The Issue The issues in this bid protest are whether, in making a preliminary decision to award a contract for drug screening services, Respondent acted contrary to a governing statute, rule, policy, or project specification; and, if so, whether such misstep(s) was/were clearly erroneous, arbitrary or capricious, or contrary to competition.
Findings Of Fact The evidence presented at final hearing established the facts that follow. The Request for Proposals On March 14, 2001, the Board authorized the issuance of a request for proposals to solicit offers on a contract for drug screening services. Soon, Request for Proposals No. 149-AA10 (the “RFP”) was issued. The purpose of the RFP, as stated on the first page thereof, was [t]o obtain the services of an organization to conduct applicant and employee specimen collection and drug screening services both to meet the general requirements for collection and drug screening services; and the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA) requirements for collection and drug screening services. These professional services are described in the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (Attachment A). The deadline for submission of proposals in response to the RFP was April 10, 2001. Page 3 of the Miami-Dade County Public Schools (M-DCPS) Drug-Free Workplace Technical Guide (the “Guide”) explained that applicants and employees are tested in the following circumstances: (1) upon application for full-time employment; (2) when "reasonable suspicion"1 exists to believe that an employee has impermissibly used drugs or alcohol; (3) as part of routine "fitness for duty" medical examinations2; and (4) as a "follow up" to an employee's completion of a drug rehabilitation program. Because the District employs persons performing safety- sensitive functions and persons who hold commercial driver licenses, the District must comply with a federal law known as the Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (“OTETA”). Employees covered by OTETA are subject to pre-employment testing, post-accident testing, random testing, reasonable suspicion testing, "return-to-duty" testing (after a positive test), follow-up testing, and annual testing. Guide, pp. 10-14. Unlike other employees, persons falling under OTETA are not subject to blood alcohol screening. Guide, p. 22. The type of drug test that the District most frequently requests involves urinalysis. For alcohol testing, breath analysis is the normal practice. Blood alcohol testing is used infrequently. The RFP did not explicitly disclose the District’s relative demand for these various types of tests. Section V of the RFP prescribed the technical requirements with which proposers needed to comply. Subsection C thereof stated, in pertinent part: The collection site is a place where individuals present themselves for the purpose of providing urine or blood specimens to be analyzed for the presence of drugs or alcohol. Page 15 of the Guide added that "[c]ollection sites shall have all of the necessary personnel, materials, equipment, facilities, and supervision to provide for the collection, security, temporary storage, and shipping or transportation of urine specimens to a certified drug testing laboratory." Section V, subsection K set forth four “location parameters [as] examples of locations which shall comprise the areas for collection and drug screening to insure [sic] convenience for applicants and employees.” These “location parameters” essentially divided the Miami-Dade County service area into quadrants. Section V, subsection L, provided in relevant part: “Mobile collection of specimens will be required at some of the Regional Transportation Centers[.]” The Guide, at page 15, further mandated that "[m]obile collection sites" be equipped and staffed "the same as" other collection sites. Section V, subsection M stated, in part: “A collection site is preferred in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33132, for the convenience of any potential employees who wish to provide specimen collection concurrent with a scheduled interview by the Office of Human Resources.” Section V, subsection N, stated: At least one site in the North end and [sic] of Miami-Dade County and one site in the South end of Miami-Dade County must be available to perform reasonable suspicion testing of employees. The hours of operation of these facilities must be from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight. Section VI of the RFP, which addressed the cost of proposed services, instructed that [p]roposals must include an itemization of charges for collection of specimens, initial and confirmatory tests. Such itemized charges will be used in the event a retest is necessary. Retests required as a result of defective equipment, incorrect analysis, or misinterpretation shall be done at the expense of the provider. Section VIII provided that proposals would be “evaluated by [a] selection committee . . . comprised of representatives of the school district, in order to ascertain which proposal best meets the needs of the School Board.” The selection committee (hereafter, “committee”) was to be composed of one administrator each from five separate offices, which were designated in section VIII. Section VIII also established the evaluation criteria to be used by the committee, stating: Evaluation considerations will include, but not be limited to, the following: Responsiveness of the proposal clearly stating an understanding of the work to be performed meeting all the technical guidelines in [the Guide]. Cost may not be the dominant factor, but will have some significance. It will be a particularly important factor when all other evaluation criteria are relatively equal. Documentation of current certification by DHHS; qualifications of laboratory staff members; past experience and record of performance; verification of references. Location of the laboratory and planned method of pick-up from designated collection sites and transportation of specimens according to chain of custody protocol to the drug testing laboratory; turnaround time relative to volume of expected need; accessibility relative to volume of expected need. Primary emphasis in the selection process will be placed on the independence, background, experience, and service of staff to be assigned to the project. Expertise in the areas addressed in the RFP, and the ability to respond in a timely, accurate manner to the district’s requirements is essential. Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collection/testing. The School District reserves the right to reject any and all proposals submitted and to waive irregularities. . . . . Relevant Details About the Proposals Two proposers, Global and RN, submitted timely responses to the RFP. The following is a look at certain terms in their respective proposals. Global’s Proposal Global was the incumbent provider pursuant to a contract that had been entered into on June 11, 1997. Even before the establishment of the expiring contractual relationship, from 1995 forward, Global had provided general drug testing services for the District. In addition to that, Global had performed fingerprint analyses for the District prior to 1995. Thus, Global had a history with the District. In a Fee Schedule included at page VIII-1 of its proposal, Global quoted the following prices for services: Federal Drug Testing for OTETA covered employees $30.00 * * * Breath Alcohol Testing $25.00 After hour Services Flat fee per donor/employee . $75.00 plus regular testing fee Monday — Friday: 5:00 p.m. — 8:30 a.m. Saturday and Sunday All Day Florida Drug Free Work Place for general employee drug testing $25.00 * * * At page V-1 of its proposal, Global listed ten collection facilities, providing their addresses and hours of operation. According to the proposal, only one of these facilities stays open until midnight. Five of them close each weekday at 4:00 p.m., and four at 5:00 p.m. None is open on weekends. Global offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered a site in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And Global offered at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County, satisfying the geographic requirements of subsection V.N. Global’s south-end site, however, closes at 5:00 p.m. and thus fails to satisfy the requirement, also prescribed in subsection V.N., that such facility remain open until midnight. In addition to these stationary facilities, Global offered the services of a mobile unit. Its proposal stated: ON-SITE COLLECTION After Hours Emergency24 hours Operating hours: Monday — Sunday Via Mobile Unit Global described its mobile unit, at page V-2, as a “self contained air conditioned motor coach equipped with 2 bathrooms, blood drawing chair, urine collection equipment, computerized breach alcohol analyzer with ample facilities for a physician to conduct physical exams on DOT (OTETA) employees and yearly re- certification.” Global, in fact, has three of these mobile units. The vans are available for use by all of Global’s clients. Two vehicles are maintained in Fort Lauderdale, Broward County, Florida, and thus are in position to respond to service calls for the District. The third van is maintained in western Palm Beach County. Because after-hours tests generally are needed in post-accident and reasonable suspicion circumstances, which require a rapid response (within two hours of the incident), the Palm Beach County-based van would not, as a practical matter, likely be deployed for the District. Global does not maintain a mobile unit in Miami-Dade County. B. RN’s Proposal Included in RN’s proposal was the following schedule of costs: RN Expertise charges $27.80 for a 5 panel NIDA drug screen. This charge includes an adulterant panel, 5 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise charges $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. This charge will include an adulterant panel, 8 panel drug screen, collection of the specimen, transportation charges and MRO charges. If the School Board does not elect to have an adulterant panel performed on general tests the charge will be $25.00. RN Expertise charges $25.00 for a breath alcohol test. This also includes on- site testing charges. There will not be a charge for confirmation tests. RN Expertise will charge $30.00 for a blood alcohol test. RN Expertise will submit monthly invoices. These invoices will be submitted to the Office of Operation and Records and/or the Office of Professional Standards (OTETA) through a purchase order. The invoices shall reflect service provided to the Board in the prior month. Regarding collection sites and locations, RN’s proposal stated, at pages 12 through 13: Quest Diagnostics [the laboratory that RN proposed to use] has 14 collection sites in the Miami-Dade County area. Please see Appendix B for all maps of locations and zip code map with all locations that have been highlighted for your convenience. RN Expertise, Inc. will provide all on- site drug screen collections and breath alcohol tests. We have numerous certified collectors and breath alcohol technicians throughout the state who specialize in on site