The Issue Should Petitioner discipline Respondent for his alleged involvement with a drug transaction based upon Respondent’s failure to maintain good moral character?
Findings Of Fact Petitioner licensed Respondent as a corrections officer on September 18, 1987. He holds corrections certificate number 81237. Respondent was employed as a corrections officer with the Sumter Correctional Institution from December 3, 1993, through June 9, 1994. In August, 1993, Respondent was the subject of a law enforcement investigation in which the DEA was the lead investigating agency. The investigation also involved Florida law enforcement agencies. The principle law enforcement personnel responsible for the investigation were certified in Florida. Investigation took place in Bradford County, Florida. The arrangement involved in the investigation was one in which Angel Allen, a police officer with the University of Florida police department, together with a confidential informant, contacted Respondent for purposes of purchasing drugs. The initial contact between Officer Allen, the confidential informant and Respondent was made on August 10, 1993. They met at a convenience store in Starke, Florida. At that time the confidential informant, who was known to the Respondent, introduced Officer Allen who was using an assumed name. Respondent then instructed the confidential informant to follow him. The parties went to a residential location off Lawtey Road. Respondent was in his vehicle, Officer Allen and the confidential informant followed in the confidential informant’s vehicle. Respondent entered the residence and passed another person who was coming out of the residence. The other person said to Respondent “I don’t know where its at.” Respondent entered the residence and then came back out and got into the car driven by the confidential informant. He sat next to Officer Allen on the passenger side. Respondent told the driver to proceed to the end of the block, and make a left, and then another left, and stop where a subject was standing on the street. Respondent then rolled down the window and spoke to a man who was standing there. Respondent used several names in referring to the individual during the conversation that ensued. Respondent instructed that individual to go around to the drivers side. When the individual reached the drivers side the confidential informant asked him how much an “eight ball” was, that is a street term referring to a certain amount of powdered cocaine. The man replied “two.” This refers to $200. The confidential informant handed the man $200. In turn the man gave the confidential informant a small plastic bag containing 2.406 grams of cocaine hydrochloride total net. The drug transaction took place in Respondent’s presence. Once purchased the confidential informant showed the cocaine to Respondent and asked if the drug seller had done her right. Respondent replied “yes.” The parties then returned to what was believed to be Respondent’s residence and he exited the vehicle. On August 17, 1993, further contact was made between Officer Allen, the confidential informant and Respondent. Respondent was reached through his pager. He returned the call to Officer Allen and the confidential informant and instructed them to come by his house in Starke, Florida. The purpose of the contact with Respondent was to purchase additional cocaine. When Officer Allen and the confidential informant arrived at Respondent’s house he entered their vehicle and sat next to Officer Allen and directed the confidential informant to the same location where the cocaine had been purchased on August 10, 1993. When the parties arrived at that location there was a person on a bicycle. The bicyclist came to the drivers side and Officer Allen gave the bicyclist $200, in return for cocaine which the bicyclist handed to the confidential informant, who in turn handed it to Officer Allen. Again the transaction took place in full view of Respondent. During this transaction Respondent made some comment to the effect of getting together with Officer Allen and the confidential informant and partying with them and having a “blow-out.” Respondent said that he had been “staying away from the stuff” referring to the cocaine, but that he would like to get together with the confidential informant and Officer Allen and have a “blow-out” in a couple of weeks. The bicyclist was the same person who had sold the parties drugs on August 10, 1993. On August 17, 1993, Respondent referred to that individual as “Frank,” a name that he had used in referring to the drug seller on the previous occasion. Respondent on this occasion stated that “Frank is good guy.” Respondent said that “Frank” was an up front guy and that he would make it right if it wasn’t right, referring to the cocaine if it wasn’t the correct amount, that “Frank” would make it the right amount of cocaine. After the transaction, Officer Allen and the confidential informant drove Respondent to what was believed to be his residence. The item that was purchased from “Frank” on August 17, 1993, was cocaine hydrochloride, 1.848 grams total net. Following these events, Respondent voluntarily gave a statement to Michael F. Page, Regional Inspector Supervisor with the Florida Department of Corrections, in which Respondent admitted being involved in the drug transactions. The statement was taken through a taped interview. In this statement, Respondent acknowledged knowing the drug seller “Frank” and that “Frank” was a person who sold drugs in the neighborhood. Respondent also admitted that he knew the purpose of the visits to the neighborhood was for the confidential informant to obtain drugs and that he took the confidential informant to a place where drugs were dealt. Respondent’s comment’s during the interview in which he said that his reason for accompanying Officer Allen and the confidential informant in purchasing drugs was to protect the confidential informant given the nature of the neighborhood, does not excuse Respondent’s conduct.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the fact finds and the conclusions of law reached it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered which revokes Respondent’s correction certificate number 81237.DONE AND ENTERED this 1st day of May, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 1st day of May, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Paul D. Johnston, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Simon L. Mitchell Route 3, Box 334 Starke, FL 32091 Simon L. Mitchell Post Office Box 63 Starke, FL 32091 A. Leon Lowry, II, Director Department of Criminal Justice Standards and Training Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Michael Ramage, Esquire Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, respondent, Reyes P. Ramos, was employed as a law enforcement officer by the City of Opa-Locka Police Department, and was duly certified by petitioner, Florida Department of Law Enforcement, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (Department), having been issued certificate number 19-83-002-05 on October 29, 1983. On January 30, 1990, respondent, as part of his annual physical examination for the Opa-Locka Police Department, reported to Toxicology Testing Services (TTS) and provided a urine sample to be analyzed for the presence of controlled substances. Upon analysis, the sample taken from respondent proved positive for the presence of the cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine, in a concentration of 55 nanograms per milliliter. Such finding is consistent with the ingestion of cocaine, as cocaine is the only drug commonly available that, when ingested into the human body, produces the cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine. On February 5, 1990, the Opa-Locka Police Department notified respondent that the analysis of his urine sample had proved positive for the presence of cocaine, a controlled substance. In response, respondent offered to provide another sample for further analysis. Later that day, February 5, 1990, respondent provided a second sample of urine to TTS to be analyzed for the presence of controlled substances. Upon analysis, the second sample also proved positive for the presence of the cocaine metabolite, benzoylecgonine, but this time at a concentration of 9.2 nanograms per milliliter. Such reduced concentration is consistent with the initial concentration of 55 nanograms per milliliter disclosed by the first sample, assuming abstinence during the intervening period. In concluding that the urine samples respondent gave proved positive for the presence of cocaine metabolite, careful consideration has been given to the collection, storage and handling procedures adopted by TTS, as well as its testing methods. In this regard, the procedures and methods employed by TTS were shown to provide reliable safeguards against contamination, a reliable chain-of-custody, and produce, through Gas Chromograph/Mass Spectrometry (GCMS), a reliable measure of the concentration of cocaine metabolite in the body. 1/ While the testing demonstrates the presence of cocaine metabolite in respondent's system, and therefore the presence of cocaine, it does not establish how ingestion occurred. 