Findings Of Fact During the audit period in question, i.e., December 1, 1975 through March 31, 1979, Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation operated the Ormond Hotel, Ormond Beach, Florida. It was licensed during the audit period by the Division of Hotels and Restaurants, Department of Business Regulation, and classified as a retirement establishment. (Interrogatories) The Ormond Hotel is an old wooden structure containing 350 rooms with 258 rooms available for rental. The remaining rooms are not in proper condition for rental. Most of the hotel guests are over 65 years of age and reside there either permanently or on a seasonal basis, usually from December through March of each year. A few married couples have accommodations at the hotel, but most of the residents are single individuals occupying one room. Prior to 1978, Petitioner advertised the hotel in a national magazine called "Retirement Living" and conducted advertising on billboards, brochures, and in the classified section of the local telephone book under the hearing "Retirement Homes." The latter advertisement states that the facility is "a residential hotel," but also includes the words "DAY-WK-MO-YR." Similarly, the hotel's brochure recites that accommodations are available by day, month, or year. All units are available for rental to permanent tenants, but short-term occupancy is accepted if there are available rooms. The hotel does not have a swimming pool, but does have restaurant facilities and recreation areas. The hotel does not primarily cater to transient guests. (Testimony of Salveson, interrogatories) Respondent's auditor conducted an audit of Petitioner's business operations for the period December 1, 1975, through March 31, 1979. In arriving at whether or not the Ormond Hotel was subject to tax imposed by Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, on its rentals, he examined the Petitioner's books to ascertain the number of total available rental units and the status of tenants at the hotel during the months of April, May, and June of each year. If he found that 50 percent or more of the total units had been rented to persons residing there continuously for the specific three-month period, those tenants were considered to be permanent rather than transient tenants and the hotel was deemed exempt from tax pursuant to Rule 12A-1.61(1), F.A.C. In arriving at his determination of exempt status, the auditor did not deduct unoccupied rooms from the total number of units in arriving at his "fifty percent" determination. Although the auditor analyzed the advertising brochures of Petitioner, and was aware that the hotel was listed in the telephone directory under retirement homes, and concluded that such advertising was directed primarily to the acquisition of permanent guests, he predicted his audit findings solely on the "fifty percent" test concerning occupancy of total units. In this manner, he determined that Petitioner was exempt from taxation in 1975 based on the fact that for the April through June period for that year, 135 of the 264 total units had been occupied continuously by "permanent" tenants. In a similar manner he found that the hotel did not qualify for exemption during the succeeding years of the audit period. In this respect, he found that for 1976, there were only 119 such guests during the three-month period out of the 263 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1977, there were 102 such tenants out of 261 total units, which was less than 50 percent. In 1978, there were 98 such tenants and 259 total units, which was less than 50 percent. The auditor's worksheet reflects that there were 124 vacant rooms during the three-month period in 1975, 140 in 1976, 153 in 1977, and 153 in 1978. He concedes that if he had applied the "fifty percent" rule by comparing the number of three-month or "permanent" tenants with the number of occupied rooms for the three-month period each year, the number of rooms occupied by "permanent" guests would have been over fifty percent for each year of the audit period. (Testimony of Boerner, Exhibits 1-2, 4) Based on the audit, Respondent issued two separate "Second Revised Notices of Proposed Assessment" on January 15, 1980. The first assessment covered the period December 1, 1975 through November 30, 1978. It asserted tax due on room rentals in the amount of $21, 362.91 plus a delinquent penalty, and interest through January 15, 1980, for a total sum of $28,062.45. The assessment also asserted tax, penalty and interest for purchases unrelated to room rentals in the amount of $984.92, for a total assessment of $29,047.37. The assessment reflected that a partial payment had been made on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $2,590.62, leaving a balance due of $26,456.75. The other assessment showed tax on room rentals in the amount of $6,001.75, plus delinquent penalty of $300.10, and interest through January 15, 1980 in the amount of $611.76 for a total of $6,913.61. It also asserted tax, penalty, and interest on purchases in the amount of $23.39 for a total assessment of $6,937.00. This assessment also showed partial payment on October 2, 1979, in the amount of $132.08, leaving a balance due of $6,804.92. In a letter transmitting the assessments, dated January 16, 1980, Respondent advised Petitioner that the hotel did not qualify as an exempt facility under Rule 12A- 1.61(1)(a), F.A.C., during the audit period, because less than fifty percent of the facility's units were occupied by guests who had resided there three or more months as of July 1 each year. The letter further stated that "an analysis" of the rental of units submitted by Petitioner as to its exempt status did not conform to the requirements of the rule because the facility advertised to guests on a daily, weekly and monthly basis in addition to long-term leasing, the analysis used an annual rather than a three-month period prior to July as a basis, and the number of tenants at the facility rather than total units. (Exhibit 2) Petitioner's accountant prepared an analysis of the room status at the Ormond Hotel during the period July 1, 1977 to June 30, 1978. It reflects that 165 rooms, or 64.5 percent of the total of 256 units rented during the year, were occupied by tenants for a continuous period of over three months. On March 31 of that year, 157 rooms, or 61 percent of the total of 258 room available for occupancy, were occupied by guests for more than three months. Sixty-nine of the rooms were occupied by transient tenants or those with less than three- months occupancy (17 percent) and 32 rooms were unoccupied (12 percent). As of June 30, 1978, the hotel had 110 guests who had resided there for more than three months, and 18 guests with residency of less than three months. (Testimony of Salveson, Exhibit 3)