testing. All collectors and BATS have been certified by Christine Steele. Please see Appendix C. for certificates of RN Expertise, Inc. and insurance and licenses. Three Quest patient care centers are located very close to the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, 33232. The hours of operation are 7:00 am to 4:30 pm. RN Expertise has arranged three third party sites in the North end of Miami-Dade county and one site in the south end of Miami-Dade County that are available to perform reasonable suspicion and post- accident testing. The hours of operation are from 8:00 am to 12:00 midnight. These addresses are: Workers Compensation Medical Center 17601 N.W. 2nd Avenue Ste S Miami, Florida 33169 Workers Compensation Medical Center 6504 N.W. 77th Court Miami, Florida 33166 Homestead Hospital 160 NW 13th Street Homestead, FL 33030 If these sites are not convenient we can arrange additional sites or provide these tests on an on-site basis. RN offered collection sites in each of the quadrants specified in subsection V.K. of the RFP. It offered sites in the area of 1500 Biscayne Boulevard, Miami, Florida, as recommended in subsection V.M. And RN offered at least two sites in the north end of Miami-Dade County and one in the south, all three of which were open from 8:00 a.m. until midnight, thereby satisfying both the geographic and hours of operation requirements of subsection V.N. The Evaluation Committee(s), Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart, and the Evaluations A. The Original Committee To evaluate the proposals, a five-person committee was appointed in accordance with the RFP. Its members were Nelson E. Diaz, Deputy Superintendent, Personnel Management and Services; Gwendolyn Jennings Kidney, Assistant Superintendent, Employee Support Programs; Jose Montes de Oca, Assistant Chief Auditor, Management and Compliance Audits; Michael Fox, Risk Analyst, Risk and Benefits Management; and Patricia Freeman, Director, Business Development and Assistance. This committee arranged to meet for the first time on April 11, 2001. Notice of the meeting was not published in advance; the committee would convene in private. The following staff persons were asked to be present at the April 11 meeting to provide technical expertise, if needed: Vera Hirsh, Administrative Director, Personnel; William Bevan, Executive Director, Personnel Operations and Records; Frederic F. Conde, Executive Director, Office of Professional Standards; and Barbara Jones, Director, Procurement. B. Mr. Bevan’s Comparison Chart Before the April 11, 2001, meeting, Ms. Hirsh asked Mr. Bevan, as a technical advisor to the committee, to prepare a comparison of the two proposals. At the time, Mr. Bevan was most knowledgeable about the District’s procedures for drug testing, because he had been directly involved in the general drug testing program. Also, through his work experiences, Mr. Bevan had acquired personal knowledge concerning Global. Indeed, Global had listed Mr. Bevan as a reference in its proposal. Mr. Bevan prepared a comparison chart that was distributed to all the members of the committee. The following table contains the substance of Mr. Bevan's comparison chart:3 Item No. GLOBAL RN EXPERTISE 1 TURNAROUND TIME IS NEXT BUSINESS DAY 5 DAYS ON POSITIVE 24 HOURS FOR NEGATIVES 48 HOURS FOR POSITIVES 2 LOCATION IS FORT LAUDERDALE ALTAMONTE SPRINGS 3 PLAN TO DELINEATE OTETA FROM GENERAL GOOD PLAN PLUS ICON BASED DRUG TEST FORM VERY WEAK PLAN VERY WEAK ANALYSIS 4 COST $30.00 DOT BLIND SAMPLES ARE INCLUDED COST $27.80 NO MENTION OF BLIND SAMPLES 5 POLICE $25.00 ALL ALCOHOL TESTS BOTH BREATH & BLOOD ARE $25.00 $26.00 8 PANEL TEST BREATH ALCOHOL $25.00 BLOOD ALCOHOL $30.00 6 COLLECTION SITES 10 TOTAL SITES 14 TOTAL SITES LESS 4 IN BROWARD, 6 FOR BLOOD DRAW ONLY = 4 NET SITES 7 MOBILE COLLECTION DONE BY MOBILE VAN "WILL PROVIDE ON-SITE COLLECTION" 8 EXPERIENCE 4 YEARS WITH M-DCPS NO SUCCESSFUL LEGITATION [sic] AGAINST M-DCPS US SUGAR ? 9 LABORATORY LAB CORP OF AMERICA LATE IN REPORTING RESULTS ONE TIME IN FOUR YEARS QUEST LABORATORIES QUESTIONABLE 10 ADULTERANT TESTING IS PERFORMED BY LAB CORP AT A STANDARD COURSE OF PROTOCOL WITH NO CHARGE FOR THIS PROCEDURE TESTSURE IS BROKEN OUT AS A SEPARATE ENTITY Because of his personal knowledge of and experience with the drug screening program, Mr. Bevan's opinions carried great weight with the committee members. As will become clear, moreover, Mr. Bevan operated as a de facto evaluator. Thus, for good reasons, his comparison chart drew RN’s close and critical attention. It will be examined in detail below. Item No. 1. This item is helpful as a contrast to the others, for here Mr. Bevan did exactly what a technical advisor should do: provide a concise, accurate, and objective summary of details contained in the proposals without making a subjective judgment as to which proposal is superior. Item No. 2. As Mr. Bevan admitted at hearing, the RFP did not include, as an evaluation criterion, the location of a proposer's base of operations. Testifying, he explained that, "in [his] mind, [a proposer's location] was not something that was in the RFP, but it was important to me." Hearing Transcript (“T.”) 59. Of course, it was not Mr. Bevan's place to make subjective judgments about what was valuable in the proposals—— that was for the evaluators. Further, even the evaluators could not properly take into account undisclosed evaluation criteria. Thus, this comparison was irrelevant and consideration thereof was contrary to the RFP and contrary to competition. Item No. 3. This comparison pertained to the evaluation criterion specified in section VIII, subsection F, which provided: Vendor must have a specific comprehensive plan in place to delineate OTETA collection/testing from general collecting/testing. Mr. Bevan dubbed RN's proposal "very weak" and Global's "good" primarily because Global's prototype OTETA form had a transparent drawing of a school bus superimposed over the writing, and its sample form for use by school police officers had a simple, freehand outline of an officer drawn on its face, whereas RN's forms did not have such "icons." Mr. Bevan believed that the pictures of the school bus and police officer would prevent the less intelligent applicants and employees from using the wrong form.4 Although reasonable people might disagree with Mr. Bevan's analysis of the respective merits of the proposals on this criterion, his conclusion was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The problem, however, is that Mr. Bevan was not a member of the committee, and his qualitative judgment went well beyond an even-handed explanation of a technical term or process, or an objective summary of the proposals' details. In other words, as this item clearly shows, Mr. Bevan assumed the role of evaluator. Item No. 4. Mr. Bevan's comparison of "blind sample testing" is interesting because the purpose of focusing on this discrete point, among all others relating to the proposers' price quotes for OTETA testing, seems to have been to blunt the advantage that RN otherwise would enjoy for having offered the lower price. (The comparison effectively says, RN's OTETA test is cheaper, yes, but Global adds value by performing blind samples, whereas RN may not provide this service.) Mr. Bevan could have written, however, with equal accuracy, that RN's price for OTETA testing "includes an adulterant panel" while Global's proposal makes "no mention of adulterant panels," which would have made RN's price quote appear even more attractive as against Global's. RN, however, did not complain about this aspect of Mr. Bevan's analysis; consequently, the undersigned has paid little attention to, and based no ultimate factual determinations or legal conclusions on, this item. Item No. 5. According to the Guide, at page 21, school police officers are required to be tested for eight drugs or classes of drugs. This is called an "8 panel" test or screen. Other employees, in contrast, need only be tested for five drugs or drug classes, using a "5 panel" screen. In his comparison, Mr. Bevan balanced Global's supposed price of $25.00 for police tests against RN's quote of $26.00 for an 8 panel drug screen. Yet, in its Fee Schedule, Global did not specify a separate charge for police tests, 8 panel tests, or 5 panel tests.5 Rather, Global quoted a price of $25.00 for "general employee drug testing." Based on his previous experience with Global, however, Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's charge for police tests would be $25.00, the same as the cost of testing other non-OTETA employees. Mr. Bevan's assumption was dubious at best, even assuming that Global previously had been charging $25.00 for police tests.6 At worst, if Global's historical pricing were ignored (as it should have been, being a fact extrinsic to Global's proposal), Mr. Bevan's assumption was bereft of factual or logical support; it was simply arbitrary. At a minimum, though, Mr. Bevan should have stated, on the comparison chart he provided to the committee, that he was making an assumption in Global’s favor. Without such a qualification, the chart——which purported to compare "apples to apples"——unfairly depicted RN's as unequivocally the costlier proposal on this item, for RN was shown truthfully to have quoted $26.00 for an 8 panel test. Moreover, significantly, Mr. Bevan omitted the fact that RN also had offered a price of $25.00 for an 8 panel screen without an adulterant panel. Thus, not only had Mr. Bevan potentially compared "apples to oranges," he had compounded the problem by making RN's quote for police testing appear higher than it necessarily would need to be. Making the matter worse still, Mr. Bevan represented that Global's price for blood alcohol testing was $25.00 versus $30.00 for the same procedure with RN. Global, however, had not offered to perform blood alcohol tests for $25.00 apiece; it had not quoted any price for such testing. Mr. Bevan assumed that Global's price would be $25.00 based on his past experience with the company. The validity of Mr. Bevan's assumption, again, is questionable;7 at the very least, his assumption should have been disclosed to the committee on the comparison chart. As drafted, without disclosure of Mr. Bevan's Global-friendly assumption, the comparison chart was grossly inequitable to RN, creating the possibly false impression that RN's price for blood alcohol testing was 20% higher than Global's. Finally, in comparing the cost proposals, Mr. Bevan failed to note that Global had quoted a hefty $75.00 surcharge for all "after hour services," meaning tests performed on weekdays between 5:00 p.m. and 8:30 a.m., and anytime on Saturday or Sunday. RN, in contrast, did not similarly propose a 400% price increase for after-hours work, and thus would have been favored by the comparison Mr. Bevan chose not to make. Item No. 6. The issue of collection sites would become crucial. Mr. Bevan's ultimate opinion——that RN had proposed "4 net sites" as against the "10 total sites" offered by Global——was highly subjective and clearly erroneous. To begin, RN's proposal in fact described a total of 17 collection sites——not 14 as Mr. Bevan