Findings Of Fact Based upon the documentary evidence and the testimony taken at the hearing, the following relevant facts were uncontroverted: At all times pertinent to this proceeding, Respondents National Home Realty, Inc. and Philip Marzo were licensed real estate brokers and Respondent Steve Mishkin was a licensed real estate salesman holding license numbers 0210856, 0056147 and 0151878, respectively. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was qualified by Philip Marzo, a licensed real estate broker. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, National Home Realty, Inc. was engaged in the business of negotiating rental contracts and in furnishing for an advance fee, rental information as to available residential rentals to prospective tenants. In connection therewith, the company used Service Agreements of which Petitioner's Exhibits 1 and 2 are accurate examples. The Service Agreements do not comport with Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code, which requires a specific refund notice to be placed on any such contract, nor do the contracts comply with Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, which provides for full refund in the event the rental information provided by the broker or salesman to a prospective tenant is not current or accurate in any material respect. In October of 1980, Grace Pasquale, as a prospective tenant, signed a rental service agreement with National Home Realty, Inc., on a form supplied by National Home Realty, and paid to National Home Realty a $65 cash advance fee for the specified rental services. During a period of approximately 25 days after the date of the contract, Pasquale was not able to locate a residential rental to meet her requirements, as set forth in her rental contract, Petitioner's Exhibit 2, from the list of alleged available rentals supplied to her by National Home Realty. As a result, Pasquale made written demand within 30 days of the date of the contract for 75 percent of her advance fee, all as provided for by Section 475.453(1), Florida Statutes, and Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. That on or about June of 1981, after intervention by the Department of Professional Regulation, Grace Pasquale received a refund. On or about February 16, 1981, prospective tenant Bruce Blair paid to National Home Realty a $75 cash advance fee, for agreement for rental services including a list of available rentals to meet the specific requirements of prospective tenant Bruce Blair. Only one listing was supplied to Blair and this did not meet Blair's requirements as set forth in his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6. Failing and unable to obtain a rental by and through National Home Realty, Blair located a rental through his own efforts unconnected with the services of National Home Realty. Within 30 days of the date of his agreement, Petitioner's Exhibit 6, Blair made written demand on National Home Realty for a 75 percent refund of his advance fee, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 12V-10.30, Florida Administrative Code. In response to his demand, National Home Realty issued check number 1735, dated March 25, 1981, to the order of Bruce Blair on the account of National Home Realty, Inc. at the Barnett Bank for $18.75 being only 25 percent of the advance fee paid and, therefore, contrary to the provisions of the above stated rule. When Blair presented the check for payment, it was not honored due to the account having been closed. In April of 1981, Respondent paid Blair in cash for the balance due on his refund. Respondent Marzo, the qualifying broker who worked in the office, never personally refused a 75 percent refund to anyone who requested the same within 30 days from the date of a service contract. However, while he was qualifying broker, certain salesmen in the office ignored demands for refunds. Marzo was unaware that this was occurring until it was brought to his attention through the Department's direct intervention. When Marzo realized there was a problem with the salesmen making timely refunds, he instituted an unwritten policy that anyone who requested a refund should be given one. Despite this directive, salesmen continued to refuse or delay refunds due to the manner in which commissions were paid by the office. Respondents Marzo and Mishkin never met either Grace Pasquale or Bruce Blair. Although Respondent Mishkin never denied a refund to anyone who requested one, he would harass or make a person who asked for a refund "feel pretty bad" for doing so. (See Transcript at 37)
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That a Final Order be entered revoking the license of National Home Realty, Inc., suspending the license of Philip Marzo for a period of six (6) months and dismissing the charges against Steve Mishkin. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of October, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 Kristin Building 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Brian Hal Leslie, Esquire 1795 North East 164th Street North Miami Beach, Florida 33160 Carlos B. Stafford, Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Samuel R. Shorstein, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation Old Courthouse Square Building 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue In relation to DOAH Case No. 05-0515, does the case involve the sale of securities as described in Chapter 517, Florida Statutes (2002), that would confer jurisdiction upon OFR to proceed to a hearing on the merits of the Administrative Complaint that forms the basis for DOAH Case No. 05-0515, and to what extent, if any, the named Respondents have been involved with the sale of securities sufficient to declare jurisdiction over their activities? Preliminary to that determination is the related issue concerning the possible pre-emption of OFR's regulatory authority by virtue of the regulatory action previously taken by the State of Florida, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Land Sales, Condominiums and Mobile Homes (DBPR) under authority set forth in Chapter 721, Florida Statutes (2002)? Argument has also been set forth concerning the significance of court cases as they might influence OFR's ability to declare their regulatory authority in this instance.
Findings Of Fact * * * 2. RESPONDENT is the 'creating developer' of the Universal Luxury Lease Plan, a personal property 'timeshare plan' as those terms are defined in sections 721.05(9)(a) and 721.05(37), Florida Statutes, located in the city of Sanford, Florida. * * * On or about July 10, 2003, DIVISION was made aware of a newspaper advertisement for Universal Luxury Lease Plan. This advertisement, promoted the purchase of a timeshare interest in the Universal Luxury Lease Plan as an investment that offered purchasers a 10 percent per year return on their investment. On July 25, 2003, DIVISION'S investigators were given an application package containing the Universal Luxury Lease Plan Enrollment Forms, CD-ROM, Public Offering Statement, Contracts and Motor Coach Brochures. The application package stated that it was advertising material being used for the purposes of soliciting timeshare interests. It described a component of the timeshare plan called the 'Affinity Rental Program' and stated that the program will typically produce a monthly income of 10 percent of the lease-hold ownership interest.
Recommendation Based upon the consideration of the facts found and the conclusions of law reached, it is RECOMMENDED: That an order be entered by OFR finding jurisdiction to proceed with the Administrative Complaint in DOAH Case No. 05- 0515 on its merits. DONE AND ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2006, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CHARLES C. ADAMS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of January, 2006.
