The Issue The issue in this case is whether the challenged portions of Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority as defined by Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes.
Findings Of Fact The Parties The Respondent The Department is the state agency charged with the responsibility of building and maintaining the state’s transportation system. Each year the Department lets out hundreds of road and bridge construction projects totaling over one billion dollars. The projects range from sidewalk improvements to major bridge construction. Accordingly, there is a wide range of expertise and qualifications necessary for the different kinds of projects let by the Department in Florida. Section 337.14(1), Florida Statutes, requires any person desiring to bid on any Department construction contract in excess of $250,000 to first be certified by the Department as qualified to perform the work to be let. Pursuant to Section 337.164, Florida Statutes, the Department qualifies contractors to preserve the integrity of the public contracting process, to ensure an open and competitive environment for the benefit of the taxpayers, and to ensure a quality project in terms of public works. Pursuant to Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, persons seeking to bid on contracts in excess of $250,000 must first file an application for a Certificate of Qualification with the Department. The statute specifically authorizes the Department to enact rules addressing the qualification of persons to bid on contracts in excess of $250,000, including requirements with respect to competency, responsibility, equipment, past record, experience, financial resources, and organizational personnel of the applicant. Gregory Xanders is the State Construction Engineer. His duties include setting policy and reviewing contractor responsibility and qualifications under Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code. In conjunction with reviewing a contractor’s qualifications, the State Construction Engineer’s Office receives input from other personnel, including contract managers in the field, the Department General Counsel’s Office, the Department Inspector General’s Office, and other cities and counties who may work with the contractor. The State Construction Engineer’s Office also reviews any intended decision to deny, suspend, or revoke a contractor’s Certificate of Qualification with the Assistant Secretary of the Department. When the State Construction Engineer’s Office makes a preliminary determination that a contractor’s Certificate of Qualification should be suspended, revoked, or denied, the contractor is notified and informed of its rights to an administrative hearing to contest the intended decision under Section 120.569, Florida Statutes. The Petitioner MBI is a company which engages in road building and asphalt paving. Since the early 1980s MBI has been qualified to bid on and awarded several Department projects. Approximately 80 percent of MBI's workload involves Department projects. Pursuant to Department rules, MBI annually submits an application to renew or obtain an updated Certificate of Qualification in order to continue bidding and performing Department projects. In 1997, MBI was denied qualification to bid on Department projects for approximately ten months. However, MBI was subsequently qualified by the Department during calendar year 1999. On or about March 31, 2000, MBI filed an Application for Qualification with the Department. By letter dated May 18, 2000, the Department gave MBI notice of its intent to deny MBI’s Application for Qualification, and stated that any subsequent application would not be considered for a period of two years. The Department’s letter advised MBI that the denial of the application constituted "a determination of non-responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract" for the same period. Specifically, the letter provided: Please be advised that pursuant to Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Rule Chapter 14- 22, Florida Administrative Code, it is the intent of the Department of Transportation (hereinafter Department) to deny Mitchell Brothers, Inc.’s (hereinafter Mitchell Brothers) Application for Qualification dated March 31, 2000. This denial shall preclude consideration of any subsequently submitted Application for Qualification for a period of two (2) years. Additionally, this denial shall constitute a determination of non- responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract and shall prohibit Mitchell Brothers from acting as a material supplier, contractor, or consultant on any Department contract during the period Mitchell Brothers is not qualified by the Department. The Department’s Notice of Intent denied MBI’s Application based upon a determination that MBI had demonstrated "a pattern of exorbitant and false, deceptive or fraudulent statements, certifications, or materials in claims for payment," and "a lack of management expertise and continuity." By Petition for Formal Hearing dated May 30, 2000, MBI challenged the Department’s Notice of Intent to Deny MBI’s Application for Qualification. MBI’s Petition for Formal Hearing was referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings and assigned DOAH Case No. 00-2431. On September 18, 2000, the Department served on MBI a Modified Notice of Intent to Deny MBI’s application. The Modified Notice gave additional grounds for the Department’s decision to deny MBI’s Application for Qualification. Among the additional grounds for denying MBI’s Application were the following: MBI submitted false, deceptive, fraudulent, erroneous or unreasonable statements, certifications, or materials in its claims for payment to the Department, the City of Tallahassee, the Leon County School Board, and other owners; MBI submitted claims or statements for services not performed or expenses not incurred; MBI failed to avoid, diminish or otherwise mitigate the effects of construction delays; and MBI failed to reasonably cooperate with the