incorrectly represented. At pages 12 and 13 of its proposal, RN responded sequentially to RFP section V, subsections K (collection sites desired in four quadrants of Miami-Dade County), L (mobile collection required at some Regional Transportation Centers), M (preference for a site near 1500 Biscayne Boulevard), and N (requiring at least one site each in the north and south ends of Miami-Dade County). In response to subsection K, RN proposed to use 14 Quest patient care centers, the locations of which were further described in maps attached to RN's proposal as Appendix B. Three of the 14 Quest centers were represented to meet the preference expressed in subsection M. And RN offered three additional "third party sites" (plainly meaning, in context, sites that were not operated by Quest) to satisfy subsection N. There was and is nothing confusing about RN's response regarding collection sites. No reasonable, fair-minded person, upon reading pages 12 and 13 of RN's proposal, could reasonably conclude that RN was offering a total of only 14 collection sites. Next, four of the Quest sites proposed by RN are located in Broward County. Mr. Bevan decided that these Broward sites should be ignored. The RFP, however, did not prohibit a proposer from offering sites outside Miami-Dade County, and, significantly, RN's proposal satisfied the RFP's technical requirements concerning collection site locations without the Broward sites. Thus, an evaluator (as opposed to Mr. Bevan, who was not one) might have regarded RN's Broward sites either an added value that made RN's proposal more attractive or an unwanted option that neither added to, nor detracted from, RN's proposal. Either way, however, this qualitative decision was not properly Mr. Bevan's to make as a “technical advisor.” Mr. Bevan then subtracted six sites from RN's total because the proposal stated that the sites were available for blood draws only. (In fact, RN's proposal indicated that nine of RN's 17 total sites collected blood samples only; three of the nine are in Broward County and six in Miami-Dade.) Mr. Bevan's decision that "blood only" sites should not be counted was plainly contrary to the RFP, under which blood alcohol testing clearly was a required service. While the evidence showed that the District considers urine collection sites to be much more valuable than “blood only” collection sites, which it views as practically worthless, the RFP nevertheless did not disclose this preference or the relative weight of urine sites versus “blood only” sites. Simply put, the RFP did not allow the evaluators to ignore “blood only” collection sites. At bottom, a fair and balanced comparison (unlike Mr. Bevan's) would have shown that RN had proposed 17 total sites (four in Broward, 13 in Miami-Dade), of which nine (three in Broward, six in Miami-Dade) were "blood only" sites, leaving eight sites (one in Broward, seven in Miami-Dade) that were available for the collection of both urine and blood. An "apples to apples" comparison of Miami-Dade sites available for blood and urine testing would have been Global, ten versus RN, seven. Each evaluator, however, in weighing the relative merits of the two proposals, should have considered RN's ten additional sites——there was no warrant in the RFP for excluding them from the mix à la Mr. Bevan's analysis——and made an independent determination of the value added by those sites. Item No. 7. On this point, Mr. Bevan was unfair to RN——but only a bit. His comparison intentionally drew a distinction between Global's "mobile collection" (the term used in section V.L. of the RFP) and RN's "on-site collection," subtly implying that RN’s proposal might not be responsive, or as responsive as Global’s, to the RFP’s technical guidelines. In fact, however, in its proposal at pages II-2, V-1, V-2, and VIII-1, Global expressly had described the function of its mobile unit as being to provide "on-site" collections; even Global, in other words, considered mobile collection and on-site collection to be fungible concepts. Mr. Bevan's comparison chart thus somewhat unfairly gave Global a gentle semantic boost while concomitantly giving RN a little linguistic gig.8 Standing alone, this comparison would not be noteworthy. Viewed in the light of other, unfair contrasts, however, Mr. Bevan's mobile collection/on-site collection dichotomy takes on a slight hue of partiality.9 Item No. 8. Here, Mr. Bevan made a comparison that was highly unfavorable to RN. One the one side, he portrayed Global attractively as the incumbent vendor that, during a four- year tenure, has not exposed the District to an adverse litigation outcome, and which also provides services to U.S. Sugar (an agricultural concern in South Florida). On RN's side there was only a question mark——nothing more. The meaning was obvious: Global has good credentials, but RN's experience and litigation track record are questionable. This was terribly unfair. RN's proposal included two pages of references listing a number of current clients. Mr. Bevan's explanation at hearing for failing to acknowledge any of RN's references on his comparison chart was that RN's references "were much longer" and would not fit on the page, and that he had "put down what [he] could in the amount of time [he] had." 89. This explanation utterly fails to account for Mr. Bevan's misleading and prejudicial use of a question mark to describe RN's documented experience; it is not credible and is rejected.10 Regarding exposure to lawsuits, Mr. Bevan's comparison was gratuitous. The RFP did not ask for information concerning lawsuits; and the lack of adverse litigation outcomes, while perhaps interesting and even relevant, was not an evaluation criterion. Further, Mr. Bevan was aware of Global's litigation track record not because of information contained in Global's proposal (for such data was not included therein) but because he previously had monitored litigation against the District arising from OTETA testing. Despite relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal for this comparison, Mr. Bevan made no attempt to determine whether RN had exposed a client to an adverse litigation outcome and hence had no idea whether RN had or had not done so. Yet, despite the absence of any basis in logic or fact for such a conclusion, the question mark in RN's column (adjacent to the favorable comment about Global) strongly implied that RN either had omitted material information about litigation or disclosed something disturbing or questionable. The unavoidable net effect of this prejudicial and unfair comparison was to put an exclamation point on the fact that Global had served satisfactorily as the incumbent vendor (and thus was a safe choice)——while portraying RN as a pig in a poke (and hence a gamble). Item No. 9. Mr. Bevan shone a flattering light on Laboratory Corporation of America ("LCA," the laboratory used by Global)——only one glitch in four years!——while labeling Quest Diagnostics ("Quest," used by RN) "questionable." This was problematic for several reasons. First, the RFP did not specify a preference for any particular laboratory. Second, Mr. Bevan's judgment was not based on the respective proposals but on his personal experiences. He had been pleased with LCA's services and preferred that the District continue to do business with that laboratory. But, as the comparison chart pointedly neglected to mention, Mr. Bevan's negative opinion of Quest was based on just one incident in which Quest had been slow in reporting the results of a retest that had been requested by an individual who had initially tested positive at LCA and requested that Quest perform the confirmatory test.11 Third, the judgment expressed on the relative merits of the proposers' laboratories was plainly qualitative; in other words, Mr. Bevan was evaluating the proposals, which was not properly his role, for he was not a de jure member of the committee. Item No. 10. Mr. Bevan's representation to the committee that LCA performed adulterant testing at no cost to the District was not based on Global's proposal, which neither mentioned adulterant testing nor quoted a price for such service, but on his experience with Global. (Incidentally, neither Mr. Bevan's testimony, nor any other evidence, persuasively established that Global or LCA had, in fact, been performing adulterant testing. Rather, the District’s employees assumed that such was the case——as it may, or may not, have been.) Aside from the impropriety of relying on facts extrinsic to Global's proposal, Mr. Bevan's contrast with RN's proposal ("TestSure is broken out as a separate entity") was both incorrect and incomplete, producing a false, "apples to oranges" comparison. First, as four pages of descriptive information included in RN's proposal made clear, TestSure is Quest's trademark for its adulterant testing protocol, which Quest considers a "breakthrough in technology for the industry." Contrary to Mr. Bevan's statement, TestSure is not a "separate entity." Thus, the apparently-intended implication that RN's price was higher because it was proposing to use a “separate entity” (in addition to Quest) for adulterant testing was untrue. Second, the information provided by RN concerning TestSure, rather than being a negative strike against RN's proposal, as Mr. Bevan's comparison suggested, was (or should have been) helpful in evaluating RN's proposal, a plus. While the committee certainly could have chosen to discount or ignore Quest's glowing review of its own product as puffery, the fact was that while Global's proposal said nothing about adulterant testing, RN had submitted some information on the subject. Finally, Mr. Bevan did not specify that his remark about Global's supposed offer to provide adulterant testing at "no charge" was merely an assumption that, for all that appears in Global's proposal, may or may not be true. This omission was especially unfair to RN because RN had stated explicitly in its cost proposal that an additional dollar would be charged for an adulterant panel——and that the District could save the dollar by electing not to have the panel performed on general tests. An impartial summary would have acknowledged RN's prices for general tests, both with and without an adulterant panel, and noted that Global's proposal was silent as to whether its quote of $25.00 for general testing included an adulterant panel. To state unqualifiedly that Global would provide adulterant testing for free, when its proposal said nothing of the sort, was patently inequitable. The First Evaluation and Recommendation After meeting for two hours on April 11, and having considered Mr. Bevan’s comparison chart, the committee voted to recommend that the contract be awarded to Global. In the minutes of the meeting, it was reported that [b]oth Proposals were evaluated according to the criteria outlined in the proposal. A comparison was made of services provided, locations for testing, cost, and other requirements. The committee recommended that Global MRO be awarded the contract. In addition to providing a reasonable fee schedule, the locations for drug testing, and the prior outstanding service provided by Global MRO, supports