent for Trent Colony Landscaping. He gave West Florida Landscaping's name to Mr. Bispham as a reference when the latter contacted him to solicit new business. Mr. Strong had done business with Mr. Justice and West Florida Landscaping. His practice was to make out checks to West Florida Landscaping and give the checks to Mr. Justice. Mr. Strong testified that Mr. Owens later told him emphatically not to give any West Florida Landscaping checks to Mr. Justice. At the hearing, Mr. Owens denied that Mr. Justice was ever an employee of West Florida Landscaping. Rather, Mr. Justice was an independent contractor whom Mr. Owens would hire on a per-job basis to lay sod. However, Mr. Owens admitted that he gave Mr. Justice authority to order sod for West Florida Landscaping, thus mooting the significance of Mr. Justice's status as an employee or independent contractor. Mr. Owens further admitted that he signed the letter seeking a line of credit from South Florida Sod. Mr. Owens testified that he was in New Orleans for an extended period. While Mr. Owens was gone, Mr. Justice began ordering sod for jobs of his own, but had the purchases billed to West Florida Landscaping. Mr. Owens testified that he has paid for any sod that Mr. Justice ordered for West Florida Landscaping projects, but that he believed himself under no obligation to pay for sod that Mr. Justice ordered for his own jobs. He discovered, belatedly, that Mr. Justice was "a liar and a cheat." Mr. McCall credibly testified that Mr. Owens said nothing to him about Mr. Justice having used West Florida Landscaping's name to fraudulently obtain sod. Rather, Mr. Owens told him that Mr. Justice was, in Mr. Owens' absence, completing West Florida Landscaping jobs, but then cashing the checks made out to West Florida Landscaping and pocketing the money. This testimony is consistent with that of Mr. Strong and is credited. Mr. Owens admitted to making some efforts to deduct money from Mr. Justice's pay in order to settle the debts with South Florida Sod, but stated that he did not feel a legal obligation to do so. Mr. Justice was subpoenaed to appear and testify at the hearing in this matter, but he did not appear. By the weight of the evidence and by his own admission, Mr. Owens authorized Mr. Justice to order sod on behalf of West Florida Landscaping. The evidence established that a course of dealing was established between Mr. Justice, on behalf of West Florida Landscaping, and the Petitioners in these cases, whereby Mr. Justice would order and take delivery of the sod from the Petitioners, and West Florida Landscaping would pay the invoices for the sod. The greater weight of the evidence is that Mr. Justice was acting on behalf of West Florida Landscaping in all his dealings with South Florida Sod and Bayside Sod. In light of the established course of dealing, West Florida Landscaping failed to establish any reasonable basis for its contention that South Florida Sod and Bayside Sod should have inquired as to Mr. Justice's continuing authority on each occasion that he ordered their sod. Mr. Owens' testimony that the sod ordered by Mr. Justice from South Florida Sod and Bayside Sod was not for West Florida Landscaping jobs cannot be credited based on the testimony of other witnesses and Mr. Owens' own actions subsequent to learning these suppliers had not been paid. While there is no question that Mr. Justice was the actual wrongdoer in these cases, there is also no question that it was West Florida Landscaping that lent the name of its legitimate business to Mr. Justice and, thus, enabled him to defraud South Florida Sod and Bayside Sod.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order ordering Respondent, West Florida Irrigation & Landscaping, Inc., to pay $29,360.80 to South Florida Sod, Inc., and $18,750.68 to Bayside Sod, Inc., together with pre-judgment interest calculated at the rate specified in Section 55.03, Florida Statutes (2003); and further requiring Old Republic Surety Company to make payment, up to the amount of its bond, in the event that West Florida Irrigation & Landscaping, Inc., fails to make payment in a timely manner. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of March, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. owes Petitioner, Florida Farm Management Inc. the sum of $4,846.00 for watermelons shipped by Petitioner and handled by Respondent as Petitioner's agent during the period from May 30, 1989 through July 5, 1989.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant fact are found: At all times material to this proceeding, Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. was a "producer" of agricultural products in the state of Florida as that term is defined in Section 605.15(5), Florida Statutes. