The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Department of Revenue (Department) has properly issued an assessment against Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood (Mitchell's) for additional sales and use tax, interest and penalty; local government infrastructure surtax, interest and penalty; and school capital outlay surtax, interest and penalty; purportedly due in connection with business operations of Mitchell's relating to underreported taxable sales.
Findings Of Fact Mitchell's Grocery and Seafood is located at 8221 North Century Boulevard, Century, Florida. Mr. Harold Mitchell is the sole proprietor of that business and it is a retail sales business meeting the definition of the term "dealer" as defined in Section 212.06(2)(c)(d), Florida Statutes (2001). The Department is an agency of the State of Florida charged with administering and enforcing the tax laws of the State of Florida in accordance with Section 213.05, Florida Statutes. Mitchell's is engaged in the business of operating a "general store," selling fresh seafood, fishing tackle, fish bait, animal feed and general grocery items during times relevant to the audit period. On June 7, 2001 the Department sent Mitchell's a Form DR-840, being a Notice of Intent to Audit Books and Records. The audit was conducted between June 2001 and July 20, 2001. The purpose of the audit was to determine whether Mitchell's was properly collecting and remitting sales and use taxes to the State of Florida through the Department. The audit period with which the audit effort was concerned relates to May 1, 1996 through April 30, 2001 (audit period). On September 4, 2001, as a result of its audit, the Department sent a "Notice of Proposed Assessment" (Assessment) to Mitchell's indicating that it believed Mitchell's owed additional sales and use taxes in the amount of $50,864.13 with a related penalty of $25,138.96, with interest through September 4, 2001 in the amount of $15,950.65, for a total amount of $91,953.74. It also assessed a local government infrastructure surtax amount allegedly due of $8,477.43, with related penalty of $4,126.79, with interest through September 4, 2001, of $2,658.39, as well as additional school capital outlay tax allegedly due $2,934.02, with related penalty of $1,505.55, with interest through September 4, 2001 of $637.96. The taxpayer, the Petitioner chose to contest this assessment and filed a protest letter, dated August 18, 2001. The Petitioner submitted financial information in an additional letter submitted to by the Department during its informal protest. Mitchell's filed a formal protest by letter dated April 23, 2002. The Petitioner availed itself of the reconsideration process by the Department and a Notice of Reconsideration dated October 16, 2002, was issued by the Department. This was done after the Department's representatives visited the Petitioner's place of business on July 9, 2002, reviewed the taxable "markup" percentages and the exempt markups and elected to reduce its total tax assessment from $62,275.58 to $58,371.47 and, concomitantly, the related penalty and interest sought as to the amount of the reduction. The Department conducted the audit of the books and records of Mitchell's from June 5, 2001 through July 10, 2001. The necessary documentation was provided by the Petitioner for the Department to make its assessment. With Mitchell's concurrence, the Department's auditor determined that Mitchell's records were voluminous and on June 21, 2001, due to the voluminous nature and substance of the records, the Department and Mitchell's agreed to a two-month sale sampling period, representing the months of July 1999 and March 2001, being used for purposes of the audit. The Department followed a regular audit program it has developed for convenience stores similar to Mitchell's which it used in conducting the audit. Upon concluding the audit, the auditor determined a proper ratio of taxable sales to gross sales should be 53 percent. He used invoices from the two months representing the Petitioner's purchases for re-sale, as a sample in determining the ratio of taxable sales to gross sales. The auditor found that during the audit period the reported taxable sales were an average of 26 percent of the invoice-supported purchases for re- sale and that after the audit period Mitchell's reported taxable sales rose to approximately 43 percent of taxable sales in ratio to the total purchases for re-sale. The auditor found that during the audit period Mitchell's purchased between $20,000.00 to $27,000.00 of taxable items to sell at retail while reporting, on a monthly basis to the Department, taxable sales of between $12,000.00 to $15,000.00. The Department's auditor found the taxpayer to be knowledgeable about the items that were taxable that he carried in inventory for sale in his store. The Department's auditor used the Petitioner's purchases supported by purchase invoices in the sample months, to determine the tax liability because of the inherent inability to determine what Mitchell's actually sold, since the cash register tapes do not show the items sold; they only show the amount and the category of the item sold. Moreover, the cash register tapes would not reflect what happened to inventory that was not sold (for instance the owner "eating out of the store"), would not show cash sales which were not "rung up" on a cash register and would not reflect items stolen. This is the procedure that the Department has determined from long practice to be the most effective in ascertaining tax liability resulting from an audit. The auditor's determination of the amount of tax actually owed by Mitchell's was not based upon what Mitchell's purchased. Rather, the auditor used the purchases to determine the proper taxable ratio of taxable items purchased for re-sale to apply in determining Mitchell's proper tax remittance to the Department. The most reliable records used by the Department to determine the tax liability were the taxpayer's own invoices of purchased inventory. Because the taxpayer's records are voluminous the Department exercised its discretion under the law and entered into a sampling agreement with Mitchell's, wherein it made a good faith effort to reach an agreement on a sampling procedure, as required by law. The records shows that Mitchell's provided documentation during the protest period which the Department also considered and analyzed, resulting in a small reduction to the assessment. The Department's assessment is based upon the average, initially 53 percent, of Mitchell's taxable purchases for re-sale. Through the Department's Notice of Reconsideration process this percentage was reduced to 51 percent. The Petitioner contends that the auditor's approach of using invoices of purchased inventory to determine the proper taxable ratio of the taxable items purchased for resale, fails to take into account that just because items come into inventory does not mean they are sold or does not mean they are sold during the period the auditor is sampling. In this regard, however, the auditor found that Mitchell's has sold essentially the same inventory mix of items, over the time period since the audit period, as was typically sold during the audit period (i.e. the mix of nontaxable to taxable items). Moreover, the auditor examined and compared Mitchell's federal tax returns and concluded that the taxpayer's inventory did not radically change during the audit period. He also determined that the inventory did not build up and remain unsold over several months, but rather tended to turn over and be completely sold on a monthly basis. He determined this by examination of the taxpayer's own yearly inventory records. Mr. Mitchell testified that his sales had not increased since the end of the audit period. The auditor for the Department testified that he determined the mark-up ratio from each invoice provided to him from the taxpayer or after talking with the taxpayer concerning his practice on determining mark-up. Based upon this determination of information by the auditor, the mark-up ratio or percentage was entered into the Department's computer program to calculate the retail price of the taxable items purchased. The mark-up is the difference between the cost of the item when purchased and the price of the item when sold by the Petitioner at retail. For each transaction reflected in the invoices provided by the Petitioner to the Department, the auditor calculated the average taxable ratio for the Petitioner. The taxable ratio is based upon an analysis of Mitchell's gross sales, exempt sales, taxable sales, tax collected and the tax rate. The taxable ratio is determined by dividing the gross purchases for re-sale at retail made by Mitchell's in a particular month, divided by the taxable purchases for re-sale at retail. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is calculated by a computer program. The retail mark-up for each transaction is examined to derive the taxpayer's taxable ratio for each transaction. The computer program then calculates the average taxable ratio for all of the transactions. The taxable amount owed by the Petitioner is then calculated by multiplying the taxable ratio by the amount of gross sales. At the end of each day the taxpayer finalizes the total number of sales by "zeeing it off" at the cash register. This procedure allows the taxpayer to ascertain the taxable merchandise sold and the total income. The "zee tapes" break down the transactions into the various categories of the items sold by the taxpayer, including sales of non-taxable items. The taxpayer records the total taxable sales in a journal at the end of each day. This journal and the sales invoices are sent to the taxpayer's accountant who figures out the taxpayer's monthly remittance of tax to the Department. Mr. Mitchell did not submit into evidence the journals used by the accountant to ascertain Mitchell's monthly tax liability. Mr. Mitchell contends that "to meet Mr. Statum's (the Department's auditor) expectations of the assessment, I would have to have approximately nine hundred dollars a day in taxable sales 30 days a month." The taxpayer stated that $900.00 in taxable sales is achieved only a "few days." The Petitioner retained the summary tapes that break down each category of items sold by the Petitioner. The summary tapes were not made available to the auditor during the audit period, nor placed into evidence. The Petitioner contends that the sampling period did not account for changes in inventory. He noted that inventory fluctuations occurred, especially with respect to fish bait and tackle. Records of spoiled inventory (fish bait) during the audit period were provided to Mitchell's accountant. The spoilage was taken into account by Mitchell's as a tax deduction. Mitchell's accountant prepared the federal income tax returns based upon journals provided by Mitchell's. The Petitioner signed those tax returns prepared by his accountant and found them to be acceptable. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant prepared his personal tax returns for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period. He testified that the inventory figures on the "Schedule C's" for the years 1996 through 2001 during the audit period, were accurate. The taxpayer's accountant, Better Business Services, also prepares a monthly income statement which shows Mitchell's gross sales, purchases, expenses, gross profit and net profit. Mr. Mitchell testified that his accountant provided him with accurate information on the income statements for the years 1996 through 2001. The Petitioner accounted for the fact that purchases of inventory on a monthly basis are greater than the taxable sales reported to the Department by stating that he has unsold inventory in his store including a lot of nails, wine, cigarettes, fishing tackle, fishing rods and reels, high powered rifle cartridges, and shotgun shells, as reflected in the inventory figures shown on his Schedule C's of his federal tax returns for the years 1996-1998. The Petitioner also contended that the auditor's mark- up prices for soda pop, potato chips (which are delivered pre- priced) and animal feed were not correct. He also contends that the auditor's mark-up prices do not reflect inflation and thus that the auditor's wrongly assessed the cost value of his inventory at 2001 prices when he bought some of it as far back as 1996 at cheaper prices. For the two months that the auditor sampled, July 1999 and March 2001, the tax liability was computed by applying the taxable ratio of 53 percent to Mitchell's gross sales. The auditor then input over 100 transactions of items sold by Mitchell in June, 2001 into a computer program in order to compute the "effective rate" of tax, taking into account the statutorily mandated "bracket" rates for taxable transactions in accordance with Section 212.12, Florida Statutes. Concerning the auditor-sampled month of July 1999, the Petitioner agreed with the "mark-up" figures as reflected in "Exhibit A01, Sales Exhibit" with regard to cigarettes, fishing tackle, and Baldwin Snacks. The taxpayer agreed with the cost figures put forth by the auditor as reflected in that exhibit. The Department's auditor determined that for the month of July 1999 the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. Concerning the sample month of March 2001, the auditor determined that the Petitioner would have more taxable merchandise sold than he reported. The Petitioner agreed that the total figure for the inventory purchases reflected in the above referenced exhibit, was accurate. The auditor examined the taxpayer's exhibits (see exhibit volume II pages 160-327) and found that purchases for the months represented in those exhibits, May, June, August, September and October, 1999, were well in excess of taxable sales reported to the Department. The auditor found that Mitchell's reported taxable sales to the Department increased by approximately 75 percent after the audit period. The records of the two sample months from the audit period show a taxable sales amount reported that is comparable to the taxable sales reported to the Department after the audit period, specifically during the month of July 2003. The Department's Exhibit, pages 335-336, shows that during months after conclusion of the audit, beginning in September 2001 through December 2002 the Petitioner had more taxable sales reported to the Department than before the audit, showing an average increase of almost 75 percent after the audit period. Indeed, for several days examined for July of 2003 (immediately prior to the hearing) the taxable sales ratio was running in the range of approximately 50 percent of gross sales. The Petitioner contends that the difference in the taxable sales ratio as reported during the audit period, with the taxable sales ratio reported after the audit period, was because, as to the months of July 2002 and July 2003, he sells more fish bait, ice and beer in the month of July. He also stated that the more outdoor-oriented workforce in the area depends on good weather to achieve a steady income, which results in his July sales being inordinately high compared to other months. The Petitioner contends that July sales do not represent an average month. In summary, the Department's audit and the method it employed in its audit was shown to be reasonable under the circumstances and in accord with the statutory authority cited below. The result of that audit, culminating in the testimony and evidence adduced by the Department, shows that the Petitioner under-reported taxable sales to the Department during the audit period. The testimony of the Petitioner concerning such matters as inventory spoilage, climatic and seasonal weather changes and their effect on the local economy and therefore sales, and discrepancies with the Department's auditor over the mark-up prices of certain items sold in the store does not constitute sufficient evidence to overcome the preponderant showing that the Department's assessment is correct.