Findings Of Fact Petitioner owns and operates an ACLF in Tampa, Florida, and has been continuously licensed by the Respondent as an ACLF since at least 1984. The Administrator, President and major stockholder of Petitioner is Ruby Byrd. On or about October 9, 1987, Petitioner applied for license renewal, and the Respondent requested additional information by letter dated October 15, 1987. According to Respondent's witness, John C. Morton, the Petitioner's license expired on December 25, 1987. However, the Department sent letters purporting to deny Petitioner's renewal on March 28 and May 12, 1988, which both state that Petitioner's license expired on March 25, 1988. This discrepancy between the testimony offered by Respondent and the Respondent's letters of denial is unexplained, and no finding can therefore be made as to when the Petitioner's most recent license did, in fact, expire. ACLF licenses are issued for a period of one year, and must be renewed annually. The sole specific reason for renewal denial set forth in the Respondent's March 28, 1988, letter is the Petitioner's "failure to provide proof of business liability insurance and proof of surety bond coverage." The Respondent's May 12, 1988, letter specifically deleted this reason as a basis for renewal denial, and superseded the previous letter by setting forth three reasons for denial. First, it is alleged that Ruby Byrd was arrested for grand theft from a former resident of the ACLF and was awaiting trial. Second, it is alleged that the facility lacks the financial ability to operate. Third, it is alleged that the facility has committed multiple and repeated violations as evidence by surveys and follow-up visits from 1985 through 1987. The only witness called as a representative of Respondent testified that he did not make a recommendation regarding Petitioner's license renewal application. The parties have stipulated that Ruby Byrd was found not guilty of the charge of grand theft. Competent substantial evidence was not presented to support the charge that Petitioner lacked the financial ability to operate. This ACLF has been in operation since at least 1984, and the evidence did not show the facility's failure to meet any of its financial obligations. Evidence produced by the Respondent was unclear in its distinction between Ruby Byrd, individually, and the corporate Petitioner in this case. The parties stipulated that representatives of the Respondent found what they believed to be violations which are enumerated in survey deficiency reports prepared in 1985 through 1987. The evidence establishes that all deficiencies noted in reports prepared in 1987 had been either corrected, administratively deleted, or the time for corrective action had not arrived by the time of hearing. Survey reports prepared prior to 1987 predominately indicate corrective action taken prior to 1987. In any event, these reports which precede the license year for which renewal is at issue in this case, are irrelevant, as is a report of a survey conducted subsequent to the Respondent's May 12, 1988 letter. The Petitioner operated under a conditional license issued by Respondent from March 26, 1988 until September 25, 1988. There is no evidence that Respondent issued any conditional license or otherwise responded to Petitioner's renewal application for the period between December 25, 1987 and March 26, 1988, assuming testimony at hearing is correct and this license expired on December 25, 1987. Similarly, there is no evidence that the Respondent has issued a conditional license, or otherwise responded to the Petitioner's renewal request for the period of September 25, 1988 until the date of hearing, which period of time would be relevant regardless whether the Petitioner's license expired in December, 1987, or March, 1988. According to the Respondent's witness, Petitioner's facility does not present any danger to the public health, safety and welfare. The Respondent does proceed against licensed ACLFs, and seek to administratively suspend or revoke their licenses during a period of licensure.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing, it is recommended that the Respondent issue a Final Order approving the Petitioner's application for renewal of its ACLF license at issue in this case. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 30th day of November, 1988. DONALD D. CONN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of November, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-3036 Rulings on Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact: 1-2 Adopted and Rejected in part in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted and Rejected in part in Findings of Fact 2 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 6, but otherwise Rejected as unnecessary. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Rejected as a conclusion of law and not a finding of fact. Rulings on the Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact: Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Rejected in Finding of Fact 2 Adopted in part in Finding of Fact 2. 4-5 Rejected as irrelevant since the Respondent has the burden of proof in this case as discussed in the conclusions of law. 6-9 Rejected in Finding of Fact 6, and otherwise as irrelevant. Rejected as irrelevant and as not supported by competent substantial evidence. Rejected in Finding of Fact 5. COPIES FURNISHED: William Park, Esquire 8001 North Dale Mabry Building 601, Suite B Tampa, Florida 33614 Edward Haman, Esquire Office of Licensure and Certification 7827 North Dale Mabry Tampa, Florida 33614 Sam Power, Clerk 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory Coler, Secretary 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 John Miller, General Counsel 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