the committee’s decision. RN timely protested the intended award, the Board referred the matter to DOAH, and a final hearing was scheduled for July 30, 2001. Before the final hearing, however, the Board determined that the April 11, 2001, meeting might have occurred in violation of the Sunshine Law. Accordingly, the final hearing was postponed to enable the committee to reconvene in a public meeting for the purpose of reevaluating the proposals in compliance with the Sunshine Law. The Second Evaluation and Recommendation The committee met for a second time on September 4, 2001, pursuant to a prior written notice of proceedings. The September 4 meeting was open to the public. Although each of the original members of the committee was asked to return, two of them——Mr. Diaz and Ms. Freeman——were unable to attend the second meeting. In their places appeared subordinates as “representatives,” Pat Parham for Mr. Diaz and Enrique Sacasa for Ms. Freeman. Four members of this committee had no direct involvement in or experience with the drug screening services that were the subject of the contract for which proposals had been solicited. Of the five, only Ms. Kidney was knowledgeable about the program areas and service requirements for which contractual services were being sought. Once again, staff persons were present, ostensibly to answer technical questions. Mr. Bevan and Mr. Conde returned. With them this time were Barbara M. Moss, District Director, Office of Professional Standards; Brenda Miles, Executive Director, Professional and Technical Staffing; and Linda Cantin, Supervisor, Division of Procurement Management. Mr. Bevan did not distribute his comparison chart at the committee’s public meeting and made only a couple of comments there in response to questions. After conferring, the committee found both proposals to be responsive and voted unanimously to recommend that Global be awarded the contract. In the minutes of the September 4, 2001, meeting, it was reported that [t]he committee agreed that both proposals were good, and clearly stated an understanding of the work to be performed. There were concerns expressed, however, regarding [RN’s proposal] in reference to the location and convenience of collection sites. . . . . [Global] was selected because of the larger number of collection sites for urine that are available and the locations of these sites throughout various parts of the county, which would be of convenience to applicants and employees, and its experience. RN’s Protest By letter to the Board’s counsel dated September 6, 2001, RN amended its pending protest of the first recommendation to challenge the second proposed award with a newly-revised statement of grounds.12 As bases for relief, RN asserted that Global’s proposal was materially non-responsive for failure to comply with several of the RFP’s technical requirements; it also alleged that the committee’s evaluation had been flawed in several respects. Ultimate Factual Determinations Certain Ultimate findings of fact have been rendered below under the heading “Conclusions of Law.” This has been done for organizational convenience and for clarity of analysis. Accordingly, the findings announced in paragraphs 114, 120, 130, 134, 156, 159, 161-64, 167, and 169, infra, are hereby incorporated as Findings of Fact, as if fully set forth in the instant section of this Recommended Order.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board enter a Final Order rescinding the proposed award to Global. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of February, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of February, 2002.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a registered Nurse, and she is registered with a national organization as a respiratory therapist. A respiratory therapist works with patients who have respiratory, spinal, lung, or drug abuse problems. One procedure used by such therapists to determine if a patient is breathing properly is an arterio blood gas test. The petitioner has performed thousands of much tests. Until the Respondent adopted rules pursuant to the Florida Clinical Laboratory Law, there was no requirement for licensure to perform arterio blood gas tests. There is now a special category for licensure as a laboratory technologist in a specialty called "Chemistry-Special" which would qualify an individual to perform such tests, but no other clinical laboratory procedures. The petitioner submitted an application for licensure in the "Chemistry-Special" specialty on September 29, 1977. She did not take the test required by the Respondent, and accordingly her license application has been denied.
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent's employment with Petitioner as a school bus driver should be terminated because he violated his rehabilitation contract and Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines by testing positive for cocaine.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida public school district. Respondent was employed by Petitioner as a school bus driver for about ten years and three months prior to his suspension without pay in the summer of 1996. The position of school bus driver is a safety-sensitive position. In June of 1989, Petitioner adopted a drug-free workplace policy. Petitioner directed its superintendent to develop guidelines to implement the policy. In December of 1991, Petitioner adopted Drug-Free Workplace Guidelines, GBCBA-G, which state as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. Employees in job classification which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services . . . . The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. * * * Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four hour notification . . . . Random testing of employees shall not be conducted. Respondent signed a notice to all applicants and employees on April 15, 1992, advising him in advance that the drug-free workplace policy would become effective on June 15, 1992. This notice stated as follows: All pre-employment applicants will be drug-tested prior to being hired. All employees who require fitness-of-duty examination will be drug-tested at least once annually. An employee will be drug-tested when reasonable suspicion of substance abuse exists. An employee will be drug-tested following any work-related accident or mishap involving actual or potential injury or property damage. An employee will be drug-tested during any probationary period following a drug- related suspension or approved drug treatment program. Petitioner acknowledged that he received a copy of the drug-free workplace policy and understood the consequences of violating the drug-free workplace guidelines by signing the notice. The notice clearly states that failure to comply with the guidelines could result in termination of employment and forfeiture of eligibility for workers' compensation medical and indemnity benefits. The guidelines for the drug-free workplace policy are a part of Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the instructional and non-instructional bargaining units of the Alachua County Education Association (ACEA). The ACEA ratified the policy and guidelines in January of 1993. The Petitioner's drug-free workplace policy and guidelines have been continuously in effect since that time. Article XI, Section 1(B) of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement between Petitioner and the ACEA requires Petitioner to provide school bus drivers with an annual physical as required by the rules of the State Board of Education. Appendix F of the 1995-1996 Collective Bargaining Agreement sets forth the drug-free workplace guidelines. It states as follows in pertinent part: The purpose of these guidelines is to comply with the Drug-free Workplace Act of 1988, 34 CFR Part 85, Subpart F, which requires grantees to certify that they will maintain a drug-free workplace. * * * Pre-employment Drug Abuse Screening examinations shall be required to prevent hiring individuals who use drugs or individuals whose use of drugs indicates a potential for impaired or unsafe job performance or for high risk positions such as bus drivers. * * * Employees in job classifications which require an annual physical will be required to submit to a drug screening as part of the annual physical. * * * As a condition of continued employment, current employees shall submit to drug screening when reasonable suspicion exists to believe that an employee is using a substance that is impairing the employee and/or his job performance . . . . * * * When a reasonable suspicion exists, the Director of Employee Relations shall be contacted. The employee, if a member of a bargaining unit, shall be afforded the opportunity to have ACEA representation. The employee will be provided an opportunity to explain his/her condition. The employee will be provided with information regarding available drug counseling, rehabilitation, assistance programs, and leave options. A rehabilitation contract including drug testing may be agreed upon. Failure to participate in a treatment program following a positive drug screening will result in disciplinary action, up to and including termination. Due process will be followed. All testing shall be conducted by a laboratory certified by the State of Florida as a Medical and Urine Drug Testing Forensic Laboratory which complies with the Scientific and Technical Guidelines for Federal Drug Testing Programs and the Standards for Certification of Laboratories engaged in Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. The laboratory shall be chosen jointly by ACEA and SBAC if the employee is a member of the bargaining unit. The procedures established by the laboratory shall be followed in administering drug tests to employees. Employees who seek voluntary assistance for substance abuse may not be disciplined for seeking assistance. Employees shall be subject to all employer rules, regulations, and job performance standards with the understanding that an employee enrolled in a rehabilitation program is receiving treatment for an illness. Employees who return to work after completion of a rehabilitation program shall be subject to follow-up drug testing with twenty-four (24) hour notification. Any employee who refuses the drug test or subsequently tests positive may be disciplined up to and including termination. Random testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law . . . . On December 13, 1994, Respondent signed the following statement: I have received, read, and understand the training materials on drug and alcohol testing under the U. S. Department of Transportation regulations. In January of 1995, Petitioner began complying with an additional drug testing program pursuant to a federal statute entitled Omnibus Transportation Employee Testing Act (OTETA). Petitioner did not formally adopt a written policy or develop written guidelines to implement the new drug-testing program. Petitioner's Collective Bargaining Agreement with the ACEA does not refer to OTETA or the federal regulations implementing it. Mandatory procedures governing drug testing in transportation