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witness, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Department of Revenue sustaining the revised assessment at issue in the amount of $58,371.47 plus concomitant penalty and interest and subject to any discretionary negotiated settlement of tax, penalty and interest amounts. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of December, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold L. Mitchell Post Office Box 13 Century, Florida 32535 Robert F. Langford Assistant General Counsel Office of the Attorney General The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1050 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Oglesby Construction, Inc., (Oglesby) is a company with its ownership controlled by members of a protected minority. Its home office is in Norwalk, Ohio, and it also has an office in Sanford, Florida. It has been certified as a "disadvantaged business enterprise" (DBE) under pertinent regulations of the U.S. Department of Transportation, as well as State Transportation Departments in twelve or thirteen states, including Florida. Prior to 1986, the company was engaged in various types of concrete work and pavement marking jobs. Although Oglesby typically maintained several hundred contracts or ongoing jobs on its books, each job would be of relatively small dollar value and performance time. Recently, however, Oglesby has been working toward becoming a "prime" contractor, successfully bidding on larger jobs. It was successful bidding on four such projects in 1986 and 1987 which had been reserved for bidding on by minority controlled companies. Oglesby has been certified as a DBE in Florida since 1983. On January 26, 1987, Oglesby was advised by the Florida Department of Transportation that its certification "will expire" on February 18, 1987. Oglesby, in fact, because it was aware that certification had to be renewed or reapplied for annually, had already submitted its application on January 2, 1987. It included in that application indication of its gross receipts for the years 1983, 1984, and 1985. Those numbers, when averaged together, produced an average gross revenue figure of $10,491,778. Oglesby maintains that it did not know its 1986 gross revenue figure, for purposes of the three year average gross revenue, for the most recent three years, required to be shown on the application by the Department's rules, because its fiscal year ended January 31, 1987. On March 26, 1987, Oglesby's application for recertification was rejected by the Department because it did not meet the definition of a "specialty contractor" or "small business concern," for purposes of Rule 14- 78.05, Florida Administrative Code. A hearing was requested by Oglesby to contest this denial of certification. Then, on May 8, 1987, the Department circulated a memorandum to all DBE contractors stating generally that the effect of the Surface Transportation Act of 1987 (Sturra) required several changes to the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program. Thus, contractors were asked to certify their firms' receipts for the last three years. Oglesby did so and showed receipts totaling $44,320,469 for the years 1984, 1985, and 1986. These gross receipts for the three years thus averaged $14,773,049. The Department, upon receiving this information, and after passage of the Sturra Act and a statute by the Florida Legislature incorporating those standards by reference, together with a related rule by the Department, moved to amend the basis for its denial to include, as a reason for decertification, or failure to certify, that the Respondent had exceeded the new $14,000,000 average revenue size standards incorporated in the more recent legislation. Prior to this legislative change and at the time Oglesby applied for recertification in January, 1987, the standard had been $17,000,000 average three year gross revenue receipts, instead of $14,000,000. The Department, by pleading dated August 24, 1987, had withdrawn its original grounds for denial and amended the grounds to the above-mentioned size issue of $14,000,000. Because the parties did not wish to go to hearing until January 1988, and ample time remained for Oglesby to conform its proof to the new allegations in the amended pleading, the Motion for Leave to Amend was granted. Thus the amended ground on which the Department maintains that Oglesby's application for recertification should be denied is that the company, for purposes of DBE certification, is no longer a small business concern, as defined by the Department's rule and state and federal law incorporated by reference. On April 2, 1987, when the size limit for DBE firms was lowered from $17,000,000 to $14,000,000, the new standard was immediately adopted by the Florida Legislature and, in turn, by the Department's rule. When Oglesby applied to the Department in early 1987, it did not include its 1986 gross receipts revenue figure of $18,516,598. Although Oglesby's fiscal records are computerized, Oglesby maintained that it did not yet, at the time of application in January 1987, have a complete 1986 revenue figure so instead listed the 1985 revenue receipt figure of $18,037,348. The 1984 receipts and 1983 receipts were $8,338,017 and $5,099,060 respectively. The inclusion of the significantly lower 1983 revenue receipts brought the three year average for Oglesby down to $10,491,778. In any event, although Oglesby may not have had the 1986 revenue figure immediately available upon application date, it was on notice that its revenue receipts for the year prior to that, 1985, exceeded even the $17,000,000 size limit for DBE contracting firms and thus was on notice that it might be approaching the end of its DBE status even had not the revenue size limits been lowered in the spring and summer of 1987. In any event, Oglesby's audited financial statements submitted indicate that Oglesby received $18,037,348 in construction revenue in 1985. The 1986 figures were supplied to the department due to a request made to all certified DBE's when the Department learned that the size limits were being revised downward by federal and state legislation in May of 1987. That audited financial statement figure for 1986 showed a gross revenue received of $18,399,844 in construction income, and $116,754 in equipment rental, totaling $18,516,598 gross revenues for 1986. When these amounts are averaged with the gross revenue figure listed in Oglesby's application for 1984 of $8,338,017, the average gross revenue receipts for the company for the preceding three fiscal years before application, is $14,963,987. Each year Oglesby was advised by the Department in the "certification notice," by which Oglesby was informed by the Department that its certification needed to be renewed, that its certification was "subject to continued eligibility" and further that its certification was "subject to actions of any other governmental agencies which may affect the minority status" of the company. Thus each year when Oglesby applied for and received DBE certification, it was on notice of these conditions on that certification, both by advisement of the Department's notices and by existing law. Oglesby is the only previously certified DBE which, at the time of hearing, exceeding the $14,000,000 average gross revenue size limit. Under the new federal law referenced above, incorporated by reference by the Florida Legislature and the State Department of Transportation rule at issue, an adjustment for inflation is allowed, to be made by the U.S. Secretary of Transportation. The Department, at the request of Oglesby, inquired of the federal government whether any such adjustment for inflation had been made. No such adjustments had been made by the U.S. Department of Transportation Secretary as of January 5, 1988. On November 4, 1987, a memorandum, (in evidence as Respondent's Exhibit 11) from the Federal Highway Administrator, affirmed that the inflation adjustment had not been defined as yet and would not apply until a method for arriving at an inflation adjustment is developed. The Department also contacted the Federal Highway Administration in order to determine whether an exception on the size limits required by the federal statute and pertinent regulation could be made in Oglesby's case. This was because Oglesby had made certain contractual obligations to buy out the white minority shareholders and purchase or lease a new facility supposedly based on, in part, its reliance on continued DBE status. The Department referenced these concerns of Oglesby in its request to the Federal Highway Administration for an interpretation regarding the applicability of the $14,000,000 revenue limit, but was advised, in effect, that the $14,000,000 limit was strictly interpreted because the response to the request merely amounted to a recitation of the statute and pertinent federal rule providing for that limit and how to calculate it. (See Respondent's Exhibits 9 and 10.) Additionally, Respondent's Exhibit 11, a memorandum of November 4, 1987, from the Federal Highway Administration signed by one R. A. Barnhart, in a like vein, merely indicated a strict interpretation of the federal rule cited below providing for the $14,000,000 average gross revenue limit on DBE status. This federal policy of strictly interpreting the $14,000,000 limit is somewhat borne out by the fact that the example in the federal rule itself, concerning how to apply that limit, with the result that the example firm is not entitled to DBE status, involved an average three year gross income of more than $14,000,000, but less than the three year average gross revenue of Oglesby, found above. The Department has a policy of strictly enforcing the certification requirements. The failure to comply with the federal regulations regarding DBE certification could subject the Department to withdrawal of federal funds from road building projects. Last year the Department received about $600,000,000 in federal funds and the federal government independently audits and reviews the Department's DBE certification decisions. The Department thus has not made any exception from the certification requirements for any firms. Indeed, in analogous circumstances, there have been Department-certified DBE specialty contractor firms who have outgrown their 2.5 million dollar revenue size standards which are applicable to firms in that category. These firms have not had their certifications renewed, that is, they have "graduated" from the Department's DBE program without exception and without dispute. It is the intent of the Disadvantaged Business Enterprise Program that firms participating in that program, will, as they acquire and perform contracting jobs for the Department, grow in size in terms of annual revenues and grow in expertise and competence in public contracting, eventually "graduate" in terms of revenue volume and contracting expertise to prime contractor status and will no longer be disadvantaged business enterprises. In this connection, Oglesby has recently entered into four prime contracts which are not affected by the result of these proceedings. In fact, no work already undertaken by Oglesby under contract will be affected. Even if it is not certified as a DBE, Oglesby may continue to contract with the Department as a subcontractor or a prime contractor. Mr. Mason P. Oglesby, the Petitioner's president, is a competent concrete construction contractor and has been in that business for some thirty years. He is also president of North Coast Eighty-Eight, Inc. Prior to any association with the DBE program, he managed the largest construction project his company has engaged in, which was a project involving construction at the Cincinnati, Ohio, Airport. His firm achieved DBE certification in Ohio in the early 1980's and has been so certified ever since. Oglesby has been certified in twelve or thirteen different states and has utilized 700 to 1000 part-time and full-time employees in a given year. The company does a high volume of work, including many large contracting jobs, and is large enough so that its president does not maintain personal familiarity with the nature of all its jobs contracted for