The Issue The issue in this case is whether the subject plan amendment, which changes the future land use designations of parcels owned by each of the Petitioners, is not in compliance for the reasons set forth in the petitions.
Findings Of Fact The Parties Each Petitioner submitted oral or written objections during the review and adoption proceedings culminating in the adoption of the plan amendment at issue. Petitioner Wilson owns about 2.5 acres on the north 1/ side of State Route 524 and east side of Westminster Drive. The Wilson parcel, which is vacant, contains about 300 feet of frontage on State Route 524 and about 250 feet on Westminster Drive. Petitioner Tompkins owns about 3.5 acres on the north side of State Route 524 and west side of Westminster Drive. The Tompkins parcel, which is vacant, contains about 600 feet of frontage on State Route 524 and about 250 feet on Westminster Drive. The Wilson and Tompkins parcels lie between State Route 524 and Cocoa North, which is a large residential subdivision. The existing land uses near the area, which is a growth center in Cocoa, are largely low density residential, and there remains considerable vacant land. There are no commercial uses within the Cocoa North subdivision. The only access to Cocoa North is by way of State Route 524, using Westminster Drive or one of two other roads. The nearest convenience store is about two-thirds of a mile east of Westminster Drive on State Route 524. An I-95 interchange lies about 1.8 miles to the west of Westminster Drive on State Route 524. The nearest property to the west designated Commercial is at the northwest corner of the Tenzel property, which is discussed below. The Commercial parcel on the Tenzel property is about one and one-quarter miles from Westminster Drive. Petitioner Messiah Church owns about 2.3 acres on the east side of U.S. Route 1 about 300 feet north of Michigan Avenue. Petitioner Fountain owns about 0.72 acre on the east side of U.S. 1 about 1200 feet north of the Messiah Church's property. The Messiah Church parcel contains a church. The Fountain parcel is vacant. The Messiah Church and Fountain parcels lie between U.S. Route 1 and a wide strip of existing low density residential uses bordered on the east by the Indian River. The narrower strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels is located in an underutilized area characterized by a mix of existing commercial uses. For example, a flea market occupies the west side of U.S. Route 1 across from the Messiah Church parcel. Respondent Department of Community Affairs (DCA) is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility of reviewing plans under Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Respondent the City of Cocoa (Cocoa) is a local government required to adopt a revised comprehensive plan under Sections 163.3164(12) and 163.3167, Florida Statutes. History of Cocoa Comprehensive Plan Cocoa adopted its comprehensive plan and transmitted it to DCA on October 4, 1988. DCA issued a notice of intent to find the plan in compliance. A petition was filed challenging the determination of compliance and requesting a hearing under Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes. Following an administrative hearing, an order recommended that DCA forward the case to the Administration Commission for entry of a final order determining the plan not to be in compliance. The parties then negotiated a settlement agreement. Pursuant to the agreement, the Administration Commission entered a final order and later an amended final order determining the plan not to be in compliance and identifying the remedial amendments necessary to attain compliance. The designations challenged by Petitioners are part of a set of plan amendments consisting of the remedial amendments ordered by the Administration Commission, amendments required to settle a federal court action in which Cocoa was a defendant, and amendments having nothing to do with either legal proceeding. The challenged designations fall in the last category. The Future Land Use Map (FLUM) in the original plan adopted in 1988 designated as Commercial a strip of land containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels. The entire strip runs 2700 feet along State Route 524, which is a two lane undivided minor arterial, and extends about 250 feet deep. The Wilson and Tompkins parcels constitute about 40% of the strip and are located at its extreme western end. State Route 524 operates at a level of service C and is projected to remain at this level of service though 1997. The FLUM designated as High Density Residential a strip of land containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels. The entire strip, which is generally quite shallow, runs about 3400 feet along U.S. Route 1, which is a four lane divided principal arterial. The Messiah Church and Fountain parcels constitute about 20% of the strip and are located in its northern half. U.S. Route 1 is operating at level of service D and is projected to be operating at level of service E by 1992 and level of service F by 1997. Transmittal and Adoption Process On October 30, 1989, the Planning and Zoning Board, which acts as the local land planning agency (LPA), conducted a public meeting at which it discussed at length new public participation procedures that it was considering adopting. Specific provisions were prepared following the meeting, circulated at the next LPA meeting on November 13, discussed, revised somewhat, and finally adopted. On November 21, 1989, the LPA met to discuss remedial amendments necessary to comply with the requirements of the Amended Final Order of the Administration Commission. Pursuant to a contract with Cocoa, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council (Regional Planning Council) had prepared a draft set of amendments for review by the LPA. At the beginning of the November 21 meeting, the city attorney stated that the purpose of the meeting was to obtain information and comments from the public. He explained that he and city staff recommended that the LPA defer any formal action on the proposed amendments until their next scheduled meeting on November 27. A representative of the Regional Planning Council was in attendance to assist in the discussion. The proposed amendments drafted by the Regional Planning Council did not change the designations of the parcels owned by any of the Petitioners. In fact, according to the minutes, none of the four parcels nor either of the two strips containing the parcels was even mentioned at the November 21 meeting. Following a very short meeting on November 27 to discuss remedial amendments, the LPA next met on November 30. By this time, the Regional Planning Council had prepared a "final draft" of proposed remedial amendments. Following discussion, the LPA voted to recommend the proposed amendments to City Council. Toward the end of the meeting, the Vice Chairman moved that the strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels be designated Low Density Residential. The motion passed. At a regular meeting on November 28, the City Council adopted Resolution 89-37, which provides for public participation procedures in connection with the comprehensive planning process. The ordinance calls for advertising of transmittal and adoption hearings in accordance with applicable law, the encouragement of oral or written public comment, and responses from the City Council or its designee. At a special meeting on December 5, the City Council considered the proposed amendments that had been recommended by the LPA. At this meeting, the City Council voted to change the designations for both strips, including all of Petitioners' parcels to Low Density Residential. The vote on the strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels was unanimous. The vote on the strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels was four to one. Neither DCA nor Cocoa staff originally suggested the new designations for Petitioners' parcels. The new designations were not prompted by any changes to the original data and analysis. It does not appear that the Regional Planning Council, which also assisted in the preparation of the original plan, proposed that the parcels originally be designated Commercial, but it does not appear that the Regional Planning Council made the suggestion for a change in designation. At a special meeting on December 11, the City Council considered the proposed amendments, including the new designations for Petitioners' parcels, as well as the amendments to settle the pending state and federal litigation. No one appeared on behalf of any of the Petitioners to object to the proposed designations. However, in response to the objections of an owner of other property on the south side of State Route 524, whose property was also proposed for redesignation as Low Density Residential, representatives of Cocoa explained that the redesignation on both sides of State Route 524 was based on Cocoa's recent experience with DCA on unrelated plan amendments involving what is known as the Tenzel property. The city attorney indicated that staff was concerned that the objections lodged by DCA to the plan amendments involving the Tenzel property, which Cocoa was at the same time annexing, could possibly be made against the Commercial designation along both sides of State Route 524. The city manager also mentioned his concern that the plan be internally consistent. The Tenzel property consists of 157 acres on the south side of State Route 524 about one mile west of Westminster Drive. Cocoa transmitted the proposed Tenzel amendments to DCA on March 13, 1989. The proposed amendments designated 60 acres, including its entire State Route 524 frontage, Commercial and the remainder Industrial. Cocoa was planning to annex the Tenzel property, which was at the time of the transmittal in unincorporated Brevard County. In its Objections, Recommendations, and Comments (ORC) dated July 6, 1989, DCA objected that, among other things, the proposed designation was inconsistent with Future Land Use Element (FLUE) Policy 1.2, which is to discourage new linear commercial development. Instead, DCA recommended that new commercial uses should be clustered. DCA also complained that the designation was not supported by data and analysis and the portion of the FLUM covering the Tenzel property did not depict natural resources. On September 6, 1989, Cocoa annexed the Tenzel property and amended its plan. The adopted plan amendments designated only 10 acres Commercial and the remaining 147 acres Residential. 2/ The property designated Commercial was limited to only about half of the available frontage and was restricted to the northwest corner, which is farthest from the Tompkins and Wilson parcels and closest to the I-95 interchange at State Route 524 to the west. The adoption package contained considerable data and analysis concerning the newly annexed property. DCA issued its notice of intent to find the plan amendment in compliance on October 25, 1989. Notwithstanding the Tenzel-related concerns expressed at the December 11 hearing of the City Council, an owner of about 2.5 acres of land on Westminster Drive near State Route 524 objected to the redesignation of his land from Commercial to Low Density Residential. He argued that the land was unsuitable for residential uses due to traffic and other factors. In response, the city manager stressed the possibility of conflict with the plan if strip commercial were "proposed." 3/ With one member changing his vote as to the strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, the City Council voted three to two to transmit to DCA the proposed amendments, including the new Low Density Residential designations for the two strips containing the four parcels of Petitioners. The sole issue concerning the advertisements for the transmittal hearings of December 5 and 11 is their failure to identify the Wilson and Tompkins parcels as the subject of proposed land use changes. The advertisement for the December 11 hearing states in bold, capital letters at the top: "Notice of Change of Land Use and Comprehensive Plan." Following a brief paragraph announcing the time and place, the first item to be discussed is: "Proposal to change the use of land within the areas shown on the map below." Immediately below this sentence is a map of the entire city. Beside the map in one block is the statement: "Landuse changes to the future landuse map." A second block below the first states: "Black shaded areas to low density residential." The shading covers the High Density Residential strip including the parcels owned by the Messiah Church and Fountain, but omits the Commercial strip including the parcels owned by Wilson and Tompkins. The map for the December 11 hearing was published on December 4. The change of designation for the Wilson and Tompkins parcels was first proposed at the City Council hearing the following day. By letter dated March 22, 1990, DCA transmitted its ORC on the proposed plan amendments. The ORC informed Cocoa that DCA had no objections, recommendations, or comments on the transmitted amendments. Following receipt of the ORC, the LPA met on May 2, 1990, to review staff's response. During the meeting, the LPA discussed the Wilson parcel with her attorney, who objected that the Commercial designation would render the property useless due to its shallow depth. The attorney pointed out that a residential designation was impractical at that location; to the east, on the north side of State Road 524, townhouses had remained unsold for a long time. A motion not to change the Commercial designation on the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, while changing the designation for the rest of the strip to Low Density Residential, was seconded and discussed. It failed by a vote of four to three. At this point, the city attorney suggested that condominiums already in the area would be incompatible with Low Density Residential. The discussion acknowledged the protests of surrounding homeowners to the Commercial designation. A motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip north of State Route 524 as High Density Residential failed by a four to three vote. This vote was immediately followed by a motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip north of State Route 524 as Medium Density Residential. This motion passed by a five to two vote. The same attorney also represented the Messiah Church at the LPA meeting. He stated that the church intended to sell the property and the new designation was disadvantageous to a sale. In the ensuing discussion, it was noted that