Department’s efforts to investigate the accuracy of MBI’s delay claims and statements. On October 13, 2000, MBI filed it’s Petition Seeking Administrative Determination that Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, is an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority (DOAH Case No. 00-4234RX). Specifically, in paragraph 11 of its Petition, MBI alleges that the Rule enlarges, modifies, or contravenes specific provisions of the law implemented, and that the Rule is vague, fails to establish adequate standards for agency decisions, or vests unbridled discretion in the agency. MBI later alleged that the Department had also exceeded its grant of rulemaking authority. A three-week final hearing was scheduled to commence in DOAH Case No. 00-2431 on October 26, 2000. Shortly prior to hearing, Petitioner filed a Motion to consolidate DOAH Case Nos. 99-2431 and 00-4234RX. The Department opposed the motion based on their counsel's inability to be adequately prepared for the 00-4234RX rule challenge proceeding. In lieu, the parties agreed to temporarily break from the 00-2431 hearing during the second week and commence the rule challenge. However, on the morning of October 26, 2000, MBI filed a Notice of its Withdrawal of its Petition for Formal Hearing in DOAH Case No. 00-2431. Consequently, DOAH Case No. 00-4234RX was scheduled for hearing on November 14, 2000. Based on MBI’s Notice of Withdrawal of its Petition, an Order Closing File was entered in DOAH Case No. 00-2431 on November 1, 2000. On November 2, 2000, the Department entered a Clerk’s Order of Dismissal of MBI’s Petition challenging the denial of its Application for Qualification. "Good Cause" Defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, provides: For reasons other than delinquency in progress, the department, for good cause, may determine any contractor not having a certificate of qualification nonresponsible for a specified period of time or may deny, suspend, or revoke any certificate of qualification. Good cause includes, but is not limited to, circumstances in which a contractor or the contractor’s official representative: Makes or submits to the department false, deceptive, or fraudulent statements or materials in any bid proposal to the department, any application for a certificate of qualification, any certification of payment pursuant to s. 337.11(10), or any administrative or judicial proceeding; Becomes insolvent or is the subject of a bankruptcy petition; Fails to comply with contract requirements, in terms of payment or performance record, or to timely furnish contract documents as required by the contract or by any state or federal statute or regulation; Wrongfully employs or otherwise provides compensation to any employee or officer of the department, or willfully offers an employee or officer of the department any pecuniary or other benefit with the intent to influence the employee or officer’s official action or judgment; Is an affiliate of a contractor who has been determined nonresponsible or whose certificate of qualification has been suspended or revoked and the affiliate is dependent upon such contractor for personnel, equipment, bonding capacity, or finances; Fails to register, pursuant to chapter 320, motor vehicles that he or she operates in this state. Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, authorizes the Department to deny, suspend, or revoke an Application for Qualification based upon a determination of "good cause." "Good cause" is defined by six examples specified in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, but the statute further provides that "good cause includes, but is not limited to" the six circumstances specified in the statute. "Good Cause" Defined in the Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, is entitled: "Suspension, Revocation, or Denial of Qualification." Subsection (1) of this Rule provides in pertinent part: (1) The Department will, for good cause, as that term is defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, suspend, revoke, or deny any contractor’s qualification to bid. A suspension, revocation, or denial for good cause pursuant to this rule shall prohibit the contractor from bidding on any Department construction contract for which prequalification is required by Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, and shall constitute a determination of non- responsibility to bid on any other construction or maintenance contract and from acting as a material supplier, subcontractor, or consultant on any Department contract or project during the period of suspension, revocation, or denial. As provided in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, such good cause shall include, but shall not be limited to, the provisions of paragraphs (a) through (e) below. When a specific period of revocation, denial, or suspension is not specified by this rule, the period shall be based on the criteria of Rule 14-22.0141(4), F.A.C., as well as Department contractor certification activities. (a) The contractor’s Certificate of Qualification shall be denied or revoked for at least one year when it is determined by the Department that any of the following has occurred: One of the circumstances specified under Section 337.16(2)(a), (b) or (d), Florida Statutes, has occurred. Affiliated contractors submitted more than one proposal for the same work. In this event the Certificate of Qualification of all of the affiliated bidders will be revoked or denied. All bids of affiliated bidders will be rejected. The contractor made or submitted to the Department false, deceptive, or fraudulent statements, certifications, or materials in any claim for payment or any information required by any Department contract. The contractor defaulted on any Department contract or the contract surety took over any Department contract from the contractor. Rule 14-22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, authorizes the Department to deny, suspend, or revoke a contractor’s qualification to bid based on a determination