in Ohio, Florida, and other states, but rather maintains a computerized listing of projects which describes the nature of work involved. The company currently has jobs in progress in Pennsylvania, Georgia, Ohio, North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia and in twenty-four counties in Florida simultaneously. Mr. Oglesby closely monitors the dollar volume of work his company contracts for in an intentional effort to keep his firm within the gross revenue guidelines of the DBE program. One of the bases for Oglesby's seeking an exception to those size rules, through this proceeding, is based upon the fact that it entered into a contract to relocate its offices because, for several years, Oglesby has had problems with DBE certification with some states, related to Oglesby renting office space from the white minority owners of Oglesby. Thus the new offices are rented from North Coast Eighty-Eight, Inc., whose president is Mason Oglesby himself. The rental lease for those premises was executed on June 1, 1987, after Oglesby had already been advised by the Department that it no longer met the requirements for DBE certification. Thus, it has not been established that Oglesby underwent any additional expense or other form of detriment involved in the relocation of its offices in justifiable reliance on continued DBE certification. Oglesby also maintains that it made the related business decision to buy out the white minority shareholders in reliance on its continued DBE certification by the Florida DOT. Oglesby, however, made the business decision to undertake that buy-out and the relocation of its offices with full knowledge that its revenues for past two consecutive years were over $18,000,000 each year. Thus it was on notice that, due to a growth in its business, it would soon exceed even the former $17,000,000 gross revenue size standard and, with the advent of its 1986 gross revenues in excess of $18,000,000, was already in excess of the existing new $14,000,000 standard. Thus Oglesby Construction, Inc., entered into these arrangements with the knowledge that the company would soon be ineligible for the DBE program anyway. In fact, Oglesby currently is successful as a prime contractor in obtaining jobs which are not DBE related and has developed considerable concrete and construction expertise in operating its construction business as a public works contractor.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that the application of Oglesby Construction, Inc., for certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise by the Florida Department of Transportation be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of August, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 87-1956 Petitioners Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected; subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings. Accepted. Rejected, Immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected, immaterial. Accepted. Accepted. Rejected; subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings. Rejected, immaterial. Accepted. Rejected; subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings. Accepted. Accepted. Accented. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted. Accepted, but not dispositive. Rejected; subordinate to Hearing Officer's findings. Rejected; Irrelevant. COPIES FURNISHED: Kaye N. Henderson, P.E., Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Judy Rice, Esquire Senior Attorney State of Florida Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, Mail Station 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Robert L. Sabo, Esquire MILLISOR & NOBIL The Huntington Center 41 South High Street, Suite 2195 Columbus, Ohio 43215
The Issue The primary issue in this proceeding is whether Gulf Coast is entitled to certification as a disadvantaged business enterprise under DOT rule 14-78.05 Florida Administrative Code. Ancillary issues include 1) the sufficiency of proof of Bernard Crooke's membership in a designated group, (i.e. "Hispanic Americans"); and 2) the criteria, if any, that DOT may utilize, other than an individual's membership in a designated group, to determine eligibility of that individual's firm for certification.
Findings Of Fact Gulf Coast and Traffic Engineers, Inc. is a Florida corporation with its principal place of business in Escambia County, Florida. Its address is 8203 Kipling Street, Pensacola, Florida, 32513. (Stipulation of the parties: Petitioner's Exhibit #la, tab 2) Gulf Coast is a "small business concern" as required by Rule 14-78.05, Florida Administrative Code. (Stipulation of the parties). The Florida Department of Transportation receives federal highway funds and administers the program for certification of disadvantaged business enterprises. (T-6,92) Bernard E. Crooke is President of Gulf Coast and sixty- percent owner. He directs the management policies and operations of Gulf Coast. (Stipulation of the parties; Petitioner's Exhibit la, tab 2) Cameron Villar is a remote blood relative of Bernard E. Crooke. He and a cousin did some genealogical research on the Villar family history. He obtained a list of names of genealogical societies in Spain from the American embassy in Madrid. After contacting all the societies on the list, he retained one, and obtained from it a picture of the Villar family crest and a brief history of the family name. The Villars originated in Galicia, Spain. Cameron Villar also prepared a genealogical chart tracing his family (and Bernard Crooke's) back to one of two brothers who came from Spain to the United States. The brothers, Augustus and Emmanuel, were sons of Don Jose de Villar, who is mentioned in the family history provided by the genealogical society. (T-22-24, 30-35; Petitioner's Exhibits #2-#5) Paula Margaret Davidson is related to Bernard Crooke through a common great grandmother. She has known Bernard and his family all her life. She also conducted genealogical research and prepared a chart tracing the family back to Spain. (T-45, 6, Petitioner's Exhibit #6) Joseph Davidson (known as "Buddy" Davidson) was raised by Bernard Crooke's aunt, whom "Buddy's" father married after his first wife died. It was common knowledge in the family and in the Pensacola community that the Villars, including the branch in which "Buddy" and Bernard were raised, were of Spanish heritage. There was a community of Spanish harbor pilots in the Old Warrington Woolsey area. Later the city of Warrington was displaced and was moved to New Warrington. (T-71, 74-75) Bernard's grandfather was one of the bar and harbor pilots. (T-56). The Villar family and its various branches celebrated the Bicentennial with their first family reunion. Seven hundred and fifty members participated, including Bernard Crooke. The family was recognized as playing a significant part in the founding of Pensacola, as the two Villar brothers sailed into Pensacola with General Galvez and received land there as a reward from the King of Spain and as an incentive to create a Spanish colony in Pensacola. A booklet was published for the Bicentennial celebration, "Your Heritage," based upon the research of the family members. (T-64, 83, Petitioner's Exhibit #11). Until the Bicentennial in 1975-76, and the resultant public recognition of the family, being Spanish was not a subject of pride and there was concern about discrimination in the community. ( T- 6 9, 77, 82). Neither Bernard Crooke, nor any of the family members who testified on his behalf, could say for certain whether, as an individual, Bernard Crooke was the subject of bias or discrimination by virtue of his Hispanic cultural heritage. (T- 50, 53, 69, 73, 83). Bernard Crooke was one of nine children in a poor family. He started his construction business approximately twenty years ago with five hundred dollars and two partners. He helped support his business in the early days by delivering papers to rack stands. He put himself through Pensacola Junior College and obtained no further formal education. He eventually bought out the two partners who had other interests and were just helping him get started. (T-80-85). The business has gradually grown to one with gross annual receipts (year ending 9/30/84) of $1,761,117.37. (Petitioner's Exhibits #la, tab 2).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be issued finding Petitioner, Gulf Coast, eligible for certification as a Disadvantaged Business Enterprise (DBE). DONE and RECOMMENDED this 3rd day of June, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of June, 1986. APPENDIX The following constitute my specific rulings pursuant to section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact Adopted in Paragraphs #1 and #3. Addressed in Background; otherwise rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in substance in Paragraph #11. Adopted in Paragraphs #3-6. Adopted in substance in Paragraphs #3-7. Rejected as unnecessary. Discussion of criteria for certification is found in the Conclusions of Law. Adopted in Conclusions of Law, Paragraph #10. Adopted in Conclusions of Law, Paragraph #10. Rejected as unnecessary. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Paragraph #1. Addressed in Background. Rejected as summary of evidence rather than a finding of fact. Adopted in part in Paragraph #4. The statement that Mr. Villar is not a genealogist is rejected as unsupported by the record. Adopted in part in Paragraph #4; otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as immaterial, except that the Villar Spanish origins are addressed in paragraphs #4 and #7. Adopted in part in Paragraph #5, otherwise rejected as immaterial. Rejected as contrary to the weight of evidence. Adopted in Paragraph #10. Rejected as being immaterial since Petitioner has also been denied loans. See Conclusion of Law, Paragraph #9. Rejected as unnecessary and while an accurate restatement of an isolated portion of testimony, the out-of-context testimony does not reflect the substantial weight of the evidence. See Conclusion of Law, Paragraph #9. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles C. Sherrill, Esquire 435 East Government Street Post Office Box 12316 Pensacola, Florida 32581 Brant Hargrove, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building, M.S. 58 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns the Palm Beach El Cid Bar and the Fifty-One-O-One Bar in West Palm Beach. Mixed drinks are sold at these establishments. In both bars, the cash registers record each item rung up but do not state the prices of the drinks separately from the sales taxes incurred on account of their sale. When James A. Blalock acquired petitioner approximately five years ago, he computed the sales tax owing on a day's sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar by examining a cash register tape which reflected the sales. For the day Mr. Blalock made his item by item calculations, he computed sales tax at 4 percent on each item, which yielded a figure slightly in excess of 4.2 percent on aggregate sales. Mr. Blalock then "made a supposition" that multiplying gross receipts (the sum of aggregate sales and aggregate sales taxes) by one twenty- fifth (4 percent) would yield a figure which would approximate 4.2 percent of aggregate sales. This supposition is well founded, as reflected by the equation .042 = X(1 + .042), where X equals the number by which gross receipts are to be multiplied. After Mr. Blalock had done his calculations, he made the assumption that the results for that day would hold true generally for both bars, and instructed petitioner's employees to multiply gross receipts by one twenty-fifth (4 percent) in order to compute petitioner's sales taxes. Petitioner's employees did in fact calculate and pay sales taxes monthly on this basis from August 1, 1974, through September 30, 1976, on sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar, and from October 1, 1979, through September 30, 1976, on sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar. Since Mr. Blalock's calculations, however, the "price structure" at the bars has changed three times. Nobody now remembers what day of the week was chosen as the basis for the original calculations. Gross sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar from August 1, 1974, through September 30, 1976, amounted to two hundred twenty thousand four hundred ninety- one dollars and thirty cents ($220,491.30). On these sales, petitioner paid sales taxes of eight thousand seven hundred forty-three dollars and twenty-eight cents ($8,743.28). Gross sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar from October 1, 1973, through September 30, 1976, amounted to four hundred ninety-two thousand six hundred forty-one dollars. and sixty-four cents ($492,641.64). On these sales, petitioner paid sales taxes of nineteen thousand six hundred sixty-five dollars and ninety-one cents ($19,665.91). At both of petitioner's bars, a price list which sated, for each item, its cost without tax, the amount of sales tax, and its cost with sales tax, was kept next to the cash register, for employees' use. Ordinarily, these price lists were not visible patrons. At least since the fall of 1971, respondent has permitted dealers in mixed alcoholic beverages to pay a sales tax equal to their gross sales less the quotient. of gross sales divided by 1.045, whenever it is impractical to record the sales price of each drink separately from the tax collected on account of the sale of the drink, but only if the dealer displays a price list on which the dealer "indicate[s]. . . the cost of each item, the applicable amount of sales tax to each and the total price of the item." Petitioner's exhibit No. 2.