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent, Debruyn Produce Co. was a licensed "dealer in agricultural products" as that term is defined in Section 604.15(1), Florida Statutes. Respondent was issued license number 596 by the Department, and bonded by Peerless Insurance Company (Peerless) for the sum of $47,000.00, bond number R2-27-13, with an effective date of November 13, 1988 and a termination date of November 13, 1989. At all times material to this proceeding, Debruyn was authorized to do business in the state of Florida. Around the last week of April, 1989, Petitioner and Respondent orally agreed, among other things, for Petitioner to produce certain quantities of Mickey Lee Watermelons and for Respondent to market those watermelons. This oral agreement was reduced to writing, executed by the Respondent and sent to Petitioner to execute. Petitioner, after making certain changes in the agreement and initialing those changes, executed the agreement and returned it to the Respondent. It is not clear if Respondent agreed to the change since they were not initialed by Respondent. However, the parties appeared to operate under this agreement as modified by Petitioner. Under the agreement, Respondent was to advance monies for harvesting and packing, furnish containers and labels for packing and agreed to pay certain chemical bills. Petitioner was to reimburse any monies advanced by the Respondent for (a) harvesting or packing; (b) containers and labels and; (c) chemicals, from the proceeds of the sale of watermelons. Any balance owed Petitioner for watermelons was to be paid within 30 days. Additionally, Respondent was to receive a commission of 8% of net FOB, except 30 cent maximum on sales of less than $6.25 per carton and 40 cents per carton for melons delivered on contract to National Grocers Co. The relationship of the parties was to be that of producer and sales agent. Before entering into the agreement with Respondent, Petitioner had agreed to furnish National Grocers Co. four shipments of melons totalling 8,000 cartons. Respondent agreed to service that agreement. Although Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows a credit of $6,007.13 for chemicals paid for by Respondent, the parties agreed that only $3,684.68 was expended by Respondent for chemicals and that Respondent should receive credit for that amount. The parties agree that Respondent advanced a total of $18,960.00 for harvesting and packing and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. The parties agree that Respondent paid to Petitioner the sum of $12,439.32 and the Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Cartons and pads for packing the melons were shipped on two occasions and the total sum paid by Respondent for those cartons and pads was $17,225.00. The cartons were printed with the logo of Respondent on one side and the logo of Petitioner on the other side. Petitioner agrees that the number of cartons and pads used by him came to $12,463.78 and the Respondent should be given credit for that amount. All cartons and pads in the sum of $17,255.00 were delivered to Petitioner's farm. The amount in dispute for the remainder of the carton is $4,762.22. The Respondent was responsible under the agreement to furnish cartons and pads (containers). Respondent ordered the cartons and pads after determining from Petitioner the number needed. There were two orders for cartons and pads placed and delivered. There was an over supply of cartons and pads delivered to Petitioner. This over supply was the result of a miscommunication between Petitioner and Respondent as to the amount of cartons and pads needed. Petitioner agrees that all of the cartons and pads were delivered to his farm but that he was unable to protect these cartons and pads from the weather. However, Petitioner advised Respondent that the remainder of the carton and pads could be picked up at his farm. Respondent contended that he was denied access to the farm and was unable to pick up the remainder of the cartons and pads and, therefore, they were ruined by exposure to the weather. While there may have been times when Respondent attempted to retrieve the carton and Petitioner was unavailable, there is insufficient evidence to show that Respondent was intentionally denied access to Petitioner's farm to retrieve the cartons. Clearly, the ordering, purchasing and storing of the cartons and pads was a joint effort and both Petitioner and Respondent bear that responsibility. Therefore, the Petitioner is responsible for one-half of the difference between the total cost of the cartons ($17,225.00) and the amount used by Petitioner ($12,462.78) which is $2,381.11 and Respondent should be given credit for this amount. Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger shows that Petitioner shipped melons to Respondent in the amount of $54,715.63, after adjustments for complaints and commission. Respondent's accounts payable ledger shows receiving melons from Petitioner in the amount of $51,483.00, after adjustments for complaints and commission. The difference in the two ledgers in the amount of is accounted for as follows: Invoice No. 210066 - Customer paid $2.00 per carton less on 93 cartons, Petitioner agreed to the reduction. However, Petitioner's account is in error by 9 cents which reduces total amount to $54,715.54. Invoice No. 210067 - Respondent paid for more melons than Petitioner shows were shipped - $39.60. Invoice No. 210068 - difference in calculation of commission $13.32 Invoice No. 2100105 - difference due to Petitioner not agreeing to adjustment in price taken by customer. $2,886.00 Invoice No. 2100239 - difference of $108.04 due to Respondent allowing customer adjustment which Petitioner did not agree to. Invoice No. 2100267 - difference of $210.00 for same reason stated in (e) above. Petitioner should be allowed