The Issue The issues in this case are whether Respondent violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (2000),1 and, if so, what discipline should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact The Department is the state department charged with regulating the practice of medicine pursuant to Section 20.43 and Chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes (2006). At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Figueroa was a licensed physician within the State of Florida, having been issued license number ME 60819. Dr. Figueroa is board- certified in Family Practice. At all times material to this proceeding, Dr. Figueroa was the supervisor and employer of mid-level provider Carl Sellers, P.A. (Mr. Sellers). G.C., a 33-year-old male, first presented to Mr. Sellers as a new patient on November 14, 2000. G.C. complained of a two-month history of coughing, low-grade fever, fatigue, and heavy breathing. G.C.'s temperature was 98.4, his weight was 181 pounds, and his heart rate was 68 beats per minute. Mr. Sellers conducted an examination of G.C. and noted that G.C. was having difficulty taking a deep breath, shortness of breath on inspiration that was better if standing upright, severe fatigue, and fits of couching where he nearly vomited. Mr. Sellers also noted that G.C. had mild lymph adenopathy. Mr. Sellers' diagnosed G.C. with a persistent upper respiratory infection. He prescribed Zithromax and Guaifed TR and ordered a chest X-ray and blood testing, including a complete blood count (CBC) with differential, comprehensive metabolic profile (CMP), and erythrocyte sedimentation rate (ESR). G.C. was instructed to return in a week or sooner if he worsened. Dr. Figueroa's normal operating practice was to review Mr. Sellers' files of the previous day on the following morning. Dr. Figueroa reviewed G.C.'s medical record and concurred with Mr. Sellers' diagnosis. Laboratory results from the blood testing arrived in the office of Dr. Figueroa on November 20, 2000. G.C.'s blood testing results revealed abnormal liver function, anemia, borderline protein, and an abnormal sedimentation rate. The results of the blood tests did not warrant immediate follow-up with G.C. Mr. Sellers reviewed the laboratory report of the blood tests and indicated that he would discuss the results with G.C. on his next visit. G.C. was scheduled for a return visit on November 21, 2000, but called Dr. Figueroa's office and rescheduled his appointment for November 22, 2000. G.C. failed to keep his scheduled appointment. On November 22, 2000, Mr. Sellers reviewed the Radiological Report for G.C. The report stated: The lungs are clear of infiltrates. There is mild blunting of the costophrenic sulci probably representative of small effusions. The heart size is moderately enlarged. No pulmonary edema nor widening of the superior mediastinum detected. The impression of the radiologist was "moderate cardiomegaly with probably small pleural effusions." The Department's expert, Dr. Rafool, testified that the Radiological Report was an indication that G.C.'s heart was failing, which was inconsistent with the initial diagnosis of upper respiratory infection. Dr. Figueroa and his expert, Dr. Harold, testified that radiologists often "over read" chest X-rays; therefore, the Radiological Report did not warrant emergent action by Dr. Figueroa. Dr. Rafool countered the common over-read argument by testifying that regular radiologists do not equivocate because it causes more work for the ordering physician. The language of the radiologist is clearly intended to alert Dr. Figueroa to the presence of unusual conditions observed in G.C.'s chest X-ray that were inconsistent with an upper respiratory infection. Dr. Rafool's testimony is more credible concerning the significance of the Radiological Report and its implications on the diagnosis of G.C. Dr. Rafool testified that the Radiological Report indicated that G.C.'s heart was failing, which constitutes a "medical emergency" that required urgent notification of the patient. Dr. Figueroa and Dr. Harold conceded that the report indicated conditions that warranted "timely" follow-up, but not immediate intervention or contact with the patient. The Radiological Report revealed a "moderate" cardiomegaly that was an indication of cardiomyopathy, a heart condition that is more often fatal if not corrected by treatment that may include a heart transplant. Since early intervention is likely to lead to an opportunity for a favorable outcome, the testimony of Dr. Rafool is more credible regarding the need for notification of the patient. The record does not indicate any affirmative effort by Dr. Figueroa, his staff, or by Mr. Sellers to contact G.C. between November 22 and November 27, 2000, which was the next time that G.C. presented to Dr. Figueroa's office. On November 27, 2000, G.C. was complaining of worsening conditions since November 23 including swollen legs, inability to sleep at night, and coughing with shortness of breath mainly at bedtime. G.C.'s temperature was 97.2, his weight was 188 pounds, and his heart rate was 114 beats per minute. Mr. Sellers conducted an examination of G.C. and noted definite lid lag with mild exophthalmia, crackles in the lungs with no wheeze, moderate jugular vein distention, orthopnea, grade +2 pitting edema, and no goiter. Mr. Sellers ordered a STAT EKG on G.C. The EKG indicated "sinus tachycardia with occasional ventricular premature complexes and possible left atrial enlargement." Mr. Sellers documented that G.C. might be suffering from left ventricular hypertrophy. Mr. Sellers' primary diagnosis of G.C. was hyperthyroid crisis (storm), his secondary diagnosis was mild congestive heart failure secondary to hyperthyroid crisis caused by high output failure, his third diagnosis was IDA, the fourth diagnosis was elevated liver function tests and bilirubin, and the fifth diagnosis was insomnia. Mr. Sellers mistakenly diagnosed G.C. with a hyperthyroid crisis. Mr. Sellers consulted with Dr. Figueroa, who also examined G.C. Dr. Figueroa concurred with the assessment, diagnosis, and treatment plan of Mr. Sellers, including the diagnosis of hyperthyroid crisis. He indicated on the EKG strip that he agreed with the findings of G.C.'s EKG. A patient in a hyperthyroid crisis requires immediate hospitalization. Dr. Figueroa did not hospitalize G.C. Mr. Sellers prescribed 40 mg of Lasix, daily; 40 mg of Inderal, twice daily; and 50 mg of propylthiouracil, three times daily. The propylthiouracil prescribed was an insufficient dose based on the diagnosis of hyperthyroid crisis. Dr. Harold testified that G.C. did not present clinical signs of pulmonary edema during Mr. Sellers' examination on November 27, 2000, based on a lack of acute distress, moist rales and rhonchi throughout the lung fields, and respiratory distress. Dr. Rafool opined that G.C. did present clinical signs of pulmonary edema based on the crackles in the lungs, neck vein distension, pitting edema, elevated heart rate, and weight gain. The Department has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that pulmonary edema was ever clinically apparent to Dr. Figueroa or Mr. Sellers. In fact, hours after G.C. was examined by Dr. Figueroa and Mr. Sellers, the emergency room physicians did not diagnose G.C. with pulmonary edema. Inderal is contraindicated in the presence of pulmonary edema. Since pulmonary edema was not clinically apparent, Inderal was appropriately prescribed. Mr. Sellers' diagnosis of mild congestive heart failure was incorrect. Based on the symptoms exhibited by G.C. of neck vein distension, weight gain, orthopnea, and grade +2 pitting edema, it should have been apparent that G.C. had severe heart failure. G.C. presented to the Bayfront Medical Center Hospital Emergency Room at 10:03 p.m. on November 27, 2000. G.C. complained of abdominal pain and swelling, nausea and vomiting, and difficulty breathing. Examination of G.C. by emergency room personnel revealed the presence of bibasilar rales, but good breath sounds. Hospital chest X-ray revealed cardiomegaly, no infiltrates. At 1:33 a.m. on November 28, 2000, G.C. went into cardiac arrest. G.C. was pronounced dead at 3:04 a.m., November 28, 2000. An autopsy performed on G.C. revealed dilated cardiomyopathy, bi-ventricular dilation, pulmonary edema, and congested liver. The immediate cause of death was listed as idiopathic dilated cardiomyopathy. The autopsy report indicated that G.C. also had pulmonary edema; however, the pulmonary edema could have resulted from the large amounts of fluids that were being administered to G.C. by hospital staff during the last few hours of G.C.'s life. Dr. Figueroa was notified of G.C.'s demise on November 28, 2000, and he immediately sent his medical records on G.C. to his legal counsel without making any further notations on the records.