The Issue Whether the Petitioner is entitled to fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is the state agency responsible for licensing and regulating skilled nursing homes in Florida pursuant to Chapter 400, Florida Statutes. At all times material to the underlying case, the Petitioner operated or controlled three licensed skilled nursing facilities: Harborside Healthcare-Pinewood, Harborside Healthcare-Sarasota, and Harborside Healthcare-Naples. In October of 2001, the Agency filed Administrative Complaints against the Petitioner's three facilities. As to each complaint the Agency relied upon its interpretation of Section 400.121(3)(d), Florida Statutes. The Agency's interpretation of the statute went beyond the plain and unambiguous language of the law. Moreover, such interpretation had not been promulgated by rule. If the interpretation was intended to be the policy of the Agency, the implementation of the policy was not authorized by the statute. The Petitioner pursued three legal strategies: it filed an injunction proceeding in circuit court, a petition to challenge the unpromulgated rule, and vigorously defended the administrative actions filed against its facilities. In so doing, the Petitioner incurred legal expenses and costs necessitated by the Agency's implementation of a policy that had not been established through rule-making procedures. Petitioner's rule challenge alleged that the Agency had failed to follow any rule-making procedures; had enlarged, modified, and contravened the specific provisions of the law; and had implemented a policy that was arbitrary and capricious. Due to the severity of the penalties the Agency sought to impose against the Petitioner, the damage to its reputation in the communities it served, and the resident fear and uncertainty at the facilities, the Petitioner sought and was granted an expedited hearing on the rule challenge. The "Wherefore" clause of the Petitioner's rule challenge clearly stated that Petitioner sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Section 120.595, Florida Statutes. Petitioner had retained outside counsel to pursue each of its legal strategies. On October 31, 2001, a Final Order was entered in the underlying case that directed the Agency to cease and immediately discontinue all reliance on the policy that had not been promulgated through rule-making procedures. That Final Order has not been appealed. The Final Order did not retain jurisdiction for purposes of addressing the Petitioner's request for attorneys' fees and costs. The instant case was opened when the Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs subsequent to the entry of the Final Order in DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU. The matter was assigned a new case number as is the practice of the Division of Administrative Hearings in ancillary proceedings. Accordingly, the instant case, DOAH Case No. 01-4283F, was designated a "fee" case (hence the F at the end of the case number). The initial order entered through the DOAH clerk's office erroneously designated that the fees were sought pursuant to Section 59.11, Florida Statutes. Nevertheless, after the time for appeal of the Final Order (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU) had elapsed, the matter was scheduled for final hearing. Carole Banks is an attorney employed by the Petitioner as an in-house counsel and director of risk management for the three facilities identified in this record. Ms. Banks is also a registered nurse and has been a member of the Florida Bar since April of 1998. Ms. Banks receives a salary from the Petitioner and is required to perform duties typically associated with her full-time job. Due to the filing of the Administrative Complaints against the facilities, Ms. Banks was required to expend additional time to assist outside counsel to defend the facilities. A portion of that time was attributable to the rule challenge case (DOAH Case No. 01-3935RU). Based upon the testimony of this witness and the exhibits received into evidence it is determined Ms. Banks expended 19.8 hours assisting in the prosecution of the rule challenge case. An appropriate rate of compensation for Ms. Banks would be $150.00 per hour. There is no evidence, however, that the Petitioner was actually required to pay Ms. Banks overtime or an appropriate rate of compensation for her additional work. K. Scott Griggs is an attorney employed by the Petitioner. Mr. Griggs serves as vice president and General Counsel for the Petitioner and is located in Massachusetts. Mr. Griggs did not testify, was not available to explain his time-keeping records, and none of the exhibits in this cause indicate how Mr. Griggs is compensated for his services or what his specific duties entail. While it is certain Mr. Griggs assisted counsel in the prosecution of the underlying case, without relying on hearsay, no determination as to the amount of time spent and the hourly rate that should be applied to such time can be reached. In order to fully protect the Petitioner's interests and those of its residents, the Petitioner retained outside counsel in the underlying case. The law firm of Broad & Cassel was hired to defend the administrative actions, seek injunctive relief, file the underlying case, and pursue other administrative remedies to assist the client. By agreement, Petitioner was to pay the following hourly rates: partners were to be compensated at the rate of $245.00 per hour, associates were to receive $175.00 per hour, and paralegals were entitled to $90.00 per hour. In this case, four partner-level attorneys from Broad and Cassel expended time in furtherance of the client's causes. After reviewing the time records and testimony of the witnesses, it is determined that the partners expended at least 172.6 hours associated with the underlying rule challenge. Additionally, an associate with the Broad & Cassel firm expended not fewer than 12.1 hours that can be directly attributed to the rule challenge case. Additional hours expended contributed to the success of the rule challenge. The Petitioner also incurred costs and expenses associated with the rule challenge. A paralegal expended 4.6 hours (with a $90.00 per hour rate) making copies of the documents used at the hearing. Other costs included court reporter fees, transcripts, telecopy charges, and expert witness fees. It is determined that the Petitioner has incurred $5819.15 in recoverable costs associated with this case and the underlying rule challenge. The hourly rates sought by the Petitioner are reasonable. The time and labor expended by the Petitioner to vigorously protect its legal interests was reasonable given the severity of the penalty sought by the Agency and the circumstances faced by the client. The Petitioner benefited from the efforts of counsel. Due to the time constraints and immediate ramifications faced by the Petitioner, special time and requests were made of the attorneys performing the work for the underlying case. In some instances, the attorneys were required to devote an extensive amount of time to address the client's interests to the exclusion of other work. This was the first time the Broad & Cassel firm had been retained to represent the client. As a result, the attorneys did not have the benefit of a long-term understanding of the facilities and the client's needs. The Broad & Cassel firm and the attorneys assigned to this matter have considerable experience and demonstrated considerable skill, expertise, and efficiency in providing services to the client. Had the Petitioner not prevailed, its ability to honor its hourly agreement with counsel may have been jeopardized. The Agency's expert recognized the difficulties presented by the case and opined that a proper fee would be $42,908. Such amount did not include attorney time spent in preparing for, conducting the fee hearing, or post-hearing activities. Such amount did not cover the amounts depicted in the billing statement from the Broad & Cassel firm. The Petitioner was required to retain expert witnesses to address the fees sought. The calculation of attorney's fees in this cause is complicated by the fact that none of the fees sought would have been incurred by the Petitioner had the Agency not implemented an unlawful policy. That is, had the non-rule policy not been utilized to support Administrative Complaints against the three facilities, none of the fees sought would have been incurred. The Petitioner presented a "shot-gun" approach pursuing every avenue available (including the underlying rule challenge) to dissuade the Agency from pursuing its action against the facilities. Only the rule challenge proved successful. Had the rule challenge not proved successful, residents would have been relocated from their homes. The Petitioner would have incurred extensive financial loss. William E. Williams and Carlos Alvarez testified as experts on behalf of the Petitioner. Their testimony has been considered and their opinions regarding the reasonableness of the fees sought by Petitioner has been deemed persuasive. Based upon the totality of the evidence presented, it is determined that the Petitioner prevailed in the rule challenge. The Agency has not demonstrated that the non-rule statement was required by the Federal Government to implement or retain a delegated or approved program or to meet a condition governing the receipt of federal funds. The formal hearing for fees in this cause lasted 4.75 hours. Petitioner's counsel expended time in preparation for the hearing and in post hearing activities. A reasonable fee associated with that time would not be less than $15,000.00.
