The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner abandoned her position of employment in the career service system of the State of Florida.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Helen L. Chappell, a career service employee of Respondent with the Polk County Public Health Unit at all times pertinent to these proceedings. Petitioner worked sporadically in Respondent's employment during the month of March, 1989. She was credited with a total of 28 hours of work during that month. Respondent's records reflect that Petitioner did not actually work any hours in the months of April or May, 1989. On May 5, 1989, Respondent received notification from personnel of the Division of Risk Management of the Department of Insurance that Petitioner, a recipient of workers compensation benefits, had reached maximum medical recovery from a previous injury. Shortly thereafter, the Division provided Respondent with a copy of a medical report documenting the extent of Petitioner's recovery. The medical report, while noting Petitioner's recovery, also restricted her employment activities to preclude activities involving "a lot of head and shoulder movement." By certified letter dated May 11, 1989, the acting administrative director of the Polk County Health Unit informed Petitioner of the receipt of the medical report and the medical restrictions contained in the report. Further, the letter set forth Respondent's position that such restrictions would not interfere with Petitioner's performance of her duties as a clerk specialist. The letter concluded by directing Petitioner to return to work immediately to avoid the presumption that she had abandoned her position of employment with Respondent. The letter's certified mail return receipt reflects that Petitioner received the letter on May 15, 1989. In the course of a telephone conversation with the acting administrative director on May 25, 1989, Petitioner was informed that she must return to work no later than June 2, 1989. Petitioner did not return to work on June 2, 1989, or at any time thereafter. On June 15, 1989, the acting administrative director notified Petitioner by certified mail that Petitioner was presumed to have abandoned her career service employment position with Respondent as a result of the failure to report to work within three days of the June 2, 1989 deadline. The certified mail return receipt documents delivery of the letter on June 20, 1989. On August 1, 1986, Petitioner acknowledged receipt of a copy of Respondent's employee handbook. Employees are placed on notice by contents of the handbook that any employee who is absent without authorization for three consecutive workdays may be considered to have abandoned his or her employment position.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Administration concluding that Petitioner abandoned her position in the career service due to her failure to report to work, or request leave for the period June 2-June 15, 1989. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4183 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. None submitted. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-5. Adopted in substance. Rejected, unnecessary. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Jack E. Farley, Esquire HRS District 6 Legal Office 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Fifth Floor, Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33514 Helen L. Chappell Post Office Box 109 Lake Wales, Florida 33859 Larry D. Scott, Esquire Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Aletta L. Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 438 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Petitioner abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service under the facts and circumstances of this case. At the hearing the Respondent offered eleven exhibits into evidence and presented the testimony of two witnesses, Charles Crozier and Sam Visconti. The Petitioner offered two exhibits, both of which were rejected. The Petitioner did not call any witnesses to testify on his behalf. He expressly declined to be sworn as a witness and testify on his own behalf, even after being specifically advised of his right to do so and being specifically advised that no findings of fact could be made on the basis of his unsworn assertions.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the sworn testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Leroy Williams-El, commenced his employment with the Respondent, Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind, in 1977. His last position was Dorm Supervisor I, which position he had held since the 1980-81 school year. The position Petitioner held was somewhat critical in that not only did he have to oversee the portion of the dormitory that was assigned to him, but he was also specifically in charge of the care and safety of some ten or twelve students. The Petitioner was a permanent employee, but his work period coincided generally with the school year and ran for ten months, generally from August to June each year. The Petitioner's last official work day was June 11, 1985. He was not in a work status during the summer of 1985. The dorm supervisors were supervised by Charles Crozier, Director of Student Life. At the end of the 1985 school year, the dorm supervisors remained at the school for approximately a week after the students had left and the administration conducted a post-planning week. During the post-planning week, Crozier met with the employees, discussed the upcoming 1985-86 school calendar, and Petitioner and the other dorm supervisors were told that their date to report back to work was August 26, 1985. In addition to discussing the return date with the various employees at the June post-planning meeting, Crozier, under date of August 21, 1985, mailed a letter to the Petitioner at his last known address as it appeared in the school file, that is, 75 1/2 Lincoln Street, St. Augustine, Florida 32084, reminding the Petitioner that his return date for reporting back for work was August 26, 1985. The Petitioner did not return to work as instructed on August 26, 1985. On August 27, 1985, the Petitioner called Crozier and advised Crozier he had been unable to report to work on August 26, 1985. He was advised by Crozier that he must report to work on Thursday, August 29, at 8:00 a.m. (Exhibit 2) The Petitioner did not report to work on August 29, but instead again called Crozier. Crozier, at this point, got the personnel officer of the school, Sam Visconti, on the phone with him. During the conversation on August 29, 1985, the Petitioner requested that the school "transfer" him to a position with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Miami. Crozier and Visconti both explained to him that the school had no authority to "transfer" the Petitioner to another job with another agency in another city. He was told that he should report to work immediately or submit a request for leave without pay. At the time of Petitioner's telephone call on August 29, 1985, Crozier had already prepared a letter dated August 29, 1985, advising the Petitioner that inasmuch as he had failed to report to work on August 26 and had not reported on August 29 as directed, he was being given an official reprimand. He was further advised that if he did not contact Crozier by September 4, 1985, he would be suspended without pay and failure to report to work would result in his termination. The Petitioner did not report to work on September 4, 1985, as instructed. On September 6, 1985, Crozier received a call from Lynn Rowe, Visconti's assistant in the personnel office, relaying a telephone call from a lady purporting to be the Petitioner's sister. Ms. Rowe was inquiring whether or not Crozier had any instructions for the Petitioner. Crozier advised Ms. Rowe that the Petitioner was to report to work by the time his normal work week would start, which would be Sunday, September 8. The Petitioner did not report to work on September 8, September 9, or September 10, 1985. The Petitioner did not call in and make contact with Crozier or Visconti on any one of those days. When the Petitioner did not report to work for those three days, Crozier again contacted Sam Visconti, the personnel officer, and reported this fact to him. At no time during the period from August 26 