the difference due to miscalculation of commission in invoice Nos. 210068, 2100134 and 2100160 in the sum of $68.10 since Petitioner's calculation was in accordance with the agreement. There was no dispute as to the condition of melons being as contracted for upon receipt. There was insufficient evidence to establish that the melons shipped under invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 by Petitioner were not of the size and number contracted for by the customer. As to invoice Nos. 2100239 and 2100267, the adjustments were made after the fact without contacting Petitioner. As to invoice No. 2100105, the Petitioner shipped the melons to Russo Farms, Inc., Vineland, N.J., as per Respondent's order who then unloaded the melons and reloaded on Russo's truck and shipped to another buyer. It was this buyer's complaint that resulted in Russo demanding an adjustment. Respondent granted such adjustment without approval of the Petitioner. Although Respondent did contact Petitioner in regard to this complaint, Petitioner would not authorize a federal inspection, which he could have, but instead, requested that Respondent obtain an independent verification of the basis of the complaint. Instead of an independent verification of the complaint, Respondent had Russo evaluate the load as to size of melons and number of boxes. No complaint was made as to condition of the melons. Petitioner would not accept Russo's evaluation because based on the total weight of the melons shipped, as indicated by the freight invoice, Russo's evaluation could not have been correct. The only evidence presented by Respondent as to size and number of melon in regard to invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 was hearsay unsupported by any substantial competent evidence. Petitioner should be allowed the difference in invoice Nos. 2100105, 2100239 and 2100267 for a sum total of $3,204.00. No adjustment should be made for the differences in invoice No. 210067 other than the 9 cent error made by Petitioner because this amount is not used in Petitioner's calculation of the gross amount due for melons shipped. Therefore, the sum total of all melons sold and shipped is $54,715.63 - 0.09 = $54,715.54. The amount due Petitioner is calculated as follows: Sum total of melons shipped with proper adjustments $54,715.54 Subtract from that the following: Chemicals 3,684.68 Advances 18,960.00 Cost of Cartons $12,462.78 + 2,381.11 14,773.89 Payment 12,439.32 Subtotal of Deductions 49,857.89 Difference and amount owed $4,857.65
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. be ordered to pay the Petitioner Florida Farm Management, Inc. the sum of $4,857.65. It is further RECOMMENDED that if Respondent Debruyn Produce Company, Inc. fails to timely pay Petitioner, Florida Farm Management, Inc. as ordered, the Respondent, Peerless Insurance Company be ordered to pay the Department as required by Section 604.21, Florida Statutes, and that the Department reimburse the Petitioners in accordance with Section 604.21, Florida Statutes. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by the Petitioner. 1. Not a finding of fact but the issue in this case. 2.-3. Adopted in findings of fact 2 and 4. Adopted in finding of fact 8. Adopted in finding of fact 4. First sentence adopted in finding of fact 7. The balance is not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Not material but see findings of fact 16-23. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-14. Adopted but modified in findings of fact 21 and 22. 10(A), 10(C)(1), 10(E), and 10(F) adopted in finding of fact 24. 10(C)(2)(3), 10(d) rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. See findings of fact 5, ,7, 9 - 15. Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent. 1.-7. Adopted in findings of fact 2, 1, 4, 4, 4, 6, and 7 respectively as modified. Not material. This involved invoice Nos. 210066 and 210067 and adjustment were agreed to be Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's accounts receivable ledger, Petitioner's Exhibit 1. Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Rejected as not being supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Not material. This involved invoice No. 2100160 and adjustments were granted by Petitioner and is not part of this dispute. See Petitioner's Exhibit 1. 12.-13.Adopted in finding of fact 21 as modified. Adopted in finding of fact 5, and 9-15 as clarified. Rejected as not supported by substantial competent evidence in the record but see findings of fact 9-15. Adopted in finding of fact 13 as clarified. Adopted in finding of fact 23 as clarified but see findings of fact 9-22.
The Issue The issues for determination in this proceeding are whether DER properly asserts jurisdiction over the site in question, and whether Petitioner (Vatalaro) is entitled to a permit to fill that site.
