The Issue Whether the five thousand dollars of prize money claimed by the Petitioner should be paid to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services due to the Petitioner's outstanding debt for child support collected through a court.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is the individual whose name appeared on the lottery ticket and claim form for a five thousand dollar prize. The claim form and winning ticket were submitted by the Petitioner to the Tallahassee Office of the Department of the Lottery for validation and payment in accordance with that Department's procedures. The Department of the Lottery, as required by law, provided the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services with a list of five thousand dollar winners. The list contained the name of the Petitioner. The Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services compared the list with its records and determined that there was an arrearage in child support of eight thousand one hundred and fifty-seven dollars and eighty-four cents owed by the Petitioner in Lee County, Florida. On July 12, 1988, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services certified the child support arrearage to the Department of the Lottery in accordance with Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes. The Department of the Lottery fowarded the five thousand dollar prize money to the Office of the Comptroller. On July 19, 1988, the Petitioner was notified by certified mail by the Office of the Comptroller of its intention to apply the entire five thousand dollars towards the Petitioner's unpaid court ordered child support. The Petitioner requested a hearing on the nature of the debt and the amount owed. The amount of unpaid court ordered child support due on the date of the hearing was eight thousand one hundred and fifteen dollars and fifty-three cents.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Department of Education (Respondent) acted properly within its authority to claim lottery winnings of Kevin Frye (Petitioner).
Findings Of Fact At all times material to this case, the Petitioner was a borrower, participating in the federal student loan program. Two of the loans involved funds disbursed in 2002, and the third involved funds disbursed in 2003. Repayment of the three loans was to begin in 2005. The Respondent acted as the guarantee agency for the Petitioner's three loans under the federal student loan program. The program provided that the Respondent was obligated to repay the loan in the event of default by the borrower. Such loans were regarded as in default after passage of a 270-day payment delinquency period. Lenders reported defaulted loans by filing claims with the Respondent. The Respondent paid the claims and initiated a collection process to obtain the funds from the borrowers. The Respondent became aware of the Petitioner's defaulted loans in February 2007, when claims were filed with the Respondent by the Petitioner's lender. The Respondent paid the claims and became the owner and holder of three promissory notes documenting the loans. By letter dated March 24, 2009, the Respondent notified the Lottery that the Petitioner had outstanding student loans in the amount of $5,788.08. The amount included accrued interest as of April 8, 2009. The letter stated that such interest would continue to accrue according to the terms of the notes. The letter requested that any lottery prize proceeds won by the Petitioner be transmitted to the Respondent to be credited towards the debt. On April 9, 2009, the Lottery delivered a check in the amount of $1,000 to the Respondent with a letter identifying the amount as lottery winnings of the Petitioner. By letter dated May 13, 2009, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that the lottery proceeds had been received and would be credited towards his student loan debt. The Petitioner's request for hearing stated that he had entered into and completed a "loan rehabilitation" program and that "there is no reflection in outstanding loan balance that coincides with the lottery winnings." Although the Respondent has a program designed to rehabilitate defaulted student loans, there was no evidence presented at the hearing that the Petitioner has entered into any rehabilitation agreement with the Respondent applicable to the debt obligations relevant to this dispute.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Department of Education enter a final order applying the $1,000 lottery prize winnings of Kevin Frye to the student loan debt referenced herein. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of November, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of November, 2009. COPIES FURNISHED: Robert C. Large, Esquire Department of Education 325 West Gaines Street, Suite 1244 Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Kevin Frye 7429 Oakvista Circle Tampa, Florida 33634 Lynn Abbott, Agency Clerk Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Dr. Eric J. Smith, Commissioner of Education Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1514 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400 Deborah K. Kearney, General Counsel Department of Education Turlington Building, Suite 1244 325 West Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0400
Findings Of Fact On April 15, 1991, petitioner submitted a claim to the Department of the Lottery (Lottery) on a ticket he held for the Lotto drawing of April 13, 1991. Such ticket reflected that petitioner had correctly selected five of the six numbers drawn on that date, and rendered him eligible for a prize of $3,529.50. On May 10, 1991, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) certified to the Lottery that petitioner owed $10,374.81 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. Thereafter, by letter of May 15, 1991, the Lottery advised petitioner that DHRS had advised it of such outstanding debt and that, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, it had transmitted the prize amount to the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). Petitioner was further advised that DBF would notify him shortly regarding the distribution of such funds. By letter of May 17, 1991, DBF notified petitioner that it was in receipt of his prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply the entire $3,529.50 toward the unpaid claim owing for child support. Such letter likewise advised petitioner of his right to request a hearing to contest such action. By letter of June 3, 1991, petitioner acknowledged receipt of the DBF's letter of May 17, 1991, disputed that any such obligation was outstanding, and requested a formal hearing. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that on January 29, 1982, the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, Dade County, Florida, rendered an order approving a stipulation for payment of child support by petitioner for the support of his children. Such stipulation provided that petitioner would pay the sum of $200.00 per month toward an arrearage of $12,234.91, due as of December 20, 1981. The stipulation further provided that such payments would be made payable to the clerk of that court, which would deduct its fee, and forward the balance to DHRS for transmittal to the State of Ohio, the apparent residence of petitioner's former wife. DHRS, the agency designated by the Circuit Court to receive the child support payments deposited with the clerk of that court, and to transmit such sums to the State of Ohio, has certified that as of May 10, 1991, petitioner owed $10,374.81 in Title IV-D child support arrearage. On May 16, 1991, DHRS confirmed such arrearage with the Clerk of the Circuit Court, Dade County, Florida, and reconfirmed such arrearage on August 25, 1991. Petitioner, the party responsible to make such payments, offered no proof at hearing to controvert such certification.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order dismissing the petitioner's request for formal hearing, and that it pay to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services petitioner's lottery prize of $3,529.50, in partial satisfaction of petitioner's debt for child support. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 12th day of September 1991. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of September 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. George Luther 10900 S.W. 134th Terrace Miami, Florida 33176 Bridget L. Ryan Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether the Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery, discriminated against the Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, on account of his race in denying him equal opportunity for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave, retention and advancement?