2/ It may be reasonably inferred, however, that such ingestion was proscribed by law, absent proof that the subject drug was possessed or administered under the authority of a prescription issued by a physician or that the presence of cocaine metabolite could otherwise be lawfully explained. In response to the testing which revealed the presence of cocaine metabolite in his urine, respondent credibly denied the use of cocaine, and offered the testimony of a number of witnesses who know him well to lend credence to his denial. Those witnesses, who also testified credibly, observed that respondent is a person of good moral character who, among other qualities has the ability to differentiate between right and wrong and the character to observe the difference, has respect for the rights of others, has respect for the law, and could be relied upon in a position of trust and confidence. Moreover, from the testimony of those witnesses who have known respondent for an extended period of time, commencing well prior to the incident in question, it may be concluded that, in their opinions, it is the antithesis of respondent's character to have ingested or used cocaine. Apart from his denial, respondent offered two possible explanations for the presence of cocaine in his system: (1) that, during the week of January 18, 1990, he had been in contact with four to five K-9 training aids, which contained pseudo-cocaine, while cleaning out his dog's possessions, and (2) that he had been in contact with 10 bags of rock cocaine, during the course of duty, in the early part of January 1990. As to the first explanation, the proof demonstrates that respondent was, and had been for some time, a canine officer with the City of Opa-Locka Police Department, and had a dog named "Eagle" as his partner. "Eagle" was a cross-trained drug and work dog. In or about September 1988, respondent and his dog attended narcotic detection training through the Florida Highway Patrol, and received training aids, which contained "pseudo-cocaine," for use in training dogs in the detection of cocaine. These aids were comprised of newborn baby socks, inside of which was placed pseudo-cocaine. The socks were then closed at the top with rubber bands and placed inside a folded towel, which was then rolled and taped. According to respondent, he continued to use these aids 2-3 times a week, after leaving the Florida Highway Patrol course, to keep his dog proficient. Eagle died in early January 1990 and, according to respondent, the week of January 18, 1990, respondent cleared a number of items that were used in the care or training of Eagle from a small aluminum shed in his back yard. Among those items were the training aids, which contained pseudo-cocaine. According to respondent, he disposed of the training aids by cutting the tape from the towels, removed the sock, and then shook the pseudo-cocaine into a trash can, which caused some residue to become airborne and contact him. Respondent's counsel theorizes that such contact with the pseudo-cocaine, as well as the possibility that some residue could have been lodged under respondent's fingernails, when coupled with the fact that respondent occasionally bites his nails, could be an explanation for the positive reading respondent received. Notably, respondent offered no proof at hearing, through representatives from the Florida Highway Patrol or otherwise, as to the chemical composition of the pseudo-cocaine. Under such circumstances, there is no showing of record that the pseudo-cocaine could have resulted in the positive reading he received, and it would be pure speculation to conclude otherwise. As to respondent's second explanation, that in early January 1990, during the course of duty, he had been in contact with 10 bags of rock cocaine, it likewise does not provide a rational explanation for his positive test results. Notably, according to respondent, that rock cocaine was bagged and, necessarily, he would not have had physical contact with the substance. Moreover, even if touched such would not explain its ingestion, and, considering the lapse of time from the event and his testing, is not a rational explanation for the source of his positive results. While the explanations respondent advanced at hearing were not persuasive, such does not compel the conclusion that his testimony is to be discredited. Indeed, if respondent never used cocaine, it is not particularly telling that he could not offer a plausible explanation for what he perceived to be an aberration. Here, while the results of the urinalysis point toward guilt, respondent's credible testimony, the character evidence offered on his behalf, and respondent's employment record suggest otherwise. With regard to respondent's employment history, the proof demonstrates that respondent was on active duty with the United States military from 1966 until 1972, and with the Florida National Guard (FNG) from 1974 until 1983. Prior to reverting to an inactive status with the FNG, respondent attended and graduated from the Southeastern Institute of Criminal Justice, a police academy, and was thereafter certified as a law enforcement officer. Following certification, respondent was employed by the Village of Indian Creek as a police officer for one year, and from January 1985 until his severance in 1990 as a police officer with the City of Opa-Locka. Currently, respondent is employed by the FNG, with the rank of Sergeant First Class, as a military criminal investigator assigned to counter drug programs for the Department of Justice. From respondent's initial employment as a police officer through his current employment, but for the incident in question, respondent has consistently been recognized as a professional, loyal and dedicated police officer who has also dedicated substantial personal time and resources to community service. During this service, he was frequently commended for his performance, and he has further demonstrated dedication to his profession through continued training in the law enforcement field. Among those who testified on his behalf, and spoke approvingly of respondent's good moral character, were Christina Royo, a sworn law enforcement officer with the Florida Department of Law Enforcement, and Alejandro Suarez, a Sergeant First Class with the United States Military, employed as a criminal intelligence analyst, and currently attached to respondent's FNG unit. Each of these witnesses are employed in positions of trust involving sensitive areas of law enforcement, and have known the respondent well for over fifteen years. In their opinions, which are credible, respondent enjoys a reputation reflecting good moral character and, it may be gleamed from their testimony, the use of controlled substances by respondent would be most uncharacteristic. Given the nominal amount of cocaine metabolite disclosed by testing and the credible proof regarding respondent's character, the inference that would normally carry petitioner's burden following proof of a positive test for cocaine metabolite, that such finding reflected the unlawful ingestion of cocaine, cannot prevail. Rather, considering the proof, no conclusion can be reached, with any degree of certainty, as to the reason for the positive test results. Accordingly, such results, standing alone, do not support the conclusion that respondent unlawfully ingested cocaine or that he is lacking of good moral character.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be rendered dismissing the administrative complaint filed against respondent. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of March 1995. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of March 1995.