The Issue Whether or not Halifax' Second Amended Petition has alleged sufficient standing to initiate a Section 120.57(1) F.S. formal hearing, pursuant to Subsection 381.709(5)(b) F.S., in challenge of HRS' modification of ATC's CON.
Findings Of Fact ATC is an existing 50-bed specialty psychiatric hospital with 25 short- term psychiatric beds for children or adolescents, five beds for short-term substance abuse by children or adolescents, and 20 long-term psychiatric beds for children or adolescents. ATC has operated under CON 2331 since 1984. By correspondence dated March 7, 1990, HRS issued to ATC Amended CON 2331 authorizing ATC to convert 15 of its 20 long-term psychiatric beds for children and adolescents into long-term psychiatric beds for adults in a secure unit. Petitioner Halifax is an existing 545 bed acute care hospital with adult patients in its 50-bed secure psychiatric unit. Its existing hospital license 2700 is for a short-term psychiatric program which does not specify use of the beds for either adults or for children and adolescents. Halifax does not have a CON for a long-term psychiatric program. Halifax' Second Amended Petition alleges its standing in the following terms: . . . Halifax is a 545 bed acute care hospital, licensed pursuant to Chapter 395, Florida Statutes, and located within HRS District IV. Halifax provides psychiatric services to adult patients in its 50 bed psychiatric unit. Due to the nature of the patients served, Halifax operates it (sic) psychiatric services in a secured unit. Halifax's psychiatric unit has been in operation since December 7, 1951 and is an "established program" under Section 381.709(5)(b) Fla. Stat. * * * 5. Halifax is a substantially affected party, and its substantial interest is subject to a determination in this proceeding in that: Halifax is an existing provider of acute care hospital services, located in Volusia County, Florida, and within HRS District IV. Halifax has an established program which provides psychiatric services to adult patients within HRS District IV. If the issuance of Amended CON 2331 were upheld, ATC would offer the same adult psychiatric services presently offered at Halifax' established psychiatric program. Therefore, Halifax is entitled to initiate this proceeding pursuant to Section 381.709(5)(b) F.S. (1989). The issuance of Amended CON 2331 will result in an unnecessary duplication of the same adult psychiatric services provided by Halifax in HRS District IV. Such duplication of services will result in decreased utilization of Halifax' psychiatric program, increased costs to consumers of such psychiatric health care services, and the decreased financial viability of Halifax' established psychiatric program. Additionally, the Second Amended Petition asserts that ATC's requested amendment of CON 2331 would represent a substantial change in the inpatient institutional health services offered by ATC and, thus, is subject to CON review pursuant to Section 381.706(1)(h) F.S. (1989). Further, Halifax alleges that, if approved, the amendment to CON 2331 will authorize ATC to serve an entirely new patient population that it is not authorized to serve pursuant to the original CON.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services enter a Final Order dismissing Halifax' Second Amended Petition and affirming the agency action modifying ATC's CON 2331. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of October, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of October, 1990. Copies furnished to: Harold C. Hubka, Esquire Black, Crotty, Sims, Hubka, Burnett, Bartlett and Samuels 501 North Grandview Avenue Post Office Box 5488 Daytona Beach, Florida 32118 Robert A. Weiss, Esquire Parker, Hudson, Rainer & Dobbs The Perkins House 118 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lesley Mendelson, Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 103 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint are correct and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged by statute with regulating the practice of osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida pursuant to Section 20.30, Florida Statutes, and Chapters 455 and 459, Florida Statutes. The Respondent is and at all times material to this case was a licensed physician in the State of Florida, license #OS 0004352, last known address identified as 1232 S.W. 8th Place, Cape Coral, Florida 33991. From 1985 until 1992, the Respondent had a private general medical practice in Fort Myers. In 1991, the Respondent began to exhibit signs of emotional instability. In April 1991, the Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) received a report that the Respondent was attempting to locate injectible Demerol allegedly for his own use. This information was forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN is a program operated by the health care professions to assist practitioners impaired by mental illness, physical or mental disability or chemical dependence. Demerol is a Schedule II Controlled Substance pursuant to Chapter 893, Florida Statutes. On July 8, 1991, the DPR again received a report that the Respondent was writing inappropriate prescriptions for patients and obtaining the medication for personal use. This information was again forwarded to the Physician's Recovery Network (PRN), but remained unverified. The PRN contacted the Respondent about the allegation. The Respondent denied the report. In 1992, the Respondent began to exhibit profuse sweating, involuntary muscle jerks, and inattentiveness to his work. Some patients expressed concern to office staff about the Respondent's condition. In 1992, a DPR investigator visited pharmacies in the Fort Myers area. She learned that the Respondent had been contacting area pharmacies in an attempt to locate injectible Demerol. She further learned that the Respondent would arrive at a pharmacy with a Demerol prescription made out to a patient and which he would obtain supposedly on the patient's behalf. She collected a number of such prescriptions which had been filled by pharmacies. Many of the prescriptions were made out for patients at Meadowbrook Manor, a nursing home at which the Respondent had patients. A review of the patient records indicated that none of the patients had been prescribed Demerol. On March 27, 1992, an member of his office staff contacted the Respondent by telephone and determined him to be incoherent. She went to the Respondent's house to ascertain his condition. After gaining entry to the home, she found a number of Demerol bottles in an open dresser drawer, at least one of which was empty. She also discovered syringes in the drawer. The Respondent's eye was blackened. Blood was visible about the bathroom in the house. The staff member determined that although the Respondent had fallen during the night, he was reluctant to seek medical attention. Several hours after the staff member had arrived at the Respondent's house, he was incoherent. She called for an ambulance. The Respondent was subsequently transported to the hospital. Examination of the Respondent clearly indicated that he had suffered a head injury. While in the hospital, the Respondent was examined by a board certified psychiatrist. According to the psychiatrist, the Respondent exhibited substantially impaired memory, was very guarded with his communication and, notwithstanding the injury, indicated his intent to leave the hospital quickly. He was unable to recall the current month and date. He denied prior consumption of alcohol despite lab tests to the contrary. He also denied having previously been chemically dependent, although he had been involved in the intervention of said problem in 1981. The psychiatrist diagnosed the Respondent as having residual organic brain syndrome as a result of his chemical intake. Based on the diagnosis, the psychiatrist recommended that the Respondent begin an inpatient drug rehabilitation program. The psychiatrist also referred the Respondent's impairment to the DPR. In March of 1992, the DPR alerted the PRN about the Respondent's condition. The PRN assigned a local representative to encourage the Respondent to seek treatment. On March 31, 1992, the Respondent entered a treatment program at Palmview Hospital. While in the program, he admitted to having self-injected Demerol. The Respondent was resistant to treatment while at Palmview Hospital. Although he acknowledged having previously received inpatient treatment at another facility, he alternately admitted and denied abusing Demerol. On April 10, 1992, the Respondent discharged himself from Palmview Hospital. The discharge was against the advise of the treating physician at Palmview. At the time of the discharge, PRN representatives discussed the matter with the Respondent. The Respondent stated that he was leaving the inpatient treatment program and was going to being outpatient treatment from the Palmview facility. The treating physician at Palmview told the PRN that the Respondent required three to four weeks of inpatient treatment. It was the opinion of the treating physician that the Respondent was not capable of safely providing medical care to patients at that time. Based on the Palmview information, the PRN instructed the Respondent that he must complete inpatient treatment and that he could not practice medicine until it was decided that he could do so safely. In April 13-16, 1992, the Respondent obtained a second opinion from another physician affiliated with the Addiction Treatment Program at Mount Sinai Medical Center in Miami Beach, Florida, where he was examined by a board certified addictionologist. According to the Mount Sinai addictionologist, the Respondent is addicted to Demerol and requires treatment. Based on the Mount Sinai information, the PRN instructed the Respondent not to practice and to seek immediate treatment for his addiction. On April 22, 1992, the Respondent reentered Palmview Hospital. Upon reentry, the Respondent denied using Demerol, but eventually acknowledged using the drug and being chemically dependent. It was determined during the second Palmview admission, that the Respondent was in need of approximately four months in a long term inpatient care treatment facility. On May 22, 1992, the Respondent was admitted to the Talbott-Marsh recovery program. He was diagnosed as having a personality disorder with antisocial, paranoid and narcissistic traits, and to being opiate dependent, On August 3, 1992, the Respondent left the Talbott-Marsh center without completing the program. The records and reports of the Respondent's condition were reviewed by Dr. Roger Goetz, M.D., the director of the PRN. Dr. Goetz, who also has personal knowledge of the Respondent's condition, is certified by the American Association of Addiction Medicine and has extensive experience as a medical doctor and in treating impaired physicians. Dr. Goetz asserted that the Respondent is suffering from a dangerous condition, that he is mentally ill and that he poses a threat to himself and to the public. Dr. Goetz opined that the Respondent is unable to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to patients and that his continued practice constitutes an immediate and serious danger to the public health, safety and welfare.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Professional Regulation, Board of Medicine, enter a Final Order determining that Benjamin D. Goldberg, D.O., has violated Section 459.015(1)(w), Florida Statutes, and revoking his license (#OS 0004352) to practice as a physician in the State of Florida. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of August, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 93-1553 The Respondent did not file a proposed recommended order. To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, the following constitute rulings on proposed findings of facts submitted by the Petitioner. The Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are accepted as modified and incorporated in the Recommended Order except as follows: 22, 37. Rejected, unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medicine 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Francesca Plendl, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Benjamin Goldberg, D.O. 1232 South West 8th Place Cape Coral, Florida 33991
The Issue Whether the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA or the Agency) should approve the application for certificate of need (CON) 7700 filed by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, LTD. d/b/a Miami Heart Institute (Miami Heart or MH).
Findings Of Fact The Agency is the state agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing and taking action on CON applications pursuant to Chapter 408, Florida Statutes. The applicant, Miami Heart, operates a hospital facility known as Miami Heart Institute which, at the time of hearing, was comprised of a north campus (consisting of 273 licensed beds) and a south campus (consisting of 258 beds) in Miami, Florida. The two campuses operate under a single license which consolidated the operation of the two facilities. The consolidation of the license was approved by CON 7399 which was issued by the Agency prior to the hearing of this case. The Petitioner, Mount Sinai, is an existing health care facility doing business in the same service district. On February 4, 1994, AHCA published a fixed need pool of zero adult inpatient psychiatric beds for the planning horizon applicable to this batching cycle. The fixed need pool was not challenged. On February 18, 1994, Miami Heart submitted its letter of intent for the first hospital batching cycle of 1994, and sought to add twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at the Miami Heart Institute south campus. Such facility is located in the Agency's district 11 and is approximately two (2) miles from the north campus. Notice of that letter was published in the March 11, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Miami Heart's letter of intent provided, in pertinent part: By this letter, Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., d/b/a Miami Heart Institute announces its intent to file a Certificate of Need Application on or before March 23, 1994 for approval to establish 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults at Miami Heart Institute. Thus, the applicant seeks approval for this project pursuant to Sections 408.036(1)(h), Florida Statutes. The proposed capital expenditure for this project shall not exceed $1,000,000 and will include new construction and the renovation of existing space. Miami Heart Institute is located in Local Health Council District 11. There are no subsdistricts for Hospital Inpatient General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11. The applicable need formula for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults is contained within Rule 59C-1.040(4)(c), F.A.C. The Agency published a fixed need of "0" for Hospital General Psychiatric Beds for Adults in District 11 for this batching cycle. However, "not normal" circumstances exist within District which justify approval of this project. These circumstances are that Miami Beach Community Hospital, which is also owned by Miami Beach Healthcare Group, Ltd., and which has an approved Certificate of Need Application to consol- idate its license with that of the Miami Heart Institute, has pending a Certificate of Need Application to delicense up to 20 hospital inpatient general psychiatric beds for adults. The effect of the application, which is the subject of this Letter of Intent, will be to relocate 20 of the delicensed adult psychiatric beds to the Miami Heart Institute. Because of the "not normal" circumstances alleged in the Miami Heart letter of intent, the Agency extended a grace period to allow competing letters of intent to be filed. No additional letters of intent were submitted during the grace period. On March 23, 1994, Miami Heart timely submitted its CON application for the project at issue, CON no. 7700. Notice of the application was published in the April 8, 1994, Florida Administrative Weekly. Such application was deemed complete by the Agency and was considered to be a companion to the delicensure of the north campus beds. On July 22, 1994, the Agency published in the Florida Administrative Weekly its preliminary decision to approve CON no. 7700. In the same batch as the instant case, Cedars Healthcare Group (Cedars), also in district 11, applied to add adult psychiatric beds to Cedars Medical Center through the delicensure of an equal number of adult psychiatric beds at Victoria Pavilion. Cedars holds a single license for the operation of both Cedars Medical Center and Victoria Pavilion. As in this case, the Agency gave notice of its intent to grant the CON application. Although this "transfer" was initially challenged, it was subsequently dismissed. Although filed at the same time (and, therefore, theoretically within the same batch), the Cedars CON application and the Miami Heart CON application were not comparatively reviewed by the Agency. The Agency determined the applicants were merely seeking to relocate their own licensed beds. Based upon that determination, MH's application was evaluated in the context of the statutory criteria, the adult psychiatric beds and services rule (Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code), the district 11 local health plan, and the 1993 state health plan. Ms. Dudek also considered the utilization data for district 11 facilities. Mount Sinai timely filed a petition challenging the proposed approval of CON 7700 and, for purposes of this proceeding only, the parties stipulated that MS has standing to raise the issues remaining in this cause. Mount Sinai's existing psychiatric unit utilization is presently at or near full capacity, and MS' existing unit would not provide an adequate, available, or accessible alternative to Miami Heart's proposal, unless additional bed capacity were available to MS in the future through approval of additional beds or changes in existing utilization. Miami Heart's proposal to establish twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its Miami Heart Institute south campus was made in connection with its application to delicense twenty adult general inpatient psychiatric beds at its north campus. The Agency advised MH to submit two CON applications: one for the delicensure (CON no. 7474) and one for the establishment of the twenty beds at the south campus (CON no. 7700). The application to delicense the north campus beds was expeditiously approved and has not been challenged. As to the application to establish the twenty beds at the south campus, the following statutory criteria are not at issue: Section 408.035(1)(c), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (m), (n), (o) and (2)(b) and (e), Florida Statutes. The parties have stipulated that Miami Heart meets, at least minimally, those criteria. During 1993, Miami Heart made the business decision to cease operations at its north campus and to seek the Agency's approval to relocate beds and services from that facility to other facilities owned by MH, including the south campus. Miami Heart does not intend to delicense the twenty beds at the north campus until the twenty beds are licensed at the south campus. The goal is merely to transfer the existing program with its services to the south campus. Miami Heart did not seek beds from a fixed need pool. Since approximately April, 1993, the Miami Heart north campus has operated with the twenty bed adult psychiatric unit and with a limited number of obstetrical beds. The approval of CON no. 7700 will not change the overall total number of adult general inpatient psychiatric beds within the district. The adult psychiatric program at MH experiences the highest utilization of any program in district 11, with an average length of stay that is consistent with other adult programs around the state. Miami Heart's existing psychiatric program was instituted in 1978. Since 1984, there has been little change in nursing and other staff. The program provides a full continuum of care, with outpatient programs, aftercare, and support programs. Nearly ninety-nine percent of the program's inpatient patient days are attributable to patients diagnosed with serious mental disorders. The Miami Heart program specializes in a biological approach to psychiatric cases in the diagnosis and treatment of affective disorders, including a variety of mood disorders and related conditions. The Miami Heart program is distinctive from other psychiatric programs in the district. If the MH program were discontinued, the patients would have limited alternatives for access to the same diagnostic and treatment services in the district. There are no statutes or rules promulgated which specifically address the transfer of psychiatric beds or services from one facility owned by a health care entity to another facility also owned by the same entity. In reviewing the instant CON application, the Agency determined it has the discretion to evaluate each transfer case based upon the review criteria and to consider the appropriate weight factors should be given. Factors which may affect the review include the change of location, the utilization of the existing services, the quality of the existing programs and services, the financial feasibility, architectural issues, and any other factor critical to the review process. In this case, the weight given to the numeric need criteria was not significant. The Agency determined that because the transfer would not result in a change to the overall bed inventory, the calculated fixed need pool did not apply to the instant application. In effect, because the calculation of numeric need was inapplicable, this case must be considered "not normal" pursuant to Rule 59C-1.040(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code. The Agency determined that other criteria were to be given greater consideration. Such factors were the reasonableness of the proposal, the ability to afford access, the applicant's ability to provide a quality program, and the project's financial feasibility. The Agency determined that, on balance, this application should be approved as the statutory and other review criteria were met. Although put on notice of the other CON applications, Mount Sinai did not file an application for psychiatric beds at the same time as Miami Heart or Cedars. Mount Sinai did not claim that the proposed delicensures and transfers made beds available for competitive review. The Agency has interpreted Rule 59C-1.040, Florida Administrative Code, to mean that it will not normally approve an application for beds or services unless the statutory and rule criteria are met, including the need determination criteria. There is no list of circumstances which are routinely considered "not normal" by the Agency. In this case, the proposed transfer of beds was, in itself, considered "not normal." The approval of Miami Heart's application would allow an existing program to continue. As a result, the overhead to maintain two campuses would be reduced. Further, the relocation would allow the program to continue to provide access, both geographically and financially, to the same patient service area. And, since the program has the highest utilization rate of any adult program in the district, its continuation would be beneficial to the area. The program has an established referral base for admissions to the facility. The transfer is reasonable for providing access to the medically under-served. The quality of care, while not in issue, would be expected to continue at its existing level or improve. The transfer would allow better access to ancillary hospital departments and consulting specialists who may be needed even though the primary diagnosis is psychiatric. The cost of the transfer when compared to the costs to be incurred if the transfer is not approved make the approval a benefit to the service area. If the program is not relocated, Medicaid access could change if the hospital is reclassified from a general facility to a specialty facility. The proposed cost for the project does not exceed one million dollars. If the north campus must be renovated, a greater capital expenditure would be expected. The expected impact on competition for other providers is limited due to the high utilization for all programs in the vicinity. The subject proposal is consistent with the district and state health care plans and the need for health care facilities and services. The services being transferred is an existing program which is highly utilized and which is not creating "new beds." As such, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The availability, quality of care, efficiency, appropriateness, accessibility, extent of utilization, and adequacy of like and existing services in the district will not be adversely affected by the approval of the subject application. The proposed transfer is consistent with, and appropriate, in light of these criteria. Therefore, the proposal complies with Section 408.035(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The subject application demonstrates a full continuum of care with safeguards to assure that alternatives to inpatient care are fully utilized when appropriate. Therefore, the availability and adequacy of other services, such as outpatient care, has been demonstrated and would deter unnecessary utilization. Thus, Miami Heart has shown its application complies with Section 408.035(1)(d), Florida Statutes. Miami Heart has also demonstrated that the probable impact of its proposal is in compliance with Section 408.035(1)(l), Florida Statutes. The proposed transfer will not adversely impact the costs of providing services, the competition on the supply of services, or the improvements or innovations in the financing and delivery of services which foster competition, promote quality assurance, and cost-effectiveness. Miami Heart has taken an innovative approach to promote quality assurance and cost effectiveness. Its purpose, to close a facility and relocate beds (removing unnecessary acute care beds in the process), represents a departure from the traditional approach to providing health care services. By approving Miami Heart's application, overhead costs associated with the unnecessary facility will be eliminated. There is no less costly, more efficient alternative which would allow the continuation of the services and program Miami Heart has established at the north campus than the approval of transfer to the south campus. The MH proposal is most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. The renovation of the medical surgical space at the south campus to afford a location for the psychiatric unit is the most practical and readily available solution which will allow the north campus to close and the beds and services to remain available and accessible. In totality, the circumstances of this case make the approval of Miami Heart's application for CON no. 7700 the most reasonable and practical solution given the "not normal" conditions of this application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order approving CON 7700 as recommended in the SAAR. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 5th day of April, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 5th day of April, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-4755 Note: Proposed findings of fact are to contain one essential fact per numbered paragraph. Proposed findings of fact paragraphs containing multiple sentences with more than one statement of fact are difficult to review. In reviewing for this case, where all sentences were accurate and supported by the recorded cited, the paragraph has been accepted. If the paragraph contained mixed statements where one sentence was an accurate statement of fact but the others were not, the paragraph has been rejected. Similarly, if one sentence was editorial comment, argument, or an unsupported statement to a statement of fact, the paragraph has been rejected. Proposed findings of fact should not include argument, editorial comments, or statements of fact mixed with such comments. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner, Mount Sinai: Paragraphs 1 through 13 were cited as stipulated facts. Paragraph 14 is rejected as irrelevant. With regard to paragraph 15 it is accepted that Miami Heart made the business decision to move the psychiatric beds beds from the north campus to the south campus. Any inference created by the remainder of the paragraph is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 16 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 17 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 18 is accepted. Paragraph 19 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 20 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 21 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 22 is accepted. Paragraph 23 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 24 is accepted. Paragraph 25 is rejected as repetitive, or immaterial, unnecessary to the resolution of the issues. Paragraph 26 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 27 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 28 is accepted but not relevant. Paragraphs 29 and 30 are accepted. Paragraphs 31 through 33 are rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 34 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 35 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant as the FNP was not in dispute. Paragraph 36 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 37 is rejected as repetitive, or comment. Paragraph 38 is rejected as repetitive, comment or conclusion of law, not fact, or irrelevant. Paragraph 39 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 40 is accepted. Paragraph 41, 42, and 43 are rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence and/or argument. Paragraph 44 is rejected as argument and comment on the testimony. Paragraph 45 is rejected as argument, irrelevant, and/or not supported by the weight of the credible evidence. Paragraph 46 is rejected as argument. Paragraph 47 is rejected as comment or conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment, argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 49 is rejected as comment on testimony. It is accepted that the proposed relocation or transfer of beds is a "not normal" circumstance. Paragraph 50 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 51 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 52 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 53 is rejected as argument, comment or recitation of testimony, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 54 is rejected as irrelevant or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 55 is rejected as irrelevant, comment, or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 56 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 57 is rejected as irrelevant or argument. Paragraph 58 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 59 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 60 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 61 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 62 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 63 is accepted. Paragraph 64 is rejected as irrelevant. Mount Sinai could have filed in this batch given the not normal circumstances disclosed in the Miami Heart notice. Paragraph 65 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 66 is rejected as comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 67 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Paragraph 68 is rejected as argument or irrelevant. Paragraph 69 is rejected as argument, comment or irrelevant. Paragraph 70 is rejected as argument or contrary to the weight of credible evidence. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Agency: Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. With the deletion of the words "cardiac catheterization" and the inclusion of the word "psychiatric beds" in place, paragraph 7 is accepted. Cardiac catheterization is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 8 is accepted. The second sentence of paragraph 9 is rejected as contrary to the weight of credible evidence or an error of law, otherwise, the paragraph is accepted. Paragraph 10 is accepted. Paragraphs 11 through 17 are accepted. Paragraph 18 is rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraphs 19 and 20 are accepted. The first two sentences of paragraph 21 are accepted; the remainder rejected as conclusion of law, not fact. Paragraph 22 is rejected as comment or argument. Paragraph 23 is accepted. Paragraph 24 is rejected as argument, speculation, or irrelevant. Paragraph 25 is accepted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Miami Heart: Paragraphs 1 through 13 are accepted. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is accepted; the remainder is rejected as contrary to law or irrelevant since MS did not file in the batch when it could have. Paragraph 15 is accepted. Paragraph 16 is accepted as the Agency's statement of its authority or policy in this case, not fact. Paragraphs 17 through 20 are accepted. Paragraph 21 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraph 22 is rejected as irrelevant. Paragraphs 23 through 35 are accepted. Paragraph 36 is rejected as repetitive. Paragraphs 37 through 40 are accepted. Paragraph 41 is rejected as contrary to the weight of the credible evidence to the extent that it concludes the distance to be one mile; evidence deemed credible placed the distance at two miles. Paragraphs 42 through 47 are accepted. Paragraph 48 is rejected as comment. Paragraphs 49 through 57 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 R. Terry Rigsby Geoffrey D. Smith Wendy Delvecchio Blank, Rigsby & Meenan, P.A. 204 S. Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Lesley Mendelson Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 325 John Knox Road, Suite 301 Tallahassee, Florida 32303-4131 Stephen Ecenia Rutledge, Ecenia, Underwood, Purnell & Hoffman, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street Suite 420 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-0551
The Issue Which, if any, of the four certificate of need applications for short-term psychiatric beds in Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services District 9 should be approved.
