Findings Of Fact Mr. Clinton Williams won a prize of $3,839.50 on a $1.00 wager in the Lotto game for October 12, 1991. Based upon a letter to the Department of the Lottery from Chriss Walker, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Child Support Enforcement. The Office of the Comptroller found that Mr. Williams owed $3,250 as back due child support. That amount was deducted from his winnings and on November 8, 1991, a state warrant in the amount of $589.50 was delivered to Mr. Williams. The arrearage arose because an error had been made in the child support enforcement division of the State Attorney's Office in Miami. An income deduction order had been entered against Mr. Williams by the family division of the Circuit Court in Dade County Florida on September 27, 1990, but no money was ever deducted from Mr. Williams' pay. When the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services checked Mr. Williams' record after he submitted the winning ticket, the error was discovered. As a result, in January 1992 the award was modified obligating Mr. Williams to continue to pay $252 per month in child support, and to pay an additional $100 per month to pay back child support due under the September 27, 1990 order. In addition, the order entered by the Circuit Court on January 13, 1992, provides, in paragraph 14: The lottery winnings that are currently being withheld in Tallahassee shall be released to the Petitioner [the child's mother] immediately. Based on the order of the Circuit Court, there is no doubt that Mr. Williams is indebted for back child support. No error occurred in the interception of his lottery winnings to satisfy his obligation for that past-due child support.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petition for Formal Proceeding filed by Mr. Williams be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 7th day of May 1992. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of May 1992. COPIES FURNISHED: Karrin R. Boehm-Alman, Esquire Law Offices of Maurice M. Diliberto 28 West Flagler Street Suite 600 Miami, FL 33130 Bridget L. Ryan, Esquire Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Louisa H. Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriot Drive Tallahassee, FL 32301 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact On January 7, 1994, the Petitioner, Idarue Pearl Jackson, executed and submitted a Winner Claim Form to the Respondent, the Department of the Lottery (hereinafter referred to as the "Lottery"). Ms. Jackson filed a lottery ticket with the Winner Claim Form worth a cash prize of $2,500.00. On January 7, 1994, the Respondent, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as "DHRS"), informed the Lottery that Ms. Jackson owed the State of Florida $3,237.00 for excessive Aid to Families with Dependent Children (hereinafter referred to as "AFDC"), payments she had previously received. On or about January 26, 1994, Ms. Jackson was informed that the $2,500.00 prize would be applied in payment of her outstanding AFDC debt. On or about January 31, 1994, Ms. Jackson requested a formal administrative hearing to contest the decision of the Respondents. Prior to August of 1987 Ms. Jackson, then known as Idarue Shepard, began receiving AFDC payments from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. Ms. Jackson signed an information and consent form provided by DHRS prior to receiving AFDC payments. In executing the form, Ms. Jackson agreed, among other things, to the following: C. I KNOW PUBLIC ASSISTANCE RECIPIENTS (APPLICANTS) HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO: . . . . Repay the Department for any assistance received for which they are ineligible. The assistance owed will be deducted for each monthly grant amount until the entire amount is paid back. Ms. Jackson also agreed by executing the DHRS exhibit 3, to inform DHRS of any changes in her employment status which would impact her entitlement to AFDC payments. Beginning in August of 1987 Ms. Jackson began employment for which she earned a sufficient amount that she was no longer eligible for AFDC payments. Whether Ms. Jackson informed DHRS of this change is not clear. From August of 1987 through December of 1988 (excluding June of 1987), Ms. Jackson, continued to receive AFDC payments. Because of her employment, she was not entitled to the payments she received from August of 1987 to December of 1988. Ms. Jackson received a total of $3,336.00 in AFDC payments for which she was not eligible. Whether she received these payments because she failed to inform DHRS of her employment or because DHRS made an error in continuing to send her the payments is not relevant. What is relevant is that Ms. Jackson received the payments by check and that she cashed the checks. DHRS investigated the payments made to Ms. Jackson between August of 1987 and December of 1988 and determined that Ms. Jackson was not eligible for the amounts she received during that period of time. By letter dated November 4, 1989, DHRS informed Ms. Jackson that she owed DHRS for the payments she improperly received. In May of 1993, DHRS began withholding a part of other benefits Ms. Jackson was receiving in payment of the excessive AFDC payments she had received. As of the date of the final hearing of this case, Ms. Jackson still owed $3,192.00 to DHRS.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered dismissing Ms. Jackson's petition and transferring Ms. Jackson's $2,500.00 lottery prize to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services in partial satisfaction of Ms. Jackson's debt to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of May, 1994, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1994. APPENDIX Case Number 94-0772 Ms. Jackson and DHRS have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Ms. Jackson's Proposed Findings of Fact The first paragraph (other than the first sentence) is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The first sentence is a statement of the position of the Respondents. The first three sentences of the second paragraph are statements of law. The fourth sentence of the second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. See finding of fact 13. The fifth sentence of the second paragraph is a statement of law. The sixth sentence of the second paragraph is not supported by the weight of the evidence. The third paragraph is argument. DHRS' Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1 and 2. Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 6. Accepted in 13 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 7 and 8. See 9 and 11. Accepted in 14 and 15. Accepted in 11. 10-11 Hereby accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Idarue Pearl Jackson 17011 NW 37th Avenue Miami, Florida 33054 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Room 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Kim Tucker, Esquire General Counse Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Scott C. Wright Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa Warren Senior Attorney Department of the Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011 Katrina Saggio, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1323 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700
The Issue The issue for determination is whether the Department of Revenue should retain and apply the Petitioner’s $800.00 lottery prize to reduce an outstanding arrearage for child support.