workplaces under U. S. Department of Transportation regulations require that drug tests be performed using split samples. A "split specimen collection" consists of one urination followed by the splitting of that specimen into two bottles. If the primary specimen tests positive, the employee may request that the split specimen be sent to a different laboratory for testing. The majority of drug testing performed in this country is single specimen collection. Drug testing pursuant to state law and rules and the regulations of the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services does not require employers to utilize split samples in the collection process. A split specimen generally is used only for purposes of testing pursuant to the regulations of the U. S. Department of Transportation. The U. S. Department of Transportation requires Petitioner to provide the following testing in transportation workplaces: (a) pre-employment testing; (b) post-accident testing; (c) random testing; (d) reasonable suspicion testing; return-to-duty testing; and (f) follow-up testing. OTETA does not require a routine fitness-for-duty drug test as part of an annual medical examination. State law does require such a test. OTETA requires random testing and post-accident testing. State law does not require these tests. Petitioner's guidelines as adopted in 1991 specifically prohibit random drug testing of employees. However, Petitioner's guidelines, as incorporated into the Collective Bargaining Agreement, state that "[r]andom testing of employees shall not be conducted except as required by state or federal law." In June of 1995, Respondent received a routine fitness- for-duty drug test as part of his annual physical examination. The test yielded a positive result for cannabinoids and cocaine metabolites. Respondent did not contest the results of the test. On June 22, 1995, Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations had a conference with Respondent. During the conference, Respondent signed a medical records release and a rehabilitation contract. The rehabilitation contract stated as follows: . . . positive results indicating alcohol and/or illegal mind-altering substances, following the initiation of this contract, is prima facie evidence of violation of this contract. I understand that failure to comply with the terms of this contract may result in termination of my employment with the School Board of Alachua County, Florida. Respondent subsequently took leave to attend to his rehabilitation. By letter dated August 21, 1995, Petitioner's rehabilitation counselor at the Corner Drug Store reported that Respondent's drug tests from July 5th through August 16th were negative for illegal drugs. The counselor also informed Petitioner that Respondent had attended weekly intervention group meetings as required under the rehabilitation contract. The counselor did not recommend further treatment. A substance abuse professional, other than one who provided treatment, had to assess Respondent in order for him to return to work. In August of 1995, a clinical psychologist from The Education Center evaluated Respondent. The psychologist recommended that Respondent return to work subject to five years participation in the "random drug screening program that is in addition to the standard screening program." Respondent returned to his duties on or about August 26, 1995. His follow-up drug tests performed on October 25, 1995, January 17, 1996, and March 4, 1996, were reported as negative. On the morning of June 10, 1996, Petitioner informed Respondent that he was scheduled that day to take his regular annual physical examination, including a drug test. Respondent went to a medical facility in the northwest part of Gainesville for the physical exam during that morning. He went to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in the southwest part of Gainesville after work for his drug test. The following are routine procedures when a person goes to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville for a urine drug test: The front desk checks the donor's photographic identification, such as a driver's license. The collector takes the photo ID and the donor into a separate room to sign in. The collector asks the donor to remove any hat, if he or she is wearing one, and to empty his or her pockets onto the counter. The collector watches the donor wash and dry his or her hands. The donor selects a testing kit, which is individually packaged in a plastic bag, from a box. The kit contains a urinalysis bottle. The collector opens the bag, breaks the seal on the specimen bottle, and gives it to the donor. The collector shows the donor how much urine is required on the bottle. The collector takes the donor to the bathroom. The donor is informed that the toilet water contains bluing. The donor is instructed not to flush the toilet. After the collector leaves the bathroom, he or she cuts off the water to the sink using a lever outside the door. The donor stays in the restroom no longer than two and a half or three minutes. The donor comes out of the bathroom and hands the specimen bottle to the collector who is waiting outside. The collector checks the amount of urine in the bottle to be sure the quantity is at least 40 ML. The collector measures the temperature by means of a gauge on the outside of the bottle to be sure that the temperature is between 90 and 100 degrees Fahrenheit. The collector notes this information on the chain-of-custody form. The bottle's cap is screwed on tightly. The collector also checks the appearance of the urine for any unusual color. The collector asks the donor to place his or her initials in the following three places: on the bag; on the chain-of-custody form peel-off label; and on the security seal. The security seal is placed over the top of the bottle. The collector dates and also initials the peel-off label. The collector then removes the label from the form and applies it to the bottle. The collector completes and signs part II of the multi-part chain-of-custody form. The collector separates copies one through three from copies four through seven. The collector hands the donor copies four through seven so that he or she can fill out part III with the donor's name, address and two telephone numbers. The donor signs the form certifying that he or she provided the specimen to the collector, that the bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in the donor's presence, and that the information on the form and on the bottle label is correct. The collector completes part IV of the multi- part forms, copies one through three, initiating the chain-of-custody documentation. The specimen bottle is then placed inside the plastic bag, which is sealed. Copies one through three of the multi-part form, which do not contain the name of the donor, are placed in a pouch on the side of the bag. Copies four through seven of the multi-part form are not sent with the specimen. Instead, one copy is retained at the collection site. Another copy is sent to the employer. The third copy is given to the donor. The bagged specimen bottle is kept in a box in a locked refrigerator with other packaged specimens prior to shipment by courier to the testing laboratory. The collector gives the donor a written checklist showing the steps to be taken in the urine collection process. The donor is asked to read the list and check to make sure that the procedures were followed. The donor signs this form indicating that the collector followed all appropriate steps in the collection process. Once a collector begins the collection process, he or she completes the process alone. No other collector at the site may perform any of the required steps or safeguards. In this case, Respondent signed the following statement in part III of the multi-part chain-of-custody form: I certify that I provided my specimen(s) to the collector, that the specimen bottle was sealed with a tamper-proof seal in my presence, and that the information provided on this form and on the label attached to the specimen bottle is correct. The collector gave Respondent a copy of the donor's checklist to read and verify that the collection procedures were followed. Respondent signed the donor's checklist. Elizabeth Verbeke was the person at Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Gainesville, Florida, who collected Respondent's urine specimen on June 10, 1996. She usually collected 50 to 60 urine specimens per week for drug testing. She has no independent recollection of collecting Respondent's specimen. However, there is no reason to believe that she failed to follow the laboratory's routine procedures in this case. Ms. Verbeke entered the word "none" at question five of part II on the chain-of-custody form, indicating the collection of Respondent's specimen was entirely routine. She noted no irregularities of any kind. The chain-of-custody identification number for Respondent's urine specimen was 026A13381. In part II of the chain-of-custody form, Ms. Verbeke indicated that she checked Respondent's picture identification, collected the urine specimen, and read the specimen's temperature within four minutes of collection. The specimen's temperature of 94 degrees Fahrenheit was within the proper range. The volume of the specimen was at least 40 milliliters. Later in the day on June 10, 1996, a courier picked up Respondent's urine specimen and transported it to Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia. The laboratory performs forensic drug testing, as well as other kinds of tests. It processes about 8,000 specimens a month. The accessioner at the laboratory receives the specimens from the courier. Next, the accessioner examines the packaging and the sample bottles for any possible compromise of the security seals. Then, the accessioner compares each specimen bottle with the custody documents to ensure that they are accompanied by the correct paperwork. The accessioner places the urine specimens in batches with approximately 40 in each group. The accessioner pours a small portion of each specimen (an "aliquot"), one at a time, into a collection cup for analysis. The original specimen bottle with the remaining portion of the specimen is placed into temporary refrigerated storage until the initial test is deemed negative or positive. If the test is positive, the accessioner retrieves the original specimen bottle from temporary storage and pours a second aliquot for confirmation testing. The original specimen bottle, with the remaining portion of the specimen, is then placed in long-term frozen storage. Once testing is completed, the aliquots are discarded. Urine drug testing consists first of a rapid and relatively inexpensive procedure which is known as an immunoassay test. A positive result is confirmed by a more sophisticated and expensive technique called gas chromatography/mass spectrometry (GC/MS). The second test, if properly performed, is one hundred percent accurate. The function of the initial test (immunoassay), is strictly to weed out the negatives. Perhaps 90 percent of all the samples that the laboratory processes are negatives. The initial test also identifies