Findings Of Fact The Declaration of Condominium for Oaks of Broward was filed by Margen, a Florida Partnership, in May, 1974 in the Public Records of Broward County and with the Petitioner. All documents required to be filed by Margen with Petitioner were filed and the fees paid. Simultaneously a recreational lease was filed of property adjacent to the condominium in which Barnett Bank of Hollywood was named as Trustee and Lessor, and The Oaks Condominium Association, Inc. of Broward as Lessee. Between May 1974 and early 1976 Margen sold to individuals 39 condominium units at Oaks of Broward. In early 1976, Housing Investment Corporation, mortgagee, began foreclosure proceedings which resulted in title to all of the Oaks condominium property, except for the 39 units previously sold, being taken by The Oaks of Broward, Inc., Respondent. Thereby Respondent became successor in title to the previously unsold 75 units in the building and to the position of the Lessor on the long-term recreational lease. On or about August 1977, Respondent offered for sale the 75 condominium units pursuant to prospectus admitted into evidence as Exhibit 2. In addition thereto and as part of the sales effort Respondent executed and recorded the Declaration Waiving Rents, a copy of which was admitted into evidence as Exhibit Neither of these documents was filed with Petitioner. The 75 units owned by Respondent were sold with the recreational lease rents waived. Pursuant to the terms of the recreational lease the original 39 buyers pay $20 per month, either to the Association or directly to the Lessor. This lease is a net/net lease, which means the Lessor performs no services except to provide the premises themselves. The Condominium Association is responsible for and pays all maintenance, taxes, upkeep and expenses for the operation of the Recreation Area. All condominium units, the original 39 as well as the remaining 75, pay to the Association, as part of the common expenses, their pro rate share of those operating expenses. It is this disparate treatment of the two groups of unit owners with respect to the recreational lease rent payment of $20 per month that is one subject of Petitioner's request for a cease and desist order. The second subject of the Petition for a cease and desist order is Petitioner's contention that Respondent is a Developer and is required to file documents and pay a $10 filing fee for each of the 75 condominiums sold, regardless of whether fees for these 75 units were paid by Respondent's predecessor in title.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, M. Betty Murray, currently holds Florida Real Estate Broker's License number 62943. At all times material to this proceeding, the license was in full force and effect. The Respondent represented L. O. Huckaby and Sarah Huckaby in the sale of property located at 363 Boylston Avenue, Daytona Beach, Florida, to Elizabeth T. Stein, the complainant in this proceeding. Pursuant to her representation of the Huckaby's, the Respondent, on or about June 18, 1979, prepared a proposed contract for the sale and purchase of the subject property. Prior to signing the contract and tendering a deposit thereunder, Ms. Stein reviewed the contract with her attorney, Berrien Becks, Sr. When reviewing the contract with Mr. Becks, Ms. Stein failed to inform either Mr. Becks or his secretary, Sylvia Van De Mark, that she intended to use the property as either a duplex or a triplex. Had Ms. Stein indicated such an intent, a provision to that effect would have been included in paragraph VIII of the contract for sale and purchase. This was the normal procedure utilized in the ordinary course of business by the Becks' law firm. The contract for sale, Respondents Exhibit 1, shows no such provision or notation. The sellers, Mr. and Mrs. Huckaby, were represented by Charles E. Booth, Esquire. On behalf of Ms. Stein, Mr. Becks requested that certain repairs be made to the property. Mr. Booth rejected these demands by letter dated July 24, 1979. Although the contract does not state that the property was intended to be used as a duplex, the property is in fact recognized as a de facto duplex under the nonconforming use provisions of the city's zoning ordinance. Had Ms. Stein elected to proceed with the sale, she would have been permitted to utilize the property as a two unit property so long as she lived in one of the units which was her expressed intent. Prior to paying the balance of the deposit due on the contract, Ms. Stein and the Respondent went to Mr. Booth's office where Mr. Booth confirmed by telephone conversation with city officials and in the presence of both Ms. Stein and the Respondent, the lawful use of the property as a single family residence with attached rental unit. Following this information, Ms. Stein paid the balance into the Respondent's escrow account. On August 20, 1979, Ms. Stein demanded return of the $9,000.00 deposit from the Respondent. Upon receipt of this demand, the Respondent contacted Mr. Booth who instructed her to retain the deposit in her escrow account. Mr. Booth and Mr. Becks negotiated a release which was signed by the Sellers on August 28, 1979 and by Ms. Stein on September 11, 1979. The release authorized disbursements to be made including $500.00 to the Respondent, $150.00 to Mr. Booth, $43.00 to Lawyers Title Services, Inc. and the remaining $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein. On August 20, 1979, prior to signing the release, Ms. Stein sent a complaint to the Board concerning the return of her $9,000.00. On September 7, 1979, Ms. Stein sent another letter to the Board indicating that she had not agreed to the disbursements set forth in paragraph 8 above notwithstanding her agreement to sign the release. Ms. Stein's attorney, Mr. Becks, witnessed the release and explained the legal implications of the release in detail to her prior to her signing. Mr. Stein did not inform Mr. Becks of her correspondence with the Board which attempted to disclaim the release. At no time did the Respondent represent the property as a triplex, but only as a single family residence with a single attached rental unit, which was a permissible use under the city zoning ordinance. In fact, Ms. Stein defaulted on the contract and under its express terms could have forfeited the entire $9,000.00. The release negotiated between Mr. Becks and Mr. Booth which returned $8,307.00 to Ms. Stein was generous and demonstrated good faith efforts on the part of the Sellers to settle this matter amicably. The Respondent has maintained her registered office at 231 Gradview, Daytona Beach, Florida. The office consists of a room where she maintains her business files and which can be closed for privacy. The allegations of Ms. Stein against the Respondent were untrue and were made with knowledge that neither the Huckaby's nor the Respondent had engaged in any illegal or unethical activities regarding this transactions. The testimony of Mr. Becks, attorney for Ms. Stein and the affidavit of Mr. Booth, attorney for the Huckaby's, corroborates the Respondent's testimony and contradicts the allegations made in the complaint filed by Ms. Stein and the administrative complaint filed by the Board which was based entirely upon Ms. Stein's allegations. Ms. Stein's failure to appear at the final hearing supports the conclusion that she knew the allegations made by her could not be proved at the hearing. Any equitable or legal rights which Ms. Stein may have had to pursue this matter ended when she knowingly and voluntarily signed a release in order to secure the return of a substantial portion of her deposit monies. In effect, the only misrepresentation in this case was that made by Ms. Stein when she represented that the release would extinguish all responsibilities, obligations and rights arising from the contract in return for the $8,307.00 and then effectively requested the Board to proceed against the Respondent.
The Issue The two issues raised in this proceeding are: (1) whether the basis and reason Respondent, Vestcor Companies, d/b/a Madalyn Landings (Vestcor), terminated Petitioner, Carlos Gomez's (Petitioner), employment on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for Petitioner's protected conduct during his normal course of employment; and (2) whether Vestcor committed unlawful housing practice by permitting Vestcor employees without families to reside on its property, Madalyn Landing Apartments, without paying rent, while requiring Vestcor employees with families to pay rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended, and Chapter 760.23, Florida Statutes (2002).