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, and in keeping with the teachings of McDonald v. Department of Banking and Finance, 346 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1977), it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent cease and desist from applying the policy set forth in petitioner's exhibit No. 2 until and unless the same shall be duly adopted as a rule, in the manner provided by law. That petitioner pay respondent twenty-two thousand one hundred sixty- eight dollars and eighty-seven cents ($22,168.87) on account of sales at the Palm Beach El Cid Bar and nine thousand nine hundred twenty-two dollars and eleven cents ($9,922.11) on account of sales at the Fifty-One-O-One Bar, together with applicable penalties and interest, less sales taxes petitioner has already paid on account of the Palm Beach El Cid Bar for the period October 1, 1973, to September 30, 1976, and on account of the Fifty-One-O-One Bar for the period August 1, 1974, to September 30, 1976. DONE and ENTERED this 19th day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. John E. Woodbery, Esquire Woodbery and Sapp 217 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 E. Wilson Crump, II, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner owes the taxes, interest, and penalties assessed by the Department of Revenue based upon its audit of Petitioner for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation engaged in the business of selling and installing floor covering materials, such as carpet and tile. Petitioner's business is located in Hillsborough County, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner sales fall into two basic categories: "cash and carry sales" and "installation sales." The "cash and carry sales" are retail sales of floor covering materials to customers that come into Petitioner's store. These sales do not involve any installation work by Petitioner. The "installation sales" are sales in which Petitioner installs the floor covering material in the customer's home or business. These sales are performed pursuant to a lump-sum contract which incorporates the price of the installation and the price of the floor covering materials being installed. Petitioner purchases the floor covering materials from suppliers and distributors. Those purchases become part of the inventory from which Petitioner makes its "installation sales." Petitioner also makes general purchases of goods and services necessary for the day-to-day operation of its business. These purchases include items such as cleaning supplies and vehicle repairs. Petitioner made several fixed-assets purchases during the audit period for use in its business. It purchased a word processor in August 1996, and it purchased equipment and fixtures in December 1996. On those occasions that Petitioner collected sales tax from its customers on the "cash and carry sales" or paid sales tax on its inventory purchases and general purchases, it remitted or reported those amounts to the Department. However, as discussed below, Petitioner did not collect the full amount of sales tax due on each sale, nor did it pay the full amount of sales tax due on each purchase. The Department is the state agency responsible for administering Florida's sales tax laws. The Department is authorized to conduct audits of taxpayers to determine their compliance with the sales tax laws. By letter dated September 10, 2001, the Department notified Petitioner of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit of Petitioner's records for the period of August 1, 1996, through July 31, 2001. The audit was conducted by David Coleman, a tax auditor with seven years of experience with the Department. Petitioner designated its certified public accountant, P.J. Testa, as its representative for purposes of the Department's audit. That designation was memorialized through a power of attorney form executed by Petitioner on March 5, 2002. Mr. Coleman communicated with Mr. Testa throughout the course of the audit. Mr. Coleman conducted the audit using a sampling methodology agreed to by Mr. Testa on behalf of Petitioner. Pursuant to that methodology, Mr. Coleman conducted a comprehensive review of Petitioner's year-2000 purchase and sales invoices and extrapolated the results of that review to the other years in the audit period. The sampling methodology was used because of the volume of records and transactions during the audit period and because of the unavailability of all of the records for the audit period. The year 2000 was chosen as the sample period because Petitioner's records for the other years in the audit period were incomplete or unavailable. Mr. Coleman's audit of the year-2000 invoices focused on three broad types of transactions. First, he reviewed invoices of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales." Second, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner purchased the floor covering materials that it later sold as part of its "installation sales." Third, he reviewed the invoices through which Petitioner made general purchases of tangible personal property used in the day-to-day operation of its business. The sampling methodology was used for the audit of Petitioner's "cash and carry sales," the inventory purchases related to the "installation sales," and the general purchases. The methodology was not used for the audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases; Mr. Coleman reviewed all of the available records for the fixed-asset purchases during each year of the audit period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's retail "cash and carry sales" identified 29 invoices during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by the customer. Those invoices amounted to $17,451.30, on which $1,178.11 in total sales tax was due, but only $552.97 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $625.14 for the retail sales during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's purchases of floor covering that was later sold in the "installation sales" identified a considerable number of purchases during year-2000 on which no sales tax or less than the full sales tax was paid by Petitioner to the supplier or distributor of the materials. Those purchases amounted to $123,398.52, but only $123,397.80 of that amount was taxable. On the taxable amount, $8,330.07 in total sales tax was due, but only $6,810.68 was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $1,519.41 for Petitioner's inventory purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's "general purchases" identified 10 sales during year-2000 on which sales tax was not paid. Those invoices amounted to $2,914.76, on which $196.77 in sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $196.77 for the general purchases during the sample period. Mr. Coleman's audit of Petitioner's fixed-asset purchases identified only two transactions during the entire audit period on which Petitioner did not pay the full sales tax. Those transactions amounted to $5,078.92, on which $330.14 in total sales tax was due, but none of which was paid. As a result, Mr. Coleman's audit identified a sales tax deficiency of $330.14 for the fixed-asset purchases during the audit period. The tax deficiencies calculated by Mr. Coleman for year-2000 for each category described above take into account any sales tax collected by Petitioner from its customers or paid by Petitioner to its vendors. After Mr. Coleman computed the tax deficiencies based upon his audit of the year-2000 records, he calculated a "percentage of error" for each category of sales/purchases. The percentage of error is the ratio used to extrapolate the results of the audit of the year-2000 records over the remainder of the audit period. No percentage of error was calculated for the fixed-asset purchases because Mr. Coleman reviewed the available records for those purchases over the entire audit period, not just year-2000. The percentage of error was calculated by dividing the sales tax deficiency identified in a particular category for the year-2000 by the total sales/purchases in that category for the year-2000. For the year-2000, Petitioner had retail sales of $1,143,182.45; general purchases of $21,254.88; and inventory purchases of $1,214,016.24. As a result, the applicable percentages of error were 0.000547 ($625.14 divided by $1,143,182.45) for the retail sales; 0.009258 ($196.77 divided by $21,254.88) for the general purchases; and 0.001252 ($1,519.41 divided by $1,214,016.24) for the inventory purchases. The percentages of error were then multiplied by the total sales in the applicable category for the entire audit period to calculate a total tax deficiency in each category. Petitioner's total retail sales over the audit period were $4,455,373.40. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $2,437.12 (i.e., $4,455,373.40 multiplied by 0.000547). Petitioner's total general purchases over the audit period were $110,741.49. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $1,025.25 (i.e., $110,741.49 multiplied by 0.009258). Petitioner's total inventory sales over the audit period were $3,130,882.10. Therefore, the total tax deficiency calculated for that category was $3,919.86 (i.e., $3,130,882.10 multiplied by 0.001252). Petitioner's total tax deficiency was computed by adding the deficiencies in each category, as follows: Retail Sales $2,437.12 General Purchases 1,025.25 Inventory Purchases 3,919.86 Fixed-asset purchases 330.14 TOTAL $7,712.37 Of that total, $6,863.02 reflects the state sales tax deficiency; $313.77 reflects the indigent care surtax deficiency; and $535.58 reflects the local government infrastructure surtax deficiency. The sales tax rate in effect in Hillsborough County during the audit period was 6.75 percent. The state sales tax was six percent; the remaining 0.75 percent was for county surtaxes, namely the local government infrastructure surtax and the indigent care surtax. That rate was used by Mr. Coleman in calculating the tax deficiencies described above. On October 4, 2002, Mr. Coleman hand-delivered the Notice of Intent to Make Audit Change (NOI) to Petitioner. The NOI is the end-product of Mr. Coleman's audit. The NOI identified the total tax deficiency set forth above, as well as a penalty of $3,856.26, which is the standard 50 percent of the tax deficiency amount, and interest of $2,561.63, which is calculated at a statutory rate. The NOI included copies of Mr. Coleman's audit work- papers which showed how the taxes, penalties, and interest were calculated. The NOI also included a copy of the "Taxpayers' Bill of Rights" which informed Petitioner of the procedure by which it could protest the audit results reflected on the NOI. On October 29, 2002, the Department issued three NOPAs to Petitioner. A separate NOPA was issued for each type of tax -- i.e., sales tax, indigent care surtax, and local government infrastructure surtax. The cumulative amounts reflected on the NOPAs were the same as that reflected on the NOI, except that the interest due had been updated through the date of the NOPAs. Interest continues to accrue on assessed deficiencies at a cumulative statutory rate of $1.81 per day. The NOPAs were sent to Petitioner by certified mail, and were received by Petitioner on November 1, 2002. By letter dated November 5, 2002, Petitioner protested the full amount of the taxes assessed on the NOPAs and requested a formal administrative hearing. The letter was signed by Mr. Testa on Petitioner's behalf. The protest letter does not allege that the methodology used by Mr. Coleman was improper or that the results of the audit were factually or legally erroneous. Instead, the protest letter states that Petitioner was disputing the results of the audit because it was "following procedures set forth by an agent from a previous audit who established the manner in which [Petitioner was] to compute sales tax on the items being questioned by the current auditor." Mr. Testa made similar comments to Mr. Coleman during the audit. When Mr. Coleman requested documentation from Mr. Testa to corroborate those comments about the procedures allegedly established by the prior auditor, Mr. Testa was unable to provide any such documentation. The record of this proceeding is similarly devoid of evidence to support Petitioner's allegation on this point. The record does not contain any evidence to suggest that Petitioner ever modified or revoked Mr. Testa's authority to represent it in connection with the audit or this protest, which Mr. Testa initiated on Petitioner's behalf. Petitioner, through Mr. Testa, had due notice of the date, time, and location of the final hearing in these cases. Neither Mr. Testa, nor anyone else on Petitioner's behalf, appeared at the final hearing.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order imposing the taxes, interest, and penalties against Petitioner in the full amounts set forth in the three Notices of Proposed Assessment dated October 28, 2002. DONE AND ENTERED this 30th day of December, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 2003.