central sewer had yet to reach this site. A motion, seconded, was made to designate the Messiah Church parcel High Density Residential. The motion failed by a five to two vote. A motion, seconded, to designate the entire strip along the east side of U.S. Route 1 Low Density Residential passed unanimously. At the conclusion of the meeting, the LPA voted to adopt the amendments, subject to changes made at the meeting, and send the package to the City Council. The City Council meeting of May 8 was announced by a large display newspaper advertisement, which was published on April 27. The advertisement contained a map shaded to indicate that the designation of the two strips in question was proposed to be changed to Low Density Residential. During the meeting, the city attorney discussed the redesignation of the strip along State Route 524 from Low Density Residential, as it was shown in the transmittal amendments, to Medium Density Residential, as had been recommended by the LPA at its May 2 meeting. An attorney representing Wilson and Tompkins argued in favor of the Commercial designation given the property in the original plan. The city manager responded that the property was reexamined as a result of Cocoa's recent experience with DCA on the Tenzel plan amendments. Trying to avoid the appearance of strip commercial zoning, staff favored the proposed recommendation. The city attorney likewise warned the City Council to consider as a matter of policy the concern of DCA to avoid urban sprawl and strip commercialism. Nearby residents were almost uniformly in favor of a residential designation. Wilson complained that she purchased the property after being told by Cocoa that she could use it for commercial purposes. She also argued that 15 units per acre would allow 30 homes, which would add to the congestion in the area. After everyone had a chance to speak, a motion, seconded, called for designating the Wilson and Tompkins parcels as Commercial with the remainder of the strip designated Medium Density Residential. The motion failed three votes to two. A motion, seconded, to accept the recommendation of the LPA passed three to two. After other parcels were discussed, the city attorney raised the redesignation as Low Density Residential of the High Density Residential strip along the east side of U.S. Route 1. The attorney representing Messiah Church asked that the City Council consider the church property separately because it was for sale and worth more in its present designation as High Density Residential. He argued that buffering provisions of the plan would be violated by a Low Density Residential designation. Concerning his property, Fountain agreed with the attorney's reasoning and informed the City Council that no home had been built along U. S. Route 1 from Sharpes to south Rockledge for over 30 years. Following discussion, during which the Mayor noted that the Regional Planning Council had recommended that the property be designated Low Density Residential, a motion, seconded, to leave the strip High Density Residential failed three votes to two. A motion, seconded, to approve the recommendation of the LPA passed by the same margin. At the conclusion of the meeting, the City Council approved on first reading the ordinance adopting the plan amendments. Following another display newspaper advertisement indicating proposed land use changes for the two strips, the City Council again met on May 22, 1990. A minister of the Messiah Church praised the City Council for its recent decisions and announced that the church had decided that to meet the needs of the community it would minister to persons whose needs were presently unmet, like transients, mentally retarded persons, handicapped persons, and residents of halfway houses. Church officials had decided that such a ministry could be carried out from the present location with the proposed designation, which nonetheless remained an example of bad planning in their opinion. Addressing the strip north of State Route 524, the attorney representing Wilson and Tompkins objected to the absence of representatives from the Regional Planning Council despite the fact that they had been responsible for drafting the plan amendments. The city attorney advised that the Regional Planning Council had originally recommended that these parcels be designated Low Density Residential, but the City Council, as it was then constituted, decided to change the designation to Commercial in the original plan. The city manager again justified the decision as to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels based on DCA's objections to the transmittal amendments for the Tenzel property. After discussion on the State Route 524 strip concluded, the attorney for Messiah Church objected to the proposed redesignation from High Density to Low Density Residential. Again protesting the absence of the Regional Planning Council planners, he asked for an explanation of this action. The city manager responded that staff's concerns involved compatibility with existing uses and recommendations of citizens in the area. The city attorney added that the central sewer lines ended south of the Messiah Church parcel. Various persons spoke on both sides of the issue. After discussion of other plan issues, the City Council adopted Ordinance 15-90, which includes the plan amendments that, among other things, redesignate the Commercial strip containing the Wilson and Tompkins parcels to Medium Density Residential and the High Density Residential strip containing the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels to Low Density Residential. The failure of the published map to depict the four parcels or the two strips undoubtedly accounts for the absence of the Petitioners from the second transmittal hearing. However, the arguments of similarly situated landowners were presented at the hearing. Moreover, five months passed between the transmittal and adoption hearings. Nothing in the record suggests than any Petitioner could have accomplished more in a few days before the second transmittal hearing that he, she, or it accomplished in the several months that passed before the adoption hearings. All Petitioners complain that the inadequacy of explanations received at the hearing for the redesignations deprived them of effective public participation. Generally, they received responses to their demands for explanations. Several reasons emerge from the record for the redesignation of Petitioners' parcels. As to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, Cocoa staff officials expressed concerned about the appearance of strip commercial designations. This explanation is difficult to justify objectively because the Commercial designations probably could not have been challenged by DCA in the subject plan amendments. DCA's objections to the transmittal plan amendments on the Tenzel property were not relevant to the Commercial designations given these four parcels, especially if taken in isolation from the strips of which they were a part. It is of course possible that, given Cocoa's recent experience in federal and state review of its land use planning efforts, beleaguered staff and local officials chose to exercise an abundance of caution. As to the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, Cocoa staff and officials expressed concern about the unavailability of central sewer. However, the concern, at least as voiced personally by the Mayor at the May 8 City Council hearing, was not so much for the protection of natural resources as for the protection of nearby homeowners from the expense of tying in to central sewer lines if they were extended through the High Density Residential strip. Transcript of May 8 hearing, pages 48-49. The Mayor's concern points to the most compelling explanation for the new designations for all four parcels. Each designation was driven by political pressure from residents, which, to some extent in this case at least, may be characterized in the more appealing terms of concerns about surrounding land use compatibility. The forces of neighborhood preservation confronted the forces of development and, in this encounter, the former prevailed by a bare majority of the City Council. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the above-described facts are not consistent with the applicable public participation criteria. Data and Analysis in Support of Designations Cocoa did not submit new data or analysis when it submitted the adopted plan amendments. However, data and analysis transmitted with the original plan, as well as the Tenzel amendments, bear on the new designations. More pertinent to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, the data and analysis note: Neighborhood commercial uses of low density and intensity should be located within neighborhoods or central to several residential clusters. Such a locational strategy would produce the beneficial effects of reducing the time and distance to neighborhood commercial, making trips quicker, easier, and more economical. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. At the same time, the data and analysis predict significant traffic impacts on State Route 524 as the impact of new residential developments is felt. Background Analysis, Traffic Circulation Element, page 2-16. On the other hand, another locational recommendation in the data and analysis is for the central business district, which is south of all four parcels, to serve as "the community focal point providing a mixture of retail and services." Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. Projecting a population increase of nearly 4000 persons from 1986 to 2000, the data and analysis report that there is generally enough land available for residential needs. Background Analysis, Housing Element, p. 3-15. The analysis concludes that County will need about 309 acres for residential development through 2000. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. Additional data and analysis accompanying the Tenzel plan amendments lower this amount to 130.6 acres, at least as to single family residential. Tenzel Data and Analysis, Part II. However, a corresponding increase in projected population probably should have accompanied the Tenzel plan amendments because they involved an annexation. Although the data and analysis provide little useful information concerning the amount of acreage designated, rather than zoned, residential, there is no evidence on which to base a conclusion that changing the designations of the State Route 524 strip from Commercial to Medium Density Residential and the U.S. Route 1 strip from High Density Residential to Low Density Residential defy the data and analysis regarding the need for residential land. The data and analysis project that 385 acres will need to be devoted to commercial uses by 2000. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-26. In 1987, about 276 acres were in commercial use. Table 1-2, Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-6. Although the data and analysis do not indicate the number of vacant or developed acres designated Commercial under the plan, Tables 1-3 and 1-4 indicate that about 800 acres are zoned commercial. Background Analysis, FLUE, page 1-7 and 1-11. The acreage zoned commercial and acreage designated Commercial are probably about the same. Table 1-4 indicates that 170 acres zoned commercial are vacant and suitable for development. If Cocoa requires another 100+ acres for commercial uses in addition to the 276 acres already in commercial use, the designation of 800+ acres as Commercial is ample to meet this need. Thus, the removal of a Commercial designation from the 15-acre strip, of which the Wilson and Tompkins parcels are a part, does not defy the data and analysis. The fairest conclusion that can be drawn from the data and analysis is that Cocoa suffers no deficiency, in terms of projected needs in the year 2000, in land designated Commercial or in either of the relevant residential categories. Pertinent to the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, the data and analysis indicate that the City's wastewater treatment facility was to be expanded in November, 1988. Background Analysis, Capital Improvements Element, page 9-11. The project was completed, and the wastewater facility has a considerable reserve capacity. Presently, the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, and the surrounding area, are served by septic tanks. The data and analysis indicate, however, that the City is committed to a program of gradually extending central sewer services to areas within the city not currently served. Background Analysis, Wastewater Element, page 3-5. More recently, the Tenzel analysis states: "A policy of phasing out septic tanks has been in place in order to protect the environment." Tenzel data and analysis, Section IV, Wastewater. A rough estimate of the cost to extend sewer lines the necessary one- quarter mile to the area of the Messiah Church parcel is $500,000. Although it might be more feasible for the developer of a High Density Residential project to provide the funds to extend sewer lines, the feasibility is not clear given a project on a 2.3 acre parcel in an underutilized part of town. In any event, Cocoa has demonstrated a commitment to expanding the central sewer system, require connections, and finance the expansion by special assessments. The data and analysis would support either designation. The evidence thus does not establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not supported by the data and analysis. Consistency of Designations with Criteria of Land Use Suitability Analysis, Encouraging Redevelopment of Blighted Areas, and Discouraging Urban Sprawl For the four parcels, the land use suitability analysis accompanying the original plan supports the designations adopted in the plan amendments. This issue has been considered above with respect to the issue involving supporting data and analysis. Given the changes in designations from Commercial and High Density Residential to Medium and Low Density Residential, respectively, no additional land use analysis was required for the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law corresponding to the preceding section. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not supported by a land use suitability analysis. For the reasons set forth in the Conclusions of Law corresponding to this section, no findings are necessary to address the issue of the consistency of the plan amendment with the criteria of Chapter 163, Part II, and Chapter 9J- 5 concerning redevelopment of blighted areas and urban sprawl. Findings concerning urban sprawl in the context of internal consistency are in the following section. Although not alleged as a basis for a finding of internal inconsistency, the issue of redevelopment of blighted areas has been considered in the following section as well, for the reasons set forth in the corresponding Conclusions of Law. Consistency of Designations with Plan Provisions Encouraging Redevelopment of Blighted Areas and Discouraging Urban Sprawl FLUE Objective 1.1 is to adopt land development regulations to "discourage the proliferation of urban sprawl." Goal 1 of the Public Facilities Element is to provide public facilities in a manner that "protects investments in existing facilities and promotes orderly, compact urban growth, and discourages urban sprawl." Similarly, Public Facilities Element Objective 4.1.2 is to coordinate the provision of public facilities with the FLUE "to discourage urban sprawl and maximize the use of existing facilities." Other provisions relied upon by Petitioners to show internal inconsistency are Public Facilities Objective 4.2.5 and FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Residential Areas--General Paragraphs 1-2 and 5-6. Public Facilities Objective 4.2.5 is to adopt land development regulations that prohibit the installation of additional septic tanks within the incorporated city limits will be discouraged except when it is determined that the use of a septic tank system is the most efficient, cost effective and environmentally compatible alternative. [sic] FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Residential Areas--General Paragraphs 1-2 and 5-6 provide that land development regulations shall be based upon the following locational criteria: Provisions of new residential uses shall be adequately balanced with the availability of residential support services including community facilities, shopping, schools, parks and open space, and transportation services. The City will encourage infill development in areas of existing viable housing, provide for redevelopment in blighted areas or areas in transition, and encourage new housing development in appropriate areas where community services exist or are programmed to occur. Residential areas shall be buffered from major transportation arteries and from incompatible non-residential uses. Residential areas should be served by sidewalks and, where practical, bikeways with convenient access to recreation, shopping, and schools. FLUE Policy 1.1.2 Commercial Areas Paragraph 2 4/ provides: New commercial uses shall be discouraged from linear commercial development and shall be encouraged to develop in clusters, with coordinated parking facilities, and with frontage roads where practical. Resulting in most cases from ineffective or no land use planning, urban sprawl is the extension of urban-type development into rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed lands in a haphazard development pattern in which land uses are not functionally related to each other. Common patterns of the premature land development characteristic of urban sprawl are the ribbon pattern, leapfrog pattern, and concentric circle pattern. In the ribbon pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area extends in ribbons or strips along certain roads and away from urban development. In the leapfrog pattern, development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area leaps from urban development so as to leave significant amounts of rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed land between the existing urban development and the scattered leapfrog development. The concentric circle pattern is similar except that the development not functionally or proximately related to other non-urban development in the area assumes the pattern of concentric circles, such as along rural roads bypassing an urban area, and is characteristically more exclusively low-density residential. Urban sprawl typically interferes with one or more of four general objectives of effective land use planning: 1) promotion of the efficient use of land in the development of new, and maintenance of existing, viable mixed-use communities; 2) protection of natural resources in rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed areas; 3) protection of agricultural lands and uses in rural, agricultural, or other undeveloped or sparsely developed areas; and 4) promotion of the efficient provision to both urban and non-urban areas of public facilities and services, such as water, sewer, roads, schools, police, fire, drainage, and other infrastructure, whether provided by public or private entities. The long strip of Commercial along State Route 524 suggests the presence of commercial sprawl along a thoroughfare. By removing the Commercial designation, Cocoa eliminates this type of sprawl. On the other hand, with respect to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, Cocoa North resembles another example of sprawl. The introduction of compatible neighborhood commercial uses would tend to mix the uses with an immediate impact of relieving some traffic on State Route 524, as residents could make small purchases at, say, a convenience store located at State Route 524 and Westminster Drive. However, the solution adopted by Cocoa for the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, although possibly not the only one available under the circumstances, is consistent with the provisions of the plan to discourage urban sprawl. When compared to the prospect of the entire strip remaining designated Commercial, Cocoa's solution represents an improvement in terms of urban containment. The reduction of density for the strip east of U.S. Route 1 has few evident sprawl implications. To the extent this action may focus more dense residential development in the central business district or elsewhere where central sewer is already provided, the new designation serves the objectives to discourage urban sprawl. In any event, the new designation is not inconsistent with the sprawl provisions of the plan. The puzzling septic tank policy is probably intended to read that septic tanks are prohibited except when the use of a septic tank is the most efficient, cost effective, and environmentally compatible solution. The new designation for the strip east of U.S. Route 1 is not inconsistent with this policy. Consequently, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are inconsistent with the provisions in the plan to discourage urban sprawl. FLUE Objective 1.3 is to eliminate "[e]xisting conditions of slum and blight . . . by the year of 2000." FLUE 1.1.2 Redevelopment Area Paragraph 1 designates the Redevelopment Area, which is depicted by map and excludes the two strips containing Petitioners' parcels, as an area of slum or blight pursuant to Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes. Paragraph 3 adds that the City shall redevelop the central business district, which is within the Redevelopment Area, as a viable business district consistent with surrounding historic resources, residential neighborhoods, and natural resources. There is no evidence of blight as to the Wilson and Tompkins parcels, notwithstanding the marketing problems experienced in connection with the nearby townhouses. Concerning the Messiah Church and Fountain parcels, a haphazard collection of largely commercial uses, such as a flea market, have accumulated over the years along U.S. Route 1 in the vicinity of the two parcels. The immediate area appears not to be economically vibrant, but no evidence establishes that the area is blighted. Further, no evidence suggests that the area's economic fortunes would be enhanced if the strip were designated High Density Residential, notwithstanding the Messiah Church's intended use of the parcel if it is not given a High Density Residential designation. The evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are inconsistent with plan provisions to encourage the redevelopment of blighted areas. Consistency of Designations with Regional and State Plans Regional Plan Policy 51.12 states: The "infilling" of existing urban areas and the renovation of blighted areas shall be encouraged in areas where existing wastewater transmission and treatment capacity are available for allocation, or funding has been committed for the provision of sufficient capacity. Emphasis should be placed on encouraging development activities within the urban service area boundaries as identified in local government comprehensive plans. Techniques of encouragement include but are not limited to: Provision of public or private facilities and services in strict accordance with adopted growth management objectives and policies . . Providing incentives for restoration or rehabilitation of blighted areas with existing sewer service through various actions such as but not limited to rezoning to other uses or higher densities Strengthening and preserving existing residential areas through the planned provision of public services, zoning and other techniques. Regional Plan Policy 57.7 5/ specifies the "designation of . . . activity centers . . . as a means of planning appropriate and balanced land uses on a scale and at an intensity consistent with the availability of public facilities and services . . Regional Policy Plan 51.10 limits the use of septic tanks in areas where conditions are suitable for installation and effective operation, provided that central sewer system services are not available due to lack of available treatment capacity, accessible facilities, or other considerations . . .. The following minimum criteria and procedures shall be adhered to . . . where regional resources may be adversely affected: * * * 3. The decision to require phasing out of septic tank systems where centralized sewer systems are available should be based solely upon the availability of those centralized systems and not upon any other consideration of ground water hydrology and current performance levels of septic tanks. For the reasons already discussed, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not consistent with these provisions of the Regional Plan. Section 187.201(18)(a), Florida Statutes (the State Plan) is for Florida to "protect the substantial investments in public facilities that already exist and . plan for and finance new facilities . . . in a timely, orderly, and efficient manner." Goal 16 of the State Plan is to direct development "to those areas which have in place, or have agreements to provide, the land and water resources, fiscal abilities, and service capacity to accommodate growth in an environmentally acceptable manner." The first three policies under Goal 16 are: Promote state programs, investments, and development and redevelopment activities which encourage efficient development and occur in areas which will have the capacity to service new population and commerce. Develop a system of incentives and disincentives which encourages a separation of urban and rural land uses while protecting water supplies, resource development, and fish and wildlife habitats. Enhance the liveability and character of urban areas through the encouragement of an attractive and functional mix of living, working, shopping, and recreational activities. In addition to the above-cited provisions relied upon by Petitioners, Policy 3 of Goal 5 of the State Plan is to increase the supply of safe, affordable, sanitary housing for low- and moderate-income persons by, in part, "recycling older houses and redeveloping residential neighborhoods." For the reasons already discussed, the evidence fails to establish to the exclusion of fair debate that the designations are not consistent with these provisions of the Regional Plan.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Department of Community Affairs enter a final order dismissing the petitions of the four Petitioners. ENTERED this 8 day of August, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8 day of August, 1991.
Findings Of Fact Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company filed petition with the Public Service Commission pursuant to Section 120.54(5), Florida Statutes, seeking to have the Commission adopt a new rule numbered 25-9.11(2). By Order entered April 10, 1979, the Commission initiated rule-making proceedings in accordance with the petition of Southern Bell, and by Order entered May 4, 1979, amended the rule-making proceeding by expanding the applicability of the proposed rule to include not only telephone utilities as proposed by Southern Bell, but also electric, gas, water and sewer utilities. On May 24, 1979, the Citizens of the State of Florida, represented by the Office of Public Counsel, initiated the instant proceeding by filing a petition to determine that a portion of the proposed rule is invalid. Various regulated utilities moved to intervene in the proceeding, and were granted intervenor status. The Public Service Commission and various other Intervenors moved to dismiss the proceeding on jurisdictional grounds. The motions were denied by Orders entered June 12 and 19, 1979. The Public Service Commission filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Supreme Court of Florida with respect to the jurisdictional issues. Proceedings before the Division of Administrative Hearings were stayed. The Petition for Writ of Prohibition was denied on September 5, 1979. Florida Public Service Commission v. Division of Administrative Hearings, Case No. 57,116 (Supreme Court of Florida). A Petition for Rehearing was denied by Order entered November 9, 1979. Subsequently, the final hearing was scheduled to be conducted on December 27, 1979, and upon stipulation of the parties was rescheduled for January 22, 1980. At the final hearing, the Public Service Commission and the Intervenors stipulated that the Petitioners have the requisite substantial interest in the proposed rule to maintain the instant rule challenge. The Petitioners and the Commission stipulated that the Intervenors have the requisite standing to participate in the proceeding as Intervenors. A copy of the rule was received in evidence. Issues respecting the validity of the rule are legal rather than factual, and the parties have submitted post-hearing briefs and legal memoranda. The proposed rule [25-9.11(2)] relates to whether a regulated utility is entitled to a rate increase during the period in which a rate proceeding is pending before the Public Service Commission. The rule provides: In any general rate case filed by a utility, the utility shall be permitted upon thirty (30) days' notice to increase its rate pending final disposition of the case by an amount sufficient to produce a rate of