Findings Of Fact Sometime in 1986, Billie Vatalaro purchased approximately eleven acres within an approximately 20-acre wetland contiguous to Lake Rouse in east Orange County, Florida. Approximately five acres of the Vatalaro parcel are in the lake itself. In June 1987, personnel from Orange County's planning department and environmental protection department visited the site in response to reports of illegal filling. Correspondence ensued, and meetings were held among Mrs. Vatalaro and her sons and the staff from Orange County. In the meantime, some activity on the site continued, including clearing of trees and vegetation and sometime in January 1988, Mrs. Vatalaro obtained from the Orange County building department building permits and septic tank permits for two houses on approximately 1/2 acre of the property. In early February 1988, the Orange County Environmental Protection Department requested the involvement of DER. Jurisdiction Pamela Thomas is an environmental specialist with DER in the Orlando office. She first visited the site on February 8, 1988, with DER's enforcement officer, a staff person from Orange County, Mrs. Vatalaro, and Mrs. Vatalaro's sons, Russ and Ron Vatalaro. She performed a jurisdictional determination on the occasion of that visit, and returned for subsequent visits on July 20, 1988 and February 22, 1989. Jurisdictional determinations were made pursuant to Rule 17-4.022 F.A.C. (Since renumbered as 17-3.022). This required locating the water body of the state, Lake Rouse, and a determination of whether there is a connection of the water body to the adjacent wetlands. The vegetation is then examined to determine whether canopy, sub-canopy or ground cover will be analyzed. Within the rule are two tests, one used when submerged species predominate, the other used when the wetland vegetation is more transitional. Ms. Thomas located Lake Rouse and found no berms or other barriers between the lake and the wetlands. She also performed transects, visually sampling segments of the area and determined there was continuity between the lake and landward to the site in question. She found a full mature canopy in the uncleared area and loblolly bay, a submerged species, dominated. This area, between the lake and cleared site met the first ("A") test in Rule 17-4.022, F.A.C. The submerged plus transitional species were greater than 50 percent of the vegetation, the submerged species was greater than 10 percent and exceeded the upland species present. Because a portion of the area had been cleared, it was necessary to attempt to reconstruct what vegetation had existed prior to clearing. The cleared area included tall spindly pine trees spaced to indicate that other trees had been growing between them. The pine trees which did not have fill next to them were sitting on hummocks, a common phenomena in wetlands. Within the disturbed area Ms. Thomas found two bore holes where previous soil borings had been done. She and the DER enforcement officer determined by examining those holes that substantial fill had been placed in the cleared area. Root mat was more than ten inches below the surface and water was standing in the bottom of the holes. In order to reconstruct what vegetation had been present in the cleared area, Ms. Thomas completed a series of three feet by ten feet visual transects fanning out into the thicket from the cleared area. The dominant species were Ioblolly bay (gordonia), sweet bay and dahoon, all submerged species. It was apparent that the predominance of trees that had been removed were submerged species, mainly Ioblolly bays. As reconstructed, the biomass in a transect would have been greater than the sum of the biomass of the pine trees. This reconstruction was further validated on subsequent visits to the site when juvenile loblolly bay trees were found seeded and thriving in the disturbed area, but no pine seedlings were found, even though there was adequate time for that to occur. DER staff also viewed aerial photographs provided by the Valataros, taken in 1984, prior to major clearing and in 1987, after the clearing. The photographs are on a scale of 1 to 300 and do not indicate a drastic change in the area that would reflect that the cleared area had been mostly pine trees. The photographs are not of such quality that a conclusive determination can be made on them alone. David Kriz is an area resource soil scientist with the U. S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service. He visited the site with representatives of DER and Mrs. Vatalaro on July 20, 1988, at the request of DER. He performed three soil borings, the first in an area of bay trees outside the area cleared for the house. This boring revealed Samsula muck, a hydric soil, indicative of being saturated or flooded. The second boring was taken within the area designated for the house pad. This yielded about fifteen inches of fill, then St. Johns soil, an organic sandy layer, which can be hydric if inundated for more than thirty days in a year. It was impossible to determine whether this specimen was hydric, because this surface had been disturbed and filled. The third boring was taken just off the pad, but still in the cleared area. It yielded about nine inches of sandy fill and Samsula muck below, similar to the first boring, and clearly a hydric soil. St. Johns fine sand also appears on the site in a USDA soil conservation map of Orange County. The map is a good guide, but cannot be relied upon without ground tests in specific sites as the scale on the map is 1 to 20,000. Although distinct soil zones are indicated, in fact there are transitional areas between soil types in the zones, which means that in a transitional zone there may be either wet or dry areas. It would be virtually