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding that Dr. Figueroa violated Subsections 458.331(1)(m) and 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes; suspending his license to practice medicine until he completes the Florida C.A.R.E.S. program or a comparable physician skills assessment program to assess his clinical skills; requiring compliance with the program's recommendations; placing him on two years' probation with direct supervision to be set by the Board of Medicine; and imposing an administrative fine of $10,000. DONE AND ENTERED this 13th day of December, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S SUSAN B. HARRELL Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th of December, 2006.
The Issue Whether Respondent should recoup Medicaid payments made to Petitioner for health care services provided to eight patients.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., (Hospital), has contracted with Respondent, Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), to provide services to Medicaid patients. The parties have agreed that there is a dispute for Medicaid reimbursement for goods and services provided to eight patients: S.G., J.D., R.J., C.A., G.M., S.S., M.P., and C.T. The Agency has paid the Hospital for the services rendered to these eight patients and seeks to recoup the payment based on a retrospective review by a peer review organization, Keystone Peer Review Organization (KePro). The Agency claims that either the admission or a portion of the length-of-stay for the eight patients was medically unnecessary. Services were provided to C.T. in 1994 and to the remainder of the patients at issue in 1995. Payment for Medicaid services is on a per diem basis. The rate for 1994 is $473.22 per day, and the rate for 1995 is $752.14. The Agency contracted with KePro to do a review of the Medicaid payments to the Hospital. KePro employs nurses to review the patient files based on criteria on discharge screens. If the services meet the criteria, there is no further review and the payment is approved. If the nurse determines that the services do not meet the criteria on the discharge screens, the patient's files are reviewed by a board certified physician, who in this case would be a psychiatrist. If the physician determines that the services are not medically necessary, a letter is sent to the Medicaid provider, giving the provider an opportunity to submit additional information. Additional information submitted by the provider is reviewed by a board certified physician. If the doctor concludes that the services are still medically unnecessary, the provider is notified that that services do not qualify for reimbursement and the provider may ask for a reconsideration of the denial. If the provider seeks reconsideration, the file is reviewed by a physician, and the provider has an opportunity to be present during the review. If the physician determines that the services are medically unnecessary, KePro sends a letter to the Agency stating the reasons for denial. The denial letters that KePro sends to the Agency are reviewed by the Medical Director of KePro, who is not a psychiatrist. Dr. John Sullenberger, the Agency's Medicaid physician, reviews the KePro denial letters sent to the Agency, and 99.9 percent of the time he agrees with the findings of KePro regarding whether the services were medically necessary. Dr. Sullenberger does not review the patient's charts when he does this review. The Agency sends a recoupment letter to the Medicaid provider requesting repayment for services provided. Patient S.G., a 12 year-old boy, was being treated pursuant to the Baker Act. He was admitted to the Hospital on March 8, 1995, and discharged on March 25, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and the entire length-of-stay for S.G. based on KePro's determination that it was not medically necessary for the services to S.G. to be rendered in an acute care setting because the patient was neither suicidal nor homicidal. Three to five days prior to his admission to the Hospital, S.G. had attempted to stab his father. He also had further violent episodes, including jumping his father from behind and choking him and pulling knives on his parents. S.G. had a history of attention deficit and hyperactive disorder. He had been using multiple substances, such as alcohol, LSD, cocaine, and marijuana, prior to his admission. His behavior was a clear reference that he was suffering from a psychosis. A psychosis is a significant inability to understand what is reality, including delusions of false beliefs, hallucinations, hearing and seeing things which do not exist, and ways of thinking that are bizarre. Psychosis is a reason to admit a patient, particularly combined with substance abuse. S.G.'s treating psychiatrist noted that S.G. had tangentiality, which means that his thoughts did not stay together. He did not have a connection between thoughts, which is a sign of a psychosis. The chart demonstrated that S.G. had disorder thinking, which includes the possibility of a psychosis. There was also a reference in the charts to organic mental disturbance which could infer brain damage as the cause for the mental disturbance. Two days after admission, there was an issue of possible drug withdrawal because S.G. was agitated and anxious and showed other symptoms. Drug withdrawal, psychosis, and a demonstration of overt violence require a stay in an acute care facility. There was some indication that S.G. was suicidal. While in the Hospital he was placed under close observation, which is a schedule of 15-minute checks to determine if the patient was physically out of harm's way. S.G. was started on an antidepressant, Wellbutrin, because the treating physician thought S.G. was becoming increasingly depressed and was having trouble organizing his thoughts. Antidepressants, as contrasted to a medication such as an antibiotic, may take a minimum of two to three weeks before the patient will benefit from the full effect of the drug. It is difficult to stabilize the dosage for an antidepressant on an outpatient basis. S.G. was taking Ritalin, which is commonly used for children with attention deficit, hyperactivity disorders. During his stay at the Hospital, S.G. was engaging in strange behavior, including absence seizures. On March 16, 1995, he was still lunging and threatening harm. On March 20, 1995, he was still unstable and at risk. The dosage of Wellbutrin was increased. On March 21 and 22, 1995, S.G. was still threatening and confused. S.G. was discharged on March 25, 1995. The admission and length-of-stay for S.G. were medically necessary. Patient J.D. was a 16 year-old boy who was admitted to the Hospital on March 7, 1995, and discharged on March 14, 1995. The Agency denied the admission and entire length-of-stay based on KePro's determination that the patient was not actively suicidal or psychotic and services could have been rendered in a less acute setting. J.D. was admitted from a partial hospitalization program pursuant to the Baker Act because he was observed by a health care professional banging his head against the wall and throwing himself on the floor. He had a history of depression and out-of-control behavior, including being a danger to himself and running away. At the time of his admission, he was taking Prozac. Banging his head against the wall can mean that the patient is psychotic, can cause brain damage, and can be dangerous if the cause of the behavior is unknown. Admission to the Hospital was