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Petitioner, Oscar Jacobs, is an Afro-American. His race is black. The Respondent, the Florida Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as the "Department"), is an agency of the State of Florida. District 2 of the Department. In the fall of 1987 the Department created a district office in Panama City, Florida. The Panama City office of the Department was part of District 2 (hereinafter referred to as the "District"). The District consisted of Bay, Calhoun, Gulf, Jackson, Holmes and Washington Counties. Steve Sumner was hired as the District Manager for the District in October of 1987. Mr. Sumner hired the staff of the District in November of 1987. The District had the following type of positions: District Manager. The District Manager was in charge of the District office and was the immediate supervisor of the employees in the District. Among other things, the District Manager was responsible for: (1) the assignment of the geographic areas LSRs were responsible for including the designation of retailers located therein that the LSRs were to service; (2) the approval of leave; and (3) the assignment of vans. Lottery Sales Representative II (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR II"). LSR IIs were responsible for inventorying lottery ticket stock sold at retail locations, settling accounts with retailers for all lottery tickets sold, ordering lottery ticket books, reviewing settlement calculations, training retailers, completing paperwork necessary for retailers to become a lottery outlet, completing paperwork upon the termination of a retailer as a lottery outlet, ensuring that retailers operated within Department rules, soliciting, conducting and monitoring retailer promotions and recruiting new retail accounts. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR II's job description. Lottery Sales Representative I (hereinafter referred to as an "LSR I"). LSR Is were responsible for delivering lottery tickets, picking up redemption envelopes from retailers and comparing them with issuance/settlement forms, assisting retailers, maintaining paperwork and daily activity reports and filling in for, and assisting, LSR IIs. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of an LSR I's job description. Each LSR I was assigned to work with one particular LSR II. Storekeepers. Storekeepers were responsible for receiving, verifying and sorting incoming orders for lottery tickets, receiving and verifying ticket redemption envelopes and ticket returns, and insuring that materials were distributed. See Petitioner's exhibit 4 for a complete description of a Storekeeper's job description. A Receptionist. An Accountant I. An Administrative Assistant I. Clerical positions. Relevant History of Mr. Jacobs' Employment at the District. In November of 1987, Mr. Sumner hired three LSR IIs (Sandra Doll, Linda Gray and Debra Chason). All three are white. Mr. Sumner also hired two LSR Is. On November 15, 1987, Mr. Sumner hired the Mr. Jacobs as an LSR I. John Stevens was the other LSR I. Mr. Stevens is white. Danny Edwards was hired in 1987 as the Storekeeper, and Mary Jane Silcox was hired as an Administrative Assistant. Mr. Edwards and Ms. Silcox are white. At the time that Mr. Jacobs was hired, he was married. Mr. Jacobs' wife's race is white. Although Mr. Jacobs subsequently separated and eventually obtained a divorce from his wife, Mr. Sumner was not aware of these events until sometime after he had hired Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner was responsible for evaluating Mr. Jacobs' performance. For the fiscal years November 16, 1987 to November 16, 1988, November 16, 1988 to November 16, 1989 and November 1989 to November 1990, Mr. Sumners rated Mr. Jacobs' performance with an overall rating of "Exceeds At Least One Standard." The possible ratings, from lowest to highest, were "Below Standards," "Achieves Standards," "Exceeds at Least One Standard," "Exceeds Most Standards," and "Sustained Superior Performance." In April of 1988, Mr. Edwards was promoted by Mr. Sumner from Storekeeper to LSR I. In May of 1988, Larry Kissinger was hired by Mr. Sumner as the Storekeeper. Mr. Sumner also hired Hannah Davis as an LSR I. Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Davis are white. In March of 1990, one of the LSR IIs, Sandra Doll, went on maternity leave. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs to fill the LSR II position of Ms. Doll during her absence. Mr. Jacobs was selected out of the three LSR Is then working for the District. Mr. Sumner arranged for Mr. Jacobs to receive a 10 percent increase in pay. The increase in pay was to be payable while Mr. Jacobs temporarily filled the LSR II position. At about the same time that Ms. Doll went on maternity leave, another LSR II, Ms. Gray, resigned. Mr. Sumner assigned Ms. Gray's duties jointly to one of the other LSR Is, Ms. Davis, and the Storekeeper, Mr. Kissinger. Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger did not receive any increase in pay for their services. During the time that Mr. Jacobs served as a temporary LSR II, he performed satisfactorily, with assistance from other District staff. Prior to August of 1990, Ms. Doll resigned. In August of 1990, Mr. Sumner decided to promote Mr. Jacobs permanently to the position of LSR II. The Department's Personnel Office, however, informed Mr. Sumner that Mr. Jacobs did not appear to meet the minimum qualifications for the position. Therefore, Mr. Sumner assisted Mr. Jacobs to supplement his resume by expanding the description of his prior sales experience in order for Mr. Jacobs to meet the minimum requirements. Mr. Jacobs was subsequently determined to be qualified and Mr. Sumner's decision to promote Mr. Jacobs was accepted. Mr. Jacobs' salary was reduced to the amount he had been paid before he was given the temporary 10 percent increase. Mr. Sumner recommended, and Mr. Jacobs received, a permanent 7 percent increase, the maximum pay increase he could be awarded upon his permanent promotion to LSR II. As of August of 1990, Mr. Jacobs became the highest paid LSR II in the District. Mr. Jacobs remained the highest paid LSR II while he was employed as an LSR II and as an LMR. Mr. Kissinger, the Storekeeper, was promoted in August of 1990 to fill the LSR I position vacated by Mr. Jacobs. Ms. Davis was promoted in September of 1990 to fill the other LSR II position. Ms. Silcox, the Administrative Assistant, was promoted to fill Ms. Davis' LSR I position in September of 1990. Charles Frederick, whose race is black, was hired by Mr. Sumner in February of 1991, as the Storekeeper. In December of 1990, Mr. Jacobs remarried. The woman that Mr. Jacobs married in December of 1990 was white. From the time that Mr. Sumner hired Mr. Jacobs until approximately May of 1991, Mr. Sumner was satisfied with Mr. Jacobs' performance. In March of 1989 Mr. Sumner nominated Mr. Jacobs to the Department as the District employee of the month. In approximately May of 1991, however, Mr. Sumner began to lose faith in Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs believes that Mr. Sumner's attitude toward him began to change in 1991 and he attributes this change to the fact that he had married a white woman in December of 1990. Mr. Jacobs' belief is not, however, supported by the record. In light of the fact that Mr. Jacobs was married to a white woman when Mr. Sumner initially hired him and during at least part of the time that Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be satisfactory, Mr. Jacobs' belief is unfounded. A more logical explanation for the change in the relationship of Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs is Mr. Jacobs' decline in performance and Mr. Sumner's criticism of Mr. Jacobs' performance as an LSR II. After being promoted to the permanent LSR II position, Mr. Sumner found Mr. Jacobs' performance to be lacking. In September of 1990, Mr. Sumner wrote four critical memorandums to Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs, based upon these memoranda and other comments from Mr. Sumner, began to believe that Mr. Sumner was treating him unfairly. This combination of lesser performance and criticism at least contributed to the rift between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs. By approximately May of 1991 Mr. Sumner concluded that Mr. Jacobs' performance