through September 10, 1985, did the Petitioner request from Crozier or Visconti, the personnel officer, annual leave, leave without pay, or any other type of approved leave. The conversations he had with Crozier and Visconti concerned a request that he be "transferred" to a job with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in Miami. On September 11, 1985, after Crozier advised Visconti of the Petitioner's failure to report to work, Visconti prepared a dismissal letter under the date of September 11, 1985. This letter summarized the chronology of events concerning Petitioner's failure to report to work and advised the Petitioner that he was considered to have abandoned his position. Petitioner was further told of his right to seek a determination and review of his abandonment. The letter of September 11, 1985, was mailed to the Petitioner's last known address in the personnel file, which was the St. Augustine address. Late in the afternoon of September 11, Petitioner called Visconti and informed him of the new address in Miami, Florida. Visconti then sent an additional copy of the same letter to Petitioner on September 13, 1985, to the Miami address. The Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind is a separate state agency and is not in any way connected with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Furthermore, the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind has no offices or positions available in the Miami area. Visconti and Crozier discussed with Petitioner his repeated requests for a "transfer" on more than one occasion and repeatedly advised him the Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind had no authority to transfer him to a different job with another state agency. At no time did the Petitioner request a leave of absence from Visconti. Visconti advised the Petitioner of the critical nature of his position as a Dorm Supervisor I and explained to him the difficulties created by Petitioner's failure to return to work. Visconti further advised the Petitioner that if he wanted a leave of absence, the personnel officer had to receive the request for the leave of absence in writing and the president of the school would consider the request after it had been received. It was imperative, however, that the Petitioner either bring or mail in a written request for a leave of absence. The Petitioner did not send a request for leave of absence to the school. The last conversation Crozier had with the Petitioner occurred sometime in late October or November and concerned a request by the Petitioner that Crozier send a copy of the Petitioner's college transcripts to an HRS office in Miami. At that time the Petitioner did not request to be re-employed or to be reinstated. Crozier mailed the materials as requested. Williams did not report to the school for employment on or after August 26, 1985, and was considered to have resigned effective September 10, 1985.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing it is recommended that a Final Order be issued concluding that the Petitioner abandoned his position and that his petition should be dismissed. DONE AND ORDERED this 11th day of July 1986, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of July 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Leroy Williams 1360 N.W. 199th Street Miami, Florida 33169 Mr. Leroy Williams-E1 10566 McLaurin Road Jacksonville, Florida 32216 Mr. Samuel R. Visconti Personnel Officer Florida School for the Deaf and the Blind 207 North San Marco Avenue St. Augustine, Florida 32084 Gene T. Sellers, Esquire State Board of Education Knott Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda H. Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Richard L. Kopel, Esquire Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 APPENDIX The following are my specific rulings on each of the findings of fact proposed by each of the parties. Findings proposed by Petitioner The rulings which follow immediately below refer to the five (5) unnumbered paragraphs which appear under the caption "Facts To Examine" in Petitioner's post-hearing document titled Order To Commence On Final Argument. The paragraphs are referred to in the order in which they appear. First paragraph on first page: First sentence is rejected as constituting a conclusion not supported by the evidence. The last sentence is accepted in substance. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence. First paragraph on second page: The first two sentences are accepted in substance. The remainder of this paragraph is rejected as not supported by competent substantial evidence and as contrary to the greater weight of the evidence. Second paragraph on second page: This paragraph is rejected in its entirety as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Third paragraph on second page: This paragraph is rejected as constituting argument rather than proposed findings. Fourth paragraph on second page: This paragraph is rejected in its entirety as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Findings proposed by Respondent All of the findings proposed by the Respondent have been accepted with a few editorial modifications in the interest of clarity and accuracy. ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= STATE OF FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION LEROY WTLLlAMS-EL, Petitioner, vs. DOA Case No. AB-85-18 DOAH Case No. 85-3600 FLORIDA SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND BLIND, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact In September, 1989, Shirley B. Walker (Walker), was a clerk-typist in the Bartow office of the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), District 6, Subdistrict B, Children, Youth and Families, Child Protection Services. Walker was absent on Tuesday, September 5, 1989, and had a friend call her supervisor to say that Walker would not be at work until Friday, September 8, 1989, due to a medical condition. Walker reportedly had been in an altercation with her husband over the Labor Day weekend and had been injured to the extent that her neck was in a brace. The supervisor, Patricia Lawler, asked that the friend give Walker the message that she would need to bring a doctor's excuse with her on her return to work. Walker did not return to work on Friday, September 8, 1989. Walker did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work that day. Since Walker had no home telephone, and the telephone number of a relative that had been given to her supervisor as a means of contacting her at home was obsolete by September 8, Lawler asked office friends of Walker to go to Walker's home during the lunch hour to check on her well-being and find out why she was not at work. When they did, they found no one at home. Walker also did not go to work on Monday through Friday, September 11 through 15, 1989. Again, she did not give, or arrange for, any notification to her supervisor or anyone in the office that she would not be at work. No one at the office knew anything further about Walker or why she was not at work from Friday, September 8 through Friday, September 15, 1989. When Walker began her work at HRS, she was given an employee handbook, part of which clearly states: "If you are absent for three consecutive workdays without authorization, you may be considered to have abandoned your position and thus resigned." At approximately 4:45 p.m. on Friday, September 15, 1989, Lawler hand- delivered to Walker at Walker's home a letter notifying Walker that she was being terminated from her employment with HRS for the consecutive unexcused and unauthorized absences, which were viewed as an abandonment of her employment and a resignation from the State Career Service. Although Walker asked for a formal administrative hearing on the question whether she had abandoned her position, neither she nor anyone on her behalf appeared at the hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Administration enter a final order finding that the Petitioner, Shirley B. Walker, abandoned her position and resigned from the State Career Service. RECOMMENDED this 1st day of March, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of March, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Shirley B. Walker 1050 Golfview Avenue Apartment 803 Bartow, FL 33830 Jack Emory Farley, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 400 W. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Boulevard Room 500 Tampa, Florida 33614 Aletta Shutes Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr. General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550