The Issue The issues in this cause concern whether disciplinary action should be taken against the Respondent's license to practice medicine, based upon alleged violations of Section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes. Specifically, the disputed issue concerns whether his license to practice medicine was revoked, suspended or otherwise acted against by the licensing authority of another state.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is and at all times material hereto, has been licensed as a physician in the State of Florida. He holds licensed number ME0028248 issued by the State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners. Respondent is also licensed in the State of New York as a medical doctor. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with enforcing the medical practice standards contained in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes and related rules. Pertinent provisions of that chapter and Chapter 455, Florida statutes authorize the Petitioner to make investigations of physician's licenses in the State of Florida and, if probable cause exists to indicate that a physician has engaged in conduct proscribed by Chapter 458, to commence formal proceedings seeking disciplinary action against such physicians. The New York State Department of Education and its Board of Regents is the licensing authority for medical doctors for the State of New York, (Petitioner's Exhibit 3 is evidence.) On August 14, 1986, the Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, on behalf of the State Education Department and its Board of Regents entered an order wherein the Respondent'S license to practice medicine in the State of New York was suspended for one year. That suspension was stayed and the Respondent's license to practice medicine was placed in probationary status with the probation being subject to certain conditions. See Petitioner's Exhibit 3 in evidence. In that order, the Respondent, had been found guilty of professional misconduct by being convicted of committing crimes under the state law of New, York. Specifically, he was convicted of four counts of violations of Public Health Law 12.B(2), by being registered as a medicaid provider and leasing space for the practice of medicine at a dental office, a "shared health facility", the rental fee for which was calculated and paid as a percentage of the defendant's earnings for medical services rendered on the premises. The Respondent was also found guilty of falsely representing that he was certified by the American Board of Internal Medicine when in fact he was not so certified, and by the willful making and filing of a false report, which also constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of the law of the State of New York, specifically 8NYCRR 29.1(b)(6), (1984), cited in Petitioner's Exhibit 3 in evidence.
Recommendation Accordingly, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the State of Florida, Board of Medical Examiners suspending the Respondent's license for one full year or until such time as the Respondent appears before the Board of Medicine and demonstrates that he is capable of practicing medicine with care, skill and safety to patients including a demonstration that his license to practice medicine in New York is reinstated and is unrestricted, whichever time period is less. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of July, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of July, 1989. COPIES FURNISHED: Jonathan King, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Vijay Sakhuja, M.D. 120 Secor Drive Port Washington, New York 11050 Vijay Sakhuja, M.D. 90-10 Sutphin Boulevard Jamaica, New York 11435 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 Kenneth Easley, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation Suite 60 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0729 ================================================================= DISTRICT COURT OPINION ================================================================= IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL FIRST DISTRICT, STATE OF FLORIDA VIJAY SAKHUJA, M.D., NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND Appellant, DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED. vs. CASE NO. 89-2296 DOAH CASE NO. 88-4658 DEPARTMENT OF PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Appellee. / Opinion filed October 10, 1990. Appeal from an Order of the Department of Professional Regulation Walter D. Forehand, of Myers & Forehand, Tallahassee, for appellant. Lisa S. Nelson, Department of Professional Regulation, for appellee. WENTWORTH, J. Appellant seeks review of an administrative order by which appellee