The Issue Whether Respondent, Lincare, Inc., is liable to Petitioner, Sharon Ford, for subjecting her to a hostile work environment based on sexual harassment.
Findings Of Fact The Parties and Complaint Allegations Lincare is a Tampa-based company that focuses on home- healthcare services. It has an annual revenue of over $3 billion and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of a company based in Germany. Ms. Ford, a married woman with children, is an accountant and an attorney. Lincare first hired her as its acquisition counsel in 2001 and promoted her to director of acquisitions in 2002. She held that position for almost 15 years before she left the company on January 27, 2017. Mr. Tripp, a married man with children, served as an Arabic linguist in the Army before obtaining his law degree. Lincare hired Mr. Tripp to replace Ms. Ford as its acquisition counsel in 2002 and promoted him to general counsel in 2013. He still holds that position. On January 19, 2018, almost a year after leaving Lincare, Ms. Ford filed a Complaint with the Commission alleging a hostile work environment. She alleged that Mr. Tripp, over a 15-month period from December 2015 through March 2017, subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment. On July 13, 2018, the Commission issued its notice of determination of no reasonable cause and mailed it to Ms. Ford. The notice advised her that she “may request an administrative hearing . . . by filing a Petition for Relief within 35 days of the date the determination was signed by the Executive Director.” Ms. Ford received the notice in the mail on July 16, 2018. On August 16, 2018, 34 days after the Commission issued its notice, Ms. Ford requested an administrative hearing by mailing her Petition to the Commission via U.S. mail. The Commission received the Petition on August 20, 2018. On the same day, the Commission generated its transmittal letter. But, instead of transmitting the Petition to DOAH, the Commission advised Ms. Ford that the Petition appeared to be untimely because it was received three days beyond the 35-day deadline under section 760.11(7), Florida Statutes. After Ms. Ford responded that she timely requested a hearing by post-marking her Petition before the 35-day deadline, the Commission transmitted the case to DOAH on September 21, 2018. The transmittal letter, dated August 20, 2018, did not dismiss the Petition as untimely but rather requested assignment of a judge to “conduct all necessary proceedings required under the law.” Lincare’s Structure and Policies Between 2015 and 2017 Lincare had three officers: chief executive officer (“CEO”), chief financial officer (“CFO”), and chief operating officer (“COO”). The corporate chart had the CEO at the top and the CFO and COO, who reported to the CEO, immediately thereunder. The second tier of the chart listed six department heads, none of whom were corporate officers: corporate compliance officer, head of business innovation, head of human resources, head of public relations & communications, general counsel, and director of acquisitions. These managers were equal on the hierarchy chart and all reported directly to the CEO. As director of acquisitions, Ms. Ford brought in the deals, negotiated the business side, and quarterbacked them to closing. She helped move the deals along by ensuring that Lincare personnel communicated and accomplished their required tasks. She provided business advice to the legal department and worked closely with the acquisition attorney (on smaller deals) and the general counsel (on larger deals). Ms. Ford received a salary and an objective bonus tied to the deals that closed.2/ As the general counsel, Mr. Tripp oversaw legal affairs and supervised five lawyers in the legal department, but had no control over any other department. As to the deals, Mr. Tripp handled the legal aspects, such as contracts, due diligence, and compliance, provided legal advice, and assessed risks. The CEO, COO, and CFO had sole authority to decide whether a deal closed. Mr. Tripp received a salary and a discretionary bonus tied to the company’s financial success in a given year. Although Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp gave each other advice, they were equals on the corporate chart. Mr. Tripp had no authority over Ms. Ford and lacked the power to hire, discipline, promote, transfer, fire, or control her compensation. They were coworkers who both answered directly to the CEO. The head of human resources (“head of HR”) ran the HR department and its roughly 15 to 18 employees. Directly under the Head of HR was the employee relations director, Ms. Adams. Among other things, the HR department oversaw the employee handbook and investigated reports of discrimination and harassment. The handbook included a detailed anti-harassment policy forbidding sexual harassment by any employee at work or at work-related events outside the office. Harassment was defined to include unwelcome sexual advances, requests for conduct of a sexual nature, and other unwelcome behavior that was personally offensive and interfered with work effectiveness done in person or through electronic means. The policy prohibited any employee from making employment decisions based on the submission to or rejection of sexual advances, and noted in bold that any violation would subject an employee to discipline up to an immediate discharge. The handbook contained a detailed reporting procedure for employees who believed, had concerns, or suspected they or anyone else may have been harassed. The policy required them “to immediately notify” a named individual based on their location, which included the employee relations director or the HR Manager for employees in the corporate office. The handbook required employees to follow the procedure and noted that the failure to do so could adversely affect their rights to pursue a claim. Lincare took harassment allegations seriously. Once an allegation was reported, the employee relations director or HR managers investigated; the legal department was not involved unless a particular legal question arose. They obtained as much information as possible from the victim, spoke to potential witnesses, reviewed available documents, and interviewed the accused. If the investigation uncovered no corroborating evidence and the accused denied any wrongdoing, a report would be added to the accused’s personnel file; upon a second allegation, the accused would be terminated. If a supervisor retaliated against an employee for reporting harassment, that supervisor would be terminated. Lincare disseminated the handbook and updated versions to employees and required them to sign a form acknowledging that they received the handbook and would abide by its policies. Ms. Ford signed such forms each time she received a revised handbook, including in 2015——the version in effect until she left Lincare in January 2017. She knew about the harassment policy, the reporting requirement, and the fact that her failure to so report could adversely affect her rights. Friends and Coworkers for Over 15 Years Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp worked closely together at Lincare for 15 years and they became good friends in the process. When Lincare hired Mr. Tripp as acquisition counsel in 2002, he worked closely with Ms. Ford on hundreds of deals. They were in constant, daily contact to strategize, handle diligence and compliance issues, advise each other on the tasks they both had to complete, and ensure the deals closed. They also had a close friendship. They regularly went to lunch alone and with others, as often as three days per week, attended social events with mutual friends, and spoke on the phone and texted about business and personal matters. They had much in common as married parents with kids around the same age and they enjoyed each other’s company. When Mr. Tripp became general counsel in 2013, Ms. Ford initially worked closely with the new acquisition counsel. In late 2014, however, she and Mr. Tripp resumed working closely together when Lincare began negotiating larger transactions. Project Maverick was the largest acquisition of Ms. Ford’s career and it closed in March 2016. Project Falcon was the largest divestiture of her career and it closed in August 2016. These two deals, and others, required Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp to work even more closely together from 2015 until she left the company in January 2017. They often met multiple times per day. Ms. Ford sought Mr. Tripp’s assistance on the legal side and he sought her assistance on the business side. As before, she remained the quarterback shepherding the deal forward. Their friendship continued during this period. They invited each other to lunch regularly, alone and with coworkers. They attended social events with friends, including holiday dinners in 2015 and 2016. On out-of-town work trips, they rented cars together and sometimes spent time alone, such as for meals. They continued to text and speak on the phone about business and personal matters. They talked about their families, children, and other personal matters much like longtime friends do. They checked in on each other when personal crises occurred. And, when Ms. Ford began tense negotiations with the CEO about her compensation, which ultimately led her to leave Lincare, she relied on Mr. Tripp as a sounding board and for moral support. Even after Ms. Ford left the company in January 2017, she maintained contact with him. They had lunch alone at least once. For months, they continued to text each other, even about personal matters such as when she texted him after he had been in a car accident. However, their communication largely ceased once Ms. Ford filed a lawsuit against Lincare over her compensation. Ms. Ford’s Testimony Accusing Mr. Tripp of Sexual Harassment The first incident occurred on December 11, 2015. In that 10 to 20 minute conversation in her office, Mr. Tripp professed strong feelings for her and that he desired a confidential, sexual relationship with her. She rejected him and said they were just friends. She immediately called her husband and spoke to him all the way home. She felt humiliated, embarrassed, and angry. She did not attend a football game that weekend with other coworkers to avoid Mr. Tripp and kept her communications with him to e-mail for the next week. The second incident occurred in her office later in December 2015. While discussing another affair that may be happening at work, Mr. Tripp said he could not report the other employee because he wanted to do the same thing with Ms. Ford, notwithstanding the professional and personal risks. She again rejected him. For the next few weeks, Ms. Ford tried to avoid him as much as possible, but she had to face him because the deals began to lag. She said he continued to make comments here and there, but she offered no specific details. The third incident occurred in January 2016, after a conference call in Mr. Tripp’s office. He said he knew Ms. Ford was avoiding him, but he could not function. He told her he was willing to leave his wife, but she again rejected him. Over the next few months, the comments and innuendo pretty much ceased so Ms. Ford decided to go back to being friends to ensure that the Maverick and Falcon deals closed. However, a fourth incident occurred in the parking lot after a late conference call in June 2016. Mr. Tripp professed that his feelings were stronger now and that he was waiting for Ms. Ford to change her mind. She said her feelings had not changed and he said he understood. For the remainder of 2016, Ms. Ford testified generally that Mr. Tripp continued to make comments about his inability to function and that he got more obsessive as the year progressed. But she offered little detail about the comments or where and when they occurred, except that she had to be around Mr. Tripp’s wife several times and she and Mr. Tripp agreed it was uncomfortable. The fifth incident occurred in October 2016 when Mr. Tripp told her he was learning Hebrew to “connect” with her in her native language. He tried to communicate with her in Hebrew in person and via text, despite her telling him to stop because it made her very uncomfortable. As a result, she again started to avoid him at the office, though he texted her to see if she was alright and admitted to acting like a high school student. In January 2017, Mr. Tripp continued with innuendo, spoke in Hebrew, and told Ms. Ford that he might move closer to her. She believed he was obsessed, which made her nervous about his stability and her safety. But she offered no specific dates on which these events occurred. Mr. Tripp came to Ms. Ford’s office twice that month after she had heated meetings with the CEO, including on her last day at the company, January 27, 2017. He cried because he could not imagine how he would go on if she left, as she was the only reason he came to work every day. That evening, he told her on the phone that he now knows what a divorce feels like. Mr. Tripp continued to harass her following her departure, including taking his family to the same ski resort in March 2017. She testified that she stayed in her room to avoid him and never initiated contact with him while there, though text messages admitted into evidence confirm she texted him several times, about a security breach and generally about his vacation. In January 2018, a year after she left the company during a mediation of her lawsuit against Lincare, Ms. Ford for the first time accused Mr. Tripp of sexual harassment. She had not reported the allegations pursuant to Lincare’s policy, though she knew it required her to do so. She never informed other coworkers either. In fact, the only person she said she told was her husband, though he did not testify at the hearing. Ms. Ford testified that she did not report the allegations because she had a contentious relationship with the CEO during this period and she believed the CEO would terminate her. She also was concerned that Mr. Tripp was unstable and could decide to kill the deals to ensure she missed out on her bonuses. Lastly, she thought reporting would be futile due to Lincare’s culture of harassment, including by one of the two individuals to whom she was directed to report, the head of HR. Mr. Tripp’s Testimony Denying the Alleged Sexual Harassment Mr. Tripp said that he never harassed Ms. Ford. Indeed, no one has ever accused him of harassment. He said he never expressed romantic feelings for her, suggested having a sexual relationship with her, or did anything to scare her. Ms. Ford’s allegations against him came as a shock. He believed they had been good friends for over 15 years and she never indicated otherwise. They enjoyed each other’s company, had children around the same age, and spoke often about business and personal things, like friends often do. Even during the period of alleged harassment, he noticed no changes in her behavior. They continued to invite each other to lunch regularly, often eating together alone, and continued to discuss deeply personal matters about their families. They texted each other often and attended holiday dinners with friends. She chose to sit next to him at a work event at a hotel in the fall of 2016. The same could be said for business trips during this period. On a March 2016 trip to New York, Ms. Ford left a group dinner early with him because he was sick, they worked out the next day, and had breakfast. On an August 2016 trip to Nashville to celebrate the closing of the Maverick deal, they rented a car together and went to dinner alone after Ms. Ford invited him. On a trip to New York in August/September 2016, Ms. Ford stayed with Mr. Tripp to retrieve his briefcase from the office and went to the airport together after the rest of the team left. Mr. Tripp admitted to learning some Hebrew, but because he liked languages (he was an Arabic linguist in the Army), not to become romantically connected to Ms. Ford. He practiced with her because she was the only person he knew who spoke Hebrew, just as he did with other coworkers who spoke another language. She never said it made her uncomfortable. Mr. Tripp also admitted that his wife suggested moving closer to Plant High School because it had a beneficial program for their son. The idea had nothing to do with Ms. Ford, who did not live nearby, and they decided not to move in any event. Even on her final days at Lincare, they had usual interactions. Mr. Tripp admitted calling Ms. Ford the evening of her last day (but said he had not come down to her office earlier) to express concern for his friend and sadness that they would no longer be working together. He did not recall commenting about a divorce, but if he had, it only related to her being a friend. For a few months after she left Lincare, Mr. Tripp believed their relationship had not changed. They continued to text each other and had lunch alone at least once. Though he took a ski trip to the same resort in March 2017, his wife chose the resort and Ms. Ford reached out to him several times during that trip to see how he was doing. Ms. Ford also texted him after he had a car accident in March/April 2017. It was not until several months after Ms. Ford left Lincare and filed her lawsuit against the company that he noticed a change in her attitude. At one point, he invited her to lunch with a mutual friend, but she did not respond and he later learned they had lunch without him. Ms. Ford also told him on the phone that he was going to hate her someday, though he had no idea then what that meant. After a hurricane in August/September 2017, he reached out to make sure she was safe; she thanked him and wished his family well too. That was their last communication before the sexual harassment allegations were made. Credibility Findings as to the Conflicting Testimony After hearing the conflicting testimony from Ms. Ford and Mr. Tripp and observing their demeanor, the undersigned found it exceedingly difficult initially to determine who is telling the truth and who is quite an effective storyteller. Ms. Ford’s conviction in her accusations against Mr. Tripp was equal to his conviction in his denials. But, when considering all of the record evidence and testimony, the scales of credibility tip in Mr. Tripp’s favor for several reasons. For one, Ms. Ford cultivated a professional and personal relationship with Mr. Tripp throughout the alleged harassment period and continued to do so even after she left Lincare. Although she said she maintained contact because they had to work together and she wanted him as an ally, she also accused him of stalker-like, obsessive, humiliating, and unstable behavior. Her efforts to maintain a friendship with him, even after leaving Lincare, are at odds with someone who feels humiliated and fears for their safety. Ms. Ford’s testimony also veered from the affidavit she filed with the Commission. She testified that he generally made comments between November 2016 and January 2017, yet her affidavit offered more specifics as to the comments allegedly made. Her testimony about him moving to her neighborhood was entirely omitted from her affidavit. Her testimony about his efforts to sometimes communicate with her in Hebrew was at odds with the affidavit’s claim that he did so “continuously.” And, her testimony about the comments he made on her last day at Lincare differed as to substance and degree from her affidavit. Further, Ms. Ford’s testimony was directly refuted by other evidence. She testified that she did not affirmatively communicate with him about anything personal in March 2017, but text messages confirm that she checked in with him several times during the trip about his vacation and engaged in more friendly conversation than initially admitted. Ms. Ford’s reasons for waiting until a year after she left Lincare to report the accusations also call her credibility into doubt. Though she testified that she feared Mr. Tripp would kill two large deals and her bonuses therefrom, those deals closed in March and August 2016, and yet she never reported the allegedly ongoing harassment before she left Lincare at the end of January 2017. It also cannot be ignored that she waited until January 2018 to report the accusations and did so during the mediation of her compensation lawsuit against the company. Lastly, though not fatal to her claim, Ms. Ford’s failure to present any corroborating evidence cannot be ignored. She testified that she lost weight, suffered hair loss, and could not sleep, and said that it was the worst year of her life. Yet, the record is devoid of evidence that any other friends or coworkers noticed such changes, that she missed work or social events, or that she suffered at work in any way. She said he sent her inappropriate text messages, but provided no proof of them. She apparently kept a journal about work issues, but did not document the harassing incidents. And, though she said she immediately told her husband in December 2015, she chose not to present his testimony even though he was the only person who could corroborate her accusations.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations issue a final order finding that Petitioner, Sharon Ford, failed to timely file her Complaint and, regardless, that Ms. Ford failed to establish that Respondent, Lincare, Inc., committed an unlawful employment practice against her, both of which warrant dismissal of her Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2019, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S ANDREW D. MANKO Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2019.