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is Ronald Charles Brown. By application dated September 16, 1987, he sought licensure as a real estate salesman. Question number six of the application completed by Petitioner requires a "yes" or "no" answer to the question: "Have you ever been convicted of a crime, found guilty, or entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere (no contest) , even if adjudication was withheld? Petitioner responded in the affirmative to question number six and disclosed that he was convicted in juvenile court of the offense of grand theft in Marion County, Florida in 1978; that he was charged with the offense of trespassing in 1982, which charge was subsequently dropped; and that he was charged with sale and possession of cocaine in Marion County in 1985. The court withheld adjudication of Petitioner's guilt of the drug sale and possession charge and placed him on probation for five years. By letter dated March 7, 1988, counsel for Respondent informed Petitioner of Respondent's intent to deny licensure to Petitioner on the basis of the 1978 grand theft conviction; a 1978 arrest and conviction for "hit and run" in Marion County; a 1978 arrest and conviction for contributing to the delinquency of a minor; and the 1985 cocaine sale and possession charge. In February of 1978, Petitioner was 17 years of age when, intoxicated by alcohol and drugs, he fell through a skylight into a jewelry store. He suffered minor cuts in the fall and remained lying on the floor at the scene until police, responding to a security alarm, arrived and took him into their custody. Petitioner was subsequently required to make restitution to the store for damages resulting from the incident in a Marion County, Florida, juvenile court proceeding. Petitioner reached his 18th birthday in May of 1978. He testified that in July of that year, he angrily backed out of the driveway of the residence of parents of a girl friend. In the process, he knocked over the parents' mailbox with the automobile he was driving. He went to his parents' home, obtained another mailbox and returned to install it at the residence of the girl friend's parents. Upon his arrival, he was met by law enforcement officials and arrested for "hit and run." A subsequent check by the officials disclosed his driver's license was invalid. The 16 year old girl friend, on a date undisclosed by the record but in close proximity to the mailbox incident, ran away from home to meet Petitioner at his parent's lake house in Marion County. Petitioner and she met there in the early evening. Her parents and law enforcement officials arrived that night. Petitioner was arrested and subsequently convicted of the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In 1985, Petitioner was arrested for sale and possession of cocaine. While the evidence fails to disclose Petitioner's plea to these charges, adjudication of guilt was withheld and Petitioner was placed on probation by the court. That probation was terminated July 19, 1988, by court order. At present, Petitioner is married. He and his wife have a small baby. He has been employed by a small chain of appliance stores for almost two years and now manages one of the stores. At the store managed by Petitioner, he exercises total control. He possesses the store keys, opens and closes the facility, oversees the inventory valued at approximately $300,000 and controls daily cash of approximately $5,000. He reports to a supervisor several miles away each morning to take and drive the delivery truck, loaded with products, to the store to which he Is assigned. Several informal inventories and one formal inventory have been performed at the store during the one year Petitioner has managed it and no losses have been noted. Petitioner denied he had ever sold cocaine; instead he insisted that his role was limited solely to that of being a delivery boy for other drug salespersons. He stated he has undertaken no specific drug rehabilitation program other than to discontinue involvement with controlled substances. In addition to his own testimony acknowledging and explaining his criminal record, he presented testimony regarding his character. Character witnesses consisted of Petitioner's mother and two other individuals. Both individuals testified they had known Petitioner only since February of 1986 or some point in time since the occurrence of his last criminal offense in 1985. Both individuals were impressed with Petitioner and indicated some knowledge, absence specific details, of his criminal background.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of January, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2900 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of January, 1989. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1231 The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED FINDINGS 1.-8. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Ronald Charles Brown, pro se 9400 Monte Carlo Blvd. Fort Pierce, Florida 33451 Lawrence Gendzier, Esquire 400 West Robinson Street Room 212 Orlando, Florida 32801 Kenneth E. Easley, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Real Estate Legal Services 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether the Respondent committed the violations charged in the Administrative Complaint, involving possessing and introducing onto the grounds of a state correctional institution, certain controlled substances and, if so, what if any penalty is warranted.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Erlene Stewart, has been employed as a correctional officer at Union Correctional Institution (UCI). She was so employed on February 1, 1999, and had been employed there for almost five years at that time. The Respondent was working on Saturday, January 30, 1999. On that day, officers at UCI examined employees coming to work by conducting an "Ion Scan" of employees to attempt to detect any drug or drug residues on or about their persons when they entered the institution to go on duty. The Respondent was subjected to such an Ion Scan and successfully passed it. Thus, she was aware that a drug detection effort was being conducted on Saturday, January 30, 1999, at UCI. February 1, 1999, was the Monday after that Saturday. The Respondent was working that day in tower number five of UCI. She had driven to work that day in the black Pontiac Grand Am in question, which is registered in her name. She was working on the 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., shift on that Monday. It was very unusual for a drug detection operation to be conducted on that Monday, immediately succeeding the Ion Scan drug detection operation which had been conducted on Saturday, two days before. Such a drug detection operation was conducted in the parking lot of UCI on Monday, February 1, 1999, however, using a drug detection dog. It was very unusual for a drug detection dog to be used so soon after an Ion Scan drug detection operation and also unusual for the dog to be used at 12:30 in the afternoon. The Respondent was surprised to find that a drug detection dog was being used in the parking lot of UCI on February 1, 1999. When the Respondent came to work on that day she locked her car leaving the windows slightly cracked and went inside to go on duty. Later that day, at approximately 12:30 p.m., a drug detection dog, handled by Sergeant Box of UCI, was examining vehicles in the parking lot and "alerted" to the presence or odor of narcotics inside or on the Respondent's vehicle. The dog had been trained and certified to be capable of passively alerting to the odors of four narcotics: marijuana, powdered cocaine, crack cocaine and heroin. After the dog alerted to the presence of contraband drugs in or on the Respondent's vehicle, the Respondent, who was then working in tower number five, was relieved of duty and summoned to her vehicle in the parking lot on the grounds of UCI. When she arrived in the vicinity of her vehicle, she was informed that a drug detection dog had alerted to her vehicle. She provided a written consent, to the officers present, to a search of her vehicle. The Respondent had to unlock her vehicle in order for the drug detection officers to begin their search of its interior. Upon gaining access to the interior of the Respondent's vehicle, Sergeant Mobley of Hamilton Correctional Institution, discovered an aluminum foil package containing a white powder suspected to be cocaine, on the passenger's side of her vehicle. Sergeant Mobley turned that package over to the custody of Inspector Bailey. Sergeant Dugger found what appeared to be marijuana on the driver's side of the Respondent's vehicle. Prior to his entry into the vehicle, Sergeant Dugger and Inspector Bailey had observed through the window what appeared to be marijuana and marijuana seeds on and about the driver's seat. The Respondent is familiar with the appearance of marijuana and cocaine. Moreover, she is aware that cocaine is commonly wrapped in aluminum foil. Her former husband had been known to use cocaine according to the Respondent's testimony. Inspector Bailey took custody of the suspected cocaine and marijuana and conducted two tests on both substances. The results of his field test and Ion Scan test were positive for marijuana and cocaine. The evidence was then turned over to Inspector Yaw who conducted another Ion Scan test on the white powder confirming it as cocaine. Sergeant Dale Pfalzgraf of the Union County Sheriff's Office, was summoned to UCI on that day, after the suspected drugs were located in the Respondent's vehicle. Inspector Yaw turned over to him a sealed plastic bag containing what appeared to be marijuana and a tin-foil package of what appeared to be cocaine. Deputy Pfalzgraf placed the Respondent under arrest and transported her and the