Findings Of Fact Description of the Parties The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") is the agency charged under Chapter 381, Florida Statutes (1991), to make decisions regarding certificate of need ("CON") applications. HRS issued its intent to approve the CON applications of Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc. ("Glenbeigh"), for 45 beds, and Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc. ("Boca"), for 15 beds, pursuant to a published fixed need for 67 beds for HRS District IX. HRS also issued its intent to deny the CON applications of Wellington Regional Medical Center, Incorporation ("Wellington") to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds, and Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership ("Savannas") to convert 20 substance abuse beds to 20 short term adult psychiatric beds and to add 10 new short term adult beds. District IX includes Palm Beach, Martin, St. Lucie, Okeechobee and Indian River Counties. As a result of Glenbeigh's Notice of Withdrawal filed on April 6, 1993, CON No. 6438 is no longer under consideration in this case. Boca is an existing 394-bed acute care hospital, located one mile north of the Broward County line, and is the applicant for CON No. 6442, to convert 15 medical/surgical beds to 15 adult psychiatric beds, and to delicense an additional 6 medical/surgical beds. Wellington is an existing acute care hospital in Palm Beach County, with 104 acute care medical/surgical beds and 16 substance abuse beds, and is the applicant for CON No. 6441 to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds. Savannas is an existing 70 bed child/adolescent and adult psychiatric and substance abuse hospital in St. Lucie County, about 40 miles north of Palm Beach, and is the applicant for CON No. 6444, to convert its 20 substance abuse beds to 20 adult short-term psychiatric beds, and to add 10 new adult short-term psychiatric beds. Lake Hospital and Clinic, Inc., d/b/a Lake Hospital of the Palm Beaches ("Lake"), at the time of hearing, was a 98-bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital, with 46 adult psychiatric beds, 36 child/adolescent psychiatric beds and 16 substance abuse beds, located in Lake Worth, Palm Beach County, between Boca Raton and West Palm Beach. The parties stipulated that Lake had standing to challenge the Boca application. Community Hospital of the Palm Beaches, Inc., d/b/a Humana Hospital Palm Beaches ("Humana") is an existing 250-bed acute care hospital, with 61 adult and 27 child/adolescent psychiatric beds, and is a Baker Act receiving facility, located directly across the street from Glenbeigh in Palm Beach. Florida Residential Treatment Centers, Inc., d/b/a Charter Hospital of West Palm Beach ("Charter") is an existing 60-bed psychiatric hospital with 20 beds for children and 40 beds for adolescents, located approximately 15 minutes travel time from Glenbeigh. Martin H.M.A., Inc., d/b/a SandyPines Hospital ("SandyPines") is an existing 60 bed child and adolescent psychiatric hospital, and a Baker Act receiving facility, located in Martin County, less than one mile north of the Palm Beach County line. By prehearing stipulation, the parties agreed that the statutory review criteria applicable to the CON application of Boca are those listed in Subsections 381.705(1)(a), (b), (d), (f), (i) - (l) and (n). If Rule 10- 5.011(1)(o) is applicable, the parties stipulated that the disputed criteria are those in Subsections 4.g. and 5.g. Background and Applicability of HRS Rules and Florida Statutes Rule 10-5.011(o) and (p), Florida Administrative Code, was in effect at the time HRS published the fixed need pool and received the applications at issue in this proceeding, the September 1990 batching cycle. The rule distinguished between inpatient psychiatric services based on whether the services were provided on a short-term or long-term basis. Similarly, Rule 10- 5.011(q), Florida Administrative Code, distinguished between short-term and long-term hospital inpatient substance abuse services. On August 10, 1990, HRS published a fixed need pool for 19 short-term psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, with notice of the right to seek an administrative hearing to challenge the correctness of the fixed need pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 32, Florida Administrative Weekly. On August 17, 1990, HRS published a revised fixed need pool for a net need of 67 additional short-term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in HRS District IX, based on the denial of a certificate of need application, subsequent to the deadline for submission of the August 10th publication. The local health plan formula, which has not been adopted by rule, allocates 62 of the additional 67 beds needed to the Palm Beach County subdistrict. The revised pool publication did not include notice of the right to an administrative hearing to challenge the revised pool number. See, Vol. 16, No. 33, Florida Administrative Weekly. There were no challenges filed to either the original or revised fixed need pool numbers. On December 23, 1990, HRS published new psychiatric and substance abuse rules, subsequently renumbered as Rule 10-5.040 and 10-5.041, Florida Administrative Code. These new rules abolished the distinction between short- term and long-term services, and instead distinguished psychiatric and substance abuse services by the age of the patient. Pursuant to Section 14 of the new psychiatric rule, that rule does not apply to applications pending final agency action on the effective date of the new rule. HRS will, however, license any applicant approved from the September 1990 batching cycle to provide services to adults or children and adolescents, using the categories in the new rule, not based on the distinction between short and long term services which existed at the time the application was filed. Approved providers will receive separate CONs for adult and child/adolescent services. Rule 10-5.008(2)(a), Florida Administrative Code, provides that the fixed need pool shall be published in the Florida Administrative Weekly at least 15 days prior to the letter of intent deadline and . . . shall not be changed or adjusted in the future regardless of any future changes in need methodologies, population estimates, bed inventories, or other factors which would lead to different projections of need, if retroactively applied. Humana, Lake, Charter and SandyPines allege that HRS incorrectly determined need under the old rule, by failing to examine occupancy rates pursuant to that rule. The rule provided, in relevant part, No additional short term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adult short term inpatient psychiatric beds in a service district is at or exceeds 75 percent for the preceding 12 month period. No additional beds for adolescents and children under 18 years of age shall normally be approved unless the average annual occupancy rate for all existing adolescent and children short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds in the Department district is at or exceeds 70 percent for the preceding 12 month period. Hospitals seeking additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds must show evidence that the occupancy standard defined in paragraph six is met and that the number of designated short term psychiatric beds have had an occupancy rate of 75 percent or greater for the preceding year. (Emphasis added.) Rule 10-5.011(o)4(e), Florida Administrative Code. HRS' expert witness, Elizabeth Dudek, testified that the fixed need pool for 67 additional short term inpatient psychiatric beds was calculated pursuant to the formula in Rule 10-5.011(l)(o), Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Dudek also testified that since calculation resulted in a positive number, according to HRS policy, the publication of the fixed need pool indicates that the occupancy prerequisites must have also been met. To the contrary, the State Agency Action Report and the deposition of Lloyd Tribley, the HRS Health Facilities consultant who collected the data to support the publication of the fixed need pool, indicate that he did not determine existing occupancy separately for adults and for children/adolescents, as required by subsection (e) of the old rule. Rather, he determined, pursuant to subsection (f), that overall occupancy rates for licensed short-term psychiatric beds exceeded 75 percent. With the August 10, 1990 publication of the need for 19 additional short-term inpatient psychiatric beds, HRS provided a point of entry to challenge the published need, including the agency's apparent failure to make a determination of existing occupancy rates for separate age categories. No challenge was filed. In the August 17, 1990 publication, HRS failed to provide a point of entry, when it added 48 more beds to the pool as a result of the issuance of a final order denying a prior CON application. The August 10th publication of numeric need, according to HRS' representative should have been based on an analysis of separate and combined occupancy rates. There was no challenge to that publication, therefore the number of beds in the fixed need pool is not at issue in this proceeding. Like and Existing Facilities Humana, Lake and Charter assert that, as a result of the new rule abolishing separate licensure categories for short-term and long-term beds, all psychiatric providers within an applicant's service district are like and existing facilities. These parties also assert that there was not, even under the old rule, any practical difference between these categories of providers, particularly for children/adolescents. In support of this position, the evidence demonstrated that the average lengths of stay in short-term and long- term adolescent psychiatric beds in 1989 were 48.1 days and 53.02 days, respectively. In 1990, the average lengths of stay in short and long-term beds were 41.8 days and 41.9 days, respectively. The parties asserting that the effect of the new rule is to create an additional group of like and existing providers point to HRS' response to the application of Indian River Memorial Hospital in Vero Beach, Florida ("Indian River"). According to the testimony of HRS expert witness Elizabeth Dudek, Indian River was another District 9 applicant in this same batching cycle. Indian River applied for a CON to convert long-term psychiatric beds to short- term psychiatric beds. HRS denied the CON application of Indian River because, under the new rule, which had taken effect before the decisions on the batch were made, Indian River would receive a new license permitting it to treat psychiatric patients regardless of their projected lengths of stay. Glenbeigh asserted that the numeric need for 67 additional short term psychiatric beds cannot be challenged in this proceeding based on the failure of any party timely to challenge the August 10, 1990, publication of need. Similarly, Glenbeigh asserted that the comparison of "like and existing" facilities must be limited to those used in the inventory to compute need. Glenbeigh relied generally on Florida Administrative Code Rule 10-5.011(o), the old rule governing short term hospital inpatient psychiatric services, for the proposition that "like and existing" in Subsection 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes, is equivalent to the inventory of licensed and approved beds for short term psychiatric services, which was used in the computation of need. However, the rule also provides, in a list of "other standards and criteria to be considered in determining approval of a certificate of need application for short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds," the following, Applicants shall indicate the availability of other inpatient psychiatric services in the proposed service area, including the number of beds available in crisis stabilization units, short term residential treatment programs, and other inpatient beds whether licensed as a hospital facility or not. In light of the rule directive that the consideration of like and existing services is not limited to licensed provider hospitals, Glenbeigh's assertion that the statutory review criteria is more restrictive and limited to the licensed and approved beds that were used to compute numeric need is rejected. The like and existing facilities are the hospitals or freestanding facilities which are authorized to provide the same psychiatric services, as the applicants seek to provide as a result of this proceeding. It was established at hearing that the following list of District 9 facilities provide psychiatric services comparable to those which the three remaining applicants seek to provide in these consolidated cases: DISTRICT 9 Hospital PSYCHIATRIC BEDS SUBSTANCE ABUSE BEDS Adult Child and Adult Child and Adolescent Adolescent Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Lic. App. Bethesda Hospital 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Charter Palm (IRTF) 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Fair Oaks 36 0 49 0 14 0 3 0 Forty Fifth Street 44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Glenbeigh Palm Beach 0 0 0 0 30 0 30 0 Humana Palm Beach 61 0 27 15 0 0 0 0 Humana Sebastian 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Indian River Mem. 16 0 38 0 0 0 0 0 J.F. Kennedy Mem. 14 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 Lake Hospital 46 0 36 0 16 0 0 0 Lawnwood Regional 36 Res. Treat. Palm 0 24 0 0 0 0 0 (IRTF) 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 Sandy Pines 0 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 Savannas 35 0 15 0 20 0 0 0 St. Mary Hospital 0 40 0 0 0 0 0 0 Wellington Regional 0 0 0 0 16 0 0 0 Vol. 16, No. 52, Florida Administrative Weekly, (December 28, 1990) (Humana Exhibit 26). Need For Additional Beds An analysis of need beyond that of the numeric need, requires an analysis of the availability and accessibility of the like and existing facilties. One reliable indicator of need is the occupancy levels in the like and existing facilities. In addition to providing guidelines for the publication of need, Rule 10-5.011(o)(4)(e) also mandates a consideration of occupancy levels to determine if applicants are or are not required to demonstrate "not normal circumstances" necessitating the issuance of a CON. For all child/adolescent psychiatric programs in District 9, the expert for Lake and Humana calculated total average occupancy rates at 57.6 percent in 1988, 64.2 percent in 1989, and 53.2 percent in 1990. In support of the accuracy of the expert's calculations, the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4) shows occupancy at 46.80 percent in general hospitals, 88.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as short term and 38.22 percent in specialty hospitals then categorized as long term. In addition, during this same period of time, average lengths of stay in District 9 child/adolescent beds also declined by approximately 10 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, new short term psychiatric beds should not normally be approved when the child/adolescent rate is below 70 percent. In the new rule, child/adolescent beds should not normally be approved if occupancy is below 75 percent. Therefore, under either rule, applicants who will be licensed for child/adolescent beds, must demonstrate not normal circumstances for their CON applications to be approved. The expert for Lake and Humana, also computed the adult occupancy rates for 1988-1990 in District 9 as follows: 1988- 66.5 percent; 1989 - 73.1 percent; 1990 - 68.5 percent. The occupancy rates for adult beds for the 12- month period ending March, 1990 was 70.6 percent and 69.2 percent for the twelve months ending June, 1990. In evaluating the accuracy of the expert's calculations of occupancy rates for adult beds, a comparison can be made to the District 9 Annual Report for 1990 (Lake Exhibit 4). Occupancy rates were 57.75 percent in general hospitals and 79.45 percent in specialty hospitals. This data does not include Indian River Memorial or Lawnwood Regional which were also listed on the December 1990 inventory of licensed adult beds, nor St. Mary's Hospital which was listed as having 40 approved adult beds. The comparison indicates the accuracy of concluding that the highest occupancy level for District 9 adult psychiatric beds during the period 1988 to 1990 was approximately 70 percent. Using the guidelines of the old rule, 75 percent occupancy is required before new adult beds can be approved unless there is a not normal circumstance. Boca's Proposal Boca Raton Community Hospital ("Boca") is a 394-bed not-for-profit acute care hospital, accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations, which proposes to convert 21 of its medical/surgical to 15 adult psychiatric beds and to delicense an additional 6 acute care beds. Boca's CON would be conditioned on the provision of 10.8 percent total annual patient days to Medicaid patients and a minimum of 5 percent gross revenues generated, or 2 percent total annual patient days to medically indigent patients. Boca has proposed this alternative so that, if it fails to provide direct care to indigents, it may donate the revenues to further the objectives of the state and district mental health councils. Boca Raton Community Hospital Corporation has control and manages the Boca's property, policies and funds. The Boca Raton Community Hospital Foundation raises funds for Boca and has the funds necessary to accomplish the proposed project at a cost of $932,531. Boca's application asserts that a not normal circumstance exists in the need to serve Medicaid patients in the district, and that a need exists to serve geriatric psychiatric patients in an acute care hospital, due to their general medical condition. Medicaid reimbursement for psychiatric care is only available in acute care hospitals. Boca Historically serves in excess of 70 percent Medicare (geriatric) patients. In 1990, 72 percent of Medicaid psychiatric patients residing in Boca's service area sought psychiatric services outside District 9, as compared to the outmigration of 14.7 percent Medicare patients, and 11 percent commercial insurance patients. Boca supported its proposed 10.8 percent Medicaid CON condition, with evidence that 10.8 percent of all psychiatric discharges in its market area were for Medicaid patients. Boca's opponents dispute the claim that a disproportionate outmigration of District 9 Medicaid patients is, in and of itself, a not normal circumstance. Using the travel time standard for inpatient psychiatric services of 45 minutes under average driving conditions, the opponents argue that District 10 facilities should be considered as available alternatives to additional psychiatric beds in District 9. In fact, the parties stipulated that there are no geographic access problems in District 9. In contrast to the opponents position, Subsections 381.705(a), (b)(, (d), (f) and (h), Florida Statutes (1991), indicate that need, available alternatives and accessibility are evaluated within a district, as defined by Subsection 381.702(5). Therefore, using the statutory criteria as indicative of the situation which is normal, the disproportionate outmigration of medicaid patients can be considered a not normal circumstance with a showing of access hardships for this payor group. Boca's opponents also assert general acute care adult beds are adequate. In August 1991, the occupancy rate was 56.9 percent in the 171 licensed adult psychiatric beds in District 9 general acute care hospitals which are eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Finally, Boca's opponents argue that Boca historically has not, and will not serve Medicaid patients in sufficient number to alter the outmigration. In 1990, Boca reported 671 Medicaid inpatient days from a total of 99,955. That is equivalent to 92 of the 16,170 admissions. Because Boca has a closed medical staff, only the psychiatrists on staff would be able to admit patients to a psychiatric unit. From the testimony and depositions received in evidence, Boca's psychiatrists who discussed their service to Medicaid patients treated less than 12 Medicaid patients a year. One psychiatrist, who had previously treated Medicaid patients at a mental health center, has been in private practice since 1983-84, but was not sure he had treated a Medicaid patient in his private practice and has received a new Medicaid provider number a few weeks prior to hearing. One Boca psychiatrist does not treat Medicaid patients on an inpatient basis. Two other Boca psychiatrists reported seeing 10 and "a couple" of Medicaid patients a year, respectively. The latter of these described the Medicaid billing procedure as cumbersome. Given the unavailability of Medicaid eligible beds in the District and the nature of the practices of its closed staff of psychiatrists, Boca has failed to establish that its CON application will alleviate the outmigration for psychiatric services of District 9 Medicaid patients. This conclusion is not altered by the subsequent closure of Lake's 46 adult psychiatric beds, because Medicaid reimbursement would not have been available at Lake which was not an acute care hospital. In fact, HRS takes the position that there are no not normal circumstances in this case. Wellington's Proposal Wellington, a 120 bed hospital in West Palm Beach, Florida, proposed to convert 15 acute care beds to 15 short term adult psychiatric beds which, if approved, will be licensed as adult psychiatric beds. Wellington's acute care beds are only 28 percent occupied. Wellington is located in the western portion of Palm Beach County, where no other inpatient psychiatric facilities are located. Wellington is a wholly owned subsidiary of Universal Health Services, Inc. ("UHS"), accredited by the Joint Commission for the Accreditation of Hospitals and Health Organizations (JCAHO) and the American Osteopathic Association (AOA), and offers clinical experience for students of the Southeastern College of Osteopathic Medicine (SECOM). Internships and externships for osteopathic students are also provided at Humana's psychiatric pavilion. Wellington proposes to fund the total project cost of $920,000 from funds available to UHS and intends to become a Baker Act receiving facility. Wellington is not a disproportionate share hospital, and projects 1 percent Medicaid service in its payor mix. Wellington proposes to serve adult psychiatric patients in 15 beds, and projects 53.3 percent and 70 percent occupancy in those beds in years one and two, but does not make a third year projection of at least 80 percent occupancy as required by Paragraph 4(d) of Rule 10-5.011(o). Because the average annual adult occupancy rate in the district is less than 75 percent, any applicant proposing to serve adults must demonstrate that a not normal circumstance exists for approval of its CON application. In addition, there appears to be no shortage of psychiatric beds in acute care hospitals in District 9. See Finding of Fact 39, supra. Not Normal Circumstance Wellington has not alleged nor demonstrated that any of the factors related to its current operations, location or proposed services are not normal circumstances in support of its CON application. Absent the showing of a not normal circumstance, Wellington's proposal cannot be approved, pursuant to Paragraph 4(e) and Rule 10-5.011(o), Florida Administrative Code. Savannas Proposal Savannas Hospital Limited partnership d/b/a Savannas Hospital ("Savannas") is a JCAHO accredited 70 bed psychiatric and substance abuse hospital located in Port St. Lucie, St. Lucie County, Florida, approximately 40 miles north of Palm Beach. Savannas, a Baker Act facility, proposes to convert all 20 of its licensed substance abuse beds to psychiatric beds and to add 10 new psychiatric beds, at a total project cost of $1,444,818. Savannas also proposes to commit to providing 7 percent indigent care. While not specifically describing its circumstances as not normal, Savannas does indicate that it is (1) the only applicant in the northern sub- district of District 9, and (2) could readmit to a segregated unit low functioning neurogeriatric patients of the type it previously served. Savannas also indicated that Medicare reimbursement is not available for patients who have substance abuse, rather than psychiatric primary diagnoses. As a freestanding provider, Savannas is not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement. Savannas demonstrates what services it would provide, if its CON is approved, but fails to identify a need for the services by District 9 psychiatric patients. Within the northern sub-district, the only other facility in St. Lucie County, Lawnwood, reported an occupancy rate of 65 percent in 1989. AHCA also argued that the substance abuse beds at Savannas are needed and should not be converted to psychiatric beds. That position is supported by the fact that Savannas substance abuse beds had a higher occupancy level than its psychiatric beds in 1989. Savannas' application and the evidence presented do not support the need for the services proposed by Savannas, nor does Savannas assert that any not normal circumstances exist.