Department of Professional Regulation, through its Board of Medicine, suspended appellant's medical license. The duration of this suspension exceeds the penalty which the hearing officer had recommended. Although we find no error with regard to appellant's other contentions, we do find that the Board did not fully and adequately delineate the basis for increasing the recommended penalty. We therefore reverse the order appealed. Appellant was licensed to practice medicine in both Florida and New York, and the current proceeding ensued after disciplinary action was taken by the licensing authority in New York for violations which had occurred in that state. The New York licensing authority acted upon appellant's conviction for violating a public health law which prohibits calculating medical office rental fees on a percentage of earnings, and upon appellant's false reporting and false representation of a medical certification. The proceeding in Florida was based upon this New York action, as appellant was charged with violating section 458.331(1)(b), Florida Statutes, which specifies that disciplinary action may be taken in this state when a license has been "acted against" by the licensing authority of another jurisdiction. After an administrative hearing on this charge the hearing officer recommended that appellant's Florida license be suspended for one year or until such time as he satisfies certain conditions including the reinstatement of his New York license. The Board of Medicine adopted the hearing officer's recommended findings, but increased the penalty so as to suspend appellant's license in Florida for one year and until such time as the various other conditions are satisfied. The order increasing the recommended penalty recites that: Rule 21M-20.001(1)(b), F.A.C., provides for discipline for action taken in another jurisdiction to be the discipline which would have been imposed if the substantive violation had occurred in Florida. Although this explanation identifies a permissible basis for the Board's action, and it does not appear that the hearing officer considered the applicability of the cited rule, the order does not specify the asserted substantive Florida violation had appellant's conduct occurred in this state. While appellant's conduct in New York, as indicated by the substantive violations in that state, might be such as would also constitute substantive violations in Florida, the Board's failure to delineate a particular substantive Florida violation does not fully satisfy the Board's obligation, as mandated by section 120.57(1)(b)10, Florida Statutes, to provide a particularize statement of the reason for increasing the recommended penalty. Appellee concedes that the Board's order is deficient, but contends that it should be afforded the opportunity to enter a more thorough and explicit order on remand. Because the order now being appealed reflects a legally permissible basis for the challenged action, on remand the Board may address the matter with greater particularity should it again decide to increase the recommended penalty. See Van Ore v. Board of Medical Examiners, 489 So.2d 883 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); see also, Pages v. Department of Professional Regulation, 542 So.2d 456 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). The order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded. MINER and WOLF, JJ., CONCUR.
The Issue Whether the Respondent, Allan Williams, P.E., and Allan Williams, P.E., d/b/a ABW Engineering (Respondent or Williams), committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint dated November 15, 2013, and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Allan B. Williams is a licensed engineer fully authorized to do business in Florida. Respondent's recognized and legally sufficient name to do business is "Allan B. Williams, P.E." On or about August 20, 2002, Respondent filed a fictitious name application with the Florida Department of State, Division of Corporations (DOS), that represented Allan B. Williams sought to do business under the fictitious name "ABW Engineering." Subsequently, the fictitious name was renewed on March 28, 2007, and was valid through December 31, 2012. On or about May 29, 2013, Respondent again filed the requisite papers with DOS to establish "ABW Engineering" as a fictitious name, with an active status expiration date of December 31, 2018. It is undisputed that Allan B. Williams, the subject of this case, is the person who established ABW Engineering with DOS. In 2007, Petitioner cited the Respondent with practicing engineering through a business entity that was not properly authorized to do business in Florida. In response to that claim, Respondent acknowledged that he did business as ABW Engineering and stated, in part: I didn't know I needed one. In all the years I practiced in Washington, D.C., Maryland and Virginia I never needed one. The only time I can remember this being a requirement, is, if you are a corporation home based outside these states and jurisdiction and you wish to do business in these states and jurisdiction, then you have to pay a "foreign corporation" tax or fee. It was my impression that Certificate of Authorization was the same as a foreign corporation fee. In