Findings Of Fact Based upon observation of the demeanor and candor of each witness while testifying, exhibits offered in support of and in opposition to the respective position of the parties received in evidence, stipulations of the parties, evidentiary rulings made pursuant to Section 120.57, Florida Statutes (2002), and the entire record compiled herein, the following relevant, material, and substantial facts are determined: Petitioner filed charges of housing discrimination against Vestcor with the Commission on August 30, 2002. Petitioner alleged that Vestcor discriminated against him based on his familial status and his June 28, 2002, termination was in retaliation for filing the charge of discrimination. Vestcor denied the allegations and contended that Petitioner's termination was for cause. Additionally, Vestcor maintained Petitioner relinquished his claim of retaliation before the final hearing; and under oath during his deposition, asserted he would not pursue a claim for retaliation. Petitioner was permitted to proffer evidence of retaliation because Vestcor terminated his employment. The Commission's Notice was issued on January 7, 2005. The parties agree that Petitioner was hired by Vestcor on June 25, 2001, as a leasing consultant agent for Madalyn Landing Apartments located in Palm Bay, Florida. Petitioner's job responsibilities as a leasing consultant agent included showing the property, leasing the property (apartment units), and assisting with tenant relations by responding to concerns and questions, and preparing and following up on maintenance orders. Petitioner had access to keys to all apartments on site. At the time of his hire, Petitioner was, as was all of Vestcor employees, given a copy of Vestcor's Employee Handbook. This handbook is required reading for each employee for personal information and familiarity with company policies and procedures, to include the company requirement that each employee personally telephone and speak with his/her supervisor when the employee, for whatever reason, could not appear at work as scheduled, which is a basis and cause for termination. The parties agree that Vestcor's handbook, among other things, contains company policies regarding equal employment; prohibition against unlawful conduct and appropriate workplace conduct; procedures for handling employee problems and complaints associated with their employment; and procedures for reporting illness or absences from work, which include personal notification to supervisors, and not messages left on the answering service. Failure to comply with employment reporting polices may result in progressive disciplinary action. The parties agree that employee benefits were also contained in the handbook. One such employee benefit, at issue in this proceeding, is the live-on-site benefit. The live-on- site benefit first requires eligible employees to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, and be a full-time employee. The eligible employee must pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the live-on-site unit. Rent-free, live-on-site benefits are available only to employees who occupy the positions of (1) site community managers, (2) maintenance supervisors, and (3) courtesy officers. These individuals received a free two-bedroom, two-bathroom apartment at the apartment complex in which they work as part of their employment compensation package. The rent-free, live-on-site benefit is not available for Vestcor's leasing consultant agent employees, such as Petitioner. On or about July 3, 2001, Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with Vestcor to move into Apartment No. 202-24 located at Madalyn Landing Apartments. The lease agreement ended on January 31, 2002. The lease agreement set forth terms that Petitioner was to receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, which became effective on September 3, 2001. Although he was eligible for the 25-percent monthly rental concession, to have given Petitioner the full 25 percent of his monthly rental cost would have over-qualified Petitioner based upon Madalyn Landing Apartment's tax credit property status. Petitioner and Vestcor agreed he would receive a $50.00 monthly rental concession, thereby qualifying him as a resident on the property. Petitioner understood and accepted the fact that he did not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. Petitioner understood and accepted Vestcor's $50.00 monthly rental concession because of his employment status as a leasing consultant agent. The rental concession meant Petitioner's regular monthly rental would be reduced by $50.00 each month. On September 1, 2001, Henry Oliver was hired by Vestcor as a maintenance technician. Maintenance technicians do not qualify for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Oliver did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Oliver was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 13, 2001, Michael Gomez, the brother of Petitioner (Mr. Gomez), commenced his employment with Vestcor as a groundskeeper. Groundskeepers did not meet the qualifications for rent-free, live-on-site benefits. At the time of his hire, Mr. Gomez did not live on site. As with other employees, to become eligible for the standard 25-percent monthly rental concession benefits, Mr. Gomez was required to complete a 90-day orientation period, meet the rental criteria for a tax credit property, be a full-time employee, and pay all applicable security deposits and utility expenses for the unit. On November 21, 2001, 81 days after his hire, Mr. Oliver commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 203-44 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Mr. Oliver's leasing consultant agent was Petitioner in this cause. Like other eligible Vestcor employees and as a part of the lease application process, Mr. Oliver completed all required paperwork, which included, but not limited to, completing a credit check, employment verification, and income test to ensure that he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Fifteen days later, on November 28, 2001, Mr. Gomez commenced his lease application process to reside in Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments. As part of the leasing process, Mr. Gomez, as other eligible Vestcor employees who intend to reside on Vestcor property, completed all necessary paperwork including, but not limited to, a credit check and employment verification and income test to ensure he was qualified to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments. Included in the paperwork was a list of rental criteria requiring Mr. Gomez to execute a lease agreement to obligate himself to pay the required rent payment, consent to a credit check, pay an application fee and required security deposit, and agree not to take possession of an apartment until all supporting paperwork was completed and approved. Mr. Gomez's leasing consultant was Petitioner. On December 28, 2001, Petitioner signed a Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 206-24, effective February 1, 2002. The Notice to Vacate was placed in Vestcor's office files. Petitioner's reasons for vacating his apartment stated he "needed a yard, garage, more space, a big family room, and some privacy." Thirty-four days later, February 1, 2002, Mr. Gomez moved into Apartment No. 206-24 at Madalyn Landing Apartments without the approval or knowledge of Vestcor management. On January 9, 2002, a "Corrective Action Notice" was placed in Petitioner's employee file by his supervisor, Genea Closs. The notice cited two violations of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Specifically, his supervisor noted Petitioner did not collect administration fees from two unidentified rental units, and he had taken an unidentified resident's rental check home with him, rather than directly to the office as required by policy. As a direct result of those policy violations, Ms. Closs placed Petitioner on 180 days' probation and instructed him to re-read all Vestcor employees' handbook and manuals. Petitioner acknowledged receiving and understanding the warning. At the time she took the above action against Petitioner, there is no evidence that Ms. Closs had knowledge of Petitioner's past or present efforts to gather statements and other information from Mr. Gomez and/or Mr. Oliver in anticipation and preparation for his