of "good cause" as that term is defined in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes. The term is defined by examples contained in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and in the Rule, but it is not exhaustive. In addition to the list of examples of "good cause" specified in Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14- 22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, the Department consistently considers other criteria contained in Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, which relate to the qualifications of a contractor. Section 337.14, Florida Statutes, requires the Department to consider a contractor’s equipment, past record, experience, financial resources and organizational personnel. Other factors considered are contained in Rule 14-22.003, Florida Administrative Code, which addresses the rating of the applicant, work performance record, quality of work performed, history of payment, timeliness of completing projects, cooperative attitude, contract litigation, claims, defaults, integrity, and responsibility. Both Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, provide the industry with sufficient guidance as to the criteria for "good cause." Responsibility A contractor bidding on projects of less than $250,000 is presumed to be responsible unless one of the circumstances specified in Rule 14-22.0141, Florida Administrative Code, occurs, in which case the contractor may be deemed "non- responsible." In addition to being "qualified," a contractor seeking to bid on projects over $250,000 must also be deemed to be "responsible." By statute, a contractor must be "responsible" as a prerequisite to being "qualified." Section 337.14(3), Florida Statutes, provides: (3) Upon the receipt of an application for certification, the department shall examine it, verify its statements when necessary, and determine whether the applicant is competent, is responsible, and possesses the necessary financial resources to perform the desired work. The Department must consider the responsibility of the contractor during the review of its Application for Qualification. If a contractor’s qualification has been denied, suspended, or revoked for "good cause," then the contractor is deemed to be non-responsible and not allowed to bid on any project. Under Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, the Department may determine the time period in which a contractor is deemed to be non-responsible. Period of Disqualification As to the period of disqualification, Section 337.16(2), Florida Statutes, and Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, provide a framework of guidelines and, in some instances, detailed timeframes relating to specific circumstances. For example, Section 337.165(2)(b)1, Florida Statutes, specifically requires the Department to deny or revoke a contractor's certification for a period of 36 months when the Department determines that the contractor has been convicted of a contract crime. This statute provides a frame of reference for the Department in establishing the period of disqualification. Within the framework provided by Chapter 337, Florida Statutes, and Chapter 14-22, Florida Administrative Code, the Department considers a period of disqualification ranging from 0 to 36 months. Rule 14-22.012, Florida Administrative Code, states that when a Certificate of Qualification is denied or revoked for any of the specified reasons in Rule 14-22.012(1)(a), Florida Administrative Code, the denial or revocation is "for at least one year." This revocation period only provides a lower limit. Rule 14-22.012(1), Florida Administrative Code, further provides: "When a specific period of revocation, denial, or suspension is not specified by this rule, the period shall be based on the criteria of Rule 14-22.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, as well as Department contractor certification activities." Rule 14-22.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides that a contractor will be "ineligible to bid on Department contracts for a period of time based on the seriousness of the deficiency." Rule 14022.0141(4), Florida Administrative Code, provides examples of factors affecting the seriousness of the deficiency. Under the Rule, the examples of factors affecting the seriousness of the deficiency include impacts on project schedule, cost, quality of work, unsafe conditions allowed to exist, complaints from the public, delay or interference with the bidding process, and the potential for repetition. It is not possible to codify in a rule the precise time period of disqualification for every single instance. Because the facts and circumstances supporting a determination of "good cause" vary, it is impracticable to compile an exhaustive list for each instance.
The Issue The Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board (Petitioner herein) seeks to revoke Carroll L. Mozingo's (Respondent herein) license to practice as a registered general contractor based on allegations which will be set forth hereinafter in detail that he diverted funds in violation of Chapter 468.112(2)(e), Florida Statutes. Based upon my observation of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying and the entire record compiled herein, I make the following:
Findings Of Fact The Respondent is a registered general contractor, who holds current license no. RG0015876. On September 7, 1976, Respondent entered into a contract with Robert Johnson and his wife Sandra Johnson for a room addition and patio to their house located at 197 North Roscoe Blvd., Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. The full amount of the contract plus agreed upon extras amounted to $9,640.00. (Petitioner's Composite Exhibit Number 2) Respondent applied for and obtained a building permit for the construction of the Johnson's addition on or about September 27, 1976, and construction commenced shortly thereafter. (Petitioner's Exhibit Number 1) Donald Jermaine, a St. Johns County field inspector, testified that he conducted inspections on the subject job and noted numerous violations of the St. Johns County Building Code. He coordinated the inspections for this project up until the time it was abandoned by Respondent during mid February, 1977. At the time of abandonment, the owner, Robert Johnson, had paid a total amount of $11,021.96 to Respondent and/or various suppliers. To complete the job as contracted by the parties (Johnson and Mozingo) Messr. Johnson had to pay Proctors Construction Company $2,800.00, an electrical contractor $369.00 and a plumbing contractor $520.00 for a total expenditure over and above the above referenced contract amount of $3,689.00. He testified that no additional work was done to his home. The Respondent testified that he expended $7,458.00 for materials on the Johnson project and was unable to complete it because his mortgage payments were delinquent and he was not receiving any additional monies from Messr. Johnson to fulfill his obligations. He testified that he was unable to work at night and therefore had to seek other employment with another contractor. The above explanation by the Respondent which led to his abandonment of the subject project does not excuse him from his contractual obligations to either fulfill the contract as agreed upon or to seek a renegotiation based on additional costs and/or unexpected circumstances. This was not done nor was any other explanation given as to where the additional monies in excess of $4,000.00 was spent. I therefore conclude that he engaged in a diversion of funds as alleged in the administrative complaint filed by the Petitioner on May 27, 1977. I shall so recommend.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Respondent's general contractor's license be suspended for a period of two years. RECOMMENDED this 2nd day of December, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Barry Sinoff, Esquire 1010 Blackstone Building Jacksonville, Florida 32202 C. H. Hoskinson, Chief Investigator Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211 Carroll L. Mozingo 1909 Ed Johnson Drive Jacksonville, Florida 32218 ================================================================= AGENCY FINAL ORDER ================================================================= BEFORE THE FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD FLORIDA CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY LICENSING BOARD, Petitioner, vs. DIVISION OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS, DOCKET NO. 77-1095 CARROLL L. MOZINGO dba CARROLL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, RG 0015876, 1909 Ed Johnson Drive, Jacksonville, Florida 32218, Respondent. /
Findings Of Fact The Department adopts and incorporates herein the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in the Recommended Order. Accordingly, it is ORDERED that: The Department’s actions in this cause are affirmed, and the Petitioner’s formal written protest is hereby dismissed with prejudice. DONE AND ORDERED this Al day of October, 2005, in Tallahassee, Florida. , JAMES V. CROSBY, JR., Secretary Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 (850) 488-2326 RIGHTS OF APPEAL This Order may be appealed with thirty (30) days by filing a Notice of Appeal with the agency and with the District Court of Appeal. Except in cases of indigence, the Court will require a filing fee and the agency will require payment for preparing the record on appeal. For further explanation of the right to appeal, refer to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes, and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure. Copies furnished to: Barbara J. Staros, Administrative Law Judge’ Richard J. Saliba, Esquire Division of Administrative Hearings Susan P. Stephens, Esquire The DeSoto Building Department of Corrections 1230 Apalachee Parkway 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32399-3060 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Michael E. Riley, Esquire Louis A. Vargas, General Counsel Gray Robinson, P.A. Department of Corrections Post Office Box 11189 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, FL 32302-3189 Tallahassee, FL 32399-2500 Filed in the official records of the Department of Corrections on this al day of October, 2005. Agency Clerk
Conclusions This matter comes before the Department of Corrections (“Department”) for consideration and final agency action. On June 30, 2005, Barbara Staros, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”), Division of Administrative Hearings, conducted a formal hearing in this cause and, on September 9, 2005, issued a Recommend Order. A copy of the Recommended Order is attached hereto as Appendix “A”. Pursuant to section 120.57(3)(e), Florida Statutes, and Rule 28-106.217, Florida Administrative Code, the parties were allowed ten (10) days to submit exceptions to the Recommended Order. On September 19, 2005, The Sherwin-Williams Company, herein after referred to as Petitioner, submitted its Exceptions to Recommended Order. Respondent, the Department of Corrections (hereinafter referred to as the Department), has not submitted any exceptions to the Recommended Order. On September 15, 2005, ‘the Department filed a motion to tax costs. On October 5, 2005, the ALJ granted the motion to stay and placed the motion to tax costs in abeyance until the issuance of a final order and any appellate proceedings concluded. STANDARD OF REVIEW An agency may not reject an ALJ’s findings of fact “unless the agency first determines from a review of the entire record, and states with particularity in the order, that the findings of fact were not based upon competent substantial evidence or that the proceedings on which the findings were based did not comply with essential requirements of law.” Section 120.57(1)(), Florida Statutes; see also Florida Power & Light v. State of Florida, Siting Board, 693 So.2d 1025, 1027 (Fla. 1* DCA 1997). An agency may not reweigh the evidence presented at formal hearing and substitute its findings for those of the ALJ. South Florida Water