The Issue Whether J.A. knowingly and willfully made a false report of abuse on November 29, 2003 (Abuse Report No. 2003-380412), contrary to Section 39.206, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Department is charged by statute to maintain the state's abuse hot line and investigate reports of abuse. It is also charged with investigating false reports of abuse, and is authorized to levy civil fines against those who willfully and knowingly make false reports of abuse. It does this sparingly because it has a chilling effect upon the reporting of abuse. The Department investigated three reports of abuse initiated by J.A. Each of the reports was thoroughly investigated, and each of the reports was determined to be unfounded. J.A. had at one time been the babysitter for G.V., the child about whom the reports were made. J.A. and her husband were also friends with the parents of G.V., for whom J.A.'s husband, Thomas, acted as a translator. When G.V.'s grandmother joined the family, J.A.'s services as a babysitter were no longer needed, and she no longer saw the child frequently. It was apparent from J.A.'s testimony and her actions that she had an emotional attachment to G.V. On March 10, 2003, J.A. made the first abuse report, No. 2003-034565, which alleged that there had been five to eight months of domestic violence between G.V.'s mother and father. It was alleged that this domestic violence occurred several times a week, and that the most recent incident had occurred within the past several days. The mother was alleged to have chased the father with a machete in one hand and G.V. in the other arm. It was alleged that the mother beat G.V. It was alleged that the mother had attempted to jump, while holding G.V., out of the car being driven by the father. The mother was described as being an unsafe and inappropriate caregiver. The child was described as having rotting and broken teeth, which the mother failed to do anything about. This report was investigated by Charles Castell, assisted by Ms. Ehlers. Ms. Ehlers examined the child on March 10, 2003 and found nothing to support the allegations made by J.A. Collateral witnesses, such as neighbors who would have been in a position to corroborate the allegations, were interviewed. Fernando Ramirez, an alleged witness, was interviewed. No witness identified by J.A. or through the investigators' efforts provided any support for the allegations made by J.A. The report was closed with no positive findings on any of the allegations, together with a statement that it appeared to be a false report. The second report of abuse of G.V. made by J.A. was on May 6, 2003. J.A. alleged that the parents of G.V. were engaged in domestic violence, and that G.V.'s mother had chased her father around the yard with a machete while he was drunk. The mother was alleged to be mentally unstable, having a short, bad temper, and beating G.V. J.A. alleged that G.V. father was a drunk who gave G.V. alcoholic drinks and who smoked marijuana and blew the smoke in G.V.'s face. J.A. also alleged that G.V.'s teeth were rotting and one was broken off, and G.V. was poorly nourished and had a flat affect. Gina Ehlers investigated this complaint. She found no indication that G.V. was malnourished or had a flat affect. Ehlers again spoke with neighbors and other witnesses and found no evidence of domestic violence or inappropriate behavior by the mother. Ehlers visited the family on several occasions, including a Friday night at 10:30 or 11:00 p.m., when one might expect to find the father drunk and a cause for domestic violence. Ehlers never found anyone impaired or any evidence of domestic violence or abuse of G.V. Ehlers interviewed J.A., who indicated that she wanted custody of the child and was going to purse whatever avenues were necessary to take the child away from the parents. On November 17, 2003, J.A. made an abuse report to the Department's hotline regarding G.V. J.A. alleged that G.V. was living with her mother and father at the father's mother's home. alleged that everyone but G.V.'s mother abused her physically. J.A. alleged that the father got drunk and hit the child in the mouth, and the child was injured and bruised from this. J.A. alleged that the father gave the child alcoholic beverages to drink. J.A. alleged that the father battered the mother in front of the child. J.A. alleged that the child was at risk with everyone except her mother, Gloria. Steven Shaver investigated this report. Shaver, who examined the child within three hours of the report, found no evidence to support the allegations. He examined G.V. on three separate occasions and looked for bruises or other evidence of physical injury or abuse. He found none. He also observed the child with the parents and did not find that the child was restrained or fearful of the father or his mother. Upon completing his investigation, Shaver reported that J.A. had reported this same information previously and that it was obvious that J. A. was harassing the family of G.V. Kasey Hart testified at hearing. She is now and was a neighbor of the family when the last report of abuse was made in November 2003. She never saw any activity of the type alleged in the abuse report made by J.A. She observed the family interact from time to time, and never saw any abusive conduct. She opined that the child seemed under-disciplined and spoiled as opposed to abused. Steve Lampros, the Child Protective Investigations Supervisor who supervised the investigators who investigated these abuse reports testified. All the investigations conducted were thorough and complete, and included interviews with family and neighbors and physical examination of the child. This included medical examination of the child for injury. All three investigations revealed no evidence that would support a finding that any abuse had occurred. Had there been any indications of abuse, the report would have been labeled "some indicators." J.A. told Lampros that she wanted custody of the child, and would file reports until the Department did something. Lampros warned J.A. that filing false reports was a felony, and that the three reports she had filed had been determined to be without indicators of abuse, that is, unfounded. J.A. stated that her reports were not false and that she would continue to make them. Lampros referred the Abuse Report No. 2003-380412 for false reporting because seven of his investigators had investigated five reports, three within the same year, without discovering any evidence of indicators of abuse. The reports were similar; the investigations were thorough; the reporter appeared to be motivated by a desire to remove the child from the home in the hopes of obtaining custody; and there had been no evidence of abuse. J.A. testified at hearing that she did not see the child from June or July 2003 until a few days prior to the time she made the November abuse report, when she saw the family at Wal-Mart. At that time, they did not see her, and she was not close enough to them to speak. The granddaughter of J.A. testified. She had not seen the child, G.V., since Easter 2004. Her testimony dealt with the period after the time frame involved in the allegations of false reporting. J.A.'s husband testified about his assisting the police with reports of domestic violence between G.V.'s parents in 2001 and 2002, before the time frame of the allegations of false reporting. Susan Mulvey, a neighbor of J.A., testified. Mulvey was at J.A.'s house at times when G.V.'s family came to pick her up when J.A. babysat for G.V. Mulvey observed that G.V. did not want to leave J.A. when her parents came for her. She also observed that the child's teeth had severe cavities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department enter a final order levying a civil fine of $5,000 against the Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 16th day of February, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of February, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucy Goddard-Teel, Esquire Department of Children and Family Services Post Office Box 3, Box 3 Gainesville, Florida 32602 J. A. (Address of record) Josie Tomayo, General Counsel Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Joe Garwood, Agency Clerk Department of Children and Family Services Building 2, Room 204B 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800
The Issue The issues in this case are, one, whether Respondent corruptly used his official positions to sexually harass female subordinates in violation of Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes; and, two, whether Respondent solicited or accepted sexual favors from female subordinates based upon any understanding that his vote, official action, or judgment would be influenced thereby, in violation of Section 112.313(2), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Rudy Maloy (“Maloy”) worked at the Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) from 1980 until October 21, 2001. The last seven years of his career in state government were spent in DOT’s Turnpike District Planning Office, where Maloy served as the “Public Involvement Manager.” In that capacity, Maloy conducted workshops and public hearings around the state concerning Turnpike projects. In 1992, Maloy was elected to the Leon County Commission as a Commissioner-at-Large. He was reelected twice, in 1996 and 2000. At the time of the final hearing, Maloy was a sitting Commissioner. Laurie Bradley When Maloy began working in the Turnpike District Planning Office on October 7, 1994, Laurie Bradley (“Bradley”) was already employed there in a career service position, namely, administrative assistant to the director of planning. Though she reported to the director, who was her immediate supervisor, Bradley performed secretarial functions for others in the office, including Maloy after his arrival. Maloy did not have the authority to promote Bradley, increase her salary, or let her go, but he was one of Bradley’s “bosses” in the sense that he could assign her tasks. Maloy and Bradley enjoyed a cordial relationship at work, at least by outward appearances. For example, Maloy frequently gave Bradley (and other co-workers) the complimentary tickets to events such as hockey games and concerts that he, as a County Commissioner, routinely received but could not always use himself. Bradley genuinely appreciated this token of Maloy’s generosity. She thought Maloy was a very friendly person, and she was friendly toward him. The two, in Bradley’s words, “got along fine.” At the final hearing, however, Bradley testified about other acts and practices of Maloy’s that she considered decidedly unfriendly. According to Bradley, Maloy touched her inappropriately on a number of occasions, as follows: Hugs. Bradley alleged that Maloy hugged her——from the side, around the waist——many times, and that after awhile this began to bother her. Shoulder rubs. Bradley alleged that “fairly often” Maloy stood behind her and rubbed her shoulders without ever being invited or encouraged to do so. Kisses. Bradley alleged that in or around February 1996, Maloy kissed her on the cheek. Bradley also claimed that a few weeks later, Maloy kissed her on the mouth, while the two were alone together in an elevator going down at the end of a workday. Caresses. Bradley asserted that on one occasion in May 1996, within hours, ironically, after they had received sexual harassment training, Maloy taunted her by stroking her arm and asking if such behavior constituted sexual harassment. Bradley further averred that Maloy expressed his opinion that if one person is bothered by another’s conduct in the workplace, then the two should resolve the problem privately, rather than reporting it to management. Finally, Bradley alleged that, as part of this episode of teasing, as she perceived it, Maloy stated that he might be able to get her a job with the county having a higher salary than her present position.1 Maloy testified that he never touched Bradley inappropriately, and he specifically denied her allegations to the contrary. Thus, the evidence is irreconcilably in conflict as to whether Maloy sexually harassed Bradley. It is significant, therefore, that not a single witness who testified at the final hearing had actually seen Maloy touch Bradley improperly or in an unwelcome manner. In contrast, one disinterested witness testified credibly that she observed Bradley hug Maloy once or twice as a friendly gesture of thanks for receiving tickets to a hockey game; this testimony is accepted as true. Several witnesses who lacked personal knowledge of any misconduct on Maloy’s part were called to establish that Bradley told others in confidence——at or near the time of the events in question——that Maloy was allegedly harassing her. There is no doubt that Bradley did share such information with others. In fact, her contemporaneous accusations were soon reported to persons in DOT’s management, who understandably insisted that an investigation be conducted. Consequently, Bradley submitted a formal written complaint about Maloy to her employer, and DOT investigated the matter.2 That Bradley complained to others about Maloy in 1996 is circumstantial evidence from which one might infer that the alleged sexual harassment occurred.3 It is relatively weak circumstantial evidence, however, because it ultimately rests largely, if not entirely, on the credibility of the very same person——Bradley——whose testimony it was offered to corroborate. Indeed, drawing the inference largely would beg the question of Bradley’s veracity, for doing so would require that her veracity (which Maloy disputes) be assumed.4 Having carefully weighed and evaluated all of the relevant, persuasive evidence, the undersigned is unable to find, without hesitancy, that Maloy engaged in the conduct of which Bradley has accused him. This determination, it should be stressed, reflects the fact-finder’s judgment concerning the weight of the evidence and nothing more; it is purposefully not a finding regarding what occurred or did not occur between Bradley and Maloy.5 The undersigned affirmatively finds that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Bradley.6 Likewise, it is found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Bradley that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Bradley——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ophelia Morris In December 1996, Ophelia Morris (“Morris”) replaced Bradley as the director’s administrative assistant in the Turnpike District Planning Office. As had Bradley, Morris served as a secretary to a number of managerial employees, including Maloy. She was a career service employee. Maloy could assign work to Morris, but he lacked the power to promote or fire her. Maloy and Morris became friends, and their friendship deepened over time. By 1999, the two were sufficiently close that Morris routinely confided in Maloy, sharing private information with him concerning the personal problems she was having with her then-fiancé, whom she planned to (and did) marry in May of that year. In June 1999, soon after Morris got married, Morris and Maloy began a mutually consensual sexual affair. While there are some conflicts in the evidence regarding certain immaterial details of their relationship,7 the fact-finder is convinced that neither party entered into this adulterous affair as the result of coercion, bribery, intimidation, harassment, or