had noticeably deteriorated and he seemed to lose interest in his job. In September of 1991 Mr. Jacobs and his wife became foster parents of two infants. The infants both suffered from severe medical problems. Mr. Jacobs' relationship with Mr. Sumner became more strained as a result of the stress on Mr. Jacobs caused by the children's condition. In the summer of 1991, a new sales director for the District was hired by the Department. SEE 23. For the November, 1990 to November, 1991 fiscal year, Mr. Sumner evaluated Mr. Jacobs' performance as "Achieves Standards." This rating was one rating lower than the previous ratings Mr. Jacobs had received from Mr. Sumner. The rating was for Mr. Jacobs' first full year as an LSR II and reflected the drop in his performance as an LSR II. The following comment, among others, was made by Mr. Sumner on the evaluation: Over the past years Jake has been an enthusiastic and productive worker. This previous year has seen a deterioration of skills that he is normally capable of doing. I feel this maybe [sic] in part to environmental pressures outside of work. Many changes have been made to improve work environment, yet employee doesn't appear to enjoy his work. This change became more evident after first full year as an LSR II. Petitioner's exhibit 11. At the time of the 1990-1991 evaluation of Mr. Jacobs, Mr. Sumner was not aware that changes in the number of LSR positions in the District would be made by the Department in 1992. Effective January 1, 1992, the Department eliminated the LSR I and LSR II classifications. A single classification, Lottery Marketing Representative (hereinafter referred to as "LMR"), was created. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the decision to make this change. Mr. Jacobs, Ms. Chason and Ms. Gray were reclassified from LSR II to LMR. Mr. Edwards, Mr. Kissinger and Ms. Silcox were reclassified from LSR I to LMR. In March of 1992 Mr. Sumner was notified by the Department that the sales staff of the District was being reorganized. As a consequence, the District LMR positions were to be reduced from six positions to four. As a part of the reorganization, the District was to receive one new position: a Telemarketing Representative, a newly created employee classification. As a result of the reorganization, Mr. Sumner was faced with reclassifying/demoting one LMR and possibly terminating one LMR. Mr. Sumner was only given two weeks to make the changes. In order to minimize the impact of the reorganization on employees of the District, Mr. Sumner successfully convinced the Department to locate the new Telemarketing Representative position at the District office. Mr. Sumner informed the LMRs of the reorganization and sought volunteers to take the Telemarketing Representative position in a meeting of all LMRs. Ms. Silcox subsequently volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. At the time that Mr. Sumner was deciding how to comply with the Department's reorganization, the Administrative Assistant position in the District became vacant. Ms. Silcox subsequently agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position when Mr. Sumner asked her to. As a result of Ms. Silcox taking the Administrative Assistant position, Mr. Sumner did not have to terminate any LMR. The person in the other LMR position eliminated could move into the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner spoke to the remaining four LMRs seeking a volunteer to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Edwards indicated that he would consider taking the position but delayed a decision over night. Mr. Jacobs did the same. Ultimately, none of the remaining five LMRs volunteered to take the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner was required to select one of the five LMRs (Ms. Chason, Mr. Edwards, Ms. Gray, Mr. Jacobs or Mr. Kissinger) to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Sumner decided that Mr. Jacobs should be reassigned/demoted to the Telemarketing Representative position. Mr. Jacobs was informed of the decision and was given the choice of accepting the Telemarketing Representative position with no reduction in salary or moving to Gainesville or Tampa as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs elected to take the Telemarketing Representative position so that he would not have to move. Mr. Jacobs was placed in the Telemarketing Representative position and continued to be paid the same salary he was receiving as an LMR. Mr. Jacobs received no reduction in pay or benefits. The Basis for Mr. Sumner's Decision to Reassign/Demote Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner's decision to place Mr. Jacobs in the Telemarketing Representative position was based on his perception of the performance of the four other remaining LMRs (after Ms. Silcox had agreed to take the Administrative Assistant position) under Mr. Sumner's supervision compared to Mr. Jacobs' performance. Mr. Sumner took into account the past performance of each of the five LMRs and their progress in the various positions they had held under Mr. Sumner's supervision. Mr. Sumner did not base his decision on or consider seniority. Mr. Sumner selected Mr. Jacobs based upon the decline in Mr. Jacobs' performance since being promoted to LSR II, and his perception of the relatively slower development of Mr. Jacobs' abilities as an LSR II when compared with the other LMRs. All of the LMRs (while employed in the various positions under Mr. Sumner's supervision) had experienced problems in their performance and had been criticized by Mr. Sumner. There were no exceptions. Except for Mr. Jacobs, all of the LMRs had received consistently high evaluations of "Exceeds at Least One Standard" or "Exceeds Most Standards" each year while under Mr. Sumner's supervision. These ratings were based on their overall performance and the evidence failed to prove that the ratings were not reasonable. Only the rating given to Mr. Jacobs for his last evaluation period prior to his assignment to the Telemarketing Representative position had declined below those ratings. Two of the five LMRs had held LSR positions for a shorter period of time than Mr. Jacobs: Mr. Edwards: Storekeeper from 1987 to April of 1988, LSR I from April of 1988 to January of 1992, and LMR from January of 1992; and Mr. Kissinger: Storekeeper from May of 1988 to August of 1990, LSR I from August of 1990 to January of 1992 and LMR from January of 1992. Mr. Edwards and and Mr. Kissinger were not selected to be placed in the Telemarketing Representative position because of their consistently high evaluations and because they had both continued to progress and improve in their performance consistently after being employed in the District. Mr. Jacobs had not continued to progress and improve. The Impact of Routes on Mr. Jacobs' Performance. In the fall of 1987, the District was divided into three geographic areas (hereinafter referred to as "Routes"), by Mr. Sumner. Each LSR II was assigned to one of the three Routes and was responsible for servicing the retailers located therein. Each of the three Routes contained a part of Panama City, the largest city in the District, and a part of the rural areas of the District. Ms. Doll was assigned the eastern portion of the District, Ms. Gray was assigned the western portion and Ms. Chason was assigned the rest. Mr. Jacobs was assigned to work with Ms. Chason on the Route assigned to her. When Ms. Doll left the District and Mr. Jacobs was temporarily assigned to replace her, Mr. Jacobs took over Ms. Doll's Route plus a part of Ms. Gray's Route. Mr. Jacobs satisfactorily performed his duties as an LSR I on Ms. Chason's Route and while temporarily replacing Ms. Doll as an LSR II on Ms. Doll's Route. These Routes did not adversely affect Mr. Jacobs' performance. In September of 1990, when Mr. Jacobs was permanently promoted to LSR II and Ms. Davis was promoted to an LSR II position, the Routes were restructured by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs continued to serve the eastern portion of the District previously serviced by Ms. Doll and by him as a temporary LSR II, Ms. Chason was assigned Panama City Beach and the accounts along part of the Florida border with Georgia and Alabama, and Ms. Davis was assigned the western portion of the District. All three Routes continued to include portions of the greater Panama City area (Lynn Haven, Parker, Callaway and Springfield). The accounts on Panama City Beach were more productive during the summer months. The accounts along the Florida border also tended to be more productive. Ms. Chason was assigned these more productive accounts because she had evidenced greater skills in sales/marketing than the other LSR IIs. Not because she was white. The Routes were not totally restructured again until the January, 1992 consolidation of LSR positions. Prior to January of 1992 changes were, however, made to the Routes. These changes were made because of frequent changes in retailers participating in lottery sales and, on a few occasions, when Mr. Sumner was requested to make changes by the LSR IIs, including Mr. Jacobs. The Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs in September of 1990 was more rural than the other Routes and Mr. Jacobs was required, on average, to drive more miles than the other LSR IIs. The last relevant restructuring of Routes took place in January of 1992 after the consolidation of LSR I and II positions. At that time, the three Routes served by the LSR IIs were divided essentially in half, creating six Routes, one for each LMR. Each LSR II was allowed to select the half of the Route he or she was previously responsible for and the other half was assigned to the LSR I that had previously been assigned to the Route. Immediately prior to January of 1992, Mr. Jacobs was assisted by Ms. Silcox. When their Route was divided, Mr. Jacobs selected the half of the Route he desired and Ms. Silcox was assigned the other half. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs was unfairly affected by the Route he was assigned to or that Mr. Sumner treated Mr. Jacobs unfairly in the assignment of Routes based upon his race. Sales figures contained on evaluations performed by Mr. Sumner were not always seen by Mr. Sumner when he completed an evaluation. In at least one year, those figures were added to the evaluation after Mr. Sumner completed his part of the evaluation. The suggestion that Mr. Jacobs' Route adversely impacted his evaluations was contradicted by the fact that for three years, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Chason, who allegedly had the most favorable Route, received the same overall evaluation: "Exceeds at Least One Standard." In the first full year that Mr. Jacobs served as an LSR II, although his overall evaluation declined, the "Other Category," which included Route statistics, on Mr. Jacobs' evaluation was rated "Exceeds at Least One Standard." The suggestion that some LSRs were able to dictate their Routes was also not supported by the evidence. All of the LSRs had some input into the Routes that they handled. For example, Mr. Jacobs and Ms. Davis both requested the assignment of retailers near the Florida border. These requests were honored by Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was assigned Bascom and Malone, Florida, and Ms. Davis was assigned Campbellton, Florida. Mr. Jacobs accepted the new accounts despite the fact that the mileage he was required to travel increased. All of the LSRs were also allowed to choose between half of their prior Routes in 1992. These incidents did not prove that white LSRs were allowed to select their Routes. Sales generated in each Route had minimal impact on Mr. Sumner's evaluation of Mr. Jacobs or the other LSR's performance. No sales quotas were established and LSRs were not compensated on the basis of their sales during the period of time relevant to this proceeding. While sales had to be taken into account to some extent, performance was evaluated based upon each person's general marketing skills and efforts. Sales goals were established during the summer of 1991 by the new sales director. Each LSR was assigned a sales quota based upon a percentage increase from their last year sales figures. If an LSR failed to meet the quota, there was no consequence. Employees were commended if they did achieve their quota. LSRs were given quotas of new retailers they were to attempt to add each month. All LSR Is were given a quota of one new retailer and all LSR IIs were given a quota of two new retailers. Recruitment of retailers was not necessarily a product of the length of a Route. See Petitioner's exhibit 36. The evidence failed to prove that the Routes assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely impacted Mr. Sumner's evaluation of his ability to recruit. Based upon the weight of the evidence, Mr. Jacobs failed to prove that the assignment of Routes was made in a discriminatory manner or that Mr. Jacobs' Routes adversely affected his performance because of difficulty caused by the Routes in meeting sales or recruitment quotas. Leave Policies. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning requests for annual leave made was that District employees should request approval at least two weeks in advance of when the employee intended to be off work. The two week notice policy was well known to all employees, including Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Sumner issued several memoranda setting out the policy. Mr. Sumner also notified employees that a telephone call was all that was necessary to take annual leave if there was an emergency. Mr. Sumner's policy concerning giving two weeks notice was not strictly adhered to or enforced. Mr. Sumner recognized there were reasonable circumstances when an employee was not able to request permission to take annual leave two weeks or more in advance. As long as an employee made a reasonable effort and the operation of District would not, in Mr. Sumner's opinion, be harmed by an employee's absence, Mr. Sumner approved leave even when two weeks notice was not given. The two week notice requirement was waived for virtually every employee, including Mr. Jacobs. On one occasion Mr. Sumner denied a request by Mr. Jacobs for annual leave. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner denied the request without just cause or based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. During the period between April of 1990 and April of 1992, Mr. Sumner approved approximately 400 hours of leave, annual and sick, for Mr. Jacobs. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was treated differently because of his race with regard to leave requests he made while employed by the Department. Part of the leave taken by Mr. Jacobs was attributable to the illness of his two foster care infants. Mr. Jacobs had taken time off on numerous occasions due to their poor health. Mr. Jacobs had been required to take annual leave, rather than sick leave, for the infants because the Department's personnel office had informed Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs that State leave policies did not allow sick leave for foster care children. Mr. Sumner did not strictly enforce the notice policy for annual leave when Mr. Jacobs took annual leave for the foster care children. Nor did Mr. Sumner give Mr. Jacobs any reasonable reason to expect that Mr. Sumner would not approve the use of annual leave when the children were ill because Mr. Jacobs had not given two weeks advance notice. Nor was it reasonable for Mr. Jacobs to not realize that a simple telephone call to the office to inform the office of an emergency with the children would not be sufficient. Between March 17, 1992 and March 18, 1992, one of Mr. Jacobs' foster care infants became extremely ill. This was not the first time that the child had experienced the type of problem experienced at that time, but the problem was more severe. Although Mr. Jacobs could have simply telephoned the office the next morning and reported that there was an emergency, Mr. Jacobs reported to work. Mrs. Jacobs took the infant to a hospital where it was to be determined whether the child would be admitted to the hospital. After arriving at the office, Mr. Jacobs, who was visibly shaken, spoke with Mr. Sumner. What took place during that discussion was disputed by Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs testified that Mr. Sumner was clearly informed that he wanted to go to the hospital to be with the child but was told he had to attend to his Route first. Mr. Sumner testified that Mr. Jacobs did not specifically request time off, that he had indicated he might be require to go to the hospital sometime during the day, and that Mr. Sumner told Mr. Jacobs to service