Management District v. Caluwe, 459 So.2d 390, 394 (Fla. 4" DCA 1984). Accordingly, an agency must accept an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are supported by competent substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 395. Finally, an agency may not circumvent these requirements by simply characterizing an ALJ’s findings of fact as legal conclusions. Goin v. Commission on Ethics, 658 So.2d 11318 la. 1"DCA 1995). RULINGS ON PETITIONER’S EXCEPTIONS 1. Petitioner’s Exception #1 to the findings of Fact in Paragraph #24 is rejected. This finding of fact largely consists of a quote from Bobby Brooks, an Operations and Management Consultant Manager for the Department. This quote is taken directly from the transcript of the hearing conducted on June 30, 2005. Nothing in Petitioner’s argument contradicts the actual finding in Paragraph 24. . Petitioner’s Exception #2 to the findings of Fact in Paragraph #13 is rejected. This finding was stipulated to by both parties. See Pre-Hearing Stipulation of the Parties, filed June 27, 2005. . Petitioner’s Exception #3 to the findings of Fact in Paragraphs #25 and #28 are rejected. Again, these findings stem directly from the testimony of Mr. Brooks found in the transcript. The conclusion complained of in the exception is found nowhere in the actual findings of fact that are being challenged. . Petitioner’s Exception to the conclusion of law found in Paragraph #35 is rejected. The hearing officer’s finding that the only evidence of a policy that the Department rejects and rebids when only one responsive bid is received comes from Mr. Brooks’s testimony and is supported by the finding of fact in Paragraph # 25: . Petitioner’s Exception to the conclusions of law found in Paragraphs #38 and #39 are rejected. As noted by the hearing officer, Mr. Brooks articulated a factual and logical basis for the decision to reject all bids, and even if one “may have reason to disagree with how Mr. Brooks reached his decision, his decision is not illogical.” (Recommended Order, p. 11) . Petitioner’s Exception to the conclusion of law found in Paragraph #41 is rejected. “An arbitrary decision is one not supported by facts or logic, or despotic.” Board of Trustees of Internal Imp. Trust Fund v. Levy, 656 So.2d 1359, 1362 (Fla. 1 DCA 1995) citing Agrico Chemical Co. v. Dep’t of Environmental Regulation, 365 So. 2d 759, 763 (Fla. 1" DCA 1978). From the transcript, it is clear that the decision to reject all bids is based on reason, even if one does not agree with the end result. Mr. Brooks reasonably had concerns about the bid prices and the fact that there was not a competitive bid. These concerns are certainly not indicative of a despotic or arbitrary decision. Again, “[a]bsent a showing that the purpose or effect of the reject is to defeat the object and integrity of competitive bidding,” the Department’s decision to reject all bids must stand. Gulf Real Properties, Inc. v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 687 So. 2d 1336, 1338 (Fla. 1" DCA 1997),
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Albert J. Ruocco, is licensed as a registered building contractor in the State of Florida, holding license number RB00030112. His last address in the Department's file is 604 Citrus Court, Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951. Sometime prior to the date of the administrative complaint, the Department received a complaint from Mrs. Dale Normington that Ruocco told her he had obtained a termite treatment for the addition he constructed on her home, but that no treatment was done. DPR investigator, John Allen, told Mrs. Normington to send her back-up information. John Allen received in the mail a copy of the purported contract between the Normingtons and Rivers Edge Construction Company, Inc., Ruocco's Company. He also received a series of cancelled checks and a copy of a letter purportedly sent by the Normingtons to Albert Ruocco. John Allen checked the Department's licensing files and obtained the licensing information on Ruocco. He also personally served the Administrative Complaint on Ruocco, but did not, to the best of his recollection, discuss the complaint with him or have any other contact with him. Ruocco never responded to any investigative correspondence. Douglas Vanderpoest, owner of Slug-A-Bug, a pest control company, established that his company never treated the addition to the Normington resident. Brevard County Building Inspector, Howard Stott, knows Albert Ruocco and is familiar with the addition Ruocco installed for the Normingtons in 1985. A permit was obtained and Stott performed three inspections, including the slab, pre-lath and final on the addition. Brevard County requires evidence of termite treatment of soil for any new construction or modifications to an existing structure. The practice is usually for the inspector to require a receipt or evidence of treatment prior to approving the slab. Stott does not remember whether he required the evidence on the Normington job. The permit in those days did not have a space to indicate the termite treatment. However, Stott did approve the slab, as noted on the permit.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is, hereby RECOMMENDED: That the Administrative Complaint dated November 2, 1987, be dismissed. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 20th day of May, 1988, in Tallahassee, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of May, 1988. COPIES FURNISHED: David E. Bryant, Esquire Bryant, Reeves & Deer 220 East Madison Street Suite 530 Tampa, Florida 33602 Albert J. Ruocco 604 Citrus Court Melbourne Beach, Florida 32951 Fred Seely, Executive Director Construction Industry Licensing Board Department of Professional Regulation Post Office Box 2 Jacksonville, Florida 32201 William O'Neil General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether the Registered Building Contractor's License No. RB0026535 and the Registered Roofing Contractor's License No. RC0028413 issued to Respondent Bradshaw should be revoked.
