Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the holder of Oyster Leases NO. 892 and 893. The annual rent for both leases was paid on December 16, 1988, and both leases are currently in full force and effect. No formal action has been brought by DNR to revoke these oyster leases. In July 1988, Petitioner filed a valid and adequate application for a special activity license to use mechanical harvesting implements on these leases. Petitioner furnished a bond payable to the Governor of the State of Florida and approved by DNR in the sum of $3,000.00 at the time he filed his special activity license application.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Natural Resources enter a Final Order and therein grant the application of Harley L. Vause for a special activity license to use mechanical harvesting implements on Oyster Leases NO. 892 and 893. DONE and ENTERED this 13th day of March, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of March, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold A. McLean Deputy General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Suite 1003 Tallahassee, FL 32399 Lynn C. Higby Attorney at Law Bryant, Higby & Williams Post Office Drawer 860 Panama City, FL 32402-0860 Tom Gardner Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 88-5988 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Harley L. Vause Each of the following proposed findings of fact are adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(3) and 2(4). Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Natural Resources The only finding of fact proposed by DNR is rejected as being irrelevant and unsupported by the competent evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold A. McLean Deputy General Counsel Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Suite 1003 Tallahassee, FL 32399 Lynn C. Higby Attorney at Law Bryant, Higby & Williams Post Office Drawer 860 Panama City, FL 32402-0860 Tom Gardner Executive Director Department of Natural Resources 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the Hearing Officer's view of the project site, the following relevant facts re found: Respondent Sunset Realty Corporation initially applied to the Department of Environmental Regulation on March 2, 1979, for a permit to place 54,600 cubic yards of fill adjacent to Three Sisters Island and waterward of the mean high water line in Charlotte Harbor in order to construct a causeway and a sixty-foot bridge from Boca Grande Isles to Three Sisters Island. The applicant Sunset was notified on May 3, 1979, that adverse comments on the project had been received due to its impact upon biological resources. DER suggested that the application be modified by bridging the entire submerged area to alleviate biological and hydrographic concerns. On June 21, 1979, the respondent Sunset filed a revised application which reduced the volume of fill from 54,600 cubic yards to 25,000 cubic yards and extended the bridge from sixty feet to ninety feet long. The Department of Environmental Regulation forwarded to Lee County a summary of the Department's biological and hydrographic report. Additional information was not requested by the County. On October 31, 1979, the Lee County Commission considered the information made available to them from the Department and passed a resolution giving their approval to the first revision of the project by respondent Sunset. Finding that the applicant had not provided reasonable assurance that immediate and long-term impacts of the project would not result in violation of state water quality standards for Class II waters, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued its Intent to Deny Sunset's permit application on March 24, 1980. After a biological and hydrographic study of the project area, Sunset filed a second revision to its project on June 30, 1980. This revised application requested a permit for 10,000 cubic yards of fill and a 120-foot long bridge. In addition, this revision contained plans to install groins at the south end of Three Sisters Island and on Boca Grande Isles, to place riprap along the face of the fill, to remove and relocate existing oyster bars, to maintain turbidity barriers around the project during construction, and to direct stormwater run-off from the concrete bridge to an upland retention area on Three Sisters Island. It was also stipulated by respondent Sunset at the hearing that it would agree, as a condition of the permit, to replant mangrove vegetation along the shoreline of Three Sisters Island. On July 18, 1980, the Department of Environmental Regulation issued a Letter of Intent to Issue the applicant a permit for the revised project. The Department of Environmental Regulation did not seek reapproval of the revised project from the Lee County Commission because the scope and impact of the revised project were substantially reduced. It is not the policy of DER to request a new local approval for reduced projects. All property within the project boundary including submerged lands to be filled is held in fee simple by respondent Sunset. The waters affected by the proposed project are Class II waters, but are unclassified by the Department of Natural Resources as to shellfish harvesting. The nearest Class II waters which thus far have been approved for commercial shellfish harvesting are located approximately one and a half miles north of the project site. The proposed project would involve the destruction and elimination of approximately one acre of productive marine bottoms. The area has an abundance of grass beds and organisms that constitute a viable marine nursery and habitat. The area is not considered a spawning ground for any significant commercial or sport fish species. While the project will eliminate one acre of shallow water and productive bottom resources, the project should have no permanent effect upon the quality of the remaining surrounding waters. Three different species of mangroves vegetate the shoreline and the project would entail the removal of approximately 2/10 acre of mangroves. As indicated above, the applicant has agreed to insert a condition in the permit to revegetate mangroves around the site. The project will also entail the removal of one or two oyster bars. Live oysters can be removed and relocated by the use of floating cages. Relocation of the oysters to the riprapping and bridge pilings should increase their productivity. While the proposed fill will eliminate a wading bird habitat, birds will not otherwise be affected except during the construction of the project. The area around Three Sisters Island is an excellent fishing ground for line and net fishing for trout, red fish, mullet and sheepshead. Concern was expressed by commercial fishermen at the hearing that the bridge would obstruct net fishing, that the construction of the bridge would drive the fish away temporarily and that the fish, being creatures of habit, would not come back. The 120-foot bridge itself would have a minor effect of approximately 2% upon the restriction of flow in the area. A flow resistance is presently caused by the channel itself, a sharp bend in the channel that occurs at a constriction or spit, and the spit itself. The spit severely restricts flow and the channel needs to be enlarged. The remedial measure proposed is to place groins on the spit and on Boca Grande Isles across the spit. This will gradually enlarge the opening and reduce constriction. The placement of groins could provide a 40% increase in flow through the channel, and the increased circulation will improve the overall system. The two groins proposed are 40 feet and 80 feet in length. The groins will intercept the transport of sand and the pass will thereby be enlarged. The groins will be visible to boaters in shallow water and will not be a significant hazard to navigation. Three Sisters Island is a fifteen acre island to be utilized by Sunset Realty Corp. for residential development. Employees of DER who testified at the hearing were not aware of DER ever permitting filling in Class II waters for the purpose of aiding a private development or use. Other regulatory agencies providing comments on the proposed project after its first revision recommended that all fill be deleted from the project plans and that the bridge be constructed so as to span the entire submerged lands and shoreline wetlands. These agencies included the United States Department of the Interior, the Department of the Army, the Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, the United States Department of Commerce and the United States Environmental Protection Agency. With the exception of Durbin Tabb and Richard Lotspeich, both of whom felt that the destruction of one acre of bottom resources would not be significant to the total system, all other experts in marine biology who testified at the hearing felt that spanning the entire area with a bridge and eliminating the fill would provide a viable alternative to the permanent elimination of wetlands and shorelands. The petitioner Gasparilla Island Conservation and Improvement Association, Inc. is a non-profit, tax exempt corporation which was incorporated in 1971. The qualification for membership is the ownership of real property on Gasparilla Island. Approximately 700 property owners on Gasparilla Island are eligible to be members of GICIA. The actual membership is approximately 446. Twenty-two members own property on Boca Grande Isles, the subdivision closest to Three Sisters Island. Among the purposes of the GICIA are the promotion of Land, water and wildlife conservation uses and purposes in the Gasparilla Island area in Lee County and Charlotte County, Florida, including the preservation of ecology of the area, the protection of fish and shellfish breeding areas, the preservation of wildlife, and the promotion of anti-pollution measures. Members of the association use the proposed project area for recreational boating, commercial fishing, shellfish gathering, swimming, fishing and enjoyment of the natural flora, fauna and wildlife. Association members will be adversely affected by the destruction of grasslands, mangroves and oyster beds. The Organized Fishermen of Florida, Inc. (O.F.F.) is a non-profit corporation with chapters throughout the State of Florida. Its purposes include the protection of the fishing industry of Florida and the promotion and sponsorship of conservation. Some members of O.F.F. regularly fish in the Three Sisters Island area that would be impacted by the proposed project. No evidence was presented at the hearing that the State Board of Directors of O.F.F. officially sanctioned witnesses to appear on behalf of the incorporated Organized Fishermen of Florida. No evidence was presented at the hearing as to the standing or substantial interest of the Florida Division of the Izaak Walton League or Eugene C. Enlow, both listed as Petitioners in the "Amendment of Petition for Formal Hearing." Petitioner Freemen Boynton is the owner of a residence located on Lot No. 98 on Boca Grande Isles. The proposed access bridge and groins are to be constructed on Lots No. 99 and 100 which are contiguous to Mr. Boynton's lot. The groin on Lot No. 99 could cause sand and other debris to accumulate upon Mr. Boynton's riparian property. Petitioner Boynton uses his home on Boca Grande Isles about two and one-half months per year and fishes along the shore, collects oysters, conch and shells and engages in bird watching. He is a member of the Gasparilla Island Conservation and Improvement Association, Inc., and he feels that the proposed project would remove some of the recreational aspects of his property and Three Sisters Island. Petitioner Ralph Cole is 71 years old and has been a commercial fisherman in the Charlotte Harbor area since the age of 12. He fishes the Three Sisters Island area every week. He feels that the area is an excellent fishing ground and that the proposed bridge would be in the way of striking a net.