Findings Of Fact Department of Revenue and Department of Lottery are the agencies of the State of Florida charged with the duty to enforce statutes which provide for the seizure of lottery prize winnings to satisfy past-due child support debt. On or about April 30, 2001, Johnson made a claim to a lottery prize in the amount of $800.00. The DOR notified the DOL that Johnson was indebted to the state for court-ordered child support through the court depository, in the amount of $10,626.79. Pursuant to Subsection 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, Petitioner’s entire lottery prize was transferred to DOR by DOL. Petitioner was given written notice on April 30, 2001, of the DOR’s intent to intercept his lottery prize and apply it to partially satisfy his unpaid child support debt. Pursuant to a Final Judgment of Paternity and Income Deduction dated September 13, 1989, Petitioner is subject to a lawful order requiring him to pay child support. Johnson has failed to discharge his child support obligations pursuant to that judgment, and as of December 8, 1995, Johnson's arrears were $10,626.79. DOR intends to apply the Petitioner’s lottery prize in the amount of $800.00 to partially satisfy his past-due child support debt.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order retaining Johnson's $800.00 lottery prize to be applied to reduce the accrued arrearage on Johnson's child support obligation. DONE AND ENTERED this 11th day of January, 2002, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. ___________________________________ FLORENCE SNYDER RIVAS Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of January, 2002. COPIES FURNISHED: William Johnson 2815 Northwest 95th Street Miami, Florida 33147 Chriss Walker, Esquire Child Support Enforcement Department of Revenue Post Office Box 8030 Tallahassee, Florida 32314-8030 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 James Zingale, Executive Director Department of Revenue 104 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 Bruce Hoffmann, General Counsel Department of Revenue 204 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0100 David Griffin, Secretary Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Ken Hart, General Counsel Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Is it appropriate for Respondent, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Program, to garnish funds for past due child support reduced to judgment from a joint account pursuant to Section 409.25656, Florida Statutes (2001)?1
Findings Of Fact On December 20, 1985, an Order of Support was issued in Derrick v. Wright in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court; pursuant to this Order, Petitioner was ordered to pay $25.00 per week for the current support of his minor child, Mesheal Lee Wright, born on April 20, 1983, commencing December 16, 1985. On February 10, 1995, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings of Fact and Order on Motion for Contempt in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $10,639.02 as of October 7, 1994. On May 11, 1995, a General Findings and Order of Arrest Instanter in Derrick v. Wright was filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $9,463.02 as of December 31, 1994. On or about May 13, 2002, a Recommendation of Hearing Officer and a Findings and Establishing Arrears in Derrick v. Wright were filed in the Hillsborough County Circuit Court, which adjudicated Petitioner’s child support arrearage in the case to be $16,121.06 as of April 9, 2002, and ordered Petitioner to pay $167.00 per month in liquidation of his arrearage, commencing May 1, 2002. All the arrearage was owed by Petitioner to the custodial parent of the minor child; none of the arrearage was owed to the state. On October 15, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast by certified mail, return receipt requested, regarding any accounts of Petitioner with the credit union; Suncoast received the Notice of Freeze on October 18, 2001. Suncoast confirmed a freeze on Petitioner’s joint account in the amount of $5,573.95 as of October 18, 2001. The signature card, produced as an exhibit by the Respondent, stipulated that the account was owned as a joint tenancy with right of survivorship by Petitioner and a non- obligor joint account holder, Petitioner's sister. On October 22, 2001, Respondent mailed a Notice of Intent to Levy in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Petitioner by certified mail, return receipt requested; the Notice of Intent to Levy was received and signed for at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida, on October 23, 2001. The Notice of Intent to Levy advised that a non- obligor joint owner, who claimed to have an equal right to all of the money levied upon in a joint account, had a right to contest Respondent’s action. The non-obligor joint account holder did not file a petition to contest the levy nor did she appear at the final hearing. On or about November 5, 2001, Petitioner filed a Petition-Disputed Issues of Material Fact with Respondent. Respondent sent a Notice of Extension of Freeze in an amount up to $16,121.06 to Suncoast on November 9, 2001. Pursuant to the official records of the Hillsborough County Circuit Court in Derrick v. Wright, Petitioner’s child support arrearage was $16,121.06 as of November 21, 2003. Petitioner and his sister, Sandra W. Russaw, opened a joint account with survivorship rights at Suncoast on November 21, 1997. The Suncoast account had balances of less than $100.00 for 12 of the first 25 months it was open including the five months immediately preceding January 20, 2000, when $3,900.00 was deposited in the account. On December 27, 1999, Petitioner had $3,655.00 deposited in a Resident Trust Account he maintained at the Florida State Hospital, Chattahoochee, Florida. These funds, which were deposited by the U.S. Treasury, were followed by a deposit of $749.00 from the same source. These funds were initial payments to Petitioner for Veteran's Administration benefits. On January 14, 2000, $4,200.00 was withdrawn in the form of a check from Petitioner's Resident Trust Account at the Florida State Hospital. On January 20, 2000, $3,900.00 was deposited in the Suncoast account. Over the next 23 months, from January 20, 2000, to November 31, 2001, $20,538.00 directly attributable to Petitioner was deposited in the Suncoast account. The money was from Veteran's Administration benefits paid to Petitioner by direct deposit. Not surprisingly, upon notification of the Notice of Freeze the monthly checks from the Veteran's Administration stopped being deposited in Petitioner's Suncoast account. On March 8, 2000, $5,000.00 was withdrawn from the Suncoast account, and on July 10 and 20, 2000, $4,990.00 was deposited in the same account. With the exception of the July 2000 deposits, only $1,490.00 in deposits to the Suncoast account are not directly attributable to Petitioner.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order that: (1) levies upon the funds in Petitioner’s credit union account with Suncoast Schools Federal Credit Union, Tampa, Florida, up to the amount of unpaid child support as of November 21, 2003, i.e., $16,121.06, or to the full amount frozen, whichever is less; (2) applies the funds levied to satisfy all or part of Petitioner’s past due child support obligation; and (3) credits Petitioner for the amount so applied. DONE AND ENTERED this 22nd day of January, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S JEFF B. CLARK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of January, 2004.