return on its investment rate base at the bottom of its most recent previously allowed zone of reasonableness; provided, however, that any such interim increase shall be subject to refund. The rule purports to implement the provisions of the so-called file and suspend laws. As to telephone companies, the file and suspend law is set out at Section 364.05(4), Florida Statutes. The section provides: Pending a final order by the Public Service Commission in any rate proceeding under this section, the commission may withhold consent to the operation of all or any portion of the new rate schedules, delivering to the utility requesting such increase, within 30 days, a reason or written statement of good cause for withholding its consent. Such consent shall not be withheld for a period longer than 8 months from the date of filing the new schedules. The new rates or any portion not consented to shall go into effect under bond at the end of such period, but the commission shall, by order, require such utility to keep accurate account in detail of all amounts received by reason of such increase, specifying by whom and in whose behalf such amounts were paid, and upon completion of hearing and final decision in such proceeding, shall by further order require such utility to refund with interest at a fair rate, to be determined by the commission in such manner as it may direct, such portion of the increased rate or charge as by its decision shall be found not justified. Any portion of such refund not thus refunded to patrons or customers of the utility shall be refunded or disposed of by the utility as the commission may direct; however, no such funds shall accrue to benefit of the utility. Virtually identical provisions have been adopted with respect to gas and electric utilities [Section 366.06(4), Florida Statutes], and with respect to water and sewer utilities [Section 367.081(5), Florida Statutes]. The leading judicial decision interpreting the provisions of the file and suspend laws is Citizens of the State of Florida v. Mayo, 333 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1976). The Court described the alternatives available to the Public Service Commission in conjunction with a request for interim rate increase as follows: (at p. 4) If the Commission does not affirmatively act within 30 days to suspend the proposed new rate schedule file as a part of the request for higher rates, the new rates go into effect automatically on the 31st day following the utility company's filing. Since the Commission's inaction is equivalent to its consent to the new rate schedule, no bond is required of the utility and there is no mechanism by which customers of the utility system can ever recover interim charges which, after the full rate proceeding, the Commission may find to have been wholly or partly unwarranted. If the Commission acts within thirty days to suspend all or part of the tariffs, the utility may not charge its customers the proposed new rates. The Commission's action is effective on a day to day basis until either (a) it grants full or partial consent to the new rates, or (b) eight months elapse from the date the new schedules were filed. If consent is given before the time expiration, as it was here, the utility may then begin to charge the new rates. Where consent is continuously withheld, the utility may still begin to charge its customers on the new basis after eight months have passed, under bond and record-keeping requirements required by statute. The relationship of the interim rate relief provisions to the general scheme of rate regulation was described by the Court as follows: (at p. 5) The Legislature did not intend all public utility filings to go into effect without some review by the Public Service Commission. Had that been the intent the Legislature would not have created a "suspend" power in the Commission. By placing the file and suspend law in Section 366.06, however, the Commission was given direct responsibility in this type of proceeding to insure that all charges collected by a public utility are lawful. See Section 366.06(1), Florida Statutes (1975). The Legislature did not intend a full rate hearing before all new rate schedules become effective. Had it intended that result, there would have been no need to enact subsection 366.06(4) at all. The Legislature obviously intended to allow public utilities the benefit of proposed rate increases from the date they could satisfy the Commission on the basis of an uncontested preliminary showing that the needs of the company were such as to necessitate immediate financial aid. Where the Commission is so satisfied after a preliminary analysis extending over a period not longer than thirty days, the rates become effective without further action by the Commission. (It follows from this, of course, that the Commission's affirmative act of suspending proposed rates means that the Commission is dissatisfied with the utility's preliminary showing.) The Legislature has relieved the Commission of the responsibility for balancing the rights of the company and its customers when the utility is unable to develop new facts to show that there exists good cause to put into operation the new rates which have been found to be unjustified on the basis of the preliminary showing. This was done by providing that Commission inaction following an initial suspension is overcome by time, and that the rates become effective at the end of eight months, automatically, under bond. In light of the conclusion in paragraph 5 and the fact that the Commission must provide its "reason or written statement of good cause" whenever it withholds consent to the new rates, the Legislature must have intended that there be some presentation of evidence or development of new facts between that initial withholding of consent by the Commission and its later grant of consent. (citations omitted) Petitioners contend that the proposed rule is invalid because it would render an interim rate increase automatic upon the filing of a request for interim rate relief by a regulated utility without regard to the merits of the request and without any review of the propriety of the request by the Commission. Petitioners argue that the proposed rule removes the discretion and range of alternatives available to the Commission set out in Citizens of Florida v. Mayo, supra. These contentions are without merit. Rather than making an interim rate increase automatic, the proposed rule sets the standard against which a proposed increase would be measured, that being a rate sufficient to produce a return on the utility's investment at the bottom of the most recently determined zone of reasonableness. The utility's expenses, revenues and investment rate would be calculated in the same manner as was used in the most recent general rate case involving the utility. See: proposed Rule 25-9.11(4). Under the proposed rule, the public Service Commission would retain its discretion to suspend an interim rate increase if the substantive requirements of the proposed rule were not met. The Commission would also retain its responsibility to consider the propriety of interim rate increases. Petitioners' contention that the proposed rule improperly denies appropriate parties who may contest the need for interim rate increases an opportunity for hearing is also without merit. The rule does not address procedures to be followed by the Commission in applying the substantive standards of the rule. The fact that procedures are not addressed does not mean that no such procedures exist. The rule neither expressly nor implicitly undermines rights to a hearing that parties may have under the Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, or under constitutional due process requirements, Florida Power Corporation v. Hawkins, 367 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Fla. 1979). Petitioners further contend that the proposed rule is an effort to reinstate the so-called "make-whole" doctrine set out in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Bevis, 279 So.2d 285 (Fla. 1973). Petitioners' argument is that the make-whole doctrine has been superseded by the file and suspend laws. In Southern Bell, the utility requested that the Public Service Commission grant it an interim rate increase pending completion of a general rate proceeding. The Commission denied the request for interim relief. The Court stated: (at p. 286) Thus when Southern Bell alleged that its rate of return was below that approved by the Commission as a minimum it had alleged a prima facie case to require approval of the Commission for an interim rate increase, so long as the increase would not raise the company's rate of return above the minimum level of 8.25 percent approved by the Commission. Since it must be assumed that the Commission obeyed its statutory mandate. . . any rate of return above the authorized minimum must, of necessity, be unfair, unjust, unreasonable and insufficient. If Southern Bell has proved the allegations which were made in its petition for an interim rate increase, the Commission must approve that request so as to bring the Southern Bell rates within statutory guidelines. It is for the Commission to determine whether or not Southern Bell has met this requirement, as the Commission sits as trier of fact, rather than this Court. The proposed rule adopts this same standard. The file and suspend laws have not changed that standard, but rather have streamlined the mechanism for considering whether interim rate increases should be granted. Maule Industries, Inc. v. Mayo, 342 So.2d 63 (Fla. 1977); Citizens of the State of Florida v. Mayo, supra, at Footnote 12, p. 6. The Petitioners have failed to establish that Public Service Commission Proposed Rule 25-9.11(2) constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The proposed rule is presently pending for consideration before the Commission. Whether the proposed rule constitutes the best of various policy alternatives that may be available to the Commission has not been an issue in this proceeding. Based upon the foregoing, it is, hereby ORDERED: Petitioner has failed to establish that Proposed Rule 25-9.11(2) of the Public Service Commission constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, and the petition to determine invalidity of the proposed rule filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed. ENTERED this 22nd day of February, 1980, in Tallahassee, Florida. G. STEVEN PFEIFFER Assistant Director Division of Administrative Hearings Room 101, Collins Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Norman H. Horton, Jr., Esquire Marta Crowley, Esquire Staff Counsel Florida Public Service Commission 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Benjamin H. Dickens, Jr., Esquire Office of Public Counsel Room 4, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Lorin H. Albeck, Esquire Post Office Box 110 Tampa, Florida 33601 Lee L. Willis, Esquire Ausley, McMullen, McGehee, Carothers & Proctor Post Office Box 391 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 William E. Sundstrom, Esquire Myers, Kaplan, Levinson Kenin & Richards 1020 East Lafayette Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James F. Sanfield, Esquire Post Office Box 14042 St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 Ms. Nancy H. Roen 1111 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33131 Matthew M. Childs, Esquire 1400 Southeast First National Bank Bldg. Miami, Florida 33131 Ms. Mary Jo Francis Post Office Box 47000N Miami, Florida 33147 William B. Barfield, Esquire General Attorney 666 North West 79th Avenue, Room 680 Miami, Florida 33126 Ms. Liz Cloud, Chief Bureau of Administrative Code Department of State The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carroll Webb, Esquire Executive Director Administrative Procedures Committee Room 120, Holland Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Introduction. 21 The Parties. 21 General Description of Monroe County 22 The Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan 24 The Original Comprehensive Plan. 24 The Remedial Comprehensive Plan. 25 Area of Critical State Concern Review 27 The Florida Keys Area of Critical State Concern. 27 Area of Critical State Concern Review of the Remedial Plan. 28 The DCA Proposed Rules 31 Challenges to the DCA Proposed Rules 33 The Administration Commission Proposed Rules . 34 Challenges to the Administration Commission Proposed Rules 36 The Final Order in the DCA and Administration Commission Proposed Rules Challenge Cases. 36 The Department's Review Pursuant to the Act. 38 Section 163.3184, Florida Statutes 38 The Department's Review. 39 Impact of the Area of Critical State Concern Review on the Department's Review Under the Act. 40 Challenge to the Remedial Plan Pursuant to the Act by the Intervenors 41 Carrying Capacity: The Cornerstone of Monroe County Remedial Plan. 42 Carrying Capacity as a Planning Tool 42 Monroe County's Carrying Capacity Analysis 44 The Settlement Agreement's Reference to a Carrying Capacity Analysis 45 Monroe County's Application of the Carrying Capacity Analysis. 46 Hurricane Evacuation Carrying Capacity 47 Environmental Carrying Capacity. 48 The Department's Review of Monroe County's General Acceptance of a Carrying Capacity Approach 49 Monroe County's Environment. 49 The Unique Environmental Character of the Florida Keys 49 General Habitat Types in the Florida Keys. 51 Upland Habitat Types 53 Wetland and Transitional Wetland Habitat Types. 55 Marine Habitat Types 59 The National Marine Sanctuary. 63 The Upper, Middle and Lower Keys 64 Areas of Critical County Concern 66 Ohio Key 67 Coupon Bight 67 Species of Special Concern 68 The Florida Key Deer 68 Marine Turtles 72 The Impacts of Development on the Environment of the Florida Keys. 72 A Brief History of Development in the Florida Keys 72 The Impact of Development on Water Quality and Marine Resources 73 The Impact of Development on Coral Reefs 79 The Impact of Development on Seagrasses. 80 The Impacts of Boating 80 The Impacts of Docks and Marinas 82 The Impacts of Development on Wetlands and Transitional Wetlands. 83 The Impact of Development on Mangroves 85 The Impact of Development on Beach Berm. 85 The Impact of Development on Hammocks. 86 The Impact of Development on Offshore Islands. 87 The Impact of Development on North Key Largo . 88 The Impact of Development on Ohio Key. 88 The Impact of Development on Key Deer and Big Pine Key 89 The Impact of Development on Coupon Bight. 92 The Impact of Development on Marine Turtles. 92 The Florida Keys' Environmental Carrying Capacity 92 Monroe County's Conclusion 92 The Carrying Capacity of the Nearshore Waters and Seagrasses. 