The Issue Whether sales tax and local government infrastructure surtax is due on the lingerie modeling session fees received by Petitioner, and, if so, whether the Department of Revenue should compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty assessed against Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the testimony and evidence received at the hearing, the following findings are made: Petitioner was established as a Florida corporation in November 1992. At the time of its incorporation, Petitioner's name was Ultimate Fantasy of Pinellas, Inc. Subsequently, the name was changed to U.F., Inc. Petitioner is an "S Corporation," having filed the required election pursuant to Section 1362 of the Internal Revenue Code in June 1994. Steve Smith was the sole shareholder and president of Petitioner during the audit period. Mr. Smith sold his interest in Petitioner in January 2002. Starting on October 1, 1994, Petitioner leased space for its business in a small shopping center at 8248 Ulmerton Road, in unincorporated Pinellas County. Petitioner's store was less than 1,000 square feet in size. Petitioner's lease included the following schedule of lease payments due from Petitioner to the lessor:1 Period Rent Sales Tax (7%) Total 10/1/94 - $585.00 $40.95 $625.95 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $605.00 $42.35 $647.35 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $630.00 $44.10 $674.10 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $670.00 $46.90 $716.90 3/31/02 The record does not include receipts showing that Petitioner actually made those lease payments. However, Mr. Smith testified that Petitioner made those payments, and the weight of the evidence clearly supports the inference that the payments were made. Specifically, Petitioner claimed a deduction for rent expenses on its federal income tax returns in amounts comparable to that set forth above, and Petitioner was actually operating its business at the location specified in the lease during the audit period. Petitioner made payments of $2,288.65 in sales tax to the lessor during the course of the audit period, computed as follows: Period Sales Tax Amount Months Total 5/1/95 - $40.95 17 $ 695.15 9/30/96 10/1/96 - $42.35 24 $1,016.40 9/30/98 10/1/98 - $44.10 12 $ 529.20 9/30/99 4/1/00 - $46.90 1 $ 46.90 4/30/00 8. Petitioner's lease stated that Petitioner would use the premises "as a retail store and for no other uses whatsoever." That limitation was apparently waived by the landlord because the lingerie modeling conducted in Petitioner's store required an adult entertainment permit from Pinellas County and the landlord's consent was required for Petitioner to obtain a permit. Petitioner's business includes the retail sale of lingerie as well as charging patrons a fee to watch lingerie modeling sessions which occur in Petitioner's store. Patrons are not charged to come into Petitioner's store. They are free to come in, look at merchandise, purchase merchandise, and/or leave. However, a patron who comes into Petitioner's store and wants to see a piece of lingerie modeled pays a fee to Petitioner. The fee is $30.00 per session, with a session lasting no more than a half hour. With a discount coupon, the fee was $20.00 per session. No sales tax was collected or remitted on those amounts. After the patron pays the fee to Petitioner, he then identifies the lingerie to be modeled and a model does so. The patron compensates the model for the session through tips. Neither Petitioner, nor any of its employees are involved in that transaction. The patron is not required to purchase the lingerie that is modeled and, as evidenced by the small amount of sales on which Petitioner paid tax during the audit period, such purchases rarely occurred. If the lingerie is purchased, Petitioner collects sales tax from the purchaser and remits it to the Department. If the lingerie is not purchased, it goes back into Petitioner's inventory. Almost all of Petitioner's income over the course of the audit period was derived from the lingerie modeling sessions. On the quarterly sales tax reports filed with the Department, Petitioner reported gross sales of $556,733.83 between May 1995 and December 1999. Of that amount, $554,829.88, or 99.65 percent, was from the fees for the lingerie modeling sessions and was reported as exempt sales. Only $1,978.57, or 0.35 percent, was reported as taxable lingerie sales. The women who model the lingerie are not employees of Petitioner. They are not paid anything by Petitioner, nor do they pay Petitioner anything. Petitioner did provide security for the models. The modeling sessions occurred in "segregated areas" of the store. They did not occur behind closed doors, behind a curtain, or in separate rooms, as that is prohibited by the Pinellas County Code.2 The "segregated areas" accounted for approximately 85 percent of the store's floor space. Thus, it is possible that a session could be observed from a distance by persons other than the patron who paid a fee to Petitioner. However, only the patron who pays the fee can view the modeling session in the "segregated areas" where the model performs. Before Petitioner opened for business, Mr. Smith contacted an accountant, Peter Ristorcelli, to provide accounting and tax services to Petitioner. Those services included compliance with Florida's sales tax laws. Mr. Ristorcelli had never worked for a client whose business was similar to that of Petitioner. Accordingly, Mr. Ristorcelli advised Petitioner to obtain guidance from the Department when he registered as a dealer and obtained a sales tax number. Mr. Smith went to the Department's Clearwater office pursuant to Mr. Ristorcelli's advice. While there, he explained the type and operation of Petitioner's business and asked whether sales tax was due on the receipts from the modeling sessions. Mr. Smith was told by an unknown Department employee that the receipts from the modeling sessions were not subject to the sales tax, but that they should be reported as exempt sales. Mr. Smith was also told that receipts from the sale of lingerie should be reported as taxable sales, and that sales tax should be collected on those sales. Mr. Smith conveyed this information to Mr. Ristorcelli who then confirmed it with Bonnie Steffes, an employee in the Department's sales tax collection division in the Clearwater office with whom Mr. Ristorcelli had prior dealings. In their conversations with the Department employees, both Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli fully explained the nature and manner of operation of Petitioner's business. Those explanations were not made in writing, nor were the Department's responses. Ms. Steffes is no longer employed by the Department, and she was not called as a witness at the hearing because she could not be located. Thus, the record does not contain any corroboration of the self-serving testimony of Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli on these events. Nevertheless, the undersigned finds their testimony to be credible. Petitioner followed the advice Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli received from the Department. Petitioner reported the receipts from the modeling sessions as exempt sales and did not collect or remit sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported $554,829.88 in receipts from the modeling sessions for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Petitioner reported the receipts from the sales of lingerie as taxable sales and collected and remitted sales tax on those receipts. As stated above, Petitioner reported taxable sales of $1,978.57, and it collected and remitted sales tax in the amount of $138.58 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. Had Mr. Smith been told that the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, he would have collected sales tax from the patron and remitted it to the Department. The Department's Audit On June 1, 2000, the Department gave Petitioner notice of its intent to conduct a sales tax audit on Petitioner's books and records for the audit period of May 1, 1995, to April 30, 2000. The audit was conducted by Jose Bautista, a tax auditor in the Department's Clearwater office. Mr. Bautista reviewed Petitioner's books and records and spoke with Mr. Ristorcelli and Mr. Smith on several occasions. In conducting the audit, Mr. Buatista utilized standard methods of assessment and followed the Department's rules and practices. He relied on the facts presented to him by Mr. Smith and Mr. Ristorcelli regarding the operation of Petitioner's business and, more specifically, the form and nature of the lingerie modeling transactions. The audit did not identify any underreporting of taxable lingerie sales, nor did it find any underreporting of the receipts from the modeling sessions. In this regard, the proposed assessment (discussed below) was simply based upon the Department's determination that the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions were taxable, not exempt from taxation. The audit working papers indicate receipts of $573,642.89 upon which sales tax was not paid over the course of the audit period. That amount is solely attributable to the receipts from the modeling sessions over the audit period, as identified in the Department's audit. That amount does not correspond with the receipts for the modeling sessions reported to the Department by Petitioner on its periodic sales tax returns. As stated above, Petitioner reported exempt sales from the modeling sessions in the amount of $554,829.88 for the period of May 1995 through December 1999. For that same period, the audit working papers show receipts from the modeling sessions as being only $540,460.32, calculated as follows: Grand Total for Audit Period (5/95 - 4/00) Less: April 2000 ($7,177.49) $ 573,642.89 March 2000 ( 8,208.15) February 2000 ( 8,872.59) January 2000 ( 8,924.34) Total for Period ( 33,182.57) Of 5/95 - 12/99 $ 540,460.32 This discrepancy works in Petitioner's favor. Had the Department simply based its assessment on the amount reported by Petitioner as exempt sales between May 1995 and December 1999 ($554,829.88), and then added the receipts for the period of January 2000 through April 2000 ($33,182.57), the amount upon which Petitioner would have owed sales tax would have been $588,012.45 rather than $573,642.89 as found in the Department's audit. Based upon the audit conducted by Mr. Bautista, the Department issued a Notice of Intent to Make Audit Changes (Notice of Intent) on August 16, 2000. The Notice of Intent assessed a total tax deficiency of $40,155.29, which included a sales tax deficiency of $34,418.81 and a local government infrastructure surtax deficiency of $5,736.78. Those amounts were calculated in accordance with the standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the tax deficiency. The Notice of Intent also assessed interest and penalty. The interest and penalty were calculated on the amount of the tax deficiency pursuant to standardized, statutory methods of calculation. Petitioner does not contest the calculation of the interest or penalty. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought administrative review of the Notice of Intent. That review is conducted at the district office level, which in this case was Clearwater. George Watson supervised the review. No changes were made based upon the review, and on October 26, 2000, the Department issued a Notice of Proposed Assessment which formally assessed the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty described above against Petitioner. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, protested the Notice of Proposed Assessment, and on July 5, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Decision rejecting the protest. The review which resulted in the Notice of Decision was conducted in Tallahassee by Charles Wallace. The Notice of Decision upheld the tax deficiency, interest, and penalty in full. Petitioner, through Mr. Ristorcelli, sought reconsideration of the Notice of Decision. On December 17, 2001, the Department issued its Notice of Reconsideration which again upheld the proposed assessment in full and refused to compromise any portion of the tax, interest, or penalty. The legal basis for the assessments asserted by the Department in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment was that the fee paid to Petitioner by a patron to view a lingerie modeling session was an admission charge. Based upon additional facts and clarifying information presented to the Department by Petitioner through the protest process, the Department concluded that the fee charged by Petitioner was more akin to a license to use real property and therefore taxable as such. That is the legal position asserted by the Department in its Notice of Decision and its Notice of Reconsideration. That legal position was also argued by the Department at the hearing and in its Proposed Recommended Order.3 Despite the change in the legal basis of the assessment, the amount of the assessment set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration is the same as the amount set forth in the Notice of Intent and Notice of Proposed Assessment. It was still based upon the full amount of the receipts from the lingerie modeling sessions (as determined by the audit) which had been reported as exempt sales.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue issue a final order that assesses tax, interest, and penalties, against Petitioner in the amounts set forth in the Notice of Reconsideration dated December 17, 2001; and, if the tax assessed in the final order is based upon Section 212.031 (license to use) rather than Section 212.04 (admissions), the Department should grant Petitioner a credit in the amount of $1,945.35, for the sales tax paid by Petitioner to its landlord on that portion of Petitioner's store where the lingerie modeling sessions occurred. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of June, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. T. KENT WETHERELL, II Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of June, 2002.