The Issue The central issue in this case is whether the sum of $1,318.00 should be permanently withheld from Petitioner's lottery winning.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Virginia Ann Dassaw, was formerly known as Virginia Ann Davis. In 1979, Petitioner was charged with a criminal violation of Section 409.325, Florida Statutes, welfare fraud. The information alleged Petitioner had received food stamps which she was not entitled to because financial assistance was not available to her. On May 29, 1979, Petitioner appeared before the court and entered a guilty plea to the charge. As a result of the negotiated plea, Petitioner received two years of unsupervised probation and adjudication was withheld. Petitioner received $1,318.00 in overpayments from the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services for the period March, 1977 through June, 1978. Such overpayments, monthly assistance payments, were from aid to families with dependent children; benefits Petitioner was not entitled to receive. Petitioner did not believe she was required to repay the overpayment amount since the criminal court did not require restitution as part of the conditions of her probation in connection with the food stamp welfare fraud. Petitioner did not, however, aver that she had repaid the obligation at issue nor did she dispute that she had received an overpayment. She felt that the criminal proceeding had been sufficient to satisfy the question. The order granting probation and fixing terms thereof did not, however, excuse Petitioner from the amount claimed in the instant case. On or about February 26, 1996, Petitioner became a lottery prize winner in the amount of $2,500.00. In conjunction with its claim for the overpayment described above, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services notified the Department of the Lottery of its claim for reimbursement from Petitioner's winnings in the amount of $1,318.00. The Department of the Lottery transmitted the winning amount to the Office of the Comptroller. The winning amount, less the claim filed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, was issued to Petitioner by expense warrant number 4-17 700 616 on March 12, 1996, in the amount of $1,182.00. Petitioner timely contested the amount claimed by the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby, RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller, issue a final order finding the Department correctly reduced Petitioner's lottery prize winning by $1,318.00 and dismissing Petitioner's challenge to the amount disbursed. DONE AND ENTERED this 25th day of October, 1996, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. JOYOUS D. PARRISH Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 25th day of October, 1996. APPENDIX Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by Petitioner: None submitted. Rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the Respondent, Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services: 1. Paragraphs 1 through 6 are accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Virginia Ann Dassaw 10075 Southwest 170th Terrace Perrine, Florida 33157 Andre L. Williams Assistant District Legal Counsel Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 401 Northwest Second Avenue, N-1014 Miami, Florida 33128 Josephine A. Schultz Chief Counsel Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Fletcher Building, Suite 526 101 East Gaines Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399 Robert F. Milligan Office of the Comptroller Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Harry Cooper General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-00350
The Issue The issues to be resolved in this proceeding concern whether the Emergency Rule 53ER99-48, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority, whether it was promulgated pursuant to a true emergency and whether certain agency statements contained in letters promulgated by the agency constitute an unadopted rule, in purported violation of Section 120.54(1)(a), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Petitioner is a corporation incorporated in the Commonwealth of Virginia as a "not-for-profit" corporation. It is registered to do business in the State of Florida. NALP is an association of six member companies. It became organized following the passage of a change to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax code enacted on October 21, 1998. That provision, I.R.C. Section 451(h), the so called "transitional rule" provided that if state lotteries offered to "cash-out" previous prize winners on a limited basis, then the tax payer would not be subject to the so called "constructive receipt doctrine." NALP's members purchase large lottery payment streams in every state that has a lottery, including Florida. The winners assign their right to the annual payments in return for a lesser amount than their payments would total over, in Florida, the twenty-year time span for pay-outs, in return for receiving the immediate cash lump-sum. In Florida this is accomplished pursuant to Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes (1999). One of NALP's main purposes is to protect the interests of its member companies through monitoring and participating in the formulation of federal legislation as well in rulemaking before various state agencies including the Florida department, as well as to provide educational materials and functions for members and for the various state lottery agencies. Each of the member companies owns at least one Florida Lottery prize and in the aggregate they own dozens of Florida large lottery prize payment streams worth over fifty million dollars. The Respondent is the Florida Department of The Lottery (Respondent or Department). It is a state agency authorized under Chapter 24, Florida Statutes, to organize, regulate and administer the operation of the state lottery and to properly account for, deposit in trust and invest lottery ticket sale proceeds and to pay related prizes from funds received from ticket sales and through investments of such lottery department revenues, all pursuant to Chapter 24, Florida Statutes, and related rules. Petitioner's Standing: The Petitioner has standing to pursue its challenge to the rule and agency statements in this case. Each of its members owns Florida lottery prizes. That is, by operation of assignment under Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes, they have assumed the interests of the actual lottery prize winners who have assigned their prizes to the members of NALP by assignment agreements enacted pursuant to the terms of this statute. The prize winners (winning ticket holders) received discounted amounts, lump-sum settlements, in lieu of prizes paid in equal annual installments over twenty years. Therefore, each of the companies who are members of NALP and hold assignment rights to the lottery prizes, are eligible for the lottery's one-time, cash-out opportunity under the subject Emergency Rule 53ER99-48, Florida Administrative Code. The Emergency Rule applies by its own terms to the Petitioner's members, as they are assignees of the prizes involved. Through the Emergency Rule as well, the Department, in effect, is competing for the same clientele, that is, past lottery prize winners who won the lottery during the relevant time period, and the same cash flow from the prize winners' annual payments as are all of the Petitioner's members by virtue of the above-referenced assignment statute. The only real difference is that the Department, by the terms of the rule, does not have to comply with the extensive "Consumer Protection" provisions of the statute which include court proceedings, explicit disclosures of purchase price and discount rate and the ultimate mandate of court orders on proposed assignments, all of which is required by Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes, of private assignment companies. In short, the Petitioner has established a sufficient substantial interest "injury and fact" which occurs within the zone of interest carved out by the lottery prize payment, revenue investment and trust fund management scheme established by Chapter 24, Florida Statutes. Emergency Rule 53ER99-48 and Agency statements Purported To be Rules. Prior to October of 1998, all large lottery prize winners could receive their prize only in equal annual installments over a period of twenty years. They were not given the choice of an immediate lump-sum, cash settlement. This was because, under the federal tax law prevailing at the time, the ability to make a choice of receiving a lump-sum prize award or payments over time automatically triggered the "constructive receipt doctrine" which thereupon allowed the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to assume the taxpayer had constructive receipt over the entire prize money and therefore, owed income tax on the entire prize in one year. However, assignments of prize payment streams to private investment companies for a cash lump-sum settlement in return were allowed through the aegis of state circuit court orders without violating the constructive receipt doctrine. Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes (1999), was enacted to provide for such assignments to third-party, private investment companies with court approval. On October 21, 1998, Congress passed an amendment to Section 451(h) of the I.R.C., henceforth called the "transitional rule." This amendment provided that if state lotteries offered, on a limited basis, to "cash-out" past prize winners, the taxpayer would not be subject to the constructive receipt doctrine for IRS tax purposes. This federal tax exception provision is only effective for a limited period of time, however, from July 1, 1999 through December 31, 2000. This change in the federal tax law does not itself authorize the Department to do anything, rather it only changes the tax consequences to individual tax payers who are lottery winners. When change in the tax code allowing state lotteries to cash-out past winners became known, Mr. Shapiro, General Counsel for a NALP member company, met with attorneys for the Florida Department in 1998 to discuss the Florida Lottery's intentions following passage of Section 451(h) (the amendment in question). In November of 1998, the Department began its examination of the federal transition rule in order to determine whether it would adopt a rule regarding cash-outs of past prize winners. There is no federal or state requirement that the Department adopt such a rule. There is no testimony of any need created by changing market conditions to adopt such a rule. The NALP sent information regarding the transition rule including memoranda and legal analysis to all the state lotteries in January of 1999. Many months elapsed during which time the Department was apparently contemplating whether or not to adopt a rule accommodating the above-referenced federal tax law change. On September 13 and September 28, 1999, letters were issued by the Department which offered a cash-out option and announced a methodology available to all previous large lottery prize winners as an alternative to the normal twenty-year, equal annual installment method of payment of prizes. These letters were sent to all eligible winners and predated the issuance of the Emergency Rule adopted by the Department and under consideration in this case. Even though the Emergency Rule was adopted after the mailing of the letters, the Department still takes the position that it relied on the letters as supplemental to the terms of the offers contained in the Emergency Rule itself. Thereafter, and almost one year after it first considered adopting a rule to accommodate the advent of the federal transitional rule, and almost a month after the first cash-out option letter went to previous lottery winners, the Department, on October 8, 1999, published its Emergency Rule 53ER99-48, entitled "Florida Lottery Prize Payment Option Election." That rule provides in pertinent part as follows: From October 1, 1999 through November 30, 1999, the Florida Lottery is providing a one-time opportunity for eligible prize winners to elect to voluntarily cash out their remaining annual installment payments and receive a single lump-sum cash payment. In order to be eligible for this opportunity, the prize winner must have won a Florida Lottery prize before October 22, 1998, which is payable over a period of at least ten years, and the prize winner must not have assigned the prize to another person or entity pursuant to Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes (1999). * * * All prize winners who elect to cash out will be paid in one lump-sum cash payment and the payment shall be calculated as follows: For all prizes, other than WIN FOR LIFE prizes, the lump-sum payment amount will be the accreted value of the Lottery's investment (original cost plus accrued interest) as determined on a date certain (the "trade date"), unless the market value of the investment is less than the accreted value determined on the trade date. In that case, the market value of the investment will be paid. If a prize winner elects to cash out, the Lottery's investment will be liquidated. . . . According to department witnesses, the delays in adopting the subject Emergency Rule were attributable to changes in the executive administration of the state due to the 1998 election of the Governor and concomitant changes in the person of the Secretary of the Lottery as well as changes in the prize payment process for new lottery winners (as opposed to past lottery winners), embodied in Rule 53-28.007, Florida Administrative Code (not here under challenge). The Department conceded that it did not make the promulgation of the Emergency Rule its highest priority and took almost a year, from October 21, 1998 to October 8, 1999, for adoption of the rule even as an Emergency Rule. No market conditions were described in the evidence which would have prevented the adoption of a regular rule proposed in the normal fashion rather than an Emergency Rule. No evidence propounded by the Department explains why regular rulemaking would not have been practicable in this matter and in dealing with the subject matter of the Emergency Rule. No reason stated by the Department at hearing will support a factual finding of any emergency existing which required the promulgation of the prize payment option election as an Emergency Rule rather than in a regularly proposed and enacted rule proposed in accordance with Section 120.53, Florida Statutes. In fact, the Internal Revenue Code transition rule option which gave rise to the purported Emergency Rule is valid through December 31, 2000, almost thirteen months after actual promulgation of the Emergency Rule. Any urgency perceived by the Department at this point was not shown to be anything other than a sense of urgency in the perceived need to adopt the past prize winner cash pay-out "Emergency Rule" caused by the Department's own delay since October 21, 1998, in promulgating a rule on the subject, emergency or otherwise. While this delay might be for legitimate, understandable reasons, the fact remains that the delay was the Departments' own responsibility and does not militate in favor of a finding that there is any emergency necessitating the adoption of an emergency rule because of changes in market conditions or for other reasons. Once a large lottery drawing produces a winner or winners and a monetary prize, the Department transfers the prize funds to the State Board of Administration (SBA) for investment pursuant to Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, and in accordance with a Trust Agreement executed between the Department and the SBA. The Department and the SBA hold those past funds in trust pursuant to Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, for the benefit of that Lottery prize winner so that the winner will be assured of receiving the prize payments in equal amounts over a twenty-year period. Under the statutorily required payments system, when a prize is awarded, the Department and the SBA calculate the amount of money needed to purchase U.S. Treasury Securities (Treasury Strips) which will generate enough funds to meet the prize payment requirements for each year of the pay-out period. The investment is then done in a manner designed to preserve capital and to ensure the integrity of the lottery disbursement system by eliminating risk of payment of funds when due and to produce annual sums of money over the required term of investments. Once the prize monies are in the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust fund, the prize is deemed awarded and paid by the Department. Thereafter, the annual payments to the lottery winner are a matter of privity between that winner and the trust fund. Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, was enacted at a time when only annual payments were statutorily authorized. Section 24.120, Florida Statutes, has not been amended since new lottery winners (post October 1998) were given the choice of annual payments or a lump-sum payment pursuant to Rule 53-28.007, Florida Administrative Code. Moreover, money for those lump-sum prize payments pursuant to that rule do not get deposited into the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust fund, but are always deposited in the trust fund called the Administrative Trust Fund pursuant to Section 24.120(1), Florida Statutes. They are not deposited in the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust because that trust was designed by the Legislature to provide investment instruments securing only equal annual installment prize payments. The Emergency Rule 53ER99-48 does not actually effectuate payment of a prize. Rather, it has the effect of changing Lottery prizes already first awarded and already transferred to the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust fund. Winners of large Lottery prizes prior to October 1998, were entitled to equal annual prize payments over a twenty-year period. The Department's Emergency Rule has the effect of changing that prize to allow a single cash payment of the funds produced from the sale of the investment held and designed by the Legislature to fund only the annual prize payments. The Department thereby would instruct the SBA to liquidate the "Treasury Strips" held in trust for the benefit of the Lottery prize winner and designed to secure payment of equal annual installments to the prize winner over twenty-years, in order to fund the lump-sum payment provided for under the Emergency Rule at issue. The Emergency Rule allows the Department to sell the trust investment which supports the twenty-year pay-out of a prize, on a "trade date" before the required term of the investments lapses. The "trade date", while it might presumably be the date of sale of the trust investment which supported installment payments of the prize in question, is not clearly defined in the rule as to what the trade date is or how it is determined. The Department would then pay the prize winner the lesser of the "market value" or the "accreted value." This lump- sum amount is not the same as the total amount of the installments the prize winner would be entitled to over the entire twenty-year period calculated as the winner's entitlement when the prize is initially awarded. The lump-sum also does not represent the liquidated value of the investment held in trust for the winner. If the accreted value is less than the market value on the trade date then the lottery winner would only get the accreted value and the Department would get the balance, presumably the difference between accreted value and market value. Thus, through this Emergency Rule the Department proposes to sell the investments before the required term lapses and potentially pay the winner only a portion of that money, thus retaining additional proceeds for the Lottery. The Emergency Rule does not specify how the Department would determine what the winner's share would be under the lump-sum arrangement, nor how much the Department would keep after payment of the lump-sum amount when the supporting investments in the trust are liquidated for a given prize winner. In this connection the Emergency Rule does not clearly define certain critical terms necessary for a lay person to be able to understand the cash-out offer from the Department. The terms include "accreted value", "original cost" and "accrued interest." Accreted value is described as being the difference in the sum of the original cost of the investment and the accrued interest earned thereon. How one determines "original cost" and "accrued interest" is not specified in the rule, however. While financial experts might easily determine how to define those terms and determine the relevant sums attributable to them, the rule is vague in these particulars in terms of adequately defining how these critical terms relate to the amount a lottery prize winner could expect from a lump-sum pay-out and in providing such a prize winner a clear understanding of how the lump-sum is calculated. Thus the rule has not been shown to be engendered by a true emergency and, in the particulars referenced last above, it is vague. Agency statements Defined As A Rule: On September 13 and 28, 1999, the Department issued letters to previous lottery prize winners setting forth the terms and conditions concerning the formulae and method in which the pricing, timing and other terms and conditions of cash pay-outs would be determined. Those letters pre-dated the promulgation of the subject Emergency Rule. Several of the Petitioner's member companies received the cash-out offer letters similar to those attached to the Petitioner's petition. The letter stated, in pertinent part: If you elect to cash out, however, you will receive a single, smaller lump-sum payment. This amount will be the accreted value of the Lottery's investment (original cost plus accrued interest) as determined on a date certain (the "trade date"), unless the market value of the investment is less than the accreted value determined on the trade date. In that case, you will receive the market value of the investment. . . . The Department's letters thus contain a formula for determining the amount of the cash-out offer. That formula is not disclosed or contained in the Emergency Rule, even though it purports to apply to all previous lottery winners eligible under the rule. Be that as it may, the Respondent has asserted in its Proposed Final Order that the Petitioner's challenge to the letters as agency statements amounting to a rule is now moot with the enactment of the subject Emergency Rule. This appears to amount to a recession by the Department from reliance on the statements and content of those letters in defining and implementing its cash pay-out program for previous Lottery winners. Nevertheless, in the context of resolving all issues raised by the Petitioner, the question of those letters having the quality of an unpromulgated rule will be addressed below. The Department has cited Sections 24.105(10)(j), 24.115(1) and 24.109(1), Florida Statutes, as the source of its rule-making authority. Section 24.105(10)(j), Florida Statutes, provides the Department with authority to adopt rules concerning the manner of payment of prizes to holders of winning tickets and such other matters necessary or desirable for the efficient or economical operation of the lottery or for the convenience of the public. See also Section 24.105(10)(e), Florida Statutes. Section 24.105(10)(j), Florida Statutes, however, does not specifically authorize cash pay-outs to previous lottery winners already determined to be eligible to receive payment as holders of winning tickets and who have already received awards of payments in equal annual installments pursuant to Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes. Section 24.115(1), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to adopt rules "to effect payment of . . . prizes." However, the payment of prizes to the relevant past winners was effected when the Department made its initial one-year payment to the pertinent prize winners and then paid the remaining cash represented by the winning tickets to the SBA in the trust established by the Legislature for the lottery winners, for investment in securities supportive of equal annual installment payments to the winners pursuant to the trust arrangement established in Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes. Section 24.109(1), Florida Statutes, while it authorizes the Department to adopt emergency rules in general when such emergency rulemaking power " . . . is necessary for the preservation of the rights and welfare of the people in order to provide additional funds to benefit the public . . . " does not specifically authorize any particular emergency rule subject matter, including cash pay-outs to prior Lottery winners already determined eligible to receive prize payments in equal annual installments