Recommendation That the proposed tax assessments against Petitioner Ormond Hotel Corporation arising out of the rental of living accommodations at the Ormond Hotel during the period December 1, 1975 through March 1, 1979, be vacated, and that the remainder of the proposed assessments be enforced. DONE and ORDERED this 10th day of June, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1980. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Lester Kaney, Esquire Post Office Box 191 Daytona Beach, Florida 32015 Linda C. Procta, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John D. Moriarty, Esquire Department of Revenue Room 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, as well as the pleadings on file, the following relevant facts are found: In the October 1, 1982 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39 at page 2685, notice was published of the respondent's proposed amendment of Rule 12A-1.61, entitled "Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations." This notice contained the following language: "IF REQUESTED, A HEARING WILL BE HELD AT: TIME AND DATE: 9:00 a.m., October 22, 1982 PLACE: New Capitol, Lower Level" By letter dated October 7, 1982, the respondent received a request for a hearing and notification of an intent to appear at the hearing scheduled for 9:00 a.m. on October 22, 1982, for the purpose of protesting the proposed change in Rule 12A-1.61. This letter was not written by or on behalf of any of the petitioners in this proceeding. The respondent did not acknowledge that it received this request, nor did it schedule or hold the public hearing on October 22, 1982. On October 18 or 19, 1982, the petitioners in this proceeding filed with the respondent a "petition to convene separate proceeding pursuant to 120.54(16), Florida Statutes." Among other allegations, this petition states that: "3. Petitioners are particularly affected by the proposed rule and cannot adequately protect those interests merely by appearing at a public hearing. Petitioners intend to present extensive testimony from their own witnesses and from the staff of DOR. Requiring Petitioners to proceed at a hearing open to the public would so disrupt, hamper and frustrate Petitioners' presentation so as to unfairly restrain Petitioners' ability to adequately oppose adoption of the proposed rule. Petitioners must be afforded an individual proceeding where they would have complete and uninterrupted access to the staff of DOR and be able to present their own witnesses in an adversary-type proceeding, which cannot be done at a standard rule hearing. Only in this manner will Petitioners be afforded a fair hearing on the proposed rule. WHEREFORE Petitioners respectfully request that DOR suspend its rule- making proceedings and convene a separate proceeding under the pro- visions of Section 120.57." The respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition to convene a separate proceeding pursuant to Section 120.54(16) on or about October 25, 1982. In the October 29, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 43, at page 2976, the following announcement appears: "The Department of Revenue announces that the hearing scheduled for October 22, 1982 on Rule 12A-1.61--Rental of Living Quarters, Sleeping or Housekeeping Accommodations, has been deferred for one month. Notice of this Proposed Rule was given in the Florida Administrative Weekly Vol. 8, No. 39, dated October 1, 1982, on pages 2686-2689." By "Final Order Denying Rule-Making Hearing and Draw-out Proceeding" dated November 8, 1982, nunc pro tunc to November 3, 1982, the respondent denied the petitioners' requests for a Section 120.54(3) and a Section 120.54(16) hearing. It was concluded that the requests were filed beyond 14 days from October 1, 1982, the date upon which notice of the proposed rule was published, and thus were untimely. It was found that since no timely request for a Section 120.54(3) hearing had been received by the respondent (a fact which the respondent now admits was erroneous), the respondent was not required to schedule such a hearing and, indeed, had not exercised its option to schedule such a hearing. Therefore, the respondent concluded that there existed no rulemaking proceeding from which to "draw-out" and the petition for a Section 120.54(16) proceeding was therefore moot. No reference was made in the respondent's order to the announcement which had appeared in the October 29, 1982, Florida Administrative Weekly that the October 22, 1982, hearing on Rule 12A-1.61 had been deferred for one month. The respondent's Order also concluded that the request for a draw-out proceeding, even had it been timely filed, was fatally defective for its failure to affirmatively demonstrate that a Section 120.54(3) rulemaking proceeding would not provide adequate opportunity to protect the petitioners' substantial interest. On November 9, 1982, the Governor and Cabinet adopted challenged Rule 12A-1.61, 1/ after receiving comments from the petitioners and counsel for the petitioners in this case. The petitioners received notice that the Governor and Cabinet would take up the proposed rule on November 9, 1982, by way of a telephone call received approximately 24 hours before November ninth. No notice was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly that a public meeting would be held by the Department of Revenue on November 9, 1982, which was the second Tuesday of the month. Notices did appear in the October 8, October 22, and November 5, 1982 editions of the Florida Administrative Weekly that public meetings would be held respectively on October 22, November 3 and November 16, 1982. These notices state that the "Department of Revenue will act on matters duly presented on its Agenda, which may include approval of rules" and other matters. The rules which govern the organization and administration of the Department of Revenue provide that regular public meetings of the Governor and Cabinet to transact the business of the Department of Revenue shall