his five biggest accounts scheduled for that day and then take the rest of the day off even if it was not necessary for him to go to the hospital. Shortly after the conversation between Mr. Sumner and Mr. Jacobs, and after Mr. Jacobs had left on his Route, the child died. Mr. Jacobs was informed at his first stop and he left for the hospital. Based upon the weight of the evidence, it is concluded that Mr. Jacobs, who was tired from the events of the night before and under a great deal of stress because of his concern for the child, was not denied approval of leave by Mr. Sumner to immediately go to the hospital and was not told that he had to complete his Route. At most, there appears to have been an unfortunate miscommunication between Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Sumner about the urgency of the situation. Mr. Sumner's belief that the matter was not as urgent as it turned out to be was supported by the fact that the infants had experienced similar difficulties in the past; the fact that the child had not been taken to the hospital earlier; the fact that Mr. Jacobs had come to the office that morning instead of telephoning; and the fact that Mr. Mr. Jacobs did not insist on going to the hospital immediately. Assignment of Department Vehicles. LSRs were assigned Department vehicles, (vans) for use in servicing Routes. In approximately November of 1987, the District was temporarily assigned one less van than needed. Mr. Jacobs volunteered to drive his personal vehicle, for which he was reimbursed by the State. Mr. Jacobs drove his personal vehicle until approximately December 24, 1987, when he received a new van. Other LSRs were required to use their personal vehicles on occasion, for which they were also reimbursed by the State. Pursuant to a replacement schedule instituted by the Department, 1/3 of all vans were to be replaced every year. In this way, every van would be used a maximum of three years. This schedule was based upon estimates of the time necessary for vans to have accumulated sufficient mileage (80,000 miles) to warrant replacement. To insure that a van was ready for replacement at the end of three years, it was Department policy to assign vans with lower mileage after a year or two years use to high mileage drivers. In November of 1991, five vans in the District exceeded 80,000 miles and were to be replaced with new vans. The District, however, only received three new vans. The other two vans were replaced with two lower mileage vans scheduled to be replaced the next fiscal year. Consistent with Department policy Mr. Sumner was suppose to assign the new vans to persons who drove less miles and the older vans should have been assigned to persons who drove greater miles. In November of 1991, the mileage driven in the previous year by each LSR was as follows: Silcox 16,327 miles Chason 16,426 miles Davis 21,000 miles Jacobs 23,717 miles Edwards 24,000 miles Kissinger 30,000 miles Pursuant to Department policy, the new vans should have been assigned to Ms. Silcox, Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis. The new vans, however, were assigned to Ms. Chason, Ms. Davis and Mr. Kissinger. The vans assigned to Ms. Chason and Ms. Davis were assigned consistent with Department policy. Ms. Silcox, Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards were assigned older vans. The assignment of an older van to Ms. Silcox was inconsistent with Department policy. The assignment of older vans with less mileage to Mr. Jacobs and Mr. Edwards was consistent with Department policy. Had Department policy been followed completely and the third new van had been assigned to Ms. Silcox and not Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Jacobs would still not have received a new van. Mr. Sumner asked Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Edwards if they would drive to another district to pick up two vans. Mr. Sumner indicated that one of the new vans would be assigned to one of them if they agreed. They agreed, and Mr. Sumner awarded a new van to Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Sumner did not give Mr. Jacobs or Ms. Wilcox the opportunity to pick up the two vans located in another district. Marketing Promotions. LSRs, as part of their marketing responsibility, could conduct various types of promotions at retailers intended to increase sales of lottery tickets. LSRs were expected to conduct promotions. Quotas were assigned to each LSR II. They were expected to conduct one promotion per month. Promotions generally did not require much of a financial investment by the retailer and smaller retailers were generally as interested in conducting promotions as larger retailers. The evidence failed to prove that the Route assigned to Mr. Jacobs adversely affected his ability to conduct promotions. The evidence also failed to prove that Mr. Sumner's evaluations of Mr. Jacobs' performance while supervised by Mr. Sumner were adversely impacted by a lack of promotions caused by Mr. Jacobs' Route. Mr. Sumner believed that Mr. Jacobs performed a sufficient quantity of promotions but that he was slow about doing them. Conducting some promotions required overtime. Overtime, however, was required to be requested and approved in writing. Approval of overtime came from the Department and not Mr. Sumner. Mr. Jacobs was aware of this requirement. In December of 1991, Mr. Jacobs requested permission to conduct a promotion which involved the giving away of coffee mugs with the Department logo on them to each customer that bought a minimum number of lottery tickets. This promotion did not involve overtime and none was requested by Mr. Jacobs. Mr. Jacobs claimed that the promotion was changed to one that would require overtime, and that he was told by Mr. Sumner that approval would be obtained from the Department. The weight of the evidence failed to support this claim. In August of 1991, Ms. Chason sought approval to conduct a promotion at a seafood festival to be held in October of that year. The festival required overtime for two employees plus Ms. Chason. Ms. Chason asked for volunteers and accepted the first two persons. Mr. Jacobs did not volunteer and, consequently, was not one of the two persons selected by Ms. Chason. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved in the failure to select Mr. Jacobs, that the failure to select Mr. Jacobs was somehow unfair or that Mr. Jacobs was not selected by Ms. Chason because of his race. Mr. Jacobs also claimed that he was not given credit for two new retailers he obtained because the forms signing up the retailers were lost. The evidence, however, proved that, although the retailers were lost as Department customers, Mr. Jacobs was given credit for signing them up by Mr. Sumner. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner was involved with the loss of the forms signing up the retailers or that they were lost to cause Mr. Jacobs to fail to meet his quota for new retailers. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Sumner or the Department awarded bonuses or that Mr. Jacobs was denied bonuses because of his race. Miscellaneous Charges. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied training provided to white employees because of his race. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Jacobs was denied the use of new equipment provided to white employees because of his race. Mr. Jacobs' Charge of Discrimination. Mr. Jacobs filed a Charge of Discrimination against the Department with the Florida Commission on Human Relations. Mr. Jacbos alleged that he had been discriminated against based upon his race. On March 29, 1993, the Commission issued a "Determination: No Cause" finding "no reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful employment practice has occurred " Mr. Jacobs filed a Petition for Relief with the Commission requesting a formal administrative hearing. In the Petition for Relief filed with the Commission Mr. Jacobs alleged, in response to questions 3, 4 and 5 on the Petition for Relief, the following: Respondent has violated the Human Rights Act of 1977, as amended, in the manner specifically described below: My supervisor, Steve Sumner has systematically and intentionally denied me equal opportunities because of my race (black) for training, compensation, use of new equipment, time off from work, leave and retention and advancement in my position as an LSR. See the attached charge of discrimination incorporated herein. The disputed issues of material fact, if any, are as listed below: Mr. Sumner allowed every other LSR (all who are white) to pick their own routes which were the best routes, leaving the most difficult to me. He has also allowed other LSR's to work for bonuses during promotions but has not allowed me to do so. Mr. Sumner has misplaced some new applications for lottery retailers that I obtained so that my quotas of achievement would be lower. Mr. Sumner retained a coworker in the LSR position when he had been promoted to LSR long after me. Mr. Sumner denied my taking leave when one of my foster children was critically ill and the child died while I was at work. The ultimate facts alleged and entitlement to relief are as listed below: I wish to have a formal post-investigative proceeding. I wish to be reinstated in my LSR position with seniority back to the date of my demotion or receive adequate compensation for the harms I have suffered and reasonable attorneys fees and costs. I am a member of a protected class and Mr. Sumner has singled me out for arbitrary and negative treatment based on my race (black). All the responses Mr. Sumner has provided are pretextual or simply not true. The Commission requested that the Division of Administrative Hearings assign a Hearing Officer to conduct the hearing requested by Mr. Jacobs. At the commencement of the proceeding, Mr. Jacobs indicated that he was seeking a "general injunction", an apology from the Department, monetary compensation for damages in the form of payment for pain and suffering, attorney fees and reinstatement as an LSR II. Alleged Race Discrimination. The evidence in this case failed to prove that any action of Mr. Sumner or the Department was based upon Mr. Jacobs' race. He was not held to any standard or requirement based upon his race and he was not treated in a manner different from the treatment afforded employees of other races. The evidence proved that Mr. Sumner had hired Mr. Jacobs, that Mr. Sumner had given him high evaluations for the first three years he worked, he had temporarily promoted Mr. Jacobs to a higher position with a temporary increase in pay not afforded white employees, he had promoted him with a permanent increase in pay which made Mr. Jacobs the highest paid employee in his class at the District, and he had assisted Mr. Jacobs in insuring that he was qualified for the promotion. Only after Mr. Jacobs' performance began to decline did Mr. Sumner take actions which were somewhat adverse to Mr. Jacobs. Those actions did not take place until after three years of working together. The reasons for taking those actions were reasonably explained by Mr. Sumner and the Department. Mr. Jacobs was unable to explain the foundation for his belief that Mr. Sumner began treating him differently in 1991 on the basis of his race.
Findings Of Fact On September 13, 1985, respondent, Bernard Gross, was found in contempt of the Circuit Court in and for Dade County, Florida, for failing to comply with previous orders of the court to provide child support. According to the order rendered by the court, Gross was in arrears in the amount of $4,650 as of September 4, 1985. A copy of the order has been received into evidence as petitioner's exhibit 2. By letter dated October 24, 1985 petitioner, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS), through its contractor, the Office of the State Attorney, advised Gross that it intended to intercept his federal income tax refund, if any, to satisfy the past-due child support. According to the letter, the past due amount was then $4,425. Gross was further advised he could request an administrative hearing to contest this action no later than November 25, 1985. However, the agency's letter was not postmarked until November 26, 1985, or after the point of entry had expired, and was not received by Gross until December 6, 1985. The letter further erroneously identified the amount due as an "AFDC" claim, which meant the person due the support payments was receiving assistance under the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. This was incorrect. Gross was given an informal meeting with HRS personnel on January 29, 1986, for an undisclosed purpose. However, later HRS correspondence implies it was for the purpose of allowing Gross to attempt to get HRS to reconsider its earlier decision to intercept his income tax refund. When this effort was apparently unsuccessful, HRS, through its contractor, issued a Notice of Right to Hearing in Non-AFDC Cases on March 3, 1986, offering Gross an opportunity for a formal hearing. The notice made reference to the earlier court order dated September 13, 1985, and stated the arrearage due was greater than $500, the support was owed to or on behalf of a minor child, and it was more than three months past due. Gross thereafter timely requested a formal hearing. The clerk of the Circuit Court in and for Dade County maintains a central depository which has an account history for each person paying child and spousal support. According to the computer printout on Gross' account, Gross owed $4,650 as of September 4, 1985, but it decreased to $4,255 as of December 25, 1985. The amount is subject to change each week since the printout indicates Gross must pay $85 per week in child support. The printout has been received into evidence as petitioner's exhibit 1. Gross did not challenge or contest the accuracy of the numbers contained in the document. At final hearing petitioner ore tenus amended its request to claim only $4,255. That amount is the last amount shown on Gross' payment record, and is the balance due as of December 25, 1985. This date was selected by petitioner's counsel since it represents the most current data on respondent's account. Gross' former wife confirmed that Gross owed her more than $4,000 as of the end of 1985, but could not state the precise amount owed. Federal regulations (45 CFR 303.72) govern the conditions under which a federal income tax refund may be intercepted in a non-AFDC case to offset past- due support owed by the taxpayer. As is pertinent here, they require that the taxpayer owe support to or on behalf of a minor child and that it be not less than $500. Regulations also require that the agency substantiate the delinquent amount with a copy of the "court order, or an order of an administrative process established under State law, for support and maintenance of a child, or of a child and the parent with whom the child is living," "a copy of the payment record," or if no payment record exists, "an affidavit signed by the custodial parent attesting to the amount of support owed." In this regard, petitioner tendered into evidence a copy of the September 13, 1985 court order, a certified copy of the clerk of the circuit court's payment record, and offered the testimony of Gross' former wife, the latter in an effort to establish the amount owed her as of the end of 1985. Through his own testimony, and the submission of respondent's composite exhibit 1, Gross contended that various errors occurred in the administrative process that culminated in the final hearing. First, he cited the agency's failure to send its October 24, 1985 letter until November 26, or after the original point of entry had expired. He also pointed out that this notice was dated only fifty days after the court order, and that a minimum of ninety days is required by law. He further contended he had no opportunity prior to hearing to question the amount of past-due support allegedly owed. Finally, he pointed out that the court order of September 13 refers to an arrearage of $4,650, the proposed agency action on March 3 relies upon an arrearage of $4,450, and at hearing petitioner claimed the past due amount was $4,255. He did not deny that he owed the above amounts, but contended the agency was bound to seek only the amount shown in the court order, and by later changing the amount allegedly due, HRS has invalidated its claim.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered certifying a claim to the Secretary of the Treasury in the amount of $4,255 against respondent's federal income tax refund, if any. DONE and ORDERED this 23rd day of October 1986 in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DONALD R. ALEXANDER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 23rd day of October 1986.