94 The Carrying Capacity of the Coral Reefs of the Florida Keys. 98 The Carrying Capacity of Offshore Islands. 98 The Carrying Capacity of North Key Largo, Ohio Key and Coupon Bight. 99 The Carrying Capacity of the Key Deer and Big Pine Key 101 The Need to Maximize Measures to Protect Other Environmental Features of the Florida Keys Environment 103 Sewage Treatment Systems 104 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 104 The Department's Review Under the Act. 107 Intervenor Challenges. 108 Maintenance vs. Improvement. 109 Delay of the Adoption of the Master Plan 110 The Interim Levels of Service. 112 Cesspool Inspection Program. 117 Disturbed and Undisturbed Wetlands 117 Stormwater Treatment. 118 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 118 The Department's Review Under the Act. 119 Intervenor Challenges. 119 Delay of the Adoption of the Master Plan 120 Impact on Water Quality. 121 The Interim Levels of Service. 121 Marine Resources 121 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 121 The Department's Review Under the Plan 124 Intervenor Challenges. 125 Adequacy of Living Marine Resource Protections. 127 Moored/Anchored Vessels, Marinas and Docks. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Moored/Anchored Vessels. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Marines. 128 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Impacting Docks. 129 The Department's Review Under the Act. 131 Intervenor Challenges. 133 F Residential Docks. 135 G. Perpendicular Docks. 136 Canals 137 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 137 The Department's Review Under the Act. 138 Intervenor Challenges. 138 Wetlands. 139 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 139 The Department's Review Under the Act. 140 Intervenor Challenges. 140 Disturbed Wetlands 141 Setbacks 141 Provisions in the Remedial Plan. 141 The Department's Review Under the Plan 142 Intervenor Challenges. 143 The Justification for Setbacks 143 "No Net Loss" of Wetlands 145 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 145 The Department's Review Under the Act. 145 Intervenor Challenges. 146 On-Site Mitigation vs. Off-Site Mitigation 147 ACCC: Big Pine Key, North Key Largo and Ohio Key. 148 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 148 The Department's Review Under the Act. 151 Intervenor Challenges. 152 Big Pine Key; Protection of the Key Deer 154 North Key Largo. 155 Miscellaneous Environmental Provisions. 156 Freshwater Lenses. 156 Open Space Requirements for Hammocks 157 Public Access to Beaches 158 Public Expenditures in the Coastal Zone. 159 Natural Heritage and Park Program. 160 Protection of Upland Vegetation. 161 Clustering 161 Hurricane Evacuation Carrying Capacity. 162 Hurricanes 162 Preparation for Hurricanes 165 The Potential Impacts of Hurricanes on the Florida Keys 167 Evacuation and Refuges of Last Resort 169 Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Provisions 172 The Department's Review of Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Response in Objective 101.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .175 Intervenor Challenges. 177 Alleged Worthlessness of Undeveloped Property and Impact on Taxes. 179 Hurricane Evacuation Clearance Time Calculations 180 The Reasonableness of the Estimated Clearance Time Calculations. 187 Sham Device and Reasonableness of Monroe County's Hurricane Evacuation Goals. 189 Hurricane Shelters 191 The Board of County Commissioner's Meeting of May 4, 1991 198 The Administration Commission's Policy 216.1.19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .198 The Permit Allocation System 200 Monroe County's Decision to Employ a Permit Allocation System. 200 Provisions of the Remedial Plan Adopting the Permit Allocation System 203 Monroe County's Method of Allocating Allowable Growth Under the Permit Allocation System. 205 The Department's Review of the Permit Allocation System Under the Act. 210 The Department's Review of the Point System Under the Act. 210 Intervenor Challenges to the Permit Allocation System. 216 General Challenges to the Point System 216 Intervenor Challenges to Policies 101.5.4 and 101.5.5. 217 The Number of Permits and Subareas 218 The General Challenges to the Permit Allocation System 219 General Challenges to Policies 101.5.4 and 101.5.4. 222 Negative Points for Habitat, Habitat of Critical Concern and Species 222 Protected Species Habitat Map. 228 Coastal High Hazard Areas. 228 Platted Subdivisions 229 Affordable Housing 229 Transportation Levels of Service 229 Commercial Infill, and the Existence of Infrastructure 230 Points for TDRs. 230 Offshore Islands, Conservation Lands and Historic/Archaelogical Resources 232 Transferable Development Rights Program 233 The Current Transferable Development Rights Program. 233 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 233 The Department's Review Under the Act. 236 D Intervenor Challenges. 238 E. Sender vs. Receiver Sites. 239 Land Use Categories. 242 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 242 The Department's Review Under the Act. 243 Intervenor Challenges. 247 D. Policies 101.4.1 and 101.4.2 248 Maintenance of Community Character and Protection of Environmental Resources. 248 Residential Medium Land Use Category 249 Mixed Use/Commercial and Mixed Use/Commercial Fishing. 249 Disturbed Wetlands 251 Height Limitation. 251 The Future Land Use Map Series. 252 The Future Land Use Map Series Adopted by Monroe County 252 The Department's Review Under the Act. 252 Intervenor Challenges. 253 Are the Future Land Use Maps in Compliance With the Act 254 Vested Rights. 255 Provisions of the Remedial Plan. 255 The Department's Review Under the Act. 256 Intervenor Challenges. 258 Definition of Vested Rights. 258 Limited Application of Land Development Regulations to Property with Vested Rights 259 Miscellaneous Provisions of the Remedial Plan 260 Non-Residential Development. 260 The Monroe County Land Authority 263 Transient Residential Unit Moratorium. 264 Nonconforming Uses 266 The Coastal High Hazard Area 268 The Post-Disaster Redevelopment Plan 269 Siting Public Facilities 270 Intergovernmental Coordination 272 The County Geographic Information System 275 Public Expenditures for Services and Infrastructure 275 Affordable Housing 276 L. Goal 101 276 Roadway Improvements 277 Solid Waste Level of Service 278 Proposed Widening of U.S. Highway 1 on Big Pine Key 279 Public Participation 280 Capital Improvements 280 Monroe County's Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 282 Monroe County's Determination of the Economic Impact Consequences of the Remedial Plan and Its Response Thereto 282 The Department's Review of Monroe County's Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 284 Intervenor Challenges. 286 Monroe County's Lack of Commitment to Funding the Remedial Plan. 286 The Justification for Funding Assistance 287 Policy 1, as Modified by the Department and Policy 4 as Adopted by the Administration Commission are in Compliance with the Act. 288 Compliance with the State and Regional Plans. 291 The State Comprehensive Plan 291 The South Florida Regional Planning Council Policy Plan. 292 Constitutional Taking. 293
Conclusions For Petitioner, the Department of Community Affairs: Stephanie M. Gehres Assistant General Counsel David J. Russ Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2796 Overseas Highway, Suite 212 Marathon, Florida 33050 For Respondent, Monroe County: Robert C. Apgar, Esquire David A. Theriaque, Esquire Apgar, Pelham, Pfeiffer & Theriaque 909 East Park Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 For Intervenor, 1000 Friends of Florida, Inc.: Richard Grosso, Legal Director 1000 Friends of Florida Civil Law Clinic Shepard Broad Law Center NOVA Southeastern University 3305 College Aveneue Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33314 For Intervenors, Henry Lee Morgenstern and Florida Wildlife Federation: David J. White, Esquire National Wildlife Federation 1401 Peachtree Street, Northeast Suite 240 Atlanta, Georgia 30309 For Intervenor, Friends of the Everglades, Inc.: Nancy Carroll Brown, President Friends of the Everglades, Inc. 9220 Southwest 166th Street Miami, Florida 33157 For Intervenor, Upper Keys Citizens Association: Dagny Johnson, President Upper Keys Citizens Association, Inc. 95,600 Overseas Highway Key Largo, Florida 33037 For Intervenors, George N. Kundtz and Florida Keys Citizens Coalition: Gregg Goldfarb, Esquire 19 West Flagler Street, Suite 707 Miami, Florida 33130 For Intervenor, The Wilderness Society: Debra S. Harrison Florida Keys Coordinator The Wilderness Society 8065 Overseas Highway Marathon, Florida 33050 For Intervenors, George DeCarion, et al.: James S. Mattson, Esquire Andrew M. Tobin, Esquire MATTSON & TOBIN Post Office Box 586 Key Largo, Florida 33037 STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES The issue in these cases is whether the remedial Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan is "in compliance", as defined in Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order finding that the Monroe County Year 2010 Comprehensive Plan is not in compliance within the meaning of Section 163.3184(1)(b), Florida Statutes, consistent with this Recommended Order. DONE and ORDERED this 17th day of July, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of July, 1995. APPENDIX A Case Numbers 91-1932GM and 93-3371GM The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. A ruling on each proposed finding of fact has been made either directly or indirectly in this Recommended Order, or the proposed findings of fact of the parties, except 1000 Friends of Florida, George N. Kundtz and the Florida Keys Citizens' Coalition and the Upper Keys' Citizens' Association, have been accepted or rejected in this Appendix A. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 9-10, 24, 26, 31-34, 43, 60, 67, 73, 75, 78, 87-88, 91, 97-100, 102-103, 107, 160, 192, 224, 231, 237, 248, 256, 282, 288, 294, 300-303, 313, 316, 331, 338, 340, 355, 376 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 2 Not a finding of fact. 108 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Monroe County's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 3, Footnote 4, 42, 55, 93-94, 115, 125-127, 130, 173, 178, and 181. Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 10 The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 13 The second sentence to the next to last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence and the rest of the proposed finding is not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 40 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. "DCA" did not amend Policy 1. Not supported by the weight of the evidence and there has been no challenge to the rules that address Policy 1. 48 Not supported by the weight of the evidence and there has been no challenge to the rules that address Policy 1. 58 The last three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 133 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 138 The first two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 146 The last three sentences are not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although generally true, the proposed finding ignores the fact that the evidence failed to prove that the lack of action by the Service is because the key deer have not reached their carrying capacity, which is the issue in these proceedings. The first two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not relevant. 157-159 Although generally correct summaries of some testimony, these proposed findings are not relevant. 160-163 These proposed findings are generally accepted. They do not, however, justify failing to recognize that the carrying capacity of the key deer has been exceeded. Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 170 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 189 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 191 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 193 The last sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 195 The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The last two sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 202 The first and last sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 203 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 204 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 205 Not relevant. 205 Not relevant. DeCarion's Proposed Findings of Fact Findings of fact after number 53 have not been numbered in DeCarion's proposed order. They are referred to in this Appendix by the titles of the portion of the proposed order under which they appear. Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 25-29, 32, 35-38 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 1 No evidence to support this proposed finding was presented. Standing was, however, stipulated to. 7-16 Although generally correct, the conclusions reached in these proposed findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 19 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 24 The first sentence is not relevant. 43-44 While these proposed findings are an accurate reflection of some of the testimony in these proceedings, the conclusions suggested by DeCarion are not supported by the weight of the evidence. 46-48 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 49-50 Not relevant. Not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first three sentences are not supported by the weight of the evidence. The third sentence is not supported by the weight of the evidence. "Five-Year Moratorium on Hotel-Motel Construction": The second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. "Marina Expansion Restrictions": The second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. Wilderness Society's Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed findings of fact which are hereby accepted in whole or in part: 1, 7, 10, 12, 29, 34, 71-72, 81, 87, 138, 141 Proposed findings of fact which are rejected in whole or in part: 3-6 Not relevant. 73-75 Not relevant. 88-89 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 102-103 Not relevant. Not relevant. The first paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. 117-130 Not relevant. 147-248 Not relevant. 154 Not supported by the weight of the evidence. 159-161 Not relevant. APPENDIX B ORIGINAL AND REMEDIAL PLAN CHALLENGE CASES: CASE NUMBERS 91-1932GM AND 93-3371GM TABLE OF CONTENTS APPEARANCES. 3
The Issue May this appeal be dismissed as moot due to the impossibility of the development order being granted?