Findings Of Fact Respondent holds Registered Building Contractor's License No. RB0026535 and Registered Roofing Contractor's License No. RC00284I3. On March 17, 1977, Respondent Bradshaw entered into a contract with Mr. and Mrs. Dennis Gergely to build a home in Fruitland Park, Florida, for a contract price of $33,400. Changes in the contract were agreed upon by Bradshaw and the Gergelys in addition to contract price. The home had not been completed in November of 1977. The Gergelys filed a complaint with the Lake County Board of Building Examiners in October, 1977. Thereafter, in November of 1977, Mr. and Mrs. Gergely dismissed Respondent Bradshaw as a contractor. After the dismissal of Respondent, Mr. and Mrs. Gergely were left with $6,974.71 undistributed funds, insufficient to complete their home in accordance with the contract. In June and August of 1977, the Gergely home was inspected by the building inspectors of the Lake County Building Department and, although they reported no problems, the Lake County Board of Building Examiners inspected the construction site on February 7, 1978, and reported numerous violations. The Lake County Board of Examiners held a public hearing on April 4, 1978, and revoked Respondent's Lake County certification. On June 21, 1978, Respondent Bradshaw filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. On October 26, 1978, Petitioner filed an administrative complaint against Respondent. Respondent requested an administrative hearing on November 3, 1978. Liens in the amount of $4,564.32 were filed against the Gergely property for Respondent's failure to pay labor and material bills. Some of said amount may have been amounts owed by Respondent for other construction sites. Respondent admitted that materials were supplied by the Green-Harris Building Supply Company, Inc., prior to a second draw, and that he did not pay Green-Harris for material supplied previously. The lien filed against the Gergely home by Green-Harris Building Supply Company, Inc., was in the amount of $3,171.97. Supplies were sent to the Gergely home in June and July of 1977, and the second draw was in August of 1977. The contractor's affidavit, signed by Respondent, stated that all materials and labor had been paid, although the Green-Harris Company had not been paid. The Hearing Officer further finds: That the Gergelys had anticipated the home was to be completed within three or four months after the contract was let; That the long delay caused them great expense and inconvenience; That Respondent did not actively pursue the building of the home or the paying of bills in a business-like manner; and That the Gergelys had just cause to dismiss Respondent and proceed to finish the construction of their home. Petitioner contends that the licenses of the Respondent should be revoked and a fine paid, for the reasons that Respondent filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; that his Lake County building license was revoked; that he diverted funds he received in payment for supplies which he did not pay for, and for which he executed an affidavit stating that said supplies had in fact been paid; and that Respondent's disagreement with the Lake County Board could have been pursued at the time of that Board's revocation. Respondent contends that he was discharged from the job by the Gergelys and was not allowed to come back and finish the job; that the Board of Building Examiners had agreed to allow Respondent thirty (30) days to correct the Gergely complaints, but Gergely would not allow the corrections; that it was impossible for members of the Board of Building Examiners to attribute any of the alleged deficiency to Respondent, inasmuch as three months had elapsed between the last work of Bradshaw and the citing of code violations by the committee; and that the filing of bankruptcy by Bradshaw is only a technical violation of Section 468.122(7), Florida Statutes.
Recommendation Suspend the building contractor's license and the roofing contractor's license held by Respondent Vernon Keith Bradshaw and assess a penalty of $500. DONE and ORDERED this 13th day of April, 1979, in Tallahassee, Loon County, Florida. DELPHENE C. STRICKLAND Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: Michael Egan, Esquire 217 South Adams Street Post Office Box i386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Reich, Esquire Post Office Box 1132 Tavares, Florida 32778
The Issue Whether Building Permit No. 9210004560 issued by Monroe County, Florida, to Ken Bockhaut as owner and Shoremont Holiday Homes, Inc. as contractor for the construction of a dock as a structural accessory to a single family dwelling is contrary to the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, the Monroe County Comprehensive Plan and the Monroe County Land Development Regulations.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state land planning agency charged with the responsibility to administer the provisions of Chapter 380, Florida Statutes, and the regulations promulgated thereunder. Petitioner has the authority to appeal to the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission any development order issued in an area of critical state concern. The appeal in the instant proceeding was timely. No appearance was made by Respondents Ken Bockhaut or Shoremont Holiday Homes, Inc., and there was no evidence submitted in support of the permit that is the subject of this appeal.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is recommended that the Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission enter a final order which sustains the appeal filed by the Department of Community Affairs and which rescinds building permit number 9210004560. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of January, 1993. COPIES FURNISHED: Lucky T. Osho, Esquire Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 Randy Ludacer, Esquire Monroe County Attorney Fleming Street Key West, Florida 33040 Ken Bockhaut H-17 Miriam Street Key West, Florida 33040 Shoremont Holiday Homes, Inc. Post Office Box 1298 Big Pine Key, Florida 33043 William R. Kynoch, Deputy Director Florida Land and Water Adjudicatory Commission Executive Office of the Governor Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carolyn Dekle, Director South Florida Regional Planning Council Suite 140 3400 Hollywood Boulevard Hollywood, Florida 33021 Robert Herman Monroe County Growth Management Division Public Service Building, Wing III 5825 Jr. College Road Stock Island Key West, Florida 33040 Linda Loomis Shelley, Secretary Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100 G. Steven Pfeiffer, General Counsel Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2100