which drug group or groups should be the focus of the extraction procedure because there is no universal extraction procedure for all drugs. The second test (GC/MS), makes an unequivocal identification of a molecule based on its molecular structure. If the confirmation test is positive, the laboratory reports the results to the medical review officer (MRO) as positive for the particular drug group. On June 10, 1996, the laboratory's accessioner received Respondent's specimen from a courier. The specimen's chain-of- custody identification number was 026A13381. The accessioner assigned the specimen a unique lab accession number, number 01298048. Subsequently, Respondent's specimen was tested in the laboratory in the usual manner. The initial test on Respondent's specimen used the total cocaine metabolite screening method. When this method is used, any compound similar to cocaine in the specimen will give a positive result. The initial test on Respondent's specimen was reported as "8H," which means that it was a presumptive positive. For the immunoassay test, any compound similar to cocaine in an amount equal to or in excess of 300 nanograms per milliliter (ng/ml) is positive. In the confirmation test, Respondent's specimen tested positive for benzoylecgonine, a cocaine metabolite. After a person consumes cocaine, benzoylecgonine is present in that person's urine specimen. Respondent's specimen contained 303 ng/ml of benzoylecgonine. For the GC/MS test, any amount of benzoylecgonine equal to or in excess of 150 ng/ml is positive. Respondent's urine sample had an abnormally low level of creatinine. Creatinine is a waste product produced by every human being. Respondent's sample had a creatinine level of 17 milligrams per deciliter (mg/dl). Any creatinine level below 20 mg/dl may indicate dilution. When the creatinine level is low, it is possible that the donor consumed a large amount of fluid at least two to three hours before donating the sample in an attempt to dilute the specimen. It is also possible that water was added to the sample. The laboratory checked the specific gravity of Respondent's sample to determine whether the sample was adulterated. Respondent's specimen passed the specific gravity test. It had a specific gravity of 1.004. Anything over 1.003 is within normal range for specific gravity. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that Respondent's sample was not diluted outside of his body because the specific gravity of the specimen was normal and because the specimen's temperature was 94 degrees within four minutes of collection. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., inserted blind quality controls in the initial testing runs to determine whether the test analysis was valid. Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., receives proficiency test inspections by the U. S. Department of Health and Human Services and the State of Florida. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, was certified by the National Institute of Drug Abuse, the State of Florida, and the College of American Pathologists to perform the kind of test at issue here. A scientist employed at Doctor's Laboratory, Inc., certified that the final result of the testing performed on Respondent's specimen was accurate. The greater weight of the evidence indicates that the tests of Respondent's urine specimen were performed in conformity with all applicable testing guidelines. On June 11, 1996, Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., in Valdosta, Georgia, reported Respondent's test results to the MRO in Brunswick, Georgia, as being positive for benzoylecgonine. Dr. Robert H. Miller was the MRO who received the Respondent's drug test report. Dr. Miller is certified as an MRO through the American Association of Medical Review Officers. He works for MRO Services, Inc. The function of the MRO is to ascertain whether there is any medical reason for a given test result. If the individual has a legitimate prescription for a medication that showed up on a drug screen and there is no safety concern over the individual having a significant blood level of that particular substance at work, then the report to the employer is negative. In this case, the MRO reviewed the chain-of-custody form. He did not find any irregularity in the chain-of-custody for the Respondent's specimen. The MRO's office telephoned Petitioner on June 12, 1996, and requested that Petitioner have Respondent contact the MRO. Respondent returned the MRO's call that same day. During their conversation, the MRO informed Respondent about his drug test report. The MRO asked Respondent whether there might be any medical reason for the positive test result. Respondent informed the MRO that he had taken a prescription for a toothache. Respondent did not furnish the MRO with the name of a specific drug to account for the positive test result. Benzoylecgonine is the metabolite measured to identify cocaine. Cocaine is rarely used in ear, nose, and throat medical procedures, such as bronchoscopy. It is not available by prescription. The MRO properly determined that there was no medical reason for Respondent's positive drug test result. The MRO explained to Respondent that a re-test of his specimen was available. The MRO gave Respondent a toll-free telephone number to call if he wanted a re-test performed. By letter dated June 12, 1996, the MRO informed Petitioner that Respondent's drug test was positive for cocaine. By correspondence dated June 13, 1996, the MRO provided Respondent with directions for obtaining a re-test of his specimen. Respondent did not request a re-test. MRO Services, Inc. receives about 1000 reports of drug tests from Doctors' Laboratory, Inc., each month. In the past three years, MRO Services, Inc., has not documented any cases where a re-test of a specimen created a discrepancy with initial test results produced by Doctors' Laboratory, Inc. Petitioner's Director of Employee Relations conducted a pre-termination conference with Respondent on June 18, 1996. The purpose of this meeting was to give Respondent an opportunity to present mitigating circumstances. In the conference, Respondent indicated his belief that a co-worker, Debra Martin, put cocaine in his drinking water without his knowledge. The Director of Employee Relations talked to individuals that Respondent thought might have witnessed his activities and the activities of Debra Martin on June 10, 1996. During the time in question, Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing and waxing buses. Respondent and Ms. Martin often would get drinking water for each other. Ice was available in coolers located in a building near the gas pumps and washrack. Water was available from a spigot next to the place where Respondent and Ms. Martin were washing the buses. Ms. Martin specifically denied that she ever put cocaine or any other illegal drug in Respondent's drinking water. Ms. Martin also tested positive for a controlled substance on June 10, 1996. She subsequently signed a rehabilitation contract with Petitioner. After completing her rehabilitation treatment, Ms. Martin returned to work as a school bus driver for Petitioner. Persuasive evidence indicates that Ms. Martin did not put cocaine in Respondent's drinking water without his knowledge at any time prior to his June 10, 1996, drug test. By letter dated June 19, 1996, Respondent was informed that the Superintendent intended to recommend that Petitioner terminate Respondent's employment.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner enter a Final Order, terminating the employment of Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of September, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUZANNE F. HOOD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of September, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas L. Wittmer, Esquire Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601 Francisco M. Negron, Jr., Esquire Florida Education Association/United 118 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1700 Robert W. Hughes, Superintendent Alachua County School Board 620 East University Avenue Gainesville, Florida 32601-5498 Michael H. Olenick, Esquire Department of Education The Capitol, Plaza Level 08 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Frank T. Brogan, Commissioner Department of Education The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant findings of fact are made: The Department is charged under Chapter 39, Florida Statutes, to conduct background screenings on individuals employed by any of its providers of delinquency services or programs who are working with juvenile offenders in positions of special trust. The purpose of the background screening is to determine if the individual has committed an offense which would disqualify the individual from working in positions of special trust with juvenile offenders. Petitioner was employed by the Lakeland Marine Institute (LMI) on May 24, 1994, as a counselor. LMI is a step-down program for juvenile offenders being released from boot camps and detention centers. A large percentage of the juveniles coming through LMI are convicted of drug offenses. During 1994, LMI was providing delinquency service and programs for the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) in connection with juvenile offenders who came through its facility and, as such, was an HRS provider. Because Petitioner was working in a position of special trust with juvenile offenders at LMI he was required to undergo background screening. Petitioner's fingerprints were taken on May 24, 1994, and submitted to HRS for processing. It is not clear from the record if HRS conducted a background screening on Petitioner. In any event, HRS did not provide LMI with any results from Petitioner's background screening. Chapter 94-209, Laws of Florida, transferred certain responsibilities concerning juvenile offenders from HRS to the Department of Juvenile Justice, a newly-created department. On January 1, 1995, the Department began background screenings on all of its providers' employees who were working in positions of special trust with juvenile offenders on January 1, 1995. On June 1, 1995, LMI submitted to the Department a Request for Preliminary FCIC/NCIC and DHSMV Screening Check and a Request for Preliminary FAHIS Screening Check on Petitioner. As part of the screening process, Petitioner signed and filed with the Department an Affidavit of Good Moral Character. His signature on this standard form affidavit indicates that Petitioner had not been convicted of any drug offenses under Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. However, it does not appear that Petitioner was attempting to conceal his convictions because at the same time he disclosed those convictions in his application for employment. The FAHIS Screening Check was negative, in that no abuse history was found. Likewise, the results of the DHSMV Screening Check indicated that Petitioner's record was clear. Preliminary FCIC/NCIC Screening Check indicated that Petitioner had been convicted of possessing cocaine with intent to sell and the sale of cocaine, a second degree felony and a disqualifying offense. The screening check was rated as Unfavorable/Disqualifying. Petitioner's criminal record revealed that Petitioner had committed the following offenses: Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - March 28, 1991. Sale of Cocaine - March 28, 1991. Both of these offenses were in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony and a disqualifying offense under Section 39.076(3)(y), Florida Statutes. Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - January 7, 1993. Sale of cocaine - January 7, 1993. Both of these offenses were in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony and a disqualifying offense under Section 39.076(3)(y), Florida Statutes. Possession of cocaine with intent to sell - February 18, 1993. Sale of cocaine - February 18, 1993, Both of these offenses were in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes, a second degree felony and a disqualifying offense under Section 39.076(3)(y), Florida Statutes. Originally, Petitioner was placed on probation for the offenses committed on March 28, 1991 However, when Petitioner committed the above listed offenses in 1993, probation was revoked. On June 10, 1993, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to all of the above offenses. Petitioner was adjudicated guilty on all counts and sentenced to a term of seven years on each count listed with each sentence to run concurrently with the other sentences. Additionally, Petitioner was placed on seven years probation on each count listed above with each term of probation to run concurrently with the other terms of probation. However, the terms of probation were to run consecutively to the sentences imposed. Petitioner freely admits that he was on drugs for a period of time before his incarceration in 1993, and that the offenses were committed for the purpose of paying for his drug habit and not as a means of making money. The offenses committed by Petitioner in 1991, were his first brush with the law, and at that time Petitioner was 38 years of age. Although the March 28, 1991, offenses involved the sale of cocaine within a 1000 feet of the Fort Meade Middle School, there is no evidence that Petitioner ever sold, or attempted to sell, illegal drugs to a minor. Petitioner served his time at Hardee Correctional Institution and Madison Correctional Institution. From the record it appears that Petitioner was eligible for early release and was released by the Department of Corrections (DOC) on February 8, 1994, and placed on probation. Petitioner began his rehabilitation while still incarcerated by DOC by participating in the DOC Drug Abuse Program and Prison Fellowship. Petitioner has continued his rehabilitation since being released from prison through his work at LMI, the church and the community. Since his release from prison, and during his tenure with LMI, approximately 15 months, Petitioner has gained the respect and support of his fellow workers and supervisors at LMI. Also, during his tenure with LMI, Petitioner has gained the respect and support of Department employees with whom he came in contact as a result of his work with juvenile offenders at LMI. Petitioner has complied with all conditions of his probation, including random drug testing with all reports showing negative results, and has shown a positive attitude toward community supervision while on probation. Since being placed on probation, Petitioner has gained the support and respect of the Correctional Probation Officers who handle his case. Since his release, Petitioner has not associated with the criminal element with whom he had association before his conviction. Since his release, Petitioner has gained the respect and support of the community of Fort Meade, specifically the religious and school community, for his work with children. During his tenure with LMI, Petitioner worked closely with children. Petitioner has counseled children and their parents without any problems. There is competent substantial evidence to establish facts to show that Petitioner has rehabilitated himself such that he will not present a danger to the safety or well being of children and that he is of good moral character so as to justify an exemption from disqualification, notwithstanding Petitioner's age when he committed the offenses or that the offenses are close in time to the request for exemption or that he has only served approximately two years and two months of a seven year probation and is still under supervised probation.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Juvenile Justice enter a final order granting Petitioner's request for an exemption from disqualification from employment in a position of special trust. RECOMMENDED this 23rd day of April, 1996, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. CAVE, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of April, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-5330J The following constitutes my specific rulings, pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Petitioner and the Department in this case. Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact 1 through 9 are set forth more as argument than findings of fact. However, where a proposed finding of fact can be gleaned from the argument it has adopted in Findings of Fact 1 through 22, with the exception of Petitioner's argument in proposed findings of fact 1, 2, 5 and 6 that his background screening with HRS had been completed by HRS and was favorable but was being disregarded by the Department. There is no evidence that HRS completed this screening or that the Department had any knowledge of any results of such screening. Department's Proposed Findings of Fact. Proposed findings of fact 1 through 12 are adopted in substance as modified in Findings of Fact 1 through 22. Proposed findings of fact 13-15 are covered in the Preliminary Statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100 Phillip White, Pro se 1370 North Charleston Fort Meade, Florida 33841 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3100
The Issue The issue in the case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint filed by the Petitioner are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed against the Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Since July 1993, and at all times material to this case, the Respondent has been licensed as a registered nurse holding Florida license number RN-2711762. On April 27, 1999, the Respondent was employed as a nurse by "Qwest, Inc." On April 27, 1999, the Respondent submitted to an employer-ordered drug screening at her workplace. The drug screen was conducted by use of a urine sample collected by Kenneth Stanley. Mr. Stanley owns and operates a business that specializes in collection of urine samples for purposes of drug screens. Mr. Stanley utilized the sample collection guidelines adopted by the "Florida Drug Free Workplace" program and the Florida Department of Transportation. Upon arriving at "Qwest, Inc." Mr. Stanley secured the rest room where the urine samples would be taken by placing blue dye in the toilet water and covering the faucet with a surgical glove secured with tape. Apparently, the purpose of the process is to prohibit the contamination of a urine sample by dilution. Mr. Stanley set up a table in the area outside the rest room to permit the processing of the samples and the completion of paperwork. Mr. Stanley called the Respondent into the area and verified her identification. He began to complete paperwork identifying the Respondent. Mr. Stanley removed a plastic cup from a sealed package that was opened for use in obtaining the sample from her. He provided the cup to her and asked her to enter the rest room, fill the cup to the proper level, set the cup on the sink counter, and then exit the rest room without washing her hands or flushing the toilet. Mr. Stanley retrieved the cup immediately after the Respondent notified him that she had completed the process and brought it back to his table. He placed the sample into a sealed tube and completed the paperwork identifying the sample as having been provided by the Respondent. The protocol utilized by Mr. Stanley requires the sample-provider to remain in the room until all paperwork is completed and the sample is properly sealed and packaged for shipment. The Respondent asserts that she left the room after providing the sample to Mr. Stanley and that Mr. Stanley failed to maintain appropriate security for her sample, permitting it to be contaminated by another employee. The evidence establishes that the Respondent remained in the area and was in the presence of the sample at all times during the collection, sealing and identification process. The Respondent was present when her sample was identified, processed, and packaged for shipment. There is no credible evidence that another employee of "Qwest, Inc." contaminated the Respondent's urine sample or that Mr. Stanley failed to maintain the proper identification of the Respondent's sample from the point of collection through the point of shipment. Mr. Stanley shipped the Respondent's sealed urine sample to Clinical Reference Laboratory (CRL) in Lenexa, Kansas. The sealed sample was received and processed by CRL, which similarly receives and processes approximately one million samples annually for purposes of drug screen testing. In performing urinalysis drug screen tests, CRL initially performs a preliminary test called an "enzyme immunoassay" on a portion of the sample. If the results of the preliminary test indicate the presence of a substance, CRL tests a second portion of the sample using a gas chromatography mass spectrometer to confirm the results of the first test and to quantify the specific amount of drug present in the urine sample. The enzyme immunoassay performed on the Respondent's urine sample indicated the presence of marijuana metabolites. Marijuana metabolites are a chemical substance contained in the Cannabis plant. Cannabis is a controlled substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. The gas chromatography mass spectrometer test performed on the Respondent's urine sample confirmed the presence of marijuana metabolites and indicated the specific amount of drug present in the urine sample as 28 nanograms of marijuana metabolites per milliliter of urine. Based on the results of the testing at CRL, the evidence establishes that the Respondent's urine sample taken on April 27, 1999 tested positive for marijuana. There is no evidence that the Respondent had a prescription or a valid medical reason for using marijuana.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Petitioner enter a Final Order reprimanding the Respondent, imposing a fine of $250 and requiring the completion of an appropriate continuing education course related to substance abuse in health professions. The continuing education course shall be in addition to those continuing education requirements otherwise required for licensure. Further, the Final Order should further require that the Respondent participate in an evaluation by the Intervention Project for Nurses (IPN) within 60 days of the issuance of the Final Order, and comply with the treatment recommendations, if any, made by the IPN, or suffer suspension of licensure until compliance with this requirement is established. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Ruth R. Stiehl, Ph.D., R.N., Executive Director Board of Nursing Department of Health 4080 Woodcock Drive, Suite 202 Jacksonville, Florida 32207-2714 Elizabeth A. Hathaway, Esquire Reginald D. Dixon, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration General Counsel's Office 2727 Mahan Drive, Building 3 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Annie Scotto Downs 8708 52nd Street North Tampa, Florida 33617