be on the first and third Tuesdays of each month or at such other place or time as may be designated, and that a standard notice of the meeting must be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least seven (7) days in advance. Rule 12-1.03, Florida Administrative Code. Any agenda item "deferred must be re-agendaed for the next regularly scheduled meeting of the Governor and Cabinet unless a longer period of deferment is approved by a majority vote of the Governor and Cabinet." Rule 12-1.06, Florida Administrative Code. In summary form, the challenged rule provides, inter alia, that individual condominium units are considered, with certain exceptions, taxable transient rental facilities if rented for periods of less than six months in continuous duration. The rule purports to make owners and/or rental agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units liable for the collection and payment of the applicable sales tax due on the rental. The petitioners in this proceeding are owners and/or rental brokers or agents for owners of individually-owned condominium units in Sarasota, Florida. G & B Properties, Inc. and Sarasota Surf Vacation Rentals, Inc. each had over $1 million in gross rental revenues last year. Many, if not most, of their present leases and rental contracts were entered into prior to the effective date of the challenged rule and the five percent sales, or transient rental, tax was not incorporated into those rental contract terms. The challenged rule has or will cause certain changes in the operations of these petitioners. Additional staff and overtime work are required to notify lessees of the newly imposed tax. New bookkeeping materials are required to account for and handle the tax, and supplies on-hand can no longer be utilized. One real estate agent estimated the expense of changing his bookkeeping system to be $1,500. This agent also opined that a considerable block of renters has been lost due to the increased five percent charge and change in contract terms, and that there has been a loss of goodwill between himself, as a rental agent, and condominium owners and tenants who have entered into lease agreements in years past without the imposition of the tax. Prior to the adoption of the challenged rule, the respondent's rules did not address individual condominium units and a transient rental tax on such units was not collected from tenants, owners or rental agents by the Department of Revenue. The "summary of the estimate of economic impact of the rule" contained in the notice of the amendment of Rule 12A-1.61 appearing in the October 1, 1982, edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 8, No. 39, page 2686, provides as follows: "None. The proposal contains amendments to existing rules and is predicated upon legislation enacted. The fiscal impact occurred upon the amendment to 212.03, F.S. by Chapter 97-359, Laws of Florida." The actual Economic Impact Statement prepared for the challenged amendment recites that the cost to the respondent of implementing the amendment is estimated at $15,122, and the "amount of paperwork is substantial." For the "estimated cost or economic benefit to persons directly affected by the proposed action," the Economic Impact Statement notes that the Revenue Estimating Conference has identified the revenue loss as $2,702,000. It lists those classes of persons (tenants) exempted from the tax as persons benefiting from the rule, and further states that the revenue loss of $2,702,000 will be offset by about $200,000 resulting from the taxable status of certain condominium rentals. The Economic Impact Statement provides that the rule "will not place any business at a competitive disadvantage, nor will it have any impact on the open market for employment." In its "statement of data and method used in calculating estimates," the Economic Impact Statement sets forth the basis for the $15,122 agency cost of promulgating and implementing the proposed rule. It then states that the "revenue impact is based on Revenue Estimating Conference consensus estimates." Neither the "Revenue Estimating Conference," its "consensus estimates" nor the basis or methodology utilized in its figures are further identified or explained in the respondent's Economic Impact Statement. According to the respondent's Director of Research, Planning and Budgeting, the Revenue Estimating Conference is an informal body under the Governor's office consisting of the State Economist and two legislative staff directors whose purpose is to develop revenue forecasts, impacts and estimates in a non-political environment. The figures utilized in the Economic Impact Statement for the challenged rule are taken directly from those utilized in connection with the passage of a 1979 amendment to Section 212.03, Florida Statutes, by Chapter 79-359, Laws of Florida. The respondent did not attempt to make its own estimate of revenues or costs or economic benefits to persons directly affected by the proposed rule, nor did the respondent request the Revenue Estimating Conference to revisit its 1979 estimate of economic impact. The instant petition challenging the validity of Rule 12A-1.61 was filed by the petitioners with the Division of Administrative Hearings on December 2, 1982. By Order of Assignment dated December 10, 1982, the undersigned was designated as the Hearing Officer. By letter dated December 14, 1982, the undersigned suggested a final hearing date of January 3, 1983. The undersigned was informed by telephone message from counsel for the petitioners that the parties were going to file a stipulation waiving the requirement that a hearing be held within thirty days. While a written stipulation was never received to this effect, it was the understanding of the undersigned that the parties did not desire to utilize the previously suggested hearing date of January 3, 1983. Through telephone conversations between the offices of the Division of Administrative Hearings and counsel for the petitioner, a hearing date of January 10, 1983, at 4:00 p.m. was originally made available and then was changed to January 14, 1983, because more hours were thought to be necessary to complete the hearing. On January 12, 1983, a notice of appearance as co- counsel for the respondent was filed, as was a Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Stay Proceeding on the ground that the Division of Administrative Hearings lacked jurisdiction to entertain this rule-challenge proceeding inasmuch as the hearing was not scheduled within the thirty days required by Section 120.56(2), Florida Statutes. Oral argument on this motion was heard prior to the commencement of the final hearing on January 14, 1983. Finding that counsel for the petitioner reasonably believed that respondent's counsel had agreed to waive the thirty-day hearing requirement and that respondent had not demonstrated that it had been prejudiced in any manner whatsoever by the four-day delay in commencing the final hearing, the Motion to Dismiss or Stay was denied.