justified because the patient was extremely agitated and self abusive, requiring restraints and medication to decrease his agitation and self abusiveness. One of the tests administered during his hospital stay indicated that J.D. was a moderate risk for suicidal behavior. During his hospital stay, it was discovered that J.D. had threatened to kill himself while at school. He had been in a partial treatment program during the day, but that environment was not working. There was violence in the home, and J.D. was becoming overtly depressed. During his stay at the Hospital, J.D. was placed on close observation with 15-minute checks. His dosage of Prozac was increased. The admission and length-of-stay for J.D. were medically necessary. R.J., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on January 1, 1995, and discharged on February 9, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement based on a determination by KePro that the treatment in an acute care facility was not medically necessary because R.J. was not psychotic, not suicidal, and not a threat to others; thus treatment could have been provided in an alternate setting. R.J. had been referred by a health care professional at Horizon Center, an outpatient center, because of progressive deterioration over the previous fourteen months despite outpatient treatment. His deterioration included anger with temper outbursts, uncontrollable behavior at school, failing grades, sadness, depressed mood, extreme anxiety, extensive worrying and a fear of his grandmother. R.J. also suffered from encopresis, a bowel incontinence. He was agitated, lacked energy, neglected his hygiene, experienced crying spells, and had difficulty concentrating. R.J. needed to be admitted for an evaluation to rule out a paranoid psychosis. It was necessary to do a 24-hour EEG as opposed to a 45-minute EEG. In order to do a 24-hour EEG, the patient is typically placed in an acute care facility. The EEG showed abnormal discharge in the brain, which could be contributing to a psychiatric illness. At school R.J. had smeared feces on the walls, behavior that could be seen in psychotic persons. There was evidence that he had been hitting and throwing his stepbrother and 3 year-old brother. He was fearful of his grandmother and, based on his family history, there was reason to fear her. R.J. was placed on Buspar, a medication which generally takes two weeks to take effect. Contrary to the Agency's determination, R.J. was disorganized. He was also violent in terms of threatening danger and extreme anger. The admission and length-of-stay for R.J. at the Hospital were medically necessary. Patient C.A., a 9 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on June 1, 1995, and discharged on June 12, 1995. The Agency disallowed one day of the length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the services provided on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in a less restrictive setting. C.A. was admitted for violent and disruptive behavior. He also had an attention deficit, hyperactivity disorder and was taking Lithium and Depakote. These medications are used for patients who experience serious mood swings and abrupt changes in mood, going from depression to anger to euphoria. To be effective, medicating with Lithium and Depakote requires that the blood levels of the patient be monitored and the dosage titrated according to blood level. C.A. also was given Wellbutrin during his hospital stay. On June 11, 1995, C.A. was given an eight-hour pass to leave the hospital in the care of his mother. The physician's orders indicated that the pass was to determine how well C.A. did in a less restrictive setting. He returned to the Hospital without incident. He was discharged the next day to his mother. The treatment on June 11, 1995, could have been provided in an environment other than an acute facility; thus the stay on June 11, 1995, was not medically necessary for Medicaid reimbursement purposes. Patient G.M., an 11 year-old male with a history of being physically and sexually abused by his parents, was admitted to the Hospital on March 21, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for inpatient hospital treatment from March 28 to April 3, 1995, based on KePro's determination that the length of hospital stay exceeded health care needs at an inpatient level and could have been provided in a less acute setting. At the time of admission, G.M. had suicidal ideation. His school had reported that G.M. had mutilated himself with a pencil, banged himself on the knuckles, and told the school nurse that he wanted to die. Prior to admission, G.M. had been taking Ritalin. His treating physician took G.M. off the Ritalin so that she could assess his condition and start another medication after a base-line period. The doctor prescribed Clonidine for G.M. Clonidine is a drug used in children to control reckless, agressive and angry behavior. Clonidine must be titrated in order to establish the correct dosage for the patient. During his hospital stay, G.M. was yelling and threatening staff. He was placed in locked seclusion, where he began hitting the wall. G.M. was put in a papoose, which is similar to a straitjacket. The papoose is used when there is no other way to control the patient. The patient cannot use his arms or legs while in a papoose. This type of behavior and confinement was occurring as late as March 31, 1995. G.M. was given a pass to go to his grandparents on April 2, 1995. He did well during his pass, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. Treatment in an acute facility was medically necessary through April 1, 1995. Treatment on April 2, 1995, could have been provided in a less acute setting. Patient S.S., a 5 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on March 9, 1995, and was discharged on April 3, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length of his hospital stay based on a determination by KePro that S.S. was not psychotic or an immediate danger to himself or others and the evaluation and treatment could have been rendered in a less acute setting. Prior to admission to the Hospital, S.S. was threatening suicide, ran into a chalk board at school, scratched his arms until they bled, and showed aggressive intent toward his sister, saying that he would kill her with a saw. S.S.'s condition had been deteriorating for approximately three months before his admission. At the time of admission, he had been suicidal, hyperactive, restless, and experiencing hallucinations. The hallucinations imply a psychosis. S.S. was put on Trofanil, an antidepressant which needs to be titrated. The patient's blood level had to be monitored while taking this drug. During his hospital stay, S.S. was on close observation. All objects which he could use to harm himself were removed from his possession. After he ate his meals, the hospital staff would immediately remove all eating utensils. On March 28, 1995, S.S. threatened to kill himself and became self-abusive. His blood level on March 31, 1995, was sub-therapeutic, and his medication dosage was increased. On April 1, 1995, S.S. had a temper tantrum. The admission and length-of-stay for the treatment of S.S. were medically necessary. Patient M.P., a 10 year-old male, was admitted to the Hospital on April 27, 1995, and was discharged on May 6, 1995. The Agency denied Medicaid reimbursement for the admission and entire length-of-stay based on a determination by KePro that the patient functions on an eighteen to twenty-four month level but is not psychotic and the treatment could have been provided in a less acute setting. M.P.'s IQ is between 44 and 51. He was diagnosed with a pervasive development disorder, which is a serious lack of development attributed to significant brain damage. His condition had deteriorated in the six months prior to his admission. He had episodes of inappropriate laughter, fits of anger, hit his head, hit windows, and put his arm in contact with the broken glass through the window. At the time of his admission, he had a seizure disorder. An EEG and an MRI needed to be performed on M.P. in order to evaluate his condition. M.P. had to have a regular EEG, a 24-hour