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Certificate of Need Number 6438 to Glenbeigh Hospital of Palm Beach, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6442 to Boca Raton Community Hospital, Inc.; Certificate of Need Number 6441 to Wellington Regional Medical Center, Inc.; and Certificate of Need Number 6444 to Savannas Hospital Limited Partnership. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 18th day of June 1993. ELEANOR M. HUNTER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of June 1993. APPENDIX The following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Humana Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 3-6. Issues not addressed. 7-8. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 4. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 10. 11-12. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 7. 13-15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 & 29. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 22. Issue not addressed. 23-24. Adopted in Findings of Fact 8 and 9. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12 and Conclusions of Law 4. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 20. Rejected in Findings of Fact 12 and 18. Adopted in Findings of Fact 15 and 17. Rejected in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 16 and 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 38-47. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 44 and 47. Issue not addressed. Rejected in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. 52-54. Adopted in Findings of Fact 46 and 47. 55-57. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 54 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26, 38, 39, 42, 43, 47, 48, 54, 55 and 57. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. Rejected in Findings of Fact 21 and 22. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 74-75. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 27. 76-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 28. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 82. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 39. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27, 29 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 31. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Addressed in Preliminary Statement. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 95-99. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 102-114. Issues not addressed Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 37. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10. 121-122. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 4 and 47. Issue not addressed. Irrlevant. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 10 Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 10, 25, 47 and 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 15. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 47, 48 and 49. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 11. Lake Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 3-4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 6 and 43. 11-12. Issues not addressed. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27-43. 20-21. Issues not addressed. 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 25-26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 29-31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. 32. Rejected in relevant part in Finding of Fact 13. 33. Issue not addressed. 34. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 35. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 36-37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 38-39. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 40. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 41. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 30. 42-43. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 46-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 49-52. Issues not addressed. 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 42. 54-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusions of Law 4. 58-59. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in Conclusions of Law 4. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 17. 65-66. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 18, 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Adopted in Finding of Fact 31. Adopted in Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 35. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47, 48, 49, 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 84-89. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 92-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 37. 100-102. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 47 and 48. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 111-113. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 29. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. Issue not addressed. 128-132. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 133-135. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32 and 41. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. 150-151. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 152-156. Issues not addressed. 157-158. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 159. Adopted in Findings of Fact 48 and 49. 160. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 161. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. 162. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 163. Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 164. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 165. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 166. Charter Adopted in Finding of Fact 57. 1. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 1. 2-3. Adopted. 4-10. Accepted in Preliminary Statement. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 12-15. Issues not addressed. 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. 18-19. Issues not addressed. 20. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. 21-25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 8. 26-38. Issues not addressed 39-40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. 43-44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 22. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adoped in Conclusion of Law 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Issue not addressed. 52-53. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 54-55. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 24. 58-73. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 23. Adopted in Finding of Fact 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 78-79. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. 86-94. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 26. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Adopted in Findings of Fact 37, 39 and 42. 99-101. Issues not addressed. 102. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 103-134. Issues not addressed. 135. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. 136-140. Issues not addressed. Boca Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Preliminary Statement. Adopted in Findings of Fact 3 and 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 14. Adopted. 15-16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 18. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 19. Issue not addressed. 20-21. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 22. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 23. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 24. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 26-27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 28-30. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 41. 31. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 34. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 39. 35. Adopted in Finding of Fact 34. 36. Rejected in Finding of Fact 39. 37-42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 41. 43-47. Issues not addressed. 48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 30. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Issue not addressed. 53-54. Rejected in Finding of Fact 30. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Rejected in Findings of Fact 39 and 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 64-65. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 32, 35 and 38. Adopted in Finding of Fact 36. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 34. Issue not addressed. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 15. Issue not addressed. Adopted. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 81-82. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. Adopted in Finding of Fact 37. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25 and 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. 89-97. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Rejected in Finding of Fact 42. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 25 and 26. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Sandy Pines 1. Issue not addressed. 2-3. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 4. Issue not addressed. 5. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 6-8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 9-13. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 14. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 15. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. Adopted in Finding of Fact 25. Adopted in Finding of Fact 27. 20-24. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 25. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 9. 26-29. Issues not addressed. 30. Adopted. 31-33. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 42, 43, 48, 49 and 54. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 28 and 31. Issue not addressed. 39-40. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 41-42. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 12 and 17. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 17. 46-47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 48. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 25 and 26. 49-50. Issues not addressed. Adopted. Adopted. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 7. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 42. 55-56. Issues not addressed. 57. Adopted. 58-59. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 62-64. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 25. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 27 and 30. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 27 and 30. 67. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 22. 68-69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 21. 70. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26. 71. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 26 and in 72. Conclusion of Law 3. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 26 and 73. 38. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 74-75. Not legible. 76. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 77-80. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 81. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. 82-83. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 27. 84-95. Issues not addressed. Wellington 1-2. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 8-10. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 45. 11-12. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 13-19. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. 20. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 46. 21-22. Adopted in Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 44 and 46. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 4 and 44. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 27-28. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 30. Adopted in Finding of Fact 46. 31-32. Issues not addressed. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 25. Adopted. Issue not addressed. 36-37. Adopted in Finding of Fact 45. 38-42. Issues not addressed. 43. Adopted in Findings of Fact 34, 42 and 47. 44-63. Issues not addressed. 64-65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 66-67. Issues not addressed. 68. Adopted in Finding of Fact 10. 69-91. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 47. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. 94-103. Issues not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Findings of Fact 1 and 44. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 106-111. Issues not addressed 112. Rejected in Findings of Fact 25, 27 and 30. 113-115. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. Savannas Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Findings of Fact 2 and 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. Adopted in Finding of Fact 4. Adopted in Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 6. Adopted in Finding of Fact 7. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 5. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 5 and 50. Adopted. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Finding of Fact 56. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. Issue not addressed. Adopted in Findings of Fact 5 and 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 51. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 30-33. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. 35-37. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Issue not addressed. 40-42. Rejected in Finding of Fact 54. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 50. 44-48. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50. 49-51. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted in Finding of Fact 53. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Adopted. Adopted. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 50 Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. Issue not addressed. 60-61. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 62-63. Issues not addressed. 64. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 65-66. Issues not addressed. 67. Rejected in Findings of Fact 53 and 57. 68-70. Issues not addressed. 71. Adopted in Finding of Fact 52. 72-77. Issues not addressed 78. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. 79-100. Issues not addressed. HRS Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Adopted in Finding of Fact 11. Adopted in Finding of Fact 13. Adopted in Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 16 and rejected in part in Finding of Fact 17. Adopted in Finding of Fact 16. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 16. Adopted in Finding of Fact 8. Adopted in Finding of Fact 9. 10-11. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Issue not addressed. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 12. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 12. 16-17. Issues not addressed. Adopted in Finding of Fact 1. Subordinate to Findings of Fact 32, 46 and 52. Adopted in Finding of Fact 20. 21. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 1. 22. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 2. 23-33. Issues not addressed. 34. Adopted in Finding of Fact 3. 35-36. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 3. 37. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 32. 38. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 32. 39. Rejected in Findings of Fact 40, 41 and 42. 40. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 41. Issue not addressed. 42. Adopted in Finding of Fact 42. 43. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 44. Issue not addressed. 45-46. Adopted in Finding of Fact 32. 47. Adopted in Finding of Fact 47. 48. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 44. 49. Issue not addressed. 50. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 51. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 52. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 46. 53-54. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 45. 55. Issue not addressed. 56-57. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 46. 58. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 47. 59-61. Issues not addressed. 62-64. Adopted in Findings of Fact 50 and 51. 65. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 65. 66-68. Issues not addressed. 69. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 52. 70-71. Issues not addressed. 72. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 73. Accepted in relevant part in Finding of Fact 53. 74. Adopted in Finding of Fact 56. 75-77. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 78-80. Issues not addressed. 81-82. Subordinate to Finding of Fact 56. 83-89. Issues not addressed. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Cooper, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 2727 Mahan Drive Fort Knox Executive Center Tallahassee, Florida 32308 William B. Wiley, Esquire McFARLAIN, STERNSTEIN, WILEY & CASSEDY, P.A. Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32316-2174 James C. Hauser, Esquire Foley & Lardner Post Office Box 508 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Michael J. Cherniga, Esquire David C. Ashburn, Esquire Roberts, Baggett, LaFace & Richard Post Office Drawer 1838 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Robert D. Newell, Jr., Esquire Newell & Stahl, P.A. 817 North Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32303-6313 Michael J. Glazer, Esquire C. Gary Williams, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Robert S. Cohen, Esquire John F. Gilroy, III, Esquire Haben, Culpepper, Dunbar & French, P.A. Post Office Box 10095 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Charles H. Hood, Jr., Esquire MONACO, SMITH, HOOD, PERKINS, ORFINGER & STOUT 444 Seabreeze Boulevard, #900 Post Office Box 15200 Daytona Beach, Florida 32115 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303 Harold D. Lewis, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, Florida 32303
Conclusions THIS CAUSE comes before the Agency For Health Care Administration (the "Agency") concerning Certificate of Need ("CON") Application No. 10131 filed by The Shores Behavioral Hospital, LLC (hereinafter “The Shores”) to establish a 60-bed adult psychiatric hospital and CON Application No. 10132 The entity is a limited liability company according to the Division of Corporations. Filed March 14, 2012 2:40 PM Division of Administrative Hearings to establish a 12-bed substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds pursuant to CON application No. 10131. The Agency preliminarily approved CON Application No. 10131 and preliminarily denied CON Application No. 10132. South Broward Hospital District d/b/a Memorial Regional Hospital (hereinafter “Memorial”) thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing challenging the Agency’s preliminary approval of CON 10131, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”). The Shores thereafter filed a Petition for Formal Administrative Hearing to challenge the Agency’s preliminary denial of CON 10132, which the Agency Clerk forwarded to the Division of Administrative Hearings (‘DOAH”). Upon receipt at DOAH, Memorial, CON 10131, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0424CON and The Shores, CON 10132, was assigned DOAH Case No. 12-0427CON. On February 16, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order of Consolidation consolidating both cases. On February 24, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge issued an Order Closing File and Relinquishing Jurisdiction based on _ the _ parties’ representation they had reached a settlement. . The parties have entered into the attached Settlement Agreement (Exhibit 1). It is therefore ORDERED: 1. The attached Settlement Agreement is approved and adopted as part of this Final Order, and the parties are directed to comply with the terms of the Settlement Agreement. 2. The Agency will approve and issue CON 10131 and CON 10132 with the conditions: a. Approval of CON Application 10131 to establish a Class III specialty hospital with 60 adult psychiatric beds is concurrent with approval of the co-batched CON Application 10132 to establish a 12-bed adult substance abuse program in addition to the 60 adult psychiatric beds in one single hospital facility. b. Concurrent to the licensure and certification of 60 adult inpatient psychiatric beds, 12 adult substance abuse beds and 30 adolescent residential treatment (DCF) beds at The Shores, all 72 hospital beds and 30 adolescent residential beds at Atlantic Shores Hospital will be delicensed. c. The Shores will become a designated Baker Act receiving facility upon licensure and certification. d. The location of the hospital approved pursuant to CONs 10131 and 10132 will not be south of Los Olas Boulevard and The Shores agrees that it will not seek any modification of the CONs to locate the hospital farther south than Davie Boulevard (County Road 736). 3. Each party shall be responsible its own costs and fees. 4. The above-styled cases are hereby closed. DONE and ORDERED this 2. day of Meaich~ , 2012, in Tallahassee, Florida. ELIZABETH DEK, Secretary AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION
The Issue Whether the Department should issue certificate of need number 4502 to construct and operate a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric hospital in Leon County, Florida, to HCAC?
