Findings Of Fact The Petitioner, Lawrence A. Grolemund, has been in the securities business for over 21 years. Except for two complaints--one in 1986 and a second 1988--he has not been the subject of complaint or investigation by the National Association of Securties Dealers (NASD) or any state. He earned a reputation as a successful securities dealer and, as his career progressed, as manager of securities dealership branch offices. As branch manager, one of Grolemund's primary responsibilities was to insure that his office functioned in compliance with applicable state and federal law, and the rules of the NASD. Due to the reputation Grolemund had earned, the Chairman of the Board of Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., personally recruited Grolemund as a branch manager. After a training period, Grolemund assumed duties at the company's New Orleans office in August, 1982. He did not become a registered options principal for the New Orleans office until December, 1982. For several years before Grolemund's arrival, the company's New Orleans office had been a "problem office." A disproportionate share of securities violations occurred in that office, and management had difficulty controlling the associated persons in the office to achieve compliance. Several branch managers who preceded Grolemund had been disciplined by the NASD for inadequate supervision of the office. Grolemund knew some of the problems--he was hired to try to correct them--but he did not know the extent of the problems he would face when he took over. On August 25, 1986, the District 5 Business Conduct Committee filed a complaint against Howard Hampton, E.F Hutton & Company, Inc., Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., Grolemund and others. The gist of the complaint is that Hampton committed various violations of the Securities and Exchange Act, SEC rules and NASD rules while an associated person with E.F. Hutton and with Prudential-Bache. Hampton was with E.F. Hutton from February, 1981, through August, 1982, and was with Prudential-Bache in the New Orleans office from August, 1982, through February, 1984. The violations involve Hampton's dealings with clients he brought with him from E.F. Hutton to Prudential-Bache. Most of the violations involve the exercise of discretionary power in the accounts of clients without prior written authorization. Some of the alleged incidents occurred while Hampton was at E.F. Hutton. Some occurred while Hampton was at Prudential-Bache but before Grolemund arrived at the New Orleans office. Some occurred after Grolemund arrived but before he became an options principal for the office. In some cases, the information in the file on which Grolemund had to rely was incorrect. Grolemund fired Hampton in December, 1983. (At the time Hampton was fired, no complaints had yet been leveled against Hampton. In fact, all of the clients who ultimately complained against Hampton went with Hampton when he was fired from Prudential-Bache.) Grolemund also fired some other "unsavory" account executives in the New Orleans office. Grolemund was charged, along with other Prudential-Bache options principals, with failure and neglect to establish, maintain, and/or enforce written procedures which would enable Prudential-Bache to exercise reasonable and proper supervision of Hampton and with failure and neglect to supervise Hampton reasonably and properly. Grolemund was represented in the proceedings before the district committee by in-house counsel for Prudential-Bache. Otherwise, Grolemund did not have independent advice of counsel. Prudential-Bache was involved in other proceedings before the SEC which made it in its best interest to resolve the matters arising out of the New Orleans office. For several months, Prudential- Bache tried to convince Grolemund to settle. In addition, Grolemund was concerned whether the District 5 Business Conduct Committee would fairly consider the complaint against him. As part of his successful management of Prudential-Bache's New Orleans office, he competed directly against other securities dealers in the area, some of which were represented on, or had friends who were on, the Committee. When Grolemund came to New Orleans, there were 16 account executives in the office. Under his term of management, after he fired four to five account executives, including Hampton, the New Orleans office grew from 16 to 36 account executives. In addition, Grolemund opened satellite offices in Shreveport and Lafayette, Louisiana. These offices grew in size to 11 and 9 account executives, respectively. Many of the account executives Grolemund added were recruited away from competitors, and he was concerned that there might be hard feelings against him among the members on the Committee. After spending considerable time weighing all factors, Grolemund agreed on or about November 3, 1987, to settle the Hampton matter on terms that included acceptance of a finding that he was guilty of the allegations against him and acceptance of a censure, a 21-day suspension, a requirement that he re- qualify as a registered options principal, and a $7,500 fine. The settlement was reduced to writing in final form on April 25, 1988. As a result of the 21-day suspension, another options principal at Prudential-Bache was required to sign all options agreements during the suspension. Otherwise, Grolemund's job was the same as before the suspension, and Grolemund continued to receive his full normal compensation from Prudential- Bache. Prudential-Bache paid the fine for Grolemund. Re-qualification was a matter of passing a written examination, which did not present a problem for Grolemund. In agreeing