EEG, and a neurological examination. The patient was aggressive, restless, and uncooperative. In order for the MRI to be performed, M.P. had to be anesthetized. The admission and length-of-stay for M.P. were medically necessary. Patient C.T., a 34 year-old female, was admitted to the Hospital on November 11, 1994, and was discharged on November 26, 1994. The Agency denied the treatment from November 17, 1994, to November 26, 1994, based on a determination by a peer review organization that the patient was stable by November 17, 1994, and psychiatric follow-up could have been performed in an outpatient setting. C.T. was admitted for kidney stones. She did pass the kidney stones but continued to have severe pain. Her doctor asked for a psychiatric consult. The psychiatrist diagnosed C.T. as having a personality disorder, chronic psychogenic pain disorder, and an eating disorder. Her depressive disorder exacerbated pain. C.T. had been given narcotics for the pain associated with the kidney stones. In order to assess her mental status, the physicians needed to taper the dosage of Demerol which she had been receiving. She was started on Sinequan, which is an anti-depressant given to alleviate the psychological condition and to help with the physical complaints. C.T. was later put on Vicodin, an oral narcotic, which seemed to bring the pain under control. The drugs used could cause a drop in blood pressure; therefore, they had to be titrated slowly. Her treating physician was trying to find an appropriate anti-depressant, while weaning the patient from intramuscular narcotics. On November 17, 1994, C.T. left her room and went to the hospital lobby, where she was found by nursing staff. C.T. was crying and saying that she was in pain and wanted to die. During her hospital stay, C.T. was in much distress; she would scream out that she was in pain. On November 18, 1994, she was found crying on the floor of the hospital chapel and had to be returned to her room. It was the opinion of Dr. Bernard Frankel, an expert retained by the Hospital, that C.T. probably could have been discharged a day earlier. The hospital stay for C.T. from November 17, 1994, to November 25, 1994, was medically necessary. The last day of her stay was not medically necessary.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered requiring Indian River Memorial Hospital, Inc., to pay to the Agency $752.14 for one day of service provided to G.M., $752.14 for one day of service provided to C.A., and $473.22 for one day of service provided to C.T. and finding that the Hospital is not liable for payment for any of the other services at issue in this proceeding. DONE AND ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 2nd day of November, 1998. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Falkinburg, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 John D. Buchanan, Jr., Esquire Henry, Buchanan, Hudson, Suber & Williams, P.A. 117 South Gadsden Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Sam Power, Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Paul J. Martin, General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration Fort Knox Building 3 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308
The Issue The issues in this case for determination are whether Respondent James C. Dozier, M.D., committed the violations of Chapter 458, Florida Statutes (2003), as alleged in an Administrative Complaint filed by the Department of Health on October 3, 2006; and, if so, what disciplinary action should be taken against his license to practice medicine in Florida.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. Petitioner, the Department of Health (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is the agency of the State of Florida charged with the responsibility for the investigation and prosecution of complaints involving physicians licensed to practice medicine in Florida. § 20.43 and Chs. 456 and 458, Fla. Stat. Respondent, James C. Dozier, M.D., is, and was at the times material to this matter, a physician licensed to practice medicine in Florida, having been issued license number ME 47971. Dr. Dozier’s mailing address of record at all times relevant to this matter is Indian River Memorial Hospital Department of Emergency Medicine, 1000 36th Street, Vero Beach, Florida 32960. Dr. Dozier is board-certified in Emergency Medicine. Dr. Dozier has previously been subject to license discipline in Agency for Health Care Administration Case Number 93-20295. Patient D.C. On September 3, 2003, Patient D.C. was 49 years of age and obese. He was living a largely sedentary lifestyle, having suffered a work-related spinal injury several years before 2003. D.C. did not work. He was taking methadone, a powerful narcotic painkiller used for long-term, chronic pain relief, daily. As a result of his spinal injury, D.C. spent most of his time at home and did not engage in significant physical activity. On September 3, 2003, D.C. experienced an episode of hard coughing, during which he produced brown sputum. At approximately 9:15 a.m., September 4, 2003, D.C. awoke with sharp, left-sided chest and shoulder pain, and shortness of breath. The pain in his chest was excruciating and he had difficulty breathing. Consequently, his wife, S.C., telephoned 911 and requested emergency assistance at approximately 9:19 a.m. Transport of Patient D.C. to the Hospital. Emergency medical services personnel (hereinafter referred to as “EMS Personnel”), arrived at D.C.’s house at approximately 9:25 a.m., September 4, 2003. What transpired beginning with the arrival of EMS Personnel and their delivery of D.C. to Indian River Memorial Hospital (hereinafter referred to as “Memorial Hospital”), was documented in an Indian River County EMS report, Incident # 014509 (hereinafter referred to as the EMS Report). A copy of the EMS Report was admitted as Petitioner’s Exhibit 3. As alleged in the Administrative Complaint, the EMS Report indicates the following: D.C.’s lung sounds were decreased on the left side with wheezes in several fields bilaterally and during transport to the hospital there was no change in his pain, although there was a decrease in the wheezing; At 9:27 a.m. D.C.’s pulse rate was 110, respiratory rate was 24 and oxygen saturation level was 92 percent by pulse oximetry; At 9:39 a.m. D.C.’s pulse rate was 116, respiratory rate was 24, and oxygen saturation level was 97 percent after the administration of oxygen by nasal cannula. A copy of the EMS Report was not provided to Memorial Hospital until after the events relevant to this case. While the EMS Report notes that EMS Personnel “[t]ransferred care to ER nurse with report,” the nature of the “report” was not proved during the hearing of this matter. Dr. Dozier was not made aware of the contents of the EMS Report or the “report” purportedly made by EMS Personnel to the emergency room nurse. Nor did he make any effort to inquire about D.C.’s condition during the time he was in the care of EMS Personnel. While the evidence presented at hearing proved that Dr. Dozier should have made an effort to inquire about D.C.’s condition during the time he was in the care of EMS Personnel, the charges in this case are limited to Dr. Dozier’s actions after D.C.’s arrival at Memorial Hospital; there is no allegation in the Administrative Complaint relating to any failure on the part of Dr. Dozier to determine what data EMS Personnel were aware of or ultimately reported. Most importantly, while there are allegations of fact concerning what EMS Personnel determined about D.C.’s condition, the Administrative Complaint does not inform Dr. Dozier of how those facts related to his care of D.C. What was in the EMS Report is, therefore, ultimately not relevant in deciding whether the allegations of the Administrative Complaint have been proved. Counsel for the Department has accurately reported parts of the EMS Report in paragraphs 23 through 32 of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order and counsel for Dr. Dozier have accurately summarized some of the information contained in the EMS Report in their proposed finding of fact 8. Those proposed findings of fact, although accurate, have