pursuant to Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes. The Department, pursuant to Section 24.104(2), Florida Statutes, and Section 24.121(2), Florida Statutes, has a mandate "to maximize revenues consistent with the dignity of the state and the welfare of its citizens" in order to provide, among other things, improvement of the Educational Enhancement Trust Fund each year. The Department has not shown any specific authority to adopt a rule which changes a prize previously awarded, even though it might create new revenues as a result of the difference between lump-sum awarded to a past winner and the accreted value of the investment supportive of the prize, or the market value as the case may be. There is no specific authority to have such funds previously invested to support annual installment payments of prize money being diverted from the trust fund set up by the Legislature by Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, instead of, for instance, the "Administrative Trust Fund," constituted under Section 24.120(1), Florida Statutes. These findings in conjunction with the reasons given in the Conclusions of Law below show that the Department exceeded its rulemaking authority in enacting the Emergency Rule and the agency statements at issue. Enlargement Modification or Contravention of the Implemented Law: Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides for a payment of prizes on a deferred basis and for the safe investment of the prize monies set aside in the trust fund under that section for payment of deferred prize payments. That section also provides for production of equal annual sums of money over the required term of the investment (twenty years). The Emergency Rule and the agency statements at issue depart from the terms of the trust relationship set up by the Legislature through Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, by changing the prize awarded to allow the early liquidation of prize monies invested on behalf of the prize winners in the trust fund constituted under that section. Such a change in the prize awarded and manner of award is not authorized by the terms of that statute. The Emergency Rule and agency statements thus enlarge, modify and contravene Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, by departing from the terms of the trust created by the Florida Legislature designed to ensure a safe investment of lottery monies so as to produce annual prize payments over twenty years. The Emergency Rule, by allowing a liquidation of trust investments before the statutorily required term and by allowing the trustee of the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust (the Department) to intentionally profit from liquidation of the trust investments and concomitant change in the prize awarded departs from the conditions of the Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes, trust, and the purposes for which it was established. In the enactment of this rule, the Department stands in the position of a trustee varying the terms of a trust in terms of the benefits to be afforded the beneficiary of that trust and the method of calculation and payment. While the beneficiary (the prize winner) in the trust analogy might agree with that course of action, the settlor has not assented to variance from the terms of the trust arrangement. The Florida Legislature is in a position analogous to the settlor of the trust created pursuant to Section 24.120(2), Florida Statutes. Since that law, implemented purportedly by the Emergency Rule and agency statements, does not itself provide authority for the change in the award of prizes and methods of paying prizes embodied in the rule and in the agency statements, it would appear that the settlor, the Legislature, must first assent to the new arrangement (ipso facto by an amendment to the statute). Moreover, it should be pointed out that the new arrangement contemplated by the Emergency Rule would be accomplished without any disclosure to a lottery winner of the discount rate or dollar amount that the state would retain, in the sense that the terms in the rule of "trade date," "market value," "original cost" plus accrued interest or "accreted value" are not adequately defined on the face of the rule. They are thus amenable to varying interpretations, leading potentially to ad hoc policy decisions by the agency or necessitating further illumination by the agency through an additional rule enactment, thus rendering the rule, in the sense of the employment of these terms and any disclosure to the lottery winner, vague. There are various "consumer protection" standards set forth in Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes (1999), which are directed to the third-party assignment arrangement whereby lottery winners may assign their right to the annual installment payments of their prizes to third-party entities and thus obtain from those entities a discounted, lump-sum payment of a prize. Those standards or restrictions include oversight by a circuit court and include the necessity of approval of the assignments and lump-sum payments through third-party entities by an appropriate circuit court order. They also include a provision allowing the prize winner a three-day cancellation period opportunity. The Emergency Rule and agency statements at issue in this case modify, contravene or depart from the provisions of that law because the Department in the so-called emergency cash pay-out provision in the subject rule is not required to adhere to the "consumer protection restrictions" mandated by Section 24.1153, Florida Statutes (1999). Although the end result of what the Department proposes by the Emergency Rule achieves a lump-sum, cash payment to the lottery winner, unlike the arrangement to be set up by the Emergency Rule, the "cash-out" assignment arrangement authorized by Section 24.1152, Florida Statutes, was mandated by the Legislature. The Emergency Rule is potentially arbitrary and capricious (meaning not adequately supported by facts or enacted without adequate support as to reason or rationale) 1/ The impetus for the Emergency Rule, as found above was a change in the Internal Revenue Code concerning the "constructive receipt doctrine". The relevant I.R.C. provision Section 451(h), contains the "qualified prize option" test. The Emergency Rule purports to meet that test but does not. A qualified prize option must contain three things: (1) A clear statement that it is only an offer; (2) A statement of the offer methodology; and (3) A disclosure of the discount rate that makes equivalent the present value of the prize previously awarded and the Department's new offer (lump-sum pay-out). The Emergency Rule does not adequately disclose the methodology of the offer since critical terms enabling a lay prize winner to understand the offer are not clearly defined, as referenced in the Findings of Fact above. The Emergency Rule does not require, on its face, any disclosure of the discount or amount of the prize valued as of an identified date. In its Executive Summary regarding its decision to adopt the Emergency Rule, the Department stated that it would meet the requirements of Section 451(h), by providing full and clear disclosure "as described in the Federal Tax Conference Report on Section 451(h)." The rule has the potential of being arbitrary and capricious in its operation since it does not in fact meet the qualified prize option test in the I.R.C. provision by clearly disclosing the discount rate or the methodology used in arriving at the offer, even though it purports to disclose those matters. Agency statements As Rules: The agency statements, the letters mailed to each prior prize winner contain financial information specific to each individual prize winner but they also contain general formulae to be applied by the Department to all eligible winners in cashing out prizes under the Emergency Rule. Thus the letters expand the cash-out procedure by providing cash-out formulae and other critical conditions beyond those which are stated and disclosed in the rule itself. This is necessary information for the prize winners to make decisions on accepting the Department offers but was not adopted as a rule and is not contained in the Emergency Rule. It is meant by the Department to apply to the entire universe of eligible prior prize winners.