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, M. Betty Murray, currently holds Florida Real Estate Broker's License number 62943. At all times material to this proceeding, the license was in full force and effect. The Respondent represented L. O. Huckaby and Sarah Huckaby in the sale of property located at 363 Boylston Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, to Elizabeth T. Stein, the complainant in this proceeding. Pursuant to her representation of the Huckaby's, the Respondent, on or about June 18, 1979, prepared a proposed contract for the sale and purchase of the subject property. Prior to signing the contract and tendering a deposit thereunder, Ms. Stein reviewed the contract with her attorney, Berrien Becks, Sr. When reviewing the contract with Mr. Becks, Ms. Stein failed to inform either Mr. Becks or his secretary, Sylvia Van De Mark, that she intended to use the property as either a duplex or a triplex. Had Ms. Stein indicated such an intent, a provision to that effect would have been included in paragraph VIII of the contract for sale and purchase. This was the normal procedure utilized in the ordinary course of business by the Becks' law firm. The contract for sale, Respondents Exhibit 1, shows no such provision or notation. The sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Huckaby, were represented by Charles E. Booth, Esquire. On behalf of Ms. Stein, Mr. Becks requested that certain repairs be made to the property. Mr. Booth rejected these demands by letter dated July 24, 1979. Although the contract does not state that the property was intended to be used as a duplex, the property is in fact recognized as a de facto duplex under the nonconforming use provisions of the city's zoning ordinance. Had Ms. Stein elected to proceed with the sale, she would have been permitted to utilize the property as a two unit property so long as she lived in one of the units which was her expressed intent. Prior to paying the balance of the deposit due on the contract, Ms. Stein and the Respondent went to Mr. Booth's office where Mr. Booth confirmed by telephone conversation with city officials and in the presence of both Ms. Stein and the Respondent, the lawful use of the property as a single family residence with attached rental unit. Following this information, Ms. Stein paid the balance into the Respondent's escrow account. On August 20, 1979, Ms. Stein demanded return of the $9,000.00 deposit from the Respondent. Upon receipt of this demand, the Respondent contacted Mr. Booth who instructed her to retain the deposit in her escrow account. Mr. Booth and Mr. Becks negotiated a release which was signed by the Sellers on August 28, 1979 and by Ms. Stein on September 11, 1979. The release authorized disbursements to be made including $500.00 to the Respondent, $150.00 to Mr. Booth, $43.00 to Lawyers Title Services, Inc. and the remaining $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein. On August 20, 1979, prior to signing the release, Ms. Stein sent a complaint to the Board concerning the return of her $9,000.00. On September 7, 1979, Ms. Stein sent another letter to the Board indicating that she had not agreed to the disbursements set forth in paragraph 8 above notwithstanding her agreement to sign the release. Ms. Stein's attorney, Mr. Becks, witnessed the release and explained the legal implications of the release in detail to her prior to her signing. Mr. Stein did not inform Mr. Becks of her correspondence with the Board which attempted to disclaim the release. At no time did the Respondent represent the property as a triplex, but only as a single family residence with a single attached rental unit, which was a permissible use under the city zoning ordinance. In fact, Ms. Stein defaulted on the contract and under its express terms could have forfeited the entire $9,000.00. The release negotiated between Mr. Becks and Mr. Booth which returned $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein was generous and demonstrated good faith efforts on the part of the Sellers to settle this matter amicably. The Respondent has maintained her registered office at 231 Gradview, Daytona Beach, Florida. The office consists of a room where she maintains her business files and which can be closed for privacy. The allegations of Ms. Stein against the Respondent were untrue and were made with knowledge that neither the Huckaby's nor the Respondent had engaged in any illegal or unethical activities regarding this transactions. The testimony of Mr. Becks, attorney for Ms. Stein and the affidavit of Mr. Booth, attorney for the Huckaby's, corroborates the Respondent's testimony and contradicts the allegations made in the complaint filed by Ms. Stein and the administrative complaint filed by the Board which was based entirely upon Ms. Stein's allegations. Ms. Stein's failure to appear at the final hearing supports the conclusion that she knew the allegations made by her could not be proved at the hearing. Any equitable or legal rights which Ms. Stein may have had to pursue this matter ended when she knowingly and voluntarily signed a release in order to secure the return of a substantial portion of her deposit monies. In effect, the only misrepresentation in this case was that made by Ms. Stein when she represented that the release would extinguish all responsibilities, obligations and rights arising from the contract in return for the $8,307.00 and then effectively requested the Board to proceed against the Respondent.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), by failing to disclose that a tenant was her son, by failing to collect a required security deposit, and by acting as the agent for the tenant rather than the landlord. (All reference to Chapters and Sections are to Florida Statutes (1997) unless otherwise stated.)