further response to the 2007 dispute, Respondent filed the appropriate paperwork and paid the required fees to obtain a Certificate of Authorization for ABW Engineering (No. 27462) with Allan B. Williams, P.E., identified as the registered principal officer for the company. The licensure date for ABW Engineering was May 3, 2007. The letter announcing the approval of the Certificate of Authorization for ABW Engineering contained the following provisions: Your Certificate of Authorization will expire February 28, 2009. A notice of renewal will be mailed to the address of the business thirty (30) to forty-five (45) days prior to the expiration date. * * * In accepting this registration, you assume the responsibility of complying with the requirements of Chapter 471, Florida Statutes and Chapter 61G15, Florida Administrative Code. Allan B. Williams, P.E., did not timely renew the Certificate of Authorization for ABW Engineering when it expired on February 28, 2009. From March 1, 2009, through May 8, 2013, Allan B. Williams, P.E., did business under the letterhead and logo of ABW Engineering. Respondent used the letterhead and logo on billing for engineering services rendered by Allan B. Williams, P.E. On or about May 8, 2013, Petitioner issued a Notice to Cease and Desist to ABW Engineering. That notice provided, in pertinent part: Our records show that you do not currently have a certification as required by section 471.023, FS. If the above facts are true, they establish probable cause for FBPE to believe you are violating Florida law by offering ENGINEERING SERVICES without the required license or certification. On May 23, 2013, Respondent wrote a letter in response to the Notice to Cease and Desist that provided: Certificate of Authority has never been uppermost in my mind. Why? For over thirty five years I have always received constant reminders to complete my courses in continuing education and to renew my PE license. Not once have I received reminders about renewing my Certificate of Authority. And so Certificate of Authority becomes obscure in comparison to the other licensing requirements. Think about it. For your PE you have to satisfy educational requirements at an accredited school of Engineering; you have to work for four (4) years doing progressively challenging engineering work which prepares you to take the PE exams; you have to pass the exams and then you get your PE License. Then every two (2) years you have to pass continuing education courses. For Certificate of Authority you fill out a form and you pay $255. I don't think any Engineer would purposely avoid paying a $255 fee and risk losing thousands of dollars in earnings. It slipped my mind—I forgot it—I apologies [sic]. On June 10, 2013, Respondent received a Certificate of Authorization for ABW Engineering. On September 18, 2013, Petitioner notified Respondent that the Board was issuing a citation based upon the allegations previously disclosed to Respondent: that ABW Engineering had offered engineering services during a period of time when it was not properly certified or authorized to do business. Under the terms of the citation, Respondent was given the option of paying the penalty calculated pursuant to Florida Administrative Code Rule 61G15-19.0071 ($5,000.00) or having the case prosecuted pursuant to section 455.225, Florida Statutes (2013).1/ Respondent chose the latter. At hearing, Respondent maintained that he did not do business as ABW Engineering, but as Allan B. Williams, P.E. That claim was not deemed persuasive in light of the totality of evidence that established Respondent routinely used the ABW Engineering letterhead and logo, was listed in the telephone and other directories as ABW Engineering, and billed for engineering services with the logo and name. Moreover, Respondent admitted that using "ABW Engineering" was a strategy to secure work.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Board of Professional Engineers enter a final order finding Respondent in violation of offering engineering services through a fictitious name that did not have a valid Certificate of Authorization, imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $5,000.00, awarding the costs of prosecution against Respondent, and reprimanding Allan B. Williams, P.E., as the registered general officer of ABW Engineering. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of September, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S J. D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of September, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing on the Department's Motion, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: In October of 1995, Petitioners, who desired to construct a single-family, concrete dock in the Hillsboro Canal (in Broward County, Florida) for their 171-foot yacht and to perform dredging adjacent to the dock (Project), filed with the Department a Joint Application for Environmental Resource Permit/Authorization to Use State Owned Submerged Lands/Federal Dredge and Fill Permit (Application). In the Application, Petitioners indicated that their mailing address was: c/o Flynn Enterprises 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000 Chicago, IL 60611 Flynn Enterprises, Inc., is a business owned