subsequent filing of claims of discrimination against Vestcor. Also, on January 9, 2002, Petitioner was notified that his brother, Mr. Gomez, did not qualify to reside at Madalyn Landing Apartments because of insufficient credit. Further, Petitioner was advised that should Mr. Gomez wish to continue with the application process, he would need a co-signer on his lease agreement or pay an additional security deposit. Mr. Gomez produced an unidentified co-signer, who also completed a lease application. On January 30, 2002, the lease application submitted by Mr. Gomez's co-signor was denied. As a result of the denial of Mr. Gomez's co-signor lease application, Vestcor did not approve Mr. Gomez's lease application. When he was made aware that his co-signor's application was denied and of management's request for him to pay an additional security deposit, as was previously agreed, Mr. Gomez refused to pay the additional security deposit. As a direct result of his refusal, his lease application was never approved, and he was not authorized by Vestcor to move into any Madalyn Landing's rental apartment units. At some unspecified time thereafter, Vestcor's management became aware that Mr. Gomez had moved into Apartment No. 206-24, even though he was never approved or authorized to move into an on site apartment. Vestcor's management ordered Mr. Gomez to remove his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24. Subsequent to the removal order, Mr. Gomez moved his belongings from Apartment No. 206-24 into Apartment No. 103-20. Mr. Gomez's move into Apartment No. 103-20, as was his move into Apartment No. 206-04, was without approval and/or authorization from Vestcor's management. Upon learning that his belonging had been placed in Apartment No. 103-20, Mr. Gomez was again instructed by management to remove his belongings. After he failed and refused to move his belongings from Apartment No. 103-20, Vestcor's management entered the apartment and gathered and discarded Mr. Gomez's belongings. As a leasing contract agent, Petitioner had access to keys to all vacant apartments. His brother, Mr. Gomez, who was a groundskeeper, did not have access to keys to any apartment, save the one he occupied. Any apartment occupied by Ms. Gomez after his Notice to Vacate Apartment No. 103-20 was without the knowledge or approval of Vestcor and in violation of Vestcor's policies and procedures. Therefore, any period of apartment occupancy by Mr. Gomez was not discriminatory against Petitioner (rent-free and/or reduced rent), but was a direct violation of Vestcor's policies. On February 10, 2002, Mr. Oliver signed a one-year lease agreement with Vestcor. Mr. Oliver's lease agreement reflected a 25-percent employee rental concession. Throughout Mr. Oliver's occupancy of Apartment No. 203-64 and pursuant to his lease agreement duration, Mr. Oliver's rental history reflected his monthly payment of $413.00. There is no evidence that Mr. Oliver lived on site without paying rent or that Vestcor authorized or permitted Mr. Oliver to live on site without paying rent, as alleged by Petitioner. On June 2, 2002, Ms. Closs completed Petitioner's annual performance appraisal report. Performance ratings range from a one -- below expectations, to a four -- exceeds expectations. Petitioner received ratings in the categories appraised as follows: Leasing skills -- 4; Administrative skills -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork, computer updating, and policy adherence; Marketing skills -- 4, with comments that Petitioner had a flair for finding the right markets; Community awareness -- 3, with no comment; Professionalism -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in paperwork reporting; Dependability -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in attendance; Interpersonal skills -- 3, with no comments; Judgment/Decision-making -- 3, with no comments; Quality of Work -- 2, with comments that work lacked accuracy; Initiative -- 4, with no comment; Customer service -- 3, with no comments; Team work -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in the area of resident confidence; Company loyalty -- 2, with comments of improvement needed in adherence to company policy and procedures; and Training and development -- 3, with no comments. Petitioner's Overall rating was 2.5, with comments that there was "room for improvement." On June 27, 2002, while on 180 days' probation that began on January 9, 2002, Petitioner failed to report to work and failed to report his absence to his supervisor, Ms. Closs, by a person-to-person telephone call. This conduct constituted a violation of Vestcor's policy requiring all its employees to personally contact their supervisor when late and/or absent from work and prohibited leaving messages on the community answering service machine. On June 28, 2002, Petitioner reported to work. Ms. Closs, his supervisor, informed Petitioner of his termination of employment with Vestcor for failure to report to work (i.e. job abandonment) and for probation violation, as he had been warned on January 9, 2002, what would happen should a policy violation re-occur. It was after his June 28, 2002, termination that Petitioner began his personal investigation and gathering of information (i.e., interviews and statements from other Vestcor employees) in preparation to file this complaint. Considering the findings favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation by Vestcor, when they terminated his employment on June 28, 2002. Considering the findings of record favorable to Petitioner, he failed to establish a prima facie case of housing and/or rental adjustment discrimination by Vestcor, based upon familial status of himself or any other employer. Petitioner failed to prove Vestcor knowingly and/or intentionally permitted, approved, or allowed either Mr. Gomez or Mr. Oliver to live on site without a completed and approved application followed by appropriate rent adjustments according to their employment status and keeping within the tax credit requirement, while requiring Vestcor employees with families (or different employment status) to pay a different monthly rent in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968. Petitioner failed to prove his termination on June 28, 2002, was in retaliation for his actions and conduct other than his personal violation, while on probation, of Vestcor's policies and procedures.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED the Florida Commission on Human Rights enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief alleging discrimination filed by Petitioner, Carlos Gomez. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of August, 2005, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S FRED L. BUCKINE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of August, 2005.
The Issue Whether Respondent's license as a real estate broker should be suspended or revoked, or the licensee otherwise disciplined for alleged violations of Chapter 475, F.S. as set forth in Administrative Complaint dated December 22, 1981. This proceeding arises from the filing of an administrative complaint by the Board of Real Estate against Jack Braunstein on December 22, 1981, which alleges that he failed to refund an advance rental fee to Annette Richard on May 13, 1980, thus violating a duty imposed upon him by law or by the terms of a listing contract in a real estate transaction in violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes. The complaint further alleges that Respondent thereby violated subsection 475.25 (1)(d), Florida Statutes, in failing to account to Ms. Richard, and violation of Section 475.453, Florida Statutes, for failing to provide repayment of any amount over 25 percent of the fee for rental information, if the prospective tenant does not obtain a rental. Respondent requested an administrative hearing, and the case was referred to this Division for assignment of a Hearing Officer on February 8, 1982. At the commencement of the hearing, the parties stipulated as to the truth of Paragraphs 2-3, 5-7, 9-11, and 19-20 of the Administrative Complaint. The parties further stipulated that Respondent was licensed by Petitioner at the time of the incident alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent objected to the proceeding on various grounds, as reflected in the transcript of the hearing. The Hearing Officer treated the objection as a motion to dismiss and denied the same. Petitioner moved to amend Paragraph 22 of the Complaint to correct a typographical error to allege a violation of subsection 475.25(1)(d), F.S. in lieu of the inadvertent recitation of a violation of subsection 475.25(d), F.S. The motion was granted. The post-hearing submission by the Petitioner has been fully considered, and those portions not adopted herein are considered to be either unnecessary, irrelevant, or unwarranted in fact or law.