any type of untoward pressure, either express or implied; rather, each wanted to have an extramarital sexual relationship with the other. Some time in the autumn of 1999, Maloy offered Morris a job as his aide at the County Commission.8 The undersigned is not convinced that Morris had attempted, in any serious way, to break away from the ongoing affair with Maloy before he made this offer of employment. To the contrary, it is found that, more likely than not, Morris remained satisfied with——and had no present intention to end——the affair at the time Maloy proposed to hire her as his aide.9 Morris testified that, after initially demurring, she finally agreed to accept the at-will position as Maloy’s aide, wherein she would serve at his pleasure, but only on the condition that she and Maloy must cease having sex once she was on the county’s payroll. Morris claimed that Maloy reluctantly assented to this condition. Morris started working for Leon County as Maloy’s aide on Monday, December 20, 1999. At a Christmas luncheon that week, Morris met Denise Williams, a one-time aide to County Commissioner Cliff Thaell who was then employed in the county’s Public Works office. The two women quickly became friends and—— within a matter of days——lovers, commencing their own affair shortly after the start of the new year. In January 2000, some secrets were revealed. Denise Williams divulged to Morris that she, Denise, had slept with Maloy and asked whether Morris had done the same. Morris lied to Denise Williams and denied that she had slept with Maloy. Shortly thereafter Morris confronted Maloy with Denise Williams’s disclosure, and he admitted that the two had indeed had sex with one another. That same month, Denise Williams separately told Maloy about the affair she and Morris were having. Maloy was upset, angry, and hurt that Morris had been seeing Denise Williams. He urged her to end the affair with Denise Williams, but Morris did not immediately follow Maloy’s counsel. By February 2000, Maloy’s ongoing interest in Morris’s sexual relationship with Denise Williams was starting to cause Morris to become concerned that she would be fired because of that affair. Consequently, Morris stopped talking to Denise Williams, effectively suspending their relationship, and informed Maloy about the apparent breakup. In the meantime, Morris and Maloy continued their liaison, contrary to the supposed understanding that the sex would stop. At hearing, Morris claimed that she continued to participate in the affair with Maloy only because she feared he would fire her if she refused. However, while Maloy clearly had the power summarily to dismiss Morris, there is no convincing evidence that he ever expressly or impliedly threatened——or even intended——to take such action if she declined to have sex with him. In June 2000, unbeknownst to Maloy, Morris resumed her relationship with Denise Williams. Then, in July or August 2000, Denise Williams left a sexually explicit message for Morris on the county’s voice mail system, in a voice mailbox that Maloy checked on a routine basis. Maloy happened to hear this message before Morris did, and he was not pleased. The voice message incident was the beginning of the end of Morris’s employment as Maloy’s aide. Before long——and for a variety of reasons that are not relevant to this case—— Morris resigned, effective September 8, 2000. Two findings about Morris’s separation are made based on a preponderance of the evidence. First, Maloy did not fire Morris or force her to resign. Second, Morris did not leave because of her sexual relationship with Maloy.10 The purported understanding, mentioned above, that the affair between Maloy and Morris would terminate upon Morris’s becoming Maloy’s aide is the factual linchpin of the Commission’s case as it relates to Morris. The reason for this is that Morris clearly and candidly testified (and the undersigned has found) that her relationship with Maloy was mutually consensual and not the product of sexual harassment during the entire period she was employed with DOT. Thus, to establish that Maloy either intentionally misused his public positions to sexually harass Morris or, by sleeping with her, improperly accepted sexual favors as consideration for some official action, the Commission needed convincingly to distinguish and separate the mutually consensual “DOT phase” of the affair (which did not violate the ethics laws11) from the allegedly coercive “County Commission phase.” The undersigned is not convinced, however, that the subject affair comprised two such distinct phases. The evidence is too much in conflict regarding whether Maloy and Morris had an understanding about——or even discussed——ending their affair effective the date Morris started working as Maloy’s aide for the undersigned to find without hesitancy that such occurred.12 As a result, and in any event, it is not clear to the undersigned fact-finder that the affair between Maloy and Morris was coercive during the time she worked as his aide. The evidence in this regard, as the undersigned has evaluated and weighed it, is much too ambiguous to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction that, beginning in January 2000, Maloy was explicitly or implicitly forcing Morris to have sex with him——especially given the undisputed fact that Morris freely and voluntarily had been sleeping with Maloy for the previous six months because she wanted to.13 Additionally, the undersigned affirmatively finds, based on the greater weight of the evidence, that whatever transpired between them, Maloy did not intentionally use or attempt to use his official positions to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Morris. Finally, it is found, also by a preponderance of the evidence, that there was no understanding between Maloy and Morris that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from Morris. Denise Williams Denise Williams, introduced above, was an aide to Commissioner Thaell from October 1997 through November 1999. At hearing, Denise Williams testified that, in June 1998, Maloy——whom she had known since the mid-1980’s——began to “prey” on her after learning that she was separated from her husband. She alleged that Maloy frequently came into her office, uninvited, to look at her legs, rub her shoulders, or give her a hug. She asserted that this attention was unwanted but admitted that she never told Maloy to stop. To discourage Maloy, she claimed, she tried to dress in a less feminine way. At the same time, she acknowledged, she sometimes hugged Maloy back.14 The picture of Maloy that Denise Williams’s testimony ultimately paints——for which, it must be said, there is no independent, eyewitness corroboration——is that of a man pursuing her with dogged persistence, ignoring her constant attempts to turn him off.15 Maloy, in contrast, suggested that Denise Williams had taken the initiative, signaling her availability by often making mildly suggestive comments to him such as, “You could have been my husband.” It is not surprising, then, that while there is no dispute that the two had casual sex at Denise Williams’s apartment in February 1999, the evidence regarding how this came about is very much in conflict. Denise Williams testified that, despite having no desire whatsoever for Maloy, she finally gave in to his repeated requests for sex in order to “let him satisfy his curiosity” in the hope that he then would quit “bugging” her.16 For his part, Maloy depicted Denise Williams as the initiator who, one Tuesday or Wednesday, unexpectedly told him that her kids would be gone the next weekend and asked him to come over for a “visit” on Saturday, which invitation he accepted. It is undisputed that Maloy and Denise Williams had casual sex a second time, in July 1999, again at her place.17 Given the conflicts and ambiguities in the evidence, the fact-finder is not convinced, without hesitancy, that the events unfolded precisely as Denise Williams has described them. Yet, he is not able to find, by the greater weight of the evidence, that Maloy’s testimony is entirely accurate, either. Thus, there can be no affirmative findings, one way or the other, on the broad question whether Maloy sexually harassed Denise Williams. Concerning the particular charges, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment or “pursuit” of Denise Williams. Nor is he convinced that there was an understanding between Maloy and Denise Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her. These determinations, it should be clear, reflect the fact-finder’s assessment of the quality and weight of the evidence; although properly made by the undersigned in his role as the trier of fact, they are not affirmative findings concerning what occurred or did not occur during the relevant timeframe.18 Tina Williams Tina Williams (no relation to Denise) was Maloy’s aide at the County Commission for about six months, from July 15, 1999, through the end of that year. Before coming to work for Maloy, she had worked as an accountant at the Florida Commission on Human Relations (“FCHR”), the state agency where persons who believe they have been discriminated against can file charges as a first step towards redress. Tina Williams had been introduced to Maloy in late 1998 by a mutual acquaintance, Edward Dixon, who at the time was not only a Gadsden County Commissioner but also was associated with the FCHR in some way. A few months later, Tina Williams had bumped into Maloy again at a local function, and he had asked her to apply for the position as his aide, which she later did. After having received favorable recommendations from Commissioner Dixon and from Ron McElrath, a fraternity brother of Maloy’s who was then the Executive Director of the FCHR, Maloy had hired Tina Williams. Tina Williams claims that Maloy sexually harassed her on numerous occasions, in various ways, starting before she was hired and continuing into September 1999. She testified, for example, that he frequently put his hand on her lap or attempted to do so, hugged and attempted to kiss her, talked dirty on the telephone, and made suggestive comments, including, once when they were on an out-of-town business trip together, “this is so soft” in reference to the bed in her hotel room. Tina Williams testified that the harassment stopped in September 1999, at which point, she asserted, Maloy became increasingly critical of her work and avoided her. Their relationship, she testified, seemed to improve in November 1999, but then in December Maloy asked for her resignation, which she tendered.19 Maloy testified that he hired Tina Williams to be his aide with high expectations concerning her abilities but soon became disappointed in her failure, as he saw it, to measure up. At hearing, Maloy asserted that Tina Williams had simply not worked out in the position for a number of reasons that need not be recounted here. Suffice it to say that Maloy testified he asked Tina Williams to leave in December 1999 because he was generally dissatisfied with her performance on the job. Maloy flatly denies that he ever said or did anything to Tina Williams that could be considered improper or untoward, including touching, kissing, hugging, shoulder-rubbing, suggestive comments, or like conduct. The conflicts in the evidence concerning Tina Williams’s allegations of harassment clearly cannot be attributed to individuals’ unique perspectives or differences of opinion. This is not a situation where two people have described the same historical event in different but reconcilable terms; instead, the testimony has produced two mutually exclusive versions of history. Determining which of the protagonists is telling the purest truth is a difficult task made tougher by several factors. First, there is no independent corroboration of either his testimony or her testimony by a witness having personal, firsthand knowledge of the facts. This is a greater problem for the Commission, of course, because Maloy did not have the burden to prove his innocence. Absent independent corroboration, the conflicting testimony presents a classic “he said-she said” dilemma whose resolution, if one must choose between the competing narratives,20 depends on whether “he” or “she” is deemed to be the more credible witness. In this particular case, because the Commission bears the burden of proving its case by clear and convincing evidence, Tina Williams must be judged not just credible, but considerably more credible than Maloy to sustain a finding of guilt.21 Herein, then, lies the second factor (or interrelated pair of factors) that complicates the fact-finding function: Neither participant’s testimony is inherently incredible;22 and conversely, neither one’s testimony is inherently more credible than the other’s. Tina Williams’s saga of sexual harassment cannot be rejected out of hand as a fabrication; it is obviously not fantastic. Upon hearing her story, one does not think, “That could not possibly have happened.” To the contrary, Tina Williams’s testimony is very believable. And yet, Maloy’s testimony, too, is eminently believable. He has not presented some half-baked alibi that tests credulity but rather has said exactly what one would expect an innocent man, falsely accused of sexual harassment, to say: “I did not do it.” What more, indeed, could he say, if in fact he were innocent? There was, really, no way for Maloy affirmatively to disprove the particular allegations that Tina Williams made. Third, having closely observed both Tina Williams and Maloy on the witness stand, the undersigned is unable to state with assurance, based on their respective demeanors, which of the two was probably telling the truth——or who was not. Both appeared to be sincere in recounting what had happened (or not happened) as they recalled the events in question. Neither appeared to the fact-finder to be lying. After carefully weighing all of the evidence with the foregoing factors in mind, the undersigned is not so convinced by either side’s proof as to conclude with confidence that any particular version of history advanced at hearing is highly verisimilar relative to the competing alternative. To the point, the evidence at bottom does not produce in the mind of this fact-finder a firm belief or conviction, without hesitancy, as to the truth of Tina Williams’s allegations.23 Thus, the fact-finder is not convinced that Maloy intentionally used or attempted to use his official position to secure a benefit for himself through the alleged harassment of Tina Williams. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, however, the undersigned finds that there was no understanding between Maloy and Tina Williams that Maloy’s votes, official actions, or judgment would be influenced by any thing of value that Maloy solicited or accepted from her——assuming he requested or received any such thing, which was not clearly and convincingly proved. Ultimate Factual Determinations24 The undersigned determines as a matter of ultimate fact that the Commission has failed to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Maloy violated either Section 112.313(2) or Section 112.313(6), Florida Statutes, as charged, in relation to his respective associations with Laurie Bradley, Ophelia Morris, Denise Williams, and Tina Williams. It is therefore determined, as a matter of ultimate fact, that Maloy is not guilty of the ethics violations with which he has been charged.