Findings Of Fact HCAC is a corporation formed by Anthony Estevez for the purpose of developing and operating a long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. The facility was to be known as HCAC psychiatric Hospital of Leon County. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of the stock of HCAC. The Department is the state agency in Florida authorized to issue certificates of need for long-term psychiatric facilities. TMRMC is a general acute care hospital located in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. TMRMC operates a free- standing short-term psychiatric facility in a two-story, approximately 45,000 square foot, structure located within a block and a half from the main hospital. TMRMC's psychiatric facility is licensed for sixty beds. At present, forty-five of its beds are actually open, with fifteen beds in each of three units. One unit is available for adult patients (including geriatric patients), one is available for adolescent patients and one is available for an open adult unit. The other fifteen beds are available but are not staffed because of a lack of patients. Apalachee is a private, non-profit corporation. Apalachee provides comprehensive community mental health services to Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties. Apalachee was established consistent with State and federal guidelines to provide a variety of mental health Services. On March 17, 1986, a Letter of Intent was filed with the Department notifying the Department of Mr. Estevez's intent to apply for a certificate of need in the March 16, 1986, batching cycle. This Letter of Intent was filed within the time requirements of Florida law. On April 15, 1986 Estevez filed an application for a certificate of need for a comprehensive, free-standing, ninety-bed long-term psychiatric facility to be located in Leon County, Florida. Leon County is located in the Department's District 2. District 2 is made up of Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Jackson, Jefferson, Holmes, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor, Wakulla and Washington Counties. Franklin, Gadsden, Jefferson, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor and Wakulla Counties make up Subdistrict 2B. The other Counties make up Subdistrict 2A. HCAC's application was filed with the Department and the District 2 local health council. In a letter dated May 15, 1987, the Department requested additional information from HCAC. The information requested by the Department was provided by HCAC on or about June 19, 1986 and June 23, 1986. On September 23, 1986, the Department issued a State Agency Action Report partially approving HCAC's certificate of need application. HCAC was notified of the Department's decision and was issued certificate of need #4502 by letter dated September 30, 1986. HCAC had sought approval to construct a ninety-bed facility providing specialty long-term psychiatric services for the chronically mentally disturbed; patients with a ninety-day average length of stay. The facility was to provide care to adolescents, adults and geriatrics. Certificate of need #4502 authorized HCAC to construct a fifty-bed long-term adult, geriatric and adolescent psychiatric hospital in Leon County. The Department approved the facility because of its perception that there is no long-term psychiatric facility serving the geographic area proposed by HCAC to be served. By letter dated November 13, 1987, the Department issued an amended certificate of need #4502 to HCAC restricting the services to be provided to adult and geriatric long-term psychiatric services. HCAC intends on using thirty-six beds for adults and fourteen beds for geriatric patients. HCAC did not contest the Department's reduction in the size of the approved facility or the limitation of the scope of services to adult and geriatric patients. At the formal hearing HCAC presented evidence to Support the approved fifty-bed facility Serving only adults and geriatrics. HCAC has not contested the Department's decision to only partially approve HCAC's application. Supporting documentation took into account the smaller size of the approved facility. No substantial change in the scope or emphasis of the facility was made by HCAC other than the elimination of adolescent Services. HCAC has projected an average occupancy rate of 80 percent for the third year of operation. Because of the failure to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds for District 2, HCAC has failed to prove that this projection is reasonable. As of the date of the Department's initial decision and at the time of the formal hearing of these cases Rivendell Family Care Center (hereinafter referred to as "Rivendell") an eighty-bed long-term-psychiatric free-standing hospital located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida, had been open for approximately six weeks. Rivendell's occupancy rate at the time of the formal hearing was approximately twenty-four percent. Long-term psychiatric services mean hospital based inpatient services averaging a length of stay of ninety days. Long-term psychiatric services may be provided pursuant to the Department's rules in hospitals holding a general license or in a free-standing facility holding a specialty hospital license. Generally, the chronically mentally ill constitute an under-served group. In order to provide a complete continuum of care for the mentally ill, in-patient hospital treatment, including twenty-four hour medical care and nursing services and intensive resocialization or teaching of resocialization skills, should be provided. The Department has not established a standard method of quantifying need for long-term psychiatric beds in Florida. The Department's approval of the additional long- term psychiatric beds and facility at issue in this proceeding and the Department's and HCAC's position during the formal hearing that there is a need for HCAC's facility was based generally upon their conclusion that there is a "lack of such a facility to serve the geographic area." During the formal hearing, the Department further justified the need for the facility as follows: Basically it was felt that given the geographic distance or distances between this area, the eastern portion of District II, and the closest facilities, meaning licensed hospitals or facilities authorized by a Certificate of Need to offer long-term adult psychiatric services in a Chapter 395 licensed hospital, that there probably should be one here of a minimal size because we were not firm in, or in surety of the number of patients who might need the service in this area. But we thought that there should be at least a minimally sized long-term psychiatric hospital in this area to serve this area. HCAC and the Department failed to prove that there is a need for an additional fifty long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. At best, HCAC and the Department have relied upon speculation and assumptions to support approval of the proposed facility. In order to prove need, the characteristics of the population to be served by a proposed health service should be considered. A determination that there is a need for a health service should be based upon demographic data, including the population in the service area, referral sources and existing services. HCAC and the Department did not present such evidence sufficient enough to Support the additional fifty beds at issue in this proceeding. HCAC did not use any need methodology to quantify the gross need for long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Nor did HCAC or the Department present sufficient proof concerning existing services, the population to be served, the income or insurance coverage of the Service area population or actual service area referral patterns. In its application. HCAC premised its proposal, in part, on the assumption that "the Leon County area is an undeserved area with residents being referred to facilities long distances away." HCAC exhibit 2. The evidence does not support this assumption. HCAC also premised its proposal upon its conclusion that it would receive patient referrals from existing institutions. The evidence failed to support this conclusion. HCAC also premised its proposal upon the fact that long-term psychiatric services have been designated as a licensure category by the Department. This does not, however, create a presumption that there is a need for such services in a particular area. Based upon the evidence presented at the formal hearing concerning one methodology for quantifying the need for long-term psychiatric beds, there may already be a surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2. Such a surplus of beds may exist whether State hospital beds and ARTS and GRTS program beds are considered. The methodology is based upon national length of stay data for 1980 which was obtained from the National Institute of Mental Health. The methodology did not take into account more current data or Florida specific data. Therefore, use of the methodology did not prove the exact number of long- term psychiatric beds needed for District 2. Although the weight of the evidence concerning the use of the methodology failed to support a finding as to the exact number of long-term psychiatric beds needed in District 2, its use was sufficient to support a finding that there may be a surplus of beds already in existence. The methodology further supports the conclusion that HCAC and the Department have failed to meet their burden of proving that there is a need for the proposed facility. The weight of the evidence failed to prove whether long-term inpatient psychiatric services, other than those provided at State hospitals, are "within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of the service area's [District 2] population." The closest long-term inpatient psychiatric facility [other than a State hospital], Rivendell, is located in Panama City, Bay County, Florida. This facility is located in Subdistrict 2A. There is no facility located in Subdistrict 2B. Rivendell is located on the western edge of Subdistrict 2B, however. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that this facility is not within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for at least 90 percent of District 2's population. On page seven of the State Agency Action Report approving Rivendell, the Department indicated that "[t]he proposed location insures that 90 percent of the District I and District II population will have access within two hours travel time." This determination was made prior to the initial approval by the Department of HCAC's proposed facility. If the Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee (hereinafter referred to as "Chattahoochee"), which is located in District 2, is taken into account, long-term psychiatric services are available within a maximum travel time of 2 hours under average travel conditions for a least 90 percent of District 2's population. Chattahoochee provides long-term inpatient psychiatric hospital care to indigent and private pay patients. The quality of cafe at Chattahoochee is good and a full range of therapeutic modalities typically available at other psychiatric hospitals are available. HCAC and the Department have suggested that there is need for the additional fifty beds at is sue in these cases because of their conclusion that 90 percent of the population of District 2 is not within two hours under average travel conditions of long-term psychiatric services. The failure to prove this conclusion further detracts from their position as to the need for the proposed facility. HCAC exhibit 8 is a copy of the goals, objectives and recommended actions contained in the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan relating to mental health facilities. The evidence in this proceeding failed to support a finding that HCAC's proposed facility will enhance these goals, objectives and recommended actions. Goal 1 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[e]nsure the availability of mental health and substance abuse services to all Florida residents in a least restrictive setting." Objectives 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4, and the actions recommended to achieve these objectives are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Objective 1.3 provides that additional long-term inpatient psychiatric beds should not be approved in any district which has "an average annual occupancy of at least 80 percent for all existing and approved long-term inpatient psychiatric beds." Goal 2 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[p]romote the development of a continuum of high quality, cost effective private sector mental health and substance abuse treatment and preventive services." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. Goal 3 of the 1985-87 Florida State Health Plan is to "[d]evelope a complete range of essential public mental health services in each HRS district." The objectives and recommended actions to achieve this goal are not applicable to HCAC's proposed facility. The Florida State Plan for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Services does not specifically deal with private long-term psychiatric services. Instead, it relates specifically to treatment in the state mental health treatment facilities. The applicable district mental health plan does not specifically address long-term psychiatric services. The plan does, however, recommend that new facilities should indicate a commitment to serving the medically indigent. HCAC has agreed to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care. HCAC's commitment to provide 5.6 percent of its patient days for indigent care is consistent with this objective. Mental Health District Boards have been abolished. The District 2 Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Planning Council, however, has published the Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health 1986-89 Provisional District Plan. It is acknowledged in this Plan that deinstitutionalization and the provision of the least restrictive means of treatment should be promoted. The use of long- term psychiatric inpatient beds does not promote this philosophy. If a patient is not admitted as part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC and cannot pay the $10,500.00 per month admission charges, HCAC will not admit the patient. Additionally, if a patient is admitted and runs out of funds to pay the daily charges and is not part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment, the patient will be transferred to another facility. HCAC's facility will be accessible to all residents who can pay for their services or who are part of the 5.6 percent indigent commitment of HCAC. The provision of 5.6 percent indigent care is adequate. HCAC will provide non- discriminatory health care services, to those indigent patients who are covered by HCAC's 5.6 percent commitment. The Counties which make up Subdistrict 2B, other than Leon County, are below the average national and State poverty levels. In most of the Counties, twenty percent of the population have incomes below the poverty level. HCAC has not managed any type of psychiatric hospital and currently has no employees. The proposed facility is to be managed by Flowers Management Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Flowers"). Flowers is a psychiatric management company that has been in operation since 1984. Mr. Estevez owns fifty-one percent of the stock of Flowers and is the Chairman of the Board. Flowers is operating five Psychiatric/substance abuse facilities: three hospital based and two free-standing pychiatric/chemical dependency facilities. The staff and faculty of Flowers has a strong background in the management of psychiatric facilities. Flowers has no experience in the management of a long-term psychiatric facility. Mr. Nelson Elliot Rodney, Flowers' Regional Vice President, will be ultimately responsible for the management of the proposed facility. The administrator of the facility will report to Mr. Rodney. Mr. Rodney will seek to implement the goals outlined in HCAC's certificate of need application for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney has not designed a psychiatric hospital. Nor has Mr. Rodney worked at or administered a long- term psychiatric hospital. The overall treatment plan as presented in HCAC's certificate of need application and as presented at the formal hearing lends itself to the development of a good program for long-term psychiatric care. HCAC has associated itself with experts in long-term psychiatric care in order to develop a detailed plan specifically addressing the treatment needs of long-term psychiatric patients. HCAC has the ability to, and will, provide good quality patient care. Apalachee provides certain programs in Subdistrict 2B which provide alternatives to long-term psychiatric hospitalization: the Geriatric Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "GRTS") and the Adult Residential Treatment System (hereinafter referred to as "ARTS"). Apalachee's GRTS program, which serves Individuals fifty-five years of age and older, contains a residential component with a total capacity of Seventy geriatric beds. A wide variety of services are provided as part of the GRTS program, including day treatment and case management components. When Apalachee's ARTS program is fully implemented there will be a total of one hundred sixty-three beds available for the care on long-term mentally ill adults and geriatrics within Subdistrict 2B. The ARTS program serves adults who are eighteen to fifty-four years of age. Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs do not provide the identical services provided in a free-standing long-term psychiatric hospital. The programs do provide some identical or similar services, and, to that extent, the programs complement the continuum of psychiatric care available. To the extent that they provide the same type of services, Apalachee's GRTS and ARTS programs serve as alternatives to HCAC's proposed facility. There is a national shortage of registered nurses. This shortage is particularly acute with regard to psychiatric nurses. TMRMC has a current shortage of three registered psychiatric nurses, three part-time psychiatric registered nurses, seven flex positions for psychiatric nurses, one full- time nurse technician position and one mental health worker. TMRMC has had difficulty, despite adequate efforts to recruit, recruiting for its psychiatric facility since it opened. It has never been fully staffed with psychiatric nurses. There is also a shortage of occupational therapists. TMRMC has had an occupational therapist vacancy for seven months. Mr. Rodney will be responsible for the recruitment of the necessary personnel for the proposed facility. Mr. Rodney indicated that he would utilize recruitment methods similar to those used by TMRMC. Mr. Rodney will also use his experience and contacts in the Dade County, Florida area. HCAC's salary package is reasonable and HCAC will provide adequate in- service training programs. Although HCAC will have difficulty in attracting qualified staff, just as TMRMC has had, it will be able to obtain adequate staff for the proposed facility. HCAC may do so, however, at the expense of existing health care providers. Apalachee provides the following programs in District 2: Wateroak--A sixteen-bed long-term psychiatric hospital for the treatment of children and adolescents. It is a licensed Specialty hospital; In November of 1987, Apalachee began construction of an acute care facility, which will provide inpatient short- term psychiatric services; Case Management Services--Case management services, which include supportive counseling, medication therapy, assistance with transportation and home visitation, are provided to the chronically mentally ill on an outpatient basis. The Services are to be provided where the patients reside; Hilltop--A sixteen-bed residential treatment center. Hilltop is a group home living facility for adults eighteen to fifty-four years of age; Chemical Dependency Program--Individual, group and family counseling and educational services on an outpatient basis for Individuals with suspected substance abuse problems; Emergency Services--Year-round, twenty-four hour a day telephone or face-to-face evaluations to persons with an acute disturbance or who are in need of evaluation for determination of the proper level of care; PATH--Positive Alternative to Hospitalization Program, a crises stabilization unit developed as an alternative to short-term psychiatric care; PPC--Primary Care Center, a nonhospital medical detoxification unit providing short-term detoxification care to alcohol abusers; Gerontological Programs--Made up of the GRTS program and an outpatient component. Through the outpatient component, Apalachee uses its outpatient clinics in each County in its service area to provide linkage for therapy and medication and supportive counseling to geriatrics; ARTS Program; and Designated Public Receiving Facility--Apalachee is the designated public receiving facility for Subdistrict 2B. It screens and evaluates every person admitted to Chattahoochee. Apalachee's adult mental health programs which are available to indigent patients, directly impact both long and short-term hospital utilization, lowering such utilization. For example, before establishing the services provided to suspected substance abusers, many patients were placed in long-term psychiatric hospitals. Referrals to TMRMC of patients under the Baker Act have been reduced from an average of fifteen to eighteen patients per day to an average of one-half to one person per day. There has also been a decrease in admissions to Chattahoochee since Apalachee established the GRTS and ARTS programs. At the time of the formal hearing of these cases TMRMC had a census of only twenty-eight adult patients in its short-term psychiatric facility. TMRMC's census has been low for the past two years. TMRMC's short-term psychiatric facility is operating at a loss. Any further loss of patients would have a serious impact on the facility. From October 1, 1986 to July 31, 1987, TMRMC lost $127,337.00 on its short-term psychiatric facility. For the twelve-month period from October 1, 1986 to October 1, 1987, it is reasonably estimated that TMRMC will lose $139,722.00. TMRMC would like to open the fifteen-bed unit (which is presently closed) of its short-term psychiatric facility. It must increase its census before it can do so. It has been attempting to increase its census by sending out mail-outs and newsletters, sponsoring educational programs advertising, inviting health care professionals to the facility and initiating clinical affiliations with university programs. Rivendell is an eighty-bed long-term psychiatric facility. Forty of its eighty beds are licensed for adults and geriatric patients. The other forty beds are licensed for children and adolescent patients. Rivendell's census at the time of the formal hearing of these cases was six to eight patients. Chattahoochee has a total of 823 long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics. There are no like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics located in Subdistrict 2B. The only like and existing long-term psychiatric beds for adults and geriatrics available to residents of District 2 are located in Subdistrict 2A at Rivendell. The proposed HCAC facility will result in increased competition in District 2. This increase in competition will have an adverse impact on suppliers of inpatient psychiatric services. Admissions to the proposed facility will likely include patients who would be more appropriately hospitalized in a short-term facility. Although HCAC has no plans to admit short-term patients and will attempt to prevent such admissions, mental health professionals cannot accurately predict the length of a patient's stay upon admission. The determination will often require an in- hospital evaluation of the patient. Therefore, patients more appropriately treated in a short-term facility such as TMRMC will end up spending some tide in HCAC's proposed facility. TMRMC will lose patient days if the HCAC facility is constructed. This will adversely affects TMRMC's occupancy rate, which is already low, and cause further losses in revenue. Given the surplus of long-term psychiatric beds in District 2 and the low occupancy of short-term beds in Subdistrict 2B, it will difficult for HCAC to continue in existence without admitting short-term psychiatric patients. The operation of the proposed HCAC facility will also adversely affect the availability of nurses to staff Apalachee's acute care facility and other Apalachee operations and TMRMC's ability to staff its short-term psychiatric facility. Even the loss of one more full-time registered nurse at TMRMC could cause critical staffing problems. Because of the lack of need for fifty additional long-term psychiatric beds in District 2, HCAC's proposed facility would also have an adverse affect on Rivendell. The proposed facility will provide internships, field placements and semester rotations for psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers, nurses and counselors. The facility will work closely with community agencies and community personnel in developing, operating and providing resources for training for community groups, patient groups and personnel. In- service training will be open to selected professionals in the community. HCAC's proposed facility will have a positive effect on the clinical needs of health professional training programs and schools for health professions in District 2. The-total estimated cost of the proposed project approved by the Department is $4,108,000.00. HCAC plans on financing 100 percent of the cost of the project with a mortgage loan at 13 percent interest. Mr. Estevez has had experience in obtaining financing for health care and other commercial projects. In 1987 alone, Mr. Estevez was personally involved in over $20,000,000.00 of financing. Short-term financial feasibility means the ability to successfully fund a project to ensure that the project will succeed in the short-term. To achieve short-term financial feasibility, there must be sufficient funds to cover any losses incurred during the initial operating period and to cover any short fall in working capital necessary to fund the project. NCNB, a financial institution with which Mr. Estevez has had, and continues to have, a long and profitable association, has indicated interest in financing the proposed project. A financing letter to this effect has been provided. Although the letter does not specifically refer to the proposed project, the weight of the evidence supports a finding that NCNB would be willing to finance the project. In light of Mr. Estevez's experience in obtaining commercial financing and his relationship with NCNB, it is reasonable to conclude that 100 percent financing of the project can be obtained at 13 percent interest. The proposed project will have a negative cash balance at the end of its first and second year of operation. Given Mr. Estevez's commitment to the project, sufficient funds for capital and operating expenses will be available to cover these negative cash balances. Although Mr. Estevez did not provide a separate audited financial statement, the weight of the evidence proved that Mr. Estevez has the ability to provide the necessary capital. In the short-term, HCAC's proposal is financially feasible. HCAC has projected that it will operate at an average length of stay of ninety days. It will charge an all-inclusive $350.00 per day for its long- term psychiatric services, including all ancillary services. Initially, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicaid of 30 percent; Medicare of 20 percent; and insurance and private pay of 50 percent. HCAC was informed by the Department that Medicaid reimbursement was not available for psychiatric services in private free-standing psychiatric hospitals. Consequently, HCAC modified its payor mix by eliminating Medicaid from its payor mix. At the formal hearing of this case, HCAC projected the following payor mix: Medicare of 3.3 percent; indigent of 5.6 percent; and insurance and private pay of 91.1 percent. Medicare reimburses for psychiatric care in a limited fashion. That is why HCAC reduced its projected Medicare reimbursement to 3.3 percent of its total revenue. Medicare patients generally use the majority of their lifetime reserve Medicare reimbursable days for other types of care, including short-term psychiatric care and acute care. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care generally have a poor work history because of their illness interferes with their ability to obtain and maintain employment. Patients have few economic resources of their own. A patients family structure is often disorganized as a result of the patient's episodes of illness. These episodes strain the family relationship. Persons in need of long-term psychiatric care are often unable to pay for needed services and their family members are either unable or unwilling to support the person. There is no facility in Florida with a payor mix of 91 percent insurance and private pay. HCAC's projection of 91.1 percent insurance and private pay is not a reasonable projection. This finding of fact is based upon the high poverty levels within Subdistrict 2B, the lack of need for additional long-term psychiatric beds and the failure to prove that insurance benefits for long-term care are available in District 2. The State of Florida, Employees Group Health Self-Insurance Plan does not provide coverage for specialty hospitals, such as HCAC's proposed facility. The State of Florida provides 42 percent of the employment in Leon County. Insurance provided by other employers in the area limits coverage for inpatient psychiatric care to thirty to thirty-one days. These benefits are often exhausted before long- term care becomes necessary. In order to achieve a 91.1 percent insurance and private pay payor mix, 80 percent to 100 percent will have to be private pay patients. Such a high percentage of private pay patients is not reasonable. The effective buying income in Leon County in 1986 was approximately $22,600.00. In District 2 it was $18,700.00. Madison County and Jefferson County are among the counties heading Florida's poverty rate. Taylor County is the ninth poorest county in the State. HCAC has projected a 95 percent occupancy rate for its proposed facility within six months of its opening. HCAC has failed to prove that this occupancy rate can be achieved. In light of the high poverty rate in the area, the lack of need for long-term psychiatric services and the inability of patients to pay for such services, this projected occupancy rate is not reasonable. In light of HCAC's failure to prove that there is a need for the proposed facility or that its payor mix is reasonable, HCAC has failed to demonstrate that its occupancy projection is achievable. HCAC has projected that 7.3 percent of its gross revenue will be deducted as revenue deductions. Included in this amount are contractual allowances, charity care and bad debts. Medicare reimburses hospitals for total costs rather than revenue or charges. HCAC, therefore, gas projected approximately $6,000.00 for the first year and $24,000.00 for second year as contractual allowances. HCAC's projection of deductions from revenue are not reasonable. Bad debt of 1.6 percent is unreasonable compared to the experience at other long- term psychiatric facilities in Florida. The $350.00 all-inclusive charge is not reasonable. This charge will not be sufficient to cover the proposed facility's costs. HCAC's projected costs for "Supplies and other" and for taxes are reasonable. HCAC has failed to prove that its proposed facility is financially feasible in the long-term. The projected and approved cost of construction is $3,965,456.00. HCAC has indicated that the facility will consist of two, one-story buildings connected by a hallway. The facility will have approximately 40,563 gross square footage. The actual site for the project has not been selected or purchased. The floor plan calls for twenty-five, semi-private rooms for patients. The patient-care building will contain four independent and secure living/program areas connecting to a central core which will contain an atrium open to the outdoors. There will be approximately 811 gross square feet per bed, which is adequate. The proposed design is reasonable. The projected completion forecast of HCAC is reasonable. The projected costs of completing the building are reasonable. The building will be built by Project Advisers Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "PAC"). PAC is a health care, commercial and residential construction company. Mr. Estevez owns 100 percent of PAC. Since 1978, PAC has been involved in the construction of St. John's Rehab Center and Nursing Home, South Dade Nursing Home, Hialeah Convalescent Center, South Dade Rehab Hospital and two psychiatric/chemical dependency hospitals for Glenbeigh Hospital. Generally, there are no differences in the construction requirements between short-term and long-term psychiatric facilities.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Department enter a Final Order denying the application of HCAC for a certificate of need to construct and operated a fifty-bed long-term psychiatric facility in Leon County, Florida. DONE and ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 86-4373 and 864374 The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact it has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommend Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. HCAC's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 5-6. The third through fourth sentence are hereby accepted. 1 and 6. 3 1 and 39. 4 6 and 9 5 7. 6 8-10, 34 and 97. 7 11. 8 11, 14 and 76. The last Sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence 6. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10 10 and 69. 11 Hereby accepted. 12 39-40. 13 These proposed findings of fact are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. They deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. 14 42. 15-19 Although these proposed findings of fact- are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the-evidence. The rest of the proposed findings of fact are hereby accepted. Although the proposed finding of fact contained in the first sentence is generally true, it is cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The rest of the proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given to other evidence. These proposed findings of fact are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 23-26 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 27 Although this proposed finding of fact is generally true, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that HCAC will be able to achieve its plans. 28-33 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 34 43. 35 51. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 36 52. 37 53. 38 69-70. 39 72. 40 73. 41 74. 42 67. 43 68. 44 34 and 37. 45 104. 46. The first sentence is law. The last sentence is accepted in 105. 47 97 and 99-100. 48 101. 49 103. 50 102. 51 Hereby accepted. 52-53 These proposed findings of fact deal with the weight to be given other evidence. 54 78. 55 79-80. 56 79. 57-58 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 76. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally correct, these proposed findings of fact do not support HCAC's projected utilization. Irrelevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 65 92. 66 93. 67 94. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 68 95. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. HCAC's proposed facility and TMRMC are not comparable. 71-75 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 54 and 59. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first two sentences are hereby accepted. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. 79-83 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 84-85 Statement of law. Hereby accepted. 6 and 25. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 88-90 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 91-92 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 93 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. 94-95 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. The first sentence is a conclusion of law. The second sentence is hereby accepted. The last sentence is irrelevant. 13. The last two sentences are conclusions of law. Irrelevant. 100-102 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Hereby accepted. 44. The last sentence is irrelevant. 47. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 16. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 108 15. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Irrelevant. See 23. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusions of law. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 114 34. 115 29. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115a 30. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115b-e 30. The next to the last sentence of e is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 115f Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 116-117 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 118 Hereby accepted. 119-120 35. 121 Irrelevant. 122 33. 123-124 Irrelevant. 125-129 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 130 3. 131 Hereby accepted. 132 64. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 133 See 49 and 65. 134 54. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1 Hereby accepted. 2-3 8-9. 4 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 5 13 and 25. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Conclusion of law. 8 31. 9 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10-12 Irrelevant. 13 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 14-16 Conclusions of law. TMRMC's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 1, 6 and 9-11. 2 See 6 and 9. 3 6-10. 4 76. 5 77-78. 6 79. 7 79-80. 8 Hereby accepted. 9 81. 10 82-83. 11 34 and 36. 12 36. 13 6. 14-15 39. 16 41-42. 17 2. 18 3. 19 4 and 6. 20-21 54. 22 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 23 54. 24 46 and 54. 25-26 54-55. 27-29 54. 30 54-55. 31 44-45, 47 and 54. 32 Hereby accepted. 33 54-55. 34 55. 35 Irrelevant. 36 56. 37 58. 38 49. 39 48. 40 50. 41-44 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 45-46 65. 47-48 57. 49 58. 50 63-64. 51 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 52 63-64. 53 63-64. 55 Hereby accepted. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 56 65. 57 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 58 25 and 59. 59 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 60-62 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 63 25 and 59. 64-68 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 69 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 70-71 27. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 74 18 and 96. Irrelevant. Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 77-81 Although generally true, these proposed findings of fact are not relevant to this de novo proceeding. 82 Hereby accepted. 83 84. 84 Hereby accepted. 85-86 Irrelevant. 87 See 69 and 72. 88 94. 89 Hereby accepted. 90 74. 91 94. The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 92-93 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 94-96 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 97 19. 98-99 18. Hereby accepted. Irrelevant. Hereby accepted. 103 19. 104 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 105 20. 106 21. 107 Hereby accepted. 108-110 See 23. 111 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 112 85. 113 86. 114 88. 115 89. 116-118 Although these proposed findings of fact are generally true, they are cumulative, subordinate and unnecessary. 119 91. 120 90. 121 96. 122-126 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 127 Hereby accepted. 128-129 Irrelevant. 130 22. 131 97-98. 132 99. 133-139 Not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 140 95. 141 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 142 97. 143-146 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Apalachee's Proposed Findings of Fact 1 6 and 8-9 2 4. 3(a)-(i)(1) 54. 3(i)(2) 44-45. 3(j) 44 and 54. 3(k) 54. 4 3. 5 1. 6 104. 7 39 and 41. 8 27 and 60. 9 25 and 59. 10(a) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 10(b) 27. 10(c) 26. 10(d) Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 11 13. 12(a) 81. 12(b) 82-83. 13 6 76 and 87. The second, third, fifth- eighth sentences, the Second Paragraph and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 71 and 74. Other than the first two Sentences of the first Paragraph and the first two sentences of the third Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(a) 90. The Second Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 16(b) 88. 16(c) 94. 16(d) 76 and 95. Other than the first three sentences of the first Paragraph and the last Paragraph, these Proposed findings of fact are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 17 48-49 and 65. The Sixth and eighth Sentences and the last Paragraph are not Supported by the weight of the evidence. 44-47 and 54. The last Sentence of the first Paragraph and the last four Sentences of the last Paragraph are irrelevant. 19 62. 19(a) 3, 23, 56-57 and 64. The Second and third Paragraph are Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(b) 63. The Second Paragraph is Cumulative and unnecessary. 19(c) Cumulative and unnecessary, 19(d) 25, 59, 62 and 66. 19(e) 65. 20 Not Supported by the Weight of the evidence or Cumulative and unnecessary, 21 39 and 41. The last Paragraph is not Supported by the weight of the evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: Jean Laramore, Esquire Anthony Cleveland, Esquire Post Office Box 11068 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ronald W. Brooks, Esquire 863 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Theodore E. Mack, Esquire John Rodriguez, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Darrell White, Esquire Gerald B. Sternstein, Esquire Post Office Box 2174 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Sam Power, Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Gregory L. Coler, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 =================================================================
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Hospital Management Associates, Inc. (HMA) filed an application in June, 1984, for a 60 bed adolescent long- term psychiatric hospital in Hillsborough County, Florida. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. A completed application was filed August 13, 1984. Petitioner's Exhibit 2. (P. PFF 1.) The proposed facility is patterned after a similar HMA facility in Arlington, Texas. The facility is proposed to be freestanding and is intended to conform to the state hospital code. The plan is to place the facility on a 10 or 15 acre tract of land. The facility will be divided into two 30 bed units, each having a 15 bed wing separated by a nursing station. T. 32- 37. Separation will be useful to separate patients by age, sex, functional levels, and treatment programs. T. 33. (The remainder of P. PFF 2 is rejected because irrelevant.) Staffing that is proposed is found on table 11, Petitioner's Exhibit 2. The staffing proposed is consistent with standards set by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and is similar to the Arlington, Texas, facility. T. 53. There is no evidence that this is not a reasonable level of staffing. The salary levels are reasonable. T.51. (The remainder of P. PFF 3 is rejected because not consistent with Petitioner's Exhibit 2 or T. 51-53, or irrelevant.) HMA operates hospitals, both psychiatric and acute care, in Texas and Florida. T. 25-26. (The transcript does not establish that HMA currently operates hospitals in any other states, and to this extent, P. PFF 4 is rejected.) HMA proposes to treat adolescents, ages 12 to 18. T. 35. (P. PFF 5 that HMA proposes to treat ages 10, 11, and 19, is rejected, based upon the testimony of Mr. Braeuning, and on the same basis, the proposed finding that the bulk of patients will be ages 13-17 is also rejected.) The proposed length of stay is 4 to 6 months. T. 36. The treatment program is aimed at the patient and the family unit, T. 41, and includes social work, family therapy, occupational therapy, recreational therapy, and education. T. 38, 39. Recreational facilities are proposed. T. 38. The proposed facility is planned to have three levels of security. T. 37. Treatment is planned on the behavior modification model, which uses a system of levels of reward and responsibility, and is used in both system and long term treatment. T. 37-40, 92. The length of stay is proposed to be an average of six months. T. 36. (The remainder of P. PFF 5 is rejected because not supported by the record in the form proposed.) Dr. Max Sugar is an expert in child and adolescent psychiatry. T. 84. Dr. Sugar has been asked to be a consultant for the HMA facility proposed, and may accept. T. 95. His consultation would involve program arrangement, milieu arrangements, in-service staff training, and recruitment of a clinical director. Id. (P. PFF 6.) Louis DeSonier is an expert in child and adolescent pyschology. T. 102-103. He received his doctorate in 1982. T. 101. Dr. DeSonier has been hired by HMA to develop the system proposed for this certificate of need, to implement development issues, and to evaluate the program on an ongoing basis. T. 104. He would be involved in hiring staff. T. 105. (The proposed finding that she will be involved in "setting up referral patterns within District VI" is rejected because not found in the transcript on the pages cited.) Dr. DeSonier envisioned attracting people from the adolescent psychology program at Florida State University to help develop a protocol for long term care for adolescents. T. 105. Dr. DeSonier envisioned attracting other persons to work on the project. T. 106-107. Dr. Desonier was familiar with the levels of treatment concept of treatment, T. 106-107, and this will be helpful to him in his work with this proposal. (P. PFF 7.) The Petitioner plans to monitor the quality of the programs at the proposed facility from its corporate offices, and will seek to use quality assurance programs as recommended by the Joint Commission on Accrediation of Hospitals (JCAH). T. 43. The Petitioner will seek JCAH accreditation accreditation by the National Association of Private Psychiatric Hospitals, and qualification for CHAMPUS reimbursement as a long term facility. Id. (P. PFF 9.) The Petitioner intends to locate its facility near the 1-4 and 1-75 interchange, which would provide good access from many parts of District VI. T. 58. All of District VI, and portions of adjacent Districts, are within a two hour driving time of the site proposed by the Petitioner. See finding of fact 38. The Petitioner proposes to obtain patients through contacts and marketing efforts with local practitioners, local religious counselors, and school counselors. T. 54. Free standing psychiatric hospitals are not eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, and thus Petitioner's proposed hospital will not do that type of work. T. 57. Petitioner's proposed facility is projected to do two to five percent indigent work. T. 70, 57. Petitioner expressed willingness to accept patients from the Children, Youth, and Family Program of HRS T. 54-55. The Petitioner proposes to accept up to 20 percent of state-funded patients. T. 57-58. (P. PFF 10, TH PFF 12.) 