evidence to the Sheriff's office. He placed the evidence into a secure locker with the evidence custodian, pending its transportation to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FDLE) laboratory. Deputy Tomlinson of the Union County Sheriff's Office was given the evidence that was seized from the Respondent's vehicle by the evidence custodian and transported it to the FDLE laboratory in Jacksonville, Florida, for testing. At the FDLE laboratory, Allison Harms received the evidence from Deputy Tomlinson. The evidence bag remained sealed until testing was performed by Ms. Somera, the FDLE chemistry analyst. Ms. Somera tested the substances contained within the bag and positively identified them as cannibis and cocaine. The Respondent maintains in her testimony that her former husband had access to her vehicle and had used it in the last several days with some of his friends. She contends that he is a known illicit drug user (cocaine). She also states that she left the windows to her car slightly cracked for ventilation when she parked it in the parking lot on the day in question to go to work. She states, in essence, that either the illicit drug materials found in her car were placed there without her knowledge by her former husband or his friends or, alternatively, that the correctional officers involved in the investigation planted the drug materials in her car in order to remove her from employment and/or licensure as retaliation for past employment-related friction she states she had with prison authorities. She also contends that another prison employee told her in private that she was being "framed" but that that person refused to testify on her behalf because of fear of potential loss of his job. In any event, her self-serving testimony is not corroborated by any other witness or exhibit and is not credited.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record and the candor and demeanor of the witnesses, and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED: That the Respondent be found guilty of failure to maintain good moral character as defined by the above-cited legal authority and that her certification be suspended for a period of two years. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of April, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of April, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: Gabrielle Taylor, Esquire Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Erlene Stewart Route 1, Box 52 Sanderson, Florida 32087 A. Leon Lowry, II Program Director Division of Criminal Justice Professionalism Services Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since 1992, licensed as an insurance representative in the State of Florida holding 02- 15, 02-16, 02-18, and 02-40 licenses. In October of 1999, an indictment was filed against Respondent and others in United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida Case No. 99-8145 (Indictment). In Count One of the Indictment, the following was alleged: From at least as early as November, 1993, through on or about September, 1999, the exact dates being unknown, at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County, in the Southern District of Florida and elsewhere, the defendants JOHN PHILIP ELLIS, SR., ROBERT KOCH, SHARON ALFONSO, MARK KENNEDY, JEFFREY POLLARD, HOWARD RICCARDI, did knowingly, willfully and unlawfully combine, conspire, confederate and agree with each other, and with persons known and unknown to the Grand Jury, to defraud the United States by attempting to impede, impair, obstruct and defeat the lawful government functions of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the Treasury Department in the ascertainment, computation, assessment and collection of revenue: to wit, income taxes. * * * In violation of Title 18, United States Code Section 371. Respondent pled guilty to the crime alleged in Count One of the Indictment. Based on Respondent's guilty plea, he was adjudicated guilty of said crime and, on January 23, 2002, given the following sentence: 21 months in prison, three years' probation following his release from prison, and a $100.00 fine.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Petitioner issue a Final Order revoking Respondent's licenses pursuant to Section 626.611, Florida Statutes. DONE AND ENTERED this 18th day of November, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of November, 2004.
The Issue Whether there was just cause to terminate Respondent’s annual employment contract during the term of the contract.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the duly authorized entity responsible for the operation, control, and supervision of all public schools (grades kindergarten through 12) in Charlotte County, Florida, and for otherwise providing public education to school-aged children in the county. Art. IX, § (4)b, Fla. Const.; § 1001.32, Fla. Stat. (2016). During all times relevant hereto, Petitioner employed Respondent as a classroom teacher working pursuant to an annual contract. Between the years 1986 through 2000, Respondent worked as an educator for the School District of Hillsborough County, Florida. During the late 1990s, Respondent had multiple surgeries on her lungs and jaw. Respondent was prescribed various pain medications following her surgeries, and unfortunately she became addicted to the medication. Around 1998, Respondent’s addiction to pain medication caused her to engage in criminal activity (i.e. attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud), which resulted in her arrest. Respondent, at the time of her arrest in 1998, was employed as a teacher by the Hillsborough County School District. As a result of her arrest, Respondent resigned from employment with the Hillsborough County School District. Additionally, the Florida Department of Education (DOE) was notified of Respondent’s arrest and as a result thereof suspended Respondent’s teaching certificate for two months, imposed a two-year probationary period, and required Respondent to submit to substance abuse treatment. Respondent left the teaching profession in 1998 and did not return to the profession until 2014, when she became employed by Petitioner. When Respondent returned to the profession in 2014, she still needed to complete the two years of probation imposed against her teaching certificate by DOE. As part of her probation, Respondent was required to submit to two years of random drug testing. For the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 school years, Respondent passed each of her randomly imposed drug tests and has subsequently been released from probation by DOE. Respondent has suffered from migraine headaches for several years and would often miss work due to migraine-related symptoms. Although Respondent missed several days of work during the 2016-2017 school year as a result of migraine headaches, her absences did not rise to the level to where it became necessary for her school principal to speak with her regarding the issue. On the morning of January 3, 2017, which was a teacher planning day, Respondent awoke with a migraine headache. Teachers are expected to report to work by 6:35 a.m. on teacher planning days. Respondent and Lisa Pellegrino were colleagues and friends. On January 3, 2017, at 7:16 a.m., 7:20 a.m., and at 10:29 a.m., respectively, Respondent called Ms. Pellegrino, who was at work. Respondent’s calls were not answered by Ms. Pellegrino because at the time, Ms. Pellegrino did not have her phone in her possession. At 9:01 a.m., on January 3, 2017, Respondent sent a text message to Ms. Deb Capo, who is the school’s secretary. The text message states: “Woke up with a headache . . . will be in ASAP.” At 10:36 a.m., Ms. Capo responded to the text message asking: “Are you here yet. Lou needs to see you.” Respondent replied and stated, “Not yet . . . I’ll be there by noon. All ok?” Ms. Capo then replied, “Yes. See you then.” At approximately 10:50 a.m., Ms. Pellegrino retrieved her cellphone and noticed that she had missed three calls from Respondent. Fearing a possible emergency, Ms. Pellegrino immediately called Respondent. Ms. Pellegrino testified during the final hearing as follows: I just called her because I wanted to see what was going on. I figured I had three missed calls; maybe there was an emergency. And when I spoke with her, she informed me that she had a really bad migraine, she didn’t think she was going to be able to make it, or she was trying to get pain pills because she couldn’t get her Imitrex prescription for a couple of days, and she was having a hard time getting to work to get her grades completed by the end of the day. And she asked me for pain pills or if I had any, and I said no.