impossible to determine the soil type prevalent in Mrs. Vatalaro's cleared half acre, without the borings. DER properly concluded that it has jurisdiction over the site. Petitioner's expert, William Dennis, concedes that most of the Vatalaro property is within DER's jurisdiction, including a substantial portion of the cleared area, most notably the 43 by 100 foot cleared finger extending south from the cleared area designated for the house. In performing his jurisdictional analysis, Dr. Dennis concentrated on the cleared area. He did not complete transects. He counted and measured trees, and with the aid of a compass, sited them on a chart, received in evidence as Petitioner's exhibit #13. Within the cleared area he found a predominance of pines, and upland species (71%) and some submerged and transitional species (4.8% and 24.2%, respectively). This, he concluded, failed the jurisdictional test described in paragraph 7, above. Dr. Dennis also examined the aerial photographs and determined there was a vegetation break extending approximately 30 feet into the thicket from the northwest corner of the cleared area. He counted and measured trees in that area and found 14.8% submerged species, 35.4% transitional species, and 49.8% upland species. That area failed the jurisdictional "A" test because the submerged species did not outnumber the upland species present. Extrapolating from this finding, he concluded that the upper part of the cleared area designated for placement of the house, is outside of DER's jurisdiction. This conclusion is unreliable. The aerial photographs, particularly the pre-clearance photographs from 1984, are not crisp and clear. It is also possible that in looking at an aerial photograph, the tallest trees, the pines, would overshadow the other species which are also four inches or greater in diameter breast height (DBH) and are, therefore, equally significant. Rule 17.4.022(1)(c), F.A.C. provides that belt transects be used when the line demarcating the landward extent of waters of the state cannot be determined visually or by photo interpretation. DER, but not Mr. Dennis, relied on belt transects. Rule 17.4.022(I)(d), F.A.C. provides that other methods may be used as long as the department and applicant both agree in writing, to the method used. DER did not agree with Dr. Dennis' method. Counting trees in an area that has been disturbed is not a reliable means of establishing what existed prior to clearance when substantial evidence suggests that the clearing left the pines but eliminated the predominant submerged and transitional species. Section 403.8171(5), F.S. provides a "back-stop" to the vegetative jurisdictional determination by providing that "...in no case shall [the landward extent of the waters of the state] extend above the elevation of the 1- in-10-year recurring flood event or the area of the land with standing or flowing water for more than 30 consecutive days per year calculated on an average annual basis, whichever is more landward." The petition in this proceeding raised the issue of the jurisdictional backstop but the application and evidence at a hearing fails to include sufficient information to substantiate that this alternative applies. Generally, a study would be required, and the applicant has not provided such. The Merits of the Application The wetland contiguous to Lake Rouse, within which the Vatalaro property is located, comprises approximately 20 acres. It is the only mature forested wetland of its quality within a large region of east Orange County. This wetland provides a filtration function contributing to the water quality of Lake Rouse and to the waters of the region. The Lake Rouse wetland also provides flood abatement capacity via its soil and plants. The effects of the loss of this capacity in other severely impacted wetlands along the State Road 50 corridor have become evident. The altered areas are no longer able to provide water holding capacities. Wildlife which are residents of the area and which use the area as a stopover will be impacted by alteration of the habitat which they currently rely upon for food, cover, nesting and resting. Examples of those wildlife are ducks and other birds, raccoons, deer and opossums. Even though the proposed project will comprise only 1/2 to 3/4 an acre of the wetland, the impact is significant considering the unique quality of the wetland. Dr. Dennis agrees that alteration of the site would change the habitat value of the area and would impact the functions of the wetlands. He argues, however, that the effects of this project are minimal compared to the development which has already occurred in surrounding areas. Although the applicant has a building and septic tank permit and a Corps of Engineers permit, the regulations for those permits are not the same as the balancing criteria which DER must consider. The Orange County Planning and Environmental Protection Departments recommend denial of the project. No evidence was presented with regard to mitigation proposed or agreed to by the applicant.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered denying the application for fill permit. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of May, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of May, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael D. Jones, Esquire 996 Westwood Square Suite 4 Oviedo, Florida 32765 Vivian F. Garfein, Esquire Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Dale Twachtmann, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400 Daniel H. Thompson, Esquire General Counsel Department of Environmental Regulation Twin Towers Office Building 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2400