Recommendation Based upon the findings and fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the application of Sunset Realty Corporation for a permit be DENIED insofar as it includes the deposition of 10,000 cubic yards of fill in Class II waters. Respectfully submitted and entered this 24th day of February, 1981, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of February, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Landers, Jr. Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers and Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles G. Batsel Wotitzky, Wotitzky, Johnson, Mandell and Batsel 201 W. Marion Drive Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Robert M. Rhodes and Terry E. Lewis Messer, Rhodes, Vickers and Hart Post Office Box 1976 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lester E. Durst Farr, Farr, Haymans, Moseley and Emrick Post Office Box 635 Punta Gorda, Florida 33950 Victoria Tschinkel, Secretary Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301 H. Ray Allen Department of Environmental Regulation 2600 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue As provided in the notice of hearing, the issues for disposition in this proceeding are whether agency statements within a memorandum and notice of Final Executive Order issued by the Department of Environmental Protection on July 5, 1996 are rules subject to sections 120.535 and 120.54, Florida Statutes, and if so whether the statements violate those sections. 1/ Petitioners pled only a violation of section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and contend that the remedy they seek, a determination of the invalidity of the agency statements, is available without recourse to section 120.535, Florida Statutes. At hearing, the parties, including Petitioners, availed themselves of the opportunity to elicit evidence related to section 120.535, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are shellfishers who harvest and relay in the affected areas in Brevard County, Florida. Intervenor is a resident of Indian River County who utilizes the areas affected by the Department of Environmental Protection (agency, or DEP) statements at issue in this proceeding. The standing of these parties is uncontroverted. Respondent, DEP, is the state agency charged with the administration, supervision, development and conservation of the natural resources of the state, as provided in section 370.013, Florida Statutes. "Saltwater fish" includes shellfish, among others. Section 370.01(2), Florida Statutes. DEP is given the authority in section 370.021, Florida Statutes, to make, adopt, promulgate, amend and repeal all [rules and regulations] necessary or convenient for the carrying out of the duties, obligations, powers, and responsi- bilities conferred on the department or any of its divisions. [Emphasis added] Persons violating any of the rules and regulations adopted under the agency's authority are guilty of a misdemeanor. Section 370.021(2), Florida Statutes, describes penalties for various violations of Chapter 370 or the rules of the agency or any rule of the Marine Fisheries Commission. Section 370.021(3), Florida Statutes, provides that [[r] ules and regulations] shall be admitted as evidence in the courts of the state when accompanied by an affidavit from the secretary of the department certifying that the [rule or regulation has been law- fully adopted, promulgated, and published]; and such affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of proper adoption, promulgation and publication of the rule or regulation. [Emphasis added] Section 370.071(l), Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that DEP ... is authorized to adopt by rule regulations, specifications, and codes relating to sanitary practices for catching, handling, processing, packaging, preserving, canning, smoking, and storing of oysters, clams, mussels, and crabs. Consistent with its specific authority in sections 370.021 and 370.071, DEP has adopted Chapter 62R-7, Florida Administrative Code, "The Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code." Included in the comprehensive code is rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, which defines various classifications of harvesting areas, adopts by reference Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas maps, and describes circumstances for opening or temporarily closing harvesting areas in the event of red tide outbreak or other emergencies or when other criteria are met. Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, also adopts by reference specific maps of growing areas and harvesting areas in the Shellfish Harvesting Area Atlas published by the agency. Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, describes boundaries of classified areas throughout Florida, county by county, and establishes operating procedures. Rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code, establishes conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas of Body D waters in Brevard County, Florida. The boundaries of each are described in explicit detail; further, temporary closing to shellfishing is provided for when ... five day cumulative rainfall as measured in the immediate vicinity meets or exceeds 2.68 inches. The area will be reopened when bacteriological levels meet standards as described in Rule 62R-7.004 and fecal coliform levels in shellfish return to normal background levels so that consumption of shellfish will not be a hazard to the public health. The history note to Rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, reflects that the rule was new on January 4, 1987 and was amended May 21, 1987, August 26, 1987, August 10, 1988, August 31, 1988, October 27, 1977, July 18, 1989, August 30, 1989, November 11, 1990, January 9, 1991, November 5, 1992, May 6, 1993, May 31, 1994 and May l, 1995. Body D is a shellfish harvesting area located in the Indian River, south of the State Road 528 bridge and north of the State Road 518 bridge, in Brevard County. DEP conducted a sanitary survey of Body D pursuant to the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual and released its findings in a document dated June 13, 1996. The first sentence of the document, in a narrative introducing the detailed survey procedures and results, states: Reclassification of the Body D Shellfish Harvesting Area in Brevard County is proposed for the harvest of oysters, clams and mussels [through amendment to 62R-7.005 (29)], the Comprehensive Shellfish Control Code. [Respondent's exhibit no. 5, emphasis added] The narrative summarizes the proposed classification changes, by total acreage, and projects an adverse economic impact due to increased closures. The narrative further states that the current classification of Body D is based on a comprehensive survey conducted in 1988. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program, of which Florida is a voluntary member, requires that a complete survey be conducted at least every twelve years, with updates annually and triennially (every three years). On July 5, 1996, DEP issued a Notice of Final Executive Order with an attached detailed description of the boundaries of conditionally approved, conditionally restricted and prohibited areas within Body D, "Effective August l, 1996." The attachment to the notice describes the management procedures governing temporary closings. Also attached to the notice was a map of the new classifications boundaries. The notice states that "[t]he order will remain in effect until administrative procedures are completed to amend rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code." DEP also issued on July 5, 1996 a memorandum to "Interested Parties," describing the reclassification of Body D for harvest of shellfish as follows: Effective August l, 1996, the Department of Environmental Protection reclassified Body D for the harvest of oysters, clams, and mussels. Body D is located in the Indian River, south of State Road 528 Bridge and north of the State Road 518 Bridge. A public workshop was conducted March 22, 1996 in Melbourne to get input on the proposed reclassification. The reclassification will increase the Conditionally Approved area by 404 acres, increase the Conditionally Restricted area by 6,075 acres, and increase the Prohibited area by 1,979 acres. Also, 9,116 acres were classified that were Unclassified; portions of this area were used for relay activities. Currently, the Conditionally Approved and Conditionally Restricted areas close when five-day cumulative rainfall measured at the DEP Rockledge Gauge exceeds 2.68 inches. Beginning August 1, 1996, the Conditionally Approved management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rockledge Waste