Recommendation The fact-finder having determined that the evidence fails clearly and convincingly to establish a factual basis for culpability on any ground charged, it is RECOMMENDED that the Commission enter a final order declaring Maloy not guilty of violating Sections 112.313(2) and 112.313(6), Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of April, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOHN G. VAN LANINGHAM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of April, 2003.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Paul Rancourt (Mr. Rancourt), established through clear and convincing evidence his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2011).1/
Findings Of Fact Before discussing the findings from the administrative hearing, it is appropriate to set out the procedural history of the criminal proceedings. On December 18, 1996, the State charged Mr. Rancourt and Daniel McLean (Mr. McLean) with the kidnapping and three counts of sexual battery of A.S., which occurred on October 31, 1996. On July 27 through July 30, 1998, the State tried Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean together. The jury convicted both men, and the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to life imprisonment on each count with the sentences to run concurrently. On April 5, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal issued an opinion overturning Mr. McLean's conviction based on trial errors. McLean v. State, 754 So. 2d 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The appellate court reversed Mr. McLean's conviction for kidnapping because it found that the State "failed to prove [McLean] intended the kidnapping to occur, or that he performed any action that assisted in the kidnapping." Id. at 180. Further, the appellate court found that the trial court erred in two key evidentiary rulings. First, the trial court erred in allowing the State to elicit testimony from the medical provider who examined A.S. following the assault. The disputed question was: "[d]id she act in any way inconsistent with the way a rape victim would act?" Id. at 181. The appellate court found that the prejudicial effect of the expert testimony substantially outweighed its probative value. Id. Second, the trial court erred in excluding testimony under the Rape Shield Statute.3/ Id. Specifically, the trial court erred in not allowing Mr. McLean's attorney to cross-examine the medical provider about whether or not the A.S.'s soreness in her vulva area was due to the fact that she had not had sexual intercourse in the past year, as opposed to a sexual battery. Id. The appellate court found that this question went to a key issue of whether the sexual contact was consensual. The appellate court found the exclusion of this testimony was not harmless error; and thus, reversed Mr. McLean's convictions and sentences, and ordered a retrial. On January 5, 2001, Mr. McLean, pursuant to a plea agreement, pled nolo contendere to one count of sexual battery, section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1996). Based on the plea agreement, Mr. McLean was sentenced to 64 and one-half months’ incarceration, which reflected his time served, and two years’ probation. On June 14, 2000, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed Mr. Rancourt's convictions for sexual battery and kidnapping, and his life sentences. Rancourt v. State, 766 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). In affirming Mr. Rancourt's conviction, the appellate court found that trial counsel had failed to preserve the issues concerning the medical expert's opinion vouching for the victim's credibility and the exclusion of the medical testimony under the Rape Shield Statute. On September 13, 2000, the appellate court issued its mandate. On September 10, 2002, Mr. Rancourt filed a post- conviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Notably, Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction motion alleged, in part, his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the evidentiary issues that had formed the basis of Mr. McLean's reversal. On November 3, 2003, the circuit court entered an order vacating Mr. Rancourt's convictions and sentences "after considering the Motion and applicable law, and upon agreement of both parties[.]" The order directed that a new trial be held. On September 27, 2005, the State re-tried Mr. Rancourt for sexual battery and kidnapping. The jury convicted Mr. Rancourt of the lesser-included offense of battery, section 784.03, Florida Statutes (1996), a first-degree misdemeanor. Consequently, the trial court sentenced Mr. Rancourt to one year in the Polk County jail with credit for time served. On June 25, 2010, Mr. Rancourt filed the Amended Petition for Determination of Wrongfully Incarcerated Person, which is the subject of this hearing. Mr. Rancourt has not been convicted of any other felony in any jurisdiction. At the time of these events, Mr. Rancourt was a 32-year- old man, and A.S. was a 19-year-old freshman at Florida Southern College. Mr. Rancourt, in offering proof of actual innocence, testified on his own behalf that the sexual encounter that occurred between him and A.S. was consensual. Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, was consistent with the testimony that he had provided in his two criminal trials. Transcripts of Mr. Rancourt's prior testimony at the criminal proceedings were admitted into evidence. Mr. Rancourt's testimony at the hearing concerning his meeting A.S. and the subsequent sexual encounter was not believable. Specifically, the undersigned did not find Mr. Rancourt's description of how a young woman, whom he had never spoken too, would at the closing of the bar grab him at the door as patrons attempted to leave the bar, and give him a "deep french kiss." Further, it was incredulous that after asking him for a ride back to her dorm room that A.S., while in the back seat of the car, would engage in a series of intimate gestures towards himself and his best friend, Mr. McLean. Finally, it was not credible that A.S. and Mr. Rancourt engaged in a consensual sexual encounter as described by Mr. Rancourt on the lawn of a home off a dark street. The conclusion that Mr. Rancourt's description of the events is not credible is further bolstered by the testimony showing A.S.'s actions immediately after the sexual encounter, and Mr. Rancourt's untruthful responses to the police investigation following the events. Mr. Rancourt also offered Mr. McLean, who testified that he witnessed A.S. acting as a "willing participant" in the sexual encounter with Mr. Rancourt. Further, Mr. McLean offered testimony that he did not engage in any sexual relations with A.S., and that he only pled to the sexual battery charge in order to avoid the risk of receiving another lengthy sentence. Next, Mr. Rancourt brought forward the testimony of Brandon Perron (Mr. Perron), a private investigator, and introduced into evidence copies of Mr. Perron's investigative reports. The record shows that Mr. Perron prepared these reports as part of Mr. Rancourt's post-conviction efforts. The reports and Mr. Perron's testimony show that he identified many factual issues regarding Mr. Rancourt's convictions. Specifically, Mr. Perron raised issues concerning discrepancies in A.S.'s statements, testimony, and her motivations to lie concerning the events of October 31, 1996; discrepancies in witnesses' statements to the police investigator and testimony; poor and prejudicial police investigative techniques that overlooked potentially exonerating evidence showing that the sexual encounter was consensual; and defense counsel's failure to conduct an adequate investigation into potential witnesses. Although Mr. Perron was a persuasive witness for showing potential problems with the State's criminal case against Mr. Rancourt, Mr. Perron's testimony did not establish Mr. Rancourt's actual innocence. Mr. Rancourt's final witness was his aunt, Barbara Hoffman (Ms. Hoffman). In October 1996, Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean were living with Ms. Hoffman while they sought employment. Ms. Hoffman's testimony concerned Mr. Rancourt's character and her opinion that he was not capable of committing a crime. Further, she testified about the day that law enforcement officers went to her home to ask Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to come in for questioning. She testified that the detective investigating the events had prejudged Mr. Rancourt to be guilty of rape. The purpose of this testimony appeared to show that statements given by Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean to the police may not have been voluntary. It is noteworthy that neither Mr. Rancourt nor Mr. McLean was arrested; thus, the questioning was non-custodial. Moreover, Ms. Hoffman's testimony was marginally relevant in that it did not bring forward any fact showing that Mr. Rancourt was actually innocent of the sexual battery and kidnapping charges. The State introduced evidence showing that the sexual encounter was not consensual. A.S.'s trial testimony shows that she consistently testified that the sexual encounter was not consensual. In addition to A.S.'s trial testimony, the State introduced trial testimony of Angie Wren (Ms. Wren) and Issac McKeithan (Mr. McKeithan). The criminal trial transcript shows that Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove upon A.S. shortly after the event and saw a car quickly drive away from the area where A.S. was standing. Ms. Wren testified that A.S. was hysterical and crying, and "she just didn't look like she had been through anything good, that's for sure." A.S. reported to Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan that she had been raped. Ms. Wren and Mr. McKeithan drove A.S. to the Lakeland Police Department immediately, and the attack was reported. This testimony shows that A.S. contended that she had been raped moments after the sexual encounter. Further, a review of the criminal proceedings shows that the State brought forward medical testimony showing bruises on A.S.'s arms. A.S. had testified that, before the attack, she did not have the bruises. Finally, the criminal trial transcripts and testimony given at the December 8 through 9, 2011, hearing showed that Mr. Rancourt and Mr. McLean had provided false statements, and changed the story given to the officer conducting the investigation. Specifically, the trial transcripts, and Mr. Rancourt's testimony on December 8, 2011, showed that he told the investigator at first that he did not engage in sexual relations with A.S., then changed his story to claim that he and A.S. had sex in the vehicle, and then changed his story, yet again, to state that he and A.S. had consensual sex on the front yard of a home off a dark street. During his testimony on December 8, 2011, Mr. Rancourt acknowledged that the statements he gave about not having sex with A.S. and then having sex in the vehicle were false. Similarly, Mr. McLean, when asked if he and Mr. Rancourt had sex, informed the officer "no." Mr. McLean testified that he answered that way because he contended that he had not had sex with A.S. This parsing of words was not credible. The undersigned found these acknowledged false statements, made at the time of the investigation, persuasive evidence that Mr. Rancourt's explanation of the night was not credible.
Recommendation Based on the record in this proceeding and the above Findings of Fact, it is RECOMMENDED that an order be entered by the Circuit Judge determining that Mr. Rancourt has failed to meet his burden of proving actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence, denying Mr. Rancourt's claim for compensation, and dismissing his Petition. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of March, 2012, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S THOMAS P. CRAPPS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of March, 2012.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner was subjected to an unlawful employment practice by Respondent, specifically sex discrimination in the form of sexual harassment due to Petitioner's gender in violation of Section 760.10, Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact Respondent employed Petitioner, a Caucasian female, from sometime in December of 2003 until termination of her employment on June 21, 2004. Petitioner worked in Respondent’s warehouse facility from December, 2003 until sometime in February, 2004, when she was transferred to one of Respondent’s retail stores, the Ocala store, where she worked until she was transferred back to the warehouse at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. Petitioner conceded at hearing that she was terminated after she argued with her supervisor and called her a bitch. Petitioner does not believe that she was terminated on the basis of her sex. During the course of her employment, Petitioner alleges that Respondent’s president, Barry Lay, made inappropriate comments to her of a sexual nature and touched her in an inappropriate way twice. All alleged sexually inappropriate conduct occurred from December of 2003 through February of 2004, during the period of time Petitioner worked in Respondent's warehouse facility. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay engaged in the following inappropriate conduct: At the end of her initial employment interview when she was hired, and out of the presence of other witnesses, Barry Lay allegedly said to her, “If we were to fuck that’s nobody’s business but ours.” In her charge of discrimination, Petitioner alleged that this statement was “said in front of witnesses.” Due to Petitioner's inconsistencies in testifying, her demeanor while testifying and Barry Lay's candid testimony of denial with regard to making such statements to Petitioner at any time, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that, right before Christmas of 2003, Barry Lay told her, "if I would let him eat me out just one time I wouldn't think about any other man." (T. 23). Petitioner testified that other witnesses, including her mother, were sitting nearby at a processing table when this comment was made. No witnesses corroborated Petitioner's testimony on this allegation and, coupled with Barry Lay's denial testimony, Petitioner's allegation is not credited. Petitioner testified that Barry Lay grabbed her face and tried to kiss her about the same time as he allegedly made the comment discussed above. Again, Petitioner alleges that witnesses were present, but all witnesses testifying in the matter, including Barry Lay, denied that such an incident occurred. Petitioner's testimony on this point is not credited. Petitioner also testified that Barry Lay grabbed her hips and tried to pull her from behind when she was bent over at a refrigerator. The allegation was denied by Lay and no corroborating testimony was presented. Petitioner's allegation is not credited. On one occasion, Barry Lay overheard conversation between Petitioner and her mother regarding their breast size and that they could form the “little titty committee.” Lay commented to the duo that both of them could be president of the committee. Barry Lay never attempted to initiate a romantic relationship with Petitioner and never threatened her with job transfer or termination if she failed to provide sexual favors. On one occasion during the course of Petitioner's employment, when employees were discussing a rumor that Barry Lay was having an affair with several people at one time, he overheard the discussion, became irritated, and addressed the employees as a group saying, “It doesn’t matter if I’m fucking you, you, you, or you, it’s none of your business.” Petitioner was transferred to the Ocala Store during the course of her employment to assist her in getting her children to day care on time. Additionally, the store hours were more suitable to her schedule at the time. Petitioner made sexual remarks, participated in discussions of a sexual nature, or participated in sexual horseplay in the workplace during the course of her employment with Respondent. Petitioner was heard and observed to smack or slap Barry Lay’s bottom and say, “I want a piece of that.” Barry Lay did not do anything to provoke Petitioner’s conduct, but responded by saying, “if you did, you’d never go back to your boyfriend.” While at work Petitioner discussed having oral sex with her boyfriend and the length and frequency of those encounters. During Petitioner's assignment to the Ocala store, she developed problems with absenteeism from the job. She quit calling in when she unable to work and demonstrated a poor attitude when she was at work. As a consequence, Petitioner was transferred back to Respondent's warehouse, where any absenteeism by the Petitioner would result in less of a hardship to operations. The transfer occurred at the end of May or beginning of June, 2004. After Petitioner was transferred back to the warehouse, she continued to exhibit a poor attitude and unacceptable conduct while at work. In June of 2004, just before she was terminated, Petitioner screamed at her supervisor that she was not going to perform a requested task due to medical restrictions. The supervisor informed Petitioner that she was not being asked to perform the task by herself, but simply to assist. Petitioner began using abusive language to the supervisor, calling her a “bitch.” Petitioner was asked to leave, but replied that she would not unless and until the supervisor “fucking” fired her. Petitioner pushed the supervisor and call her a “fucking whore” and “bitch.” Eventually, after using further epithets, Petitioner left the premises. Barry Lay did not witness the argument between Petitioner and the supervisor, but when he was later informed he instructed the supervisor to tell Petitioner that her employment was being terminated. The decision to terminate Petitioner’s employment was communicated to her the next day. Petitioner's stated response to the supervisor, before walking away, was “get fucked.”
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of October 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DON W. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Kenneth M. Hesser, Esquire Seven East Silver Springs Boulevard Suite 300 Ocala, Florida 34470 Gary R. Wheeler, Esquire McConnaughhay, Duffy, Coonrod Pope and Weaver, P.A. Post Office Box 550770 Jacksonville, Florida 32255-0770 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue The issues presented by this case concern the question of whether the Respondent, State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, has exhausted all treatment for the Petitioner, Melvin Robinson, through sex offender programs administered by the Respondent. See Section 801.111, Florida Statutes (1975).