The Issue Whether or not Petitioner abandoned her position in accordance with the terms of Rule 22A-7.010(2) F.A.C.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed as an FSDB groundskeeper. Robert "Curly" Schopmann, the Grounds Supervisor and Petitioner's immediate supervisor, considered her to be "a very good employee" during her two years of employment prior to June 19, 1990. Petitioner's performance ratings confirmed Mr. Schopmann's assessment that Petitioner's quantity and quality of work was excellent during that period of time. Petitioner suffered an on-the-job accident on March 20, 1990 for which the employer and the Department of Insurance, Division of Risk Management accepted responsibility under Chapter 440 F.S., "The Florida Workers' Compensation Law." In June, 1990, Petitioner requested that the employer provide further medical treatment by an orthopedic physician, which further medical treatment was approved and provided. As a consequence thereof, Petitioner was off work from June 19 to mid-October 1990. Dr. Charles, Petitioner's authorized treating orthopedic physician, prepared a list of "job limitations" dated October 3, 1990 (Heilmann Exhibit 2). There is no evidence Petitioner was provided with a copy of this until after her termination. Sometime between October 1 and October 5, 1990, a rehabilitation consultant/specialist and registered nurse also prepared another, slightly more stringent list of limitations (DOE Exhibit B) which was not "verified" (approved) by Dr. Charles until October 29, 1990. Since Dr. Charles did not sign this second, more restrictive list until October 29, 1990, it must be assumed that neither Risk Management nor FSDB personnel saw it until after that date. Petitioner testified that she did not see it until after her termination. Effective October 13, 1990, Dr. Charles formally released Petitioner to do light work. The day before, Petitioner received notification concerning her release for light work from Risk Management (DOE Exhibit A). In that October 12, 1990 letter, Risk Management notified Petitioner that she was to either return to her old job and do light work while receiving temporary partial disability payments under the workers' compensation law or she was to make a good faith job search among other employers as also contemplated by that law. An abbreviated list of physical limitations based on Dr. Charles' October 3, 1990 list was also given by Risk Management to the Petitioner in its October 12, 1990 letter. By mutual agreement with the FSDB personnel office, Petitioner reported for light duty work at FSDB on Thursday, October 18, 1990. Mr. Schopmann first suggested that Petitioner work at her own speed outside but acceded to Petitioner's rejection of the use of a scooter to get around and do outdoors groundskeeping when she told him the scooter was "too bumpy" for her injured back. Either of Dr. Charles' job restrictions/physical limitations lists would have permitted Petitioner to work with hand-sized garden tools, a scooter, a riding mower, or a rolling seat for 80% of her day outside with only 20% of her day inside, provided she moved around and rested as needed with no lifting over 15 pounds and no squatting, crawling, bending, twisting, rotating, kneeling, or climbing inside or outside. When she said she could not ride the scooter, Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner to pot plants and trim the plants in the pots inside the greenhouse and that when she got tired, she should sit down and answer phones in the office before returning to pot more plants in the greenhouse. This instruction was in accord with the limitations for light work placed on Petitioner by her doctor in his October 3, 1990 list of limitations. It also was within the parameters of the abbreviated list relayed to Petitioner in Risk Management's letter of October 12 and those of the more stringent list the doctor later approved on October 29, 1990. At formal hearing, Petitioner admitted that she had understood that the supervisor's instructions included answering phones in the office and that she was otherwise assigned to the greenhouse. On Thursday, October 18 and Friday, October 19 and on October 22-24, she went to the greenhouse and office but did not restrict herself to just the jobs assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Instead, she tried to do all the usual work that is required of full-time, unimpaired greenhouse personnel. This additional work was considerably in excess of the limitations placed on her by her treating physician in either his October 3 or October 29 lists of limitations and was never directly assigned by her supervisor. The Petitioner asserted that she did this additional work because she was relying on the information provided in the October 12 Risk Management letter and in a telephone conversation she had had with Ms. Battle of FSDB's personnel office prior to October 18, and because she personally had never seen either of Dr. Charles' lists of limitations. On Wednesday, October 24, 1990, Petitioner left work at noon saying that she had a doctor's appointment, which she in fact did not have. Instead, she went home to rest. On Thursday, October 25, 1990, she called in sick and, as it turned out, she did not return to work after that date. The Petitioner testified that she did not return to work after October 24 because it was too painful for her to continue the work she had attempted. On October 26, 1990, a letter was sent from FSDB by Ms. Stephanie Battle notifying Petitioner that she was expected to come to work unless she had received a doctor's statement and that she was expected to return to work no later than Tuesday, October 30, 1990. Because October 26, 1990 was a Friday, it was Ms. Battle's intention that Petitioner would receive the letter on Saturday, October 27 or on Monday, October 29, and would then be able to obtain a doctor's certificate before the employer's October 30 deadline, if, in fact, Petitioner were eligible to receive a doctor's certificate at all. The October 26, 1990 letter sent by Ms. Battle provided in pertinent part: You are required to return to your job with the approved restrictions immediately. If you cannot return to work, you must provide this office with a letter from your attending physician saying why you are unable to perform your job, what the inclusive dates are that you cannot work and the approximate date of your return. At the present time you are in an unapproved leave without pay status. I expect to hear from you no later than Tuesday morning, October 30, 1990. On October 29, 1990, petitioner telephoned Stephanie Battle and informed her that she had received Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, that she could not work, but that Dr. Charles would not give her a "no work disability slip." At that time, Ms. Battle told Petitioner that she must return to work and asked if Petitioner had told her supervisor that she could not physically do the work assigned. Petitioner admitted to Ms. Battle that she had not yet discussed the problem with her supervisor. Later on October 29, Petitioner spoke on the telephone with Mr. Schopmann. Mr. Schopmann told Petitioner that she had to come back to work on October 30 or bring a doctor's certificate saying that she could not work at all. At that time, Petitioner indicated to Mr. Schopmann that she was aware that if she did not come back to work or provide some doctor's certificate she would lose her job. Whether Petitioner was consciously aware of the abandonment rule or merely thought she would be fired for not coming to work is not clear from the record. Petitioner asserted that she called Mr. Schopmann a second time on November 1, still seeking to retain her job; Mr. Schopmann denies that such a telephone call ever took place. It does not appear that Petitioner and Mr. Schopmann ever had a meeting of the minds that Petitioner was attempting to do more strenuous work than Mr. Schopmann thought he had assigned her to do, but at no time did Mr. Schopmann urge Petitioner to work harder. In her testimony, Petitioner