not been included in this Recommended Order because they relate to information which Dr. Dozier never had at the times relevant to this case. Dr. Dozier’s Treatment of Patient D.C. EMS personnel delivered D.C. at Memorial Hospital at approximately 9:54 a.m., September 4, 2003. It was documented in the Emergency Room (hereinafter referred to as the “ER”), nurse’s notes, that D.C., upon arrival, reported that he had suffered a severe coughing spell the night before, experienced increased shortness of breath, coughed up dark brown sputum, and had felt sharp left-side chest pain. It was also documented that D.C.’s oxygen saturation was 94 percent on supplemental oxygen; he was experiencing the highest level of left-sided chest pain, pain that increased with deep breaths; he was awake, alert, and oriented; his complexion was normal in color; his pulse rate was 99 beats per minute; and his respiratory rate was 22 breaths per minute. An ER nurse noted that D.C. had a history of spinal surgery and was taking methadone. Another ER nurse saw D.C. at approximately 10:00 a.m. The nurse noted in the record that D.C. was suffering sharp pain on inspiration, his oxygen saturation had increased to 97 percent on two liters of supplemental oxygen, and that he had decreased breath sounds on the left side of his chest. One of the nurses who saw D.C. ordered blood tests, including a complete blood count, cardiac markers, a differential, and a complete metabolic panel. The blood tests were subsequently cancelled. The only documentation in D.C.’s medical records at Memorial Hospital indicates that the tests were cancelled at 10:15 a.m. with a notation “Cancelled Requested by Nurse/MD PER DR DOZIER,” although Dr. Dozier did not first see D.C. until approximately 10:15 a.m. Dr. Dozier testified at final hearing that the tests had been cancelled at D.C.’s request. There are no medical notes to substantiate this testimony. Dr. Dozier documented his care of D.C. in an “Any Complaint Template” form with a time stamp of 10:17:33 a.m. Dr. Dozier noted in the Any Complaint Template that D.C. was suffering from sharp, left-sided chest pain of several hours duration with splinting (stiffening of the body to avoid pain caused by movement) and decreased breath sounds on the left side. Dr. Dozier also documented that D.C.’s past medical history included chronic pain that was being treated by methadone. Dr. Dozier ordered a chest X-ray and an EKG. He also started D.C. on Toradol, a non-steroidal, anti-inflammatory drug used for pain relief, and Levaquin, an antibiotic. The chest X- ray and EKG were documented in the Any Complaint Template. The EKG performed on D.C. was normal. His chest X-ray was interpreted by the radiologist as normal, except that he was exhibiting poor inspiratory effort. Dr. Dozier, under “differential diagnosis,” listed pleurisy (an inflammation of the lining of the chest wall and lungs marked by chest pain that increases on inspiration) first and pneumonia (an infection of the lungs marked by a severe cough, chest pain, and fever) second. A “differential diagnosis” was explained by Dr. Murray: Differential diagnosis is when you have a patient that comes into the emergency room and he has this constellation of signs and symptoms and risk factors. You try to put it together, you make a list, here’s all the possible things that could be wrong with this guy. So that’s your differential diagnosis. What are the possibilities here with what I have to look at. So you list our differential diagnosis. Transcript, page 39, lines 22-25, and page 40, Lines 1-4. Based upon the information which Dr. Dozier had concerning D.C., while pleurisy and pneumonia were reasonably included in his differential diagnosis, he should have also considered myocardial infarction, bronchitis, and, most significantly, pulmonary embolus. Of significance in this case, is Dr. Dozier’s failure to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis. Pulmonary embolus is a condition whereby the arteries in the lungs are blocked by one or more blood clots. A pulmonary embolism usually occurs when blood clots that have formed in the veins of a person’s extremities dislodge and are transported by the blood stream to the lungs where they become trapped by smaller arteries. The formation of blood clots in the extremities is called deep vein thrombosis (hereinafter referred to as the “DVT”). When blood clots become lodged in the lungs, the lungs can be damaged or, if blood flow becomes too constricted, the person can die. Pulmonary embolisms are encountered in emergency rooms with some frequency. In determining whether a person is suffering from pulmonary embolus, the common risk factors must be considered. Those risk factors include a history of previous pulmonary embolus or DVT; immobilization (the person is confined to bed, sedentary, or has recently taken a long trip); smoking; obesity; hypercoagulablity (increased tendency of the blood to clot); and cancer. The most common signs of pulmonary embolus are chest pain, usually of sudden onset and which becomes worse with deep breathing or coughing; shortness of breath, again of a sudden nature; sweating; nausea; rapid breathing or tachypnea; increased heart rate or tachycardia; low oxygen saturation; and hemotysis or coughing up blood. Making it difficult to diagnose, a patient with a pulmonary embolism may present with various combinations of symptoms, and the symptoms are often similar to those of other ailments, such as heart attack, bronchitis, pleurisy, pneumothorax, acid reflux, dissecting thoracic anerurysm, and pneumonia. Tests which can assist a physician in the either confirming or ruling out a pulmonary embolism, include ventilation/perfusion scanning (hereinafter referred to as “V/Q Scanning”), d-dimer testing, spiral computerized axial tomography, pulmonary angiography, and Doppler ultrasound. While not all of these tests were available to Dr. Dozier, V/Q Scanning was. Pulmonary embolus should have been included in Dr. Dozier’s differential diagnosis of D.C. because D.C. arrived at the ER with a chief complaint of chest pain and, as explained by Dr. Murray because of the following: Now, what would even make [pulmonary embolus] more likely, and perhaps having to pursue a little bit more, is the type of pain that he had, which is important to tell the difference between a lot of those conditions. He had pleuritic pain. That’s the classic type of chest pain that somebody with a pulmonary embolus has as classically described as pleuritic sharp chest pain. That’s what this patient had. Then what was the onset? Was this gradual onset or sudden? P[ulmonary] E[mbolism]s are sudden onset. As far as I can tell, when it says in timing, it says symptoms for, now I can’t read that, how many that is, but he had circled hours. So I can just assume that he told Dr. Dozier that he was having these symptoms just for however many hours that stands for. So I was worried about the chest pain, the nature of the chest pain, the short duration of it, that I think it says brownish – or I’m not even – I would cough brownish sputum. I think that’s what it says, but I couldn’t say for sure under history of present illness, which would make me worry about that. Transcript, page 85, lines 3-23. D.C.’s history of acute onset shortness of breath and severe left-side pleuritic chest pain, his possible hemoptysis the night before his arrival at Memorial Hospital, and his elevated pulse and respiratory rates, all facts that were documented in the medical records for D.C. at Memorial Hospital, should have caused Dr. Dozier to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis. As a result of the fact that he did not consider pulmonary embolus as a possible ailment, Dr. Dozier failed to order tests which could have helped him to rule out pulmonary embolus or led him to conclude that D.C. was suffering from the ailment. In particular, he failed to order a V/Q scan. Ultimately, Dr. Dozier released D.C., listing as his final diagnoses pleurisy and bronchitis (inflammation of the bronchial tubes marked by painful cough and fever). Dr. Dozier prescribed Vioxx, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug, Levaquin, and