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Hearing Officer recommends that the license of Frederick B. Mee d/b/a B & M Air Conditioning and Refrigeration Service, Inc., be suspended until satisfactory proof of his personal finances is received by the Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board. DONE and ORDERED this 5th day of July, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. STEPHEN F. DEAN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675 COPIES FURNISHED: David Linn, Esquire Post Office Box 1386 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Mr. Frederick B. Mee 1123 El Dorado Parkway Cape Coral, Florida 33904 Mr. J. K. Linnan Executive Director Florida Construction Industry Licensing Board Post Office Box 8621 Jacksonville, Florida 32211
Findings Of Fact DOT has been engaged for some years in a program to improve U.S. Highway 1, which runs through the Florida Keys. The program has involved highway paving, and reconstruction of most of the bridges. The roadway and bridge construction projects require large amounts of fill material. DOT has experienced an increase in the cost of obtaining fill material in the Florida Keys. To lessen the cost of the fill material DOT is seeking to open a borrow pit on Dudjoe Key. The pit, and an adjoining roadway would cover approximately fourteen acres. DOT initially filed a permit application with DER, seeking approval to construct the pit. DER ultimately issued a notice of intent to deny the application on the grounds that reasonable assurances had not been given that the short-term and long-term effects of the proposed project would not violate water quality standards set out in DER's rules and regulations. DOT thereafter filed a request for variance from the water quality standards so that the pit could be permitted. This proceeding ensued. Petitioner is a Florida corporation which does business in Monroe County, Florida. Petitioner has engaged in numerous public road and bridge construction projects in the Florida Keys and in the selling of fill material for road and bridge construction projects. Petitioner currently owns and operates a "borrow pit" on Cudjoe Key. Petitioner's pit is located within one- half mile of DOT's proposed pit. The purpose of the DOT pit would be to provide fill material which the Petitioner currently provides from its Cudjoe Key pit. DOT originally asserted that operation of a state borrow pit would result in savings of nine million dollars. This assertion has been scaled down to three million dollars, and more recently to 1.5 million dollars. Basically, DOT asserts that fill from a state-owned pit would be cheaper because the operation costs would be approximately the same, but no royalty would need to be paid for the material. DOT sought to establish the amount of potential savings at the hearing through two kinds of analysis: First, DOT offered the testimony of its former cost estimator as to the costs per cubic yard of fill from a state-owned pit as opposed to fill from a private contractor pit; and second, DOT offered bid submissions that have been made by contractors in recently bid projects in the Keys, and which had alternative bids for state-owned and private contractor supplied fill material. DOT's estimator calculated that the State would save approximately 1.5 million dollars through operation of a state-owned borrow pit. The testimony, however, is not of probative value, and cannot serve as the basis for a finding to that effect. In the first place, many of the estimator's figures were determined through private conversations that he had with various unnamed contractors. This hearsay evidence is not cumulative nor corroborative of other evidence, and cannot therefore serve as the basis for a finding of fact (See discussion at Paragraph 2 of the Conclusions of Law, infra.). Furthermore, the estimator underestimated the heavy equipment that would be required to operate the borrow pit; underestimated the cost of the equipment; did not include insurance, social security, and overtime in labor costs; overestimated by twice the number of swings that a dragline would be able to make; and underestimated the cost of moving equipment to the site. Methodology used by the State's estimator would appear to be the best that is available to the State in making initial estimates as to the cost of proposed road-building projects. The State does not have the detailed cost information available to it that private contractors have. While useful for the purpose of making preliminary estimates of the cost of proposed projects, the methodology is not adequate to support a finding of fact based as it is upon hearsay, and containing numerous miscalculations. The second line of analysis offered by DOT to establish the amount of possible savings was a comparison of recent bids submitted by contractors. Special provisions drafted by DOT for the Park and Bow bridge projects using two alternatives for embankment or fill material. Alternate "A" in the bid called for state-furnished material. The low bidder on the project was Atlantic Foundation Company, Inc. Under Alternate "A", Atlantic bid a price of $9.35 per cubic yard for embankment material, and $12.00 under Alternate "B". This would have resulted in a total of $222,574.00 lest using the Alternate "A" bid on the Park and Bow projects. The second low bidder, MCC of Florida, Inc., bid $11.13 for material under Alternate "A", and $14.02 under Alternate "B". Alternate "A" would have been $247,752.00 cheaper under the MCC bid. Petitioner was the next low bidder, and it bid $10.05 per cubic yard under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". Hardaway Constructors, Inc., was the only other bidder, and it offered $10.00 under Alternate "A", and $10.25 under Alternate "B". The potential savings in favor of Alternate "A" under all of these bids is reduced somewhat by clearing and grubbing costs which were bid separately