by Petitioner Donald Flynn. The Application listed "Jeff Adair, Project Manager" of "Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 N. Andrews Avenue, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33309," as the "agent authorized to secure permit" for Petitioners. The application form that Petitioners used to submit their Application contained the following signature page: By signing this application form, I am applying, or I am applying on behalf of the applicant, for the permit and any proprietary authorizations identified above, according to the supporting data and other incidental information filed with this application. I am familiar with the information contained in this application and represent that such information is true, complete and accurate. I understand this is an application and not a permit, and that work prior to approval is a violation. I understand that this application and any permit issued or proprietary authorization issued pursuant thereto, does not relieve me of any obligation for obtaining any other required federal, state, water management district or local permit prior to commencement of construction. I agree, or I agree on behalf of my corporation, to operate and maintain the permitted system unless the permitting agency authorizes transfer of the permit to a responsible operation entity. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430, F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below) Signature of Applicant/Agent Date (Corporate Title if applicable) AN AGENT MAY SIGN ABOVE ONLY IF THE APPLICANT COMPLETES THE FOLLOWING: I hereby designate and authorize the agent listed above to act on my behalf, or on behalf of my corporation, as the agent in the processing of this application for the permit and/or proprietary authorization indicated above; and to furnish, on request, supple- mental information in support of the appli- cation. In addition, I authorize the above- listed agent to bind me, or my corporation, to perform any requirement which may be necessary to procure the permit or authorization indicated above. I understand that knowingly making any false statement or representation in this application is a violation of Section 373.430. F.S. and 18 U.S.C. Section 1001. Typed/Printed Name of Applicant Signature of Applicant Date (Corporate Title if applicable) Please note: The applicant's original signature (not a copy) is required above. PERSON AUTHORIZING ACCESS TO THE PROPERTY MUST COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING: I either own the property described in this application or I have legal authority to allow access to the property, and I consent, after receiving prior notification, to any site visit on the property by agents or personnel from the Department of Environ- mental Protection, the Water Management District and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers necessary for the review and inspection of the proposed project specified in this application. I authorize these agents or personnel to enter the property as many times as may be necessary to make such review and inspection. Further , I agree to provide entry to the project site for such agents or personnel to monitor permitted work if a permit is granted. Typed/Printed Name Signature Date (Corporate Title if applicable) The name "Jeff Adair" appears on the "Name of Applicant (if no Agent is used) or Agent (if one is so authorized below)" line under the first paragraph on the signature page of Petitioners' Application; however, neither Adair's signature, nor any other signature, appears on the signature line under this paragraph. Petitioner Donald Flynn's signature appears on the signature lines under the second (agent designation and authorization) and third (access to property) paragraphs on the page. By letter dated November 17, 1995, the Department informed Petitioners of the following: Preliminary evaluation of your project leads staff to the conclusion that the project as proposed cannot be recommended for approval. While this is not final agency action or notice of intent, it does represent the staff review of your application based on consider- able experience in permitting matters. We are sending you this letter at this stage of the processing to allow you to assess fully the further commitment of financial resources for design dependent on permit issuance. . . . In summary, please revise plans to: (1) reduce the amount of dredging; (2) reduce impacts to natural resources; (3) reduce the size of the dock; (4) reduce encroachment on navigational channel; (5) reduce encroachment on adjacent properties; and (6) after minimization, offer mitigation plans that would address the loss of seagrass in the vicinity (watershed or basin) of the project site. Your application is currently "incomplete" and Final Agency Action will not occur until a reasonable amount of time is allowed for the submittal of a revised plan. A completeness summary has been sent under separate cover, addressing the items that are still outstanding. Staff will continue to process your application in the normal manner; however, I suggest you contact Tim Rach of this office . . . to discuss these possible alternatives regarding your project. The Department's November 17, 1995, letter was