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner and another podiatrist were engaged in a partnership, practicing podiatry with offices in two locations, one on Broward Boulevard (hereinafter "the Broward office"), and one in Tamarac (hereinafter "the Tamarac office") On February 2, 1977, Respondent initiated negotiations for the acquisition of Parcel No. 154, the property leased by Petitioner or his partnership for the location of the partnership's Broward office. On February 7, 1977, Respondent delivered to the Broward office its ninety-day letter of assured occupancy. Since Respondent and the owner of Parcel No. 154 were unable to agree, Respondent was required to litigate the acquisition of that parcel, and Respondent obtained an order of taking in August, 1978. The contract for constructing the segment on Broward Boulevard where the Broward office was located was let on December 31, 1978. Petitioner closed his Broward office and vacated the premises in March, 1978. No notice to vacate the premises was ever issued to Petitioner, since he had vacated the premises approximately five and one-half months prior to Respondent obtaining possession of the property pursuant to the order of taking. Petitioner's partnership kept only one set of records for both the Tamarac and Broward offices. All of the income, the expenses, and the other allowable deductions were consolidated for both offices, and it is not possible to determine from those records any specific expenses attributable to the Broward office only. In determining the amount of gross income for patients seen at the Broward office, Petitioner, through his accountant, reviewed all patient cards of Broward office patients and added together those charges for services rendered. Those patient cards, however, do not indicate whether those patients were seen by Petitioner or by Petitioner's partner and, accordingly, reflect the income generated by both members of the partnership. In order to then determine expenses generated by the Broward office in order to compute net income, Petitioner, through his accountant, selected a percentage and, using that percentage, divided all expenses between the Broward office and the Tamarac office. No evidence was presented to explain or justify the basis upon which the percentage figures were chosen. Petitioner sold both offices to his partner on April 18, 1977. Petitioner's accountant certified the following figures in support of the amount of fixed payment claimed by the Petitioner: Fee Income per Patient Cards Year Broward Office Profit Percentage per Income Tax Returns Indicated Annual Profit Broward Office 1975 $ 30,371.00 25.09 percent $ 7,620.00 1976 8,093.00 18.04 percent 1,460.00 1977 491.00 44.09 percent 216.00 The figures for expenses used in determining Petitioner's net income were taken from Petitioner's income tax returns, and those returns were also used to verify income and in computing the percentage of business attributable to the Broward office. Petitioner's tax returns, however, were computed on the accrual basis rather than on the cash basis. Books maintained using the accrual method include billed fees not actually received in that year and total expense obligations incurred that year although those expenses may not have been paid. In billing patients who were medicaid or medicare recipients, Petitioner charged the amount of fee he considered proper. If the full amount of Petitioner's bill was not paid by medicare or medicaid, he reduced his fee to the amount actually paid under those programs. Fees not collected would be written off during the following tax year. A review of the records and of the return for the year in which the fee was declared would not reveal the fact that it was subsequently written off, whether partially or fully, such as in the case of an uncollectable fee. The figures set forth in Paragraph numbered 7 above are based upon Petitioner's books and tax returns on the accrual basis and have not been adjusted to reflect income actually received rather than billed or to reflect expenses actually paid rather than incurred. Only sixteen residents were displaced as a result of the entire road- widening project along Broward Boulevard.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED THAT: A final order be entered finding Petitioner, Mark H. Feldman, entitled to receive an additional $1,400 in relocation benefits, which represents the minimum fixed payment minus the amounts previously paid to him by the Respondent. RECOMMENDED this 16th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Dr. Mark H. Feldman 7160 N.W. 45th Court Lauderhill, Florida 33319 Charles G. Gardner, Esquire Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. Paul N. Pappas Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined. Background Petitioner, Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. (petitioner or Gator), is a Florida corporation engaged in the vending machine business throughout the northern part of the State extending from Leon County eastward to Duval County. Gator places coin-operated cigarette vending machines in various business locations, such as lounges, package stores, motels and restaurants. In return for allowing the machines to be placed on the premises, the location owner receives a fee for each pack of cigarettes sold from the machine. This fee is paid to the location owner and is considered a commission or rent for allowing Gator to "lease" the real property on which the machines are placed. All such commissions are subject to the sales tax, which rate may vary depending on the sales tax rate in a particular county. The sales tax is included with the commission (rent) paid to the location owner, and the location owner then has the obligation of remitting the tax to the state. However, the burden of showing that the tax has been paid to the location owner rests upon the vending machine owner. Respondent, Department of Revenue (DOR), is the state agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing the Florida Revenue Act of 1949, as amended. Among other things, DOR performs audits on taxpayers to insure that all taxes due have been correctly paid. To this end, in 1990 a routine audit was performed on Gator covering the audit period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989. After the results of the audit were obtained and an initial assessment made, on January 22, 1991, DOR issued a revised notice of intent to make sales and use tax audit changes wherein it proposed to assess Gator $35,561.67 in unpaid sales taxes, $8,887.82 in delinquent penalties, and $12,934.34 in accrued interest on the unpaid taxes through the date of the revised notice, or a total of $57,383.83. The unpaid taxes related to taxes allegedly due on commissions paid to location owners during the audit period and were assessed against Gator on the grounds the taxpayer had not separately stated the tax on its evidence of sale and failed to provide internal documentation to verify that the taxes had actually been paid. On April 19, 1991, a third revision of the proposed assessment was issued which decreased slightly the unpaid taxes and corresponding penalties but increased the size of the assessment to $57,945.10 due to the continuing accrual of interest. On July 1, 1991, Gator was offered the opportunity to informally contest the assessment. A letter of protest was filed on July 29, 1991, wherein Gator generally contended that (a) its records conformed with the industry practice and that an adequate audit trail existed to substantiate the payment of taxes, and (b) the responsibility for payment of the taxes ultimately rested with the location owner rather than Gator. On February 10, 1992, DOR issued its notice of decision rejecting Gator's position but offering to reduce the penalty on the unpaid sales taxes to 5%. At the same time, and although Gator had not challenged the auditor's method of computing the amount of sales tax, DOR upheld the auditor's determination on that point. After a petition for reconsideration was filed by Gator on March 10, 1992, in which Gator raised for the first time a claim that it was due a refund of $11,015 for overpayment of taxes on cigarette sales during the audit period, DOR issued its notice of reconsideration on June 12, 1992, denying the petition and offering Gator a point of entry on these issues. Such a request was timely filed and this proceeding ensued. The Tax The tax for which petitioner has been assessed became effective on July 1, 1986, and is found in Section 212.031, Florida Statutes. On an undisclosed date, DOR mailed each vending machine company in the state a flier which summarized the new changes in the tax law. The flier noted that the sales tax would be levied on each "license to use or occupy property" and specifically included "an agreement by the owner of real property granting one permission to install and maintain full-service coin-operated vending machines on the premises." Because the vending machine owner is considered to have been granted a license to use the real property of the location owner, the fee (rent) paid by the vending machine owner to the location owner was thus subject to the new sales tax. The notice further provided that the tax "must be collected by the person granting the privilege to use or occupy any real property from the person paying the license fee and is due and payable at the time of receipt." This flier constituted the only notice by DOR concerning the imposition of the new tax. There was no notice to the vending machine owners that they must separately state the sales tax from the commission when paying the commission to the location owner. This was because the flier's main purpose was to put the taxpayers on notice that they were subject to the new tax. Sometime after the tax became effective, DOR developed a rule to implement the new law. Specifically, it amended Rule 12A-1.044, Florida Adminstrative Code, to provide guidance to taxpayers in the coin-operated industry as to who had the taxpaying and collecting responsibility. However, the rule simply stated that the owner of the vending machine was responsible for paying the tax on the rental fee paid to the location owner and did not state how this payment was to be documented or recorded by the lessee. In the absence of any guidance from DOR, the Florida Amusement Association, of which Gator is a member, held meetings around the state to inform the members of their responsibilities under the new law. One method thought to be acceptable to establish payment of the sales tax was to keep internal documentation as to commission rate and tax paid to the various locations. As will be discussed hereinafter, Gator and other vending machine owners began following this practice. On May 11, 1992, or three years after the audit period had ended, and almost six years after the imposition of the tax, DOR adopted an amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10) to provide that "the tax must be separately stated from the amount of the lease or license payment." This constituted the first notice to vending machine owners that they were required to state separately on the check remitted to their locations each month the commission plus tax. It should also be noted that DOR has never specified the exact type of documentation required by this rule or the format in which the information should be submitted. The Industry Practice Petitioner is one of many coin-operated vending machine companies doing business in the state of Florida. The evidence shows that of some twenty representative companies doing business in the state, including Gator, all operate in the same manner. Generally, the vending machine owner has a low investment in equipment which is easily relocated from one place of business to another. Because it is not unusual for the businesses in which equipment is placed to frequently change ownership, and often times the location owner can shop around and obtain a better commission from another vending machine company, it is fairly common to have machines placed in a location for as few as six or seven months. Therefore, it is a common practice in the industry to do business on a handshake and without a formal written agreement. In other words, the agreement to allow the machines to be placed on the premises and the amount of commission (rent) to be paid for leasing that space is based largely on a handshake between the two owners. This accounts in part for the lack of documentation such as a charge ticket, sales slip or invoice between the two owners concerning the amount of sales tax associated with the rent since such documents or evidence of sale are not practicable. The lack of documentation is also attributable to the fact that until May 1992 DOR never advised the vending machine companies that some type of "evidence of sale" was needed. In determining the commission rate to be paid to the various locations, the vending machine owner must first ascertain what the market will bear in terms of selling a pack of cigarettes in the machine. After calculating his overhead, the vending machine owner then bargains with the location owner as to how much of the remaining difference between the cost of cigarettes and overhead and the selling price should be paid to the location owner. This amount of money agreed upon by the vending machine and location owners, and expressed in a per pack rate, is commonly known as the commission expense and includes the total sum of rent plus sales tax. For example, if the total commission is twenty cents per pack of cigarettes sold from each machine, the rent would be approximately 18.2 cents while the sales tax would make up the remainder of that amount. All vending machine owners, including Gator, made it explicitly clear to the location owner that the commission check was tax inclusive. During the audit period, it was standard industry practice for the vending machine owner to write a tax inclusive check to the location owner each month. In other words, a check for the amount due the location owner, including rent and tax, is paid to the location owner each month without any notation on the check as to what portion represents the rent and what portion represents the tax. In the case of Gator, its checks carried only the stamped notation "CIG- COM", which represented the words "cigarette commissions." The record shows that except for one small company with relatively few clients, all representative vending machine companies operated in this manner. Gator's Recordkeeping Like other vending machine companies, Gator's records consisted only of hand-written records on index cards. Indeed, Gator kept no computerized records at the time of the audit. More specifically, all calcuations as to taxes owed, the price of cigarettes, tax calculated on cigarettes vended through any given machine, and any additional information pertaining to the individual machines were kept on 8 x 10 white and pink index cards. These cards were commonly referred to as location cards and were updated each time the machine was moved from one location to another and when the price of cigarettes was changed. At the time of the audit, more than 99% of the original white and pink cards from the sample time period requested by the auditor were available for her inspection. The only documentation existing between the location and vending machine owners was the machine or route ticket, which is no different than merchandising tickets showing the number of units sold. This document reflected the amount of packs sold and the amount of money received from each