blamed the employer far not making her fully aware of the limitations placed on her by her doctor. Petitioner also asserted that Ms. Battle had telephoned Dr. Charles on October 24, 1990 to see if the Petitioner's job assignments in the greenhouse and office exceeded his prescribed limitations for Petitioner and, further, that in so doing, Ms. Battle had misrepresented to the doctor the tasks that Petitioner was, in fact, doing and that Petitioner believed that it was due to Ms. Battle's misrepresentations that Dr. Charles would not give Petitioner a certificate of "no work." Ms. Battle confirmed that she had called Dr. Charles at some point and represented to him the type of light work that she understood from Mr. Schopmann that Petitioner was doing in the greenhouse and the office. However, at the time she telephoned Dr. Charles, Ms. Battle also did not know that Petitioner had physically attempted more than she had been assigned to do by Mr. Schopmann. At the time of her phone call, whenever it may have been, Dr. Charles told Ms. Battle [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] that Petitioner could do the light work described by her and assigned by Mr. Schopmann. Petitioner admitted that she did not consult her doctor in his office on October 24-25, that she never spoke personally with Dr. Charles during this period of time or tried to get a "no work certificate" from him personally prior to October 30, 1990, and that she dealt with him solely through his receptionist. However, the doctor's October 29, 1990 list of limitations and Petitioner's recitation of what the receptionist told her [admissible hearsay pursuant to Section 120.58(1) F.S.] supports a finding of fact that at all times material, Dr. Charles felt Petitioner could continue to do the light work actually assigned by Mr. Schopmann, a description of which had been related to him by Ms. Battle, and that the doctor also felt that the Petitioner could do all the light work which the doctor later listed on his October 29, 1990 list. Petitioner never presented a medical certificate to her employer. There was no evidence at formal hearing of whether or not the Petitioner had any accrued annual or sick leave that she could draw on, but it is clear that she never applied for authorized leave. The Petitioner never returned to work. On November 1, 1990, Mr. Schopmann notified the FSDB personnel office that Petitioner had not returned to work for three consecutive days, that he considered her to have abandoned her position, and that he recommended her dismissal on that basis. (DOE Exhibit D) In a letter dated November 2, 1990, Mr. Sam Visconti, FSDB Personnel Director, notified Petitioner that she was deemed to have abandoned her position due to her absence on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1 (sic, see Findings of Fact 12- 13), and that she was dismissed based on Rule 22A-7.010(2)(a), F.A.C. That letter reads in pertinent part: You failed to report or call in to work for four (4) consecutive work days on October 29, 30, 31, and November 1, 1990. In accordance with Chapter 22A-7.010(2), of the Florida Administrative Code, State Personnel Rules and Regulations, you have abandoned your position. Abandonment of position is considered and treated as a resignation from your job. Your resignation is effective 12:01 a.m., November 2, 1990. Petitioner had been on unauthorized leave without pay since October 24, 1990. However, due to the terms of Ms. Battle's October 26, 1990 letter, the only three days which could be legitimately counted against Petitioner under the abandonment rule were October 30 and 31, and November 1, 1990. Petitioner is angry about the on-the-job accident and how it occurred. She testified that as of the date of formal hearing she continues to see Dr. Charles professionally and that she would not do so if she were not in pain and really injured, but she produced no medical evidence that she was physically unable to report for work at all on October 30 and 31, and on November 1, 1990 or that she was unable on those dates to do the jobs contained in Dr. Charles' October 29, 1990 list of limitations.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Education enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner abandoned her position by unreasonable absence on October 30 and 31 and November 1, 1990. DONE and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1991.
Findings Of Fact At all times material, Petitioner was employed by the Department of Corrections as a full-time career service employee. On July 13, 1984, he was ranked as a Correctional Officer I at Florida State Prison (FSP). On March 2, 1990, Petitioner had been placed on workers' compensation due to a back injury. On Thursday, April 5, 1990, Dr. W. David Sikes of the Bradford Chiropractic Center signed a medical release permitting Petitioner to return to light duty on Monday, April 9, 1990. Dr. Sikes was apparently the authorized treating physician to whom the agency had currently obligated itself pursuant to Chapter 440 F.S. [The Florida Workers' Compensation Act]. A previous physician had released Petitioner for full-duty work on April 3, 1990. Petitioner was present in the office of Personnel Manager Marion Bronson on Friday, April 6, 1990. At that time, Mr. Bronson told Petitioner to report for work on the first shift (8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.) on Monday, April 9, 1990. This meant Petitioner would be doing mail room duty during the day instead of his regular duties on his regular shift of midnight to 8:00 a.m. Petitioner told Mr. Bronson he could not work the first shift due to his needing to be home to take of his invalid wife. To this, Mr. Bronson replied that the first shift was the only light duty available. On Friday, April 6, 1990 Petitioner did not refuse to come in to work the first shift on Monday, April 9, and he did not tell Mr. Bronson that he was already signed out on annual leave for that date. Nonetheless, Mr. Bronson was left with the impression at the end of their meeting that Petitioner would not come back to light-duty work on Monday. Petitioner did not report for work on the first shift on April 9, 10, or 11, 1990 (Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday). On Wednesday, April 11, 1990, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: You have been carried in unauthorized leave without pay status since April 9, 1990. You were also carried on unauthorized leave without pay on April 3, 1990. You are hereby instructed to return to duty at 8:00 a.m. the day after you receive this letter. If you do not return to duty on that date it will be deemed that you have abandoned your position at Florida State Prison and you will be dismissed. In the past, the FSP personnel office usually made further efforts to contact missing employees after such a letter had been sent, but no such attempts were made in this instance. Normally, FSP gives employees an opportunity to call in and rectify absentee problems but deems it abandonment if the employee does not respond. At no time subsequent to April 6, 1990 did Petitioner contact anyone at FSP regarding his absence. Petitioner did not actually receive the April 11 letter until Friday, April 13. Petitioner did not report for work on Saturday, April 14, Sunday, April 15, or Monday, April 16. Saturday would have been a regular workday for Petitioner. However, Petitioner's usual days off were Sunday and Monday, and nothing had been said by Mr. Bronson about altering Petitioner's workdays. On Monday, April 16, Mr. Bronson mailed Petitioner a letter that read, in pertinent part: This is to inform you that in accordance with Section 22A-7.010(2), F.A.C., you have been deemed to have abandoned your position as Correctional Officer I and resigned from the Career Service System effective April 14, 1990. A copy of Section 22A-7.010(2) is enclosed for your information. You have been absent from duty for at least three consecutive workdays without authorized leave as follows: April 10, 11, and 12, 1990. Please be advised that you have been dropped from the payroll effective the close of business April 14, 1990. Unbeknownst to Mr. Bronson, Petitioner had exercised preapproved annual leave for the period of April 10-14, 1990. None of Petitioner's superiors advised Mr. Bronson of this fact. There