Flexeril (a central nervous system depressant, commonly referred to as a “muscle relaxer”). Cancellation of the Blood Tests. As noted in Findings of Fact 19, blood tests ordered for D.C. were ultimately cancelled. According to Dr. Dozier, they were cancelled because D.C. refused the tests, a suggestion that was not documented by Dr. Dozier in D.C.’s medical records, despite the seriousness of a patient refusing tests which a physician prescribes. Given the significance of the consequences of such a refusal, Dr. Dozier’s testimony on this point is questionable and rejected as not convincing. Other facts also raise concerns about the credibility of Dr. Dozier’s testimony concerning the cancellation of the blood tests. For example, S.C. saw D.C. approximately an hour after his arrival at the hospital and found him quiet, pale, and looking very ill. At no time did D.C. or Dr. Dozier, whom she had spoken with, inform S.C. that D.C. had refused blood tests. It is also noted that D.C. did not refuse other tests, including the chest X-ray and EKG ordered by Dr. Dozier. Ultimately, Dr. Dozier’s explanation concerning the cancellation of the blood tests was not convincing, based upon findings made in this Recommended Order and because of the troublesome aspects of his testimony as explained in paragraph 51 of Petitioner’s Proposed Recommended Order, which is incorporated by reference. Despite this conclusion, ultimately, it was the Department’s burden to prove why the blood tests were cancelled. This the Department simply did not do. Ultimately the evidence simply proved that the tests were ultimately cancelled. Regardless of why the blood tests were cancelled, Dr. Dozier violated the standard of care, as found, infra. Instructions on Discharge. On discharge, D.C. was given the following written instructions on a pre-printed form: The doctor thinks your symptoms may be due to: PLEURISY. Keep this in mind: DIAGNOSIS WITH 100% CERTAINTY IS NOT POSSIBLE in the Emergency Department. Therefore, if you find you are not getting better, another diagnosis is possible, and you must see your doctor or return here. After you leave, you must properly care for your problem and observe its progress. If you do not improve as expected, or are worse, do one of the following. Immediately: contact your doctor or follow up doctor or call here [the ER]. Contact your doctor, call, or return here if you experience any of the following: A) high fever or chills B) difficulty breathing C) difficulty; swallowing or drooling D) pain or tightness in chest or neck E) thick green or bloody sputum F) fast pulse (more than 100 a minute at rest) G) vomiting. Your symptoms should improve within 4-6 days and should not worsen. You should be able to breathe comfortably when sitting or lying down, and should not be struggling to breathe. You should be able to eat, drink, and swallow without pain or drooling. Rest, drink plenty of fluids, and eat regular well-balanced meals. Use Acteminophen (Tylenol, etc.) for pain or fever, and take any prescribed medications. A cool-mist vaporizer may help decrease cough and discomfort. DO NOT use a hot mist vaporizer of hot steam. DO NOT smoke during your illness; smoking will delay your recovery. The forgoing instructions were consistent with Dr. Dozier’s diagnosis of pleurisy or bronchitis. Having failed to consider pulmonary embolus, the instructions were inadequate in failing to address this possible condition. The Standard of Care. The Department's expert, John V. Murray, M.D., credibly opined that Dr. Dozier failed to practice medicine in accordance with the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized in general law related to health care licensure in violation of Section 458.331(1)(t), Florida Statutes (hereinafter referred to as the "Standard of Care"), in his treatment of D.C. In particular, it was Dr. Murray’s opinion that Dr. Dozier violated the Standard of Care by failing to recognize the possibility that D.C. was experiencing a pulmonary embolism and, as a consequence, by failing to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis; and by failing to order diagnostic tests, in particular V/Q Scanning, which may have either ruled out or confirmed the existence of a pulmonary embolism. Dr. Murray’s opinions are credited and accepted. The opinions to the contrary offered by Dr. Dozier and his expert witness are rejected as not convincing and as not addressing the issues precisely enough. Too much was made of facts which were not available to Dr. Dozier at the time he made his differential diagnosis and the consequences thereof, unlike Dr. Murray, who specifically testified, when asked whether he attempted “to put yourself in Dr. Dozier’s shoes on the day these events occurred,” as follows: A. Yes, sir. I think that’s necessary. If you’re going to make a finding that was the standard of care, I think the standard of care relates to what would the prudent physician in the same circumstances on the same day do. In order to do that, you put yourself in those shoes. Say if I was there what would I do and what would be the standard of care for that, the minimum. Transcript, page 33, lines 22-25, and page 34, lines 1-3. Dr. Murray went on to explain that, although he had learned from the documents presented to him, information that Dr. Dozier did not have available while caring for D.C., he was able to limit his opinions appropriately to the time of the actual events and the information which Dr. Dozier was presented with. The opinions offered on behalf of Dr. Dozier were not so precisely limited. Medical Records. Dr. Dozier failed to document in his medical records for D.C. whether D.C. was a smoker or had recently taken any long trips, both facts which are relevant bits of information when considering pulmonary embolus. Dr. Dozier’s medical records were, therefore, inadequate in this regard. Dr. Dozier also failed to give adequate follow-up instructions for pulmonary embolus upon discharge. Dr. Dozier’s actions, however, were the result, not of his failure to include pulmonary embolus in his differential diagnosis, but in the failure to accurately diagnosis D.C.’s condition, a failure for which Dr. Dozier has not been charged. I. D.C.’s Demise. On September 6, 2003, D.C. died in his sleep. A postmortem autopsy of D.C. revealed that he died of “massive pulmonary thromboembole due to phlebothromboses of lower extremities.” It was found that D.C. had an abdominal malignancy, a significant contributing factor in the death of D.C. What role, if any, that Dr. Dozier’s failures in his treatment of D.C. contributed to D.C.’s ultimate demise was not proved.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the a final order be entered by the Board of Medicine finding that James C. Dozier, M.D., has violated Section 458.331(1)(m) and (t), Florida Statutes, as described in this Recommended Order; issuing a reprimand; imposing a fine of $10,000.00; requiring that he complete the Florida Medical Association’s “quality Medical Record Keeping for health Care Professionals” course or a Board-approved equivalent; and requiring that he complete five hours of continuing medical education in diagnosis and treatment of pulmonary embolus. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of September, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LARRY J. SARTIN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of September, 2007. COPIES FURNISHED: Don Freeman, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Prosecution Services Unit Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin C-65 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3250 Barry A. Postman, Esquire Lee Cohen, Esquire Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A. 1645 Palm Beach Lakes Boulevard Second Floor West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 Larry McPherson, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Josefina M. Tamayo, General Counsel Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 Dr. Ana M. Viamonte Ros, Secretary Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A00 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701 R. S. Power, Agency Clerk Department of Health 4052 Bald Cypress Way, Bin A02 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1701