by the contractors. Clearing and grubbing costs would actually have made Alternate "B" cheaper under the bids submitted by Petitioner and Hardaway. Clearing and grubbing costs would not, however, continue as a cost item in subsequent projects, because once clearing and grubbing is accomplished, it would not need to be done again. DOT seeks to apply bid differentials submitted for the Park and Bow Channel jobs to determine the potential saving the State could realize by using a state-owned landfill for the remaining road and bridge projects in the Keys. Approximately 402,039 cubic yards of embankment material will be needed to complete the remaining projects. Using the high differential between Alternates "A" and "B" submitted for the Park and Bow Channels (that submitted by MCC), which was $2.89 per cubic yard, the potential saving would be $1,161,892.00. Using the low differential (twenty cents per cubic yard as submitted by Petitioner), savings would be $80,407.00. Subsequent to the hearing, DOT awarded the Park and Bow Channel construction to the low bidder, Atlantic Foundation, Inc. The Alternate "B" proposal was accepted. DOT did not accept that proposal because of a preference to do that, but rather so that the otherwise advantageous bid could be accepted despite the pendance of this proceeding. During the hearing, bids were opened for two new road and bridge projects in the Keys: the Kemp and Torch-Ramrod Channel Projects. The apparent low bidder on these projects was the Petitioner. Petitioner bided a price of $11.00 for embankment material if provided by a private contractor, and $10.80 if provided from a state-owned pit for the Kemp project, and $10.40 and $10.20 respectively for the Torch-Ramrod Project. The differences between the two reflect differences in hauling distance. The price differentials for contractor versus state provided embankment material in projects that have already been let cannot be used to determine with any precision the amount of saving that would inure to the State through opening its own borrow pits. Potential savings depend upon many factors. The primary of these factors is which contractor happens to make the lowest bid for the project, and this in turn depends upon the contractor's cost figures for many items other than embankment material will receive the bid only if the total bid is lower than that submitted by other contractors. It is clear that opening a state-owned borrow pit would result in some savings. It appears that $10.00 per cubic yard is the lowest possible price that could be expected for contractor- provided fill material. It appears that state-furnished material could reach a price as low as $7.00 per cubic yard, although none of the bids submitted up to the time of the hearing reflected such a price. It appears that the highest potential saving would be less than the approximately one million dollars that would have been saved if the price differential reflected in the Atlantic Foundation bid on the Park and Bow Channel projects became the differential in all subsequent projects. It also appears that the saving would be somewhat more than the eighty thousand dollar saving that would inure if the price differential reflected in the Petitioner's bid on the Park and Bow projects remained consistent. Beyond these parameters, the evidence would not support a finding as to the amount of savings. The fourteen-acre site of the proposed borrow pit is presently comprised entirely of tidally inundated wetland areas. Approximately two-thirds of the area has average water depths up to six inches. The southeastern portion of the site is dominated by buttonwood, and red, black and white mangrove. All of these species are wetland indicator species under DER's rules and regulations. A large number of mollusks inhabit the area, and it is a feeding area for birds, and for deer. The area of the proposed borrow pit is within the Key Deer Refuge, which is managed by the Refuse Division of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. There is now a stable herd from 350 to 400 Key deer, an endangered species, and they feed primarily on mangrove. There are 15 to 20 deer in the Cudjoe Key area. The deer do presently feed in the area of the proposed borrow pit. The proposed pit, including the access roads, would comprise approximately fourteen acres. It would be located landward of a berm so that there would not be a constant exchange of waters between the pit and surrounding areas. There would be an initial two-foot drop form the edge of the pit, and then a slope of five-to-one extending into the pit. A ten-to-one slope would be preferable because ultimately vegetation would be ore easily established in such a slope area. The term "Borrow pit" is actually a euphemism for a mining operation. Material would be extracted from the pit to be used as embankment material on the Keys road and bridge projects. The pit would ultimately reach a depth of more than thirty feet. Construction of the borrow pit would result in obliteration of approximately fourteen acres of a natural wetland environment in the Keys. All the flora and fauna presently on the site would be destroyed. During the time that the pit is being constructed and actively operated, violations of DER's standards for turbidity, lead, oils and greases, and transparency would be likely. Once the mining operation terminates, these short-term impacts would lessen; however, violations of the Department's dissolved oxygen standards would be likely as long as the pit exists. A viable biologic community could be established along the fringes of the pit, but in the deeper areas, low dissolved oxygen levels would be a limiting factor. Other mining operations in the Keys and elsewhere in Florida confirm the likelihood of dissolved oxygen violations. Loss of the fourteen acres of feeding ground for the Florida Key deer would be a significant loss in terms of preservation of that species. The proposed borrow pit is located adjacent to U.S. Highway 1. On the other side of the highway, there is a housing development. Operation of the borrow pit, especially blasting activities would inevitably prove a nuisance to residents of that area. One witness testified that blasting would likely cause damage to the residences, but this was not confirmed by competent, scientific evidence.