was no notation to this effect in Petitioner's personnel file in Mr. Bronson's office. It was Mr. Bronson's testimony that it was better personnel management and he would have preferred to have Petitioner drawing annual leave during this period than to be paying him full pay for makeshift light duty. If Petitioner had requested annual leave on April 6, 1990, Mr. Bronson would have granted it. As of April 14, 1990, Petitioner had "banked" 119.75 hours of annual leave time which would have been sufficient to cover his April 10-14, 1990 vacation or "no show" days. Additionally, he also had available 26.5 hours of sick leave but this sick leave was subject to certain deductions and adjustments which had allowed the agency to keep Petitioner on at full pay the previous week while technically he was only eligible for a reduced amount based on workers' compensation. In accord with standard FSP policy, Petitioner had previously submitted an annual leave request form on October 16, 1989 to request leave for the week of April 10 through April 14, 1990. This form had been approved by his immediate superior, who at that time was his shift supervisor, Officer Gaskin. Officer Gaskin was the correct superior to make such approval. Mr. Bronson has nothing to do with the approval of leave under such circumstances. Harry Tison, who became Petitioner's shift supervisor in April 1990 while Petitioner was still out on workers' compensation leave, was not aware of Petitioner's preapproved annual leave until Mr. Bronson's office began making inquiries after the April 16 letter, but at that time, Tison was able to refer to a leave calendar posted in his area which showed that Petitioner was expected to be out on annual leave on those days. From that information, Officer Tison, by reason of his familiarity with the FSP system and hierarchy, could infer that Petitioner's leave had been approved by FSP's highest command figure, "the Colonel." Some witnesses alluded to FSP policy that even preapproved annual leave requests constituted only tentative approval unless the employee checked with his supervisor a week before actually exercising his leave so as to be sure that the preapproved leave had not been revoked due to an employee crunch, but there is no such rule or printed policy of the Department of Corrections or FSP, and the evidence is insufficient to establish such a vague policy as uniform or binding on Petitioner. Also, in this instance, the week before, Petitioner was away from work most of that week on workers' compensation disability, and there is no evidence of any employee crunch which would have altered the prior annual leave approval.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Corrections enter a Final Order finding that Petitioner has not abandoned his position and returning him to the appropriate position with back pay and emoluments, subject to any appropriate setoffs under the Workers' Compensation Act and any mitigation from other employment. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of August, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER The following constitute specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. upon the parties' respective proposed findings of fact (PFOF): Petitioner's PFOF: Petitioner has filed only a "Final Argument" and that is essentially legal argument and proposed conclusions of law as opposed to proposed findings of fact which are entitled to a ruling pursuant to Section 120.59(2) F.S. Moreover, the format does not lend itself to intelligible rulings since no sentence is numbered. Respondent's PFOF: 1-6 Accepted. Accepted except for the last sentence, which does not comport with the testimony heard. Accepted. Rejected in FOF 13, which reflects the greater weight of the credible evidence. Accepted but subordinate. - 15 Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Perri M. King Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Rodney W. Smith, Esquire Gloria W. Fletcher, Esquire 515 North Main Street, Suite 300 Post Office Box 1208 Gainesville, Florida 32602 William A. Frieder, Esquire Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner was overpaid in the amount of $809.46; and, if so, whether she should be required to repay that amount to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this matter, Petitioner was a career service employee of Respondent until her separation in October 2018. Petitioner went into labor unexpectedly in December 2017, and as a result, she began maternity leave. Petitioner was not present at work and did not submit a timesheet for the timeframe of December 29, 2017, through July 2, 2018. Petitioner testified that she was unable to submit her timesheets electronically and for this reason, someone else submitted them on her behalf. The evidence presented at hearing did not show who submitted her timesheets. By May 23, 2018, Petitioner had exhausted all of her annual, sick, and donated leave. Once an employee of Respondent no longer has sick leave remaining, annual leave is used to cover any shortages of sick leave. An employee may use donated leave to cover any shortages. Once an employee has exhausted annual, sick, and donated leave, the employee cannot be paid for additional time taken as leave. The additional time during leave is considered “leave without pay” (“LWOP”). Petitioner was placed on LWOP from March 23, 2018, through July 2, 2018, because she had exhausted all of her leave. Although Petitioner was on LWOP during the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, a pay warrant for 80 hours of work was inadvertently issued on May 25, 2018, for that pay period. Consequently, Petitioner was overpaid $809.46. Petitioner was not responsible for the overpayment. She did not submit her timesheets and, thus, did not falsify them. Petitioner testified that her supervisor verbally advised her that she had received donated leave, but she could not recall the amount. Petitioner also did not offer any written representation from her supervisor or otherwise regarding her leave. The overpayment resulted because Petitioner's timesheet for LWOP for the pay period of May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, was not timely approved. Upon discovery of this error, Respondent’s human resources office conducted a manual audit of Petitioner’s leave. Ms. Anderson completed the leave audit and discovered that Petitioner had been overpaid for the May 4, 2018, through May 17, 2018, pay period. On May 30, 2018, the Department sent Petitioner a certified letter requesting the overpaid amount of $809.46. Petitioner became aware of the error when she received the Department’s letter. Petitioner’s pay was transmitted to her bank account electronically via direct deposit. However, she was not monitoring her bank account closely and did not immediately realize that she had been erroneously overpaid. At the time of the final hearing, Petitioner had not paid the overpayment. Petitioner stated she could only pay $40 per month to repay the overpayment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health enter a final Order requiring Shanace Isaac to repay Respondent $809.46. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of March, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S YOLONDA Y. GREEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of March, 2019. COPIES FURNISHED: Shanace Isaac Post Office Box 101 Hastings, Florida 32145 (eServed) Riley Michelle Landy, Esquire Department of Health Bin A-02 5052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) Shannon Revels, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1703 (eServed) Louise Wilhite-St Laurent, Interim General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (eServed) State Surgeon General Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 (eServed)