[1/] Within an hour or so of speaking with Respondent, Ms. Pellegrino and a few of her colleagues were preparing to leave for lunch when the question was asked, “did Lori [Respondent] come in yet?” One of the teachers in the lunch group was Amy Haggarty, who is the chairperson of the school’s math department and was aware of Respondent’s history of addiction to pain medication. Ms. Pellegrino, in response to the question about Respondent’s whereabouts, mentioned to Ms. Haggarty that she had just gotten off the phone with Respondent and that it was a weird conversation because Respondent said, according to Ms. Pellegrino, “that she has a bad migraine headache and she can’t fill her pain medication,” and asked her [Ms. Pellegrino] “if she had any pain medication.” Ms. Haggarty, because she knew of Respondent’s history with addiction to pain medication, became alarmed by Ms. Pellegrino’s statement and she immediately arranged to meet with the school principal, Mr. Long, to discuss what she had been told about Respondent. During her meeting with Mr. Long, Ms. Haggarty informed him of what she had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long, upon concluding his meeting with Ms. Haggarty, then met with Ms. Pellegrino. Upon questioning by Mr. Long, Ms. Pellegrino confirmed that she had spoken with Respondent that morning and that Respondent asked her for pain medication. Mr. Long then contacted the school board’s office of human resources to report what he had been told by Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Long was advised by a representative from the office of human resources that Dave Carter would report to the school on the morning of January 4, 2017, to “possibly place Ms. Lorenz on administrative leave.” Dave Carter is a “human resources investigator” for the Charlotte County School Board and he reports to, among others, Mr. Chuck Breiner, assistant superintendent for the school board. According to Mr. Carter, his job responsibilities include conducting “personnel investigations based on allegations of misconduct or violations of school district policies, rules, or the Department of Education code of ethics.” During his testimony, Mr. Carter explained that when Mr. Breiner, or others as appropriate, believes that reasonable suspicion exists to subject an employee to drug testing, he [Mr. Carter] will go to the employee’s worksite, perform “an on- scene concurrence evaluation” of the employee, and, if necessary, transport the employee to the drug testing facility. Mr. Carter testified that an on-scene concurrence evaluation consists of him “interview[ing] the principal, call[ing] the employee down, [and] mak[ing] a physical observation of [the employee].” Mr. Carter testified that upon completion of the concurrence evaluation, if he believes that reasonable suspicion does not exist for drug testing, he will contact Mr. Breiner who will then make the final determination of whether the employee should be subjected to drug testing. Respondent arrived at the school around 6:15 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017. Soon after arriving at the school, Respondent saw Mr. Long who informed Respondent that he needed to meet with her during the “second hour” of the day, which is her planning period. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that Respondent taught her first-period class before meeting with Mr. Long and Mr. Carter at 8:10 a.m. There is no evidence indicating that Mr. Long took any steps to observe Respondent’s “performance, appearance, or behavior” in preparation for his January 4, 2017, meeting with Respondent and Mr. Carter, or that Mr. Long reasonably believed that Respondent was under the influence of drugs such that she should be prevented from teaching her class.2/ At about 8:00 a.m. on the morning of January 4, 2017, Mr. Carter reported to Port Charlotte High School for the purpose of interviewing Respondent as part of an investigation into an unrelated matter. When Mr. Carter checked in at the school, he met with Mr. Long who informed him of the allegations concerning Respondent’s solicitation of pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter immediately contacted Mr. Breiner and informed him of the allegations against Respondent. Mr. Breiner, when he spoke with Mr. Carter, was not aware of Respondent’s history of drug addiction and, consequently, this was not a factor that he considered when ordering that Respondent be drug-tested. Mr. Breiner, based on the information that Respondent allegedly solicited pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino, as reported by Mr. Long, and the fact that Respondent, like a number of other employees, had multiple absences from work, directed Mr. Carter to terminate the investigation into the unrelated matter and to proceed with taking Respondent to an authorized facility for reasonable suspicion drug testing. At no time prior to directing Mr. Carter to subject Respondent to drug testing did Mr. Breiner instruct Mr. Carter to personally interview Ms. Pellegrino regarding her conversation with Respondent. Additionally, at no time prior to Respondent’s drug test did Mr. Carter even attempt to question Ms. Pellegrino about her conversation with Respondent and the circumstances related thereto. It was only after Respondent had been drug tested that Mr. Carter interviewed Ms. Pellegrino. Mr. Carter, after receiving direction from Mr. Breiner, and with the assistance of Debbie Anderson, who works as a personnel analyst in Respondent’s department of human resources, met with Respondent and explained that she was required to submit to drug testing pursuant to the school board’s drug-free workplace policy. Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Petitioner uses a form titled “Reasonable Suspicion Indicators Checklist” (checklist), when evaluating employees for suspicion of violating Petitioner’s Drug and Alcohol Free Work Environment Policy. The checklist provides as follows: Manager/Supervisor: This form is to be used to substantiate and document the objective facts and circumstances leading to a reasonable suspicion determination. After careful observations of the employee’s performance, appearance or behavior, please check all the observed indicators that raised the suspicion that the employee may have engaged in conduct which violates the Drug- and Alcohol-Free Work Environment Policy. Incident or reason for suspicion Apparent drug or alcohol intoxication Nausea or vomiting Abnormal or erratic behavior Evidence of possession, dispensation, or use of a prohibited substance Industrial accident requiring medical attention Physical altercation or assault Odors and/or Appearance Odor of alcohol (on breath or person) Distinctive, pungent aroma on clothing Excessive sweating or skin clamminess very flushed very pale Jerky eye movements Unfocused, blank stare Dilated or constricted pupils Dry mouth, frequent swallowing or wetting lips Bloodshot or watery eyes Behavior and Speech Slurred or incoherent speech Breathing difficulty or irregularity Loss of physical control, dizzy or fainting Unsteady walk, poor coordination Euphoric, fidgety, agitated or nervous affect Shaking hands/body, tremors, twitches Extreme fatigue or sleeping on the job Lackadaisical, apathetic attitude Irritable, moody, belligerent or aggressive demeanor Nausea or vomiting Suspicion of others; paranoia; accuses others Physical and/or verbal abusiveness Rambling, loud, fast, silly or repetitious speech Talkative, cursing, other inappropriate speech Diminished (or lack of) concentration Delayed or faulty decision making Impulsive, unsafe risk-taking Inappropriate response to instructions Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed a checklist. None of the indicators listed above were checked by either Mr. Carter of Ms. Anderson as it pertains to their evaluation of Respondent. There is, however, an “indicator” appearing on the respective forms that is different in substance when comparing the form completed by Mr. Carter with the one completed by Ms. Anderson. On the form completed by Mr. Carter, there is a marked indicator that reads “Colleague disclosed that employee solicited ‘pain medication’ (controlled substance) during a teacher work day.” By comparison, the form completed by Ms. Anderson notes a different indicator which states “Employee discloses that he or she has consumed alcohol, used or ingested a controlled substance during or immediately prior to duty.” Neither party offered an explanation regarding the differences between the forms. Nevertheless, both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson attached a narrative to the checklist regarding the circumstances surrounding Ms. Pellegrino’s statement about Respondent allegedly soliciting Ms. Pellegrino for pain medication. Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson each completed their respective checklist on January 11, 2017, which coincidentally, was the same date that Respondent’s lab results from her drug test were received by Petitioner.3/ The evidence does not explain why both Mr. Carter and Ms. Anderson waited several days to complete their respective checklists. Mr. Carter testified that when he performed his concurrence evaluation of Respondent on January 4, 2017, the only indicator present for subjecting Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing was the statement of Ms. Pellegrino indicating that Respondent solicited pain medication from her on January 3, 2017. Ms. Anderson did not testify at the final hearing. Mr. Breiner, who made the ultimate decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing on January 4, 2017, testified that two factors drove his determination: the first being Ms. Pellegrino’s statement, and the second being Respondent’s history of absenteeism from work during the 2016- 2017 school year.4/ On cross-examination, however, Mr. Breiner admitted that in Respondent’s notice of termination he made no reference to absenteeism being a factor in his decision to subject Respondent to reasonable suspicion drug testing. Morphine and Imitrex Respondent admits that on January 3, 2017, she took morphine in order to get relief from her migraine headache. Respondent testified that she typically takes Imitrex to treat her migraines, but when that drug is ineffective she takes morphine for relief of her symptoms. According to Petitioner, she has been taking Imitrex since about 2007 and she suffers no side effects from the medication. Respondent testified that she typically takes morphine about once or twice a year “when the Imitrex [is not] working” and that the effects of the morphine last “[a]nywhere from four to six hours, sometimes eight, but nothing after that.” Petitioner did not rebut Respondent’s statement and offered no evidence regarding the effects of morphine and the period of time after ingestion that a person is typically under the influence of the drug. According to medical records from Peace River Medical Center, Respondent was discharged from the hospital on August 23, 2007, following treatment for: 1. “[c]hest pain, myocardial infarction protocol; 2. [p]leuritic pneumonia; [and] [m]igraine.” At the time of release from the hospital, Respondent was “discharged home with Morphine 60 mg p.r.n.” According to Respondent’s unrefuted testimony, the morphine pill that she took on January 3, 2017, was part of the batch of pills that she received when discharged from the hospital in 2007. Petitioner, when first interviewed by Respondent on January 13, 2017, denied soliciting pain medication from Ms. Pellegrino.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Charlotte County School Board enter a final order finding that there was no just cause to terminate Respondent’s employment during the term of her 2016-2017 annual contract with the School Board. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 2017.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaint and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken.
Findings Of Fact Respondent was certified by the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission on July 11, 1990, and issued certificate number 4-90-502-02. On May 31, 1990, Dawn Rees was working in concert with the Police Department of Williston, Florida, and the Florida Department of Law Enforcement as a confidential informant regarding illegal drug activity in the Williston area. In the course of her work, Rees would meet with various individuals and attempt to buy illegal drugs. As a prelude to each of these meetings, Rees would be searched by law enforcement officials to determine that she had no illegal drugs on her person. Then, she would be "wired" or fitted with sonic monitoring equipment and sent to negotiate the illegal drug purchase. Upon her return from the drug rendezvous, Rees would turn over any contraband purchased by her and submit again to a personal search. Rees' conversations with the persons from whom she sought to buy drugs was monitored and recorded by authorities via the broadcast of those communications to them through the "wire" worn by Rees. On the evening of May 31, 1994, Rees went to the residence where Respondent lived and spoke with William Lynch, a friend of Respondent who also resided in the house, concerning the purchase of an ounce of marijuana. The conversation between Lynch and Rees took place on the front porch of the residence. Lynch told Rees that he could get the marijuana for her. Later that evening, Rees, equipped with the hidden listening device described above, returned and entered the residence to get the promised marijuana. Sometime later, Rees left the residence and met with law enforcement authorities. As stipulated by the parties at the final hearing, a field test of the substance obtained from Lynch in the residence by Rees, and provided to authorities that night, identified the drug as marijuana. As established by Rees' testimony at the final hearing, she was involved in several other investigations as a confidential informant during the same general time span that she was also involved in the drug purchase at Respondent's residence. Rees testified from the basis of her recollection of events that had occurred several years prior to final hearing. Respondent was present and operating a "Nintendo" game when Rees entered the house. Respondent engaged in conversation with Rees, but did not observe the later exchange of money for marijuana between her and Lynch. The exchange, as established by Lynch's candid and credible testimony, took place in a back bedroom of the house, out of the presence of Respondent. Respondent testified that he had no knowledge of the transaction or the presence of illegal drugs in the house. Accordingly, Rees' testimony, absent further corroboration by other direct admissible evidence, that Respondent knew illicit drugs were on the premises and observed the drug transaction, cannot be credited. A transcript, presented at the final hearing and purportedly derived from the tape of conversations had between Rees and persons in the residence garnered via the "wire" worn by Rees, offers no proof in support of a contention that Respondent was aware of the presence or sale of illegal drugs on the premises. As established by the credible testimony of Respondent, and corroborated by Lynch, Respondent was unaware of the presence of illicit drugs in the residence or the sale of such drugs in the residence at any time, contrary to allegations of the Administrative Complaint. Later, Lynch moved out of the residence. Respondent was arrested several months later in connection with the incident. By stipulation of the parties, it is established that those charges were subsequently nolle prossed by the Office of the State Attorney, 8th Judicial Circuit of Florida. The evidence presented by Petitioner of Respondent's knowledge and possible participation in the possession and sale of an illicit drug, marijuana, as charged in the Administrative Complaint, is met by Respondent's credible denial of any knowledge as to the alleged events. Further, Respondent's assertion of innocence is corroborated by the testimony of William Lynch. It is concluded that there is insufficient evidence to establish that Respondent knew that drugs were in the house on the night in question or that Respondent knew of the drug sale to Dawn Rees.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that a Final Order be entered dismissing the charges contained in the Administrative Complaint. DONE and ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of June, 1994. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX In accordance with provisions of Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, the following rulings are made on the proposed findings of fact submitted on behalf of the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings 1-2 Accepted. 3-4 Rejected, the transcript reference shows that Respondent was arrested on February 5, 1991, following the May, 1990 incident. 5-6 Accepted. 7-8 Subordinate to HO's findings on these points. Specifically, Ms. Rees is found to have been mistaken about the content of her conversations with Respondent and without a basis to draw the conclusion that Respondent was a willing and knowledgeable participant in illegal activity. Subordinate to HO findings. Respondent had the transcript admitted to show its lack of probative value. At no time does Respondent adopt the transcript in order to prove the case against himself. Rejected, relevance. Accepted. Rejected, relevance. Accepted. Rejected, weight of the evidence. Respondent's Proposed Findings None submitted. COPIES FURNISHED: Pauline Ingreham-Drayton Attorney at Law Florida Department of Law Enforcement 711 B Liberty Street Jacksonville, Florida 32202 Richard Bova, Jr. 624 S.W. 70th Terrace Gainesville, Florida 32608 Leon Lowry, Director Criminal Justice Standards Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael Ramage General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302