The Issue The issue in this case concerns the application of Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, to a claim for payment filed by a person who owes a child support arrearage but who did not purchase the lottery ticket presented for payment.
Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits received in evidence at the hearing, I make the following relevant findings of fact. On November 2, 1992, Petitioner, Joseph Judah, Jr., the husband of Petitioner, Diana Judah, presented for payment at the DOL's office in St. Petersburg, a lotto ticket which had been purchased by his wife and which had a prize value of $4,989.50. Mr. Judah placed his name, address and signature on the back of the ticket and completed and signed the winner claim form. Additionally, he presented, as proof of identification, his driver's license and social security card. Pursuant to procedures set forth in Chapter 53-4, Florida Administrative Code, on November 3, 1992, DHRS certified to DOL that Mr. Judah owed $13,302.00 in child support arrearages as of that date. DOL transmitted the prize amount to the Office of the Comptroller and applied the entire amount of $4,989.50 to Mr. Judah's child support arrearages. Mr. Judah was notified that the lottery prize would be applied to his outstanding child support arrearages which prompted him to timely request an administrative hearing. It is undisputed that Mrs. Judah purchased a winning lotto ticket with her money and she is not personally responsible for the support of Mr. Judah's child from a prior marriage. At all times material hereto, DOL had in effect Rule No. 53ER87-43, Florida Administrative Code, entitled "Procedure for Awarding Prizes". That rule provides, in pertinent part, that: (6) Until such time as a name is imprinted or placed upon the back portion of the lottery ticket in the designated area, a lottery ticket shall be owned by the physical possessor of such ticket. When a name is placed on the rear of the ticket in the designated place, the person whose name appears in that area shall be the owner of the ticket and shall be entitled to any prize attributable thereto.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: The Department of Banking and Finance, Office of the Comptroller, issue a Final Order in this case providing for payment to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services of the entire $4,989.50 prize money originally claimed by Petitioner, Joseph Judah, Jr. DONE AND ENTERED this 14th day of July, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of July, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esq. General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Carrole R. Ward, Esquire 12029 Majestic Boulevard, Suite 7 Bayonet Point, Florida 34667 Karen M. Camechis, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa H. Warren, Esquire Department of Lottery Capitol Complex Tallahassee, Florida 32399-4011
Findings Of Fact Everett Stapleton held a winning ticket from the December 9, 1989, Florida Lotto drawing, and claimed his prize of $4,312.50 on December 12, 1989. The Office of the Comptroller searched the records of state agencies to determine whether Mr. Stapleton was indebted to the state, or owed child support which was being collected through a court. It determined that Mr. Stapleton owed $5,896 in child support, and therefore withheld paying the prize. By an Amended Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage dated November 29, 1983, Mr. Stapleton had been required to make child support payments of $50 per week through the Clerk of the Circuit Court in Dade County. During the hearing, the parties had conflicting payment records from the Clerk of the Circuit Court. After a recess, during which Mr. Stapleton and representatives of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services consulted, they came to an agreement, which they announced when the hearing reconvened. The parties agreed that as of Friday, April 20, 1990, Mr. Stapleton owed $6,796 in back child support, under the Amended Final Judgment Dissolving Marriage dated November 29, 1983.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Office of the Comptroller requiring the payment of the $4,312.50 to the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, to be applied to reduce Mr. Stapleton's current obligation for past due child support. DONE and ENTERED this 26th day of April, 1990, at Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of April, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Chriss Walker, Esquire Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren, Esquire Department of the Lottery 205 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jo Ann Levin, Esquire Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Everett Stapleton 17600 Northwest 27 Court Miami, Florida 33056 Honorable Gerald Lewis, Comptroller Department of Banking & Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, General Counsel Department of Banking & Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether petitioner's lottery prize is subject to an outstanding debt to any state agency or owing child support collected through a court.
Findings Of Fact On June 16, 1993, petitioner submitted a claim to the Department of Lottery (Lottery) on a Black Jack Instant Ticket she held. Such ticket reflected that petitioner was eligible for a prize of $1,000.00. On June 17, 1993, the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (DHRS) certified to the Lottery that petitioner owed $1,224.00 in Aid to Families with Dependent Children benefit overpayments and $675.00 in Food Stamp benefit overpayments, for a total of $1,899.00. Thereafter, pursuant to Section 24.115(4), Florida Statutes, the Lottery transmitted the prize amount to the Department of Banking and Finance (DBF). By letter of June 28, 1993, DBF notified petitioner that it was in receipt of her prize from the Lottery and that it intended to apply the entire $1,000.00 toward the unpaid claim owing DHRS. Such letter, likewise, advised petitioner of her right to request a hearing to contest such action. By letter of July 13, 1993, petitioner requested a formal hearing to contest DBF's action, and the matter was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings for the assignment of a Hearing Officer to conduct a formal hearing pursuant to Section 120.57(1), Florida Statutes. At hearing, the proof demonstrated that the only state warrants actually negotiated by petitioner, which represented an overpayment of benefits for Aid to Families with Dependent Children, totalled $612.00. All other state warrants which had been issued to petitioner, and upon which DHRS had initially calculated the debt owing to it from petitioner for overpayments of Aid to Families with Dependent Children and Food Stamp benefits, had been returned, unnegotiated, to the state. Accordingly, the total debt shown to be owing DHRS by petitioner was $612.00.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order applying $612.00 of petitioner's lottery prize of $1,000.00 to satisfy the debt owing DHRS, and remit the balance of $388.00 to petitioner. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of October 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Debra J. Ihasz 1529 61st Trail South West Palm Beach, Florida 33415 WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of October 1993. Scott C. Wright Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Katrina M. Saggio Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1335 23 Winewood Boulevard Building One, Room 407 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0700 Louisa Warren Department of Lottery 250 Marriott Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32301 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
The Issue The issue in this case is whether Petitioner has an outstanding arrearage for child support and, if so, whether the Department of Revenue is authorized to retain and apply the Petitioner’s $1,471.00 lottery prize to reduce an outstanding arrearage for child support.