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Department of Revenue should retain and apply the Petitioner’s $800.00 lottery prize to reduce an outstanding arrearage for child support.
Findings Of Fact Department of Revenue and Department of Lottery are the agencies of the State of Florida charged with the duty to enforce statutes which provide for the seizure of lottery prize winnings to satisfy past-due child support debt. On or about April 30, 2001, Johnson made a claim to a lottery prize in the amount of $800.00. The DOR notified the DOL that Johnson was indebted to the state for court-ordered child support through the court depository, in the amount of $10,626.79. Pursuant to Subsection 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner’s entire lottery prize was transferred to DOR by DOL. Petitioner was given written notice on April 30, 2001, of the DOR’s intent to intercept his lottery prize and apply it to partially satisfy his unpaid child support debt. Pursuant to a Final Judgment of Paternity and Income Deduction dated September 13, 1989, Petitioner is subject to a lawful order requiring him to pay child support. Johnson has failed to discharge his child support obligations pursuant to that judgment, and as of December 8, 1995, Johnson's arrears were $10,626.79. DOR intends to apply the Petitioner’s lottery prize in the amount of $800.00 to partially satisfy his past-due child support debt.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order retaining Johnson's $800.00 lottery prize to be applied to reduce the accrued arrearage on Johnson's child support obligation. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William Johnson 2815 Northwest 95th Street Miami, Florida 33147 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David Griffin, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart, General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Is it appropriate for Respondent, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program, to garnish funds for past due child support reduced to judgment from a joint account pursuant to Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes (2001)?1
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, an Order of Support was issued in Derrick v. Wright in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court; pursuant to this Order, Petitioner was ordered to pay $25.00 per week for the current support of his minor child, Mesheal Lee Wright, born on April 20, 1983, commencing December 16, 1985. On February 10, 1995, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings of Fact and Order on Motion for Contempt in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $10,639.02 as of October 7, 1994. On May 11, 1995, a General Findings and Order of Arrest Instanter in Derrick v. Wright was filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $9,463.02 as of December 31, 1994. On or about May 13, 2002, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings and Establishing Arrears in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $16,121.06 as of April 9, 2002, and ordered Petitioner to pay $167.00 per month in liquidation of his arrearage, commencing May 1, 2002. All the arrearage was owed by Petitioner to the custodial parent of the minor child; none of the arrearage was owed to the state. On October 15, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast by certified mail, return receipt requested, regarding any accounts of Petitioner with the credit union; Suncoast received the Notice of Freeze on October 18, 2001. Suncoast confirmed a freeze on Petitioner’s joint account in the amount of $5,573.95 as of October 18, 2001. The signature card, produced as an exhibit by the Respondent, stipulated that the account was owned as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship by Petitioner and a non- obligor joint account holder, Petitioner's sister. On October 22, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested; the Notice of Intent to Levy was received and signed for at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, on October 23, 2001. The Notice of Intent to Levy advised that a non- obligor joint owner, who claimed to have an equal right to all of the money levied upon in a joint account, had a right to contest Respondent’s action. The non-obligor joint account holder did not file a petition to contest the levy nor did she appear at the final hearing. On or about November 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition-Disputed Issues of Material Fact with Respondent. Respondent sent a Notice of Extension of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast on November 9, 2001. Pursuant to the official records of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court in Derrick v. Wright, Petitioner’s child support arrearage was $16,121.06 as of November 21, 2003. Petitioner and his sister, Sandra W. Russaw, opened a joint account with survivorship rights at Suncoast on November 21, 1997. The Suncoast account had balances of less than $100.00 for 12 of the first 25 months it was open including the five months immediately preceding January 20, 2000, when $3,900.00 was deposited in the account. On December 27, 1999, Petitioner had $3,655.00 deposited in a Resident Trust Account he maintained at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. These funds, which were deposited by the U.S. Treasury, were followed by a deposit of $749.00 from the same source. These funds were initial payments to Petitioner for Veteran's Administration benefits. On January 14, 2000, $4,200.00 was withdrawn in the form of a check from Petitioner's Resident Trust Account at the Florida State Hospital. On January 20, 2000, $3,900.00 was deposited in the Suncoast account. Over the next 23 months, from January 20, 2000, to November 31, 2001, $20,538.00 directly attributable to Petitioner was deposited in the Suncoast account. The money was from Veteran's Administration benefits paid to Petitioner by direct deposit. Not surprisingly, upon notification of the Notice of Freeze the monthly checks from the Veteran's Administration stopped being deposited in Petitioner's Suncoast account. On March 8, 2000, $5,000.00 was withdrawn from the Suncoast account, and on July 10 and 20, 2000, $4,990.00 was deposited in the same account. With the exception of the July 2000 deposits, only $1,490.00 in deposits to the Suncoast account are not directly attributable to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that: (1) levies upon the funds in Petitioner’s credit union account with Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union, Tampa, Florida, up to the amount of unpaid child support as of November 21, 2003, i.e., $16,121.06, or to the full amount frozen, whichever is less; (2) applies the funds levied to satisfy all or part of Petitioner’s past due child support obligation; and (3) credits Petitioner for the amount so applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2004.