addressed to Petitioners "c/o Jeff Adair, Project Manager, Keith and Schnars, P.A., 6500 North Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, FL 33309-2132," as were subsequent requests for additional information made by the Department and other correspondence from the Department concerning the Project. Adair responded to the Department's requests for additional information and otherwise corresponded and communicated with the Department on behalf of Petitioners. In July of 1996, Adair participated in a telephone conference call during which the Department advised him that, if the Application was not withdrawn, it would be denied. On August 13, 1996, Adair sent the following letter to the Department concerning the Project: Pursuant to our recent discussions pertaining to the proposed mitigation plan and final review and processing of the Flynn Dock application, we have been advised via Mr. Flynn's attorney not to withdraw the application. Therefore, we await the Department's final decision relative to the permittability of this project. As you have indicated, we are anticipating the Depart- ment's response toward the end of this month. In making your decision, we strongly urge you to consider the merits or our innovative and "no risk" mitigation plan. We believe our mitigation plan more than compensates for proposed impacts and provides substantial net benefits to the environment and the research community. In particular, information obtained from our proposed research effort would not only benefit our project, but would also facilitate scientific analysis and review of similar applications and issues. As always, please do not hesitate to call should you have any questions or concerns. On August 19, 1996, the Department sent the following letter to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611," the address that Petitioners had indicated in the Application was their mailing address: We have reviewed the information received on May 31, 1996 for an Environmental Resource Permit and authorization to use sovereign submerged lands. The Department has deemed the application complete as of this date. Final action on your application for an Environmental Resource Permit and sovereign[] submerged lands authorization will be taken within 90 days of receipt of your last item of information unless you choose to waive this timeclock. If you have any questions, please contact me at . . . . A copy of this August 19, 1996, letter was sent by the Department to Adair. On August 27, 1996, the Department issued a Consolidated Notice of Denial (Notice) in which it announced its preliminary decision to deny Petitioners' Application. The Notice contained the following advisement: A person whose substantial interests are affected by the Department's action may petition for an administrative proceeding (Hearing) in accordance with Section 120.57, Florida Statutes. Petitions filed by the permittee and the parties listed below must be filed within 14 days of receipt of this letter. Third party Petitioners shall mail a copy of the petition to the permittee at the address indicated above at the time of filing. Failure to file a petition within this time period shall constitute a waiver of any right such person may have to request an administrative determination (hearing) under Section 120.57, F.S. The Petition must contain the information set forth below and must be filed (received) in the Office of General Counsel of the Department at 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard, Mail Station 35, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000: The name, address, and telephone number of each petitioner, the permittee's name and address, the Department Permit File Number and county in which the project is proposed; A statement of how and when each petitioner received notice of the Depart- ment's action or proposed action; A statement of how each petitioner's substantial interests are affected by the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of the material facts disputed by petitioner, if any; A statement of facts which petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; A statement of which rules or statutes petitioner contends warrant reversal or modification of the Department's action or proposed action; and A statement of the relief sought by petitioner, stating precisely the action petitioner wants the Department to take with respect to the Department's action or proposed action. If a petition is filed, the administrative hearing process will constitute a renewed determination of the Department's decision on the application. Accordingly, the Department's final action may be different from the position taken by it in this letter. Persons whose substantial interests will be affected by any decision of the Department with regard to the permit have the right to petition to become a party to the proceeding. The petition must conform to the requirements specified above and be filed (received) within 14 days of receipt of this notice in the Office of General Counsel at the above address of the Department. Failure to petition within the allowed time frame constitutes a waiver of any right such person has to request a hearing under Section 120.57, F.S., and to participate as a party to this