10. In a long term psychiatric facility, patients may stay six months or longer. T. 88. A short term facility deals with acute problems, and tries to discharge the patient in one to three months. T. 87. Long term facilities address long standing maladaptive behavior. T. 87. A patient requiring long term treatment can become isolated among patients in a short term facility. T. All of the ancillary services in a long term facility should be staffed and planned to provide long term continuity for the patient. T. 88-9. Over time, long term problems, which the patient may hide during short term treatment, become visible. T. 92. Progress on these problems then can be made. T. 92. An acute care general hospital is geared for acute care to a range of ages, and having a program for long-term adolescent care is potentially in conflict with these goals. T. 95 However, treatment is often the same for both long and short term patients. T. 90. Behavioral modification is used in both short and long term treatment. T. 37-40, 92. The physician. determines the length of stay, and the physician cannot tell precisely how long a patient may need to stay. T. 89-91. A patient may begin as identified for short term treatment, but may later have long term treatment needs identified. T. 90-91. The adolescent portion of the proposed psychiatric facility at University Psychiatric Center is expected to experience an average length of stay of from 45 to 60 days per patient, with the greater probability of longer lengths of stay. T. 432. The average length of stay for adolescents at Tampa Heights Hospital may be about 47 days. T. 253. Tampa Heights Hospital provides short term psychiatric services. Tampa Heights is not certified for long-term care under the CHAMPUS program. T. 253. But Dr. Rene Haney, a psychiatrist and the adolescent services chief at Tampa Heights Hospital, T. 246-247, has observed some patients staying longer than 90 days, and some of his patients have stayed more than 90 days, receiving essentially the same kind of care. T. 248-49, 255. One patient stayed over 1.4 months. T. 251. During the current fiscal year, Tampa Heights will earn approximately $4 million from adolescent Patients, and approximately 36.3 percent of that $4 million will[ be derived from adolescent patient days from patients that stay over 90 days (or $1.6 million). T. 334. (TH PFF 2.) (TH PFF 1, that Dr. Haney had a "substantial" number of patients is rejected for lack of quantifying evidence in the record.) Thus, while there are some differences between a facility devoted to short term psychiatric care and a facility intended for long term psychiatric care, there is a significant overlap with respect to the manner in which both types of facilities provide the same service for patients staying in the midrange of lengths of stay. For these patients, a short term inpatient psychiatric hospital provides a service that is the same as that provided by a long term inpatient psychiatric hospital. (P. PFF 6 and 8. the remainder of P. PFF 8 is rejected as cumulative.) A loss of as much as 10 percent of long term adolescent revenue would cause Tampa Heights to increase patient charges. T. 335. (Th PFF 2.) Given the ultimate finding that a substantial need exists for the facility proposed by the Petitioner, it cannot be concluded that Tampa Heights will in fact lose 25 percent of its adolescent patient days to Petitioner. For this reason, TH PFF 2 is rejected. Given the overlap in treatment, however, Tampa Heights would probably lose some patient days to Petitioner, but the degree of lost patient days cannot be determined on this record. Tampa Heights Hospital and University Psychiatric Center both have a substantial interest that could be affected by this proceeding. The Health Council for West Central Florida, Inc., is the local planning council for HRS District VI, which consists of Hardee, Highlands, Hillsborough, Polk, and Manatee Counties. Tampa Heights Exhibit 2. The local health council has adopted a health plan for the district, which is Tampa Heights Exhibit 2. The local health plan, as corrected, shows that there are expected to be 134 excess psychiatric beds in the District by 1990. Ibid. at page 119; T. 286. Additionally, the District has a number of non-hospital residential beds, some of which are exclusively for adolescents and children, and others of mixed ages. Tampa Heights Exhibit 2, page 113; T. 311. The local health plan adopted a policy to encourage use of the least restrictive, non- hospital facility wherever possible. Tampa Heights Exhibit 2, page 112-114; T. 303-305. Thus, in these respects, the proposal of the Petitioner is not consistent with the local health plan. (TH PFF 4 and 13.) The local health plan estimates of need are not consistent with actual need as will be discussed ahead. There is no direct evidence in the record of the occupancy levels of the one long term psychiatric facility in District VI, Northside Community Mental Health Center, which has 16 beds. (TH PFF 5.) An occupancy level for Northside may be inferred from the testimony of Ms. Marsha Lewis, Deputy Director of that facility. Ms. Lewis stated that the facility has 16 licensed long term beds, and ran an average length of stay of 349 days in 12 beds. This means that the facility had 4188 patient days (12 times 349) out of a possible 5840 (16 times 365), which converts to an occupancy level of 72 percent in 16 license beds. T. 320. The 1984 occupancy rates for some short term psychiatric facilities in District VI were below 80 percent, and were as follows: 66 percent, Tampa Heights Hospital; Memorial, 76 percent Lakeland Regional, 54 percent; Winter Haven, 71 percent; Palmview, 27 percent. T. 213-216, 117. (The occupancy rate for Hillsborough County Hospital Authority was not provided by the witness.) (TH PFF 6 and 39.) The relevance of these figures is not clear, since the evidence does not state whether these occupancy rates are for adult psychiatric patients, adolescents, or both. The Petitioner projects that it would reach 80.6 percent occupancy by March 1988, and would be at 72 percent occupancy in September of that year. Petitioner's Exhibit 2, table 10; T. 49- 50. In fact, the Petitioner predicted 80 percent occupancy in the second year of operation, based upon the analysis of Mr. Braeuning of Petitioner's needs analysis, the gross population, and the number of adolescents in the District, T. 50, as well as comparisons to the HMA Arlington Texas, facility, analysis of District competition, availability of physicians, and information provided by children, family, and youth of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. T. 49. Mr. Braeuning had not previously staffed or administered an adolescent psychiatric center in Florida. T. 61. He had conducted a socioeconomic profile study of Hillsborough and Highlands Counties, but not for Polk, Manatee, or Hardee Counties. T. 63-64. Mr. Braeuning was not personally aware of whether District VI psychiatrists would use the program proposed by HMA, and was not aware in any great detail of the existing programs in the District. T. 64-66. The Petitioner does not currently operate an adolescent psychiatric facility in Florida. T. 61. Mr. Braeuning is an expert in health care administration and operations. T. 25. It is the further finding of the Hearing Officer that the projections of the Petitioner that an 80 percent occupancy rate will be achieved by this projected depend primarily upon the Petitioner's evidence as to need provided by other witnesses. Since, as will be discussed ahead, that evidence was sufficient to demonstrate need, the projection of an 80 percent occupancy rate is accepted as based upon sufficient evidence. (TH PFF 7 through 11.) Children ages 0-17 are reasonably expected to require long term inpatient psychiatric hospital care at a rate of 103 per 100,000 persons in that age group. T. 159-161, 461-464; Petitioner's exhibit 5, pp. 21-22, 35. The age group that the Petitioner proposes to serve is ages 12 to 18. T. 35-36. This is a medically appropriate age group to be served by the planned facility. T. 97, 397. No party presented evidence as to the precise rate of need for long term inpatient psychiatric hospital care for ages 12-18, the ages which Petitioner proposed to serve. The Petitioner relied upon the rate for ages 0-17 adjusted by 0.96. T. 160-161. Tampa Heights relied upon the rate for ages 0- 17, unadjusted. T. 465. The method employed by Tampa Heights was much less reliable than that used by the Petitioner, and is rejected. Within the group of persons ages 0-17, the need for long term psychiatric hospital care is greatly skewed toward older persons in the group. Persons in the first 9 ages, from 0-9, account for only 3.596 of the need; in the next 5 ages, 10-14, there is 31 percent of the need; and in the last 3 years, 15-17, there is 6596 of the need. T. 160. These statistics follow a curve of accelerating need as children increase in age. The composite rate of 103 per 100,000, which includes a very large number of persons in the 0-11 age group with very little need, thus is much too low to be used as a predictor of need for the 12-18 age group. T. 578-579, 582-583. Petitioner's method of adjustment also has a flaw, but the flaw is less unreasonable than that proposed by Tampa Heights. Petitioner proposes that the rate of 103 per 100,000 be adjusted so that it reflects that portion of the rate attributable to persons ages 10-17. This includes need of children ages 10 and 11, and thus includes need which Petitioner does not propose to serve. Second, it fails to include 18 year olds, and thus underestimates need in that regard. The net result, however, is probably to underestimate need slightly. As discussed above, the need for long term hospital care seems to increase at an accelerated rate. If, for ages 0-9, only 3.5 percent of the need is represented, it is unlikely that the need of 10 year olds or 11 year olds will be all that much, and thus, inclusion of those ages probably has not contributed greatly to an overstatement of need. On the other hand, the failure to include 18 year olds, given the fact that persons 15-17 represent 6596 of the total need in the 0-17 age group, probably results in an underestimation of need. In all probability, the overinclusion and underinclusion problems with Petitioner's method cancel out. At ,worst, if one assumed a completely linear distribution of need between the ages 10-18 (which, as discussed above, is contrary to the evidence), the 0.96 adjustment would be evenly distributed throughout all the ages from 10-17. Thus, since there are 8 ages in that group, each age would account for 0.12 of the need, assuming linear distribution. Subtracting ages 10 and 11, and adding age 18, would result in an adjustment factor of 0.84. The calculations which follow will use both the 0.96 and 0.84 factors, although it is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that the 0.96 factor is most reasonable. District VI consists of Hillsborough, Manatee, Polk, Highlands, and Hardee Counties. Tampa Heights Exhibit 2. The population for 1990 in District VI of persons ages 12-18 is predicted to be 135,627. T. 456. The population for ages 0-17 is predicted to be 380,583. (This is derived by reversing the calculations on pages 157-158 of the transcript, i.e., dividing 392 by 103 and multiplying by 100,000.) As explained above, it would be statistically incorrect to multiply the rate for ages 0-17 times the population for ages 12-18, as proposed by Tampa Heights, since the rate of 103 per 100,000 is much lower due to the inclusion of ages 0-11 in calculating the rate. Petitioner's method is mathematically sound. It requires the multiplication of 103 times the projected population for District VI in 1990 for ages 0-17, which is 380, 583, divided by 100,000, and then adjusted by multiplying the adjustment factor discussed above, by 0.96. The result is 376, which represents the number of persons, ages 10-17, who are expected to require long term inpatient psychiatric hospital care in 1990, and on this record, represents also the best estimate of the number of such persons in age group 12-18 predicted for District VI in 1990. (Assuming that 0.84 is the correct adjustment factor, and performing the same mathematical computation, the number of such persons is 329.) Calculation of the gross bed need for these 376 patients depends entirely upon the choice of length-of stay estimated for such patients. The Petitioner proposes a length of stay at its facility of from 120 days to 180 days. T. 158; 36. Petitioner's expert, Mr. Britton, admitted that he used the range of 120 days to 180 days in his estimates of need because "they were the lengths of stay that were indicated for the Applicant's project as it related to specific program they intended to utilize . . . ." T. 265. Thus, to this extent, these length of stay are inappropriate for determining projected need for the District in 1990. As Mr. Brittion admitted, these lengths of stay are only those patients which Petitioner seeks to attract and serve. Mr. Britton testified that there is no definitive length of stay for adolescents in the expert literature, hut that one study reported a range from one month to nine months, with an average of 108 days. T. 242. Tampa Heights' expert, Howard E. Fagin, Ph.D., was of the opinion that an average length of stay of 90 to 120 days would be appropriate. T. 466. Tampa Heights thus used this range in its estimates. Tampa Heights Exhibit 8. Dr. Max Sugar felt that the length of stay could be six months or longer. T. 88. Northside Community Mental Health Center, the only facility (apparently) that has a certificate of need in District VI for long term adolescent inpatient hospital psychiatric beds, had an average length of stay of 349 days for 12 of 16 long term beds. T. 320. Finally, and most persuasive to the Hearing Officer, Tampa Heights presented the testimony of Peter Michael Kreis, Program Director, Children, Youth and Families Program Office, of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Mr. Kreis was the District Administrator of District VI for five and one-half years, T. 342, and was accepted as an expert on the issue of the availability and adequacy, from the perspective of the Children, Youth and Families Program, of facilities in District VI and the central Florida area for children and adolescents eligible for that program. T. 348-352. As will be discussed ahead, Mr. Hreis identified some 320 beds in District VI that could be categorized as residential beds (including hospital beds) available to provide long term mental health care to CYF adolescents, and his testimony has been accepted as fact in the paragraph ahead. Mr. Kries testified that the normal length of stay in these facilities is "probably closer to nine months," and that the majority of them are "90 days and beyond." T. 354. Thus, the best evidence of length of stay is the actual length of stay now experienced, as shown by Mr. Kreis and the experience of Northside Community Mental Health Center, the only long term adolescent facility in the District. A length of stay of 180 days as proposed by the Petitioner is probably conservative, and is accepted as a reasonable basis for calculating need. The gross bed need for District VI for adolescent long term inpatient psychiatric hospital beds is thus calculated as follows. In 1990, 376 patients will stay an average of 180 days, resulting in 67,680 patient days. Divided by the number of days in the year, 365, this is 185 patient years, which is also the annual bed need. This figure is adjusted by dividing by 80 percent to assure that the 80 percent or less occupancy standard contained in the rule is met, which results in a gross bed need in 1990 of 231 beds. Performing the same calculation, but using the figure derived from using the 0.84 adjustment factor, the result is a gross bed need in 1990 of 202 beds. As will be seen ahead, the net bed need, insofar as the application of this Petitioner is concerned, is not materially affected, regardless whether the 0.96 (the factor chosen by the Hearing Officer) or a factor of 0.84 is used. It must be reiterated that the factor of 0.84 is rejected for the reasons stated in paragraph 22 above. Camelot Care Center is erroneously carried by HRS in the inventory of District VI long term child and adolescent psychiatric beds. T. 164, 536. Camelot Care Center is not in District VI, but is in Pasco County, which is not in District VI. T. 163-166. The only long term inpatient hospital psychiatric beds currently in District VI for children and adolescents are 16 beds located in Hillsborough County at Northside CMHC. Tampa Heights Exhibit 7. Thus, if only long term beds in District VI were to be considered, there would be a net need of 215 beds by 1990. As will be discussed ahead in the conclusions of law, both the statutes and the rules adopted by HRS require that the availability of short term inpatient psychiatric facilities to provide care for some of the long term inpatient psychiatric patients of the District must be considered in determining net bed need. This conclusion was reached, following the language used by the rules, without regard for asserted differences in treatment modalities. But even if treatment differences were relevant, the Petitioner has not proven that the short term Inpatient psychiatric hospital facilities in District VI do not provide, in part, services "like" those provided in a long term facility. It is true that the short term facility will tend to treat acute problems, and that a patient having deeply seated mental problems may not reveal such problems in a short treatment period. T. 92. But Petitioner's own expert noted that the psychiatric treatment itself is the same for short and long term patients, and that the physician sometimes needs a period of time of evaluation to determine the patient's longest term needs. T. 89-90, 92. The treatment program at Tampa Heights is very similar to that proposed by the Petitioner. T. 326. The treatment program at Palmview Hospital seems to be quite similar to that proposed by the Petitioner. T. 115. Moreover, short term facilities in fact provide treatment for those "long term" patients who experience the shorter stays. Rule 10-50.11(26)(a), Florida Administrative Code, defines long term services as those averaging a length of stay of 90 days. Thus, at least some of the need for long term services is a need for hospital care (in gross number of days) of less than 90 days, and these stays could just as easily be provided by short term facilities. In fact, such potential "long term" patients are, in part, being served by such facilities as Tampa Heights, which observed lengths of stay of 90 days and longer, one patient for 14 months, and 2 patients for 8 months at the time of the hearing in August. T. 248-249, 255, 334. For these reasons, as well as the findings in paragraph 10 above, it is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that short term inpatient psychiatric hospital facilities in District VI have the capability of providing a portion of long term services to adolescents, and in fact do so to some extent, and thus must be considered as a "like and existing health care service" as defined by section 381.494(6)(c)2, Fla. Stat. The record does not contain high quality evidence as to what portion of existing and approved short term hospital inpatient psychiatric facilities for adolescents in District VI should be deemed to be "like" long term facility. The only attempt at quantification of this issue is found in the evidence presented by Tampa Heights that 36.3 percent of its revenues in the current fiscal year derived from adolescents were from adolescents who stayed longer than 90 days. There was no evidence as to the proportion of patient days represented by this revenue, and there was no evidence that this percentage holds for other short term facilities in the District. However, the percentage is conservative in one way: it includes only such stays that are more than 90 days, and does not include those who stayed less than 90 days. As discussed above, some of those adolescents who stay less than 90 days can be characterized as both a "long term" and a "short term" patients due to the definitions adopted by HRS in its rules. Rather than reject the only data available, it is concluded that approximately 36 percent of adolescent short term hospital inpatient psychiatric beds are available for the needs of "long term" adolescent patients. District VI currently has 124 licensed and approved free standing short term inpatient psychiatric hospital beds, and 19 licensed and approved beds in a general hospital, for a total of 143 short term inpatient psychiatric beds. T. 459; Tampa Heights Exhibit 7. Since 36 percent of these beds are available to serve the needs of some of the long term patients in the District, the short term beds in the District provide an additional 51 beds. Thus, the total number of psychiatric beds in District VI available to provide for the needs of long term adolescent psychiatric patients is 67, which includes 51 short term beds and 16 long term beds. (The 32 long term beds at Camelot Care Center have been excluded because not located in District VI.) Since 231 long term adolescent psychiatric beds are needed in District VI by 1990, and 67 such beds exist, there is a net long term psychiatric bed need of 164. Even if the lower bed need number is used (which was 202, derived from using the 0.84 adjustment factor), the net bed need shown by the Petitioner is at least 135 beds by 1990. The Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, proposes to apply non-rule policy to the application of the Petitioner. The non-rule policy is that consideration should be given to the availability of like and existing services that are within two hours driving time of the site of the facility proposed by the applicant, even though some of those facilities are outside the District. T. 534. The Department justifies this policy to prevent overbuilding, T 535, to allow focus upon a standard metropolitan area, rather than upon a District, T. 536, and because patients for long term psychiatric hospital care cross county lines, T. 543, 550. The policy makes sense. Long term psychiatric care, in all probability, does not need to be located by District, but could be sited regionally, to serve larger numbers of people than those in just a District, since by definition, such care ought not involve acute emergencies. The policy is reasonable and has been justified by the Respondent. Intervenor Tampa Heights demonstrated that there are perhaps 270 long term psychiatric hospital beds within two hours drive of the site proposed by the Petitioner. T. 475-478; Tampa Height Exhibit 10. FIRS presented similar, if less precise, testimony. T. 535-536, 545-552. But neither the Respondent nor the Intervenors provided evidence as to how many of the beds outside District VI are actually available to serve the needs of persons in District VI. It is probable that facilities located in Orlando, Sarasota (Tampa Heights Exhibit 10) and St. Pet-ersburg (T. 536) are located in those cities to serve persons needing such services in those cities and Districts. There was no evidence that any of these out-of-District facilities were granted certificates of need to serve the needs of persons living in District VI. Moreover, without evidence to show to what extent these 270 out of District beds are needed to serve the needs of non-District VI patients, it is factually impossible to determine to what extent some of these 270 beds might be used to meet the needs of District VI. For this reason, the 270 beds identified as being within two hours of the site of the facility proposed by the Petitioner cannot be considered to be available to serve District VI needs. The Children, Youth, and Families (CYF) program of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services helps place eligible children and adolescents in psychiatric or other mental health programs. T. 346. Mental health programs exist in outpatient and residential facilities as well as licensed general and specialty hospitals. T. 346-347. The Department prefers not to use the more restrictive hospital setting for placement of these children. T. 353. The majority of facilities providing mental health care to children and adolescents in District VI provide such care on a long term basis, that is, for more than 90 days, and normally about nine months. T. 354. District VI has the following facilities which do provide or can provide such long term mental health care for CYF children and have the following approximate number of beds: (T. 355-357): Childrens' Home 68 Northside CMHC 24 (This is 8 more than TH. Ex. 7) FMHI 28 Childrens' Services Cen. 24 Tampa Heights 38 (This is 2 less than TH. Ex. 7) Hillsborough C. Hosp. 12 Memorial 10 University of S. Fla. 24 (Devoted to adolescents) Peach R. CMHC 34 Palmview 18 Winter Haven Hospital 30 Manatee Memorial 10 TOTAL 320 All of the above programs are residential programs, not outpatient programs. See T. 353-357. All, or a substantial portion, of these 320 beds are available in District VI to meet the need by 1990 in that District for long term psychiatric beds. T. 354. However, this inventory of 320 beds includes residential programs (such as perhaps the "Childrens' Home" listed above) that are not hospitals as characterized by Tampa Heights Exhibit 7. It should be remembered that the need for 231 long term psychiatric hospital beds was derived from data used by all parties from table 13, page 35, Petitioner's Exhibit 5. The rate of 103 per 100,000 was derived from that table by adding only the predicted number of psychoses and neuroses for the age group 0-17 needing "24-hour institution" care. Excluded from that rate were persons needing "acute hospital" care and "special programs." One cannot meaningfully assess the availability of the 320 beds listed above for long term care until the need for such beds for acute care and residential care has been calculated. Since there has been no expert testimony in this case to calculate the total need in District VI for adolescent mental health care (including long term 24 hour beds, acute care beds, and other types of residential beds), the testimony of the "availability" of the 320 beds is rejected as an irrelevant and statistically incorrect correlation of bed inventory with "need." It is possible, however, to test the meaningfulness of the testimony that 320 beds are "available" for long term care in District VI by reference to statistics contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Since this exhibit and the date contained therein is heresy, the Hearing Officer cannot make a finding of fact by reference to the statistics contained in Petitioner's Exhibit 5, in the absence of expert opinion, which is lacking in this record. However, a relatively simple calculation can be made, using exactly the same method used by all the experts in this case. That calculation will be made in findings of fact 42-46, however, not as a finding of fact per se, but as explanation for why the 320 beds must be ignored absent some evidence that such beds are indeed available to serve long term patient needs (or, are unavailable because currently serving many other needs). Turning to Petitioner's Exhibit 5, table 13, the following predicted incidence of mental illness by treatment facility for the age group 0-17 is recorded therein: Special Programs Acute Hospital 24 Hour Psychoses 128 210 30 Neuroses 123 253 73 The total of these numbers is 817. Excluded from the above are "outpatient" statistics. "Outpatient" as used in table 13, Petitioner's Exhibit 5, is concluded to mean the same as "ambulatory" as described on pages 21 and 22 of the same exhibit, and "special programs" on table 13 are concluded to be "partial hospitalization" as described on the same pages. "Partial hospitalization" and "special programs" include halfway houses, group homes, day care centers, boarding homes, foster homes, and congregate care facilities. Id. at page 21. Thus, the commination of data with respect to "special programs," "acute hospital," and "24-hour institutions" much more reasonably approximates the types of facilities and care included in the 320 beds identified by Mr. Kreis. Adding these numbers, the total predicted incidence of psychoses and neuroses for persons ages 0-17 needing partial hospitalization, acute hospital care, and 24 hour hospital care, would be 817 per 100,000. This number should also be modified by the factor 0.96 to convert it to a better estimate of the rate per 100,000 for the age group 12-18, which is a rate of 784 per 100,000. Using this rate, it might thus be predicted that 2984 adolescents in District VI in 1990 (ages 12-18) will need special programs, acute hospital care, and 24 hour care, for psychoses and neuroses. This number is based upon the predicted 1990 population of the District of 380,583. Mr. Kreis testified that the majority of the 320 beds are used by adolescents staying longer than 90 days, and that the norm for these beds was about nine months. T. 354. Using a more conservative average length of stay for all of these beds of 180 days, and apply an 80 percent occupancy standard, the following calculation can be made, using the same need formula used above. The 2984 adolescents needing special programs, acute care, and 24 hour institutional care, will need 537,120 patient days of care per year at an average length of stay of 180 days. Dividing by 365, this converts to an annual bed need of 1472. Assuming the need to maintain 80 percent