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency responsible for regulating the practice of real estate. Respondent is licensed as a real estate broker pursuant to license number 0480790. At all relevant times, Respondent was employed by Norris Realty, Inc. ("Norris"). In March 1990, Mr. and Mrs. George and Margaret Nichols entered into a property management agreement with Norris. Respondent was aware of the management agreement. Norris was the agent for the Nichols and assumed all duties owed to a principal by an agent. The managing broker was Mr. Alan Norrie. On March 22, 1996, Mr. Norrie died, and Respondent assumed responsibility as the broker/office manager for Norris. Respondent had no experience managing a real estate office at the time. She continued in that role for approximately seven months. During the time Respondent was the broker/office manager for Norris, another agent for Norris obtained a lease from Mr. Joseph McGee to rent the Nichol's property. There were no written amendments made to the lease during the time Respondent was the broker/office manager of Norris. The lease required all rents and other monies to be paid to Norris. The tenant was to deposit with Norris a $750.00 security deposit and the last month's rent of $750.00 prior to occupying the property. Respondent failed to disclose to the Nichols that the tenant was her son. The lease does not disclose the relationship of the tenant to the broker/office manager of Norris. The Nichols did not learn that the tenant was Respondent's son until March or April of 1997, approximately four months after the tenant occupied the rental property. Respondent permitted the tenant to move into the property without collecting either the security deposit or last month's rent from the tenant. Respondent failed to disclose to the Nichols that the tenant had paid neither the security deposit nor the last month's rent. Shortly after occupying the property, the tenant failed to pay further rent. A judgment of eviction was eventually entered against the tenant. The tenant vacated the property and took the stove that was in the rental property. Respondent acted as her son's agent in the rental transaction. By letter dated May 21, 1997, the Nichols filed a complaint against Respondent with Petitioner. During the formal hearing, Respondent admitted to being negligent regarding the transaction in question and acting as her son's agent.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a Final Order finding Respondent guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), reprimanding Respondent, requiring Respondent to complete continuing education relevant to the specific offenses, and either imposing an administrative fine of $1,000 or requiring restitution to the Nichols. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of September, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of September, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Henry M. Solares, Division Director Division of Real Estate Department of Business and Professional Regulation 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Lynda Goodgame, General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation Northwood Center 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Geoffrey T. Kirk, Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32802 Dorothy A. McGee pro se 109 11th Avenue Indiatlantic, Florida 32801
Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence and the testimony taken at the hearing, the following relevant facts were uncontroverted: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondents National Home Realty, Inc. and Philip Marzo were licensed real estate brokers and Respondent Steve Mishkin was a licensed real estate salesman holding license numbers 0210856, 0056147 and 0151878, respectively. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was qualified by Philip Marzo, a licensed real estate broker. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was engaged in the business of negotiating rental contracts and in furnishing for an advance fee, rental information as to available residential rentals to prospective tenants. In connection therewith, the company used Service Agreements of which Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 are accurate examples. The Service Agreements do not comport with Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, which requires a specific refund notice to be placed on any such contract, nor do the contracts comply with Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for full refund in the event the rental information provided by the broker or salesman to a prospective tenant is not current or accurate in any material respect. In October of 1980, Grace Pasquale, as a prospective tenant, signed a rental service agreement with National Home Realty, Inc., on a form supplied by National Home Realty, and paid to National Home Realty a $65 cash advance fee for the specified rental services. During a period of approximately 25 days after the date of the contract, Pasquale was not able to locate a residential rental to meet her requirements, as set forth in her rental contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, from the list of alleged available rentals supplied to her by National Home Realty. As a result, Pasquale made written demand within 30 days of the date of the contract for 75 percent of her advance fee, all as provided for by Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. That on or about June of 1981, after intervention by the Department of Professional Regulation, Grace Pasquale received a refund. On or about February 16, 1981, prospective tenant Bruce Blair paid to National Home Realty a $75 cash advance fee, for agreement for rental services including a list of available rentals to meet the specific requirements of prospective tenant Bruce Blair. Only one listing was supplied to Blair and this did not meet Blair's requirements as set forth in his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Failing and unable to obtain a rental by and through National Home Realty, Blair located a rental through his own efforts unconnected with the services of National Home Realty. Within 30 days of the date of his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Blair made written demand on National Home Realty for a 75 percent refund of his advance fee, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. In response to his demand, National Home Realty issued check number 1735, dated March 25, 1981, to the order of Bruce Blair on the account of National Home Realty, Inc. at the Barnett Bank for $18.75 being only 25 percent of the advance fee paid and, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the above stated rule. When Blair presented the check for payment, it was not honored due to the account having been closed. In April of 1981, Respondent paid Blair in cash for the balance due on his refund. Respondent Marzo, the qualifying broker who worked in the office, never personally refused a 75 percent refund to anyone who requested the same within 30 days from the date of a service contract. However, while he was qualifying broker, certain salesmen in the office ignored demands for refunds. Marzo was unaware that this was occurring until it was brought to his attention through the Department's direct intervention. When Marzo realized there was a problem with the salesmen making timely refunds, he instituted an unwritten policy that anyone who requested a refund should be given one. Despite this directive, salesmen continued to refuse or delay refunds due to the manner in which commissions were paid by the office. Respondents Marzo and Mishkin never met either Grace Pasquale or Bruce Blair. Although Respondent Mishkin never denied a refund to anyone who requested one, he would harass or make a person who asked for a refund "feel pretty bad" for doing so. (See Transcript at 37)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the license of National Home Realty, Inc., suspending the license of Philip Marzo for a period of six (6) months and dismissing the charges against Steve Mishkin. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brian Hal Leslie, Esquire 1795 North East 164th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Respondent Shirley Holland was registered with Petitioner as a real estate salesman in January, 1976, associated with Vern Duncklee Real Estate and Insurance, Inc., Naples, Florida. He is presently registered as a real estate broker. (Stipulation) On January 5, 1976, W. H. Ragan gave the Duncklee firm a listing to sell real property consisting of approximately one and one-quarter acres located in Collier County, Florida, for a selling price of $7,500. Respondent was the listing salesman. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibit 6). Respondent also was a builder who operated as Holland Investment Company. It was his practice to purchase various properties, remodel existing structures on the same, and thereafter sell them at a profit. There was a two- room shed located on the Ragan property that had no inside finishing work, electricity, or septic tank. Respondent decided to take an option on the property in order to remodel it by adding a room and to place it in a habitable condition. He broached the subject to Ragan on January 6, 1976, and Ragan told him on January 7, that he was agreeable to such a contract. On January 8, Respondent and Ragan and his wife entered into a Sales Contract and Option to Buy for $7,500. The contract provided that closing would take place within twelve months and that the seller would give possession of the property to the purchaser on January 8, 1976. This was pursuant to an accompanying rental agreement dated January 8, 1976, between the parties for a period of twelve months which provided that Respondent could exercise his option at any time within the stated twelve-month period whereby all rents paid would be applied toward the down payment on the property of $1,900 which was to be made at closing of the sale. The rental agreement further provided that if Respondent did not exercise his option within the required time, any improvements made by him on the property during that period would be considered liquidated damages of the owner. Pursuant to these agreements, Respondent made a payment of $100 at the time they were executed, which represented an initial deposit on the contracts and as rent for first month of the term. The Option Agreement also gave Respondent authority to remodel the building on the property and it further reflected that Respondent was a registered real estate salesman and would be selling the property for profit. (Testimony of Respondent, Duncklee, Petitioner's Exhibits 5, 7) On January 5, 1976, Respondent showed Harold and Ruby Stacy several houses in the area that were for sale. On January 9, Respondent went by the Stacy residence to see if they were interested in any of the houses he had shown them. They were not interested in those houses and Respondent told them of property that he had recently acquired which was the Ragan property. He showed it to Mr. Stacy that night and the next day Mrs. Stacy went with him to look at the premises. During the course of their conversations, Respondent offered to rent the property to them for $100 for the period January 10 to February 1, 1976. It was his intention to rent it to them for $125 per month commencing in February on the condition that they clean and fix up the property. They also discussed the possibility of purchase at a later date. Respondent told them that he would sell to them for $13,000 if Harold Stacy would do the remodeling work on the shed with Respondent supplying the materials. Respondent quoted a possible sales price of $14,500 if he was obliged to provide both labor and materials for renovating the shed and providing for utility services. Respondent and the Stacys entered into a rental agreement on that day for the initial period of some three weeks and Ruby Stacy gave him a check dated January 10 for $100 with a notation thereon that it was a deposit on land. Respondent explained to Mrs. Stacy that he was merely renting the property at that time and added the word "rent" at the bottom of the check. (Testimony of Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibit 1, 2) Thereafter, the Stacys proceeded to clean the premises and commence installing a ceiling in the building located on the property. They also installed a septic tank. At some undisclosed date, Ragan came to the property to obtain some of his belongings and found the Stacys there. He learned that they supposedly had purchased the property from Respondent, Ragan was of the opinion that Respondent had purported to sell the property before he had obtained the option thereon and that he had therefore defrauded the Stacys. Ragan thereupon filed a complaint against Respondent with the local Board of Realtors in latter January, 1976. About the same time, Respondent had been in the process of obtaining local permits to install the septic tank and do the other work. He discovered that the Stacys had installed a septic tank without his authorization and without obtaining a permit. He thereupon, by letter of January 21, 1976, informed the Stacys that they had done work on the property without a building permit or approval of the County Health Department and therefore was refunding the rental payment of $100. He enclosed his check in that amount, dated January 21, 1976. Although Respondent later attempted to exercise his option to purchase the property, Ragan refused to fulfill the agreement and later sold the property to the Stacys himself for $7,500. (Testimony of Respondent, R. Stacy, Ragan, Petitioner's Exhibits 3,4) Mrs. Stacy testified at the hearing that she was under the impression that she and her husband had purchased the property in question on January 10, 1976, and that the $100 payment had been a deposit for such purchase. She was under the further impression that they were to make a $2,500 down payment in February to consummate the deal. She further testified that they made the improvements on the land because of their understanding that they were going to purchase it. Mrs. Stacy had never been involved in a prior purchase of real property and is unfamiliar with contract documents and terminology. It is found that Mrs. Stacy honestly believed that she and her husband had a valid agreement to purchase the property. Her testimony that she and her husband entered into the rental arrangement in January to enable them to work on the property until they could make the down payment in February is deemed credible. (Testimony of R. Stacy) Ragan and Respondent had been involved in a prior real estate transaction and Respondent testified that Ragan had not been satisfied with that transaction, but Ragan testified to the contrary. However, Ragan talked to Respondent's broker in January, 1976, about the Stacy situation, at which time Ragan stated that he had a chance to get even with Respondent for the prior transaction and that he was going to do so. (Testimony of Respondent, Ragan, Duncklee, D. Holland)
Recommendation That the Administrative complaint be dismissed. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of March, 1979, in Tallahassee, Florida. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph A. Doherty, Esquire Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Ed R. Miller, Esquire Suite 212 - 1400 Gulf Shore Boulevard Naples, Florida 33940
The Issue The issues in this case are as follows: Was Respondent Daniel Oldfather legally responsible for accounting and refund? Were the refund provisions of the receipt form printed in type as required by Rule 21V-10.15, Florida Administrative Code? Was Richard Vanicek due a 75 percent refund? Was Vanicek due a complete refund because of inaccurate information given him? Did Vanicek make written demand for a refund, and was a written demand for the refund necessary?