Findings Of Fact Petitioner's name and address are North Broward Hospital District d/b/a North Broward Medical Center, 201 E Sample Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33604. The North Broward Hospital District is a Special Taxing District created by the Florida Legislature. It currently owns and operates three public, nonprofit hospitals in Broward County including Broward General Medical Center ("BGMC") and North Broward Medical Center Respondent, Department of Heath and Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"), is responsible for the administration of Section 381.493 through 381.499, Fla. Stat. ("the CON statute"), and Fla. Administrative Code Ch. 10-5 ("the CON rules"). Under the foregoing, authorities, HRS reviews applications for CONs to construct, purchase or otherwise implement certain new health care facilities and new institutional health care services, as defined by the CON statute. One of these new institutional health care services subject to HRS' review under the CON statute and CON rules is open-heart surgery service, as defined in Fla. Admin. Code Rule 10-5.11(16)(a). By formal application under the CON statute and CON rules which was deemed complete by HRS effective October 16, 1985, NBMC applied for a certificate of need ("CON") to institute an open-heart surgery service at 201 E. Sample Road, Pompano Beach, Florida 33604. Exhibit "A" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of NBMC's application for certificate of need for open-heart surgery. NBMC's application was denied by HRS by letter dated February 28, 1986, received by NBMC open March 10, 1986. Exhibit "B" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of said letter. Publication of the denial appears at Vol. 12; No. 11, Florida Administrative Weekly (March 14, 1986). HRS' basis for denying the application is contained in the "State Agency Action Report". Exhibit "C" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of HRS' State Agency Action Report pertaining to NBMC's application. NBMC has petitioned HRS for formal Section 120.57(1), Fla. Stat., administrative proceedings challenging the denial of its application for open- heart surgery. Exhibit "D" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of that petition. In its application, NBMC stated that one of its sister hospitals, BGMC, currently provided open-heart surgical services. NBMC proposed in its application to utilize the same open-heart surgical team at NBMC as was then practicing at BGMC. Applicants for CONs for open-heart surgery services must satisfy certain regulatory standards prescribed in CON Rule 10-5.11(16). These standards include: (k)1. There shall be no additional open- heart surgery programs established unless: The service volume of each existing and approved open-heart surgery program within the service area is operating at and is and expected to continue to operate at a minimum of 350 adult open-heart surgery cases per year or 130 pediatric heart cases per year; and The conditions specified in (e)4., above will be met by the proposed program. (E.S.) Rule 10-5.11(16)(e)4. provides in pertinent part as follows: There shall be a minimum of 200 adult open- heart procedures performed annually, within three years after initiation of service, an any institution in which open-heart surgery is performed for adults. (E.S.) Exhibit "E" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of CON Rule 10-5.11(16). 10. In 43 Fed. Reg. 13040, 13048 (March 28, 1978) (42 C.F.R. 121.207), the Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") set forth the federal CON standards for open-heart surgery, as part of the National Guidelines for Health Planning. The National Guidelines for Health Planning are referenced in HRS's State Agency Action Report. Exhibit "F" is a true, correct, and authentic copy of that portion of the Nation Guidelines for Health Planning which pertain to the implementation of open-heart surgery services. The National Guidelines for Health Planning also provide that approval of new open-heart surgery services should be contingent upon existing units operating and continuing to operate at a level of at least 350 procedures per year. The National Guidelines for Health Planning further provide as follows: In some areas, open-heart surgical teams, including surgeons and specialized technologists, are utilizing more than one institution. For these institutions, the guidelines may be applied to the combined number of open-heart procedures performed by the surgical team where an adjustment is justifiable in line with Section 121.6(B) and promotes more cost effective use of available facilities and support personnel. In such cases, in order to maintain quality care a minimum of 75 open-heart procedures in any institution is advisable, which is consistent with recommendations of the American College of Surgeons. (E.S.) HRS' CON Rule 10-5.11(16); which contains the "350" standard, does not contain any comparable exception for institutions sharing open-heart surgical teams. NBMC's application for CON projects 200 open-heart surgeries by the end of the third year of operations and, when combined with BGMC's open-heart procedures satisfies the exception contained in the National Guidelines for Health Planning, as described above. There are no disputed issues of material fact that will require an evidentiary hearing in this matter. The parties therefore agree that the matter shall be submitted pursuant to legal memoranda and oral argument. The parties' legal memoranda will be due on June 17, 1986, and oral argument will be held on the scheduled hearing date of June 19, 1986. The parties agree to allow responses to the legal memoranda, which responses shall be submitted no later than June 26; 1986.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether Petitioner should be awarded a certificate of need authorizing the establishment of cardiac catheterization laboratory services at its facility in Port Charlotte, Florida. As a result of stipulations of the parties presented at hearing, matters for consideration were limited to whether Petitioner meets the criteria of availability of funds for capital expenditures for the project in accordance with Section 381.705(1)(h), Florida Statutes; and whether Petitioner has shown the existence of need for additional services by any existing medically underserved groups in the service area.
Findings Of Fact The parties have stipulated that Petitioner does not meet the criteria of Section 381.705(1)(a), Florida Statutes, because there is no numeric need for the program established by any agency rule formula and that no emergency or other not normal circumstances exist, including problems of geographic, financial or programmatic access, justifying the program in the absence of such enumerated need. Petitioner's agreement to this stipulation was conditioned upon an assumption that previous Certificates of Need, formerly granted by final orders of Respondent to other entities in previous batching cycles and now the subject of legal appeals by Petitioner in the appellate court, will eventually be confirmed by that court to have been properly issued. The parties have stipulated that Petitioner, as the result of nonexistence of numeric or nonnumeric need, has not met criteria regarding its ability to provide quality care, a requirement of subparagraph (c) of Section 381.705(1), Florida Statutes; has not met criteria regarding availability and adequacy of other health care facilities in the applicant's service district, a review component set forth in Section 381.705(1)(d), Florida Statutes; has not met criteria regarding immediate and long term financial feasibility of Petitioner's proposal, a requirement of Section 381.705(1)(i), Florida Statutes; has not met criteria regarding the impact of the proposed project on the costs of providing such health services, a requirement of Section 381.705(1)(l), Florida Statutes; and has not met criteria, as required by Section 381.705(2)(a)-(d), Florida Statutes, regarding alternative services, efficiency of existing services, alternatives