or less occupancy, the gross bed need is 1840 beds to provide special programs, acute care, and 24 hour institutional care. Subtracting the 320 beds now available, there would be a net need by 1990 of 1520 beds. Thus, the 320 beds identified by Mr. Kries would not adequate to fulfill the need identified in earlier parts of this order. While it is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that a length of stay of 180 days for the combined 320 beds is appropriate, given the testimony of Mr. Kreis, it would be useful to recalculate the above figures assuming only a 60 day average length of stay for all of these beds. (This length of stay is far too low, given the probability that adolescents assigned to residential settings are, for reasons of continuity of care and for lack of parental availability to cope with the adolescent's problems, destined to spend far more than 60 days per year in such programs.) At a length of stay of 60 days, 2984 persons would generate 179,040 patient days annually, which converts to a bed need of 491 annually. At 80 percent occupancy, 614 beds would be needed by 1990, a net need (subtracting 320 beds) of 294 beds. This calculation is not correct, given the testimony of Mr. Kreis as to normal length of stay, and is not adopted by the Hearing Officer. It is performed, however, to show that even if Mr. Kries were wrong about the length of stay, the 320 beds he identified still do not meet predicted need, even if a 60 day average length of stay is used. Based upon all of the foregoing, there is a need for the 60 beds proposed by the Petitioner in District VI. George Britton, who testified on behalf of the Petitioner with respect to calculation of need, was tendered as an expert in health care planning. Mr. Britton received a master's degree in business administration in health care administration in 1979. During his master's work, Mr. Britton took a course in health economics. T. 139. In part that course concerned health care regulations at the national level. T. 140. The primary focus of his master's degree was hospital administration. T. 137. There were no courses available specifically dealing with planning for psychiatric services, and he took none. T. 137. He has had experience with various methodologies for determining bed need for a new health service both in his academic work and in practical experience. T. 140- 141. He also has attended seminars over the past five years concerning planning for new health services. T. 141. He worked as a health care administrator in a middle level position at George Washington University Medical Center between his undergraduate degree and his master's degree. T. 128. He served as assistant to the executive director, University of Florida Medical Center, Shands Teaching Hospital, from 1979 to 1982. T. 129. From 1982 to late 1984, Mr. Britton worked as vice president operations, University Community Hospital, in Tampa, Florida. Id. At Shands, Mr. Britton was also in charge of planning, and in that job, worked on several applications for certificates of need. T. 131. These certificates of need were quite substantial, one involving about $70 million for a proposed new hospital, and another for about $30 million in renovations. T. 132. Other certificates of need applications that he worked on included applications for neonatal services, radiology, and for helicopter service. T. 132. As vice president at University Community Hospital, Mr. Britton was similarly responsible for certificate of need applications, and worked on applications for cardiac catheterization, open heart surgery, and nuclear magnetic resonance imaging. T. 133. One of the applications for a certificate of need for which Mr. Britton was responsible concerned renovation of a children's mental health unit, but did not involve new beds. T. 138. All of his work with certificate of need applications involved work with need methodologies based upon the demographics of a service population. Id. Mr. Britton has been qualified on one prior occasion as an expert in emergency medical services or hospital administration. T. 135. He had not testified previously with respect to need for psychiatric services. T. 138. Mr. Britton's testimony covered areas well within his general expertise. First, Mr. Britton selected the same rate of incidence of psychoses and neuroses among persons ages 0-17 in need of 24 institutional care as selected by the Tampa Heights expert. Thus, there was no dispute as to that basic rate and its genesis from Petitioner's Exhibit 5. Second, Mr. Britton applied a factor of 0.96 to reduce that rate, deriving this factor from Petitioner's Exhibit 10. Dr. Fagin was less conservative, proposing to use the 103 per 100,000 prevalence rate without adjusting for ages 0-11. If Mr. Britton erred, the error is not in the favor of the Petitioner. Third, Mr. Britton used the same mathematical formula as used by Dr. Fagin, including use of the 80 percent occupancy standard. Fourth, there was no dispute as to the accuracy of the population figure used, and as discussed above, Dr. Fagin seriously erred in using a population figure for only ages 12-18. Fifth, the length of stay was primarily established by Mr. Kreis and testimony from Northside Community Mental Health Center, and Mr. Britton's expertise only corroborated that primary evidence. It is the conclusion of the Hearing Officer that Mr. Britton is as an expert in health planning for the testimony that he rendered in this case. TH PFF 30 is rejected for these reasons. and finding of fact 48. Mr. Britton was deposed on July 5, 1885. He was questioned about several methodologies, and thought that he had been asked about three methodologies. T. 216. But it is clear from the cross examination of Mr. Britton during the hearing that none of the deposition testimony amounted to his opinion on July 25, 1985, as to need, with the exception of one statement: on July 25, 1985, Mr. Britton apparently was of the opinion that there was a net need for 105 beds. T. 219-220. All of the other deposition testimony appears to have simply been Mr. Britton responding to questions by counsel as to the results if various other methodologies were used; at no point did Mr. Britton admit that any of the alternative methodologies were ones that he adopted. He said that he considered various age ranges, and ultimately refined his opinion as he gathered data from professional literature. T. 204. In the deposition, Mr. Britton reviewed one version of inventory of available beds, but he never stated that the 479 beds identified were in fact available to serve long term adolescent needs. He clearly stated that "there was a great deal of confusion about that at that particular time, which I indicated I was in the process of sorting out" with respect to "what constituted inventory." T. 207 He characterized the list of 479 beds as a "mixture of facilities," Id. He later said that these beds were in short term facilities. T. 213. It should be remembered that earlier Mr. Britton had stated that he considered 8 wide variety of facilities in the District, and that due to various statistical problems, it was not possible to develop a precise number of beds available for long term patients, T. 153-155. The second method explored in the deposition was based upon the District VI local health plan of 1985, and was simply something that Mr. Britton "took into consideration." T. 218. In the deposition, he went through the local health plan and verified the numbers, T. 218, and stated that there was other information not yet available on July 25, 1985, upon which he intended to rely. T. 219, 223-224. This second method was the method used to determine need for short term psychiatric facilities. T. 224. None of the foregoing detracts from the ultimate credibility of Mr. Britton. It only reflects that various types of methodologies that he considered and ultimately rejected. (TH PFF 31.) At a deposition on July 25, 1985, Mr. Britton testified that it was not possible to establish the number of beds available in District VI for long term adolescent care, and on cross examination, Mr. Britton explained that when he was asked that question, he had under consideration a wide variety of facilities throughout the District. He further explained that due to the practice of combining adult and adolescent beds and reporting irregularities, plus the inclusion of short term beds, it was not possible to develop a precise number of such beds as long term beds. T. 153-155. Rather than detract from the credibility of Mr. Britton as a witness, this answer adds to his credibility. As discussed above in other findings of fact, none of the parties presented evidence of high quality as to the availability of beds to provide long term adolescent care. Tampa Heights proposed to extrapolate from its own revenue experience to apply a 36.3 percent figure to all other facilities, and did so without any specific evidence to justify such as extrapolation. See findings of fact 11 and 32. HRS asked the Hearing Officer to consider the availability of beds within a two hour driving time without providing any evidence as to the actual availability of out-of-District beds to serve District VI needs. And Tampa Heights applied the prevalence rate of psychoses and neuroses for adolescents needing 24 hour institutional care to the bed inventory provided by Mr. Kreis, which included halfway houses and acute care hospitals. In sum, Mr. Britton's candor concerning the problems of precisely determining the availability of beds to serve the long term need of District VI adolescents adds to his credibility. (TH PFF 31.) As discussed above, Mr. Britton considered and rejected several age groups in arriving at his final opinion. T. 204. That he did so is normal for an expert in arriving at an opinion, and his testimony coupled with his deposition testimony ultimately does not detract from his credibility on this point. He admitted that he looked at various lengths of stay, including 45 days (when he was analyzing short term bed need, T. 241 and Tampa Heights Exhibit 1), and 87.2 days, T. 242, but, as found earlier, Mr. Britton testified that there is no one definitive length of stay in the professional literature. T. 242. Moreover, Tampa Heights' expert, Dr. Fagin, used two lengths of stay, without explaining a detailed basis for either. Finally, it is true that Tampa Heights Exhibit 1 contains an analysis performed by Mr. Britton as of August 9, 1985, which contains a prevalence rate of 1,010 per 100,000. T. 237. But that rate is correct for the analysis performed on Tampa Heights Exhibit 1, which shows an analysis of short term (acute hospital) bed need. As Mr. Britton stated, it was not "his" rate, it was the rate for such need derived form the GMENAC study, Petitioner's Exhibit 5. T. 238. Tampa Heights Exhibit 1 is marked "working - notes," and, as discussed in earlier parts of this recommended order, it would be appropriate to use a rate for acute care psychiatric hospitals to determine need for such hospitals as one step in an analysis of determining to what extent such short term hospitals might in fact be available to serve long term needs. That Mr. Britton performed such an analysis is to his credit. For these reasons, TH PFF 32 is rejected. The following are specific rulings upon the proposed findings of fact of the Petitioner which have not previously been identified in the above findings of fact, or which may contain sentences that have not specifically been addressed. The numbers which follow correspond to the numbers of Petitioner's proposed findings of fact: Rejected because not factual in nature. The facts proposed herein are dealt with in findings of fact 36- 38. All of the facts proposed by Petitioner in proposed finding of fact 13 are true, but irrelevant, since the methodology of Dr. Fagin, and his result, have been rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 18-35, and findings of fact 21 and 26 in particular. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 14 is adopted by reference. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 15 is adopted by reference. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 16 is adopted by reference. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 17 is a summary of Mr. Britton's calculations of need. The majority of these calculations were adopted, except that the average length of stay was found to be 180 days. Findings of fact 18-38 deal with Petitioner's proposed finding of fact 17. Adopted by findings of fact 29, 30 and 47. The following are specific rulings upon the proposed findings of fact of Tampa Heights which have not previously been identified in the above findings of fact, or which may contain sentences that have not specifically been addressed. The numbers which follow correspond to the numbers of Tampa Heights' proposed findings of fact: TH PFF 14 is adopted by reference, except the last sentence. The testimony of pages 529-530 of the transcript was that "the need for care is greater than those people who demand care" because people who need care sometimes do not receive it. It cannot be concluded that calculations of need based upon estimates of need are overstated, or that demand statistics are more suitable, since the point of calculating "need" is to estimate the number of people who are in need, and not to exclude those who need care but are unable to obtain it. Rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 18 through 38, and particularly 21 and 26. TH PFF 16 is adopted by reference. The first and last sentences were adopted in findings of fact 19 and 23. The second sentence was rejected by findings of fact 21 and 25. TH PFF 18 was adopted, except that the adjustment factor of 0.96 was also adopted; see findings of fact 18 and 22. Most of TH PFF 19 has be rejected in findings of fact 20 through The rate of 103 per 100,000 cannot be applied solely to the population ages 12-18 for the reasons stated in finding of fact 21 and 25. The average length of stay is not as low as 90 or 120 days for the reasons stated in finding of fact 26. TH PFF 20 uses a correct mathematical formula, but reaches an incorrect result for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph. TH PFF 21 is rejected for the reasons stated with respect to TH PFF 19, except that the 80 percent occupancy standard was adopted. TH PFF 22, which concerns the correct inventory of beds available to serve the need, is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 29 through 34. TH PFF 23 is rejected as stated in finding of fact 30 and findings of fact which precede that finding. TH PFF 24 has been adopted by findings of fact 31 through 34, to the extent that 36 percent of the short term beds identified by Tampa Heights were counted as available to serve long term needs. However, the resulting net bed need is rejected for the reasons stated above with respect to TH PFF 18-22. TH PFF 25 is rejected by finding of fact 29. TH PFF 26 is rejected due to differing calculations adopted above, see paragraphs dealing with TH PFF 18-22. and 37. TH PFF 27 is adopted to the extent stated in findings of fact 36 TH PFF 28 was adopted by finding of fact 38 to the extent that such facilities exist, but the conclusion reached, that these facilities were shown by evidence to be available to serve District VI needs, is rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 38. TH PFF 29 is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 39 through 46. TH PFF 30 was rejected in findings of fact 48 and 49. TH PFF 31 was rejected in findings of fact 50 and 51. TH PFF 32 was rejected in finding of fact 52. TH PFF has been considered and ruled upon in findings of fact 20, 21, 25, and 31 through 34. 34-38. TH PFF 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38 are cumulative, and were completely contained in earlier proposed findings which have already been ruled upon. TH PFF 39 has been adopted and rejected for the reasons stated in finding of fact 16. TH PFF 40 has been adopted, in essence, in finding of fact 31. TH PFF 41 is adopted by reference to the extent that there is no evidence that there are access travel to and from) problems with existing psychiatric facilities in District VI. TH PFF 42 is adopted by reference. However, even with the addition of 22 long term beds, under any of the above calculations, there would still be a net need for the facility proposed by the Petitioner. Further, there was no evidence that Tampa Heights in fact intends to add 22 beds to its facility. Absent such evidence, the inference in TH PFF that 22 beds would be available to serve the needs of District VI is rejected. TH PFF 43 is rejected as irrelevant, given the calculations of need contained in earlier protions of this - recommended order. TH PFF 44 has been rejected for the reasons set forth in findings of fact 39 through 46. There was no evidence of need for additional teaching or research facilities to be served by Petitioner, nor was there evidence of the adequacy of existing teaching or research facilities. TH PFF 45 is rejected as worded, and the above sentence is adopted as an alternative. TH PFF 46 is rejected for the reasons stated in findings of fact 7 and 3. The testimony as to a national shortage of child psychiatrists was not sufficiently detailed to result in a finding that the Petitioner could not attract psychiatrists to provide treatment at its facility. In fact, the Petitioner showed consulting affiliation with one psychiatrist, Dr. Sugar, end a plan for attracting staff. The vast majority of staff shown in Petitioner's Exhibit 2 are not psychiatrists, in any event. There was no other evidence of a shortage of other types of staff. TH PFF 47, to the extent that it proposes that long term financial feasibility has not been shown, is rejected based upon the findings in finding of fact 17, since financial feasibility is largely determined by the existence of patients needing the service. Failure to present evidence from a financial expert does not cause a finding of a lack of financial feasibility where need is clearly demonstrated in the record. Although Mr. Jaffe questioned the amount that Petitioner stated it would receive per patient from the CYF" program, Mr. Jaffe did not correlate this with any evidence of the actual amount of CYF payments that should be substituted in place of Petitioner's estimates, and did not quantify the estimated revenue shortfall. Commitment from a bonding authority is not essential to show financial feasibility, since such commitment could not be expected until a certificate of need is granted. TH PFF 48 is rejected based upon finding of fact 12. TH PFF 49 is the same as proposed findings in TH PFF 37 and 42, which already have been ruled upon. TH PFF 50 is rejected due to the analysis of need contained in the findings of fact above, finding a need for an additional 151 long term adolescent inpatient psychiatric hospital beds by 1990 in District VI, and finding of fact 16.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Health and Rehabilitation approve the application of Petitioner and issue to it a certificate of need for the establishment and operation of a new 60 bed adolescent long term psychiatric hospital in Hillsborough County, Florida. RECOMMENDED this 20th day of January, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM C. SHERRILL, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of January, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert S. Cohen, Esquire Haben, Parker, Skelding, Costingan, McVoy & Labasky P. O. Box 669 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Jay Adams, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Suite 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 George N. Meros, Esquire Carlton, Field, Wars, Emanuel, Smith & Cutler, P.A. 410 Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Susan Greco Tuttle, Esquire Moffit, Hart & Miller 401 South Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602 David Pingree, Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: The petitioner Hillsborough County Hospital Authority, a public body corporate, owns and operates two public hospitals - Tampa General Hospital and Hillsborough County Hospital. In 1981, the Authority received Certificate of Need Number 1784 which authorized an expenditure of $127,310,000 for the consolidation of the two hospitals. The project involved new construction and renovation at Tampa General, delicensure of beds at Hillsborough County Hospital and the transfer of those beds to Tampa General. The Certificate provided for a total of 1,000 licensed beds at Tampa General Hospital and for the "renovation, new construction, consolidation and expansion of service per application." The completion of the total project was projected to occur by October, 1987, but is presently running about four months behind schedule. When the Authority received its Certificate of Need in 1981, it was then operating a total of 93 psychiatric beds between the two hospitals -- 71 at County Hospital and 22 at Tampa General. The plan for consolidation and the 1981 Certificate of Need called for an overall reduction of 14 psychiatric beds - from 93 total beds between the two facilities to 79 total consolidated psychiatric beds, at the conclusion of the project. At the time the Authority obtained its Certificate of Need in 1981, there was no differentiation between determinations of need for general acute care beds and psychiatric beds. The number of psychiatric beds operated by a hospital were not separately listed on a hospital's license. As noted above, Tampa General was operating 22 psychiatric beds when it received its 1981 Certificate of Need. Because of an increased demand for acute care beds (non- psychiatric medical and surgical beds) in late 1982, Tampa General closed the psychiatric unit and made those 22 beds available for acute care. In the Authority's 1983-85 license for Tampa General, those 22 beds were included in the 637-bed total, which was not broken down by bed type. An attachment to the license indicates that the total bed count should read 671. In the space designated for "hospital bed utilization," the figure "O" appears after the word "psychiatric." (Respondent's Exhibit 1) In 1983, the statutory and regulatory law changed with regard to the separate licensure and independent determination of need for psychiatric beds. Section 395.003(4), Florida Statutes, was amended to provide, in pertinent part, that the number of psychiatric beds is to be specified on the face of the license. Rule 10-5.11(25), Florida Administrative Code, adopted in 1983, set forth a specific psychiatric bed need methodology for use in future Certificate of Need decisions. In order to implement its new 1983 policy and rule with regard to the separate licensure and determination of need for psychiatric beds, HRS conducted a survey to determine the number of existing psychiatric beds in the State. Hospitals then had the opportunity to indicate whether their existing beds were to be allocated or designated as acute care beds or psychiatric beds. HRS conducted the survey by directly contacting each hospital which had previously indicated it was operating a psychiatric unit and then contacting by telephone any facility not answering the initial inquiry. In August and September of 1983, the Authority indicated to HRS that Tampa General did not have any psychiatric beds in operation. HRS published the results of its survey and final hospital bed counts in the February 17, 1984 edition of the Florida Administrative Weekly, Volume 10, Number 7. The inventory listed Hillsborough County Hospital as having 77 psychiatric beds and Tampa General Hospital as having O psychiatric beds. The notice in the Weekly advised that hospital licenses would be amended in accordance with the published inventory to reflect each hospital's count of beds by bed type. Hospitals were further notified that "Any hospital wishing to change the number of beds dedicated to one of the specific bed types listed will first be required to obtain a certificate of need." (Respondent's Exhibit 2). For economic and business reasons, and in order to accomplish a more orderly consolidation of the two hospitals, the Authority now desires to re-open a small, self-funding psychiatric unit at Tampa General Hospital. It wishes to utilize the maximum number of psychiatric beds designated in its 1981 Certificate of Need application (93), including the beds which had been temporarily changed in late 1982 to acute care beds, while gradually phasing out a sufficient number of beds at the County Hospital to bring the total number of psychiatric beds down to 79 by late 1987. In order to implement this plan, the Authority applied to the office of Licensure and Certification in 1985 for the licensure of 77 psychiatric beds at County Hospital and 22 psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital. The Authority acknowledges that it should have applied for only 16 psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital to meet the 1981 figure of a total of 93 beds. HRS issued a license for the 77 requested psychiatric beds at County Hospital, but issued a license for only 2 psychiatric beds at Tampa General. The record does not adequately reflect the rationale for licensing even 2 beds at Tampa General. It is not economically or practically feasible for a hospital to operate a separate 2-bed psychiatric unit. The rationale for refusing to license the remaining psychiatric beds requested is the change in the statutory and regulatory law occurring in 1983 and the survey results published in 1984 illustrating Tampa General to have no psychiatric beds in operation at that time. The stated reason for denial is "because you have failed to obtain a Certificate of Need or exemption from [CON] review . . . ." (Petitioner's Exhibit 3).