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner submitted a "Petition for Administrative Determination" to the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Petition was received by the Division of Administrative Hearings on November 4, 1981, as transmitted by the State of Florida, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. The Department had requested the Division to conduct a formal hearing in keeping with Subsection 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. The final hearing in this cause was conducted on January 5 1982, following a continuance of the previously scheduled hearing of December 16, 1981, which was designed to allow the Petitioner to gain the assistance of counsel. The Petitioner was unable to make those arrangements and the hearing was held with the Petitioner appearing pro se. In the course of the final hearing, the Petitioner testified and offered as witnesses, Alice Butler, Section Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program, Florida State Hospital; Sterling George, Psychiatric Aide in the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; and Alfred Gerardo, a participant in the sex offender program at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent offered as witnesses, Robert Alcorn, Clinical Director for the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital; Charles Shaffer, Clinical psychologist in the aforementioned program; Allison Dowling, Clinical social Worker in that program; and Lois Stevens, Clinal social Worker at Florida State Hospital. The Respondent presented two exhibits which were admitted into evidence. At all times pertinent to this proceeding Petitioner has been in the custody of Respondent, in keeping with orders of court. During that time, the Petitioner has resided at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, where he has undergone treatment in the program for the benefit of sex offenders, to include those persons committed under Chapter 801, Florida Statutes (1975), entitled "Child Molester Act." Although the Petitioner has been subjected to a full range of treatment opportunities his progress in the recognition of and the ability to deal with the underlying conditions which caused his placement in the program are at end. In the face of these circumstances, the Respondent has made a preliminary determination that it has exhausted treatment for the Petitioner, through the program in which he is enrolled. Additionally, it has been concluded that similar programs within the State of Florida do not offer other opportunities for progress. These opinions were made known to the Petitioner and when confronted with this information, the Petitioner requested the formal hearing which is the subject of this Recommended Order. Robinson was admitted to the forensic service at Florida State Hospital on October 9, 1990, to begin his participation in the mentally disordered sex offender program. He had previously been enrolled in the program from March, 1979, through February, 1979, a commitment under the terms of Chapter 801, Florida Statutes. Following his initial release from the program, Robinson was accused of violating the terms and conditions of probation and was adjudicated guilty of the offense for which probation was granted. Imposition of a sentence in that case was withheld and the Petitioner was returned to the custody of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, in keeping with the rationale expressed in his original commitment to the program at Chattahoochee, which original commitment had occurred by Order of Court on February 20, 1976. In the matter of the most recent offense which had caused the revocation of Robinson's probation, Robinson received a sentence of ten years in the Florida State Prison; however, service of that sentence was stayed pending release and discharge from the custody of the Respondent on this most immediate commitment for care and treatment in the mentally disordered sex offender program. Beginning with the October 9, 1980, hospital stay, the goals of the program have been to deal with the patient's problems concerning sexual deviation, pedophilia; alcoholism; inadequate and passive aggressive personality styles and cultural deprivation. Notwithstanding the efforts of the patient and those of the staff to deal with the underlying disorders, this success has not been complete. The treatment has been exhausted in this program and other similar programs in the system in the State of Florida, and the Petitioner still presents a danger based upon his sexual deviation and propensity to commit sexual acts involving children, in particular minor females. These determinations are reached in the face of the facts that follow. The program at Florida State Hospital has as its main focus the utilization of group therapy with adjunctive programs in recreational and occupational therapy, and this treatment regime relies heavily on a patient's self-motivation. The Respondent's Exhibit 2 is a series of clinical summaries related to the patient's performance during the course of his treatment. The most recent evaluation points out, in general terms, the Petitioner's pattern of acting-out behavior and disregard for ward policy and, more importantly his lack of motivation and progress in the therapies which are essential to success in the program. In addition, testimony was given in the course of the hearing on the part of the Petitioner's therapist and other persons affiliated with the treatment team. Lois Stevens had been the Petitioner's primary therapist from October, 1980, to January, 1981. She observed in the Petitioner indications of low self- esteem; the fact that the Petitioner was easily disappointed; that he was easily influenced by others; that he had an inability to deal with abstract feedback and a problem of allowing himself to be abused. These were matters of concern which needed to be addressed as a prerequisite to dealing with the Petitioner's sexual deviation. In effect, this was a process of identifying the problems which underlie his sexual deviation. In this connection, Stevens found that the Petitioner had the desire to do better but evidenced poor judgment and impulse control. These circumstances were aggravated by the fact that the Petitioner had and has limited intellectual ability. During this phase no intense effort was made to discuss the sex offense, molestation of a young girl. While in this treatment situation, Robinson accepted staff criticism in an appropriate way and he did improve in personal hygiene, which had been a problem initially. After a period of time it was determined that the Petitioner should be placed with a separate therapist to go forward with his treatment. From January, 1981, to July, 1981, the Petitioner had Allison Dowling as his primary therapist. In the beginning Robinson performed reasonably well and had been given some freedom of movement within the facility and was granted a position as a patient volunteer on the ward. He was beginning to cope better in the institutional environment; however, he remained reluctant to examine, in therapy sessions, the problem of his sexual deviation. Specifically, that difficulty related to his ability to deal with insight oriented therapy. He would enter into a discussion of the offense in the therapy sessions, but tended to minimize the seriousness of his offense, demonstrating marginal understanding of the etiology and maintaining factors in his deviant sexual behavior. Moreover, between sessions with the group he tended to forget what had been dealt with on the prior occasion. He had to be prompted to participate, with one exception. As established by Dowling in this sequence of the treatment, the Petitioner began to act in an inappropriate way while on the ward and was tardy for group therapy sessions. In the connection with his misbehavior on the ward, it was necessary to force the Petitioner to engage in a discussion of those matters and the act of taking away his privileges of freedom of movement and position did not promote a change in the Petitioner. He attempted to manipulate staff members about the misbehavior and to have group members in the therapy sessions accept his side of the dispute as opposed to directly addressing problems. The items of misbehavior included homosexual activity with another participant of the program and sleeping in the nude, which were contrary to hospital policy. On another occasion the Petitioner attempted to get a staff aide to take him to an unauthorized activity, in violation of ward policy. Dowling has observed little progress in the Petitioner's attempts to control his sexual misbehavior and she correctly indicates that his sexual deviance still exists and no further progress can be made in dealing with this condition. Charles Shaffer, a clinical psychologist was the primary therapist for the Petitioner from November, 1981, to January, 1982. His observations concerning the progress of the Petitioner are in accord with those of Allison Dowling. He did note that the Petitioner has shown himself to be willing to help others with their daily problems but is unwilling to participate himself, and by way of explanation Robinson states that the other patients don't understand or can't understand his problem related to the sexual deviance. Shaffer's observations establish that the Petitioner is comfortable with his life style, and hasn't indicated any desire to change that pattern. Robert Alcorn, the director of the mentally disordered sex offender program at Florida State Hospital, through his testimony indicated agreement to the effect that the treatment had been exhausted in that program without success, which is an accurate depiction. Alcorn also established that conferences related to Robinson's potential placement in affiliated sex offender programs led to the conclusion that those programs could not assist the Petitioner, ergo, treatment has been exhausted in those other facilities. The Petitioner, through his testimony, acknowledged that he had participated in homosexual activities at the hospital and had been punished by the suspension of his grounds privileges and job opportunity. Following those episodes the Petitioner indicated that he lost interest in participating in the program but did in fact participate. He acknowledged that he attended occupational therapy, as well as the primary therapy, and was tardy at times. Robinson admits that he has difficulty explaining himself and has problems with impulse control. He says he can't find himself, is tired of being a nothing. Robinson believes he does not always think before acting. Finally, he has a fear of returning to court and facing the disposition of his case. Alice Butler, a witness for the Petitioner who was a co-therapist at the time that Stevens was assigned to Robinson's case, established that earlier in the treatment Petitioner was more motivated in his participation than he has been recently. And, in fact, the Petitioner has broken the rules as recently as two weeks prior to the hearing by sleeping nude. She also observed that the Petitioner has been in the so-called "observation section" for a long time and is satisfied with his placement. (This particular section is a more restricted area than some of the other advanced wards.) Sterling George, a psychiatric aide and witness for the Petitioner from his observation finds that as a general proposition the Petitioner takes part in activities with other patients and is not a problem on the ward. Finally, Alfred Gerardo, another participant in the mentally disordered sex offender program, gave testimony. He has known the Petitioner for approximately fifteen months. He has also participated in the same group with Robinson from October, 1980, through May, 1981. His initial impressions of Robinson were not favorable, but in the last few months he has gained a better appreciation of the Petitioner. In particular, he has observed Robinson to have made improvement in terms of his willingness to he concerned about matters of education and acting-out, and in the realm of the Petitioner's appearance. From this witness's understanding the Petitioner's participation in group activity is limited and particularly so in the area of the underlying sexual problem. In summary the Respondent has exhausted all appropriate treatment for the Petitioner's sexual deviance, but that treatment has not been totally successful and the patient continues to be a sexual menace, and there is a likelihood that the Petitioner would commit other sexual crimes.
The Issue Whether the Petitioner has presented clear and convincing evidence that he is of good moral character so as to receive an exemption from disqualification from employment with children or adults who are developmentally disabled, under Section 397.451, Florida Statutes (1995).
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks an exemption for employment in a position of special trust for which a security background check is required under Florida law. In 1977, Petitioner pled nolo contendere to a misdemeanor sexual assault for fondling an adolescent. He was sentenced to probation. Petitioner was 22 years old at the time. In 1986, Petitioner pled guilty to a felony sexual assault of a 15 year old boy, in the state of New Hampshire. Petitioner was 31 years old at the time. After serving 2 years of a 3~ to 7 year sentence, Petitioner was released from prison in 1989. Petitioner successfully completed parole and was released in March, 1993. Petitioner has not been arrested for any crime since 1986. Petitioner stated he received therapy in prison in a sexual offender program. However, Petitioner presented no evidence of attending a sexual offender program while in prison or afterwards, nor did he submit records of his treatment while in prison. Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the 1986 conviction for sexual assault. While working as an athletic trainer, Petitioner took advantage of a situation while he was performing massage therapy on a fifteen year old boy, he fondled and performed oral sex on the boy. Petitioner stated the victim consented, as much as a 15 year old can consent. Petitioner did not explain the circumstances surrounding the 1977 incident. Petitioner did not express remorse for any sexual misconduct that he committed other than the 1986 offense. He addressed his 1977 charge only to say that had he received more than a slap on the wrist, the 1986 sexual assault might not have occurred. Petitioner stated he was sexually abused as a child. In 1993, Petitioner received a Masters Degree in social work from Salem State College in Massachusetts. Petitioner explained he studied for his masters in social work because he would no longer be eligible for licensure as an athletic trainer. Petitioner stated it would not be appropriate for him to put his hands on adults or children, which is necessary as an athletic trainer. He feels it wouldn't be appropriate for him to be in a position where he could possibly be aroused by an adult, an adolescent or a child. Although Petitioner states he has never been aroused or interested in anyone other than what would be considered a mature adolescent or an adult. Petitioner is licensed as an independent clinical social worker in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. In 1994, Petitioner moved to Florida to work for the Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach in the psychiatric unit of the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. Petitioner has been denied a license as a clinical social worker in Florida based on his history of sexual misconduct. As a result of his denial of a license, Petitioner must perform his duties under the supervision of another licensed clinical social worker. Working under someone else's supervision means he may continue to work with clients in group or individual therapy. Kathy Palezuelos, a licensed clinical social worker, has known Petitioner for two and a half years. They worked together at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Palezuelos performed a mental health status examination on Petitioner on May 2, 1996. She discussed his homosexuality and the sexual offense at the time she did the mental status exam. Ms. Palezuelos described herself as more a friend than a colleague. They only worked together about six months. She was sometimes present while he did therapy if they were doing group therapy. He trained her when she first came on the job. Petitioner did not inform her of his past criminal history while they worked together. At the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health supervision was structured loosely where the therapists would give each other feedback after presenting cases. Sara Billings is a licensed clinical social worker. She was qualified as an expert in the area of clinical social work. Ms. Billings met Petitioner in January, 1994, at the Center for Emotional and Behavioral Health. She has supervised Petitioner since that time. Ms. Billings worked with Petitioner for two years before he disclosed his criminal history involving sexual assaults. During those two years Petitioner did therapy on children as well as adults. In January, 1995, she asked Petitioner to join her in her private practice in Melbourne, Florida. Ms. Billings is not present while Petitioner does therapy. She did not feel the children being treated and their parents should be told about Petitioner's criminal history. A child is anyone under the age of 18. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM IV) is an accepted textbook for practicing psychologists. DSM IV states that guidelines for pedophilia are an age difference of 5 plus years between the offender and the victim. Ms. Billings admitted Petitioner meets the criteria for a pedophile as set forth in the DSM IV. However, she does not believe he is a pedophile because the child Respondent molested was as physically mature as an adult. She bases this opinion on what Petitioner has related to her about his case. Dr. Deborah Day is a licensed clinical psychologist, licensed mental health counselor and a certified family mediator. Her specialty is clinical and forensic psychology specializing in physical and sexual abuse. She was the consultant for the Child Protection Team and the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She is presently on the Board of the Sexual Abuse Treatment Program. She has dealt with approximately 1000 cases involving sexual abuse. She was qualified as an expert in the area of sex offenders and sexual abuse. Dr. Day reviewed a file provided by the Respondent that included the mental health status exam and copies of the Petitioner's criminal records. The issues presented in the file are issues she commonly deals with in her practice. Petitioner has not provided sufficient information to make an assessment on whether he is a risk to re-offend. The Mental Status Exam only addresses current levels of functioning. Full responsibility in the course of treatment for a sex offender means getting past the defense mechanisms offenders use initially in treatment in order to keep their ego safe. Full responsibility for a person's conduct is saying the child or adolescent had nothing to do the adult's conduct. The offenders' responsibility was solely to say "no". Most homosexuals are not pedophiles. Homosexuals generally either withhold their sexuality or they hide it from the general public. A sex offender with a history of being molested as a child is common. A convicted sexual offender who has applied to work with children in a therapeutic relationship is a risk to the offender and the child. It sets up a trusting relationship where boundaries have to be closely monitored. Petitioner's statement that he was confused about his homosexuality in 1986, when he sexually assaulted the 15-year old boy, is minimization, rationalization and demonstrates a superficial understanding of what really happened. It is denial for a convicted sexual offender to say he is not aroused by children. There has to be sexual attraction if you sexually abuse a child. Petitioner will be able to continue to work as a social worker and a therapist as long as his clients are adults. Whether or not he discloses his past to adult patients is an ethical matter and not one for the present case. Petitioner has not testified with candor as to his past conduct. Moreover, Petitioner made conflicting statements and rationalizations with respect to the circumstances surrounding the crimes. He has not produced treatment records to support his claim that he received treatment in a sexual offender program. Petitioner has not demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he is rehabilitated and will not present a danger to children or disabled adults.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner's request for an exemption be DENIED. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of March, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of March, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Philip S. Paul 537 Wilson Avenue Satellite Beach, Florida 32937 Carmen Muniz Sierra, Esquire District 7 Legal Office Department of Children and Families 400 West Robinson Street, Suite S-1106 Orlando, Florida 32801 Gregory D. Venz Agency Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204-X Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Richard Doran General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard, Room 204 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue Whether Petitioner was subjected to sexual harassment and/or retaliation while employed with Respondent in violation of Subsections 760.10(1)(a) and/or (7), Florida Statutes (2008).1
Findings Of Fact Respondent is an employer within the definition found in Section 760.02, Florida Statutes. Petitioner was hired as an employee of Respondent in July 1993, as an X-ray technologist ("tech") in the Radiology Department. She is an adult female and, as such, is a member of a protected class. During her employee orientation, Petitioner received and read a copy of Respondent's Employee Handbook. Among other things, Respondent's Employee Handbook addresses the issue of sexual harassment in the workplace. Respondent's policy strictly prohibits sexual harassment and states that Respondent "will not tolerate such action by employees." Respondent's policy also encourages any employee who feels that he/she is being subject to sexual harassment to discuss and/or make a complaint with the Human Resources Department. Any such complaint is handled according to Respondent's Policy No. 9510-17, in order to ensure appropriate investigation and action. Respondent's employees also receive computer-based training regarding sexual harassment and Respondent's policy prohibiting the same, every year. Petitioner received this computer-based training regarding sexual harassment. In October 2006, Petitioner started training to be a magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") tech. Petitioner was chosen to be cross-trained from an X-ray tech to a MRI tech by Greg Phillips, who was then the manager of Diagnostic Imaging. Phillips became her unofficial "mentor" at Respondent's facility. Petitioner received on-the-job training for an MRI tech from Chris Depelteau, Amy Brantly, and Lucinda Swales, all of whom were MRI techs at the time. In December 2006, Petitioner received a secondary job code which allowed her to work independently as an MRI tech part-time. Essentially this meant that she could "take call." That same month, Paul Licker was hired by Respondent as lead MRI tech. Depelteau had also applied for this job, but had not been chosen. Upon being hired by Respondent, Licker was also made aware of its policy regarding sexual harassment. As lead MRI tech, Licker was responsible for scheduling the MRI techs, ordering supplies, working on protocols, ensuring that patients were being properly scanned and treated, and following up with the MRI techs as they cared for patients. Therefore, Licker became Petitioner's immediate supervisor. Like all the other MRI techs, Licker also trained Petitioner in MRI. In training Petitioner, Licker often taught her different techniques or ways of doing things than the way she had been taught by the other MRI techs. Licker, on several occasions, sought to teach Petitioner his way of doing things on the computer, which was different from the others. In doing so, Licker invaded Petitioner's workspace and engaged in inappropriate touching, particularly by covering her hand with his while manipulating the mouse, to the point that she became uncomfortable. Licker also started implementing changes and different ways of doing things throughout the MRI department. As lead MRI tech, Licker had the authority to implement such changes. Also, during this same period, if Licker added patients or made other changes to her schedule, Petitioner would argue with or complain to him. In fact, Petitioner did not like Licker and also told Depelteau and other employees that Licker was a "bad supervisor." Licker himself recognized that Petitioner did not like the way he was supervising the department. A few weeks after Licker started working for Respondent, Petitioner approached Phillips complaining that Licker was calling her, other female employees, and patients, "Babe." For instance, Licker would say, "Babe, I need you to do this for me," when asking Petitioner to complete a task. Petitioner indicated that she thought that the use of this term was inappropriate and demeaning and that it made her uncomfortable. In fact, other employees who were friendly with Petitioner understood that Licker was using the term "Babe" the way another person might use the terms "Sweetie," or "Honey," i.e., in a non-sexual or non-derogatory way. However, understanding that Licker was a new supervisor who may not have understood that the term suggested something sexual in using the term "Babe," Phillips suggested to Petitioner that she speak directly with Licker to resolve this issue. Phillips also spoke to Licker directly regarding his use of the term "Babe." Specifically, Phillips advised Licker that he "needed to carefully choose his words around patients and employees." Phillips also advised Licker that some people did not like being addressed by "Sweetie or Hun or Babe," and that he should refrain from using these terms in the workplace. Licker understood Phillips' suggestion and tried to refrain from calling Petitioner, or anybody else, "Babe" or any word similar to the term. Petitioner did not complain about any other alleged inappropriate conduct by Licker to Phillips, or any other manager, until February 1, 2007. However, shortly after he started working for Respondent, Licker made an inappropriate comment in the cafeteria to Petitioner. Licker stated to other employees that he could not sit next to Petitioner because they were sleeping together. Licker made a similar inappropriate comment to Dana Keach when he first started employment at Parrish. He suggested that there was a lesbian relationship between Keach and another woman. This conduct was not reported until much later. Prior to February 1, 2007, it became readily apparent that the MRI department was suffering serious setbacks because the department employees were not working cooperatively together. The biggest problem in the MRI department appeared to be a lack of teamwork resulting from the staff's inability to communicate effectively with one another. Licker advised Gallacher that he was struggling in his "daily interactions" with Depelteau and Petitioner and that he simply "could not make the group happy, whether it was scheduling or time off or just getting through the day." MRI's problems grew to the point that Phillips and Gallacher both stepped in to try to improve communications and teamwork among Licker, Petitioner, Depelteau, and Shelly Hugoboom, the MRI CT assistant. The entire MRI department engaged in team-building meetings and even worked with the medical center's chaplain in an attempt to learn to work together. These department meetings were intense and discussion often became heated among the MRI staff members. In addition to these team-building meetings, Gallacher met with staff members individually to discuss their concerns. Gallacher also addressed the interpersonal skills issues between Petitioner and Hugoboom. Specifically, Gallacher met with the two employees together "to see if they could put [their issues] to rest and move on." In the midst of these efforts to improve the department, Petitioner came to Phillips on February 1, 2007, complaining that Licker was continuing to call her "Babe," and that he had also offered her some concert tickets. Phillips observed that Petitioner was extremely upset and immediately contacted Human Resources Manager Roberta Chaildin to start an investigation in regard to Licker's alleged behavior. Phillips and Chaildin spoke with Petitioner and Licker, individually, regarding Petitioner's claims. When questioned regarding the concert ticket, Licker explained that he had been looking to sell an extra ticket that he had. Licker advised Phillips and Chaildin that Petitioner had taken his offer to sell her the extra ticket "out of context," when she assumed that he was asking her to the concert on a date. Licker specified that he had asked Petitioner if she wanted to buy his extra ticket and "tag along" with him and his friends to the concert. Licker also offered his extra ticket to other people besides Petitioner. After speaking with Petitioner and Licker, Phillips and Chaildin determined that they were dealing with a "he-said- she-said situation and a misunderstanding." "He said, I was trying to sell the ticket or give it away. She said, he had asked me out on a date to a concert." Phillips and Chaildin determined that this was not a case of "sexual harassment" by Licker. They did, however, warn Licker that as a supervisor, he had to be "extremely careful" in how he spoke to his subordinate employees. Phillips and Chaildin advised Petitioner that they had investigated her claim and concluded that there was no evidence of sexual harassment. They encouraged her, however, to file a report if she continued to have issues with Licker. Over five months passed without a complaint or incident. Then on July 11, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner regarding her having accumulated nine tardy appearances ("tardies") at work since January 1, 2007. In speaking with Petitioner, Licker wanted to ensure that Petitioner understood that she needed to be on time in the future, as she had exceeded the number of tardies deemed acceptable by Respondent. To ensure that nothing said during the verbal counseling session was misconstrued by Petitioner, Licker had another supervisor, Boyd Wallace, serve as a witness. The tardies cited in Licker's verbal counseling to Petitioner were unrelated to instances when he would excuse her from work due to slower volume in the MRI department. On August 21, 2007, Licker observed Petitioner on the telephone being advised by security that she had parked in a "no parking" zone. During the conversation, Petitioner became agitated. Licker documented and filed the incident. Phillips personally addressed this incident with Petitioner. On October 10, 2007, the MRI department was working an already full schedule when Licker had to add a patient to the schedule due to an emergency situation. Petitioner objected to Licker adding another patient to the day and became withdrawn and resentful. Licker instructed Petitioner that she needed to change her attitude and become more cooperative. The evidence is not persuasive that Licker assigned Petitioner "menial tasks" after she complained about his having offered her the concert tickets in February 2007. In October 2007, Gallacher, Phillips and Chaildin met Petitioner and issued her a Decision Day disciplinary letter. A "Decision Day" meeting and letter is a management tool in which the employee is given a paid day off to contemplate whether they wish to remain an employee of Respondent. This resulted from Respondent's concerns regarding her "interpersonal skills." This was an issue that had been continuously addressed by Licker and other supervisors or managers at Respondent. The incident which prompted the progressive disciplinary action involved Debbie York, a relatively new employee who resigned from the MRI department, claiming that Petitioner and her interactions with other employees and with Licker was the reason for her leaving. During the Decision Day meeting, Petitioner stated that she was the "victim" and brought up the previous incidents of allegedly being sexually harassed. Petitioner was reminded that she had not complained of any other instances of alleged sexual harassment since she complained of Licker's offering her concert tickets in February 2007 and that the matter was investigated and resolved. From the point of view of management, the Decision Day meeting was intended to address Petitioner's on-going issues with her co-workers and her supervisor. However, Petitioner did not bring up any new incidents of alleged sexual harassment by Licker during the Decision Day meeting. Following the meeting, Petitioner took her Decision Day letter and returned to work. The Decision Day letter called for the creation of an Action Plan, which Respondent uses to help a struggling employee "become invested with the organization and with [his or her] team." Thereafter, Petitioner met with Gallacher to discuss what should be included in her Action Plan. On November 7, 2007, an Action Plan was drafted and signed. It included a number of initiatives designed to assist Petitioner in being "re[-]engaged" with the MRI department. Despite being placed on an Action Plan, Petitioner continued to have issues with Licker being her supervisor. On November 20, 2007, Licker verbally counseled Petitioner for her failure to discuss changes in her weekly schedule with him. Licker specifically identified Petitioner's "communication skills" as a continuing issue. On December 19, 2007, Petitioner was suspended without pay for two days for stating that Licker was being an "asshole," or something to that effect, in front of a co-worker. Petitioner accepted responsibility for her comment. Along with her suspension, Petitioner was also issued a written warning stated in pertinent part, "Upon your return [from suspension], you will be expected to demonstrate a high level of interpersonal skills towards your co-workers, management and this organization and work on completion of your Action Plan items. Any reports of less than acceptable behavior or performance or deviation from a Diagnostic Imaging or PMC policy or procedure will result in immediate termination." As a result of the written warning, Petitioner also lost 50 percent of her annual merit increase. In January 2008, management considered that the MRI department was still very "dysfunctional." Scott Hazelbaker, the new executive director of Diagnostics/Cardiovascular, met with all of the MRI employees as a group to discuss his "expectations of working together as a team." Hazelbaker also discerned that Licker lacked leadership skills to be an effective supervisor. In fact, none of the MRI employees had much respect for Licker's management style. On April 10, 2008, Hazelbaker, Gallacher, and Chaildin met with Petitioner to discuss her progress under the Action Plan. During the meeting, Hazelbaker reviewed Petitioner's history toward Respondent, explaining that her negative attitude could not be tolerated. Specifically, her negativity, failure to be a team player, and refusal to embrace or become engaged in Respondent's culture were detrimentally affecting the work of MRI as a whole. Hazelbaker continued by advising Respondent that as a result of her "track record," she could either resign from her employment or be terminated. Petitioner was advised that if she resigned, Respondent would pay her for two weeks in lieu of having her work through her notice period, pay her the balance of her personal leave bank, extend her health benefits for two weeks so that she could fill her prescriptions, and even designate her eligible for rehire in its system. At the end of the meeting, Petitioner tendered her resignation notice to Respondent. At no time during the meeting did Petitioner ask to leave the room or make a call in order to seek advice or legal counsel. Further, at no time during the meeting did Petitioner raise her past issues regarding Licker and the alleged sexual harassment she suffered. The evidence is persuasive that Licker did not influence the decision to terminate Petitioner. He had not asked for her to be terminated. In August 2009, more than one year after Petitioner resigned, Respondent received a complaint regarding Licker from then-X-Ray Tech Dana Keach, who claimed that Licker made sexually suggestive comments to her. Following an investigation, Licker was terminated, effective September 24, 2009, for "communication unsuitability between care partners." It does not appear that Licker was terminated for engaging in sexual harassment. The evidence is not persuasive that during the time he was employed by Respondent that Licker had inappropriate discussions in the workplace on numerous occasions in front of both male and female employees; nor that Licker would also discuss pornography in the workplace.
Recommendation Based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing Petitioner, Lesa Burkavage's, claims of unlawful sexual harassment and retaliation against Respondent, Parrish Medical Center. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of July, 2010, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 2010.