Findings Of Fact Gene Flinn (Flinn), filed Complaint Number 95-156 dated October 31, 1995, with the Commission on Ethics against John G. Tomlinson, Jr., (Tomlinson) alleging that Tomlinson committed the following unlawful acts: Advising or instructing his attorney to suborn perjury by denying to the Executive Director and Chairman of the Ethics Commission the existence of Rose Upton. Advising or instructing his attorney to certify false and misleading information to the Ethics Commission concerning himself and Rose Upton with the intent to influence the Supreme Court in Flinn's disbarment proceedings. Conspiring to or participating in the act of tampering with jurors in the 1991 trial of Flinn v. Shields. Forwarding misstatements concerning the Shield litigation to clerks of the Florida Supreme Court to effect Flinn's disbarment and to foreclose appeals. Advising or instructing his attorney to falsely inform the Ethics Commission concerning the status of law enforcement investigations being conducted of Flinn. Committing acts in violation of federal and state racketeering laws by providing false information to other Judges of Compensation Claims, resulting in loss of fees and costs to Flinn. Filing a fraudulent application with the Governor for reappointment. On January 8, 1996, Bonnie Williams, Executive Director of the Commission on Ethics, filed a Recommendation of Legal Insufficiency with the Commission, recommending that the Commission dismiss Complaint Number 95-156 without investigation as legally insufficient. On January 25, 1996, the Commission entered a Public Report and Order Dismissing Complaint, dismissing Complaint Number 95-156 for failure to constitute a legally sufficient complaint. The order stated, "No factual investigation preceded the review, and therefore the Commission's conclusions do not reflect on the accuracy of the allegations of the Complaint." The unrebutted testimony of Tomlinson is that the allegations in the Complaint are false. Based on the testimony of Tomlinson and the case, The Florida Bar v. Flinn, 575 So.2d 634 (Fla. 1991), I find that Flinn filed Complaint Number 95-156 with a reckless disregard for whether the allegations in the Complaint were false. The only evidence presented relating to the amount of the attorney's fee requested is Exhibit Number 9 which is a letter from Stephen Slepin (Slepin) to Tomlinson, stating that the fee for representing Tomlinson regarding Complaint Number 95-156 was $10,000 plus expenses. On December 1, 1995, Slepin did file a five-page response to the Commission on behalf of Tomlinson. No evidence was presented as to the amount of time that Slepin spent in representing Tomlinson relative to Complaint Number 95-156. No evidence was presented as to the nature of the actual work performed by Slepin other than the written response submitted by Slepin to the Commission. Exhibit 9 did indicate that Slepin would review the Complaint, the previous Compliant, Flinn's disbarment proceedings and Flinn's federal actions and research the applicable law. However, no evidence was presented to show what work was actually done. No evidence was presented to show what the customary charge in the community is for such services. No evidence was presented concerning the experience, ability, and reputation of the lawyer performing the services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying John Tomlinson, Jr.'s petition for attorney's fees. DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of July, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of July, 1996. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephen Marc Slepin, Esquire Stephen Marc Slepin, P.A. 1114 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Gene Flinn 5100 Southwest 87th Avenue Miami, Florida 33165 Carrie Stillman Complaint Coordinator Commission on Ethics Post Office Box 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Bonnie Williams, Executive Director Florida Commission On Ethics Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709 Phil Claypool, General Counsel Ethics Commission 2822 Remington Green Circle, Suite 101 Post Office Drawer 15709 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-5709
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Respondent is guilty of sex discrimination in employment.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner was born in Puerto Rico and lived there 11 years. She speaks English fluently with a Spanish accent. Respondent is a wholesale distributor of building materials. Four- fifths of its customers are retail outlets, and the remainder are building contractors. Respondent is the largest such distributor in the Southeast and is a mid- to large- size corporation. Respondent is an employer within the meaning of Chapter 760. Answering a want ad in the newspaper, Petitioner sent David Russell, who is Respondent's controller, a resume and letter of recommendation. She had two interviews with Mr. Russell and was hired. It is unclear whether Petitioner's Puerto Rican background came up during the interview. Evidently unknown to Petitioner at the time, each of four other interviewees was offered the job and refused it before it was offered to Petitioner. Petitioner began work with Respondent on May 21, 1989, as an invoicing clerk. Her responsibilities included invoicing, copying, mailing, filing, and microfilming. Petitioner began work at an hourly rate of $5.50, which was raised after the completion of a 90-day probationary period to $6.00. After one year, she received a raise to $6.50 per hour, which remained her hourly rate through her date of termination. The raise resulted from the favorable recommendation of Mr. Russell to the president of Respondent. Mr. Russell earlier gave Petitioner preferential treatment when he recommended to the president that Respondent lend her over $1000 for surgery. Normal company policies did not authorize such loans to new employees, which Petitioner was at the time. The loan was made and later repaid. An important part of Petitioner's duties was to learn how to operate a Burroughs L-9000, which is a dedicated, automated ledger machine. The L-9000 dates back to the early days of office automation. Invoices are run through the L-9000, which performs simple mathematical functions to extend total costs based on number of units and price per unit, total costs per invoice, and total invoiced costs per day and per month. Inputting data into the L-9000 is a time-consuming process. Corrections take even more time, as each incorrect entry has to be deleted and the correct entry added. The machine has other problems, such as the loss of data during power outages. When Petitioner joined Respondent, she knew nothing about the L-9000. At the time, Shirley Rehrig, who had been employed by Respondent since October, 1985, was operating the machine. Ms. Rehrig had joined the company as an invoice operator on the L-9000 and was, by May, 1989, supervisor of the Invoicing Department. The Invoicing Department works closely with the Pricing Department, which are both part of the Accounting Department. At the time, employees in the Pricing Department manually took prices for invoiced items from books and entered them in handwriting on invoices. The process was prone to error through mistranscriptions of quantity, price, or cost. Pricing errors were only one source of invoicing errors. Additional errors could arise in invoicing, such as by misreading the handwritten information provided by the Pricing Department or misentering the data. In May, 1989, there were two persons working in the Pricing Department and, counting Petitioner, two persons working in the Invoicing Department. Speed and accuracy were important characteristics for the L-9000 operator. Petitioner's early experience with the machine was frustrating for her, Ms. Rehrig, and Mr. Russell, who was in charge of the Accounting Department. Despite repeated demands from Ms. Rehrig and Mr. Russell that she work more slowly, Petitioner continually tried to operate the machine as fast as Ms. Rehrig could operate it. The result was that Petitioner's error rate was unacceptably high and thus her processing of invoices was relatively slow. Ms. Rehrig became very upset with Petitioner and several times complained about her to Mr. Russell. Perhaps recalling the difficulty he had had filling the position, Mr. Russell tried to calm Ms. Rehrig and continually counselled Petitioner to work more slowly. Mr. Russell is a mild-mannered man, who showed great patience with his employees. He tolerated a longtime employee in the Pricing Department who, partly due to poor health, was often volatile and one time threw invoices at Ms. Rehrig. Petitioner gradually began to gain competence with the L-9000. However, she was unable to erase completely the perception of her coworkers, but not Mr. Russell, that she was the source of more invoicing errors than for which she was in fact responsible. Petitioner's high error rate gave her one advantage, though. She knew how to correct errors, which were inevitable in the invoicing process, especially given the peculiarities of the L-9000. In July, 1990, Respondent hired Alice Sweet to work in the Invoicing Department. Petitioner trained Ms. Sweet in the use of the L-9000, and soon Petitioner and Ms. Sweet were alternating on the machine. Ms. Sweet was a very good worker who was able to concentrate on her work better than Petitioner could. However, she was more timid than Petitioner in trying to fix the mistakes that she did make and often required the assistance of Petitioner or Ms. Rehrig in making the corrections. When Ms. Sweet was hired, Ms. Rehrig was given a chance to learn pricing, while still supervising invoicing. The division between the Invoicing and Pricing Departments, which are really subdepartments, is not as clear as the line between Accounting and other true departments. When Ms. Rehrig told Mr. Russell in the summer of 1991 that she would be quitting, he asked her if Petitioner or Ms. Sweet should take Ms. Rehrig's position in pricing. Ms. Rehrig recommended Ms. Sweet because she was more focused and methodical than Petitioner, but also because Petitioner could handle the L-9000 on her own and Ms. Sweet could not. Mr. Russell made the changes that Ms. Rehrig had