to new construction or the likelihood of patients obtaining the proposed service in the absence of Petitioner's proposal. The parties have stipulated that review requirements of subparagraphs (e), (f), (g), (j), and (k) of Section 381.705(1), Florida Statutes, are found not to be applicable to this proceeding. Those subparagraphs relate, respectively, to economics of shared services, need for special services, need for research and educational facilities, special needs of health maintenance organizations and needs of entities serving residents outside the service area. The parties have stipulated that the criteria ofSection 381.705(1)(b), Florida Statutes, has not been met because they were not addressed or challenged by Petitioner. However, Petitioner does contest the accessibility by medically underserved groups of existing and approved providers in the service district. With the exception of the availability of funds for capital and operating expenditures related to the project in Petitioner's application and the extent to which the proposed services will be accessible to all residents of the service district, further stipulation between the parties also establishes that the review criteria contained in Section 381.705(1)(h), Florida Statutes, does not apply to this proceeding. Portions of Rule 10-5.011(b), Florida Administrative Code, relating to accessibility of services to residents of the service district are also excepted from consideration in this proceeding by the parties' stipulation. By stipulation of the parties, it is established that the review requirement of Section 381.705(1)(l), Florida Statutes, relating to the probable impact of the proposed project on the cost of providing services proposed by Petitioner, is met. The parties' stipulation further establishes that requirements of Section 381.705(1)(m) and Section 381.705(1)(n), Florida Statutes, have been met. These statutory subparagraphs relate, respectively, to methods and costs of proposed construction, and Petitioner's past and proposed provision of health care services to medicaid and medically indigent patients. Petitioner is a separate, albeit subsidiary,corporation from its parent, Bon Secours Health Systems, Inc., (Bon Secours) a "not for profit" corporation based in Marriottsville, Maryland. Approximately 80 percent of the total project cost of $1,450,000 cost is expected to come from the parent organization and not Petitioner's corporation. The project has been approved by Petitioner's corporation and management approval has been granted by Bon Secours, subject only to final board approval and reevaluation by the parent corporation on an annual basis until the actual capital expenditure is incurred. Petitioner's parent corporation uses either a line of credit or goes to the tax exempt bond market to meet capital expenditure needs. The bond market is utilized when capital needs exceed $15 million for the year. Whether the funding source for Petitioner's project would come from a line of credit or bond financing would not be known until the actual year in which the expenditure is incurred. Bon Secours includes Petitioner in its obligated group which consists of a system-wide master trust indenture established in 1985. The group consists of eight hospitals and three long term care facilities. Weaker entities in the group have the benefit of the credit strength of the group's entire system. In this regard, Bon Secours enjoys a Standard & Poors and Moodys' bond rating of A+ and A-1, respectively. The corporation is a good credit risk with a strong financial position and good earnings record. Over the next five years, Bon Secours has the ability to raise in excess of $100,000,000 in the bond market for funding purposes, inclusive of the project which is the subject of theseproceedings. Although final approval of Petitioner's project by Bon Secours' board of directors is expected shortly, that approval had not occurred at the time of final hearing. As a result, the proof fails to establish that Bon Secours is committed to provide financing for Petitioner's project. Petitioner presented expert testimony regarding accessibility by medically underserved groups to Petitioner's and other cardiac catheterization programs. Petitioner's expert placed the size of the medically indigent population, a subcategory of the medically underserved group, at six to seven percent of the total population of the service area. Due to the lack of specificity of the methodology used in arriving at the cited percentage figure, no credibility can be ascribed to that population percentage. However, both Respondent and Petitioner concede the existence of this group in the district service area sought to be served by Petitioner's project. Petitioner has not established whether the medically indigent population is denied access to cardiac catheterization programs within the district service area. While Petitioner's hospital is a medicaid provider with a proactive policy of aiding the medically indigent, the availability of cardiac catheterization services exist for this group at Intervenor's medical center facilities, located only five miles from Petitioner's hospital. Intervenor is also a medicaid provider. The proof fails to establish that medicaid patients or medically indigentpatients are presently denied or turned away from Intervenor's facility. Further, the duplication of such services at Petitioner's hospital could effectively reduce the number of cardiac catheterization procedures required for the medical staff of Intervenor's laboratory to maintain proficiency. In point of fact, there is unused cardiac catheterization capacity at Intervenor's facility. As established by Intervenor's exhibit number one, there were 562 cardiac catheterization procedures performed at Intervenor's facility in 1988. The State Health Plan recites a minimum goal of 600 such procedures a year as a proficiency measurement; the Local Health Plan maintains that a minimum of 300 procedures should be performed to insure proficiency.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for approval of a cardiac catheterization Certificate of Need. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W.DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Fl 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of June, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. 1.-3. Adopted in substance, except that part (l) of proposed finding 3 was met by Petitioner. 4.-5. Addressed in part. To the extent that the last sentence of proposed finding 5 suggests the establishment of final approval by the parent corporation, it is rejected. 6. Accepted with the exception of approval by the parent corporation. The record supports a finding of approval by management of that corporation, but not the board of directors. 7.-8. Adopted in substance. Adopted in part, remainder rejected due to witness's inability to support her calculations as to percentages of the population within the service district classified as medically indigent. Addressed in part, remainder unnecessary to conclusion. Addressed in part, remainder rejected on basis of relevancy. Addressed. Rejected on basis of relevancy. Addressed in part, remainder rejected as argumentative and speculative. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1.-2. Rejected. Treated in preliminary discussion. 3.-21. Adopted in substance. 22.-23. Adopted by reference. 24.-25. Addressed in substance. 26.-30. Adopted by reference. 31.-33. Adopted by reference. Intervenor's Proposed Findings. 1.-3. Adopted in substance. 4. Rejected as unnecessary. 5.-9. Adopted in substance. 10. Adopted by reference. 11.-12. Adopted in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph R. Buchanan, Esq. Suite 900, Sun Bank Building 777 Brickell Avenue Miami, FL 33131 Edgar Lee Elzie, Jr., Esq. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 804 Tallahassee, FL 32301 E. G. Boone, Esq. 1001 Avenida del Circo Venice, FL 34284 Gregory L. Coler Secretary Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Sam Power Clerk Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 John Miller, Esq. General Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700