Water Treat- ment Plant exceeds 0.44 inches, and the Conditionally Restricted management plan will temporarily close when two-day cumulative rainfall measured at the Rock- ledge Waste Water Treatment Plant exceeds 1.29 inches. The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally Approved area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of 0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 21 days and an average 8.2 days per month. The estimated number of days per month that the Conditionally Restricted area will be closed will increase from a range 0 to 8 days and an average of 0.8 days per month to a range of 0 to 15 days and an average 2.9 days per month. Maps are available that illustrate the shellfish harvesting area classifications at the DEP shellfish office in Palm Bay. The mailing address of this office is 250 Grassland Road, SE, Room 149, Palm Bay, Florida 32909. You may call your local DEP Marine Patrol Office or the DEP Shellfish Office at 407/984-4890 to the open/closed status of the area for shellfishing. (Petitioners' exhibit no. 2) As described in the Notice of Final Executive Order and the memorandum, the reclassification substantially altered the classification descriptions and the management practices found in rule 62R-7.005(29), Florida Administrative Code. The reclassifications were not adopted as a rule amendment pursuant to section 120.54, Florida Statutes. Instead, on September 20, 1996 DEP published notice in the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 22, number 38, page 5397, that it proposed repealing rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, in its entirety, and amending rules 62R-7.001 and 62-7.004, Florida Administrative Code: * * * PURPOSE, EFFECT AND SUMMARY: This amendment proposes to repeal a rule containing references to shellfish harvesting area maps, the detailed verbal descriptions of shellfish harvesting areas classification boundaries, and criteria for temporary closure, reopening, and monitoring of shellfish harvesting areas. The rule proposed for repeal is 62R-7.005 because it was identified as procedural. An address and telephone number were provided in 62R-7.004 where the information currently contained in 62R-7.005 will continue to be made available to the public. This approach provides for reclassifications through the Governor's delegation of authority to the Division of Marine Resources. Repeal of the rule is in accor- dance with Governor Chiles' rule reduction initiative. The Department will continue to conduct public workshops and hearings and incorporate pubic input that is consistent with maximizing the harvest of shellfish and protection of public health. Additionally, this amendment proposes to update a 1993 version with a 1995 version of the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, Part I and Part II, that is incorporated by reference. SPECIFIC AUTHORITY: 370.021(l), 370.071(l) FS. LAW IMPLEMENTED: 370.071 FS. DEP has closed harvesting areas in the past without following the section 120.54, Florida Statutes, amendment procedures. The record in this proceeding does not reflect whether those changes or closures were on a temporary or emergency basis as provided within rules 62R-7.004 and 7.005, Florida Administrative Code. DEP has never opened up new, previously unclassified, areas for harvesting without a formal rule amendment and has not been challenged in the past. DEP concedes that the regulatory content of the Final Executive Order supersedes rule 62R-7.005(29) (j), (k), and (l), Florida Administrative Code: Q. I want to clarify one aspect of your testimony, Mr. Heil, because I think you suggested that if a hypothetical individual were to go into Body D today and to harvest shellfish pursuant to a classification contained in Rule 67R-7.005, that is to say his conduct would have been lawful under the standard contained in that administrative rule, but his conduct is in discord or isn't in compliance with the standard for Body Water D contained in the final executive order which is the subject of this dispute today. Am I correct that it was your view that that person would be subject to present criminal prosecution for that act? A. If the area in question from harvest was previously allowed in the classification effective August 1st by the July 5th memorandum was not now allowed for harvest, then that person would be subject to arrest by the Florida Marine Patrol. Q. And prosecution and conviction? A. Correct. (Transcript, pp. 131-2) The National Shellfish Sanitation Program (NSSP), of which Florida is a voluntary member, is a consortium of federal officials (including the Food and Drug Administration, Environmental Protection Agency and National Marine Fisheries), state officials from state shellfish control agencies, and members of the shellfish industry. DEP contends that its participation in the NSSP and obligation to comply with the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations (the manual) precludes compliance with section 120.54, Florida Statutes, rulemaking requirements. Florida has been criticized for moving too slowly in reclassifying areas, but the record in this proceeding does not establish that delay is because of rulemaking requirements. The manual is adopted as a rule by reference in rule 62R-7.001(5), Florida Administrative Code. The manual provides, in pertinent part: (Both the 1993 version currently adopted and the 1995 version proposed for adoption are precisely the same in this regard.) Public Health Explanation The NSSP gone [sic] beyond the original objective set forth in the 1925 Conference of insuring that shellfish shipped interstate would not be the cause of communicable disease. In the 1940's paralytic shellfish poison became a matter of public health concern and steps were taken to protect the public against this hazard. In 1957 it was recognized that shell- fish might concentrate certain radionuclides and that a radiation surveillance activity might become a necessary addition to the established procedures. In the 1960's and 1970's it became apparent that shellfish have the ability to concentrate poisons and deleterious substances such as metals, pesticides, hydrocarbons, etc. to potentially unsafe levels. To ensure the safety of shellfish, the State must supervise the growing, harvesting, relaying and transportation of shellfish. It is also important that shellfish be protected against contamination. [If State supervision is to be effective, the activity must be supported by legal authority. This authority may be either a specific law or a regulation]. The success with which the State is able to regulate the several components of the shellfish industry provides a measure of the adequacy of the statutory authority. [The unique nature of shellfish as a food also makes it necessary for the State shell- fish control agency to have authority to take immediate emergency action without recourse to lengthy administrative procedures, to halt harvesting and processing of shell- fish]. This authority should include placing restrictions on harvesting on the basis of a potential as well as an actual public health hazard. As examples, a State may find it necessary to close a shellfish growing area following a breakdown of a wastewater treat- ment plant or the unexpected finding of marine toxin(s), or when a growing area is implicated in confirmed illness. [Periodic revisions of State shellfish laws or regulations may be necessary to cope with new public health hazards and to reflect new knowledge]. Examples of changes or develop- ments which have called for revision of State laws include: (1) the increased used of pleasure boats with the resulting probability of contamination of shellfish growing areas with fresh untreated fecal material, (2) the conditionally approved area concept resulting from the construction of wastewater treatment facilities, (3) the effect of non-point source pollution, and (4) the ability of shellfish to concentrate certain radionuclides and hazardous chemicals. Experience has demonstrated that all actual and potential shellfish growing waters of the State must be classified by their sanitary suitability for shellfish harvesting. Harvesting should be permitted only from those areas which have been found by sanitary survey to meet the criteria of this Manual. Harvesting should accordingly be specifically prohibited from areas which do not meet the criteria, or which have not been surveyed, or which have outdated survey information. [Respondent's exhibit no. 4, pp. A2 and A3, emphasis added] CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The Division of Administrative Hearings has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to section 120.535, Florida Statutes. Standing