The Issue Whether Respondent Employer committed an unlawful employment practice against Petitioner on the basis of his race, color, disability/handicap, and/or age.1/
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is an African-American male who was 66-68 years of age at all times material. Petitioner worked successfully, in a variety of positions, for Respondent from March 20, 1999, until July 29, 2007. By all accounts, he was an excellent employee in each position. He has, at his own expense, trained for, and received, a security guard license and education as a fork lift operator. The published job description for employment as a Wal- Mart Garden Center Sales Associate, has, since May 2005, required, among other "essential functions," that one be able to: While moving within the department over uneven surfaces and moving up and down a ladder, frequently lifting, sorting, carrying, and placing merchandise and supplies of varying sizes, constantly lifting up to 50 pounds without assistance and over 50 pounds with team lifting. On March 3, 2006, Petitioner signed this job description, signifying that he possessed the ability at that time to perform all its essential functions. On a Saturday in July 2007, Petitioner was still working for Respondent as a Garden Center Sales Associate. Early that day, Petitioner and a cashier were alone in the garden center of Respondent's store at 13th Avenue, Gainesville, Florida. Upon her request, Petitioner loaded 83 bags of top soil into a customer's truck without assistance. Later that same day, Petitioner's wrist began to hurt. The following Monday, Petitioner’s hand was swollen. He approached Store Manager Thomas Horton, and told Mr. Horton that he needed to see a doctor. Petitioner did nothing to alert Mr. Horton that he might have had an on-the-job injury. Mr. Horton orally authorized Petitioner to go to a doctor. Petitioner unilaterally selected Dr. Youssef W. Wassef to treat his wrist. There is no evidence of the workers' compensation process, pursuant to Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, ever being invoked. On or about August 2, 2007, Dr. Wassef provided a note that said: Patient should not allowed [sic] to lift more then [sic] 15 lb. This note was provided to Respondent’s store personnel office by Petitioner at or about the same time he got it. According to the August 2, 2007, restrictions placed on Petitioner by his treating physician, Petitioner was unable to perform the essential functions of the Garden Center Sales Associate position. Petitioner testified that he last worked on July 29, 2007. On or about September 6, 2007, Petitioner delivered to his store’s personnel office another note from Dr. Wassef, stating: Patient should continue until further notice on full-time, light duties, no lifting or pushing. This note also placed medical restrictions on Petitioner which made him unable to fulfill the essential functions of his Garden Center Sales Associate position. It is unclear whether Petitioner was working or was on the equivalent of sick leave from Monday, July 30, 2007, until September 7, 2007. It is most probable, based on the evidence as a whole, that at least after receiving the August 2, 2007, doctor’s note, Wal-Mart did not allow Petitioner to work in the capacity of a Garden Center Sales Associate. Specifically, Mr. Horton testified that he “called back” Petitioner sometime during the back-to-school/college season, which “season” would have been in late August or early September, to work in a temporary position. The temporary position assigned Petitioner was described by Ms. Chewning, the store's Personnel Manager, as a “May I assist you?” position. In this temporary position, which lasted only a few weeks, Petitioner was only required to walk around and point out to inquiring shoppers their requested back-to-school/college materials. Wal-Mart did not require Petitioner to work outside his medical restrictions. When the back-to-school/college season ended, so did the temporary position. When the back-to-school/college season ended and the temporary sales associate position was eliminated, there were no positions available at Petitioner’s store that he could perform with his medical restrictions on lifting and pushing. Also, at that point in time, Mr. Horton began to lay off people in some positions. However, Petitioner remained on leave and was not laid off. Although Petitioner referred to a People Greeter position in his November 20, 2007, discrimination complaint before FCHR, there is no credible record evidence that Petitioner requested a Wal-Mart People Greeter position as an “accommodation” of his condition prior to filing his discrimination complaint or that a People Greeter position was vacant at any time material to this case. However, the published job description for employment as a Wal-Mart People Greeter has, since May 2005, required, among other "essential