The Issue Whether Petitioner, Andrew Anthony Taylor (“Petitioner”), timely filed a petition under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Act, chapter 961, Florida Statutes (2016)(“the Act”); and, if so, whether Petitioner demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, his actual innocence, thereby entitling him to monetary compensation under the Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner seeks compensation pursuant to the Act after serving a prison term of 25 years for the sexual abuse of his stepdaughter, C.J. The jury verdict was vacated after C.J., in 2014, recanted her accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her in 1990, when she was eight years old. The undersigned will begin with a discussion of the events in 1990, when C.J. first reported the allegation of sexual abuse against Petitioner to Dr. Valerie Rao, a rape treatment medical examiner. On the evening of March 10, 1990, C.J. was brought to the Jackson Memorial Hospital Roxcy Bolton Rape Treatment Center by her mother and grandmother, at which time C.J. came under the care of Dr. Rao. Dr. Rao obtained a detailed history from C.J., during which C.J. reported that she had been sexually abused by her stepfather, “Andrew,” at two different locations--her old house and her new house. According to C.J., the most recent sexual encounter was when she was awoken by Petitioner on “Friday night,” March 8, 1990, and told to get up and go to her mother’s bed. C.J. did so, and Petitioner then told her to take off her pajamas, which she did. According to C.J., Petitioner got on top of her, put his “private part” in her, began kissing her, and put his mouth on her “private part.” C.J. also stated Petitioner made her touch his “private part,” and that he touched her in the anal area. C.J. also stated Petitioner often put his “private part” in her mouth. C.J. also stated Petitioner told her that if she told anyone, he would kill her. After obtaining the history, Dr. Rao examined C.J. and observed multiple bruises on her right arm and thighs, and abrasions on her back and on her left breast. The bruises and abrasions were caused when C.J.’s mother beat her with a baseball bat after C.J. told her mother of Petitioner’s sexual abuse. Dr. Rao immediately reported the mother to law enforcement, and C.J.’s mother was arrested at the rape treatment center for aggravated child abuse. Dr. Rao conducted a vaginal examination of C.J. and used a colposcope to observe and document the status of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao observed and documented several healed tears of the hymen, which made the opening of C.J.’s hymen bigger than it should be for a child of her age. According to Dr. Rao, C.J. did not show any natural signs of progression of the hymen tissue that might be present due to a child approaching puberty. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified at hearing that C.J.’s history was consistent with her physical examination. According to Dr. Rao, the healed tears could have resulted from Respondent “trying to push his penis into her” consistent with C.J.’s history. Dr. Rao acknowledged the tears also could have been caused by a finger, a pencil, or any object that is bigger than the opening of the hymen. However, no evidence was presented at hearing indicating that a finger, pencil, or any other object was placed in the opening of C.J.’s hymen. Dr. Rao further acknowledged there was no physical evidence that she could discern or collect that identified Petitioner as the assailant in this case. However, in 1990, obtaining DNA samples and the gathering of other types of physical evidence in an effort to specifically identify perpetrators of sexual abuse were not as advanced and reliable as it is today. Following Dr. Rao’s examination on March 10, 1990, C.J. was separated from her mother, and her mother no longer had custody of her. C.J. lived with her maternal great grandmother, and without her mother in her life, until she was 16 years old. On March 27, 1990, Mercy Restani, a trained interviewer who was employed by the Dade County Children’s Center within the office of the State Attorney, interviewed C.J. at the children’s center. C.J. provided a detailed history to Ms. Restani. C.J. told Ms. Restani that the sexual abuse by Petitioner happened in the old house and at the new house. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would get her out of her bedroom and take her into her mother’s bedroom. C.J. told Ms. Restani that Petitioner would touch her “pocketbook” (the child’s word for a vagina) with his “private” (the child’s word for penis). C.J. told Dr. Restani that Petitioner got on top of her, that he moved very fast, and that it hurt when he did so. C.J. said Petitioner touched her breasts, put his mouth on her “pocketbook,” and his “private” in her mouth. C.J. also told Ms. Restani that Petitioner told her he would kill her if she told anyone. Ms. Restani asked C.J. if she had told her mother or anyone about what had happened to her. C.J. told Ms. Restani that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid. C.J. told Ms. Restani that her mother “had been asking her for several days if Andrew had been messing with her.” When C.J. eventually told her mother what had happened, C.J. said her mother beat her with a baseball bat. On April 3, 1990, C.J. was interviewed by a clinical forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Alvarez, Ph.D. The purpose of the interview was to assess C.J.’s current mental status and emotional therapeutic needs. According to Dr. Alvarez, C.J. was able to distinguish between the truth and a lie. C.J. had the intelligence to comprehend what had happened to her, to be able to relate it to others, and she was competent to testify. C.J. provided a detailed history to Dr. Alvarez. Dr. Alvarez observed that C.J. was able to provide a synopsis of her living arrangements at the time of the incidents. C.J. identified her stepfather, “Andrew,” as the perpetrator of the sexual abuse. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred at the old house and current house. C.J. told Dr. Alvarez it occurred when Petitioner would wake her, take her into the room, and tell her to get onto the bed. C.J. was reluctant to verbally tell Dr. Alvarez what Petitioner did to her, but C.J. wrote it down on a piece of paper (Petitioner’s Exhibit 4) in her own handwriting: He would get on me. He would start moving fast on me. He would take out his private part. On my private part and In my mouth. C.J. also told Dr. Alvarez that after the incidents, Petitioner threatened to kill her if she told anyone about it. On April 5, 1990, C.J. executed an affidavit, attesting to the fact of her name, that she was eight years old, that she lived with her mother and Petitioner at a specific street address in Dade County, Florida, and that: Early in the morning on Friday, March 9, 1990, Andrew woke me up and took me to his bedroom. Andrew told me to take off my panties. He touched my breasts. He put his private part into my pocketbook. It hurt. He kissed me on my mouth and on my pocketbook. He had done this before. He told me he would kill me if I told. My mother asked me if anyone was messing with me. For several days I wouldn’t tell her. When I did tell her what Andrew did, she beat me with a baseball bat. In August 1990, C.J.’s mother entered a plea of nolo contendere to the offense of aggravated child abuse against C.J. She was adjudicated guilty, sentenced to community control, and ordered not to have any contact with C.J. until approved by the court. On October 22, 1990, C.J. gave a videotaped deposition in Petitioner’s criminal case, in which she provided details of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In the deposition, C.J. described how Petitioner woke her up, took her to her mother’s room, touched her “pocketbook” with his mouth, and placed his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook.” C.J. testified he moved his body around while putting his “wee-wee” in her “pocketbook,” and that it hurt when he did so. She testified that on another evening, Petitioner woke her up again, took her to her mother’s room, and touched her “pocketbook” with his hand moving up and down as he did so. She testified it happened at the new house and at the old house. Petitioner’s criminal jury trial was held in March 1991, before the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade County, Florida, in the case of State of Florida v. Andrew Anthony Taylor, Case No. F90-009928. At Petitioner’s criminal trial, C.J. testified via closed circuit television that Petitioner came to her bedroom, woke her up, and took her to her mother’s room. C.J. testified that she was wearing pajamas and panties and that Petitioner removed them. Using anatomically correct dolls, C.J. showed the jury that Petitioner touched her vagina with his hand and put his mouth on her breasts. She further indicated that Petitioner put his mouth on her vagina and demonstrated how he put his penis in her mouth and vagina. C.J. testified that it hurt when Petitioner placed his penis in her “private part.” She testified she did not tell her mother about this that night because Petitioner said he would do something bad to her. C.J. testified that another incident occurred that same week where Petitioner did the same things to her. C.J. also testified Petitioner put something “greasy” on his “private part” before he put his “private part” in her “private part.” C.J. indicated Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her also occurred at the old house. C.J. testified that when she told her mother about Petitioner’s sexual abuse of her after the last incident, her mother became upset and hurt her. C.J. testified that when she told Dr. Rao she got all the bruises when her mother hit her with a baseball bat, it was the first time her mother ever hit her with a bat. C.J. testified she has not been able to live with or have contact with her mom since her mother hurt her. C.J.’s mother did not testify at the criminal trial against Petitioner because she had an open warrant for her arrest at the time for violating her community control. Petitioner testified at his criminal trial. Although Petitioner denied he sexually abused C.J., he acknowledged that he was C.J.’s stepfather; he married C.J.’s mother in 1989; he had a son with C.J.’s mother in 1998; he was having an extramarital affair with another woman; and while he divided his time between Maryland and Miami because of work, he was sleeping in the same home as C.J. during the timeframe that C.J. indicated she had been sexually abused by him. Following the criminal trial, Petitioner was convicted on March 15, 1991, of three counts of capital sexual battery and one count of lewd and lascivious behavior for the sexual abuse of C.J. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison on the three capital offenses. The judgment and sentences were per curiam affirmed on appeal in Taylor v. State, 610 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). After reporting the incidents of sexual abuse, C.J. went through counseling two times per week for several years. At no time did C.J. tell any therapists that she was not sexually abused by Petitioner. In 2006, C.J. was approached at her grandmother’s home by a male private investigator for Petitioner. The investigator wanted to ask C.J. questions about what happened with Petitioner, but C.J. refused to speak with the investigator. In either late 2013 or early 2014, C.J. was again approached by a private investigator for Petitioner, this time a female who came to C.J.’s place of employment (“Walmart”). The investigator wanted to ask C.J. if anything had happened with Petitioner. In response, C.J. immediately told her “no.” The investigator then gave C.J. a card, and C.J. told the investigator she would call her in couple of weeks. On February 17, 2014, C.J. executed an affidavit formally recanting the accusation that Petitioner sexually abused her when she was eight years old. In this affidavit, C.J. asserted now, at the age of 32, that she made the allegation because her mother was either drunk or high on drugs who would ask her “if anybody touched me inappropriately.” C.J. asserted that late one night after telling her mother that nobody touched me, her mother beat her with a baseball bat and started yelling, “did Andrew touch you.” C.J. asserted that after telling her mother no, her mother began to beat her and beat her for hours. C.J. asserted that after an extensive beating, she told her mother that “Andrew” had touched her so that she would stop beating her, and after telling her that Andrew touched her, the beating stopped. However, by this time, C.J. had developed a close relationship with her half-brother Andrew Taylor, Jr. C.J. further asserted: A while back, I began to talk with my half- brother, Andrew Jr., and would see him interacting with his own son. This started me thinking about what I had done and only I knew the real truth that Andrew was innocent. My conscience started bothering me every time I would see Andrew, Jr. playing and interacting with his son and it got to the point where I couldn’t sleep and hardly eat. I finally called my half-brother, Andrew Jr., and told him I needed to meet with him and explain what had happened regarding his father. I told Andrew Jr. that his father never touched me or bothered me sexually and that I was so sorry for his dad not being in his life because of what I did. I asked Andrew Jr. to forgive me and he agreed. I also asked Andrew Jr. what I should do and who I could write in order to correct this situation. Investigator Jeannie Rogers came to see me a few months ago and spoke to me about coming forward. I have finally gotten the courage to stand up and do what is right. On June 23, 2014, Petitioner filed a Motion for Post- Conviction Relief Based on Newly Discovered Evidence in Case No. F90-009928. The newly discovered evidence was C.J.’s recantation of the sexual abuse allegation against Petitioner. On April 2, 2015, an evidentiary hearing was held on the motion before Circuit Court Judge Diane Ward. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Petitioner presented the live testimony of C.J., who testified she made up the allegation that Petitioner sexually abused her because her mother beat her with a baseball bat to make her provide a false allegation against Petitioner. C.J. testified she told her mother Petitioner sexually abused her because she wanted the beating to stop. However, C.J. also testified when she told her mother that Petitioner sexually abused her, the beating did not stop, and her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat for not telling her about the sexual abuse sooner. During the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. acknowledged she provided specific details of sexual abuse by Petitioner to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings involving Petitioner. C.J. was asked how she could have had such knowledge of sexual activity as an eight year old in order to provide the details that she did to Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, Dr. Alvarez, and in her testimony in the underlying criminal proceedings. In response, C.J. testified she came up with the details by watching cable television and walking in on her mother and Petitioner while they were having sex. At the hearing before Judge Ward, Respondent presented the live testimony of C.J.’s mother, who acknowledged she was a cocaine addict in March 1990. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that she recalled an incident in which she had returned home one night on March 5, 1990, and found C.J. lying in bed with her hands covering her front “private parts.” She testified that she could smell a “sexual scent” in the room and that she asked C.J. “what was wrong.” She testified C.J. did not indicate anything was wrong, but she was still suspicious something was wrong because of the sexual odor in the room. C.J.’s mother testified that due to this suspicion, she asked C.J. a second time on March 9, 1990, if “anyone had been messing with her.” According to C.J.’s mother, C.J. indicated this time that Petitioner “[h]ad been bothering her,” which meant that he had been sexually molesting her. C.J.’s mother testified on direct examination that when C.J. began telling her specific details of the abuse by Petitioner, she became irate and beat C.J. with a baseball bat. However, C.J.’s mother’s testimony as to when she began to beat C.J. with a baseball bat is inconsistent. C.J. and her mother acknowledged their relationship over the past several years has been good, and there is no current animosity between them. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, Judge Ward orally announced her ruling that C.J.’s change in testimony is newly discovered evidence. In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward specifically found C.J.’s testimony “reliable and credible.” Judge Ward commented she “had the opportunity to view her, and observe her during the testimony, and as well as consider any motive that she had for the recantation of her testimony.” On the other hand, Judge Ward specifically found the live testimony of C.J.’s mother to be “incredible.” In reaching this conclusion, Judge Ward commented that at the time of the events, she was by her own admission using drugs, and she had a poor recollection of the events, which is attributable to her drug use rather than to the passage of time. Judge Ward further stated: There were multiple lengthy pauses between the attorney’s questions and her answers where she seemed to be searching in her memory for answers. The Court observed that she seemed very hesitant and unsure of her own recollection of the events, and I further find that this is attributable to her extensive drug use, and that, and her intoxication on drugs at the time that this occurred. With regards to the beating, but with a baseball bat, although at some times she did acknowledge, did state that she beat her child with the baseball bat after she implicated the Defendant in the sexual assault, there were times that she said that she couldn’t recall and it could have been before she implicated her. And this is the most damaging testimony you could possibly have given the fact that there was no direct evidence otherwise implicating the Defendant as the person who sexually assaulted her. She did have six healed tears on her hymen which could have occurred at any time, and been caused by any other person. There was no DNA, blood evidence, semen, eyewitnesses, or a confession, so the only evidence that the State had, or the strongest evidence that the State had was the victim’s testimony, which was obviously obtained through a beating with a baseball bat by her mother when she was a very tiny child. The pictures of her are very sad at such a young age. There is no doubt that if a jury were to hear that the victim, hear from the victim that the Defendant was not the person that sexually abused her, and that she lied because her mother beat her with a baseball bat when she was eight years old, would have produced an, could have, would have produced an acquittal on retrial, and that the Defendant would probably be acquitted on retrial, so based on the foregoing I’m going to grant the motion for post-conviction relief. We need to schedule it for trial now. I think it has to be set in ninety days; isn’t that correct? Okay, I’ll answer my own question yes. Pet. Ex. 14, pp. 245-247. On April 2, 2015, a written order was entered vacating the finding of guilt, judgment, and sentence, and a hearing was scheduled for April 10, 2015, at which time a new trial date would be set. On April 10, 2015, the State announced a nolle prose of all criminal charges against Petitioner. On June 30, 2015, Petitioner timely filed a Petition to Establish Wrongful Incarceration in Case No. F90-009928. On July 31, 2015, Respondent filed a response contesting the petition. After the filing of the initial petition, a grand jury returned an indictment recharging Petitioner for the same crimes. C.J. was notified of the grand jury proceeding, but she did not appear or request a continuance. After the criminal case was re-filed, Respondent and Petitioner were unable to reach a settlement. On December 12, 2016, the second set of charges were nolle prossed. On January 25, 2017, Petitioner filed an amended petition. On March 17, 2017, pursuant to section 961.03(4)(a), Judge Ward issued an “Order Finding That Defendant Was a ‘Wrongfully Incarcerated Person’ and Is ‘Eligible for Compensation’ Pursuant to Section 961.03, Florida Statutes.” Judge Ward held that the petition was timely filed and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, his “actual innocence” of the charges. Central to Judge Ward’s conclusion that C.J.’s recantation is reliable and that Petitioner met his burden of establishing his actual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence is that she had the opportunity to observe C.J. and her mother’s demeanor when they testified live at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. Judge Ward’s findings are largely based on credibility assessments of C.J. and her mother based on observations of their demeanor while testifying. In concluding that Petitioner established his “actual innocence” by a preponderance of the evidence, Judge Ward relied on the evidence presented at the April 2, 2015, evidentiary hearing on Petitioner’s motion for post-conviction relief. In the instant proceeding, however, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of establishing his actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. Whether Petitioner is actually innocent turns on whether Petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that C.J.’s recantation is reliable. The evidence presented in this case does not clearly and convincingly establish the reliability of C.J.’s recantation. To begin with, C.J. consistently provided details about sexual conduct perpetrated against her by Petitioner in her visits with Dr. Rao, Ms. Restani, and Dr. Alvarez, and in her prior deposition and trial testimony in the underlying criminal proceeding against Petitioner. C.J. gave details about how Petitioner would wake her up and take her to another room. She gave details about oral sex by Petitioner on herself and that she performed on Petitioner. She gave details about Petitioner using a lubricant on his penis. She gave details about how he would place his penis in her vagina and move up and down really fast. She said it hurt when he did so. Dr. Rao persuasively and credibly testified that the injuries to C.J.’s hymen were consistent with her history. C.J. consistently stated in 1990 and 1991 that her mother beat her with a baseball bat after she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. Over 20 years later, C.J.’s story changed, and she stated that her mother beat her with a baseball bat before she told her of the sexual abuse by Petitioner. In her recantation affidavit, C.J. stated that after telling her mother that Petitioner touched her, the beating stopped. However, in the hearing before Judge Ward, C.J. testified that her mother continued to beat her with the baseball bat after she told her about the abuse for not telling her about the abuse sooner. From March 10, 1990, when C.J. was removed from her mother until she was 16 years old, C.J. had many opportunities to come forward and recant the allegation of abuse against Petitioner. During this time, there was no reason for C.J. to fear her mother because her mother was not in C.J.’s life. Subsequently, C.J. and her mother developed a good relationship. However, Petitioner waited almost 24 years to recant. C.J. recanted after developing a relationship with her half-brother, Andrew Taylor, Jr. When Andrew Taylor, Jr., turned 18 years old, he began a relationship with his father, Petitioner. Prior to recanting, C.J. regretted her half-brother did not get to spend quality time with Petitioner because Petitioner was in prison. C.J.’s development of a relationship with her half-brother and her desire that he have a strong relationship with Petitioner could be a motive for her recantation. C.J. did not appear before the grand jury, she did not request a continuance, and she was not called as a witness at either of the hearings in the instant matter. The undersigned lacked the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor because she was not called to testify as a live witness. However, the undersigned had the opportunity to observe C.J.’s demeanor while testifying in her videotaped deposition in 1990, at which time she testified credibly and persuasively to facts demonstrating that Petitioner sexually abused her. Petitioner was called as a witness at the August 8, 2017, hearing, at which he was simply asked on direct examination if he ever molested C.J., to which he responded no. Petitioner’s testimony at the hearing was unpersuasive.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., subjected Petitioners, Jasen Baker and Bernard Southwell, to a hostile work environment and retaliation in violation of Subsection 760.10(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2004).
Findings Of Fact Respondent operates a chain of casual Italian restaurants. Respondent has adopted a policy against discrimination and harassment. In addition to prohibiting harassment, the policy instructs employees whom to contact if they experience harassment. The policy is contained in an employee handbook that is distributed to all employees during the initial orientation process. During orientation, Respondent's manager reviews the employee handbook with the new employee, including the policy on sexual harassment. During the orientation process, Respondent also requires employees to view a video that explains that Respondent will not tolerate harassment. The video familiarizes the employees with the company's expectations regarding the reporting of harassment in the workplace. During the orientation process, the employees are required to sign an acknowledgment on the exterior of their employee folders indicating that they have received and read the policy against harassment. The critical sections of the policy are reprinted on the folders immediately above the signature lines. All of Respondent's restaurants are required to display a poster known as the "Carrabbamico Info" poster in the kitchen area. This poster reprints the harassment policy and provides employees with a list of names to call if they feel that they have been harassed. Respondent has implemented reasonable precautions to prevent harassment from occurring in its restaurants. In the Central Florida market, Respondent's restaurants are overseen by a joint venture partner named Dick Meyer. Meyer is responsible for hiring and firing the managers of the restaurants that he oversees. In March 2000, Lawton DePriest became the managing partner at Respondent's Palm Bay location. DePriest reported to Meyer. DePriest remained in that capacity until September 2003, when he became the managing partner of Respondent's restaurant located in Formosa Gardens. It was DePriest's management style to frequently yell at employees in order to motivate them. It is also possible that he had favorites on the staff of the Palm Bay restaurant. Baker was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in January 2002. At the time that Baker began working for Respondent, he attended an orientation session conducted by DePriest. It was DePriest's practice during orientation to discuss harassment issues and instruct employees to come to him directly if they experience any problems with sexual harassment. If for some reason an employee is not comfortable with him, DePriest would encourage the employee to contact any other person listed on the poster. Baker was given a copy of Respondent's handbook, which contains the company's policy against harassment. On that same date, January 19, 2002, Baker signed his employee folder on the blank line under the harassment policy indicating that he had read and received the policy. Whether he reviewed the employee handbook further after that date is irrelevant. Baker "vividly remembers" that during his orientation, he watched the videotape that included instructions on what he should do if he felt harassed. However, during the hearing, Baker denied ever seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster. However, Baker admitted on cross-examination that during his deposition, he had acknowledged seeing the Carrabbamico Info poster posted in the store. During the deposition, Baker specifically remembered that there were business cards with contact information for Meyer and Cheri Ashe attached to the bottom of the poster. Despite Baker's attempt to deny seeing the poster, his earlier answers in deposition were more credible in view of his specific recollection of the attached business cards and the lack of any persuasive explanation for the discrepancy. After completing his orientation, Baker initially worked as a dishwasher. Later, he was shown how to do food preparation work. Before coming to work for Respondent, Baker had previously worked for a restaurant by the name of Golden Corral. During the time that he worked with Golden Corral, he became acquainted with a co-worker named Bernard Southwell. In the summer of 2002, Petitioners discussed the possibility of Southwell coming to work for Respondent. Baker spoke favorably of the restaurant and recommended that Southwell submit an application. At the time, Baker had worked for Respondent for six or seven months. Baker did not express to Southwell that he had observed or experienced any problems with unwelcome harassment. Southwell submitted an application and was hired by Respondent's Palm Bay restaurant in August 2002 as a dishwasher. At the time he began employment with Respondent, Southwell was living with a friend of his named Joe Corbett. At the time, Baker was living in a one-bedroom apartment with his girlfriend. Several weeks later, Baker's girlfriend decided to move out. According to Petitioners, she suggested to Southwell that he move into Baker's apartment to replace her. Around October 2002, Southwell moved out of the Corbett residence and moved in with Baker. A third employee named Chris Germana also moved into the residence around the same time. Because the apartment only had one bedroom, Germana slept on the couch. Petitioners slept in the bedroom. When employees at the restaurant learned of these arrangements, speculation began about whether the two men were homosexual. According to Petitioners, sometime after Southwell started to room with Baker, co-workers at the restaurant started referring to Petitioners by nicknames. The co-workers referred to Baker as "powder," "crack pipe," and "crack head." Baker knew that "powder" was a reference to a character from the movie "Powder" and that the name had nothing to do with his sexuality. The co-workers also referred to Petitioners as "butt buddies." Southwell testified that a male co-worker, Christopher Bouley, told him, "I know you guys are lovers." Bouley, Arnold Samuel and DePriest all used these nicknames on occasion to refer to both Petitioners, according to Baker. After several months, Southwell eventually went to DePriest and complained about the "powder," "crack pipe," and "butt buddies" nicknames. Southwell told DePriest that the nicknames were funny at first, but that they started getting old. DePriest then told Samuel and Bouley to stop using the nicknames. Thereafter, the use of the nicknames stopped. Southwell claimed that Bouley would gyrate his hips behind other employees as they were bending down. However, Petitioners both admitted that Bouley would do these hip motions to both male and female employees. During the hearing, Petitioners claimed that Bouley subjected them to unwelcome touching. Baker claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks once. However, Baker acknowledged that when his deposition was taken prior to the final hearing, he did not mention that Bouley touched his buttocks. In fact, when asked during his deposition whether he had been sexually harassed, Baker testified that he had not and that he had only been verbally harassed. Furthermore, Baker made no mention of any physical touching in the Affidavit that he submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination. Southwell never saw Bouley touch or grab Baker's buttocks. And despite their close relationship, Baker never told Southwell that Bouley had grabbed his buttocks. Accordingly, Baker's allegation that he was touched inappropriately by Bouley or any other of Respondent's employees is not credible. Southwell claimed that Bouley had touched his buttocks on two or three occasions and touched his nipples twice. Southwell also claimed that Bouley had touched his penis on one occasion. According to Southwell, he was bending down to pick up sauté pans when Bouley, who was supposedly standing behind him, reached between Southwell's legs from behind and clutched Southwell's genital area through his trousers. This incident supposedly occurred during the restaurant's hours of operation while customers were in the restaurant. The alleged grabbing supposedly took place in front of a stove that sat in full view of customers seated at the restaurant's bar. Bouley flatly denied ever touching Southwell's genitals or private area. In the Affidavit that Southwell submitted to FCHR at the time he filed his charge of discrimination, Southwell made no mention of Bouley touching Southwell's penis. At the time that he submitted this Affidavit, Southwell was represented by counsel. Southwell did not offer any convincing reason for the omission of any description of his genitals being grabbed. Accordingly, Southwell's allegation that Bouley touched Southwell's genitals is not credible. Although Petitioners testified that they spoke to DePriest on several occasions, they admit that they never spoke to any of the other individuals listed on the harassment poster to complain about sexual harassment. DePriest testified that the only complaint he ever received had to do with the nicknames and that he took prompt action to resolve this problem. Annually, Respondent submits an employee experience survey to its employees that is completed anonymously and forwarded to an outside company for analysis. After the survey is completed, employees participate in a small group feedback session to discuss the results of the survey. On March 11, 2003, DePriest held the feedback session for his store, which was attended by Petitioners. During the session, Southwell commented about the situation with the nicknames. He indicated that the situation was resolved when it was brought to DePriest's attention. This was the sole extent to which either employee complained of unwelcome behavior. Respondent was not on notice of any problems with regard to touching or more serious inappropriate behavior. On March 12, 2003, Petitioners' last day of work, Southwell approached DePriest to complain about scheduling for a special event at the convention center. Southwell stated that he and Baker had signed up to participate in this event. Southwell was scheduled for the event, but Baker was not. DePriest explained that he needed Baker to float, because there were not enough people scheduled to work at the restaurant that night. DePriest later talked to Baker, who indicated that he was not disappointed that he was not participating in the event. That conversation, however, was the last time that DePriest saw Baker. DePriest learned that Petitioners had left before the end of their shift, when the plates in the restaurant were getting low and the sauté pans were getting stacked up. DePriest asked about the whereabouts of Petitioners and learned that they were seen riding their bicycles away from the restaurant. DePriest could not contact them because they did not have a telephone. DePriest eventually terminated their employment for voluntarily walking off the job.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order that: Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Jasen Baker, in DOAH Case No. 05-0623, FCHR No. 23-03891; and Dismisses the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioner, Bernard Southwell, DOAH Case No. 05-0632, FCHR No. 23-03892. DONE AND ENTERED this 10th day of November, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of November, 2005. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jason M. Gordon, Esquire Gordon & Cornell 103 North Atlantic Avenue Cocoa Beach, Florida 32931 Kevin D. Johnson, Esquire Thompson, Sizemore & Gonzalez, P.A. 501 East Kennedy Boulevard, Suite 1400 Tampa, Florida 33602 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301