machine but did not contain a separation of commission plus tax. This information was used by Gator to determine the number of packs sold from each machine during the month. The number of packs was then multiplied by the "rate" for that machine to ascertain the commission due the location owner. Although route tickets were contemporaneously prepared by a route (service) man, they were discarded before the audit began. This is probably because in a prior audit conducted in 1983 or 1984 DOR auditors expressed no interest in reviewing the route tickets. In any event, the route tickets are not essential to a resolution of the issues. A pink card was generated by Gator for each machine placed in a lessor's place of business. The card contained information, all written in pencil and amended as necessary, regarding inventory, location of machine, selling price of cigarettes, the negotiated commission rate to be paid to the location owner, and the tax computed on the license fee. The latter item was recorded in the top right hand side of the index card and, when coupled with the independent accounting firm's representation as to the integrity of the accounting system, provides reliable evidence that the commission paid to the location owner was tax inclusive. For example, petitioner's exhibit 2 received in evidence, which contains representative pink cards, reveals that on November 7, 1986, machine number 175 was installed at "River Walk Cruises #1" in Jacksonville and the location owner was thereafter paid a per pack commission of fourteen cents, of which 13.15 cents represented the rent while the remainder represented the sales tax. It is noted again that more than 99% of these cards from the sample period audited were available for inspection. A white card was also prepared for each machine and listed the number of packs sold, the per pack rate, and the amount paid to the location owner. However, it did not contain a breakdown between commission expense and the related tax. In addition, Gator maintained what was known as a monthly report, which was a summation and accumulation of sales information derived from the white cards. The report listed the rate and number of packs sold for each machine. Like the white card, the monthly report did not contain a breakdown between the rent and sales tax. Finally, journals and ledgers were prepared containing summaries of information taken from the machine cards. Expert testimony by two certified public accountants (CPAs) and a longtime industry representative established that petitioner's records (general accounting records, route tickets, location cards and ledgers) were in conformity with good accounting practice and the industry norm. If anything, Gator's records were more comprehensive than most other vending machine companies and satisfied the requirements of applicable rules and statutes. More specifically, by maintaining location cards which show the sales price per pack of cigarettes with a breakdown between the tax and rent, Gator's records were consistent with good accounting practices and the type of recordkeeping maintained by the industry. It was further established that the industry practice is to conduct business on a "tax inclusive" basis, that is, to issue checks without separately stating what portion of the amount is taxes. In addition, cancelled checks, bank statements, journals and ledgers were available to verify commissions paid to various locations. DOR did not challenge the accuracy of this supporting documentation and agreed, for example, that the month-end commission summaries tied into petitioner's journals and checks. Both financial experts concluded, and the undersigned so finds, that the records establish that the taxes were paid. During final hearing, and for the first time during the administrative hearing process, DOR challenged both the testimony of the experts and the reliability of petitioner's records on the ground the CPAs who testified were not present when the checks were written and thus had no personal knowledge that the checks were tax inclusive. However, the CPAs established the integrity of petitioner's recordkeeping and accounting system and the fact that the system used by Gator produces accurate information that can be relied upon by third party users. This was not credibly contradicted. It can be reasonably inferred from these facts that the hand-written notations on the pink cards concerning the sales tax computed on the license fee were accurate and that the corresponding checks paid to the location owners were tax inclusive. DOR also suggested that the penciled entries on the pink cards pertaining to the tax may have been prepared solely for purposes of this litigation and were not contemporaneous. For the reason stated above, this assertion is also rejected. It should be noted further that except for the allegations themselves, DOR did not challenge the authenticity of the records nor produce any evidence of circumstances that would show the records lacked trustworthiness. DOR further contended that because there was no written contract or other tangible evidence of sale between the two owners where the tax was separately stated, there was insufficient evidence to support petitioner's claim that the taxes were paid. Put another way, DOR contended that Gator needed not only internal documents (such as location cards) to verify the payment of taxes, it also needed documents submitted to the location owner reflecting the separation of tax and commission. However, prior to the 1992 amendment to rule 12A-1.044(10), there was no formal or informal requirement to do so nor had DOR given notice of such a need, and since the internal documentation confirms the payment of the taxes, no other evidence is required. Finally, the evidence shows that a vending machine company has never been considered a "dealer" within the meaning of Subsection 212.07(2), Florida Statutes, as asserted by DOR, and thus the requirement in that subsection that a dealer separately state the amount of tax on the evidence of sale is not applicable. Indeed, this interpretation of the statute is consistent with the language in Rule 12A-1.086, Florida Administrative Code, which characterizes the lessor (location owner) rather than the lessee as the dealer. Refund Issue Gator contends that using an error rate of two or three percent, a recomputation of its taxes paid during the audit period reveals that it is owed a refund of $11,015 occasioned by its bookkeeper incorrectly computing the tax due on the gross sales price of cigarettes rather than on the net price. Since the alleged overpayment of taxes occurred during the period from June 1, 1985, through April 30, 1989, the last alleged overpayment of taxes would have occurred shortly after April 30, 1989. Prior to March 10, 1992, when Gator filed its petition for reconsideration with DOR, Gator had not filed a request for a refund on DOR Form 26 (DR-26), which is the form on which refunds must be requested. In its petition for reconsideration, Gator noted that "a Petition for Refund will be filed in the immediate future if this has not previously been accomplished." As of the date of hearing, which was more than three years after the last alleged overpayment of taxes was made, no DR-26 had been filed. Therefore, the request for refund is deemed to be untimely.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that respondent enter a final order granting the petition of Gator Coin Machine Company, Inc. and rescinding (withdrawing) the assessment set forth in the notice of reconsideration dated June 12, 1992, but denying petitioner's request for a refund of $11,015 for sales taxes allegedly overpaid during the audit period. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of March, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of March, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 92-4806 Petitioner: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 2. 3-6. Partially accepted in finding of fact 3. 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 8-9. Rejected as being unnecessary. 10. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 11. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 12-14. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 15-17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 18-20. Rejected as being irrelevant. 21-22. Rejected as being unnecessary. 23-24. Partially accepted in finding of fact 11. 25. Rejected as being unnecessary. 26. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 27. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 28-29. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. 30-33. Partially accepted in finding of fact 4. 34-35. Partially accepted in finding of fact 5. 36. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 37. Rejected as being unnecessary. 38-39. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 40-41. Partially accepted in finding of fact 8. 42. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10 and 15. 43-45. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 46-49. Partially accepted in finding of fact 6. 50-51. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 52. Rejected as being unnecessary. 53-54. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 55-56. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Rejected as being a conclusion of law. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 61-63. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. 64-65. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 66-68. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 69. Partially accepted in finding of fact 7. 70-75. Rejected as being unnecessary. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 15. 79-81. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 82. Partially accepted in findings of fact 13 and 14. 83-84. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. Rejected to the extent it is inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. 87-88. Rejected to the extent they are inconsistent with findings of fact 17 and 18. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Partially accepted in finding of fact 17. Partially accepted in finding of fact 16. Rejected as being irrelevant since the collection of taxes from Jax Liquors occurred after the audit period. 93-95. Rejected as being unnecessary. Respondent: 1-2. Partially accepted in finding of fact 1. 3-4. Partially accepted in finding of fact 9. 5. Partially accepted in finding of fact 13. 6-8. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 9. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. 10. Rejected as being unnecessary. 11a. Partially accepted in finding of fact 12. 11b. Partially accepted in findings of fact 10, 13 and 15. 11c. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 11d. Partially accepted in finding of fact 14. 12-15. Partially accepted in finding of fact 10. Note - Where a proposed finding has been partially accepted, the remainder has been rejected as being unnecessary, subordinate, irrelevant, not supported by the more credible and persuasive evidence, or a conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda Lettera, Esquire General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Mr. Larry Fuchs Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 William A. Friedlander, Esquire Marie A. Mattox, Esquire 3045 Tower Court Tallahassee, FL 32303 Eric J. Taylor, Esquire Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol-Tax Section Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue The issue is whether a proposed sales tax assessment should become final agency action.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212, Florida Statutes (2001).1 From May 1, 2002, through April 30, 2005 (the audit period), Petitioner was a dealer, defined in Subsection 212.06(2), and was required to collect and remit sales tax to the state. Petitioner is a closely held Florida corporation located at 2802 Thomasson Drive, Naples, Florida 34112. Petitioner is engaged in the business of retail sales, including the sale of tangible personal property such as food, beer, beverages, and fishing bait (goods). Petitioner uses the accrual method of accounting. Petitioner elects, under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code, to report income and deductions for purpose of the federal income tax on form 1120S. Sometime in June 2005, Respondent sent Petitioner a Notification of Intent to Audit Books and Records identified in the record by audit number A200015450. Upon completion of the audit, Respondent concluded that Petitioner had not reported all of the gross sales that occurred during the audit period (unreported sales) and assessed tax, penalty, and interest, through July 13, 2006, in the amount of $163,914.16. During the audit period, it is undisputed that Petitioner did not maintain cash register receipts identified in the record as Z-tapes (Z-tapes).2 Respondent claims the absence of Z-tapes deprives Respondent of adequate records to determine the amount of a tax deficiency, if any. Respondent defines adequate records in Florida Administrative Code Rule (Rule) 12-3.0012(3). The definition of adequate records does not include a requirement for Z-tapes. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner concerning the adequacy of its records to be credible and persuasive. Petitioner maintained adequate records within the meaning of Rule 12-3.0012(3). The records include books, accounts, and other records that are sufficient for Respondent's auditors (the auditors) to reliably determine a tax deficiency. The available records are accurate within the meaning of Rule 12-3.0012(3)(a)1. The records are adequate for the auditors to reconcile differences between gross sales reported for federal and state tax purposes. The available records are inclusive within the meaning of Rule 12-3.0012(3)(a)2. The records capture the transactions necessary to determine a tax deficiency. The available records include a breakdown of individual suppliers for all products that Petitioner sold during the audit period. The amount charged by each vendor ties into the total claimed for federal tax purposes on Petitioner's 1120S tax returns. The available records are authentic within the meaning of Rule 12-3.0012(a)3. It is undisputed that the available records are authentic. The available records are systematic within the meaning of Rule 12-3.0012(a)4. Available records include: daily summary tapes for each shift, spread sheets, and quarterly summaries, each of which is maintained by Petitioner, and journals and general ledgers, which are maintained by Petitioner's accountants. During the audit period, each shift operator manually prepared a worksheet for daily sales and reconciled those numbers with the corresponding bank deposit. Petitioner maintained working papers supported by summary tapes. The summary tapes document totals for each day's operations. Each summary tape is proofed against two of three tapes prepared by different employees. The daily totals are entered on a monthly spreadsheet and submitted to Petitioner's accountants quarterly for preparation of sales tax returns. The auditors were not satisfied with the records Petitioner maintained during the audit period. The cost of goods sold exceeded gross sales (operating losses) for two federal tax years during the three-year audit period (operating loss years).3 The auditors regarded the operating loss years as evidence of unreported sales. As Respondent explains: The controversy regarding the true amount of total sales made by Petitioner arose because [Respondent] could not accept as correct Petitioner's assertion that for two of the three years under audit, Petitioner's reported costs of goods sold were greater than its reported gross receipts [operating losses]. . . . The question puzzling the . . . auditors was - how could a business continue to operate if its costs were greater than its revenue? [Respondent] concluded unreported sales were indicated. . . . Respondent's PRO, paragraph 8, page 6. Respondent knew, or should have known, that unusual facts and circumstances existed during the audit period which answered the auditor's questions concerning the operating loss years. During a substantial part of the audit period, the road fronting the store, which provided virtually all practical access to the store, was closed for construction by the county government. The road closure depressed sales substantially and required Petitioner to sell some goods for less than cost and to offer customer incentives and promotions in an effort to maintain the customer base. The owner and her mother financed the operating losses with annual shareholder loans of approximately $200,000 for each of the two operating loss years. Petitioner provided the auditors with material information, including documentation of the road construction and shareholder loans. That information concerned the nature of the taxpayer's business and included information authorized in Rule 12-3.00112(3) such as third-party confirmations, corroborating evidence, and related supporting documentation. The auditors were not satisfied. They concluded that available records were not adequate. When records are inadequate, Respondent has statutory authority to conduct an audit on the basis of: test or sampling of the dealer's available records or other information relating to the sales or purchases made by such dealer for a representative period. (Emphasis supplied) § 212.12(6)(b). Subsection 212.12(6)(b) is the statutory basis for the proposed agency action. The Notice of Decision, in relevant part, cites Subsection 212.12(6)(b) as statutory authority for the proposed assessment. The available records were adequate for the auditors to use sampling authorized in Subsection 212.12(6)(b) based on Petitioner's federal tax information.4 For example, the auditors could have used the gross profit percentage reported for the federal tax year during the audit period in which Petitioner reported a profit (the profit year) to increase either: the cost of goods sold reported for federal tax purposes during the operating loss years, or the undisputed purchase invoice costs that Petitioner provided to Respondent. Respondent does not assert in its PRO that the proposed assessment is authorized by Subsection 212.12(6)(b). Rather, Respondent reasons at paragraph 23, page 9, of the PRO that the proposed assessment is based on an estimate authorized in Subsection 212.12(5)(b). Subsection 212.12(5)(b) would have authorized Respondent to "make an assessment" against Petitioner "based on an estimate from the best information then available" (emphasis supplied) if it were shown that Petitioner failed or refused to make records available, Respondent suspected fraud, or any of the other statutory prerequisites for an estimate existed. However, it is undisputed that none of the statutory prerequisites for an estimate authorized in Subsection 212.12(5)(b) exist in this proceeding. The Notice of Decision does not reference Subsection 212.12(5)(b), much less cite Subsection 212.12(5)(b) as authority for the proposed assessment. Nevertheless, the auditors estimated unreported gross sales for state tax purposes (unreported sales) based on three field visits to the store.5 In the first field visit, an auditor walked through the store with one of Petitioner's employees and compared the sale price marked on selected goods with costs recorded in the purchase invoices for those goods. The auditor estimated that Petitioner marked up purchase invoice costs for all goods by 50 percent (the 50 percent markup). The auditor estimated sales tax due on unreported sales in four steps. First, the auditor estimated gross sales by marking up the cost of goods sold on Petitioner's federal tax returns by 50 percent. Second, the auditor multiplied the estimated gross sales by 33.33 percent; a percentage derived from the ratio of taxable sales to gross sales (taxable sales ratio) reported by Petitioner. The auditor used the mathematical product of that calculation as the estimated taxable sales. In the third step, the auditor multiplied estimated taxable sales by the effective tax rate to estimate the total tax. Finally, the auditor estimated that the tax due on unreported sales was equal to the difference between the estimated total tax and the amount of taxes paid. The auditors were not satisfied. The auditors believed the taxable sales ratio reported by Petitioner was lower than the actual taxable sales ratio. The parties reached an audit agreement during a meeting conducted on December 8, 2005, subject to Petitioner's objection to an assessment based on any sampling or estimate. Each party determined a taxable sales ratio based on Z-tapes that were available from July 16 through November 2005 (the representative period) and applied the taxable sales ratio back over the entire audit period. Prior to the representative period, an auditor made a second field visit and identified certain goods, including potato chips, which he believed employees were incorrectly selling as non-taxable items. The auditor asked the employees to keep register tapes for the representative period in accordance with his instructions. After the second visit to the store, store employees kept Z-tapes during 141 shifts. The Z-tapes for the 141 shifts provide a "sample . . . for a representative period" within the meaning of Subsection 212.12(6)(b). Respondent determined the applicable taxable sales ratio to be 55.2 percent.6 A certified public accountant (CPA) retained by Petitioner determined that the taxable sales ratio during the representative period was 43 percent. The auditors were not satisfied. They conducted a third "field visit" to the store prior to March 1, 2006. In the third field visit, auditors again viewed goods for sale on store shelves. The auditors estimated the taxable sales ratio to be 75 percent and retained the 50 percent markup. Based on selected goods the auditors viewed on store shelves, the proposed assessment incorrectly estimates unreported sales using a taxable sales ratio and markup of 75 and 50 percent.7 The 50 percent markup lacks economic reality. The markup is necessarily limited to selected items and does not accurately reflect actual markup for all goods sold. Nor does the markup accurately reflect the impact of construction on Petitioner's business within the meaning of Rule 12-.0012(3)(b). Petitioner presented credible and persuasive testimony that the correct markup is 23 percent. That testimony is consistent with evidence sanctioned in Rule 12-3.0012(3)(b) that the industry operates on a markup of only 20 percent. A taxable sales ratio of 55.2 percent is reasonable and accurately reflects economic reality. The taxable sales ratio of 55.2 percent was correctly determined by a sampling method authorized in Subsection 212.12(6)(b). The sampling method used to determine a taxable sales ratio of 55.2 percent is consistent with the legislative description of sampling in Subsection 212.12(6)(c) that the Legislature authorizes when available records are adequate but voluminous.8 If the proposed assessment were correct, Respondent should not assess any penalties against Petitioner. It is undisputed that an alleged failure to maintain adequate records was unintentional and that Petitioner fully cooperated in the audit. On July 10, 2007, Petitioner paid Respondent an additional $47,727.41; comprised of additional tax totaling $35,589 and accrued interest of $12,138.41.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order assessing sales tax based on the available records maintained by Petitioner, and, if sampling is authorized, using a taxable sales ratio and markup that do not exceed 55.2 and 23 percent, respectively. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of March 2008, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of March, 2008.
The Issue Petitioner's challenge to determine the invalidity of Rule 60S-6.001(6), (11), and (16), Florida Administrative Code, as an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as alleged in the petition filed October 15, 1993.
Findings Of Fact The District is a public corporation in the State of Florida existing by virtue of Chapter 25270, Laws of Florida, 1949, and operating pursuant to Chapter 373, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 40E, Florida Administrative Code, as a water management district. Retirement is an agency of the State of Florida existing by virtue of Section 20.22(2)(i), Florida Statutes, and operating pursuant to Chapter 121, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 60S, Florida Administrative Code, as the retirement and pension administrator for the Florida Retirement System (FRS). The District is an employer and its employees are eligible to be members of the FRS. The District is a member of the FRS pursuant to Section 121.051(2)(b)1., Florida Statutes, and, as such, makes regular contributions (based upon its employees' total compensation) to Retirement. Until February, 1993, and for the period of time at issue in this case, the District provided its employees with a total compensation package which included: one performance appraisal with a base pay increase depending on merit, and one interim performance appraisal with a lump sum performance payment also depending on merit. The District's lump sum performance payments were funded on a sound actuarial basis. The District's performance appraisals are based on merit and the procedure for both base pay and lump sum performance appraisals are identical. The District's lump sum performance payments are paid according to a formal written policy which was adopted as a rule and applies to all eligible employees equally. In order to receive the lump sum amount, the employee must requalify for it each year based on merit. Eligibility for the District's lump sum performance payments commences during the first year an employee works at the District. The District's lump sum performance payments are paid at least annually to all employees who qualify for it. Not all District employees qualify for the payment. Less than one percent of the District's employees do not receive the lump sum performance payment. The District has made contributions to Retirement based upon the total compensation paid to its employees, including the lump sum performance payments. However, the District did not pay contributions for the months of February, 1990, through April, 1990; this cumulative amount was paid in lump sum to Retirement in May, 1990. Retirement accepted the contributions, including the lump sum performance payments, through February, 1993, when the plan was terminated and contributions ceased. The District was aware that Retirement had a dispute regarding the reporting of lump sum performance payments in June, 1992, as the result of a calculation of a District employee's retirement benefit. In May, 1993, after receiving notice of the disallowance, the District timely challenged Retirement's decision to exclude the lump sum performance payments from average final compensation. As a result of changes in the law in 1984 and 1989, Retirement promulgated rules to advise all FRS members of how retirement benefits would be calculated. The rules and subsequent memoranda dealt with issues of how to define "compensation" and "bonuses" so that all agencies would have the proper method to report compensation and make appropriate contributions. Each memorandum and the rules consistently stated the same criteria for determining whether or not a payment should be considered a "bonus." Not at issue in this case are two of the four criteria noted in memorandum 90-189. The only criteria at issue are the provisions that the payments, once commenced, are paid for as long as the employee continues employment, and that the payments are paid at least annually. Since the District lump sum performance payment was tied to the employee's merit performance, there is no assurance that the payment will be paid as long as the employee continues employment, and, therefore, that the payment will made at least annually. Retirement uniformly and consistently applied the rule dealing with "bonuses" to all agencies where such issue arose.