functions" that the incumbent be able to: Provide shopping carts to customers by pushing or pulling up to 10 pounds of pressure . . . Frequently lifting, placing and deactivating items weighing up to 10 pounds without assistance, and regularly lifting merchandise over 10 pounds with team lifting. Petitioner documented at hearing, via an old doctor’s report, that in 1991, he had severe arthritis in both his elbows and that surgery was contemplated at that time. However, there is no clear evidence that he had the surgery or, if he had the surgery, what was its outcome. There also is no persuasive evidence that Respondent’s personnel office or any Wal-Mart employee material to the instant case knew about this doctor’s report prior to the present litigation. Petitioner demonstrated at hearing that his elbows are visible in the short-sleeve shirts worn by Wal-Mart employees. He believes his elbows stick out farther than other people’s elbows, and he speculated that his superiors and store personnel office employees decided visually that he had a handicap because “my arms stick out” and because of a scar on one arm. The undersigned observed his demonstration. If there is a deformity, it is not substantial, and the scar is not visible without close inspection. Sometime in August-September 2007, probably during the back-to-school/college season, Mr. Horton observed Petitioner wearing what Mr. Horton believed to be a brace on Petitioner’s hand, but which was, in fact, a wristband. However, no evidence supporting Petitioner’s theory that any superiors or personnel office employees did, in fact, perceive him as disabled/handicapped was adduced. Petitioner denied ever being handicapped or unable to perform the essential functions of his job as a Wal-Mart Garden Center Sales Associate. Mr. Horton and Jennifer Chewning each credibly denied ever perceiving Petitioner as handicapped, even up to the date of the hearing. When he had been hired in 1999, Petitioner acknowledged receipt and understanding of the policies contained within Respondent’s Associates Handbook. Petitioner again acknowledged receipt and understanding of these policies on March 29, 2001, when he was issued a revised Associates Handbook. Wal-Mart regularly offers leaves of absence to any associate who has a medical condition that is not perceived by the employee or management as a “disability” under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Florida Civil Rights Act, but whose condition prevents him from performing his job. Ms. Chewning testified that the Request for Leave of Absence form described below is used specifically for situations not covered by the ADA or by State disability laws.3/ The form upon which an employee may apply for such a leave of absence advises that the leave of absence is without pay; that there will be no accrual of benefits or seniority during the leave of absence; and that the employee must pay his own insurance premiums during this period. Grant of the requested leave is dependent upon the treating physician’s verification of the employee's medical condition. (See Finding of Fact 20.) Based on Petitioner's inability to perform the essential functions of any available position within the store in September 2007, Ms. Chewning offered Petitioner such a leave of absence. Petitioner disputes some of the contents of the Request for Leave of Absence form in evidence, which completed form Mr. Horton retroactively approved on September 21, 2007, for Petitioner to be on continuous leave beginning September 7, 2007, with a return date of December 31, 2007. However, Petitioner admits that he signed this form. The date beside Petitioner’s signature seems to be September 19, 2007. Petitioner’s signature on this form signifies that he was requesting “medical leave,” thereby acknowledging: A medical condition (including pregnancy and childbirth, and on-the-job Workers’ Comp. injuries) requiring time away from work. The Health Care Provider’s Section, below, must be completed and signed. Before returning, associate must submit a return- to-work statement/release from a Health Care Provider detailing restrictions, if any. . . . * * * . . . I fully understand Wal-Mart’s Leave of Absence Policy. Petitioner also agreed that on or about September 19, 2007, as reflected on the portion of this Request for Leave of Absence form which was filled-in by Dr. Wassef, Petitioner’s doctor had certified that Petitioner should begin medical leave on September 9, 2007, and continue through September 30, 2007. Petitioner asserted that on or about September 13, 2007, he delivered to someone other than Ms. Chewning in Respondent's personnel office another note from Dr. Wassef stating: Patient has partial permanent disability.