of all parties has been established by stipulation. Petitioners allege that the Final Executive Order issued by the agency on July 5, 1996 is a rule that has not been promulgated by the procedures in section 120.54, Florida Statutes, and is therefore invalid. At the time that the Petitioners filed their challenge, the agency action was proposed to take effect on August 1st; thus, Petitioners invoked section 120.54(4), Florida Statutes, which provides: Any substantially affected person may seek an administrative determination of the invalidity of any proposed rule on the ground that the proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. Pursuant to section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, a proposed rule is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority when the agency has materially failed to follow applicable rulemaking procedures set forth in section 120.54, Florida Statutes. The agency readily admits that it has not promulgated the material styled Final Executive Order as a rule. Nor has it commenced rulemaking proceedings to adopt the material. On the contrary, it has commenced proceedings to repeal all of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including the portion which conflicts with the Final Executive Order. The agency claims foremost that the material in the Final Executive Order is not a rule; but that if it is a rule, the agency is entitled to the section 120.535, Florida Statutes, defense that rulemaking is simply not practicable. This latter argument is based, at least partially, on the insistence by federal members of the Interstate Shellfish Sanitation Conference that the agency improve its procedures. It is appropriate to consider this case under section 120.535, Florida Statutes. In Christo v. State Department of Banking and Finance, 649 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), the court determined that section 120.535, Florida Statutes, was the exclusive mechanism for challenging an agency's failure to promulgate rules. The case cited by Petitioners, Matthews v. Weinberg, 645 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1994) Rev. denied (654 So.2d 919 (Fla. 1995), arose under substantially different procedural circumstances (an appeal from a circuit court decision in an injunctive proceeding) and does not establish authority for section 120.54 or 120.56 challenges to agency statements based on their non- promulgation as rules. Without citing section 120.535, Florida Statutes, Petitioners' petition still included the three allegations required by subsection 120.535(2)(a), Florida Statutes: that Petitioners are substantially affected by the statement; that the statement constitutes a rule under section 120.52(16); and that the agency has not adopted the statement by the rulemaking procedure provided in section 120.54. The parties had ample notice that the hearing was to be conducted pursuant to section 120.535, and testimony and evidence was presented with regard to the defenses available to an agency. Because section 120.535, Florida Statutes, in general, and more specifically in this proceeding, permits the consideration of factual matters presented by the agency, Petitioners' motion for summary final order is DENIED. Petitioners, however, still prevail in their challenge to the Final Executive Order. Section 120.535(1), Florida Statutes, provides: 120.535 Rulemaking required.- Rulemaking is not a matter of agency discretion. Each agency statement defined as a rule under s. 120.52(16) shall be adopted by the rulemaking procedure provided by s. 120.54 as soon as feasible and practicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible and practicable to the extent provided by this subsection unless one of the factors provided by this subsection is applicable. Rulemaking shall be presumed feasible unless the agency proves that: The agency has not had sufficient time to acquire the knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address a statement by rulemaking; or Related matters are not sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address a statement by rulemaking; or The agency is currently using the rule- making procedure expeditiously and in good faith to adopt rules which address the statement. Rulemaking shall be presumed practi- cable to the extent necessary to provide fair notice to affected persons of relevant agency procedures and applicable principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions unless the agency proves that: Detail or precision in the establishment of principles, criteria, or standards for agency decisions is not reasonable under the circumstances; or The particular questions addressed are of such a narrow scope that more specific resolution of the matter is impractical out- side of an adjudication to determine the substantial interests of a party based on individual circumstances. The material contained in the Final Executive Order is a rule, defined in section 120.52(16), Florida Statutes, as follows: (16) "Rule" means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes any form which imposes any require- ment or solicits any information not specifi- cally required by statute or by an existing rule. The term also includes the amendment or repeal of a rule. It does not matter how the agency seeks to characterize its statement. Amos v. Department of HRS, 444 So.2d 43 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Proper characterization of a statement depends on the effect of the statement, not on the agency's appellation. Thus, the fact that DEP adopted similar statements as rules, then disavowed the necessity for such procedural refinements is immaterial. In twenty-plus years of experience under the Administrative Procedures Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, the distinction between rule and order has been immutable. An agency statement is a rule if it purports in and of itself to create certain rights and adversely affect others, or serves by its own effect to create rights, or to require compliance, or otherwise to have the direct and consistent effect of law. Balsam v. Dept. of HRS, 452 So.2d 976, 977-78 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) The agency statement contained in the Final Executive Order is generally applicable. Anyone intending to harvest shellfish within the many thousands of acres of water described in Body D is subject to the classifications. Anyone failing to comply is subject to criminal prosecution. The statement implements, interprets or prescribes law or policy: it establishes where, and under what conditions, shellfish may be taken; it establishes rainfall standards which affect temporary closings; it plainly, as stated in its counterpart rule 62R-7.005, implements section 370.071, Florida Statutes; it also implements rule 62R-7.004, Florida Administrative Code, and the National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations, which is, itself, a rule. Significantly, the statement does not fall within one of the exceptions described in section 120.52(16)(a)-(g), Florida Statutes. It most closely resembles the specific exception provided in section 120.52(16)(d), Florida Statutes, for agency action which alters established annual harvest limits for saltwater fishing. This latter statutory exception underscores the notion that the legislature intended to otherwise include such statements within the definition of a rule. Since the statement at issue is found to be a rule, the agency is entitled to prove that rulemaking was not feasible and practicable. The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the Final Executive Order and the testimony of the agency's witness establish that rulemaking is both feasible and practicable. As provided in the document describing the comprehensive survey of Body D, Brevard County, Florida, the survey was conducted over many months and culminated in the survey report and in the reclassifications and changes in procedure described in the Final Executive Order. Prior to issuance of the Final Executive Order, the agency conducted a workshop. The agency had ample time to acquire knowledge and experience reasonably necessary to address its statement by rulemaking. The specificity of the text reflects that related matters have been sufficiently resolved to enable the agency to address the statement by rulemaking. Indeed, the agency has, in the past, addressed such statements by rulemaking and, for the present, still has such rules in effect. At the time of hearing, the agency had not proceeded with rulemaking procedures addressing the statement, although the text of the Final Executive Order disclosed an intention to so proceed. In the material filed post-hearing and