recommended after she left the company in November, 1991. Ms. Rehrig was not contacted subsequently about problems with the L-9000 as long as Petitioner remained with the company. In October, 1991, Felicia Jones, who is an African- American, was hired by Respondent through Kelly Temporary Services. Ms. Jones was assigned to the Invoicing Department where she reviewed invoices and Petitioner's output from the L-9000. After Ms. Rehrig's departure, Petitioner alone operated the L-9000. Although improved from her early days on the machine, Petitioner continued to make errors on the L-9000, and Mr. Russell continued to ask that she improve her performance on the machine. During this time, Respondent was undergoing difficult financial times. The depression in the construction industry sharply impacted Respondent's business. Total sales were down about 1 percent between fiscal years-end June 30, 1989, and June 30, 1990. Sales plummeted 14.4 percent between fiscal years- end 1990 and 1991, and slid 4.4 percent between fiscal years-end 1991 and 1992. Although still showing earnings, profits between fiscal years-end 1990 and 1991 were almost halved, and profits between fiscal years-end 1991 and 1992 slipped another 18 percent. By sometime in the first half of 1989, Respondent had been adopted cost-containment strategies to deal with poor market conditions. Examples of Respondent's efforts included controlling the purchasing of supplies, requiring bids on goods and services, and using inventory-control mechanisms. These strategies proved ineffective in the face of seriously deteriorating market conditions in 1991. Finally, Respondent turned to reductions in force. When voluntary attrition proved insufficient, Respondent implemented layoffs. Layoffs throughout the company in each of its offices throughout the state reduced employment from 131 persons to 94 persons from January, 1989, to December, 1992. The impact in the Accounting Department was a reduction in the average workforce of 12 persons from January, 1989, through January, 1992, to 10 persons in January, 1992, and 8 persons in December, 1992. After Ms. Rehrig's departure, the president of Respondent instructed Mr. Russell to identify an employee to layoff should the president decide to make layoffs. The most likely candidates were Petitioner and Ms. Sweet. Petitioner decided that he would lay off Petitioner because Ms. Sweet was trained in invoicing and pricing and could run the L-9000, even though she was less able to correct errors than could Petitioner. Mr. Russell decided not to lay off Ms. Jones, who remained employed with Respondent through Kelly Temporary Services. Even though Respondent paid Kelly Temporary Services $7.50 per hour for Ms. Jones, Respondent owed no benefits for her. Estimating that benefits cost $1.91 per hour, Mr. Russell figured that Petitioner, who was then receiving $6.50 per hour, was costing Respondent a total of about $8.41 per hour--almost one dollar more per hour than Ms. Jones cost. The Pricing and Invoicing Departments could withstand a reduction in force. After Ms. Rehrig's departure, there had been times that Petitioner had nothing to do in invoicing. When Petitioner was terminated in April, 1992, Ms. Sweet returned to operate the L-9000 for one year. During that time, she worked exclusively in the Invoicing Department, but only about four of five days a week were required for work on the L-9000. Ms. Sweet's former duties in pricing were covered by another employee. Sometime in the second quarter of 1992, Mr. Russell discussed with Ms. Jones the possibility of her permanent employment with Respondent, rather than through Kelly Temporary Services. Because Petitioner had already filed her Charge of Discrimination, Mr. Russell decided not to pursue fulltime permanent employment with Ms. Jones until the discrimination charges were resolved. Following Petitioner's departure in April, 1992, Ms. Sweet encountered problems with the L-9000 that she could not solve. She and Mr. Russell several times contacted Ms. Rehrig, and at least once Ms. Rehrig came to the office after finishing her other work for the day to fix the problem. Mr. Russell offered her a consultation contract, which Ms. Rehrig declined. Mr. Russell and Ms. Rehrig discussed the possibility of her returning to work with Respondent, but they could not agree on acceptable conditions. Ms. Rehrig testified that, on one occasion immediately after interviewing Petitioner, Mr. Russell referred to her as a "Puerto Rican" and alluded to the excitability of Puerto Ricans. This testimony is not credited. Ms. Rehrig was displeased with Respondent for undisclosed reasons when she quit, and she became more displeased when, after being badgered by Ms. Sweet and Mr. Russell concerning the L-9000, she and Mr. Russell could not agree on adequate conditions for her reemployment with Respondent. Called as a witness by Petitioner, Ms. Rehrig initially omitted mention of her early dissatisfaction with Petitioner's work, although she admitted that she had recommended to Mr. Russell that he assign Ms. Sweet, rather than Petitioner, to the Pricing Department after Ms. Rehrig quit. The only other evidence concerning Petitioner's national origin involves Petitioner's testimony that Ms. Sweet angrily called her a "Puerto Rican" one time, that coworkers routinely assumed that Petitioner had made all errors in invoicing even when she had not, and that Mr. Russell treated her in a diffident manner. There are problems with each of these items of proof. First, Petitioner admitted that Mr. Russell did not know that Ms. Sweet had referred to Petitioner's national origin in a derogatory way. Petitioner never told Mr. Russell about this remark, nor is she aware that anyone else did. Second, the coworkers who wrongly assumed that Petitioner was responsible for invoicing errors when she was not were understandably basing their assumption on Petitioner's history of a high number of mistakes, not on her national origin. More importantly, Mr. Russell did not misperceive Petitioner's error rate. Third, Mr. Russell was not especially close with a number of employees, including but not limited to Petitioner. But he resisted Ms. Rehrig's requests to fire Petitioner, showed patience with her high error rate, and gave her one raise. Petitioner has proved a prima facie case of discrimination. She is Puerto Rican. She was generally qualified for the invoicing job. And she was replaced by Ms. Sweet, who is a white person whose national origin evidently does not place her in a protected class. However, Respondent has shown a legitimate business reason for Petitioner's layoff. Business was poor and getting worse. Petitioner's competence was marginal. Ms. Sweet, whom Ms. Rehrig herself had named over Petitioner for what appears to have been a promotion, was cross-trained and thus, for that reason alone, more useful to Respondent. And Respondent's president justifiably believed that the Invoicing and Pricing Departments could continue to operate effectively with one less employee. The quick offer of fulltime permanent employment to the less experienced Ms. Jones did not mean that she was intended to replace Petitioner. Following Petitioner's termination, Ms. Sweet worked for one year on the L-9000 before Ms. Jones, who was not even trained on the machine until August, 1992, replaced her in April, 1993. Respondent in effect gave Ms. Jones a raise when she began to operate the L-9000 by increasing the pay to Kelly Temporary Services to $8.55 per hour. However, competence in 1992 with the L-9000 was of increasingly limited utility to Respondent, which, by the time of the final hearing, had replaced the obsolete device with modern automated office equipment.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. ENTERED on January 13, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings on January 13, 1994 APPENDIX Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-4: adopted or adopted in substance. 5: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Petitioner failed to prove that the matter of her national origin arose during the interview. 6 and 8: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 7: adopted or adopted in substance. 9-10: adopted or adopted in substance. 11: adopted or adopted in substance except that Petitioner continued to make a high rate of mistakes on the L-9000. 12: adopted or adopted in substance, although the reasons for Ms. Rehrig's recommendations go beyond those stated in the proposed finding. 13: rejected as subordinate. 14-17 (first sentence): rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. (remainder): adopted or adopted in substance. (first two sentences): adopted or adopted in substance. 18 (remainder)-20: rejected as subordinate, irrelevant, and unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 21-22: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence except for positions of Respondent. 23-25: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Subsequent events led Mr. Russell to reassess his needs and the costs of meeting these needs. However, in April 1992, he did not have the advantage of this knowledge and made in good faith the personnel decisions that he made at the time. 26: adopted or adopted in substance, but see 23-25. 27: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. 28: adopted or adopted in substance. 29: rejected as unnecessary. 30: rejected as unsupported by the appropriate weight of the evidence. Rulings on Respondent's Proposed Findings 1-16: adopted or adopted in substance. 17: rejected as subordinate and recitation of evidence except that Ms. Rehrig unhappily left her job with Booker. 18-19: adopted or adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Sharon Moultry, Clerk Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Dana Baird, General Counsel Human Relations Commission 325 John Knox Road Building F, Suite 240 Tallahassee, FL 32303-4149 Craig P. Clendinen Stearns Weaver One Tampa City Center Suite 3300 Tampa, FL 33601 Michael D. Malfitano Macfarlane Ferguson 111 E. Madison St. Suite 2300 Tampa, FL 33601
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment practice contrary to Section 760.10, Florida Statutes (2008),1 by discriminating against Petitioner based on her color and/or her age.