Findings Of Fact This case involves Florida Rock's May 20, 1992, application for a development order to the Citrus County Department of Development Services (LDDS or Department) for a mining operation. Sometime after 1980, the real property at issue had been designated "extractive" on the Future Land Use Map (FLUM). Citrus County's 1986 Comprehensive Plan designated Florida Rock's real property as "extractive." In 1990, after the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs challenged the "extractive" designation in the County's 1989 plan amendments, the site continued to be designated "extractive." Citrus County simultaneously enacted its Citrus County Land Development Code (LDC or Code). At all such times, zoning and all maps also embraced the same "extractive" designation. Citrus County maintains two sets of land use maps. The Comprehensive Land Use Plan (CLUP or Comprehensive Plan) has a FLUM (a generalized land use map) and the LDC has attached to it atlas maps on a smaller scale. The LDC maps are identical to the county tax assessor tax maps and show individual parcels/lots of record. Such parcels defined by the Comprehensive Plan and LDC text have a land use designation as associated with each. Mining operations are permitted on real property designated "extractive." Under the LDC, when an application is submitted, it must be reviewed for completeness and the applicant notified within three days of whether the application is deemed complete or incomplete. If the application is deemed incomplete, the applicant must be advised of how the application should be amended or supplemented in order to be deemed complete for technical review. The applicant then may amend or supplement the application. Once a determination of completeness has been made, a technical review must be completed by each member of the technical review team within ten days, and thereafter, a series of committee meetings and public hearings may follow. During this portion of the procedure, amendments to the application may be required before the development order is ultimately granted or denied. Citrus County's land use amendment process began on April 10, 1992, before Florida Rock's application was submitted to the LDDS. Florida Rock had actual notice on April 10, 1992, that a change in its property designation from "extractive" to "rural residential" was pending, but no moratorium on development orders was imposed. Thus, the "rush to the Commission" began.1 On May 20, 1992, Florida Rock's application for a development order to permit mining on its real property was submitted to the Citrus County LDDS. The Department made four sequential determinations of incompleteness. At no time did Florida Rock ever amend its application or submit any supplemental material. On December 22, 1992, Citrus County's Board of County Commissioners adopted Ordinance 92-A73, to change the designation of the subject real property on the Comprehensive Plan from "extractive" to "rural residential." The ordinance does not recite any retroactive effect. No moratorium on development orders was imposed. Mining operations are prohibited on real property designated as "rural residential." On December 28, 1992, the Department made the determination of incompleteness which gave rise to this instant proceeding. Florida Rock has not affirmatively plead and has not proven that the Department made any of its incompleteness determinations arbitrarily, capriciously, discriminatorily, in bad faith or solely for purposes of delaying the process of a technical review on the merits of the project. In the absence of any formal allegation and affirmative proof, no improper motive or improper purpose by the Department can be found.2 The December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness noted, in the following terms, the refusal of the applicant to supply certain assurances: The applicant is exempt from Section 4344 of the LDC only in regards to the bonafide [sic] agricultural or forestry purposes. Commercial forestry involves the harvesting or marketable timber not the wholesale clearing of all vegetation. Therefore, the impact on protected trees as defined by Section 4342.A and 4344.B needs to be addressed as it regards compliance with Section 4344 of the LDC. The application needs to reflect how this will be accomplished. Contrary to your statement, this item was previously referenced as Item 11 in my letter of May 29, 1992. While vegetative removal of unprotected trees as defined in Section 4343.A.6. of the LDC is acceptable, the issue of protected trees as defined in Section 4344.B of the LDC is still unaddressed in your application submittal. The submitted site plan indicates a setback of less than the 3000 feet from residentially committed areas as required by Section 4525.A.8.1 and 4531.E.1. of the LDC regarding expansion of existing mines. Interpretation of the LDC is addressed in Section 1410 of the LDC and so the attached interpretation is not applicable. Please revise your site plan to reflect this set back or resubmit your application after vesting pursuant to Section 3160 through 3163 of the LDC has been determined. Pursuant to Section 380.06(4)(b)F.S., Citrus County believes that Florida Rock Industries operations within Hernando/Citrus Counties may exceed DRI threshold. Therefore, please provide a letter from DCA resolving this matter. In regard to your position that DCA has not formally requested a binding letter, please note that the above referenced citation specifies the state land planning agency or local government with jurisdiction over the land on which a development is proposed may require a developer to obtain a binding letter. Based on information made available to this Department, we believe a determination is called for. In regards to the requested items 23 through 34 of my letter of May 29, 1992, please be advised that Section 4659.F. of the LDC requires proof of compliance with all applicable Citrus County regulations and policies. This includes the Comprehensive Plan (C.O. 89-04) and its amendments. The information requested is to assure that the proposed development will be in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan. None of the reasons listed in the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness specifically stated that Florida Rock could not qualify for a development order for mining because its real property had just become designated by the December 22, 1992, ordinance as "rural residential," instead of "extractive." Indeed, the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness did not mention the ordinance change at all. However, its fourth paragraph concerns the requirement that an applicant establish its real property's consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. The County has taken the position that, without using the terms "extractive use" or "rural residential," paragraph four encompasses the change of ordinance as well as all matters pertaining to the Comprehensive Plan. Under the statutes in effect on December 22, 1992, Ordinance 92-A73 was not effective until filed with the Secretary of State. (See the face of the ordinance). The exact date of its filing was not stipulated, but it was agreed that filing occurred sometime in December 1992. Under Florida's growth management process, the newly adopted ordinance also was transmitted to the State of Florida, Department of Community Affairs, which would then issue a report before the new ordinance became part of the Citrus County Comprehensive Plan.3 On January 3, 1993, Florida Rock challenged, pursuant to Section 163.3184(9), Florida Statutes, the new ordinance as it progressed through the Florida Department of Community Affairs' review process. On January 19, 1993, Citrus County's LDDS sent a letter to Florida Rock, further interpreting its December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness. That letter also made no specific mention of the ordinance amendment and did not amend the fourth paragraph of the incompleteness determination. It provided, in pertinent part: For the record, my letter of December 28, 1992, was not a "Denial" but rather a determination of incompleteness pursuant to Section 2222.B.1 of the Land Development Code. In response to your question of January 12, 1993, I was not persuaded by your argument in regards to access by way of Parcel 22100 lying in Section 36, Township 20 South, Range 19 East, but did recognize the driveway onto County Road 581. Florida Rock declined to amend its application or supply the information requested. On January 26, 1993, Florida Rock initiated the instant administrative appeal of the December 28, 1992, determination of incompleteness. However, by agreement of Florida Rock and Citrus County, the appeal was abated until January 13, 1999 (see the Preliminary Statement), when it was transferred from a local hearing officer to the Division of Administrative Hearings. Florida Rock's challenge of the ordinance before the Florida Department of Community Affairs also did not progress in a timely manner. On February 6, 1998, Florida Rock's challenge to the new ordinance was dismissed. The effect thereof is that the Florida Department of Community Affairs has found, and entered a Final Order pronouncing, Citrus County Ordinance 92-A73 to be in compliance with Chapter 163, Florida Statutes, pertaining to Florida's Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Act. That Final Order, as final agency action, was not appealed. By any interpretation, Citrus County's Comprehensive Plan, embracing the new ordinance's land use designation of Florida Rock's property as "rural residential" has been in effect since February 1998, as have been coordinated zoning, FLUM, and LDC atlas maps. Since December 22, 1992, the ordinance has designated Florida Rock's proposed site as "rural residential," which precludes the proposed mining operation. Since February 1998, the Comprehensive Plan, FLUM, and LDC atlas maps have all embraced, and currently all of them now embrace, the ordinance, and all of them prohibit mining or "extractive use" of the real property in issue.
Recommendation Upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that Citrus County Department of Land Development Services enter a final order dismissing the appeal for mootness. DONE AND ENTERED this 4th day of June, 1999, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ELLA JANE P. DAVIS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 4th day of June, 1999.
The Issue The issue is whether the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission should promulgate a rule establishing the Poinciana Community Development District.
Findings Of Fact In June, 1982, Florida East Coast Railway Company filed an Application for Development Approval for a Development of Regional Impact to be called "F.E.C. Park of Industry and Commerce" to be located in Dade County, Florida. On June 23, 1983, the Board of County Commissioners of Dade County adopted Resolution Z-114-83, a Development Order approving with conditions the development proposed by Florida East Coast Railway Company. A copy of the Development Order was transmitted to the Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners on July 7, 1983. By letter dated July 8, 1983, and received by the Department of Community Affairs on July 11, 1983, the Assistant Director of the Building and Zoning Department of Dade County advised that: In compliance with Section 380, Florida Statutes, we are enclosing , herewith, a copy of Resolution No. Z-114-83, adopted by the Board of County Commissioners on June 23, 1983, approving a development of regional impact applied for by Florida East Coast Railway Company to permit the development of the above-described property for an industrial park complex involving a district boundary change from GU (interim) to IU-C (Industry-Controlled) and an Unusual Use to permit two lake excavations. By letter dated July 19, 1983, the Department of Community Affairs responded to receipt of the copy of the Development Order as follows: We have received the copy of the Florida East Coast Railway Development Order you sent on July 8 in accordance with Chapter 380, Florida Statues[sic]. However, to fulfill the requirements of the law, the Development Order must he signed and include all exhibits. Therefore would you please he kind enough to provide the Department with a signed copy of Resolution #Z-114-83. . . . By letter dated July 27, 1983, and received by the Department of Community Affairs on August 1, 1983, Dade County advised that: In accordance with your letter of July 19, 1983, and our telephone conversation of this date, I am enclosing, herewith, a certified copy of Resolution Z-114-83; as I explained to you on the telephone, the Board of County Commissioners does not sign its resolutions. The only significant difference between the copy of the Development Order received by the Department of Community Affairs on July 11, 1983, and the one received on August 1, 1983, is a certificate signed by a Deputy Clerk in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Dade County certifying that the latter copy of Resolution No. Z-114-83 was a true and correct copy of the original of that document. Since at least 1946, Dade County has adopted and codified its zoning actions in the following manner. After the Board of County Commissioners acts on zoning applications at a regularly scheduled zoning meeting, zoning resolutions are prepared by Mr. Chester C. Czebrinski, who is in attendance at the meetings. Mr. Czebrinski is an attorney and is the Assistant Director of the Dade County Building and Zoning Department. He is also legal counsel to the Department and is a Deputy Clerk of the Board of County Commissioners. He has performed the functions described herein since 1946. While in attendance at the zoning meeting, Mr. Czebrinski records the action of the Board of County Commissioners on zoning applications noting any conditions adopted by the Board. In preparing the zoning resolution, he uses information obtained from the Clerk of the County Commission as to the resolution number, the names of the Commissioners who made and seconded the motion, and the vote on the resolution. When such resolutions are prepared, they are never re-submitted to the Board of County Commissioners for any further action or review. Copies of final zoning resolutions prepared by Mr. Czebrinski are sent to the Clerk of the County Commission (two original copies), other county departments, to the applicant, and to the attorneys of record. The purpose of transmitting the resolution to those departments and persons is to notify them of the official final action taken by the Board of County Commissioners. Additional copies of resolutions are also placed in the zoning hearing file. All such resolutions transmitted contain a transmittal date on the face of the resolution. The purpose of the transmittal date is to commence the appeal period within which an appeal may be taken to circuit court from the action of the Board of County Commissioners pursuant to the Code of Metropolitan Dade County. All such resolutions transmitted by Mr. Czebrinski are unstamped, uncertified copies of the final zoning resolution. Upon receipt of the transmittal of two copies of the resolution from Mr. Czebrinski, the office of the Clerk of the Board stamps both with the name of the deputy clerk, who for the past eleven years has been Raymond Reid. The letters on one stamp (the large stamp) are larger than the letters on the other, smaller stamp. The copies stamped with the large stamp are also stamped with the county seal. This copy is retained by the Clerk and is never certified. The other copy, stamped with a small stamp, is not stamped with the county seal. This copy is sent to Mr. Czebrinski