officially recognized upon the request of the Intervenor and agency, the agency "addressed the statement" by announcing its intent to repeal the whole of rule 62R-7.005, Florida Administrative Code, including, of course, the subsection which is substantially amended in the Final Executive Order. The principles, criteria or standards for agency decision based on the Final Executive Order are detailed and precise and are established by agency fiat, rather than through an adjudicative process in which the substantial interests of a party are determined based on individual circumstances. Evidence in this proceeding establishes that the agency plainly intends to rely on the Final Executive Order as its basis for enforcement and prosecution and does not intend to develop on a case by case basis the standards it has already created. Nothing in the record of this proceeding supports the argument by the agency that its Final Executive Order is legally compelled by a higher federal authority or that the shellfish industry in Florida is jeopardized by rulemaking requirements. The National Shellfish Sanitation Program Manual of Operations supports, rather than discourages, the adoption of regulations. (See paragraph 17, above). Throughout Chapter 370, Florida Statutes, are references to regulations. (See, paragraphs 3 and 4, above.) Section 370.103, Florida Statutes, authorizes the agency to enter into cooperative agreements with the Federal Government, but also includes this manifest intent: When differences between state and federal laws occur, state laws shall take precedence. None contests the need for the agency to act promptly under certain circumstances to meet the exigencies of a reasonable enforcement program. According to the record in this proceeding, the Final Executive Order was not developed under such compulsion. Existing rules, the manual and even the Administrative Procedures Act provide for emergency responses to threats to public health, safety and welfare. Those are the procedures which the agency must employ. The "impressive arsenal" of remedies in the Administrative Procedures Act, acknowledged in State, ex rel. Department of General Services v. Willis, 344 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977) exists for the benefit of agencies as well as citizens at large.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the amended petition alleges facts sufficient to establish standing and a legal basis for a hearing pursuant to 120.57, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact For the purposes of this recommended order the following substantive facts alleged by Petitioner are deemed to accurate: On May 22, 1970, the Department entered into a lease agreement with the City which, for the sum of one dollar per year, leased the right of way to the south approach to the Bakers Haulover Bridge located in Dade County, Florida. According to this lease, the property was to be used as a parking lot and remain open to all members of the motoring public. The property leased to the City was, and is, adjacent to Biscayne Bay. This bay has been designated an aquatic preserve as defined in Section 258.39(11), Florida Statutes. The Petitioner is a sport fisherman who for many years has utilized the public right of way leased to the City to gain access to fishing at Bakers Haulover Inlet. On or about July 11, 1987, the City erected a fence on the right of way which blocked Petitioner's access to the water at Haulover Cut. The fence was erected without a permit from the Department. On November 13, 1987, Petitioner and other members of the public, primarily fishermen, met with officials from the Department to complain about the fence and to attempt to reach a compromise. As a result, the City was to apply for an after the fact permit to erect the fence. Petitioner and the other protesting fishermen believed they would be given an opportunity to review and comment upon the permit application. No notice was provided to Petitioner nor any other member of the group regarding the permit application. On December 1, 1987, the Department approved the City's permit for the erection of the fence. Petitioner has not been given an opportunity to respond to the permit application submitted by the City.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Transportation enter a final order dismissing the amended petition filed by Dan Dawson. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 19th day of December, 1988, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of December, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: Fred W. Van Vonno Suite 1750, Courthouse Tower 44 West Flagler Street Miami, Florida 33130-1808 Charles G. Gardner Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street, Mail Station 58 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0458 Kaye N. Henderson, Secretary Department of Transportation Haydon Burns Building 605 Suwannee Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450 Attn: Eleanor F. Turner, Mail Station 58 Thomas H. Bateman, III General Counsel 562 Haydon Burns Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0450
The Issue Whether the South Florida Water Management District’s (“District”) intended award of a contract for aerial spraying services, granular application services, and aerial transport services, to Coastal Air Services, Inc. (“Coastal”), is contrary to the District’s governing statutes, rules, policies, or the bid specifications; and, if so, whether the decision was clearly erroneous, contrary to competition, arbitrary, or capricious.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The District is an independent taxing authority created pursuant to section 373.069, Florida Statutes, with the authority to contract with private entities to maintain real property controlled by the District. See § 373.1401, Fla. Stat. HAI is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 1090 Airglades Boulevard in Clewiston, Florida. Coastal is a Florida corporation duly authorized to do business in the State of Florida with a business address of 7424 Coastal Drive in Panama City, Florida. The RFB On February 7, 2018, the District issued the RFB, soliciting bids for qualified respondents to provide the following: [F]urnish all labor, equipment, perform data entry and perform all operations for spraying of aquatic, ditchbank and invasive vegetation by helicopter and provide aerial flight services for site inspection and plant surveys. Both HAI and Coastal submitted timely bids, which the District deemed responsive and responsible under the terms of the RFB. The District deemed Coastal the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for aerial spraying, granular application, and aerial transport services. The District deemed HAI the lowest responsive and responsible bidder for spot spraying services. On May 11, 2018, the District posted its Notice of Intent to Award the respective contracts to Coastal and HAI. HAI challenges the award to Coastal because it is not a responsible bidder under the terms of the RFB. HAI’s challenge focuses on two items required to document the bidder’s responsibility to perform the requested services. First, the RFB requires the bidder to provide at least two helicopters certified pursuant to 14 CFR Part 133, Rotocraft External-Load Operations; and 14 CFR Part 137, Agricultural Aircraft Operations (Part 137 Certificate). Second, the RFB requires the bidder to demonstrate its ability to obtain required insurance coverage. Part 137 Certificate HAI contends that Coastal’s bid does not meet the responsibility provisions of the RFB because it did not include sufficient Part 137 Certificates for its subcontractor, HMC Helicopters (“HMC”). HAI contends the Part 137 Certificates are required to expressly state that aircraft are certified to dispense economic poisons. Petitioner’s argument fails for three reasons. First, the RFB does not require the bidder’s Part 137 Certificate to expressly endorse aircraft to dispense economic poisons.3/ Second, assuming the express endorsement was required, the requirement does not apply to HMC. The RFB defines the term “Bidder” and “Respondent” as “[a]ll contractors, consultants, organizations, firms or other entities submitting a Response to this RFB as a prime contractor.” (emphasis added). In its bid, Coastal is listed as the prime contractor, and HMC as a subcontractor. The RFB requires each Respondent to list at least two aircraft which are Part 133 and 137 certified. The requirement applies to Coastal as the primary contractor, not to its subcontractor. Coastal’s bid listed five aircraft with both Part 133 and 137 Certificates, actually exceeding the requirement for two such certified aircraft. Third, assuming