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: Petitioner Janet Truett was a former vocational rehabilitation client due to a hearing problem. After successfully completing the program, she was employed as a secretary by the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation in Tampa, a position which she retained for approximately five years. In 1983, petitioner often took annual leave, sick leave and leave without pay, usually calling in at the last minute. On October 13, 1985, her immediate supervisor advised her that "in the future, all leave must be approved in advance except for emergency sick leave." (HRS Exhibit 1). Due to an automobile accident and gall bladder surgery, Mrs. Truett was absent from work approximately one-fourth of the time from mid-November of 1984 through mid-April of 1985. On April 22, 1985, petitioner and her supervising counselor had a conference and discussed her continued use of leave without pay. Petitioner was advised that her absence put undue stress on the rest of the unit and that her physician was being consulted to determine if she was able to return to work on a full-time basis. Another conference was to be scheduled after receiving her doctor's response. By letter dated April 30, 1985, Dr. Michael J. Wiley advised petitioner's supervisor that petitioner had been discharged from care after recovering from her surgery on March 18, 1985, but had come back to his office on April 3, 1985, complaining of abdominal pain. She was instructed to stay home and return for a follow-up visit the following week. She did not return to Dr. Wiley's office after April 3, 1985. Petitioner received her annual performance evaluation on May 2, 1985, with an overall rating of "conditional". The areas of deficiency included dependability, quality of work and quantity of work. Petitioner was advised that her attendance at work would be monitored over the next sixty days and that she would "not be given any approved leave whether sick leave, annual leave or leave without pay without a written explanation. If she falls ill during the 60 days she must provide me with a doctor's report indicating her problem. If she is to take any other type of leave she must provide me with a written explanation. I will then make a determination as to whether or not I will approve this leave." (HRS Exhibit 3). On May 17, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor and indicated she had car problems. She did not come in to work for the entire day. A counseling session was held on May 20, 1985, and petitioner was advised by her supervisor that she was expected to take the city bus or arrange for other transportation should she experience further car trouble. On May 24, 1985, petitioner called her supervisor at 9:45 A.M. and requested leave because of an alleged family problem. She was told that her story would be verified and was reminded that she had been instructed to call in to request leave before 8:30 A.M. The stated reason for her absence on May 24, 1985 was not truthful. On May 28, 1985, petitioner called in at 8:20 A.M. and requested leave, stating that her car had broken down and that she had numerous family problems. She was told that the leave for May 24 and May 28, 1985, would not be approved. On May 29, 1985, she arrived to work late at 8:15 A.M. Also on that date, she received a written reprimand from her supervisor for taking unauthorized leave on May 24 and May 28, 1985. She was instructed to be honest and to call in by 8:30 A.M. if she was going to be out for any reason. On May 31, 1985, petitioner was granted approval for three hours leave in order to get her electricity turned on. On June 3, 1985, she called in requesting leave stating that she still had no electricity, that she had been up late the night before due to family problems and that she had no way to get to work anyway. Her daughter picked up some checks for her around 1:10 P.M. On June 4, she came to work but requested leave. This request was not approved and she received a second written reprimand for taking unauthorized leave on June 3, 1985. In this second reprimand dated June 4 but signed June 11, 1985, petitioner was advised that "further occurrences of unauthorized leave could result in a suspension or dismissal." (HRS Exhibit 5) A counseling session was held with petitioner on June 4, 1985, to review her job performance since the time of her conditional performance rating. She was advised that her attendance problem had not improved. She was referred to the Employee Assistance Program and was advised that the only way she could obtain future approved sick leave was to provide her supervisor with a doctor's statement. On June 14, 1985, a Friday, petitioner called in and requested sick leave. Her supervisor told her that in order for him to approve her sick leave, she must provide him with a doctor's report. On June 17 and 18, 1985, petitioner failed to report to work and failed to request additional leave. On June 19, 1985, she called in and said she was "too upset" to come to work. When asked if she had seen a doctor, she replied that she had not. Petitioner was then advised by her supervisor that he would not approve her leave for June 14, 17 or 18, 1985. When petitioner was absent from work, other secretaries in the office were required to perform her duties, as well as their own. This created a hardship on the other secretaries, and petitioner's frequent absences impaired both the quantity and the quality of her own work. By letter dated June 21, 1985, petitioner was advised that the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation was processing her resignation from her position as a secretary effective June 13, 1985 at 5:00 P.M. Citing Rule 22A-7.10, F1orida Administrative Code, it was assumed that petitioner had abandoned her position and resigned from the Career Service since she had been on unapproved leave for three consecutive work days.
Conclusions Rule 22A-7.10(2t(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that "An employee who is absent without authorized leave of absence for 3 consecutive workdays shall be deemed to have abandoned the position and to have resigned from the Career Service." The evidence clearly demonstrates that petitioner's absence on June 14, 17 and 18, 1985, was not authorized. Petitioner does not even contend that it was authorized, but merely urges that it was not "reasonable" for her supervisor not to grant her retroactive approval for these absences. Given the numerous amount of leave time utilized by the petitioner and the repeated warnings, both oral and written, concerning future absences, HRS's action can hardly be termed "unreasonable." Petitioner's supervisors and co-workers were aware that petitioner had medical and personal problems and attempted to work around those problems and provide help and counseling to her. Her absences were both disruptive to the operation of the office as a whole and affected the quality and quantity of her own performance. Petitioner was repeatedly advised and counseled concerning the problems her absences were causing and was instructed and warned of the proper procedure to follow should future absences be necessary. It is difficult to envision any further steps HRS could have taken to solve petitioner's problems with continued absences. She was fully aware of the consequences which would ensue should she fail to report to work without authorized leave. Nevertheless, she chose to do so in the face of two written reprimands within a one-week period, and the passage of less than ten days between the second written reprimand and June 14, the first of her three days of absence without authorized leave. Rule 22A-7.10(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code; is clear and mandates the action to be taken when an employee is absent without authorized leave for three consecutive work days. A review of the facts of this case clearly supports the conclusion that petitioner abandoned her position with HRS and must be deemed to have resigned from the Career Service.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that petitioner Janet E. Truett be deemed to have abandoned her position with HRS and to have resigned from the Career Service. Respectfully submitted and entered this 19th day of November, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1985. COPIES FURNISHED: Janet Truett 1605 East Kirby Apartment B Tampa, Florida 33610 Robert Cox Regional Director, ASCME 4404 Westmoreland Court New Port Richey, Florida 33552 Claudia Isom-Rickert District VI Legal Counsel 4000 West Buffalo Avenue Tampa, Florida 33614 Richard L. Kopel Deputy General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gilda Lambert, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
The Issue Whether Petitioners received salary overpayments from the Agency for Persons with Disabilities.