with a separate certification by the Clerk on a separate page attached to the back of the resolution. Upon request, the Clerk's office will provide a copy of the zoning resolution retained by it. Such a copy is never certified, even for a state agency, unless a specific request for certification is made. An individual requesting certification is required to pay the Clerk a fee of one dollar. Section 2-1, Rule 1.05, Dade County Code, is interpreted and applied by Dade County not to require certification of the resolution physically retained by the Clerk and not to require certification of any copies of that resolution unless a specific request for certification is made. If Mr. Czebrinski receives a request for a copy of a zoning resolution, he provides one of the additional unstamped copies made prior to transmittal of the Clerk. If a certified copy of the resolution is requested, Mr. Czebrinski would make a copy of the resolution with the certification and then place a further certificate on it indicating that it was a copy on file with his office. The above procedures are for normal zoning actions of the Board of County Commissioners and differ from untypical procedures utilized for Zoning Appeals Board (ZAB) resolutions (which are certified by the Building and Zoning Director) and for resolutions pertaining to county airport matters, which are prepared by the County Attorney's office. Where a resolution encompasses an order of the Board of County Commissioners for a Development of Regional Impact, Mr. Czebrinski prepares a resolution in the manner described above and distributes it to all of the previously mentioned parties, and in addition to the Florida Department of Community Affairs and to the South Florida Regional Planning Council. Mr. Czebrinski has had responsibility for transmitting copies to the State Land Planning Agency pursuant to Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, since the adoption of the state law. The resolutions transmitted have been blank, uncertified copies. Each copy is accompanied by a transmittal letter which is signed by Mr. Czebrinski. Although in a few instances the files of the Department of Community Affairs contain items where the typical County Commission zoning procedure was not applicable, this was because either the special procedure of the ZAB or airport zoning applied, because the Department has specifically requested a certified copy in an isolated case, or because the Department had received a transmittal from a non-county source. On September 12, 1983, the Department of Community Affairs filed a Notice of Appeal with the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission objecting to various portions of the Development Order.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Park Central Industrial, which is referenced in this record as Park Central DRI, was originally called the "Andrews Avenue Business Park." This project is referred to as "Park" for convenience sake. The Park application for development approval (ADA) was filed in 1982 with Broward County, Florida since the property was, at that time, within an unincorporated area of the county. The Broward County Commission adopted Ordinance 82-43, effective August 26, 1982, which approved the project and made specific findings in connection with the development. At the time of the passage of Ordinance 82-43, Section 380.06, Florida Statutes, did not require the inclusion of a buildout date in a development order. At the time of the passage of Ordinance 82-43, Section 380.06, Florida Statutes, did not preclude the inclusion of a buildout date in a development order. Ordinance 82-43, recorded in the public record for Broward County, Florida, which is also known as the original development order (Joint Ex. 2), provided, in pertinent part: Section 3. Phasing of Development 3.01 The development and construction of each of the five (5) phases within the Andrews Avenue Business Park shall proceed in accordance with the Master Development and Phasing Plan attached hereto as Exhibit "2." * * * Section 4. General Provisions. 4.01 The ADA submitted to the SFRPC, is incorporated herein by reference and relied upon by the parties in discharging the statutory duties under Chapter 380, Florida Statutes. Substantial compliance with the representations contained in the ADA is a condition for approval unless waived or modified by agreement among the parties. * * * 4.08 . . . The Applicant shall obtain County approval of any proposed change in the state Phasing Plan, as prescribed in Section 3.02 of this Development Order. The Phasing Plan identified as Exhibit "2" in Section 3.01 above specified that the final date for construction to end for all five phases was 1991. Such date has been interpreted by the City and Intervenor to mean not later than December 31, 1991. The ADA incorporated by reference to Ordinance 82-43 provided for a buildout date of 1991. Additionally, the title to the original development order specified that the ordinance was "ESTABLISHING A PROCESS FOR CONTROLLED BUILDOUT OF THE ANDREWS AVENUE BUSINESS PARK DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL IMPACT." In September 1983, the Park was annexed into the City. Consequently, the City became the local governmental agency responsible for assuring compliance with the development order. On March 22, 1988, the City adopted two ordinances which amended the original development order. These ordinances, numbered 88-39 and 88-40, allowed the inclusion of an additional 9.5 acres and made pertinent findings related to this case. Ordinance 88-39 provided, in part: WHEREAS, the development phasing of this project is being extended by four years beyond the original Development Order schedule such that full development will not be completed until 1995; and * * * 7. The proposed extension of the date of buildout for the development does not exceed the threshold limitations established in Section 380.06(19)(c), Florida Statutes. Ordinance 88-40 provided, in part: Section 3: This Development Order shall terminate at midnight on December 31, 1995. Park did not challenge the findings nor the conclusions reached in Ordinances 88-39 and 88-40. Subsequently, however, Park filed an application with the City to again amend the development order to extend the buildout and termination dates from December 31, 1995 to December 30, 2002. With input from the South Florida Regional Planning Council and the Department of Community Affairs, the City enacted Ordinance 95-23 which provided, in part: WHEREAS, The Applicant also requested on September 30, 1994 that the buildout date be extended to December 30, 2002; and WHEREAS, at the Public Hearing held on Ocober (sic) 4, 1994, the Applicant requested that the City Commission consider an alternative buildout date extension to December 30, 1998; and * * * Section 1. The foregoing "WHEREAS" clauses are true and correct and are hereby ratified and confirmed by the City Commission. Section 2. The City, pursuant to Section 380.06(19), Florida Statutes, makes the following findings of fact: * * * Broward County Ordinance 82-43 and subsequent City ordinances established December 31, 1991 as the buildout date for this project by incorporation of the Phasing Schedule and by incorporating the Application for Development Approval. City of Pompano Beach Ordinance 88-40 created a termination date of December 31, 1995. The requested buildout date extension to December 30, 2002, represents a cumulative extension of approximately eleven (11) years. An extension of the buildout date to December 30, 1998 represents a cumulative extension of not more than seven (7) years. * * * SECTION 3. Conclusions of Law. Pursuant to Section 380.06(19), Florida Statutes, the City makes the following conclusions of law: * * * The Applicant's proposal to extend the buildout date to December 30, 2002 is presumed to constitute a substantial deviation and the Applicant has not submitted sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption. An extension of the buildout date to December 30, 1998 does not constitute a substantial deviation. SECTION 4. Modification of Development. The Development Order is hereby amended as follows: The buildout date of the Park Central Development of Regional Impact is hereby extended and the new buildout date is December 30, 1998. The termination date of the Park Central Development of Regional Impact is hereby extended and the new termination date is December 30, 1998. Section 380.06(19)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that an extension of a buildout date of less that seven years is presumed not to create a substantial deviation. The extension of a buildout date beyond seven years creates a presumption of a substantial deviation which a developer must refute with clear and convincing evidence.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order finding that the original development order contained a buildout date of 1991 which was extended to December 31, 1995 by the subsequent ordinance and which cannot under the circumstances of this case be extended beyond December 31, 1998. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 6th day of December, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6th day of December, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-1452DRI The parties did not submit proposed findings of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Gordon B. Linn, Esquire City of Pompano Beach Post Office Box 2083 Pompano Beach, FL 33061 Richard G. Coker, Jr., Esquire Brady & Coker 1318 SE 2nd Avenue Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33316 Robert B. Bradley Secretary Land & Water Adjudicatory Comm. 2105 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001 Carolyn Dekle Director South Fla. Regional Planning Council 3440 Hollywood Blvd., Ste 140 Hollywood, FL 33021 Dan Stengle, Esquire Dept. of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Gregory Smith, Esquire Office of the Governor The Capitol, Room 209 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0001 Suzanne H. Schmith Assistant General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 James F. Murley Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
The Issue The dispositive issue in the above-styled cases is whether certain Lee County plan amendments and revisions to data and analysis are consistent with and substantially similar to the amendments and revisions described in a settlement agreement previously entered into by the parties.
Findings Of Fact Lee County is a local government that is required to prepare and submit to the state land planning agency a comprehensive plan pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 163, Part II, Florida Statutes ("the Act"). Section 163.3167, Florida Statutes. (All references to Sections and their corresponding Chapters are to Florida Statutes. All references to Rules and their corresponding Chapters are to the Florida Administrative Code.) The Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") is the state land planning agency, pursuant to Section 163.3164(19). As such, DCA is responsible for reviewing the comprehensive plans of local governments and determining whether they are in compliance with the Act. Section 163.3184(8). The City of Fort Myers ("Ft. Myers") and the City of Cape Coral ("Cape Coral") are municipalities located in Lee County. Relative to Lee County, they are adjoining local governments, pursuant to Section 163.3184(1)(a). Each municipality has standing in the above-styled case. By Lee County Ordinance No. 89-02, adopted on January 31, 1989, Lee County adopted a comprehensive plan, effective March 1, 1989. (The Lee County comprehensive plan shall be referred to as "the Plan.") Although not adopted as part of the Plan, two volumes of data and analysis, which are entitled "Support Documentation," accompany the Plan. (These materials shall be referred to as "the Data and Analysis.") On March 24, 1989, DCA issued its Notice of Intent to Find the Lee County Comprehensive Plan Not in Compliance. The Notice of Intent is accompanied by a 24-page Statement of Intent to Find Comprehensive Plan Not in Compliance. The Statement of Intent details the various alleged deficiencies in the Plan, but omits any mention of the Intergovernmental Coordination element contained in the Plan. On July 12, 1989, Ft. Myers filed its Petition for Leave to Intervene. Paragraph 19 of the petition alleges that the Intergovernmental Coordination Element of the Plan fails to provide a strong and effective intergovernmental coordination element showing relationships and stating principles and guidelines to be used in the accomplishment of coordination of the [Plan] with the comprehensive plans of adjacent municipalities. The Intergovernmental Coordination element of the Plan states: GOAL 108: SERVICE COORDINATION. To provide for efficient and effective coordination of provision of public services by Lee County and its special districts, bodies, boards, and other entities. OBJECTIVE 108.1: SPECIAL DISTRICTS. By 1991, a clearinghouse process shall be instituted to provide for the regular exchange of information, proposals, and plans between the county and its special districts, bodies, boards, and other entities. POLICY 108.1.1: The office of the county administrator shall establish a special district clearinghouse, in coordination with district directors and managers, for the purpose of coordinating the programs, activities, and procedures for the provision of services and information. OBJECTIVE 108.2: LEVEL-OF-SERVICE STANDARDS. By 1991, conflicts in level-of-service standards for public facilities shall be resolved. POLICY 108.2.1: The Planning Division shall prepare an inventory and analysis of the various level-of-service standards for public facilities and shall recommend means of coordinating those standards which are not in agreement. POLICY 108.2.2: Where conflicts with other entities regarding service standards cannot be resolved through discussion among those concerned, the informal mediation process of the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council shall be utilized to seek resolution. POLICY 108.2.3: Development proposals within Lee County shall be reviewed for their impacts on levels of service for public facilities as stated in the comprehensive plans of adjacent governments. OBJECTIVE 108.3: POLICY COORDINATION. By 1989, the Lee County Executive Advisory Committee shall be re-established in order to provide an intergovernmental policy coordination policy. POLICY 108.3.1: The office of the county administrator shall be responsible for organizing meetings of the Executive Advisory Committee. POLICY 108.3.2: The initial agenda for the Executive Advisory Committee shall be to discuss issues identified during the 1988 comprehensive plan revision process. Other items for discussion may include: --discuss areas of mutual interest; --establish and implement formal procedures for mutual review of appropriate planning and policy documents; --enter into agreements at the direction of and with the approval of the Lee County Board of Commissioners; --encourage participation of representatives from adjacent and overlapping jurisdictions, and state and federal agencies to attend EAC meetings on a standing or specific basis when appropriate; --utilize staff support of the appropriate planning departments; and --schedule public meetings, when appropriate, to ensure citizen awareness. POLICY 108.3.3: Lee County shall continue to: --utilize the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) for matters of coordination in transportation planning and implementation; and --utilize the Technical Advisory Committee to the MPO in matter requiring communication, cooperation, and coordination between