Findings Of Fact On November 28, 1994, a hearing officer of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Circuit Court for Broward County, Florida (Seventeenth Judicial Circuit) conducted an evidentiary hearing on a petition to determine child support filed against Thomas Boganski (Petitioner). By Report dated November 28, 1994, the hearing officer determined, among other things, that Petitioner was liable for a past public assistance obligation in the amount of $8,871, representing monies received by his children from October 1991 through November 1994 and that payments on the child support obligation would be payable through the court. By Order dated December 12, 1994, a circuit judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit ratified and approved the hearing officer's Report; thereby, establishing a child support debt, payable through the court. On June 26, 1995, a hearing officer of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit conducted an evidentiary hearing on a motion for contempt filed against Petitioner for nonpayment of the child support obligation. By Report dated June 26, 1995, the hearing officer determined, among other things, that Petitioner had a past public assistance obligation and arrears totaling $10,551 as of June 14, 1995. By Order dated July 14, 1995, a circuit judge of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit ratified and approved the hearing officer's Report. On January 9, 1995, Petitioner presented to the Department of the Lottery (Respondent Lottery) a claim for payment of a lottery ticket which he had purchased. The lottery ticket had a prize value of $2,500. On June 9, 1995, the Department of Revenue (Respondent Revenue) certified to Respondent Lottery that, as of that date, Petitioner had a court- ordered past public assistance debt of $9,500. The $2,500 prize winnings was transmitted to the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller (Respondent Banking and Finance) by Respondent Lottery. Respondent Banking and Finance did not disburse the $2,500 to Petitioner but retained the entire amount. By letter dated May 9, 1995, Respondent Banking and Finance notified Petitioner that the $2,500 prize winnings had been transmitted to it by Respondent Lottery. Furthermore, Respondent Banking and Finance notified Petitioner that the entire $2,500 was going to be applied to his unpaid past public assistance obligation of $9,500.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller enter a final order providing for payment to the Department of Revenue the lottery prize winnings of $2,500 claimed by Thomas Boganski. DONE AND ENTERED this 27th day of November, 1995, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ERROL H. POWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 27th day of November, 1995. APPENDIX Respondents' joint proposed findings of fact 1 - 6 have been adopted in substance in this recommended order. COPIES FURNISHED: Thomas Boganski 1519 North 57th Terrace Hollywood, Florida 33021 Stephen S. Godwin Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue P.O. Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 The Honorable Robert F. Milligan Comptroller State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue Whether Willie J. Thompson is entitled to the $5,000.00 prize for a winning lottery ticket presented by Mr. Thompson to the Department of the Lottery for collection?
Findings Of Fact Horace Bell purchased lottery ticket number 04-202290-059 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ticket") on approximately December 11, 1988. The Ticket was an instant winning ticket in the amount of $5,000.00, in the Florida Lottery's Money Tree Instant game. Willie J. Thompson drove Mr. Bell, his wife and other family members to Tallahassee on December 12, 1988, to file a claim for the prize. Upon arriving at the Lottery's offices Mr. Bell found that he did not have proper identification. Therefore, he allowed Mr. Thompson to present the ticket for collection because Mr. Thompson had proper identification. On December 12, 1988, Mr. Thompson completed a Florida Lottery Winner Claim Form (hereinafter referred to as the "Form") and submitted the Form and the Ticket to the Lottery. On the back of the Ticket Mr. Thompson listed his name and address on the spaces provided for the person claiming the prize and signed the Ticket. Mr. Thompson listed his name, Social Security Number, address and phone number on the Form. Mr. Thompson signed the Form as the "Claimant." In a letter dated December 12, 1988, DHRS notified the Lottery that Mr. Thompson owed $4,026.40 in Title IV-D child support arrearages as of December 12, 1988. Mr. Thompson has been paying his child support arrearages by having $30.00 taken out of each of his pay checks. The $5,000.00 prize was forwarded from the Lottery to the Comptroller on December 12, 1988. By letter dated December 20, 1988, Mr. Thompson was notified that the $5,000.00 prize for the Ticket he submitted was being transmitted to the Comptroller for possible payment of his Title IV-D child support arrearages. Mr. Thompson was notified by the Comptroller by letter dated December 28, 1988, that the Comptroller intended to apply $4,026.40 of the $5,000.00 prize toward his unpaid obligation. Mr. Thompson was provided a state warrant for the $973.60 balance of the $5,000.00 prize. Mr. Thompson requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the proposed action of the Comptroller. Mr. Thompson's total obligation as of the date of the formal hearing had been reduced by the court-ordered $30.00 payments he has made since December, 1988. As of the date of the formal hearing, Mr. Thompson's total obligation was $3,335.60. His obligation will reduce further by payments made up until the date of the issuance of a Final Order in this matter. Mr. Thompson should be given credit for these additional payments.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it Is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be issued providing for payment of the portion of the $5,000.00 prize attributable to the Ticket owed by Mr. Thompson as child support arrearages as of the date of the Final Order to DHRS. The balance of the $5,000.00 prize should be paid to Mr. Thompson. DONE and ENTERED this 21st day of June, 1989, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of June, 1989. APPENDIX Case Number 89-1102 The Petitioners have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. The Petitioners' Proposed Findings of Fact Proposed Finding Paragraph Number in Recommended Order of Fact Number of Acceptance or Reason for Rejection 1. 1. 2. 2-3. 3. 4 and 6. 4 7. 5 9. 6 11. 7 13. 8-9 Conclusions of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Jo Ann Levin Senior Attorney Office of Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa E. Hargrett Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Chriss Walker Senior Attorney Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Willie J. Thompson Post Office Box 3655 Jacksonville, Florida 32206 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Charles L. Stutts General Counsel The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