Findings Of Fact The Town is an employer as that term is defined in Subsection 760.02(7), Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired by the Town in November 2004 as an administrative assistant to Mayor Anthony Grant. Petitioner is a dark-skinned African-American woman who was 51 years of age at the time of the hearing. Petitioner was interviewed and hired by a committee appointed by Mayor Grant. The committee included town clerk Cathlene Williams, public works director Roger Dixon, and then- chief administrative officer Dr. Ruth Barnes. Mayor Grant did not meet Petitioner until the day she started work as his administrative assistant. The mayor's administrative assistant handles correspondence, filing, appointments, and anything else the mayor requires in the day-to-day operations of his office. For more than two years, Petitioner went about her duties without incident. She never received a formal evaluation, but no testimony or documentary evidence was entered to suggest that her job performance was ever less than acceptable during this period. In about August 2007, Petitioner began to notice a difference in Mayor Grant's attitude towards her. The mayor began screaming at her at the top of his lungs, cursing at her. He was relentlessly critical of her job performance, accusing her of not completing assigned tasks. Petitioner conceded that she would "challenge" Mayor Grant when he was out of line or requested her to do something beyond her job description. She denied being disrespectful or confrontational, but agreed that she was not always as deferential as Mayor Grant preferred. During the same time period, roughly July and August 2007, Petitioner also noticed that resumes were being faxed to the Town Hall that appeared to be for her job. She asked Ms. Williams about the resumes, but Ms. Williams stated she knew nothing and told Petitioner to ask the mayor. When Petitioner questioned the mayor about the resumes, he took her into his office and asked her to do him a favor. He asked if she would work across the street in the post office for a couple of weeks, to fill in for a post office employee who was being transferred to the finance department; as a team player, Petitioner agreed to the move. While she was working as a clerk at the post office, Petitioner learned that the mayor was interviewing people for her administrative assistant position. She filed a formal complaint with the Town. For a time after that, she was forced to work half-time at the post office and half-time in the mayor's office. On or about October 22, 2007, Petitioner was formally transferred from her position as administrative assistant to the mayor to the position of postal clerk in the post office. Her salary and benefits remained the same. At the hearing, Mayor Grant testified that he moved Petitioner to the post office to lessen the stress of her job. Based on his conversations with Petitioner, he understood that Petitioner was having personal or family problems. He was not privy to the details of these problems, but had noticed for some time that Petitioner seemed to be under great stress. The post office was a much less hectic environment than the mayor's office, and would be more amenable to her condition. Ms. Williams, the town clerk, testified that the mayor told her that Petitioner was stressed and needed more lax duties than those she performed in the mayor's office. Mr. Dixon, the public works director, testified that Petitioner had indicated to him that she was under pressure, but she did not disclose the cause of that pressure. He recalled that, toward the end of her employment with the Town, Petitioner mentioned that she felt she was being discriminated against because of her skin color. Petitioner denied ever telling Mayor Grant that she was feeling stressed. She denied telling him anything about her family. Petitioner stated that the only stress she felt was caused by the disrespect and humiliation heaped upon her by Mayor Grant. Petitioner's best friend, Gina King Brooks, a business owner in the Town, testified that Petitioner would come to her store in tears over her treatment by the mayor. Petitioner told Ms. Brooks that she was being transferred to the post office against her will, was being forced to train her own replacement in the mayor's office,3 and believed that it was all because of her age and complexion. Mayor Grant testified that he called Petitioner into his office and informed her of the transfer to the post office. He did not tell her that the move was temporary. He did not view the transfer from administrative assistant to postal clerk as a demotion or involving any loss of status. Mayor Grant testified that an additional reason for the change was that he wanted a more qualified person as his administrative assistant. He acknowledged that Petitioner was actually more experienced than her eventual replacement, Jacqueline Cockerham.4 However, Petitioner's personal issues were affecting her ability to meet the sensitive deadlines placed upon her in the mayor's office. The mayor needed more reliable support in his office, and Petitioner needed a less stressful work environment. Therefore, Mayor Grant believed the move would benefit everyone involved. Mayor Grant denied that Petitioner's skin color or age had anything to do with her transfer to the post office. Petitioner was replaced in her administrative assistant position by Ms. Cockerham, a light-skinned African- American woman born on October 17, 1961. She was 46 years of age at the time of the hearing. Documents introduced by the Town at the hearing indicate the decision to hire Ms. Cockerham was made on March 26, 2008. Ms. Williams testified that she conducted the interview of Ms. Cockerham, along with a special assistant to the mayor, Kevin Bodley, who no longer works for the Town. Both Ms. Williams and Mayor Grant testified that the mayor did not meet Ms. Cockerham until the day she began work in his office. Petitioner testified that she knew the mayor had met Ms. Cockerham before she was hired by the Town, because Mayor Grant had instructed Petitioner to set up a meeting with Ms. Cockerham while Petitioner was still working in the mayor's office. Mayor Grant flatly denied having any knowledge of Ms. Cockerham prior to the time of her hiring. On this point, Mayor Grant's testimony, as supported by that of Ms. Williams, is credited. To support her allegation that Mayor Grant preferred employees with light skin, Petitioner cited his preferential treatment of an employee named Cherone Fort. Petitioner claimed that Mayor Grant required her to make a wake-up call to Ms. Fort every morning, because Ms. Fort had problems getting to work on time. Ms. Fort was a light-skinned African-American woman. Under cross-examination, Petitioner conceded that Mayor Grant and Ms. Fort were friends, and that his favoritism toward her may have had nothing to do with her skin color. Petitioner claimed that there were other examples of the mayor's "color struck" favoritism toward lighter-skinned employees, but she declined to provide specifics.5 She admitted that several dark-skinned persons worked for the Town, but countered that those persons do not work in close proximity to the mayor. As to her age discrimination claim, Petitioner testified that a persistent theme of her conversations with Mayor Grant was his general desire for a younger staff, because younger people were fresher and more creative. The mayor's expressed preference was always a concern to Petitioner. Petitioner testified that she felt degraded, demeaned and humiliated by the transfer to the post office. She has worked as an executive assistant for her entire professional career, including positions for the city manager of Gainesville and the head of pediatric genetics at the University of Florida. She believed herself unsuited to a clerical position in the post office, and viewed her transfer as punitive. In April 2008, Petitioner was transferred from the post office to a position as assistant to the town planner. Within days of this second transfer, Petitioner resigned her position as an employee of the Town. At the time of her resignation, Petitioner was being paid $15.23 per hour. Petitioner is now working for Rollins College in a position she feels is more suitable to her skills. She makes about $14.00 per hour. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that there was a personality conflict between Petitioner and Mayor Grant. Neither Petitioner nor Mayor Grant was especially forthcoming regarding the details of their working relationship, especially the cause of the friction that developed in August 2007. Neither witness was entirely credible in describing the other's actions or motivations. No other witness corroborated Petitioner's claims that Mayor Grant ranted, yelled, and was "very, very nasty" in his dealings with Petitioner.6 No other witness corroborated Mayor Grant's claim that Petitioner was under stress due to some unnamed family situation. The working relationship between Mayor Grant and Petitioner was certainly volatile, but the evidence is insufficient to permit more than speculation as to the cause of that volatility. The greater weight of the evidence establishes that, due to this personality conflict, Mayor Grant wanted Petitioner transferred out of his office. He may even have used the subterfuge of a "temporary" transfer to exact Petitioner's compliance with the move. However, the purpose of this proceeding is not to pass judgment on Mayor Grant's honesty or skills as an administrator. Aside from Petitioner's suspicions, there is no solid evidence that Mayor Grant was motivated by anything other than a desire to have his office run more smoothly and efficiently. Petitioner's assertion that the mayor's preference for lighter-skinned employees was common knowledge cannot be credited without evidentiary support. Petitioner's age discrimination claim is supported only by Petitioner's recollection of conversations with Mayor Grant in which he expressed a general desire for a younger, fresher, more creative staff. Given that both Petitioner and Ms. Cockerham were experienced, middle-aged professionals, and given that Mayor Grant had nothing to do with the hiring of either employee, the five-year age difference between them does not constitute evidence of discrimination on the part of the mayor or the Town. Petitioner was not discharged from employment. Though Petitioner perceived it as a demotion, the transfer to the post office was a lateral transfer within the Town's employment hierarchy. Petitioner was paid the same salary and received the same benefits she received as an administrative assistant to the mayor. A reasonably objective observer would not consider working as a clerk in a post office to be demeaning or degrading.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that the Town of Eatonville did not commit any unlawful employment practices and dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of February, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LAWRENCE P. STEVENSON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 2009.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Respondent committed an unlawful employment act by discriminating against Petitioner on the basis of national origin in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended.1/
Findings Of Fact Mr. Charlot is a Black male of Haitian descent. Mr. Charlot was employed by the County in the Department for almost 16 years before he was terminated in December 2008. The Department operates Miami International Airport (Airport). At the time of his termination and all times material hereto, Mr. Charlot's classification was an Airport Automotive Equipment Operator II, operating heavy machinery in maintenance work at the Airport. At all times material hereto, the majority of the Department's employees were Hispanic, including the supervisors. Mr. Charlot's Dismissal before the Aviation Director By letter dated December 12, 2008, the Aviation Director, José Abreu, dismissed Mr. Charlot from employment with the Department and the County, effective the close of business on December 4, 2008, upholding the "recommendation by management" for dismissal. Mr. Abreu indicated, among other things, that, in upholding the recommendation, he considered the Disciplinary Action Report (DAR) and Mr. Charlot's work history. Furthermore, Mr. Abreu indicated, among other things, that his decision on termination was based in part upon Mr. Charlot's violations of the County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraphs (I), (R), and (BB), related to Mr. Charlot's arrest on grand theft charges; and that the basis for his (Mr. Abreu's) final decision was based upon Mr. Charlot's disregard for County Personnel Rules. Additionally, Mr. Abreu indicated that, because Mr. Charlot failed to attend the meeting at which Mr. Charlot would have been able to appeal management's recommendation, he (Mr. Abreu) had no additional factors to consider in making his decision. Consequently, Mr. Charlot was dismissed from employment with the Department and the County, effective close of business on December 4, 2008. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, was considered by Mr. Abreu. The DAR notified Mr. Charlot that he was charged with violating the County's Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraphs (I), (R), and (BB), which provides: (I) that the employee has been guilty of conduct unbecoming an employee of the County whether on or off duty, provided allegations shall be specific and shall describe the conduct which is the basis of the charge; (R) that the employee has misappropriated County funds, appropriated County property for personal use, or illegally disposed of County property; and (BB) that the employee has violated any of the provisions of the Act or the Rules. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, set forth revised facts. Those revised facts state that, on September 24, 2008, Mr. Charlot was re-arrested, arraigned, and formally charged with a third degree felony for theft of County property based upon an incident occurring on August 5, 2008; and that, also, as a result of the formal charge, the County automatically placed Mr. Charlot on suspension without pay. Additionally, the revised facts recite facts stated in a DAR dated August 6, 2008, issued as a result of the incident occurring on August 5, 2008, which cited the same violations of the County's Personnel Rules. In essence, the DAR facts state that, on August 5, 2008, Mr. Charlot was on an overtime assignment, from 11:00 p.m. through 7:00 a.m., repairing asphalt; that his duty was to operate the scrubber/sweeper, sweeping around the site prior to the asphalt being placed; that, at approximately 3:00 a.m., Mr. Charlot advised Kendall Davis that he would return and left the worksite; that, shortly thereafter and according to an Airfield Security Incident Report, a law enforcement officer observed Mr. Charlot on Airport property, not at the worksite, with two bags of copper wire, weighing approximately 140 pounds; that Mr. Charlot left the worksite and was found committing a crime against the County by stealing County material; that Mr. Charlot was in an area in which he was not authorized and found in a vehicle no longer in service and not able to be driven; and that the DAR was warranted because of Mr. Charlot's actions of taking County material, leaving the worksite and not performing his assigned duties while on County time. Further, the facts in the DAR dated September 25, 2008, stated that Mr. Charlot was arrested on May 11, 2006, for petty theft, but had failed to advise the Aviation Director or anyone in the chain of command about the arrest. Also, the facts stated that his failure to so advise of the arrest was a violation of Department's Rules which placed an obligation on County employees to notify their Department Director or his/her designee of an arrest, whether on or off duty, within a reasonable amount of time, not to exceed three calendar days, of the arrest. A copy of the Department's policy regarding arrests was included with the DAR. Additionally, a copy of the disposition of the charge was included with the DAR, which showed that Mr. Charlot was not prosecuted. The DAR dated September 25, 2008, concluded that the DAR was warranted based on Mr. Charlot's actions of taking County material, being formally charged with a third degree felony, leaving the worksite, not performing his assigned task while on duty, and failing to report a prior arrest to the Department. Mr. Charlot's responded to the DAR dated August 6, 2008, and his response was also included with the DAR dated September 25, 2008. The response stated, among other things, that the State Attorney's Office had decided that the evidence was insufficient to charge Mr. Charlot with committing a crime and took no action on the charge; that Mr. Charlot was on his lunch break, with his identification, and it was not uncommon for employees to take a lunch break away from the worksite; and that Mr. Charlot advised Mr. Davis that he (Mr. Charlot) was taking his lunch break and would return. Also, the response included affidavits from several employees stating that it was normal for employees to take lunch breaks away from the worksite and attesting to Mr. Charlot's performance as an employee and to his character. Mr. Charlot's Appeal of the Termination through Arbitration Having been terminated from his employment by Mr. Abreu, Mr. Charlot appealed the termination through arbitration. On September 29, 2009, the appeal was heard by a Hearing Examiner of the American Arbitration Association. The Hearing Examiner issued a written recommendation on November 22, 2009. The Hearing Examiner's recommendation was to sustain Mr. Charlot's dismissal. Mr. Charlot's Dismissal before the County Manager After arbitration, the Hearing Examiner's recommendation was considered by the County Manager. By letter dated December 3, 2009, the County Manager sustained and confirmed Mr. Charlot's dismissal from employment with the County. The Incident on August 6, 2008 Mr. Charlot was arrested and charged with burglary on August 6, 2008. He obtained counsel. The State Attorney's Office decided to nolle prose, and the charge against Mr. Charlot was dismissed. He returned to work. However, subsequently, in September 2008, Mr. Charlot was re-arrested and arraigned on a third degree felony count of grand theft regarding the incident on August 6, 2008. On September 24, 2008, the State Attorney's Office filed an information charging Mr. Charlot with the third degree felony count of grand theft. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County played a part in or influenced the action by the State Attorney's Office to re-arrest Mr. Charlot, arraign him on a different crime, and file an information against him on the different crime. By letter dated September 25, 2008, Mr. Abreu advised Mr. Charlot, among other things, that he was suspended indefinitely in accordance with the "Code of Miami-Dade County, Section 2-42, Paragraph (22), which provides: 'For the automatic suspension of any person from the County service immediately upon being indicted by any grand jury or upon having an information filed against him by any prosecuting official, such suspension to continue until any such indictment or information shall have been disposed of by a trial and conviction or acquittal of the accused or by any dismissal or quashing or reversal of the same.'" The letter further advised Mr. Charlot that, if the charges were reduced or dropped, it was his (Mr. Charlot's) responsibility to immediately advise Human Resources; and that, even if the charges were reduced or dropped, the Department may still pursue any administrative action deemed necessary. The evidence demonstrates that Mr. Charlot's immediate suspension was in accordance with the County's Code. Mr. Charlot was unable to afford the continuation of representation by counsel. He entered into a plea agreement, and the charge was nolle prossed.2/ Prior Disciplinary Action Against Mr. Charlot In October 2004, Mr. Charlot was suspended for three days for an incident that occurred on July 2, 2004. He served the three-day suspension from October 13 through 15, 2004. Mr. Charlot received a DAR in July 2004 for the incident, which stated, among other things, that his minor child was with him on a sweeper during his work hours. Also, the DAR indicated previous disciplinary action taken against Mr. Charlot in November 2003 and December 2002, resulting in a five-day suspension and a three-day suspension, respectively; and indicated that the County would not tolerate continuous violation of its rules. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on July 2, 2004, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In November 2003, Mr. Charlot received a five-day suspension for an incident that occurred on October 11, 2003. He served the five-day suspension from November 18 through 22, 2003. Mr. Charlot received a DAR on October 14, 2003, which stated, among other things, that he failed to report to work during his scheduled work shift hours and failed to notify his supervisor that he would not be reporting to work. Also, the DAR indicated previous disciplinary action taken against Mr. Charlot for leaving work prior to the scheduled end of his shift, without swiping out of his shift, resulting in a three-day suspension. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on October 11, 2003, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In December 2002, Mr. Charlot received a three-day suspension for an incident that occurred on November 26, 2002. He served the three-day suspension from January 15 through 17, 2003. Mr. Charlot received a DAR on December 2, 2002, which stated, among other things, that he left the worksite in his personal vehicle during his regularly scheduled shift hours, without swiping out and without notifying his supervisor. In a memorandum dated December 30, 2002, the Assistant Aviation Director, among other things, advised Mr. Charlot of the suspension and further advised Mr. Charlot that, should he need to leave the worksite to respond to personal matters, he was required to swipe out and to ensure that his supervisor was notified. As to the incident on November 26, 2002, at hearing Mr. Charlot testified that school personnel at the school that his child was attending contacted him regarding his child experiencing a diabetic episode; and that he immediately departed the worksite for the school to give his child an insulin injection. His testimony is credible. Further, no evidence was presented to indicate that the County failed to consider his explanation at the time of the disciplinary action. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incident on November 26, 2002, was unreasonable or discriminatory. In July 1998, Mr. Charlot received a written reprimand for various incidents occurring in May 1998. He received a DAR on May 26, 1998, regarding the incidents. The written reprimand indicated, among other things, that Mr. Charlot engaged in insubordinate behavior and took an unauthorized break. Additionally, the written reprimand advised him that further such incidents would result in progressive disciplinary action up to and including termination. The evidence is insufficient to demonstrate that the County's disciplinary action, regarding the incidents in May 1998, was unreasonable or discriminatory. Alleged Employees Similarly-Situated to Mr. Charlot Mr. Charlot asserts that there are other Department employees who are similarly-situated to him and who are Hispanic. The other employees are Robert Chacon, Rodolfo deArmas, and Ricardo Mendez. No dispute exists that all of the other employees are Hispanic. Robert Chacon Robert Chacon was employed with the Department for approximately 20 years. Since 2008, he has been an Airport Maintenance Mechanic. The evidence demonstrates, among other things, that, in 2009, Mr. Chacon was suspended due to an incident not associated with the Department and which occurred outside of the workplace; that in 2001, he was issued a DAR, which he grieved, but lost; that he was a supervisor, but was demoted and is no longer a supervisor; and that he has been suspended four times. The evidence fails to demonstrate the details of or the circumstances of the suspensions, the DAR, or the demotion. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates that Mr. Chacon has not been charged with stealing from the Department. Rodolfo deArmas Rodolfo deArmas has been employed with the Department since 1984. He has been an Equipment Operator II for more than 15 years. The evidence demonstrates that, in 1991, Mr. deArmas was charged with a criminal offense which was not associated with the Department and for which he was not convicted; and that he has been subject to two disciplinary actions. The evidence fails to demonstrate the details of or the circumstances of the criminal offense or the disciplinary actions. Ricardo Mendez Regarding Ricardo Mendez, the evidence demonstrates that the Department charged Mr. Mendez with violating the County's Personnel Rules and that one of the Rules was the same one Mr. Charlot was charged with violating, i.e., Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraph (R); and that Mr. Mendez was dismissed and terminated in 200l for the violation. Among the alleged facts associated with Mr. Mendez's violation of Personnel Rules, Chapter VIII, Section 7, Paragraph (R) were that Mr. Mendez submitted more hours of work than he had actually worked and was paid for more hours than he had actually worked. Furthermore, the evidence demonstrates Mr. Mendez appealed his termination through arbitration, as did Mr. Charlot. However, the evidence demonstrates that, unlike in Mr. Charlot's situation, a hearing examiner found facts favorable to Mr. Mendez and recommended reinstatement of Mr. Mendez. The County reinstated Mr. Mendez.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the discrimination complaint of Venis Charlot. S DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of April, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 2012.