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Petitioners Ileana Toledo, Norma Pedraza, and Lil Guerrero have been career service employees of Respondent. The Department of Management Services (“DMS”) has a classification and pay system that is used by Respondent, and DMS is responsible for designating employment positions within Respondent. A position is either included for overtime pay or excluded from overtime pay. At issue is whether Petitioners erroneously received monetary compensation for overtime hours worked after their position was reclassified from an included career service position to an excluded career service position. Prior to March 28, 2013, Petitioners held the position of Human Services Counselor III, which was designated by DMS as an included career service position. On March 26, 2013, Respondent proposed to reclassify Petitioners’ position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, which is designated by DMS as an excluded career service position. The proposed reclassification resulted from a reorganization of Respondent’s regional offices, and an effort by Respondent to standardize its functions, services, and types of positions in its regional offices. In a letter dated March 26, 2013, Petitioners were advised by Respondent’s Human Resources Director, Dale Sullivan, that if they accepted an offer to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst, their “current status and salary will remain unchanged.” Notably, the March 26, 2013, letter makes no specific mention of overtime. On March 28, 2013, Petitioners accepted Respondent’s offer of employment to reclassify their position from Human Services Counselor III to Human Service Program Analyst. Typically, employees of Respondent who are appointed to new positions are placed in probationary status, as opposed to permanent status, and are required to review and execute new position descriptions. However, the reclassification of Petitioners’ position by Respondent was not typical. As part of the reclassification of Petitioners’ position to Human Service Program Analyst, Respondent provided Petitioners with a new position description. However, Petitioners’ job duties, salaries, and permanent status remained the same as they had been in their prior position of Human Services Counselor III. Petitioners read and acknowledged their receipt of the new position description on March 28, 2013. On the first page of the position description, there is a heading titled “Position Attributes”. Under this heading, the term “Overtime” is shown, followed by two boxes, “Yes” and “No.” The “No” box is marked, indicating that Petitioners are not eligible to work overtime hours. The position description further indicates that Petitioners would be career service employees. However, the position description does not specifically include the terms included or excluded. Prior to the reclassification, Petitioners were paid bi-weekly based on an 80-hour pay period. If they worked more than 80 hours in a pay period, they received additional monetary compensation for their overtime hours. Payment for Petitioners’ regular and overtime work hours was based on employee timesheets submitted to the People First leave and payroll system. After the reclassification of their position, Petitioners continued to work overtime in excess of their bi-weekly contractual hours, despite the prohibition in the position description. Petitioners were required to obtain approval by their supervisors before being allowed to work overtime. Petitioners’ overtime was approved by their supervisors after the reclassification despite the prohibition on working overtime hours as indicated in the position description. During the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-June 23, 2013, Petitioner Ileana Toledo worked a total of 28 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $464.63 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Norma Pedraza worked a total of 32.25 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $624.14 from Respondent for these overtime hours. For the pay periods of March 29-April 11, 2013; April 12-April 25, 2013; April 26-May 9, 2013; and May 10-May 23, 2013, Petitioner Lil Guerrero worked a total of 25.50 hours of overtime, and received monetary compensation in the amount of $426.65 from Respondent for these overtime hours. Respondent’s payment of monetary compensation to Petitioners for the overtime hours worked after the reclassification of their position to Human Service Program Analyst occurred due to an administrative coding error, thereby resulting in the overpayment of monetary compensation to Petitioners by Respondent in the amounts the Respondent seeks to recover from Petitioners. The administrative coding error occurred because of Respondent’s failure to note the change from included to excluded on the People First system following the reclassification of Petitioners’ position. The error occurred due to an honest mistake, and resulted in the overpayments at issue. Petitioners should not have received monetary compensation for their overtime hours in the Human Service Program Analyst position because a Human Service Program Analyst position is an excluded career service position. An excluded career service employee must earn and receive regular compensation leave credits for overtime work, but cannot receive monetary compensation for overtime work. On the other hand, included career service employees, such as those persons in Petitioners’ previous position of Human Services Counselor III, must receive monetary compensation for overtime hours worked, rather than regular compensatory leave credits. Neither Petitioners nor their supervisors were aware at the time that the overpayments were made that Petitioners could not receive monetary compensation for their overtime hours, but must instead receive regular compensatory leave credits. At hearing, Petitioners did not dispute the amounts and hours of overtime worked as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. In accordance with the Department of Management Services’ Bureau of Payroll Manual, the amount of salary overpaid, and the amount sought to be repaid, was calculated as set forth in paragraphs 12-14 above. When an agency has determined that a salary overpayment has occurred, it is required to follow procedures set forth in the above-referenced manual, to seek repayment. Respondent followed those procedures in making the calculations relevant in this case.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Agency for Persons with Disabilities determining that: 1) Petitioner Ileana Toledo was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $464.63; 2) Petitioner Norma Pedraza was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $624.13; 3) Petitioner Lil Guerrero was erroneously paid salary in the amount of $426.65; and 4) Petitioners are entitled to be compensated by Respondent through compensatory leave credits for the overtime hours worked as reflected in paragraphs 12-14 above. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DARREN A. SCHWARTZ Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2013.