The Issue The issue is whether Respondent attempted to obtain his license to practice medicine by fraudulent representations, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(a), Florida Statutes, or if Respondent misrepresented or concealed a material fact during any phase of a licensing or disciplinary process, in violation of Section 458.331(1)(gg), Florida Statutes. If so, an additional issue is what penalty the Board of Medicine should impose.
Findings Of Fact By application dated and acknowledged on December 27, 1993, Respondent applied for a medical license by endorsement. Respondent filed the application with the Board of Medicine on January 12, 1994. Question 6 on the application asks: Have you ever been convicted of a felony? Yes No ; a misdemeanor? Yes No . Have any judgments ever been entered against you? Yes No . Have you ever been sued for malpractice? Yes No . In response, Respondent typed X’s in the “No” boxes for the first two questions in Question 6. Immediately above the signature of Respondent and acknowledgement of the notary public, on the last page of the application, is the statement: I have carefully read the questions in the foregoing application and have answered them completely, without reservations of any kind, and I declare under penalty of perjury that my answers and all statements made by me are true and correct. Should I furnish any false information in this application, I hereby agree that such act shall constitute cause for denial, suspension or revocation of my license to practice medicine/surgery in the State of Florida. In fact, on October 24, 1988, Respondent was found guilty, after a three-day jury trial, of 12 misdemeanor counts of failure to remit a total of over $47,000 in state sales taxes due from November 20, 1985, through December 20, 1986. On December 22, 1988, the court sentenced Respondent to pay a fine of $12,000 on all 12 counts and reasonable court costs, and serve six months’ probation on each of the 12 counts, with the periods of probation to run consecutively. Respondent’s explanation for the omission from the application is that he mistakenly believed that the only misdemeanors covered by the question were those involving the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the nondisclosure is unreasonable. Nothing in the language of Question 6 limits the scope of the inquiry to misdemeanors involving the practice of medicine. The preceding question in Question 6 asks about felonies without qualification or limitation, and it is absurd to interpret this question as not asking about any felony, such as bank robbery, even though the felony did not involve the practice of medicine. For the same reason, Respondent knew that he was to have disclosed any misdemeanor, even if it did not involve the practice of medicine. Respondent’s explanation for the commission of the crimes is more plausible. Briefly, Respondent testified that he had invested about $100,000 of the total of $250,000 in the acquisition of the Philadelphia franchise of long-distance telephone provider that had emerged immediately following the breakup of AT&T in the mid 1980s. Essentially reselling AT&T long-distance services, the new company paid AT&T at wholesale for the services that it marked up and sold at retail to end users. Respondent explained that he had been an absentee owner for much of the time. Also, the AT&T billing for this new arrangement was confused and irregular. Changes in ownership preceding and following Respondent’s investment in the company further complicated the situation. A Pennsylvania revenue auditor contacted Respondent over a year after he had sold his stock in the company in 1986, gotten married, and been traveling extensively out of state. At this time, Respondent learned of the company’s sales tax problems, which involved a complicated telecommunications excise tax. Respondent’s corporate purchaser was no longer operating the company, which had become bankrupt. Respondent paid the taxes due, but the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania nevertheless prosecuted him for his role in the failure of the company to pay its taxes. After sentencing, Respondent paid the fine and served his probation without incident. He disclosed the misdemeanor convictions to the Pennsylvania agency regulating the practice of medicine and was able to continue practicing medicine there. After consideration of Respondent’s application, the Florida Board of Medicine issued Respondent license number ME 0066606.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint against Respondent. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of December, 2000, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of December, 2000. COPIES FURNISHED: Tanya Willaims, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin C03 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 William W. Large, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Theodore M. Henderson, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Kim M. Kluck Carol Gregg Senior Attorneys Agency for Health Care Administration Post Office Box 14229 Tallahassee, Florida 32317-4229 Christopher Grillo 1 East Broward Boulevard, Suite 700 Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301
Findings Of Fact O.L.T., the Petitioner, was hired by Disc Village, Inc., as a youth counselor at Greenville Hills Academy in December, 1995. Because of the nature of the employment, the Petitioner provided Disc Village, Inc. a fingerprint card for the purpose of conducting the statutorily required criminal records check. The Petitioner reported his prior arrest and subsequent plea of guilty to criminal charges in South Carolina to his employer at the time of his application for employment. The criminal records check reveal the Petitioner's arrest and the investigator at the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS), which was administering this part of the program at the time, requested the Petitioner to provide them information regarding his criminal record in South Carolina in order to determine if the offense involved was disqualifying under the Florida law. The records from South Carolina were provided to DHRS by the Petitioner, and revealed he had plead guilty to "conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute," in Horry County, South Carolina on December 7, 1987. Based upon these records, which were provided to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) by DHRS when DJJ assumed full administration of the juvenile justice program, DJJ determined that the Petitioner was disqualified from employment as a youth counselor, and advised Disc Village, Inc., which discharged the Petitioner from the position in which he was employed. The Petitioner's court records from South Carolina were introduced as Department's Exhibit 3. These records reveal that the Petitioner pleaded guilty to "conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute." These records do not reveal the statute to which the Petitioner pleaded guilty. The sentencing document references only the indictment (87-GS-26-1796). Indictment 87-GS-26-1796 does not reference a specific statute, but recites the Petitioner did "knowingly, wilfully and intentionally, combine, conspire, confederate and agree between and among and have tacit understanding with a reliable informant working with the Myrtle Beach Police Department and with other evil disposed persons whose names are unknown to the Grand Jurors for the purpose of Possessing Cocaine with Intent to Distribute." Joint Exhibit 1 is a copy of a portion of the South Carolina Code defining criminal offenses involving possession of drugs. There are two portions of the exhibit which address conspiracy, Section 44-53-370(e) and Section 44-53-420. Section 44-53-420 provides that any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense made unlawful by the statutes, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than half of the punishment prescribed for the offense which was attempted or which was the object of the conspiracy. Section 44-53-370(e) provides that any person who knowingly sells, manufactures, delivers, or brings into this state, or who provides financial assistance or otherwise aids, abets, or conspires to sell, manufacture, deliver, or bring into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive possession of: (1) ten pounds of marijuana . . . ; (2) ten grams or more of cocaine or any mixtures containing cocaine is guilty of a felony which is known as trafficking in cocaine and upon conviction must be punished as follows if the quantity is: (a) ten grams or more, but less than twenty-eight grams, . . . not less than three years . . . ; (b) twenty-eight grams of more, but less than one hundred grams . . . not less than twenty-five years . . . [.] These are mandatory minimum sentences. The Petitioner was sentenced to one year in prison, and that sentence was suspended