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether an interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, by the Board of Medicine is an agency statement which violates Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), pursuant to Section 120.56(4), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact These findings of fact, with a few changes based upon the stipulated record in this case, are facts contained in the Joint Stipulation: The Parties. Petitioner Franciso Vazquez, M.D., is a licensed medical doctor within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 68742. Respondent Board of Medicine (hereinafter referred to as the “Board”), is charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Dr. Vazquez’s address of record is 4595 Palm Beach Boulevard, Fort Myers, Florida 33905. DOAH Case No. 07-0424PL, Dr. Vazquez’s Disciplinary Case. Dr. Vazquez signed a written opinion in the form of an Affidavit on September 5, 2003, as required by Section 766.104(1), Florida Statutes (2003), in support of a medical malpractice action related to the death of C.L. Dr. Vazquez named approximately 40 doctors and one hospital in the sworn statement. The sworn statement generally stated that each of the defendants committed medical negligence and a breach of the prevailing professional standard of care in a multitude of ways, but did not specify which doctor committed which negligent act or how any individual doctor breached the prevailing standard of care. Dr. Vazquez further asserted in this sworn statement that the negligence and breach of the prevailing professional standard of care of all the doctors caused injury, damage and ultimately the death of C.L. That sworn statement ultimately formed the basis for a civil malpractice action filed on February 2, 2004, in the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in and for Pinellas County, Civil Division, Case Number 04-875CI-7. On or about February 22, 2005, circuit court judge Bruce Boyer of the Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit of Florida, in an for Pinellas County, Civil Division, in case Number 04-875CI-7, entered an order of dismissal as to two defendant doctors. In the order of dismissal, Judge Boyer stated that the Dr. Vazquez was not a gastroenterologist and did not otherwise appear to be qualified to comment on the defendants’ care and did not appear to have made any reasonable effort to investigate and determine what role the [two] defendants played in C.L.’s care. Dr. Vazquez was not provided with any notice of the hearing on February 22, 2005, and neither he nor anyone acting on his behalf was present at the hearing to defend his interests. The court forwarded its order to the Division of Medical Quality Assurance as required by Section 766.206(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2003). On or about May 3, 2006, an Administrative Complaint was issued against Dr. Vazquez charging him with a one count violation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), which subjects a physician to license discipline for “being found by any court in this state to have provided corroborating written medical expert opinion attached to any statutorily required notice of claim or intent or to any statutorily required response rejecting a claim without reasonable investigation.” The recommended penalties for a violation of Section 4458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), include revocation of the physician’s license. Dr. Vazquez is the first and only physician in Florida who has been formally charged with violating Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003). On or about January 22, 2007, the Department of Health referred Case No. 2005-03579 (DOH v. Francisco Vazquez, M.D.) to the Division of Administrative Hearings (hereinafter referred to as the “DOAH”) for a formal evidentiary hearing on the Administrative Complaint pursuant to Chapter 120, Florida Statutes. The case was assigned DOAH Case Number 07-0424PL. The case was assigned to the undersigned. On or about March 1, 2007, Dr. Vazquez filed a Motion to Relinquish Jurisdiction in the administrative proceeding, advising the court of his intent to file his constitutional challenge to Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, in circuit court and arguing the DOAH should relinquish jurisdiction until after the Leon County Circuit Court has ruled on his constitutional challenge. On or about March 5, 2007, Dr. Vazquez filed a Petition for Declaratory Action and/or Injunctive Relief in the Second Judicial Circuit Court in and for Leon County, Florida, alleging that Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, is unconstitutional under the U.S. and state constitutions, in that it allows disciplinary action against a physician’s license based exclusively on the existence of a court order entered in a proceeding in which the physician, acting as a presuit medical expert, is not a party and has no right to notice and an opportunity to be heard. The case was assigned case number 2007-CA-0663. On or about March 19, 2007, an Order Denying Motion to Relinquish was entered by the undersigned. On or about March 21, 2007, a hearing was held before the undersigned on Dr. Vazquez’ Motion to Continue Hearing. At the hearing, counsel for the Department of Health, argued that it is her client’s position that Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, only requires proof of the existence of a court order that includes the language mentioned in the statute and that, once this is proven, there is no opportunity for the physician to dispute the findings of the court order. The Department of Health’s argument was accepted by the undersigned. On or about April 17, 2007, after a formal administrative hearing was conducted but before a recommended order was issued, the Department of Health filed a Motion to Reopen the Hearing and Record and Schedule Evidentiary Formal Hearing. In the motion, the Department of Health urged the undersigned that a new interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), should be accepted, stating: It is the [Department of Health’s] position that Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, creates a rebuttable presumption. Under this interpretation, to create a prima facie case, the Department must prove that [Dr. Vazquez] was found to have provided a corroborating written affidavit in support of a notice of a claim without reasonable investigation. [Dr. Vazquez] may rebut such a showing by demonstrating that, notwithstanding the finding, his investigation was in fact reasonable. On or about May 8, 2007, the undersigned denied the Department of Health’s Motion to Reopen, holding that its new interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), is contrary to any reasonable reading of the statute. On or about July 5, 2007, the Department of Health filed its Exceptions to the Recommended Order of the undersigned in DOAH Case No. 07-0424PL, in which it reasserted that the correct interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), is the one set forth in its Motion to Reopen Hearing (quoted in paragraph 20, supra). On or about July 6, 2007, Dr. Vazquez filed his Reply to Petitioner’s Exceptions urging that, even if Petitioner’s new interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes, were to be adopted and applied to this case, the case should be dismissed and sent back to the probable cause panel for a determination made based upon the new interpretation. On or about August 10, 2007, a meeting of the Board was held in Fort Lauderdale, Florida at which the Board approved the Department of Health’s Exceptions to the Recommended Order and entered an Order remanding the case back to the DOAH for a “de novo hearing so that findings may be entered consistent with the Board of Medicine’s reading of Fla. Stat. § 458.331(1)(jj), as set forth in this order.” By accepting the Department of Health’s Exceptions, the Board adopted as its own, the interpretation of Section 458.331(1)(jj), Florida Statutes (2003), asserted by the Department of Health in its Motion to Reopen the Hearing and Record and Schedule Evidentiary Formal Hearing and quoted in paragraph 20, supra. In light of the fact that the Board has the final authority over its interpretation of the laws it is charged with applying, the Order of Remand was accepted by Order Accepting Remand and Reopening File entered September 17, 2007. On or about January 8, 2008, Dr. Vazquez filed his Motion to Dismiss Administrative Complaint and Remand to Agency for Probable Cause Determination, again arguing that the probable cause determination made against him was based on a reading of the statute which is substantially different than the reading that the Board adopted in the Order on Remand. The Department of Health opposed this motion. The motion was denied by an Order entered by the undersigned on January 18, 2008. The final hearing on remand in DOAH Case No. 07-0424PL was held on January 29, 2008, pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. In his Amended Petition, Dr. Vazquez has challenged the statement adopted by the Board through its Order of Remand. That statement, which is quoted in paragraph 20, supra, will hereinafter be referred to as the “Challenged Agency Statement.” The Challenged Agency Statement has not been adopted a rule pursuant to Section 120.54(1), Florida Statutes, and the Board has not initiated any rule-making procedures in this regard. The Board has not argued or presented evidence to support a finding that rule-making is not feasible and practicable under Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding are whether Respondent was the employer of Petitioner; and, whether Petitioner was terminated from his employment with Respondent because of his race.