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Jack Braunstein is licensed as a real estate broker and was so licensed at all times relevant to the matters alleged in the Administrative Complaint. Respondent operates Rent-Aid, Inc. located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a corporate real estate broker, He is the active broker for that firm. (Petitioner's Exhibits 1-2, Stipulation) On April 15, 1980, Annette H. Richard went to Respondent's firm to ascertain the availability of an apartment for rent in the school district where her child attended school. She had previously talked to Respondent by telephone concerning her needs, and Respondent had informed her that rentals were abundant and that she should come into the office. After she arrived, Respondent turned her over to his associate Jeannie Nemett who took down the information concerning Ms. Richard's apartment requirements. Ms. Nemett informed her that they could find her an apartment in the area, but had nothing available at that time. Although Ms. Nemett looked through the firm's book of apartment listings, she did not permit Ms. Richard to do so. Ms. Nemett told her that there was a new duplex listing not far from the desired area and Ms. Richard agreed to look at it. Ms. Nemett had explained the fact that the firm's services were available for a $50.00 "membership" fee. Since Ms. Richard did not have the money with her, she and Ms. Nemett stopped at the bank on the way to see the property and, after paying the requisite fee, Ms. Nemett gave her a copy of the "membership" agreement. She then showed the duplex and one other rental apartment to Ms. Richard. (Testimony of Richard, Nemett, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) A few days later, Ms. Nemett, having identified some existing available apartments in the school district area in her book of listings, called Ms. Richard several times but could not reach her. The messages were recorded on a telephone answering device. Ms. Richard did not return the calls immediately. About four days after having been shown the duplex by Ms. Nemett, she found an apartment which met her needs as a result of a newspaper ad. Prior to locating this apartment, Ms. Richard had also left telephone messages for Ms. Nemett which had not been returned. About a week or ten days after their initial meeting, Ms. Richard telephoned Ms. Nemett and informed her that she had secured her own apartment and did not wish Rent-Aid, Inc. to proceed any further in her behalf. (Testimony of Nemett, Richard, Petitioner's Exhibit 3) The agreement signed by Ms. Richard with Rent-Aid, Inc. included the following statement: If you do not obtain a rental you are entitled to receive a return of seventy-five percent of the fee paid, if you make demand within thirty days of this contract date. All notices shall be sent by certi- fied mail. A rental has been obtained when company provides a guaranteed available rental unit upon the terms specified and requested by member. (Emphasis added) By letter dated May 10, 1980, Ms. Richard requested a refund of her $50.00 fee from Rent-Aid, Inc., but by letter dated May 13, 1980, signed by Ms. Nemett, Ms. Richard was informed that a refund could not be made, as follows: It has been construed that the obtaining of rental property is when you receive listings--available, shown by us, in your price range and area, or any other listings which you agree to see. We did, in fact, show you available rental property under the terms of the Rent-Aid policy #011061. Also at that time, I left messages on your answering machine, concerning other avail- able rentals. Under the conditions and terms of this policy--a refund cannot be made. On advice of counsel, Respondent refunded the amount of $37.50 to Ms. Richard on January 11, 1982. (Testimony of Richard, Respondent, Petitioner's Exhibits 4-5) On March 27, 1980, Respondent's attorney wrote to Salvatore A. Carpino, Staff Attorney of the Department of Professional Regulation enclosing Rent-Aid, Inc.`s contract form and requesting review of it to determine whether or not it met the requirements of Chapter 475. The form sent to Mr. Carpino contained the same language as that used in the Richard transaction. By letter of April 1, 1980, the attorney informed Respondent that he had heard from the Department of Professional Regulation about the case and that the form would be acceptable if he deleted the word "registered" in "registered mail." Thereafter, on May 8, 1980, the attorney again wrote Mr. Carpino enclosing print sizes of the form to determine if it met the Department's print size requirements. By letter of May 15, 1980, Carpino informed the attorney that the Respondent could continue to use the existing forms "with the changes that we have previously discussed." Respondent utilized the contract form in question in reliance upon the advice given to him by his attorney in the above regards, and believed that he was operating properly in accordance with the Department's requirements. He had inserted the definition of "obtaining a rental" in the contract form in order to eliminate the vagueness of the statute pertaining to refunds. (Testimony of Braunstein, supplemented by Respondent's Exhibits 1-2)
Recommendation That the Florida Real Estate Commission (formerly Board of Real Estate) issue a private reprimand and impose a $100 administrative fine against Respondent, Jack Braunstein, pursuant to subsection 475.25(1)(d), Florida Statutes. DONE and ENTERED this 20th day of July, 1982. THOMAS C. OLDHAM Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of July, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Bruce Lamb, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 John P. Gaudiosi, Esquire 3801 North Federal Highway Pompano Beach, Florida 33064 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801
The Issue Whether Petitioner is eligible to participate in the State of Florida Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program ("DSCP").
Findings Of Fact On December 21, 1995, Petitioner was incorporated as a Florida corporation. Prior to its incorporation, Petitioner did not conduct any business activities. Since that time it has provided pretreatment for waste water generated by Associated Uniform Rental, Inc. ("AUR"). AUR is a uniform rental facility that rents uniforms and cleans those same uniforms using a laundry process that involves the use of soaps, softeners, and neutralizers. AUR's uniform cleaning process does not currently use, and has never used, drycleaning chemicals. On April 24, 1996, Petitioner applied to Respondent for eligibility to participate in the DSCP. Petitioner's DSCP application lists the street address for the site as 35 North Parramore Avenue, Orlando, Florida. The application is signed by Dominick Cirotti. Petitioner maintains a business office in the building located at 35 North Parramore Avenue. Although the application for eligibility lists the address for the site as 35 North Parramore Avenue, Petitioner has operated and continues to operate a waste water treatment system in the northwest corner of the building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. Petitioner began operating the waste water treatment system after it was incorporated in December 1995. In January 1996, Petitioner acquired title to the real property located at 35 North Parramore Avenue. Petitioner's predecessor-in-title with respect to the above-referenced real property was AUR, f/k/a/ Atlantic Uniform Services, Inc. AUR originally acquired the property from Associated Uniform Rental and Linen Supply, Inc. ("AURLS") on July 21, 1979. AURLS and AUR are different companies. In January 1996, Petitioner also acquired title to the real property comprising the northwest corner of the building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. AUR was Petitioner's predecessor-in-title with respect