an express endorsement for dispensing economic poisons was required, and that the requirement applied to HMC, HMC’s Part 137 Certificate documents HMC’s authority to dispense economic poisons. Pursuant to 14 CFR 137.3, “Agricultural aircraft operation” is defined as follows: [T]he operation of an aircraft for the purpose of (1) dispensing any economic poison, (2) dispensing any other substance intended for plant nourishment, soil treatment, propagation of plant life, or pest control, or (3) engaging in dispending activities directly affecting agriculture, horticulture, or forest preservation, but not including the dispensing of live insects. To obtain a Part 137 Certificate, the operator must pass a knowledge and skills test, which includes the safe handling of economic poisons and disposal of used containers for those poisons; the general effects of those poisons on plants, animals, and persons and precautions to be observed in using those poisons; as well as the primary symptoms of poisoning in persons, appropriate emergency measures in the case of poisoning, and the location of poison control centers. See 14 CFR § 137.19. However, if the operator applies for a Part 137 Certificate which prohibits dispensing of economic poisons, the applicant is not required to demonstrate the knowledge and skills listed above. See Id. HMCs’ certificates do not contain an express prohibition against dispensing economic poisons. The authorization for HMC’s aircraft to dispense economic poisons is inherent in its Part 137 Certificate. Coastal’s bid meets the solicitation requirement for at least two aircraft with Part 137 Certificates. Insurance Requirements The RFB requires each Respondent to “provide evidence of the ability to obtain appropriate insurance coverage.” Respondents may meet the insurability requirement by having their insurance agent either (1) complete and sign an insurance certificate which meets all of the requirements of Exhibit H to the RFB; or (2) issue a letter on the insurance agency’s letterhead stating that the Respondent qualifies for the required insurance coverage levels and that an insurance certificate meeting the District’s requirements will be submitted prior to the execution of the contract. In response to this requirement, Coastal submitted a letter from Sterlingrisk Aviation, dated March 6, 2018, stating, “All required coverage amounts are available to Coastal Air Service, Inc. to fulfill the requirements of this contract.” In the Re: line, the letter refers to the specific RFB at issue in this case. Coastal also submitted a certificate of insurance from Sterlingrisk Aviation demonstrating the levels of insurance coverage in effect at the time the bid was submitted, although the coverages are less than the amounts required under the RFB.4/ HAI takes issue with Coastal’s evidence of ability to obtain the required coverage because the letter from Sterlingrisk does not state “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Based on the totality of the evidence, the undersigned infers that Sterlingrisk’s letter omits the language that a certificate “will be provided” prior to contract execution, because Sterlingrisk will issue an insurance certificate only when Coastal applies, and pays the premium, for the increased coverage limitations. The letter from Sterlingrisk substantially complies with the insurance requirements of the RFB, and constitutes competent, substantial evidence of Coastal’s ability to obtain the required insurance coverage. HAI introduced no evidence that Coastal obtained an economic advantage over HAI by failing to include language from its insurance agent that “an insurance certificate reflecting the required coverage will be provided prior to the contract execution.” Instead, HAI argued that by failing to enforce that provision of the RFB, the District cannot ensure the winning bidder will be responsible to undertake the contract. HAI argued that the District’s failure to adhere to this RFB requirement may create inefficiencies that “would result in the event that Coastal were unable to obtain the required insurance coverage” before execution of the contract. Coastal’s bid documents its eligibility for insurance coverage in the amounts required by the RFB. If Coastal does not provide said certificates, it will not be qualified for final execution or issuance of the contract.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Southwest Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing Helicopter Applicator, Inc.’s Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 15th day of November, 2018, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUZANNE VAN WYK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of November, 2018.
The Issue Whether Respondent's wholesale and retail dealer's licenses should be revoked or otherwise disciplined for two convictions of Possession of Undersized Crawfish Tails, as alleged.
Findings Of Fact I. MGB Corporation, a corporation organized under the laws of Florida, owns and operates a seafood dealership known as Gulfstream Seafood at 5300 Georgia Avenue West Palm Beach, Florida. It holds Retail Seafood Dealer's License No. RC-W3246 and wholesale Seafood Dealer's License No. WD2239 issued by DNR for the 1985-86 license year. (DNR Ex. 1,2) George M. Michael is the president and chief executive officer of MGB. In connection with MGB's application for issuance or renewal of its current seafood dealer's licenses, Mr. Michael executed a required affidavit from the individual responsible for the day-to-day management of the business. By the terms of the affidavit, he pledged himself "to the faithful observance of all . . . laws . . . regulating the . . . possession of fish, seafood, and other saltwater products (DNR Ex.2) On October 21, 1985, following a plea of no contest, the County Court of Palm Beach County, Florida, adjudicated MGB d/b/a Gulfstream Seafood guilty of two counts of Possession of Undersized Crawfish Tails, a violation of Section 370.14, Florida Statutes. MGB was fined $500, in addition to a $20 surcharge and a $25 fine for contempt of court. (DNR Ex.3; Tr.21-22) II. One of these counts alleged that on March 29, 1985, MGB d/b/a Gulfstream Seafood, unlawfully possessed crawfish tails which measured less than five and a half inches lengthwise from the point of separation along the center of the entire tail until the rearmost extremity is reached, contrary to Section 370.14(2), Florida Statutes. Facts Underlying this Violation. On March 29, 1985, Officer Francis Crowley accompanied by another officer of the Florida Marine Patrol entered the premises of Gulfstream Seafood and observed undersized crawfish on pallets in the production area. They were not refrigerated and had not yet been processed. Mr. Michael, who was present, tried to divert Officer Crowley's attention while another individual attempted to wheel the crawfish out the back door. The two officers separated the legal-sized crawfish from the undersized crawfish and weighed each category. There were 254 pounds of undersized crawfish, i.e., crawfish with tails measuring less than five and a half inches lengthwise from the point of separation along the center of the entire tail to the foremost extremity. The number of undersized crawfish involved is unknown. Officer Crowley issued a citation to Mr. Micheal and donated the undersized crawfish to a children's home in Fort Pierce. III. The other count of which MGB was found guilty alleged that on May 17, 1985, MGB again unlawfully possessed 3undersized crawfish in violation of Section 370.14(2), Florida Statutes. The circumstances surrounding this violation including the weight or number of undersized crawfish involved, have not been shown. IV. MGB has 165 employees, a payroll of $127,000 a month, and processes between 10,000 and 15,000 crawfish per month. A suspension of its seafood dealers' license for a month or more would adversely impact its operations. Customers would most likely obtain seafood from other dealers and it would be difficult for MGB to recoup the lost business.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing; it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges, and administrative complaint filed against MGB; be DISMISSED. DONE and ORDERED this 12th day of August, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of August, 1986.
The Issue The preliminary issue in this case is whether the South Florida Water Management District (District) has jurisdiction over the Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing (Petition) filed by the Save the Manatee Club (Club)--i.e., whether the Petition was timely or, if not, if the District has jurisdiction under principles of equitable tolling or excusable neglect.