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a white male. At all times relevant to this matter, Petitioner was employed with the City of Tallahassee (City). Petitioner continues to be employed by the City. As part of its municipal function, the City of Tallahassee has the responsibility of maintaining drainage ditches located within the City limits. The Leon County Sheriff’s Office (Sheriff's Office) provides inmate work crews to the City for assistance in carrying out this responsibility. The Sheriff's Office also provides the inmates with any food or other items they require. The inmate work crews are supervised by City employees who have completed the Sheriff’s Office certification program for supervising inmates. The certification program is required because of security concerns involved with utilizing the labor of incarcerated individuals outside of the controlled environment of a jail. Because of security concerns, employees are instructed not to provide contraband to inmates. Contraband is defined as any item given to an inmate which the Sheriff's Office has not authorized to be given to the inmate. If any items are provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. Petitioner completed the certification program and was employed by the City to supervise inmate work crews. He was told during the training session that inmate supervisors could not provide contraband to inmates, but if any items were provided to inmates, all inmates must receive the item. On or about August 16, 2000, Petitioner gave a bucket of Popeye's chicken to an inmate under his supervision. The bucket of chicken had been given to Petitioner by a Popeye’s employee to give to the inmates because the Popeye's employee knew one of the inmates. Each inmate received a piece of chicken. However, even though Petitioner checked the bucket for weapons, Petitioner did not obtain or attempt to obtain authorization from the Sheriff's Office to give the chicken to the inmates. When Sergeant Lee, a Sheriff’s Office sergeant, visited the work site and saw the chicken bucket and that chicken had been eaten, he asked Petitioner if he had given the chicken to the inmates. Believing that he had done something wrong, Petitioner lied to Sergeant Lee and said that he had not given chicken to the inmates. Sergeant Lee instructed Petitioner to return the inmates to the Leon County Jail. While at the jail, Petitioner admitted that he had given the chicken to the inmates. Petitioner was advised by the Sheriff’s Office that he could no longer supervise inmates. The Sheriff's Office also advised the City that Petitioner was no longer certified to supervise inmates. The City then transferred Petitioner to another position but did not reduce his pay or benefits. On a date after Petitioner’s removal from supervising inmates, the City held a luncheon and invited inmates. There was no evidence presented that the invitation to lunch was or was not authorized by the Sheriff’s Office. Ted Hubbard, a white City employee, has provided watermelons to inmates and other unnamed black inmate supervisors were present when Leon County employees gave Gatorade and other items to inmates. Neither Hubbard nor any other person has been removed from supervising inmates. However, other than very vague references to these "other" supervisors, Petitioner offered no evidence of any similarities between his employment and these other employees or that the items allegedly given to the inmates were not authorized by the Sheriff's Office or that the Sheriff's Office even knew alleged contraband had been given to any inmates. Certainly, no other person lied about providing items to inmates. At no time did the Sheriff's Office make any employment decisions on behalf of the City. Likewise, at no time did the Sheriff's Office employ Petitioner. In fact, the City made all decisions with regard to Petitioner's employment and was the actual employer of Petitioner. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.
Recommendation Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of July, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of July, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: Linda G. Bond, Esquire Powers, Quaschnick, Tischler & Evans Post Office Box 12186 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-2186 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Donald H. Lairsey 8031 Smith Creek Road Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of lawrecited above, it is recommended that the procedural deficiencies as to the timeliness of the review process be construed as an approval of petitioner's capital expenditure proposal to construct a 91-bed nursing home in Alachua County. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of June, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: James M. Bradshaw, Jr. Post Office Box 6697 Birmingham, Alabama 35210 Douglas E. Whitney, Esquire Department of HRS District VII Office 1350 Orange Avenue Winter Park, Florida 32789 Art Forehand, Administrator Office of Community Medical Facilities 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Hugh V. Smith, Jr., Esquire 540 South Perry Street Montgomery, Alabama 36104
Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
The Issue Whether Petitioner was wrongfully terminated from her position as a custodial worker with Respondent because of her race, in violation of Section 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Based upon all of the evidence, the following findings of fact are determined: Petitioner, an African-American female, was hired by Respondent in the fall of 1994, as a custodial worker and she continued in that position until October 17, 1995, when she was terminated. On or about October 12, 1995, Rollins College (Respondent) received two letters of complaint regarding Petitioner's conduct and work performance. One of these was from a group of students living in a dorm which Petitioner was assigned to clean. The other letter was from the parent of a student living in another dorm assigned to Petitioner. These letters were not the first complaints Respondent had received regarding Petitioner's work performance. After receiving the letters, Petitioner was placed on a three-day suspension by Tom Waters, Director of Respondent's Facilities Management Department. After investigating the complaints, Respondent, on October 17, 1995, terminated Petitioner's employment. Prior to the termination of her employment, Petitioner attended a training and safety meeting of custodial workers. During that meeting, Petitioner's immediate supervisor, Frank Pravdik placed his hand on Petitioner's uniform shirt and stated words to the effect that the shirt was "nasty." Pravdik was generally known to be a difficult person to work under. He was eventually terminated by Respondent because of his abrasive management style. Fredrick Wooden, called as Petitioner's witness, assisted with the management of the custodial workers prior to his retirement. He often disagreed with Pravdik's style of management. In the case of Petitioner, he did not believe that any disciplinary actions taken against her were unwarranted, and Respondent had legitimate grounds to terminate her employment. Wooden further believed that Pravdik treated all subordinate employees equally, if not with respect. On November 20, 1995, Petitioner filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Orlando Human Relations Department. The Charge of Discrimination indicated that Petitioner believed that Respondent discriminated against her because of her race. Petitioner testified that the Charge of Discrimination was incorrect. Petitioner did not actually believe that the termination of her employment was related to her race. However, she permitted a representative of the Orlando Human Relations Commission to complete for her the Charge of Discrimination. The Charge does not allege a claim of retaliation nor does it allege that Petitioner ever complained about Pravdik's behavior to Respondent. While Petitioner testified that she first visited the Orlando Human Relations Department prior to the date of her termination, the Charge is signed, dated and notarized on November 20, 1995, three days after the effective date of her termination. After the Commission issued a No Cause Determination in this matter, Petitioner filed a Petition for Relief. The Petition for Relief alleges that Respondent terminated her employment in retaliation for complaining about Pravdik. Petitioner again testified that the Petition for Relief was also incorrect stating her case was not about whether Respondent had a right to terminate her employment, but instead was about whether Pravdik violated her civil rights for impermissibly touching her person and calling her shirt "nasty."
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner's Petition for Relief with prejudice. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Gloria J. Holloway 397 Chaucer Lane, South Lake Mary, Florida 32746 Sharon Moultry, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 325 John Knox Road Suite 240, Building F Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149 Mark Van Valkenburgh, Esquire Winderweedle, Haines, Ward & Woodham 250 Park Avenue South, 5th Floor Winter Park, Florida 32789 Dana A. Baird, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations Building F, Suite 240 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4149