to both of the above-referenced real property. There is one building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. The remainder of the building is utilized by AUR in conducting its business operations as a uniform rental company. The waste water treatment plant is separated from the remainder of AUR's building by a knee-wall. Petitioner's waste water treatment system processes waste water generated by the operations of AUR. Petitioner's waste water treatment plant is an integral part of the operation of AUR's uniform rental facility. The building at 35 North Parramore Avenue is located immediately to the north of the building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. A narrow alleyway separates the two buildings. Prior to transferring the property to Petitioner, AUR used the northwest corner of 21 North Parramore Avenue for the storage of clothing as part of its operations as a uniform rental company. Since 1979, AUR has operated a uniform rental company in the building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. AUR is currently located in the same building. AUR does not use perchloroethylene in its cleaning process. AUR rents uniforms and cleans them in a laundry process. AUR's facilities are utilized primarily for the cleaning and distribution of work apparel. Since 1985, AUR has also maintained an office in the building located at 35 North Parramore Avenue. This office operates as part of AUR's uniform rental company. Dominick Cirotti is a corporate officer of Petitioner as well as the President of AUR. Petitioner and AUR share common employees. Petitioner and AUR also share common office space in the building located at 35 North Parramore Avenue. At some time between 1925 and 1979, various drycleaning businesses operated on the property located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. Drycleaning operations ceased on the real property sometime between 1960 and 1965. In April 1993, AUR retained Environmental Science and Engineering, Inc. ("ESE") to perform a limited site assessment with respect to suspected drycleaning solvent contamination beneath AUR's building on 21 North Parramore Avenue. ESE's assessment, completed on May 6, 1993, was to determine the presence of impacted soil and/or groundwater in the immediate vicinity of a hole in the concrete slab located in that area of the facility which was once used for drycleaning operations. This area was targeted because the hole was a suspected dump site for used perchloroethylene, a solvent used in drycleaning. The hole was located in the northwest corner of AUR's building on 21 North Parramore Avenue. ESE collected soil samples and screened the samples for the presence of organic vapors, and also installed a temporary monitor well and collected a groundwater sample. ESE's analytical results verified that "both the soil and groundwater had been affected by a release of chlorinated solvents . . ." In June 1993, ESE performed an additional site assessment with respect to the contamination beneath AUR's building at 21 North Parramore Avenue. On July 28, 1993, ESE provided AUR with a letter that described its findings concerning the suspected contamination. The July 1993 ESE site Assessment Report includes a site plan (Figure 1) which depicts the installation of a temporary well in the northwest corner of the AUR building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. This temporary monitor well was installed in the vicinity of the hole in the concrete slab. At the time the site assessment was performed by ESE, the northwest corner of the building was still owned by AUR. This monitor well was located in the same part of the building that AUR would later transfer to Petitioner. The additional site assessment performed by ESE confirmed the presence of perchloroethylene contamination. In April 1994, HSA, Inc., was contracted to provide AUR with a Preliminary Contamination Investigation with regard to the perchloroethylene contamination at AUR's building on 21 North Parramore Avenue. At the time the investigation was performed by HSA, the northwest corner of the building was still owned by AUR. A summary of the investigation's findings provided that soil and groundwater contamination issues apparently resulted from the disposal of purgeable hydrocarbons. Disposal was likely through one of two holes in the concrete slab within the cleaning facility. These site investigations corroborate that there is perchloroethylene contamination, and that it originates under two holes in the concrete slab in the northwest corner of the building located at 21 North Parramore Avenue. The perchloroethylene contamination meets the definition of "drycleaning solvents" per Subsection 376.301(9), Florida Statutes (1995). This statute provides that the definition of "drycleaning solvents" only includes " . . . those drycleaning solvents originating from use at a drycleaning facility . . ." Id. Respondent denied the application for eligibility in the DSCP because Petitioner's predecessor-in-title, AUR, operated a uniform rental company on the real property that is the subject-matter of this proceeding. Effective October 1, 1995, the term "drycleaning facility," as defined in Subsection 376.301(8), Florida Statutes, was amended to exclude uniform rental companies from eligibility to participate in the DSCP. At the time the amendment to Subsection 376.301(8), Florida Statutes, became effective, AUR was operating a uniform rental company in the buildings located at 21 North Parramore Avenue and 35 North Parramore Avenue. AUR continues to operate a uniform rental company in the building locates at 21 North Parramore Ave and 35 North Parramore Avenue.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore, RECOMMENDED that the Secretary declare Petitioner not eligible to participate in the Drycleaning Solvent Cleanup Program, and its application should be denied. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of May, 2001, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of May, 2001. COPIES FURNISHED: William H. Haak, Esquire Lowndes, Drosdick, Doster, Kantor & Reed, P.A. 215 North Eola Drive Post Office Box 2809 Orlando, Florida 32802 Jason Hand, Esquire Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Kathy C. Carter, Agency Clerk Department of Environmental Protection Office of General Counsel 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000 Teri L. Donaldson, General Counsel Department of Environmental Protection 3900 Commonwealth Boulevard Mail Station 35 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3000
Findings Of Fact Heede is in the business of leasing tower cranes as a distributor for Linden Tower Crane Company. It has been in this business for many years. In the early 1980's, Heede began subcontracting for the transportation, erection, and dismantling of the cranes it leased. Linden tower cranes are the "climbing cranes" found on all modern high- rise construction sites. They are initially installed by being mounted on a concrete pad and attached by bolts. During construction the crane is frequently "climbed" as the building construction goes up. The cranes are used for many functions as part of the construction process, including placing concrete forms and pouring cement. The crane does not become a permanent part of the building, but is dismantled and removed after construction, leaving the concrete pad and bolts at the site. It does not become a part of the building as tangible personal property affixed to or incorporated into the real property. These cranes are like other forms of construction equipment utilized in the erection of high-rise buildings. At issue here are seven Equipment Rental Agreements for separate jobs (Respondent's Exhibit 1) and seven corresponding sets of invoices relating to the freight-in (transportation from Heede's equipment yard), erection, dismantling, and freight-out (Respondent's Exhibit 2). Both parties relied on a summary of those invoices and charges, which is set forth below for ease of reference. NOTE: The chart attachment is in an unscanable format and therefore not shown in paragraph 5. of this Recommended Order. It is available for review from the Division's Clerk's Office. The audit period began after the first construction job, number 3050, had commenced so that only the dismantling and freight-out charges were covered by the audit. Similarly, the audit