[4] Does not need sick leave. He needs to continue to work full-time with limited lifting, pulling, and pushing. Petitioner asserted that on or about October 29, 2007, Petitioner delivered to someone other than Ms. Chewning in Respondent's personnel office the last note he had received from Dr. Wassef, which stated: Patient able to work full-time with limited lifting to 20 pounds. Ms. Chewning testified that neither the September 13, 2007, nor the October 29, 2007, medical notes contemporaneously reached either herself or Petitioner’s personnel file. According to the last medical note she received prior to hearing, Petitioner could not even perform the essential functions of a People Greeter position. (See Findings of Fact 10 and 13.) Reviewing Dr. Wassef’s September 13, 2007, and October 29, 2007, notes for the first time at hearing, she pointed out that, according to the most recent note, Petitioner was still medically restricted from performing some of the essential functions of his Garden Center Sales Associate’s position. (See Findings of Fact 3 and 22.) She has never received a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to full functioning as a Garden Center Sales Associate. Ms. Chewning testified that Wal-Mart has a policy that a medical leave of absence may not extend beyond one year. However, neither its printed non-ADA leave of absence policy in evidence nor the Request for Leave of Absence form in evidence specifies a one year maximum leave. More than a year after Petitioner’s leave began on September 7, 2007, and nearly 10 months after the leave was supposed to end on December 31, 2007, Wal-Mart has not taken steps to terminate Petitioner, because of the current litigation that began with Petitioner’s filing his complaint with FCHR on November 20, 2007. Ms. Chewning testified that, as of the date of hearing on October 15, 2008, Respondent had not terminated Petitioner; Petitioner remained on his approved unpaid leave of absence; and if Petitioner brings in a doctor’s note saying he can perform all the essential functions listed on his Garden Center Sales Associate’s job description, including but not limited to being able to lift 50 pounds, Wal-Mart will put Petitioner back in his Garden Center Sales Associate position, and he will retain his salary level, his accrued years of service, and all his benefits as they existed at the beginning of his leave of absence. Petitioner erroneously perceives himself as having been terminated and wants to go back to work, but he has not yet presented any doctor’s release that allows him to perform regularly the functions of a Garden Center Sales Associate. There is no evidence herein that under similar conditions Wal-Mart has treated any person of any race other than African-American differently than Petitioner has been treated. There is no evidence herein that under similar conditions Wal-Mart has treated any person of any age other than 66-68 years of age, differently than Petitioner has been treated.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner’s Complaint of Discrimination and Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of February, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hillside Sod Farms, Inc., is a producer of agricultural products, grass sod. Respondent, S. J . Harper Landscaping Enterprises, Inc., is a dealer of such products in the normal course of its landscaping business activity. Petitioner generally deals on a cash basis with customers, unless the customer is licensed by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services for the sale of agricultural products. Customers who are licensed may maintain an open account status with Petitioner. Respondent is licensed by the Department. The Respondent has maintained an open account with Petitioner since 1986. Petitioner sold Respondent grass sod by the truck load for various projects, and was given an invoice therefor. Under the terms of the account, payment was due in full the week following receipt of the sod. On November 21, 1988, including invoice number 12284, Respondent's account balance was $2,098.80. On November 25, 1988, the account balance was $3,129.12. On December 12, 1988, Respondent paid on the account the sum of $2,594.88, leaving a balance due, owing and unpaid of $534.24. Respondent's alleged that in early November, 1988 several trucks loads that were accepted by Respondent were short of sod by approximately eight pallets (each pallet contains 400 square feet of sod) Simon J. Harper, Respondent'S president, reported this fact to Petitioner's foreman, Larry Poole, at night after the work day. He did not reject the trucks with the lesser amount of sod on them, but accepted them. Respondent did not file a complaint or objection to the billing, verbally or in writing, to an officer in the Petitioner's company, although he had dealt with the company for years. Respondent estimated the amount of sod it believed they had been shorted and sent a check for the unpaid balance, less the charges for shorted sod. The amount withheld was the sum of $534.24.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Respondent to pay to the Petitioner the sum of $534.24. DONE AND ENTERED this 31st day of January, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of January, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Avery P. Wisdom Vice President Hillside Sod Farms, Inc. 1620 East State Road 46 Geneva, FL 32732 Simon J. Harper President S. J. Harper Landscaping Enterprises, Inc. 205 Zenith Point Geneva, FL 32732 Clinton H. Coulter, Jr., Esquire Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Ben H. Pridgeon, Jr. Chief Bureau of License and Bond Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800 Honorable Doyle Conner Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0810 Mallory Horne General Counsel 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0800