Findings Of Fact In September of 1979, Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., was a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0208997 and doing business at 2703 East Oakland Park Boulevard in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. At that time, Victor Stevens was a licensed real estate salesperson employed by Sun Rentals. Stevens, as an employee of Sun Rentals, interviewed Richard D. Vanicek concerning Vanicek's rental needs. Vanicek entered into a contract with Sun Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit number 1) under which he paid Sun Rentals $45 and Sun Rentals was to provide him with rental information on available rentals. Vanicek received a receipt (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3) which provided in pertinent part as follows: ... Notice, pursuant to Florida Law: If the rental information provided under this contract is not current or accurate in any material aspect, you may demand within 30 days of this contract date a return of your full fee paid. If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of 75 percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within 30 days of this contract date. ... It was agreed that the receipt was printed totally in ten-point type. Vanicek attempted to visit one of the listings provided to him by Sun Rentals. He encountered difficulty in locating the listing; however, his lack of familiarity with Fort Lauderdale may have contributed to his difficulties. Vanicek found a rental through his own efforts and requested a refund of 75 percent of his $45 fee by telephone. He made his request first to Stevens, who referred him to Daniel Oldfather pursuant to office policy. As a result of this referral Vanicek spoke with a man at Sun Rentals, who may have been Oldfather, and restated his request for a refund. His request was denied. Daniel Oldfather was the licensed broker/salesman for Sun Rentals during September, 1979. He was the office manager of Sun Rentals at that time. Martin Katz was broker for Sun Rentals in September of 1979 (Transcript; Page 261, L 21). Oldfather was the next man in authority at the office under Katz (Transcript; Page 235, L 6). Katz delegated to Oldfather the authority to make refunds. The rental forms, including the rental receipt form (Petitioner's Exhibit number 3), were submitted to the Board of Real Estate.
Recommendation Having found that Daniel Oldfather was not guilty of any of the allegations in the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Counts I, II and III against him be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals and Management, Inc., is not guilty of the allegations contained in Count III of the amended Administrative Complaint, it is recommended that Count III against Sun Rentals be dismissed. Having found that Sun Rentals is guilty of violating Sections 475.25(1)(d) and 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, it is recommended that the license of Sun Rentals be suspended for 60 days, during which time the officers and directors of said corporation may not engage in the practice of real estate sales or brokerage under their names or in any other corporate name. DONE and ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of May, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert F. Jordan, Esquire Post Office Box 14723 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33302 James Curran, Esquire 200 SE Sixth Street, Suite 301 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Appellants raised two issues for resolution in this appeal. First, Appellants seek reversal of the LOU and Resolution No. 06-20, and recognition of a lawful non-conforming vacation rental use of the Property. Second, Appellants seek clarification that they are not subject to any provisions of section 134-1, Monroe County LDC, regarding the Property.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations of the Administrative Complaint, Gerald Schultz was a real estate broker holding License #0215135 and active firm broker for Choice Rentals and Realty Corporation (formerly Choice Rentals, Inc., and hereinafter "Choice Rentals"), which was a corporate broker holding License #0195222. Rosemary Hufcut entered into a contract with Choice Rentals on July 30, 1980, for Choice Rentals to provide her with rental information based upon criteria she gave Choice Rentals. Hufcut paid a fee of $50 to Choice Rentals for its services. Hufcut was looking for an apartment for herself and her two daughters. She specified she wanted a good neighborhood with good schools. Hufcut was given rental data by Choice Rentals and, with her father, visited a number of the apartments listed. The apartments were not suitable. On the following day, Hufcut requested a refund and submitted a written request for a refund on August 6, 1980. On August 26, 1980, Hufcut's refund request was denied by a letter from Choice Rentals (Petitioner's Exhibit #6). This letter provided in part: Refusal to accept available rental properties meeting the requirements as set forth in your contract with us, does not constitute cancellation of contractual agreement. (This is pursuant to the Florida Law regarding "obtaining a rental".) note - produced available rental property meeting the requirements stated on contract. Hufcut has never received a refund from Choice Rentals. The Board introduced Petitioner's Exhibits #1 through #6, which were received in evidence.
Recommendation Having found the Respondents guilty of violating Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the Hearing Officer recommends that the Board of Real Estate suspend the licenses of Respondents for ten years. DONE and ORDERED this 25th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of March, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Theodore J. Silver, Esquire 9445 Bird Road Miami, Florida 33165 Mr. Gerald Schultz c/o John Hume, Esquire 5100 North Federal Highway, Suite 405 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 Choice Rentals & Realty 3367 North Federal Highway Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33308 C. B. Stafford, Executive Director Board of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Florida Real Estate Commission should discipline the Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, on charges that he failed to deliver rental proceeds, was dishonest in his dealings regarding the rental property, failed to escrow rental deposits and proceeds, and failed to properly reconcile his escrow account.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Mounir Albert El Beyrouty, is licensed as a real estate broker in Florida, having been issued license no. BK 596936. He is the qualifying broker for Intermab, Inc., d/b/a Byblos Beach Realty. Acting through the real estate brokerage he qualified, Intermab, Inc., the Respondent orally agreed with Virginia Covington to manage apartment Unit 1-E, Redington Tower 3, located at 17940 Gulf Boulevard in Redington Shores, Florida. Initially, Covington, who is a federal district judge, was the personal representative and sole beneficiary of her mother's estate, which owned the unit; after probate, Judge Covington became the owner of the unit. The Respondent and Judge Covington agreed orally that the Respondent would try to lease the apartment on an annual basis at a lease rate of $850 per month, less a 15 percent commission to the Respondent. Although the Respondent was unable to secure such a lease, he intentionally misled Judge Covington to think there was such a lease and, in January 2008, began paying her $722.50 per month by check drawn on his brokerage operating account. He did this because he wanted her to think highly of his abilities as a real estate broker in the hopes that she would retain him to list the property when she decided to sell. Not long after he began sending monthly checks, the Respondent told Judge Covington that a leak in the kitchen sink should be repaired and a stained mattress should be replaced. He got her permission, took care of both items, and was reimbursed. However, he perceived that Judge Covington did not want to put additional money into the apartment unnecessarily and decided to avoid these kinds of conversations and dealings with her. Instead, he began to expend his own funds to maintain and upgrade the property as he saw fit without telling her. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for six weeks during February and March 2008. He collected a $500 security deposit and $5,250 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In April 2008, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $722.50 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February, and March 2009. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. The Respondent secured a paying tenant for the apartment for January, February and March 2010. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. When the seasonal renter left, the Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $722.50 per month. In July 2010, the Respondent was able to lease the apartment for a year at a monthly rent of $1,300. He also collected a $1,000 security deposit. He deposited this money in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $722.50 per month and continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month. In November 2010, Judge Covington told the Respondent to tell the tenant she wanted to increase the annual lease rate to $935 a month. The Respondent continued to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $850 a month and told her that he would advise the supposed tenant of the rent increase. Instead, he kept collecting $1,300 a month from the tenant and began paying Judge Covington $794.75 a month (the $935, less a 15 percent commission). He did not tell her there actually was an annual lease for $1,300 a month. The $1,300 annual lease was not renewed in July 2011. The Respondent continued to pay Judge Covington $794.75 a month and to lead her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. In about June 2011, Judge Covington decided to sell her apartment. As the Respondent hoped and planned, she listed it with his brokerage. Judge Covington asked the Respondent to notify the supposed annual tenant, who she believed had been living in the apartment since December 2007, to make sure the tenant would be agreeable to a month-to-month lease during their efforts to sell. The Respondent continued to lead Judge Covington to believe there was such an annual tenant and assured her that he would be able to convince the tenant to cooperate with her plan to sell. From August 29 through October 5, 2011, the Respondent allowed friends to stay in Judge Covington's apartment free of charge and without paying a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington, rationalizing that he was paying her the $794.75 per month she thought was her share of the annual lease payments. In November and December 2011, the Respondent rented Judge Covington's apartment to the sister of the court clerk for $850 a month without requiring a security deposit. He did not tell Judge Covington about this rental. The Respondent secured paying tenants for the apartment for February, March and April 2012. He collected a $500 security deposit and $9,000 in rent, all of which he deposited in the brokerage operating account. He did not tell Judge Covington about the seasonal renter. Instead, he kept paying her $794.75 a month and led her to believe there was an annual lease for $935 a month. Despite several price reductions, the Respondent was unable to sell the apartment, and Judge Covington decided to switch selling brokers. In February 2012, she signed a listing agreement with another real estate broker. Later in February 2012, a real estate salesperson showed Judge Covington's apartment to a prospective purchaser. Upon questioning, an older woman told the salesperson that they were paying $3,000 a month in rent. The Respondent told the salesperson to disregard the information because the woman was not thinking straight, or words to that effect, because her husband had been ill. He also told her that the woman's son was actually paying the rent. The salesperson related this information to Judge Covington and also told her that she noticed that the residents were not the same people she happened to see in the apartment on one occasion in February 2012. Upon receiving this information, Judge Covington became suspicious that the Respondent had been dishonest and misleading her. She contacted the State Attorney's Office and the Division regarding the process for filing a complaint against the Respondent. She also arranged for a meeting with the Respondent. When she met with the Respondent, she brought a forensic accountant to review the Respondent's records. The Respondent told them he was sorry that Judge Covington was upset with him, but that he did not owe her any money--to the contrary, that she owed him money. However, he told them he was being audited by the Division and was unable to provide supporting documentation. At the final hearing, the Respondent provided a ledger to support his position that all the rent he collected belonged to him alone because Judge Covington owed him money throughout his dealings with her due to his payments to her, regardless whether her apartment was rented, and the money he spent to maintain and improve the apartment. (This was an after-the-fact justification for his failure to deposit any security deposits or rental payments into his escrow account when, in fact, he did not do so because he did not know it was required.) There is reason to believe that the ledger is not entirely accurate. For example, the Respondent omitted rent collected from at least one occupant of the apartment. It also does not account for the times the Respondent allowed friends and relatives to stay there free of charge, essentially acting as if he owned the apartment. Although the Respondent's testimony regarding the money he paid to maintain and improve the apartment is accepted, his failure to timely apprise Judge Covington regarding those expenditures makes it difficult to be certain about it. Finally, even accepting the ledger at face value, it shows that there were times when the Respondent owed Judge Covington, and not vice-versa. The Division attempted to make a case that the Respondent intended to and attempted to steal rental proceeds. It is unlikely that the Respondent actually targeted a federal judge to victimize in that way. It is more likely that the Respondent was attempting to impress Judge Covington with his skill and expertise as a real estate broker and, ultimately, to be rewarded with the listing on the property when it was sold. In so doing, the Respondent flagrantly violated several laws and rules regarding his professional responsibilities as a licensed Florida real estate broker. Respondent has been a licensed real estate broker for many years and depends on his license to make a living to support himself and his family. He has no prior disciplinary record. However, it has become known in this case that, over the years, he consistently has failed to use his escrow account for rental deposits and proceeds because he did not know it was required.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Real Estate Commission enter a final order: finding the Respondent guilty as charged; fining him $2,000; suspending his license for one year; and placing him on probation for a suitable period of time and upon suitable conditions. DONE AND ENTERED this 5th day of August, 2013, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of August, 2013.