ended before the final two jobs were completed, job numbers 3090 and 3099. Therefore only the freight-in and erection portion of those invoices were subject to this audit. The parties filed a Joint Stipulation as to Amount in Controversy and therein stipulated that the amount in controversy is: Tax $12,071.77 Penalty $ 3,015.01 Interest through 5/20/91 $ 5,762.65 TOTAL $20,849.43 Daily interest continues to accrue at $3.97 per day. This Joint Stipulation was signed by the Department of Revenue and expressed in writing what the parties had agreed on throughout the proceedings, namely that the freight charges were not subject to tax based on the holding in Florida Hi-Lift v. Department of Revenue, 571 So.2d 1364 (1st DCA 1990). However, as will be discussed further in the Conclusions of Law supra, the Department, for the first time in its Memorandum of Law in Support of Respondent's Proposed Recommended Order, now seeks to be relieved from its stipulations and to include the freight charges in calculation of the tax due. The seven Equipment Rental Agreements are essentially similar in form. Attached to each is a separate typed sheet identified at the top as "Equipment Rental Agreement Continued" and also as "Additional Agreement Continued." With the exception of job number 3090, each of the printed forms provides on its face: Said equipment shall be shipped to Lessee at , on or about the day of , 19 , freight or delivery charges Collect from Port of Entry or from see additional agreement [or see attachment]. On the second page of the Equipment Rental Agreement, entitled Conditions of Lease, paragraph 13 provides: 13. TRANSPORTATION--The Lessor shall at its own expense load the equipment for transit to the Lessee and unload it upon its return. The Lessee shall at its own expense do all other loading, unloading, installing, dismantling and hauling and shall pay all transportation charges from and to Lessor's shipping and receiving points; provided, however, unless otherwise agreed, that the Lessee shall not pay return transportation charges greater than those necessary to return the equipment to the point from which it was originally shipped to the Lessee. The "Additional Agreement Continued" attached to each Equipment Rental Agreement essentially contains the following additional paragraphs: Lessor will freight to and from the project, erect, climb, dismantle, and remove the crane from the project. Tower crane operator to be furnished by lessee during erection, climbing, and dismantling. We hereby propose to furnish labor and material complete in accordance with the above agreement for the sum of [sum inserted]. Ira Schmidt, the Comptroller and Secretary/Treasurer and a shareholder of Heede, explained how the books and records of Heede are maintained and what is intended by the Additional Agreement. His testimony was uncontroverted and is accepted as fact. According to Schmidt, Heede leases the tower crane under a separate rental agreement which requires the lessee to transport, erect and dismantle and return the crane to Heede's yard. Numerous parties can bid for the performance of the transportation, erection, dismantling and freight-out at the time the crane is leased. Heede is one of those bidders. Heede generally gets the subcontract for the transportation, erection, dismantling, and freight- out because it has a trained crew that can perform the work less expensively on the Linden cranes. The cranes are loaded onto the convoy of trucks at Heede's yard by Heede personnel as part of the Rental Agreement. If Heede is the successful bidder for the subcontract, it pays the carrier for transportation to the job site and its crew travels by separate transportation to the site, arranging to meet the truck convoy on arrival. Arrangements are made to lease a truck crane from another subcontractor who provides an operator. With the use of the truck crane, Heede's crew then proceeds to erect and test the tower crane. After instructing the contractor's crane operator, the equipment is turned over to the contractor. After the job is completed, the Heede crew, again with the assistance of the subleased truck crane, dismantles and loads the tower crane equipment on a truck convoy to be returned to Heede's yard in Charlotte, North Carolina. On arrival, Heede personnel unload the truck convoy. The freight-in and freight-out costs in all seven of the transactions are F.O.B. Heede's yard, but all such freight charges on these particular rentals are paid by Heede as part of the Additional Agreement subcontract total charge. These freight charges are reflected by separate bills and invoices as shown in the sets of invoices found in Respondent's Exhibit 2. Heede has rented cranes to contractors who have subcontracted with others for the transportation, erection, dismantling, and freight-out. Heede has also bid on and been awarded the subcontract to transport, erect, dismantle and freight-out cranes that were not leased to the contractor by Heede. Job number 3090 is somewhat different in the handling of the transportation portion of the Rental Agreement and Additional Agreement. The lessee in job 3090 and job 3075 was the same. Job 3075 involved the lease of the tower crane at the Caribbean Condominiums in Daytona Beach, Florida, until October, 1987. Job 3090 involved the lease of the tower crane at the Ashley Condominiums in Daytona Beach, Florida, beginning in November, 1987. Because the lessee and the specific tower crane were the same, it would have been ridiculous to transport the crane to Heede's yard in North Carolina and then transport it back to Daytona Beach. The lessee deleted the transportation provisions in the Rental Agreement for job 3090 and entered into a subcontract with Heede for the transportation and erection of the crane at the new site. The transportation charges were then divided between the two jobs as shown in the separate invoices for these two jobs. The transportation charges for job 3090 are included in the parties stipulation as to the amount in controversy because of the deletion of the transportation provisions in that Rental Agreement and because the crane was not F.O.B. Heede's yard. The $675.00 freight charge for job 3090 is included in the tax assessment which the Department seeks and in the stipulated amount in controversy. The stipulated tax amount in controversy represents the tax allegedly due on the freight charge for job 3090 and for the erection and dismantling charges arising from the subcontracts, which includes the costs actually incurred by Heede (trucking and truck crane and operator) and the charges for labor, hotel, food, gas, truck expenses, insurance, and estimated profit.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Revenue enter a Final Order and therein reverse and deny the assessment, penalties and interest, against Heede Southeast, Inc., for the transportation, erection and dismantling services which were not a taxable part of the rental transaction. RECOMMENDED this 4th day of October, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of October, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 89-4627 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Heede Southeast, Inc. Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(7); 3(5); 4(6); 7(9&10); 8(12); 9(16); 10(13&14); 11&12(2); 13(15); and 15(2). Proposed findings of fact 2, 5, 6, and 14 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Respondent, Department of Revenue Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: (1) and 5(9). Pproposed findings of fact 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 12, and 13 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. Proposed findings of fact 8 and 11 are irrelevant. Proposed findings of fact 4 and 9 are unsupported by the credible, competent and substantial evidence. COPIES FURNISHED: J. Thomas Herndon Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Vicki Weber General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, FL 32399-0100 Bengamin K. Phipps Attorney at Law 802 First Florida Bank Tower Tallahassee, FL 32301 Lealand L. McCharen Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs Tax Section, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
The Issue Whether Respondent, Royal Arms Villas Condominium, Inc., discriminated against Petitioners, Eric and Nora Gross, in violation of the Florida Fair Housing Act.