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, has held the position of a veterinary aide since approximately November, 1967. During October 1974, he was converted from OPS status to a regular career service employee subject to the normal six month probationary period. By letter dated June 24, 1976, from J. Patrick McCann, Division Director, Petitioner was advised that based on "action by the 1976 legislature, we most regretfully inform you that it will be necessary to abolish your position effective the close of business, June 30, 1976. In lieu of two weeks notice, you will receive two weeks termination pay." (See Respondent's Composite Exhibit Number 1). Within a few days, the Petitioner was converted back to an OPS position receiving the same hourly pay and was advised that he would be offered any vacancy which occurred within the department to which he qualified within the following 12 month period. Petitioner, through his attorney, timely appealed the Respondent's actions essentially contesting his conversion from the career service status to the OPS status and thereby losing social security benefits, retirement benefits and the accrual of vacation and sick leave. He further complained about the manner in which he was served his layoff notice. Specifically, he complained that his letter was hand delivered whereas personnel rules and regulations require that layoff notices etc. be sent by certified mail. In this regard, evidence reveals that by letter dated August 3, 1976, by certified mail, return receipt requested, Petitioner was advised that he was then being provided notice in accordance with the requirement in the department's personnel rules and regulations. Pursuant to emergency rules governing the layoff of career service employees, 22AER76-1, the Petitioner was advised that his position was abolished pursuant to action taken by the 1976 legislature. Evidence adduced during the course of the hearing reveals that the Petitioner's layoff was effected via the procedures as outlined in the above referred emergency rule and he was immediately converted to an OPS position, a position he now holds, at the same rate of pay. Evidence clearly reveals that Petitioner's layoff was effected pursuant to and authorized by the foregoing emergency rule. In view thereof, and in the absence of any evidence which would provide basis for a contrary finding, the action of the Department in effecting the Petitioner's layoff was proper and I shall accordingly recommend that such action be sustained. It is therefore recommended that the action of the Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, in effecting the layoff of the Petitioner, Alfred Greenberg, pursuant to emergency rule 22AER76-1, as published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on June 11, 1976, and adopted by the Administration Commission that same date, be sustained. RECOMMENDED this 28th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: William Hatch, Esquire Department of Business Regulation 725 South Bronough Street Tallahassee, Florida 32304 James W. Pritchard, Esquire 1038 Alfred I. DuPont Building 169 East Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33131 Mrs. Dorothy B. Roberts Room 443, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304
Findings Of Fact At all times material to the issue of abandonment in these proceedings, Petitioner Bynoe was a Career Service Employee, and was employed by the Department of Corrections at Hendry Correctional Institution in Immokalee, Florida, as a Correctional Officer I. In February 1989, the Petitioner submitted a written request for annual leave from June 9, 1989 to June 17, 1989. The leave was approved by the Petitioner's supervisor, Captain Jody Davis. June 6, 1989, Petitioner Bynoe was informed by Captain Davis that he did not have enough hours of annual leave accrued to cover the vacation period which was to begin on June 9, 1989. The prior written approval to the Petitioner for annual leave was revoked as the previously anticipated hours of accrued annual leave did not exist. The Petitioner had only eight hours of annual leave accrued at the time the approval of annual leave was revoked by Captain Davis. In an attempt to accommodate the Petitioner, who had already scheduled vacation plans, Captain Davis told him that the work schedule could be rearranged to allow Petitioner Bynoe to have five days off in a row from June 7, 1989 through June 11, 1989. This work schedule would give Petitioner Bynoe his regular days off of June 7th and 8th. His regularly scheduled days off of June 14th and 15th could be moved to June 9th and 10th, and the eight hours of annual leave available to Petitioner could be used on June 11th. Thus, Petitioner could have time off from work, and Captain Davis could act within his supervisory authority with regard to his approval of leave requests from the Petitioner, who was under his direct supervision. During the discussion between the Petitioner and Captain Davis, the Petitioner requested that he be allowed to take the full vacation period previously scheduled, and that the time from June 12, 1989 through June 17, 1989, be granted as leave without pay. Captain Davis informed Petitioner Bynoe that he did not have the authority to approve such a request, and that such an approval would have to come from someone higher in command. Although the two men ended their conversation with the clear intention to discuss the matter later during the work period on June 6, 1989, they were unable to discuss the matter again on that date. After the Petitioner completed work on June 6, 1989, he left for South Carolina as he had originally planned. On June 9, 1989, Petitioner telephoned Colonel Page at Hendry Correctional Institute. As Colonel Page was on leave, the call was transferred to the personnel manager, Mr. Dick Vollmer. During the conversation, the decision made by Captain Davis to revoke the Petitioner's leave from June 12, 1989 to June 17, 1989, was discussed. Captain Davis' decision was not modified by Mr. Vollmer or anyone else at the correctional institution. The Petitioner did not return to work on June 12, 1989. No additional contact with the institution was initiated by Petitioner until June 19, 1989, when he informed Captain Davis that he was to begin jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989. Captain Davis expected the Petitioner back to work on June 12, 1989. Petitioner Bynoe was scheduled to work from June 12, 1989 to June 20, 1989. The Petitioner did not report to work nor did he contact anyone at the institution until June 19, 1989, when he began jury duty on that date. The Petitioner was absent from work without an authorized leave of absence on his scheduled work days of June 12, 1989 through June 18, 1989.
Recommendation Based upon the evidence, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Secretary of the Department of Administration issue a Final Order finding that Petitioner Bynoe abandoned his position and resigned from the Career Service System. DONE and ENTERED this 9th day of February, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. VERONICA E. DONNELLY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of February, 1990. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. See HO #2. Rejected. Contrary to fact. Accept that Captain Davis spoke with Petitioner. See HO #3 - HO #6. Reject the finding that Captain Davis had not informed the Petitioner that his previously approved leave request had been rescinded. Contrary to fact. See HO #3. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #7 and HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. Rejected. This testimony not believed by the Hearing Officer. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Contrary to fact. This testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer. 19.-27. Rejected. Immaterial to these proceedings. Also, Daugherty's testimony was not believed by the Hearing Officer, and was rejected in full. Respondent's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: Accepted. See HO #1. Accepted. See HO #2. Accepted. See HO #3. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #4. Accepted. See HO #5. Accepted. See HO #6. Accepted. See HO #3. Rejected. Irrelevant. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Rejected. Contrary to fact. See HO #8. Rejected. Irrelevant. Accepted. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See HO #9. Accepted. See preliminary statement. COPIES FURNISHED: Joan Stewart, Esquire Florida Police Benevolent Association, Inc. Post Office Box 11239 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Perri M. King, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Aletta Shutes, Secretary Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Augustus D. Aikens, Jr., Esquire General Counsel Department of Administration 435 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 Richard L. Dugger, Secretary Department of Corrections 1311 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500