Findings Of Fact On October 11, 1999, Hidden Harbor filed with the District an application for an Environmental Resource Permit (ERP) to construct and operate a surface water management system serving a proposed residential development in Lee County, Florida. In January 2001, the Club sent an email to the Florida Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) stating that it was concerned about Hidden Harbor's Application No. 991011- 13, as it might impact an area the Club would like to see as a manatee sanctuary, and was requesting copies of all FWCC documents relating to the permit. FWCC forwarded a copy of this email to the District on January 19, 2001. At the time, the Club's internet website gave the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. On April 9, 2001, the Club opened a Southwest Florida regional satellite office in Estero, Florida, and installed Laura Combs as Regional Coordinator in charge of that office. Responsibility for monitoring the Hidden Harbor application was delegated to Combs and the satellite office. Nonetheless, the Club's website continued to give the address of its main office in Maitland, Florida, as the Club's official mailing address. Combs's prior work experience with the Club was as assistant director of governmental relations in Tallahassee, Florida. In that position, she tracked legislation and actions of the Governor and Cabinet that were of interest to the Club. She had no role in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of governmental agencies. Combs's education included a bachelor's degree in English and a master's degree in urban and regional planning. She did not have specific legal education in the filing of petitions for administrative hearings on actions of state governmental agencies. On May 30, 2001, the District mailed to the Club at its Maitland office address a letter enclosing the "District's staff report covering the [Hidden Harbor] permit application [No. 991011-13]" and notifying the Club that the "recommendations as stated in the staff report [to grant the attached draft permit] will be presented to our Governing Board for consideration on June 14, 2001." The Club also was advised: Should you wish to object to the staff recommendation or file a petition, please provide written objections, petitions and/or waivers (refer to the attached "Notice of Rights") to [the District's deputy clerk]. The "Notice of Rights" addresses the procedures to be followed if you desire a public hearing or other review of the proposed agency action. You are advised, however, to be prepared to defend your position regarding the permit application when it is considered by the Governing Board for final agency action, even if you agree with the staff recommendation, as the Governing Board may take final agency action which differs materially from the proposed agency action. The Notice of Rights stated that it was intended to conform to the requirement of Section 120.569(1), Florida Statutes, to "inform the recipient of any administrative hearing or judicial review that is available under this section [120.569(1)], s. 120.57 or s. 120.68." It cautioned: Please note that this Notice of Rights is not intended to provide legal advice. Not all the legal proceedings detailed below may be an applicable or appropriate remedy. You may wish to consult an attorney regarding your legal rights. The Notice of Rights included a section entitled "Petition for Administrative Proceedings," which stated in pertinent part: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the South Florida Water Management District's (SFWMD) action has the right to request an administrative hearing on that action. The affected person may request either a formal or an informal hearing, as set forth below. A point of entry into administrative proceedings is governed by Rules 28-106.111 and 40E-1.511, Fla. Admin. Code, (also published as an exception to the Uniform Rules of Procedure as Rule 40E-0.109), as set forth below . . .. Formal Administrative Hearing: If a genuine issue(s) of material fact is in dispute, the affected person seeking a formal hearing on a SFWMD decision which does or may determine their substantial interests shall file a petition for hearing pursuant to Sections 120.569 and 120.57(1), Fla. Stat. or for mediation pursuant to Section 120.573, Fla. Stat. within 21 days . . . of either written notice through mail or posting or publication of notice that the SFWMD has or intends to take final agency action. Pertinent to this case, the Notice of Rights included a verbatim reproduction of Florida Administrative Code Rule 28- 106.201, addressing required contents of a petition to initiate proceedings involving disputed issues of material fact. Rules 28-106.111, 40E-1.5111, and 40E-0.109 were not reproduced in the Notice of Rights. It is not clear from the evidence when the letter dated May 30, 2001, with attachments (the Notice Correspondence), was received in the Club's Maitland office. It was not date-stamped, as time-sensitive correspondence normally would be. Apparently, it was decided to forward the Notice Correspondence to the new satellite office in Estero for handling. Combs received the forwarded Notice Correspondence in early June 2001. This was the "first time [Combs] had been through this type of process." Combs reviewed the Notice Correspondence, eventually focusing on paragraph 1.a. of the "Petition for Administrative Proceedings" section of the Notice of Rights. She did not read any of the cited statutes and rules except for the rules reproduced verbatim as part of the Notice of Rights. Combs made conflicting statements regarding her understanding of the District's administrative process. However, it appears that she understood that the Club could file a petition within 21 days of receipt of the Notice Correspondence, or within 21 days of the "final" action of the District's Governing Board. She testified that, because the Notice Correspondence did not bear a date-stamp, it was unclear when the first 21-day time period began or ended; as a result, she decided to wait until the District's Governing Board took "final" action and file a petition within the second 21-day time period. Combs appeared at the meeting of the District's Governing Board on June 14, 2001, and spoke in opposition to issuance of the draft permit. Notwithstanding the Club's opposition, the Governing Board decided to issue the draft permit. Combs does not have authority to file petitions for administrative hearings on District actions. She consulted with her supervisor, Patricia Thompson, and they made a recommendation to the Club's governing board, which has ultimate authority to file petitions. Prior to Combs's involvement in the Hidden Harbor application, the Club had staff legal counsel, who could be consulted with respect to the filing of petitions and would advise the Club's governing board. However, the Club did not have staff legal counsel at the time of Combs's involvement and through the time of filing of this petition. (The Club now again has staff legal counsel.) Neither Combs nor Thompson saw any need to consult an attorney. It is not clear when the recommendation of Combs and Thompson was presented to the Club's governing board or when the Club's governing board made its decision to file the Petition. Neither Thompson nor any member of the Club's governing board (nor anyone else who may have participated in the decision to file the Petition) testified. Several (according to Combs, approximately 12) times after the District's Governing Board's meeting on June 14, 2001, Combs telephoned the District's offices to obtain a copy of the District's Governing Board's "final" action when it was reduced to writing. It is not clear from the evidence why several telephone calls were required. Eventually, on June 26, 2001, Combs received a copy of the permit issued to Hidden Harbor; there was no Notice of Rights attached. On July 17, 2001, the Club filed its Petition challenging the permit issued to Hidden Harbor. In the meantime, Hidden Harbor had obtained a final development order from Lee County in reliance on the Club's failure to petition for an administrative hearing. The Club is not a newcomer to Florida's administrative process. It can be officially recognized that the Club has participated in numerous proceedings before DOAH. At least one of those cases involved issues similar to those presented for determination in this case. See Conclusion of Law 32, infra.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the South Florida Water Management District enter a final order dismissing the Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of December, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. _________________________________ J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Cindy L. Bartin, Esquire Post Office Box 861118 St. Augustine, Florida 32086 Martha M. Collins, Esquire 233 3rd Street North, Suite 100 St. Petersburg, Florida 33701 Keith W. Rizzardi, Esquire South Florida Water Management District 3301 Gun Club Road West Palm Beach, Florida 33406-3089 Frank R. Finch, Executive Director South Florida Water Management District Post Office Box 24680 West Palm Beach, Florida 33416-4680
The Issue The issues in this case are the validity of Florida Administrative Code Rules 18-14.003(4) and 18-21.004(1)(g)-(h) and (7)(i),1 and an alleged unadopted rule prohibiting fish cleaning stations over sovereign submerged land (SSL); and Petitioner's claim to an award of attorney's fees and costs under Section 120.595(3)-(4), Florida Statutes.2
Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns land on Lake Talquin. In 2003, he obtained a joint permit and SSL consent of use to build a seawall, a boat dock and a covered but not walled boathouse there. In 2005 he obtained another joint permit and SSL consent of use to build another boat dock and another covered boathouse at another location on his property there. Both joint permit/authorizations had general and special conditions. Both had a general condition that limited the permit/authorization to "the specific processes and operations applied for and indicated in the approved drawings or exhibits" and required Petitioner to operate and maintain the facilities "to achieve compliance with the conditions of this permit." Both have a specific condition prohibiting "fish cleaning stations . . . on any structure that is located over the water." The 2003 joint permit/authorization has a specific condition prohibiting any walls and doors on the boathouse and another specific condition prohibiting the installation of water and electric lines. The 2005 joint permit/authorization omits those specific conditions. DEP has issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) against Petitioner for violating the 2005 joint permit/authorization's specific condition prohibiting water and electric lines, for exceeding the dimensions of the boathouse authorized by the joint permit/authorization, for adding a second story structure of livable space (with a kitchen, bathroom, shower, furnished seating area, flat-panel television, and window air conditioning unit) above the boathouse in the space between the roof rafters and the top of the authorized first story structure. DEP has not issued an NOV as to the 2003 joint permit/authorization although it also has electric and water lines. DEP has not issued an NOV as to either joint permit/authorization for having a fish cleaning station over the water. An inspector told Petitioner that the fish cleaning station on the newer facility was a violation of the 2005 permit but that it was not an issue anymore after a change in the law. Petitioner attempted but failed to prove that DEP or BOT prohibits fish cleaning stations over water as a general rule. It is not clear what change in the law has occurred with respect to fish cleaning stations. In any event, the evidence was that these facilities are prohibited when appropriate for protection of water quality, not as a general rule. Rule 18-14.003 states in pertinent part: It shall be a violation of this rule for any person or the agent of any person to knowingly refuse to comply with any provision of Chapter 253, F.S., willfully violate any provision of Chapter 253, F.S., or to willfully damage state land (the ownership or boundaries of which have been established by the state) or products thereof, by doing any of the following: * * * (4) Maintain, place or build permanent or temporary structures, including, but not limited to, additions to existing structures; all structures whose use is not water- dependent; sanitary septic systems; fences, docks and pilings; houses; oil rigs; and utility installations on or over state land without consent or authority from the Board or Department. Petitioner's rule challenge focuses on the part of the rule specifying: "structures whose use is not water-dependent; sanitary septic systems; . . . houses; . . . and utility installations on or over state land without consent or authority from the Board or Department." Rule 18-21.004 states in pertinent part: The following management policies, standards, and criteria shall be used in determining whether to approve, approve with conditions or modifications, or deny all requests for activities on sovereignty submerged lands. General Proprietary. * * * Activities on sovereignty lands shall be limited to water dependent activities only unless the board determines that it is in the public interest to allow an exception as determined by a case by case evaluation. Public projects which are primarily intended to provide access to and use of the waterfront may be permitted to contain minor uses which are not water dependent if: Located in areas along seawalls or other nonnatural shorelines; Located outside of aquatic preserves or class II waters; and The nonwater dependent uses are incidental to the basic purpose of the project, and constitute only minor nearshore encroachments on sovereign lands. Stilt house, boathouses with living quarters, or other such residential structures shall be prohibited on sovereignty lands. * * * General Conditions for Authorizations. All authorizations granted by rule or in writing under Rule 18-21.005, F.A.C., except those for aquaculture activities and geophysical testing, shall be subject to the general conditions as set forth in paragraphs through (i) below. The general conditions shall be part of all authorizations under this chapter, shall be binding upon the grantee, and shall be enforceable under Chapter 253 or 258, Part II, F.S. * * * (i) Structures or activities shall be constructed, operated, and maintained solely for water dependent purposes, or for non- water dependent activities authorized under paragraph 18-21.004(1)(g), F.A.C., or any other applicable law. Petitioner's rule challenge focuses on the parts of this rule prohibiting non-water dependent uses over SSLs, unless in the public interest as determined by a case-by-case evaluation and prohibiting stilt houses, boathouses with living quarters, and other residential structures. Petitioner contends that these rules: exceed their legislative authority; enlarge, modify, or contravene the laws they implement; are vague, lack adequate standards for BOT decisions, and vest unbridled discretion in the BOT (particularly by use of the terms "structure whose use is not water dependent," "utility installations," and "public interest by a case by case evaluation"); and are arbitrary and capricious (for essentially the same reasons they allegedly are vague). See § 120.52(8)(b)- (e), Fla. Stat. The term "structure whose use is not water dependent" is not defined by rule, but Rule 18-21.003(68) states: "'Water dependent activity' means an activity which can only be conducted on, in, over, or adjacent to water areas because the activity requires direct access to the water body or sovereign submerged lands for transportation, recreation, energy production or transmission, or source of water, and where the use of the water or sovereign submerged lands is an integral part of the activity." DEP makes determinations of water-dependency on a case- by-case review of the facts and circumstances presented in each case. DEP does not have a list of factors used in making this determination in any rule, non-rule policy, or other document. According to the evidence, DEP considers docks and boathouses to be water-dependent structures. A roof over a dock may be considered water-dependent depending on the facts and circumstances and whether the roof is an integral and required part of the water-dependent activity. The same is true with respect to benches that are part of a dock structure. Boating- related paraphernalia such as boat paddles, life vests, and similar items can be stored in empty rafters under the roof of a permitted docking facility, but not rakes and shovels cannot, because boating-related paraphernalia are associated with transportation across water, while rakes and shovels are not. Cans of gasoline are related to transportation on water, but their storage on the rafters of a boathouse is not necessarily a water-dependent activity because this is not considered to be safe. Depending on the circumstances, DEP has authorized the installation of electrical and water lines and sewage pump-out systems on boat docking facilities. The installation of electrical and water lines and sewage pump-out systems can be an integral or required part of a public or private commercial marina or docking facility, but generally not a noncommercial dock. DEP once authorized the use of golf carts in connection with a long private pier. The evidence proved that reasonable people of common intelligence can disagree on the interpretation and application of the "not water-dependent" definition. Even experienced consultants are required to check with DEP to be sure they are interpreting and applying the definition correctly. DEP employees sometimes are required to check with DEP headquarters in Tallahassee to be sure they are interpreting and applying the definition correctly. But the evidence did not prove that the definition is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The term "utility installations" is reasonably clear and is generally understood to mean the installation of water, sewer, and electricity. The evidence did not prove that the term is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The evidence did not prove that the term "public interest by a case by case evaluation" is vague, lacks adequate standards for BOT decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the BOT. The evidence was that DEP interprets the definition in the sentence that immediately follows in Rule 18-21.004(1)(g) to limit the "public interest" exception to certain "public projects" (which BOT then broadly interprets to include privately-owned marinas that are open to the public). The evidence did not prove that the challenged parts of Rules 18-14.003 and 18-21.004 are unsupported by logic or the necessary facts, or were adopted without thought or reason or are irrational.