Findings Of Fact Petitioners are a married couple, living in a rental home at 209 Yorkshire Court, Naples, Florida (rental unit). Petitioners have two children and two grandchildren; however, none of these relatives live in Petitioners’ rental unit. Mr. Gross was diagnosed with stage four hodgkin’s lymphoma in 2002. Mr. Gross has been in remission since 2003. Mr. Gross was declared disabled by the Social Security Administration in 2003. Petitioners have lived in this rental unit since August 2006. A Florida residential lease agreement with the property owners, Joan and Charles Forton, was entered on August 8, 2006.3/ This lease was for a 12-month period, from September 1, 2006, through August 31, 2007. At the end of this period, the lease became a month-to-month lease and continued for years without anyone commenting on it. In 2012, Respondent inquired about a dog that was seen with Petitioners. After providing supporting documentation to Respondent, Petitioners were allowed to keep Mr. Gross’ service dog, Evie. Respondent is a Florida not-for-profit corporation. There are 62 units, and the owner of each unit owns a 1/62 individual share in the common elements. Since its inception, Respondent has, through its members (property owners), approved its articles of incorporation, bylaws, and related condominium powers, and amended its declaration of condominium in accordance with Florida law. Ms. Orrino is currently vice-president of Respondent’s Board of Directors (Board). Ms. Orrino has been on the Board since 2009 and has served in every executive position, including Board president. Ms. Orrino owns two condominiums within Respondent’s domain, but does not reside in either. In 2012 or 2013, Respondent experienced a severe financial crisis, and a new property management company was engaged. This company brought to the attention of Respondent’s Board that it had not been approving leases as required by its Declaration of Condominium.4/ As a result of this information, the Board became more pro-active in its responsibilities, and required all renters to submit a lease each year for the Board’s approval. Petitioners felt they were being singled out by Respondent to provide a new lease. The timing of Respondent’s request made it appear as if Respondent was unhappy about Petitioners keeping Evie. Petitioners then filed a grievance with HUD.5/ HUD enlisted the Commission to handle the grievance, and Mr. Burkes served as the Commission’s facilitator between Petitioners and Respondent. On October 24, 2013, Petitioners executed a Conciliation Agreement (Agreement) with Respondent and the Commission. The terms of the Agreement include: NOW, THEREFORE, it is mutually agreed between the parties as follows: Respondent agrees: To grant Complainants’ request for a reasonable accommodation to keep Eric Gross’s emotional support/service dog (known as “Evie”) in the condominium unit even though it exceeds the height and weight limits for dogs in the community. That their sole remedy for Complainants’ breach of the provisions contained in subparagraphs (a) through (g) below, in addition to the attorney’s fees and costs provision of paragraph 10 of this Agreement, shall be the removal of the Complainants’ dog. Complainants agree: That they will not permit the dog to be on common areas of the association property, except to transport the dog into or out of Complainants’ vehicle, to and from Complainants’ unit, and to take the dog through the backyard of the unit to walk it across the street off association property. That if the dog is outside of the condominium unit, they will at all times keep the dog on a leash and will at all times maintain control of the dog. That if their dog accidentally defecates on association property, they will immediately collect and dispose of the waste. That they are personally responsible and liable for any accidents or damages/injuries done by the dog and that they will indemnify and hold the Respondent harmless and defend Respondent for such claims that may or may not arise against Respondent. That they will not allow the dog to be a nuisance in the community or disrupt the peaceful enjoyment of other residents. A nuisance will specifically include, but is not limited to, loud barking and any show of aggressive behavior, including, but not limited to, aggressive barking, growling or showing of teeth regardless of whether the dog is inside or outside of the unit. That they will abide by all community rules and regulations of Respondent with which all residents are required to comply, including but not limited to submitting to the required pre-lease/lease renewal interview, and completing a lease renewal application and providing his updated information to Respondents and submitting to Respondent a newly executed lease compliant with Florida law and the Declaration of Condominium. The pre-lease/lease renewal interview will be conducted at Complainants’ unit at a time and date agreeable to the parties but not to exceed 30 days from the date of this agreement. If Complainants’ current dog “Evie” should die or otherwise cease to reside in the unit, Complainants agree to replace the dog, if at all, with a dog that is in full compliance with the association’s Declaration of Condominium or Rules and regulations in force at that time and will allow the dog to be inspected by Respondent for approval. Respondent agrees to ensure, to the best of their abilities, that their policies, performance and conduct shall continue to demonstrate a firm commitment to the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, as amended, Sections 760.20-37, Florida Statutes, (2012), and the Civil Rights Act of the United States (42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982 and 3601 et.seq). [sic] Respondent agrees that it, its Board members, employees, agents and representatives shall continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which provides that Respondents shall not make, print or publish any notice, statement of advertisement with respect to the rental or sale of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation or discrimination based on race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondent also agrees to continue to comply with Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, as amended by The Fair Housing Act, which prohibits Respondents from maintaining, implementing and effectuating, directly or indirectly, any policy or practice, which causes any discrimination or restriction on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability or familial status. Respondents also agree to continue to comply with Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute a judgment on the part of the Commission that Respondents did nor did not violate the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, Section 760.20-37, Florida Statutes (2011). The Commission does not waive its rights to process any additional complaints against the Respondent, including a complaint filed by a member of the Commission. It is understood that this Agreement does not constitute an admission on the part of the Respondent that they violated the Fair Housing Act of 1983, as amended, or Section 504 of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act. Complainants agree to waive and release and do hereby waive and release Respondent from any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Respondent, with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in this complaint under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Respondent’s performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The Commission agrees that it will cease processing the above-mentioned Complaint filed by Complainants and shall dismiss with prejudice said complaint based upon the terms of this Agreement. Respondent agrees to waive and release any and all claims, including claims for court costs and attorney fees, against Complainants with respect to any matters which were or might have been alleged in the complaint filed with the Commission or with the United States Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and agree not to institute a lawsuit based on the issues alleged in these complaints under any applicable ordinance or statute in any court of appropriate jurisdiction as of the date of this Agreement. Said waiver and release are subject to Complainants’ performance of the premises and representations contained herein. The parties agree in any action to interpret or enforce this agreement the prevailing party is entitled to the recovery from the non-prevailing party its reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, including attorney’s fees and costs of any appeal. FURTHER, the Parties hereby agree that: This Agreement may be used as evidence in any judicial, administrative or other forum in which any of the parties allege a breach of this Agreement. Execution of this Agreement may be via facsimile, scanned copy (emailed), or copies reproduced and shall be treated as an original. This Conciliation Agreement may be executed in counterparts. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have caused this Conciliation Agreement to be duly executed on the last applicable date, the term of the agreement being from the last applicable date below for so long as any of the rights or obligations described here in continue to exist. Eric Gross and Nora Gross signed the Agreement on October 24, 2013. Ms. Orrino, as President of Respondent, signed the Agreement on September 9. The Commission’s facilitator, Mr. Burkes, signed the Agreement on October 24. The Commission’s housing manager, Regina Owens, signed the Agreement on October 30, and its executive director, Michelle Wilson, signed the Agreement on November 4. The effective date of the Agreement is November 4, the last day it was signed by a party, and the clock started running for compliance. Petitioners failed to abide by the Agreement in the following ways: Petitioners failed to submit an updated lease agreement that conformed to Respondent’s rules and regulations. Petitioners failed to submit to the required pre- lease/lease renewal interview within 30 days of signing the Agreement. Petitioners failed to complete a lease renewal application. Petitioners failed to provide updated information to Respondent. It is abundantly clear that Eric Gross and Ms. Orrino do not get along. However, that personal interaction does not excuse non-compliance with an Agreement that the parties voluntarily entered. Each party to the Agreement had obligations to perform. Respondent attempted to assist Petitioners with their compliance by extending the time in which to comply, and at one point, waving the interview requirement. Petitioners simply failed to comply with the Agreement. Petitioners failed to present any credible evidence that other residents in the community were treated differently. Mr. Gross insisted that the Agreement had sections that Petitioners did not agree to. Mr. Burkes was unable to shed any light on the Agreement or the alleged improprieties that Mr. Gross so adamantly insisted were present.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Florida Commission on Human Relations dismissing the Petition for Relief filed by Petitioners in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of March, 2015, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LYNNE A. QUIMBY-PENNOCK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of March, 2015.