Findings Of Fact On November 22, 1995, Petitioner, James Earl Pickett, was ordered to pay monthly ongoing child support of $175.00 per month, $5.25 clerk’s fee, $29.00 per month for retroactive support arrears of $7,395.00 and $5.25 clerk’s fee for a total monthly child support obligation of $179.00 per month. On or about February 8, 2002, Petitioner entered into a Stipulation for Increased Pay Back on Arrears (Stipulation) with the Department, acting on behalf of Delores Griffin-Pickett.1 The Stipulation provided in part the following: I, James E. Pickett, do swear that I am the Respondent in this cause, and recognize my obligation to provide support for the dependent(s) named. * * * I swear that I am the natural father of the above-child(ren) * * * I agree to payment of the following amounts: $145.00 per month as current support $50.00 toward arrears of $8357.25 as of 02/07/2002 * * * for a TOTAL PAYMENT OF $195.00 per month, commencing next charge date. All payments shall be made payable to the State of Florida Disbursement Unit . . . Tallahassee, Fl 32314-8500. * * * I agree that this Court shall reserve Jurisdiction over arrears due and owing, if any. I agree to entry of an Income Deduction Order effective immediately. I understand it is my obligation to pay child support when it is not being deducted from my pay check. . . . * * * I have executed this Stipulation FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY, and with full knowledge of its contents. By executing the Stipulation described and quoted in paragraph 3 above, Mr. Pickett agreed to the terms and conditions therein. The Stipulation was approved and adopted in an Order issued on March 11, 2002, by the Circuit Court of the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of Florida in and for Hillsborough County, in State of Florida, in the case of Department of Revenue, on behalf of Delores Griffin-Pickett v. James E. Pickett, Civil Circuit Number 95-9901. In adopting the Stipulation, the Order provided that "Respondent shall pay $145.00 monthly as current support, plus $50.00 monthly towards arrears of $8,357.25 as of 2/7/02, for a total payment of $195.00 monthly, commencing the next charge date." On December 11, 2002, Mr. Pickett and the Department executed a Stipulation and Final Order Approving Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License and/or Motor Vehicle Registration (Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License). Pursuant to the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License, Mr. Pickett: agreed that, as of December 11, 2002, there was a delinquency in the child support obligation of $1,255.00 and a total past due balance of $8,416.29; and (2) agreed to make lump sum payment of $300.00 toward the child support obligation on or before December 11, 2002. According to a notation next to this provision, Petitioner paid this $300.00 on December 11, 2002. The Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License also provides that Respondent agrees and understands that the periodic child support obligation is $145.00 per month, as on-going child support, plus $60.00 per month, toward the past due balance until paid in full, for a total periodic payment of $205.00 per month, with such payments to begin on January 1, 2003. In addition to the foregoing, Mr. Pickett agreed to pay administrative and court costs of $258.00 within 365 days.2 The Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License provides that "[t]he parties agree that this stipulation may be entered into evidence in a court of competent jurisdiction and shall be binding on the parties." Furthermore, pursuant to the terms of that stipulation, "[a]ll conditions and terms of the previous court orders not changed by this agreement remain in full effect." The Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License provides that Mr. Pickett "executes this Stipulation [on Suspension of Driver License] freely and voluntarily, and with full knowledge of its contents. At this proceeding, Mr. Pickett testified that he executed the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License in order to retain his driver’s license.3 However, notwithstanding his reason for signing the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License, Mr. Pickett never denied that he was obligated to pay child support, that he was delinquent in that child support obligation, and that there was a past due balance of the child support obligation. Moreover, at this proceeding, Mr. Pickett presented no evidence that he had paid the child support and the past due child support obligation as reflected in the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License. By executing the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License, Mr. Pickett agreed to the terms and conditions set forth therein. The Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License was approved and adopted in an Order Approving Stipulation [Order] entered on December 29, 2002. See State of Florida, Department of Revenue, on behalf of Delores Griffin-Pickett, vs. James E. Pickett, Circuit Civil Number 95-9901, in the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit of the State of Florida in and for Hillsborough County. The Order specifically found that Mr. Pickett freely and voluntarily entered into the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License. Additionally, the Order adopted and incorporated the Stipulation on Suspension of Driver License. In connection with the Order entered December 29, 2002, the court also entered an Income Deduction Order directing present and subsequent employer/payers. One provision of the Income Deduction Order requires employers/payers "to deduct 100% of any income paid in the form of a bonus other similar one-time payment, up to the amount of arrearage reported in the income deduction notice or the remaining balance thereof and forward to the court depository." On October 23, 2006, the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County prepared and issued an Arrearage Affidavit (Affidavit) in Case No. 95-9901. The Affidavit noted that as of the date of the Affidavit, Mr. Picket had remaining established arrears for child support of $7,416.54. As of the date of the final hearing, Petitioner's outstanding arrearage for child support was $7,416.54. Mr. Pickett appeared at this proceeding. However, he did not present any evidence to establish that he does not owe the outstanding arrearage, as alleged by the Department, or that he has paid the outstanding arrearage for child support. Instead, Mr. Pickett argued that he was unaware of the Order issued on March 11, 2002, and the Order issued on December 29, 2002, requiring him to make the payments discussed in the above findings. At the time of this proceeding, and at all times relevant to this proceeding, Mr. Pickett has resided at 2721 North 46th Street in Tampa, Florida.4 This is the address that is listed on the Stipulation, the Stipulation on the Suspension of Driver license, and the Orders related thereto, and discussed above. Moreover, both the Order issued March 11. 2002, and the Order Approving Stipulation entered December 29, 2002, show that copies of those orders were furnished to Mr. Pickett at 2721 North 46th Street in Tampa, Florida.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Revenue enter a final order that authorizes it to retain Petitioner's lottery prize of $1,471.00 and apply that total amount to reduce Petitioner's accrued child support arrearage of $7,416.54 . DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of Januuary, 2007, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S CAROLYN S. HOLIFIELD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of January, 2007.