Lee County and other jurisdictions. GOAL 109: GROWTH MANAGEMENT. To coordinate the plans and policies of Lee County, its municipalities, and adjacent local governments so as to guide, manage, and regulate urban growth in a compatible fashion. OBJECTIVE 109.1: EFFECTS OF NEW DEVELOPMENT. By 1990, the review of impacts of planned developments on the municipalities within Lee County and on adjacent counties, regional agencies, and other governmental units shall function in a coordinated and efficient manner. POLICY 109.1.1: Lee County shall adopt formal coordination procedures for mandated planning activities with other local governments, regional agencies, the state, and other governmental units. POLICY 109.1.2: Where conflicts regarding growth management and development issues cannot be resolved through discussion among those concerned, the informal mediation process of the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council shall be used where judicial action can be avoided. POLICY 109.1.3: Lee County shall enter into interlocal agreements with appropriate entities for the notification and exchange of information regarding changes in land use or zoning of areas within one mile of its boundaries. POLICY 109.1.4: The county shall strive to negotiate interlocal agreements with all incorporated municipalities to resolve planning issues relating to areas outside the cities' limits which they would like to target for annexation. "Urban Reserve" boundaries adopted in such agreements will be designated on the future land use map (see Policy 1.7.3). POLICY 109.1.5: The county shall protect natural resource systems that cross governmental boundaries through the means described under Goal 82 of this plan. POLICY 109.1.6: The county shall coordinate transportation planning and road improvements with other jurisdictions through the means described under Goal 28 of this plan. POLICY 109.1.7: The county shall address the regional need for adequate sites for water- dependent uses through means described under Objective 98.7 of this plan. POLICY 109.1.8: The county shall continue to pursue efforts to establish a plan for surface water management with the surrounding affected counties and affected municipalities within Lee County. OBJECTIVE 109.2: POLITICAL INTERVENTION. By 1989, vehicles for dialogue and communication with other local governments shall be initiated by Lee County to address issues which have an effect beyond the boundaries of unincorporated Lee County. POLICY 109.2.1: In order to address issues which cross jurisdictional boundaries, during 1989 the chairman of the Board of County Commissioners shall initiate and coordinate interactions with political counterparts in municipalities and counties in the region. The Data and Analysis accompanying the Intergovernmental Coordination Element contains an evaluation and appraisal report (the "EAR") concerning intergovernmental coordination provisions of the former comprehensive plan. The EAR notes that the Executive Advisory Committee is a permanent committee of the chief executive officers (or their designees) of the County, the municipalities, the Regional Planning Council, the School Board, and the South Florida Water Management District. The EAR states that the Executive Advisory Committee has been effective in the past, but has not met since 1984. Addressing the Traffic Circulation Element of the proposed comprehensive plan of Ft. Myers, the EAR accompanying the Data and Analysis of the Intergovernmental Coordination Element merely notes the inconsistencies between the two plans as to the proposed Mid-Point Bridge. The EAR concludes that the intergovernmental coordination goals, objectives, and policies of Lee County's former comprehensive plan are "very general and broad in scope[, which] is unfortunate [because] this element provides an excellent opportunity to establish a better working relationship with other units of government." The Data and Analysis underlying the Intergovernmental Coordination Element note that Lee County uses the following methods to ensure intergovernmental coordination: interlocal agreements, coordinating organizations, and informal working groups. The Data and Analysis explain that interlocal agreements allow two or more units of government to integrate functions and provide services more efficiently than each could separately. The Mid-Point Bridge is not the subject of such an agreement. The Data and Analysis state that Lee County is a member of three coordinating organizations. In addition to the Florida Association of Counties and the Southwest Florida Regional Planning Council, Lee County belongs to the Lee County Metropolitan Planning Organization (the "MPO"). The MPO, which consists of representatives from the governing boards of each local government in Lee County, is primarily concerned with transportation planning. The Data and Analysis describe three working groups: the Regional Planning Council Technical Advisory Committee, which consists of representatives from the planning departments of each of the 19 local governments in the region, the Florida Department of Transportation, and other entities; the MPO Technical Advisory Committee, which consists of staffpersons from Lee County and the cities of Ft. Myers, Cape Coral, and Sanibel; and the now-dormant Executive Advisory Committee, which consisted of the chief executive officers of Lee County, the three municipalities, and three other entities. The Data and Analysis analyze the three coordination mechanisms. The interlocal agreement is "only used when the solution to an issue has been decided upon." The interlocal agreement "has had only a small role in resolving disputes." Addressing specifically the Mid-Point Bridge dispute, the Data and Analysis note: For over twenty years a new bridge across the Caloosahatchee has been discussed to connect the central portions of Cape Coral and Fort Myers. Although such a bridge would cause admitted difficulties on both sides of the river, the idea has persisted and gained momentum through the years. The obvious symptom was the increasingly paralyzing traffic backups, especially during the commuting hours, on the existing bridges. The underlying causes of this congestion include both the area's general strong growth and also the extremely rapid construction of homes in Cape Coral, which had originally been intended as a retirement haven but instead has become a full-fledged city with all age groups well represented. Very little land was set aside for employment and commerce when Cape Coral was platted, and despite active efforts by both the Cape Coral and Lee County governments to allow business development on the Cape Coral side of the river, most jobs still lie across the river. Many studies have been conducted by all parties to this dispute. The mid-point bridge has at this point become a political issue of the greatest importance. Lee County leaders for years opposed the bridge but now are very actively supporting it as the only possible means of relieving the crippling traffic problems that have developed. The politics of the situation are such that no Cape Coral councilman could get elected without being an absolute proponent of the bridge, and no Ft. Myers councilman could get elected without being an absolute opponent. Within this context it has become apparent to all parties that the solution lies not with intergovernmental cooperation in the normal sense but rather by resolving the legalities involved. Since the issue will ultimately be settled by the courts anyway, Lee County has decided to force the issue at this time by filing suit against the city of Ft. Myers over their resistance to the bridge and their inclusion in their comprehensive plan of language to positively forbid the bridge. Just prior to the filing of this suit, a joint meeting was held between the city council and the county commission in a last attempt to resolve the difference. As this effort was entirely unsuccessful, the case is working its way through the courts. It is an emotional issue for all parties but has not otherwise interfered with a generally friendly relationship between both governments on a multitude of other issues. The Data and Analysis identify working groups as efficient methods of coordination between governments, but acknowledge that they were unsuccessful as to the Mid-Point Bridge issue. The Traffic Circulation Element of the Plan states in relevant part: GOAL 24: MAJOR INTRA-COUNTY TRANSPORTATION CORRIDORS. To provide for efficient intra- county vehicular traffic by planning an integrated system of transportation corridors, possibly of limited access design, that connect urban centers within the county. OBJECTIVE 24.1 MID-POINT CORRIDOR. Create a new east-west transportation corridor, possibly of limited access design, across central Lee County in order to alleviate existing congestion of traffic crossing the Caloosahatchee River. POLICY 24.1.1: The county will continue the planning, feasibility determination, and environmental impact assessment for the Mid- Point Bridge. POLICY 24.1.2: The construction of this east- west transportation corridor will be coordinated through the Metropolitan Planning Organization to ensure system-wide continuity. POLICY 24.1.3: Due to the overriding public need to provide this critically important corridor so as to solve existing roadway deficiencies affecting most of Lee County, and due to the admitted impossibility of devising any alignment which would not generate at least some negative impacts, it is declared as the policy of Lee County that once the best alignment is selected, this policy shall preempt any other perceived conflicting portion of the Lee Plan and such conflicts, real or perceived, shall not be construed so as to require or justify blocking the construction of this facility. POLICY 24.1.4: Because of the high priority Lee County places on the planning and construction of this transportation corridor, permitting efforts shall be initiated by the year 1989, if feasible, and construction shall begin, if possible, by the year 1993. * * * GOAL 28: INTERGOVERNMENTAL COORDINATION. Lee County shall participate in and share the leadership of all necessary and desirable programs in coordinating the transportation planning and improvements of routes within or affecting Lee County. OBJECTIVE 28.1: PLANNING. Lee County will continue to plan cooperatively with its municipalities, surrounding counties, and FDOT. POLICY 28.1.1: The county will participate in the MPO and Regional Planning Council planning processes for system-wide facility needs. POLICY 28.1.2: The county will use informal mediation whenever possible to resolve disputes before other formalized processes are pursued. * * * The Data and Analysis accompanying the Traffic Circulation Element contain an EAR for the transportation goals, objectives, and policies of the former comprehensive plan of Lee County. The EAR addresses only those goals, objectives, or policies for which modifications are recommended. Nothing concerning the Mid-Point Bridge is discussed in the EAR. The Data and Analysis note that the continued rapid growth of Lee County necessitates major roads beyond a traffic circulation map dated November 26, 1986. One of the two major elements of the addition is an east-west corridor through Cape Coral and across the Caloosahatchee River. The second is a continuous loop around central Lee County. Further studies will determine if the southwest quadrant of the loop could replace the east-west corridor. The two major additions remain largely conceptual. The Data and Analysis explain: The exact location, timing, and cost of these improvements cannot be easily determined until at least general alignments have been selected. The final alignment process is time-consuming because it must address and weigh a multitude of sometimes conflicting factors such as needed capacity, environmental impacts, affordability, engineering feasibility, neighborhood disruption, relative costs, air quality and noise impact, and permitting requirements. Moreover, this exercise must address more than one possible alignment and a "no-build" alternative. To provide the necessary flexibility to allow this alignment selection process to function, the alignment for the east-west corridor was shown only in general form on the Traffic Circulation Plan Map (which was originally adopted November 16, 1984, amended on November 26, 1986, . . . and incorporated by reference as an integral part of the Lee Plan). A shaded corridor was shown that incorporated the alignment alternatives that have been previously studied. The bridge portion of this corridor is popularly known as the "Mid-Point Bridge." Another alternative which is also being considered was not shown on the Traffic Circulation Plan Map because it was not sufficiently detailed as of the most recent revision. This alterative can generally be described as the accelerated construction of the southwest quadrant of a future loop expressway system which would include a crossing of the Caloosahatchee four to seven miles southwest of the existing Cape Coral Bridge, connecting Cape Coral from a point somewhere between Piney Point and Punta Blanca Creek, to the mainland at a point somewhere between Iona Point and Punta Rassa Cove. The bridge which would be needed to accomplish this crossing has yet to acquire a popular name. For purposes of this element it is called the "Loop Bridge." Ft. Myers opposes the construction of the Mid-Point Bridge and associated expressway, and Cape Coral supports the construction of the bridge and expressway. Provisions in the respective plans of the two municipalities generally reflect these positions. The plan of Ft. Myers was adopted on February 13, 1989, but was in preparation and available to Lee County when it adopted the Plan. No evidence was presented at the hearing that Lee County requested the participation of DCA at the adoption hearing or that DCA participated at the adoption hearing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Administration Commission enter a Final Order dismissing the petition of the City of Fort Myers. ENTERED this 6 day of April, 1990, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT E. MEALE Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 6 day of April, 1990. APPENDIX Treatment Accorded Ft. Myers' Proposed Findings rejected as irrelevant. 2-3 adopted in substance. 4-5: rejected as subordinate. 6: adopted in substance. 7: adopted. 8-22: rejected as unsupported by the greater weight of the evidence and, in some cases, irrelevant. Treatment Accorded Lee County's Proposed Findings All of Lee County's proposed findings are adopted or adopted in substance except for Paragraphs 10, 11, 21, 22, and 25-28, which are rejected as conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: David J. Russ, Senior Attorney Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399 Andrew C. Stansell Siemon, Larsen & Purdy Mizner Administration Building East Camino Real Boca Raton, FL 33432 Michael J. Ciccarone Assistant County Attorney P.O. Box 398 Ft. Myers, FL 33432 William M. Powell City Attorney P.O. Box 150027 Cape Coral, FL 33915-0027 James F. Murley 1000 Friends of Florida P.O. Box 5948 Tallahassee, FL 32314 Thomas W. Reese 123 Eighth Street North St. Petersburg, FL 33701 Kenneth G. Oertel Scott Shirley Oertel, Hoffman, et al. P.O. Box 6507 Tallahassee, FL 32314-6507 Gary P. Sams Elizabeth C. Bowman Douglas S. Roberts Hopping, Boyd, et al. P.O. Box 6526 Tallahassee, FL 32314 Frank B. Watson, Jr. City Attorney City of Fort Myers 2200 Second Street Ft. Myers, FL 33901 Harold N. Hume Henderson, Franklin, et al. P.O. Box 280 Ft. Myers, FL 33902-0280 David Emerson Bruner Chamber of Commerce Plaza 1114-B North Collier Blvd. Marco Island, FL 33937