proceeding. Any subsequent intervention will only be at the approval of the presiding officer upon motion filed pursuant to Rule 28-5.207, and 60Q-2.010, F.A.C. This Notice constitutes final agency action unless a petition is filed in accordance with the above paragraphs or unless a request for extension of time in which to file a petition is filed within the time specified for filing a petition and conforms to Rule 62-103.070, F.A.C. Upon timely filing of a petition or a request for an extension of time this Notice will not be effective until further Order of the Department. . . . The Notice was mailed (by certified mail, return receipt requested) to Petitioners "c/o Flynn Enterprises, 676 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 4000, Chicago, IL 60611." Although the Notice's certificate of service reflected that a copy of the Notice had been mailed to Adair "before the close of business on AUG 27 1996," in fact, as a result of inadvertence on the part of Department staff, a copy of the Notice had not been mailed to Adair. On September 3, 1996, the Notice sent to Petitioners was received by a Flynn Enterprises, Inc., employee at the address to which it was mailed. The employee executed a return receipt upon receiving the Notice. The Notice was referred to Victor Casini, Esquire, the general counsel of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., on September 4, 1996. Casini set the document aside for filing. He did not believe that there was any immediate action that he or anyone else in the Flynn Enterprises, Inc., office in Chicago needed to take in response to the Notice. Casini noted that Adair's name was listed in the Notice as among those who purportedly had been furnished copies of the Notice. He knew that Adair was handling all matters relating to the permitting of the Project for Petitioners. He therefore assumed that any action that needed to be taken in response to the Notice would be taken by Adair on behalf of Petitioners. Inasmuch as it appeared (from his review of the Notice) that the Department had already furnished Adair with a copy of the Notice, he saw no reason to contact Adair to apprise him of the issuance of the Notice. In taking no action in response to the Notice other than setting it aside for filing, Casini acted reasonably under the circumstances. Adair first learned of the issuance of the Notice during a telephone conversation he had on September 9, 1996, with an employee of Broward County, who mentioned to him, in passing, that the Department had denied Petitioners' Application. 2/ Adair thereupon immediately telephoned the Department to confirm that the Application had been denied. The Department representative to whom he spoke confirmed that the Notice had issued, apologized for the Department's failure to have sent him a copy of the Notice, and promised to rectify the error by sending him a copy of the Notice as soon as possible. Keith Skibicki, the vice president of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., in charge of its day-to-day operations, served as the liaison between Adair and Petitioners. On September 12, 1996, Adair telephoned Skibicki to inquire (for the first time) if Petitioners had received a copy of the Notice. Skibicki, who previously had neither seen nor heard about the Notice, asked around the office and learned that the Notice had been received and was in Casini's files. Skibicki related this information to Adair. Later that same day, September 12, 1996, Adair received the copy of the Notice that the Department had sent him. He then faxed a copy of the Notice to Harry Stewart, Esquire, the Florida attorney who had been retained by Petitioners to assist them in their efforts to obtain favorable action on their Application. Shortly thereafter Adair telephoned Stewart to discuss what they should do in response to the Notice. During their conversation, Stewart expressed the opinion that the 14-day period for filing a petition for an administrative proceeding began to run only upon Adair's receipt of the Notice and that therefore Petitioners had until September 26, 1996, to file their petition. During the two-week period that followed their telephone conversation, Adair and Stewart worked together to prepare such a petition. The petition was filed with the Department on September 26, 1996 (which was 23 days after the Notice had been delivered to the Chicago office of Flynn Enterprises, Inc., but only 14 days after Adair, Petitioners' designated agent in their dealings with the Department, had received a copy of the Notice). The actions taken on behalf of Petitioners in response to the Notice were intended to preserve Petitioners' right to challenge the proposed denial of their Application. At no time was there any knowing and intentional relinquishment of that right.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department enter an order finding that Petitioners' petition challenging the proposed denial of their Application is not time-barred and remanding the matter to the Division of Administrative Hearings for a Section 120.57(1) hearing on the merits of Petitioners' challenge. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 6th day of February, 1997. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of February, 1997.