and he was placed on one years probation. Although the Petitioner was arrested for conspiracy to possess more than 28 grams of cocaine, the indictment and sentencing documents do not reflect that he was charged with that offense, and his sentence is less than the minimum mandatory sentence for either of the offenses regarding possession or conspiracy to possess cocaine, even if the court reduced the sentence by a half pursuant to Section 44-53-420. None of the court records establish an amount of cocaine which Petitioner was charged with possessing, conspiring to possess, or to which the Petitioner plead guilty to conspiring to possess. The Petitioner is a Black male who graduated from Florida A and M University, and was commissioned in the U.S. Air Force. He was employed by the Florida Probation and Parole Commission as a probation officer until going on active duty in the Air Force where he was trained as an Air Policeman. He left the Air Force and was employed as by the Commission of Alcoholism and Drug Abuse in South Carolina where he established diversion programs for persons charged with driving under the influence. He was subsequently employed in the low energy assistance program of the state, and then left state employment to work for C & S Bank, at which time he left South Carolina. Subsequently, he left C & S and returned to South Carolina where he started his own construction company. Because of financial hard times, he lost money and had to declare bankruptcy. At the time of the events which gave rise to the charges against him, his wife was employed by the local prosecuting attorney, and he was well known to local law enforcement officers. In 1987, he was working in Myrtle Beach, South Carolina; and it was his practice to eat lunch with a group of persons who were self employed, none of whom were involved in illegal dealings. This group of acquaintances also got together occasionally after work for a drink, and at one of these meetings one of the members of the group raised the possibility of investing in an enterprise which was not described, but which was represented to be very lucrative. From the way it was presented and very large return which was available, the Petitioner concluded it was an illegal activity, and was shocked that this person would make this representation. When he left the meeting, he was asked whether he wished to participate, he indicated that he would have get back to them about it. Upon leaving the meeting, Petitioner commented to one of the other attendees that the enterprise was undoubtedly illegal and something to be avoided. Several days later, he received a telephone call after having been out with another group of friends drinking. The caller did not identify himself and was not a party to the earlier meeting; however, the caller referenced that meeting. The caller advised the Petitioner that the caller had $40,000, and indicated indirectly he was calling about drugs and wanted to meet with Petitioner. The Petitioner said he did not know what the caller was talking about, but would meet him in a vacant parking lot, very close to Petitioner's house, to determine what the caller was calling about. The Petitioner did not acknowledge in the call what the caller was talking about or agree to do anything beyond meeting the caller. Petitioner admitted that he had been drinking most of the evening, was drunk, and agreed to meet with the caller just to see if he really had the money. The Petitioner thought it could be a practical joke, and really did not give a great deal of thought to the matter because he was so drunk. The Petitioner had picked the vacant parking lot in which to meet the caller because it was close to Petitioner's house and he would not have to drive far as drunk as he was. The area was also well lighted and he felt safe there. Petitioner arrived at the parking lot, stopped his car, and was immediately surrounded by police officers who arrested him for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. A search of Petitioner revealed Petitioner was carrying twenty-seven cents. A search of his wife's car, which he had driven to the meeting, revealed his wife's pistol for which she had a permit and which she kept under the driver's seat. The Petitioner knew the gun was there. There were no drugs found in the car. The caller was not present, and was never arrested or identified. Petitioner was represented by the former solicitor (prosecutor) for the county. Petitioner and his attorney listened to the tape of the telephone conversation shortly after Petitioner's arrest. The tape was consistent with the Petitioner's testimony above; however, prior to trial, a copy of the tape was produced which was altered to be more damaging. Petitioner's attorney indicated that it would be very expensive to have the tape analyzed and to fight the charges, and that Petitioner could be sentenced up to twenty-five years for the offense. Petitioner's attorney advised Petitioner that the prosecutor was offering one year's probation if Petitioner plead guilty. On the advise of counsel, Petitioner accepted the plea bargain. The Petitioner satisfactorily completed his probation, and has spent the intervening time supporting his children by working at various occupations to include installing cable TV and working on a electronic components assembly line after his return to Madison, Florida. He has attempted to rehabilitate his reputation by working regularly, avoiding disreputable persons, and attending church regularly. His employment with Disc Village, Inc. was his first attempt to reenter the criminal justice field since his probation. At the time of the hearing, Petitioner was volunteering as a facilitator in a life skills class, but was unemployed. Petitioner's coworkers and supervisors testified in his behalf. They found him to be honest, truthful, and morally upright in his actions and dealings with them and the young people with whom he counseled. He spent many extra hours at the facility, and respected by young people for whom he was an effective counselor. Petitioner would not be a danger to young people. No credible evidence was presented that the Petitioner did not possess good character or was a danger to children. Since his probation, the Petitioner has had no further criminal involvement. He has been gainfully employed until discharged from Disc Village, and has been engaged in worthwhile volunteer work since then. He attends church regularly, sings in the choir, and lives with a minister. Petitioner has amended his life, and has a reputation of being honest and truthful. His work with the young people at Disc Village was exceptional, and he was held in high esteem by the staff and the young people.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is, RECOMMENDED: That Petitioner be qualified to work with youth in the Department's facilities and those of its contract agencies. DONE and ENTERED this 8th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER CASE NO. 95-3630J The parties submitted proposed findings of fact which were read and considered. The following states which facts were adopted and which were rejected and why: Petitioner's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1,2 Irrelevant. Paragraph 3 Paragraph 1. Paragraph 4 Paragraph 2. Paragraph 5 Irrelevant. Paragraph 6 Paragraph 3. Paragraph 7 Subsumed by Paragraph 4. Paragraph 8 Paragraphs 3,5. Paragraph 9 Subsumed by Paragraph 6. Paragraphs 10-12 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 13-16 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraphs 17-20 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 21-23 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraphs 24-26 Irrelevant. Paragraphs 27-31 Subsumed in Paragraph 18. Paragraphs 32-35 Discussed in the C/L and rejected as credible witnesses regarding the Petitioner's character Paragraphs 36-40 Unnecessary. Paragraphs 41,42 Subsumed in Paragraph 17. Paragraphs 43,44 Conclusions of Law (C/L). Respondent's Recommended Order Findings Paragraphs 1-3 Subsumed in Paragraphs 1,2 Paragraph 4 Conclusion of Law. Paragraphs 5,6 Subsumed in Paragraph 1. Paragraphs 7-9 Subsumed in Paragraph 4. Paragraphs 10,11 Subsumed in Paragraph 2. Paragraph 12 Paragraph 3. Paragraph 13 Paragraph 7. Paragraphs 14,15 Subsumed in Paragraph 4. Paragraphs 15-17 The discussion of the informal hearing and its results is irrelevant. Paragraph 18 Rejected as contrary to more credible evidence. Paragraphs 19-21 Irrelevant. Paragraph 22 Conclusion of Law. COPIES FURNISHED: Richard M. Summa, Esquire Post Office Box 1677 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Lynne T. Winston, Esquire Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100 Calvin Ross, Secretary Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100 Janet Ferris, General Counsel Department of Juvenile Justice 2737 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-3100