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified as a correctional officer by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on February 13, 1987, and was issued certificate number 19-86-502- 05. Respondent is employed as a correctional officer by Metro-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and has been so employed since June, 1986. Respondent's current assignment is at the Metro-Dade County Women's Detention Center, Miami, Florida, where she works in different correctional capacities. Respondent was born on March 18, 1956, and attended junior and senior high school in Miami, Florida. She then attended Miami-Dade Junior College on a two-year scholarship, earning an A.A. degree in criminology. She then attended Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida, earning a Bachelor's degree in criminology. During high school Respondent lost the tips of three fingers on her right hand, as a result of an accident in the factory where she worked. Respondent worked for the Clerk of the Courts, Dade County, Florida, from 1979-1986. At first, she worked in the Clerk's Office itself. She was subsequently assigned to work as a courtroom clerk in the misdemeanor division, and later moved up to working as a courtroom clerk in the felony division. Hector A. Rocafort, a polygraph examiner with the Metro-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, administered a polygraph pre- test to Respondent on November 5, 1985. The pre-test involves a discussion/interview between Rocafort and the person being examined prior to the time that the polygraph examination itself is administered. Rocafort made notes of his interpretation of the discussion between Respondent and him. Those notes were never shown to Respondent. Respondent was never advised that any statements made by her to Rocafort could or would be used against her in an administrative forum. The statements subsequently attributed to Respondent, as reported by Rocafort, are not verbatim statements; rather, Rocafort paraphrased statements made by Respondent to him. The statements allegedly made by Respondent were not sworn to by Respondent, and the written interpretation subsequently made a part of her personnel file by Rocafort were not sworn to by him. During the pre-test, Respondent was encouraged to disclose any conduct that was even questionable in her mind, and Rocafort explained legal ramifications to her. For example, he explained that taking items home from work, shoplifting, and petit theft were all the same thing. When a specific dimension of the pre-test format called for time periods or the number of times that conduct was engaged in, Respondent was asked to indicate a time frame or number with which she would feel comfortable. Rocafort explained that the methodology used is to have the examinee make pre-test disclosures in their worst light so that when the actual polygraph examination is administered, he can ask the question "Other than what we have already discussed, have you ever . . . ." That way, the examinee does not have to worry about exact numbers or dates or questionable incidents during the examination and can comfortably answer the polygraph examination questions so as to produce accurate readings. Accordingly, the number of occasions indicated or the time periods indicated during the pre-test need not be accurate. According to Rocafort, Respondent did very well on the actual polygraph examination. During the November 5, 1985, polygraph pre-test, Respondent allegedly admitted to being arrested and charged with petit theft in 1977. In 1977 Respondent, while attending Florida State University, was in a Woolco Department Store in Tallahassee with another lady she knew. Respondent's companion took off the pair of old "thongs" which she was wearing and put on a new pair of "thongs" which the store had for sale. The "thongs" had a retail value of $1.99. She left the store without paying for them. A Woolco security guard called Respondent and her companion back to the store. Respondent returned to the store, but her companion did not, having gone elsewhere in the mall. Since Respondent had been with the person who committed the theft, the security guard called the police, and Respondent was charged with petit theft. She was taken to jail and brought before a judge the next morning. When she appeared in court, she had no attorney, was scared, and was alone. The judge explained to her that if she pled guilty, she would be required to serve 24 hours of community service. Since she was afraid of what else could happen to her if she did not plead guilty, she entered a plea of guilty and was required to perform 24 hours of community service. She performed her community service at the Salvation Army's nursery and worked there for more than the 24 hours required, working there during the evenings when she had spare time. During the November 5, 1985, polygraph pre-test, Respondent allegedly admitted to purchasing stolen goods on four occasions, the last time being 1980 when she allegedly purchased a pair of sneakers for $5.00. Respondent purchased items from street vendors several times throughout her life, a common occurrence or "way of life" in her neighborhood. In approximately 1980, while Respondent was working in a restaurant with her mother a man came into the restaurant selling canvas sneakers. Respondent's sister wanted to purchase a pair, so Respondent gave her the $5.00 she needed to buy a pair of sneakers from the vendor. Currently, similar sneakers can be purchased retail for $5.99. Similarly, Respondent purchased undershirts for her baby son when Respondent was 15 years of age. Respondent never considered the fact that the sneakers or the undershirts might have been stolen until Rocafort suggested to her during the pre-test on November 5, 1985, that items bought from street vendors could be stolen property. During the November 5, 1985, polygraph pre-test, Respondent allegedly admitted to shoplifting ten times, the last time being five years earlier. Respondent has never shoplifted. During the November 5, 1985, polygraph pre-test, Respondent allegedly admitted to using marijuana approximately five times, the last time being two years earlier. Respondent took a single puff from a marijuana cigarette at a party while she was in the 9th or 10th grade, at the age of 15 or 16. Respondent involuntarily took a single puff from a marijuana cigarette, at the insistence of a man she was dating in 1982 or 1983. Respondent has no recollection of puffing a marijuana cigarette other than on those two occasions. Respondent took a pre-employment physical examination on April 10, 1986, at Cedars of Lebanon Hospital, part of which was a urinalysis in which Respondent proved negative for all drugs tested, including marijuana. Respondent took an annual employment physical on March 14, 1990, at Mount Sinai Hospital, part of which was a urinalysis. Respondent proved negative for all drugs tested, including marijuana. Metro-Dade Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation considers, in determining whether an applicant's prior use of controlled substances should be a bar to employment, the severity and frequency of the usage and the lapse of time between the usage and the applicant's employment. If the usage is not severe or frequent and one year has passed between the last usage and the employment application date, then the usage is not considered proximate in time and prior use will not be a bar to employment but will simply be considered along with all of the other factors considered as a result of the background investigation of an applicant. During the November 5, 1985, polygraph pre-test Respondent allegedly admitted to taking minor office supplies totalling approximately $10.00. Respondent, while working as a courtroom clerk for the Clerk of the Courts, Dade County, Florida, was issued pens, pencils, "Wite out", and manila folders to use at her job. When Respondent "used up" the supplies issued to her or if someone took them off her desk in the courtroom, she would have to submit a written request for a replacement. Accordingly, Respondent often took these supplies home to safeguard them and generally brought them back to the job the next day, but may have forgotten on occassion. The polygraph examination, the pre-test, the physical examination, and a background investigation are required to be conducted by the employing agency prior to certification of a correctional officer by Petitioner. By virtue of the fact that Respondent was certified by Petitioner on February 13, 1987, she was determined at that time by Petitioner to be of good moral character up to that date. All allegations of misconduct made by Petitioner in this cause involve dates prior to the date that Petitioner concluded that Respondent had good moral character. Respondent is considered, by reputation, to be honest beyond reproach, to possess integrity, and to be of good moral character. She is an outstanding employee, and has the respect of her supervisors. As one supervisor testified, "She can work with me any time." Respondent possesses, and has maintained, good moral character.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding Respondent not guilty of the allegations contained in the Administrative Complaint filed against her and dismissing the Administrative Complaint with prejudice. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of May, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 31st day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-3, 5, 6, 9, and 10 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact numbered 4 has been rejected as not constituting a finding of fact but rather as constituting argument of counsel or a conclusion of law. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 7 and 8 have been rejected as being irrelevant to the issues under consideration in this cause. Petitioner's proposed findings of fact numbered 11- 15 have been rejected as not being supported by the weight of the credible evidence in this cause. Respondent's proposed findings of fact numbered 1-23 have been adopted either verbatim or in substance in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James C. Casey, Esquire 10680 Northwest 25th Street Suite 100 Miami, Florida 33172 Jeffrey Long, Director Department of Law Enforcement Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Rodney Gaddy, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 =================================================================