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the request of the Hillsborough County Hospital Authority for the licensure of 16 short-term psychiatric beds at Tampa General Hospital be DENIED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 24th day of December, 1985, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of December, 1985. APPENDIX-CASE NO. 85-3109 The proposed findings of fact submitted by the petitioner and the respondent have been approved and/or incorporated in this Recommended Order, except as noted below. Petitioner Page 3, last sentence and Page 4, first sentence Rejected, not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Page 6, first full paragraph Rejected, not a finding of fact. Page 6, second paragraph Rejected, not a finding of fact. Page 7, Reject those findings based upon a conclusion that Tampa General has Certificate of Need approval for psychiatric beds. Respondent 9. Second and third sentences Rejected, irrelevant and immaterial to issue in dispute. COPIES FURNISHED: William S. Josey, Esquire Allen, Dell, Frank and Trinkle P. O. Box 2111 Tampa, Florida 33601 R. Bruce McKibben, Jr., Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 ================================================================ =
Findings Of Fact On August 12, 1982, CPC, a hospital-operating corporation whose home office is in California, submitted to Respondent HRS an application fee and application for a Certificate of Need to construct a 60-bed adolescent acute care psychiatric and substance abuse hospital in Melbourne, Florida. Projected cost was to be $3,571,220 of which approximately $685,000 was to be in the form of local equity and the balance of approximately $2,730,000, constituting approximately 80 percent of the total cost, was to be in the form of a 20-year loan from CPC at 12 percent annual interest. Project development costs are projected to be $30,000; architectural and soil testing fees, $109,500; construction costs, $2,452,680; land acquisition, $350,000; interest during construction, $188,856; and fixed and movable equipment, $371,965. The facility will include a 15-bed locked intensive care psychiatric unit, a 25-bed open psychiatric unit, a 17-bed substance abuse unit and a 3-bed detoxification unit. The facility will have a total of almost 35,000 square feet of which almost 23,000 square feet will be devoted to the nursing units. The facility will be situated on 17 acres of land, the site plan for which calls for outdoor eating facilities, ball fields and other athletic opportunities. The intent of the developers is to make the facility as close to the campus situation as is possible, considering the nature of the operation. The facility will be built at no more than $60 per square foot, which includes all site preparation-- clearing, building, fencing, lighting, nurses' call system--all inclusive except for furniture and professional equipment. Staffing projections for the facility which are considered adequate by both CPC and state agencies include the following major categories: Registered nurses (psychiatric); Licensed practical nurses; Mental health specialists; Secretarial; Alcohol and drug counselors; Occupational therapists; Recreational specialists; Educational director; Special education teachers; Psychologists; Social workers; Administration; A medical director (1/2 time); and An alcohol and drug treatment director (1/2 time). The projected ratio of staff to patient for the first year (66.7 staff members to 33 patients) is approximately 2.07 to 1. CPC's other hospitals in Florida, both full-service hospitals as opposed to specialty hospitals, have a staff to patient ratio somewhat lower. Personnel cost is a significant factor in budgeting for total expenses. Projected equipment costs are not considered unreasonable. CPC operates 20 acute psychiatric facilities in nine states and the United Kingdom, and its hospitals are all accredited by the Joint Commission on the Accrediation of Hospitals. All CPC hospitals are contracting members of the Blue Cross Association. It anticipates charging $227 per day on the open adolescent unit, $224 per day on the closed adolescent unit and $227 per day on the alcohol and drug abuse unit during the first year. CPC anticipates that in the first year of operation, it will realize 10 percent of its patient income from Medicaid (Baker Act), 80 percent from insurance and 3 percent from private pay patients, and attributes a figure equal to 5 percent of income to indigents and 2 percent to bad debts. It is the intention of CPC to seek Baker Act patients to account for 10 percent of its patient days and will work with state and local agencies and the courts to seek patients and funds for providing care to adolescents. CPC projections, not successfully shown to be unreasonable, reflect an anticipated net income after taxes of $120,000 for the first year of operation and $335,000 for the second year. These figures are based, as was stated above, on Baker Act funding of 10 percent of the patient load. At the present time, BMHC receives all Baker Act funds in the area, and additional funds from this source may not be available. If not, the absence of Baker Act funds would have a negative impact on the local CPC facility's financial position unless those patients were replaced by patients from other programs like child services or private pay patients based on the projected need. CPC authorities feel their projected occupancy rate of plus or minus 70 percent for the second year of operation is conservative and should be higher. The lower (60 percent) occupancy rate of CPC's other two Florida hospitals, difference in program from that proposed here, nonetheless has not resulted in either being financially unfeasible. Projected equipment for the facility, though heavily attacked by HCA as being inadequate, has not been so shown. Similarly, the testimony that it would be impossible for CPC ton construct and equip the facility for the price quoted is not persuasive. There are decided differences between the facilities in design, construction and equipment. It cannot be said, however, that either is inadequate for the purpose. The differences, where they exist, appear to be primarily related to style and preference, and do not relate directly to safety or the suitability of the facility to serve as a psychiatric hospital. CPC proposes a highly structured program for each patient--all of whom will be adolescents. A team proposal for treatment of the individual patient will be developed when the patient is first admitted and will include several major factors. The first will be medical treatments, as necessary as well as the second, psychotherapy treatments by doctors, psychologists, and in group therapy when indicated. Also of importance is a school special education program using a curriculum from the patients' own school district. This program is important both to keep the patient's grade level up and as a support mechanism therapeutically. They propose, also, a structured recreational therapy and conjunctive therapy in which something is always happening for that patient. Finally, CPC will include a family therapy situation wherein, as is possible, the patient's family will come in for counseling to educate them as to the problem their patient has so that when the patient comes out, the family can cope with it. As the patient, here, improves, he or she is brought into group therapy with the family. Since the purpose of all this is to get the patient back into the community when ready for that, CPC proposes to start a program of partial hospitalization that is flexible to meet the circumstances (days out--nights in/weekdays in--weekends out). The theory will be to provide whatever is best for that patient in a sequential progression with more and more freedom and a gradual transition into a course of outpatient treatment. There is not thought of developing an outpatient treatment program for use as an initial treatment. All partial patients will develop from former inpatients. HCA, a hospital-operating corporation whose home office is in Tennessee, also submitted an application for a Certificate of Need to construct and operate a 60-bed acute care freestanding psychiatric and substance abuse hospital in Melbourne, Florida. Projected cost of the facility is to be $5,713,998 of which 40 percent would be equity and 60 percent ($3,428,399) would be long-term debt at 13 percent interest for 20 years. Project development costs are projected to be $75,000--all in legal and accounting fees; $178,323 in architectural and engineering fees; financing costs of capitalized interest of $198,747; construction costs of $3,430,866; equipment costs (fixed and movable) of $1,274,478; and land acquisition and other related costs of $556,584. The facility will include 20 adolescent psychiatric beds, 20 adolescent substance abuse beds and 20 adult/geriatric psychiatric beds. The facility will have a total of almost 39,000 square fee of which almost 19,000 square feet will be devoted to the nursing units. The remainder will be used by administrative, office and other services. The facility will be located on 31 acres of land which will also be the site for a proposed general hospital for which HCA intends to seek approval. Staffing projections for this facility, which are considered adequate by both HCA and state agencies, include the following major categories: Nursing; Psychology; Activities; Social services; Education; Administration; Business office; Medical records; Dietary; Housekeeping; and Engineering/maintenance. The projected ration of staff to patient for the first year (67.4 staff members to 33 patients) is approximately 2.04 to 1, roughly equivalent to that of CPC. HCA operates 301 hospitals throughout the United States, 23 of which are psychiatric hospitals. In addition to the psychiatric hospitals, many of its general hospitals have psychiatric units. All of its presently operating units are full accredited. It anticipates charging $260 per day during 1984-85 and $275 per day during 1985-86. HCA anticipates that during its first year of operation, it will realize 5 percent of its patient income from Medicaid, 10 percent from Medicare, 15 percent from insurance, 65 percent from private and 5 percent from other. HCA omitted any reference to Baker Act in its application because at this time such funds are fully committed elsewhere and not available and, as a result, felt it would be imprudent to include these funds in financial projections. However, if these funds were to become available, as unlikely as that may be, HCA would consider taking these patients. In any case, HCA projections reflect an anticipated net income after taxes of $2,000 for the first year of operation and $61,000 for the second year. Up until approximately two years ago, HCA only had two hospitals in its psychiatric program. Since that time, acquisitions and construction have brought the inventory up to its present strength. HCA acquired HCI, an organization which has had extensive experience in operating 20 psychiatric hospitals. HCA has a large cadre of people available to help start up new hospitals and shore up existing programs. It operates a center for heal studies, and its informational branch produces its own continuing education films and other materials. Its treatment programs are developed by its local staff based on input by professionals in the local community and designed to meet the needs of the local community. Once developed and implemented, all HCA programs are periodically evaluated by central teams who visit the local site. If a problem is found, HCA sends out experts in that problem area to fix it. It is HCA policy, however, to provide as much autonomy to the local staff as is possible, though staff, both professional and nonprofessional, are recruited locally and from other areas. HCA's position is that these factors have a major positive impact on patient care and treatment in that it insures currency of ideas and treatment modalities. HCA's proposed treatment program was described as to each category of patient. As to adults, it follows a "therapeutic community approach" which starts with a pleasing residential building and furnishings. All persons contacting patients are trained in the patient's needs and how to react to the patient. This would include such peripheral people as maintenance and support personnel. There would be a specific treatment plan for each patient with the patient's day planned out totally for every hour of the day, including recreation designed for that patient's needs. Little time is provided for the patient to be confined to the sleeping room. HCA anticipates the average length of stay (ALOS) for an adult psychiatric patient will be 21 days. As to the adolescent psychiatric patient, the prescribed treatment program will be basically the same as for adults except that HCA would provide an active school program, staffed by HCA employees, which would interface with the local school system. The patient day would be geared to the adolescent's needs. HCA proposes few children facilities because child programs require a specially designed program with a higher staff to patient ration than is anticipated here because of the need for play therapy and family involvement. HCA officials believer the child patient can successfully be integrated into the adolescent hospital unit without difficulty until the patient can be transferred to a specialized facility elsewhere. The ALOS for adolescent psychiatric patients will be 45 days. The substance abuse programs will be similar to those for the psychiatric units with specialization on drug abuse counseling and interface with Alcoholics Anonymous. ALOS here is expected to be 35 days. It must be recognized, however, that theories of treatment change rapidly. That proposed in HCA's Certificate of Need would not necessarily be that ultimately used upon approval if a change is justified. HCA's expert, Dr. Winston, contends, from a clinical standpoint, it is better to operate without locked units if possible, and categories of patients are better separated. However, he contends it is perfectly all right and may even be superior to have the different classes of patient in the same facility. This position is corroborated by other psychiatric experts who testified that one of the reasons for the need for an adolescent psychiatric hospital is the clinically undesirable requirement, currently existing in the area, for adolescent and even children psychiatric patients to be placed in units with adult psychiatric patients. It is obvious, then, that all agree that a separate adolescent unit is clinically needed in the area. The size, configuration and location remain to be established. The issue of need can and must be divided into two categories. One is the actual need for the implementation of psychiatric services for children and adults. The other is the need established for psychiatric beds in the area in accordance with the formulas established by HRS. First to be discussed is the actual service need. CPC's Vice President for Psychiatric Hospital Development, in developing the proposal for this project, first did a desk audit regarding population growth potential and the like for Brevard County and the surrounding contiguous counties. Thereafter, he made a number of visits to the area during which he spoke with as many area psychiatrists as he could. He also toured the BMHC and its inpatient facility, as well as the other two hospitals in the immediate area, Holmes Regional Medical Center, which does not have a psychiatric unit, per se, and Wuesthoff Hospital, which does. He also talked with court and school officials familiar with the area's mental health problems. From his investigation and conversations, CPC's expert found that BMHC's inpatient facility, consisting of 28 beds, was oriented primarily to adult psychiatric patients, as was Wuesthoff's 30-bed psychiatric unit. (In that regard, Wuesthoff's plan to convert five psychiatric beds to some other service, thus reducing the number of psychiatric beds in Brevard County, has been approved by HRS, if not already implemented as of this writing. From this it was concluded, and the evidence does establish, that there are no psychiatric facilities in Brevard County specifically for adolescents. The consensus among the psychiatrists and psychologists in the subject area, whose testimony was presented, was that there is a definite need in the Brevard County area for adolescent psychiatric and substance abuse beds. Adolescents requiring psychiatric or substance abuse treatment are treated on an outpatient basis if possible because of a reluctance to confine adolescents in an adult psychiatric ward. If outpatient treatment is not possible, the less than desirable alternative is to admit the adolescent patient to an adult unit for only so long as is necessary to make other arrangements for inpatient care. Currently, relatively few adolescent inpatient facilities exist. Among the better are those at the University of Florida in Gainesville, in Miami, several out of state and, while not a psychiatric hospital, a special school in Orlando--all of which have waiting lists. Community surveys were made by both marketing representatives and by facilities experts from HCA, as well. It was their opinion that a need exists in the subject service area for both adolescent and adult psychiatric beds, and that both HCA's and CPC's proposals would fill the need for substance abuse beds. HCA's position is that not all new beds would be adolescent beds. A need exists for adult beds in Brevard County because the predictions of the Bureau of Business and Economic Research (BBER), while indicating a general population increase for the area, also indicates that the adolescent population will decline. BBER projections have not been totally accurate for Brevard County in the past because of aerospace fluctuations in the area, however. In fact, the HCA prediction is for an adult population growth rate three to four times as fast as that for children and adolescents, thereby placing a strain on the available adult psychiatric beds. HCA's expert disagreed with the CPC expert's method of establishing clinical need (interviews with practictioners). It was felt this is a supply-driven opinion as opposed to a demand-driven opinion, is unsupported by data, is imprecise and not accurate, and is therefore not reliable for health planning purposes. To the contrary, the professional opinions stated by CPC's witnesses were equally as persuasive as those of their opponents. The psychiatrists and psychologists referenced above unanimously concluded that professionally it is better to admit adolescents to adolescent programs and units. Mixing of patients is quite disruptive to both categories of patient. In the opinion of the experts who testified here, where adolescent psychiatric patients are confirmed with adult patients (such as at Wuesthoff), they sleep in the same room, eat with them, smoke with them and discuss adult problems all day long. The doctors feel the continued closeness of this type is not only not therapeutic, but is sometimes counter therapeutic. In the case of adolescents, a major part of therapy is re-integration of the patient into the family; and if the unit is not near the family (as is presently the case with the out-of-town and out-of-state units referenced above), this is difficult. Also, liaison between the inpatient's doctor and the outpatient therapy is difficult when the unit is not local. As a result, at least some of the practitioners in the area have stopped seeing certain categories of patients because there is no facility currently in the area who can provide the necessary environment. For example, Dr. McClure, a psychiatrist, has stopped seeing adolescent substance abuse patients. If a facility currently in the area who can provide the necessary environment. For example, Dr. McClure, a psychiatrist, has stopped seeing adolescent substance abuse patients. If a facility became available, he would resume that segment of his practice. Dr. Slade, a clinical psychologist, has stopped seeking out patients who might need hospitalization because there is currently nothing in the area available to fill that need. It one were to come, she would again start seeing that category of patient. From the above, it can clearly be seen a clinical need for an adolescent psychiatric facility exists. Whether it should be freestanding, as proposed by both CPC and HCA, or a part of an existing hospital psychiatric unit is another question. Both proposals here are for freestanding units and, as a result, only that concept will be considered. Turning to the issue of bed need, at the time CPC's original Certificate of Need application was submitted, the Florida State Health Plan contained no methodology for establishing bed need for psychiatric hospitals. Such as now been promulgated and shows a need for 156 short-term psychiatric beds and 44 substance abuse beds in District VII, which includes Brevard, Orange, Osceola and Seminole Counties. This is based on a projected population base for the district in 1988 of 1,230,180 people. Applying the state methodology of 0.35 beds per 1,000 population, five years into the future resulted in a total projected bed need of 431 beds. Subtracting from that the 275 existing and approved beds leaves an unsatisfied psychiatric bed need of 156 for the district. Authority to designate subdistrict bed needs has been delegated to the district health councils. Brevard County has been subdivided into a subdistrict, but bed needs have not been allocated to the subdistricts. However, even if the 40 (total 60 minus 20 substance abuse) psychiatric beds are approved for Brevard County, this falls well within the total need figure for the district and leaves 116 beds remaining for the other three counties. Both CPC's and HCA's proposals call for 40 psychiatric beds. Both are, therefore, compatible with the State Plan. Rule 10-5(25)(d)5, Florida Administrative Code, states that no additional short-term inpatient hospital adult psychiatric beds shall normally be approved unless the annual occupancy rate for all existing beds in the service district for the prior 12-month period is at or exceeds 75 percent. As to adolescent beds, the criterion is 70 percent. There is not evidence of bed utilization percentages for either category districtwide. There is however, evidence establishing that the criteria have been met since 1980 for adult beds in Brevard County, a subdistrict; and since there are currently no short-term adolescent psychiatric beds in the subdistrict, that use percentage requirement is meaningless. Also, both applicants project meeting the requirements in Rule 10-5(25)(d)4 for 70 percent occupancy rate by the third year for adolescent short-term (CPC predicts 72 percent the second year). At the present time, two separate facilities provide adult short-term inpatient psychiatric care in Brevard County. They are Wuesthoff Memorial Hospital in Rockledge, Florida, which has 30 beds (predicted to be reduced to 25), and the Brevard Mental Health Center and Hospital, which operates an outpatient facility in Titusville and Rockledge and a 28-bed inpatient facility in Melbourne. This facility is a $2.6 million dollar facility constructed on 8 percent bond financing, and is fully accredited. BMHC receives all Baker Act patients in Brevard County and, in addition, provides care and treatment to indigents. Of its $1,238,000 revenue for last year, it received $468,000 for Baker Act patients, $156,000 in county matching funds and $614,000 form other patient fees. Its expenses for the same period last year were $1,250,000, for a deficit of $12,000. It is, both in theory and actuality, a nonprofit operation with 78 percent of its patients being indigent. Baker Act funds provided a total of $614,000. At $156 per day per bed, this equals 4,000 bed days, which, when divided by 365, shows that 11 paid beds are provided for Baker Act patients. In addition to Baker Act patients, BMHC also provides other beds for indigents. The terms of the Baker Act contract require all clients referred be accommodated. These additional patients provide insurance funds equivalent to 2.5 more beds, or a total of 13.5 beds provided by Baker Act matching funds and related insurance. BMHC is generally 85 percent occupied, which relates to 25.2 of the 28 beds. Subtracting the 13.5 Baker Act beds from the 25.2 leaves 11.7 beds for private patients. The average charge for private patients at BMHC is $230, which includes physicians' services. Their collection rate of 87.5 percent reduces that on average to an actual income of $200 per private bed day. Medicare, which accounts for 38 percent of BMHC's income, reimburses at a rate of $168 per day. If, as a result of the establishment of either of the two proposed facilities, BMHC were to lose one bed year of patients, it would represent a dollar loss of $73,000. This constitutes a serious thereat to a nonprofit organization, such as BMHC, because of the possibility of a loss of patients to a private hospital, even if its charges were higher. To some people, exclusiveness is more important than cost. A loss of one bed's revenue would jeopardize the free care presently provided by BMHC. A loss of two beds' revenue would make a reduction in the free care provided a certainty. Brevard County has an ongoing relationship with BMHC. It provides an annual operating subsidy for the currently existing facilities and, in addition, has guaranteed a bond issue for the building of the south county facility. It also provides a number of in-kind services. If BMHC were to become financially insolvent for any reason, the county would have to step in and pay off the bonds, but it could not and would not take over the operation of the facility. As a result of the above, the county is opposed to any threat to the financial health of BMHC. It feels that while the proposal of CPC would not constitute a threat, that of HCA would because the full range served of the latter could and probably would draw away some of the private pay patients now going to BMHC. This alternative drawing power would adversely affect BMHC's ability to stay in business eventhough, according to the HRS methodology, there is room in the county for additional adult beds for which BMHC is applying. In that regard, however, the county authorities concede that if it could be demonstrated that an additional provider could come in without adversely affecting the operation of BMHC, they would not oppose it. The District Mental Health Board for Brevard County (DMHB) has also taken a position in this area. Created by the Legislature, DMHB is charged with identifying the need for services in the county, the resources available to satisfy them and the gaps between. To a certain extent, it also funds the operations monitors them, evaluates them and produces the District Plan for them, the latest edition of which is for the years 1983 through 1987. This plan, which takes about a year to develop, is based on input provided by the mental health professionals, organizations and community representatives. It is used as a basis for the allocation of available funds and upon which to request funds from the Legislature. Neither CPC's nor HCA's application is contained in this plan; and though both applicants have made presentations to the Board, the Board has not taken a position favoring either. However, the plan as it currently exists proposes an additional 20 adult psychiatric beds which, it is anticipated , would be located under BMHC's auspices at its Melbourne site and for which BMHC made timely application. BMHC provides 80 percent of the mental health services in Brevard County now in all categories--adult, child and adolescent--and is rated excellent. In the opinion of the Director of DMHB, who is aware of BMHC's financial picture, approval of either proposal would have a negative impact, but that of HCA would be worse because of the likelihood it would draw adult paying patients away from BMHC. If that happened, it would jeopardize BMHC's financial position and its relationship with the county. In that regard, the District Plan goal, "to provide for the availability of comprehensive community alcohol, drug abuse and mental health services to persons in Brevard County, regardless of their ability to pay, "would best be complemented by the CPC proposal because: (1) it is limited to adolescents and would not risk drawing adult pay patients from BMHC; (2) it integrates with other existing services; and (3) it has the least restrictive admissions policy. On the other hand, in the opinion of Dr. Milton Schoeman, a health care consultant testifying on behalf of HCA, CPC's proposal, providing for adolescent beds only, will not help meet the need for general psychiatric beds projected for 1988. Of the 67 new beds needed, 40 would go to specialty hospitals, such as proposed by both CPC and HCA, and 27 would go to psychiatric units in general hospitals. These figures are for all ages of patients. Even though the HRS rules are silent on the issued of bed allocation between adults and adolescents, to permit CPC to use all 40 specialty hospital beds for adolescents would be inconsistent with the formula. He also is of the opinion that HCA's proposal will not materially affect BMHC's operation. To the contrary, according to HCA adolescents would be inconsistent with the formula. He also is of the opinion that HCA's proposal will not materially affect BMHC's operation. To the contrary, according to HCA witnesses, the HCA program would have a positive impact on BMHC's program in that its presence will make the community more aware and conscious of the need for mental health, and by cross- cooperation with BMHC in staffing and patient split. This has been shown in other areas where HCA was first seen as a threat by the existing hospital treating Baker Act patients. However, both hospitals now work together on joint programs to do the best possible for the patients. The fear of competition, HCA contends, is normally not realized. The type of facility represented by BMHC generally operates a shorter term, crisis intervention type program, one substantially different from that of HCA. As such, it does not lose patients to the longer term program of HCA. HRS has taken a position in opposition to HCA's proposal, concluding that CPC's application would fill the need for adolescent care with less impact on the current provider, BMHC. While HCA's programs are of high quality, they are almost identical to those currently offered by BMHC. It is unlikely that HCA will get any Baker Act funds under the current funding situation. If HCA were to be approved and built and would result in the loss to BMHC of only one bed/year in income ($73,000), this would have a severe adverse impact on BMHC's operation. On the other hand, the CPC would be less likely to duplicate services already being furnished. There are already two existing providers for adult patients; and while BMHC's utilization is high, Wuesthoff's is not, being only 62 percent after five years of operation. Under these circumstances, it would, in all probability, be a duplication of service to provide additional adult beds at this time. In addition to the differences in building layout, construction costs and equipment costs, previously found to be satisfactory in both cases, much evidence was produced by both sides to show that their proposal was economically more feasible and would result in lower patient costs. Conversely, the proposing parties presented evidence to show that the figures and statistics relied upon by their opposition were flawed and unreliable. After thorough saturation with offer and rebuttal, it is ultimately concluded that again the difference is one of style rather than substance. Neither part has been shown, by competent convincing evidence, to be materially superior to or inferior to the other. This issue will not be decided, therefore, on the basis of the ability to provide the service since both have been shown to be fully capable of doing so in a creditable fashion.
Recommendation It is accordingly RECOMMENDED That HRS approve Petitioner CPC's application for a Certificate of Need to construct and operate a 60-bed freestanding adolescent inpatient psychiatric facility in Brevard County, Florida, and deny the similar application of Petitioner HCA. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of February, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. COPIES FURNISHED: Morgan L. Staines, Esq. 2204 East Fourth Street Santa Ana, California 92705 Jon C. Moyle, Esq. Donna H. Stinson, Esq. 118 North Gadsden Street Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Eric B. Tilton, Esq. 702 Lewis State Bank Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John Antoon, II, Esq. 970 Michigan Avenue Building C Cocoa, Florida 32922 ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Department of Administration 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of February, 1984. Claire D. Dryfuss, Esq. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building 1, Room 406 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Mr. David Pingree Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32301 =================================================================