to settle, Grolemund misunderstood that the district committee's action would not be the basis of any other proceedings against him. He also misunderstood that the offer of settlement would resolve all pending matters involving the New Orleans office, including the so-called Keel matters. Contrary to Grolemund's understanding, the NASD filed another complaint against Prudential-Bache and Grolemund on May 9, 1988. This complaint, which had been under investigation during the time the Hampton case was proceeding, involved an account executive named Patrick Keel. Like Hampton, Keel was alleged to have exercised discretionary power in the accounts of clients without prior written authorization. He also was alleged to have recommended unsuitable stock and option investments to two clients and to have falsely reported to Prudential-Bache that some of his clients enjoyed profits from the investments he had recommended and made for them, when in fact they had incurred losses. As with the Hampton matter, Grolemund was accused of having failed to establish, maintain, and enforce written supervisory procedures that would have enabled him to exercise proper supervision of Keel and of having failed to properly supervise Keel. The Keel matter went to hearing before the District 5 Business Conduct Committee on August 24-25, 1989. As to what it called Cause One, the Committee found that Keel engaged in unauthorized and unsuitable options transactions in the account of one customer and that Grolemund had failed to supervise Keel properly in connection with the options transactions. Under Cause Two, the Committee found that Keel made unauthorized and unsuitable stock and options transactions in the account of another customer and that Grolemund had ample early warning that Keel was not handling his options accounts properly. The Committee noted that in October, 1984, the customer had lodged complaints regarding Keel's options trading and that Grolemund had daily conversations with a superior concerning problems with Keel's options accounts. The Committee found that, even if Grolemund did not have the benefit of the early warnings of irregularity, his response to the concerns raised by the customer in her December 10, 1984, telephone conversation was inadequate. The Committee found that, given the customer's refusal to sign the activity letter that Grolemund sent her, it was incumbent upon Grolemund to determine whether the customer understood options, whether options transactions were consistent with her financial situation, and whether she had approved the options transactions before their execution. The Committee found that Grolemund did not compile and review the customer's account documentation, which would have revealed that options trading was inconsistent with her objectives and needs and that the customer was only approved for Level II trading although Keel had executed two Level III transactions. Accordingly, the Committee found that Grolemund had violated Article III, Sections 1 and 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice by failing to supervise Keel properly. Under Cause Three, the Committee found that Keel recommended to a customer (the same customer involved in Cause Two) that she commit 25-30% of her net worth to a Hawaiian real estate private placement tax shelter that was not consistent with the customer's needs and objectives. However, the Committee noted that there was conflicting evidence as to whether Grolemund had reviewed the recommendation in light of the customer's personal financial strategy form. Although it was not Grolemund's job at Prudential-Bache to review suitability determinations with respect to private placements, the Committee expressed the view that Grolemund was in the best position to supervise the recommendations of salesmen and that he could not delegate this responsibility to other departments. Accordingly, the Committee found that Grolemund had violated Article III, Sections 1 and 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice under Cause Three. As to Causes Four through Eleven, the Committee dismissed all but two for insufficient evidence. As for the two that were not dismissed, the Committee found that Keel exercised discretion in the accounts of customers without prior written approval and that Grolemund failed to exercise proper supervision over Keel. The Committee reasoned that, by the time at issue, Grolemund had adequate warning of Keel's exercise of discretion without authority and that Grolemund allowed Keel not only to continue options trading but also allowed Keel to continue using special telephone and "bunching" privileges that, in the Committee's view, "greatly facilitated Keel's exercise of discretion." The Committee dismissed Cause Twelve to the extent that it alleged that Grolemund failed to supervise Keel reasonably with respect to the submittal of inaccurate active account information reports by him. The Committee, in its June 21, 1990, decision, censured Grolemund, barred him from associating with any NASD member in any principal capacity and fined him $4,000. Under the bar, Grolemund would not have been permitted to apply for reinstatement for at least ten years. Based on this decision, and the earlier disposition of the 1986 complaint in the Hampton matter, the Department offered to conditionally grant Grolemund's application, prohibiting Grolemund from acting as a principal, supervisor or manager. When Grolemund refused to accept the conditions, the Department denied the application. Grolemund appealed the Committee decision in the Keel matter to the Board of Governors of the NASD. The appeal was heard on October 11-12, 1990. On appeal, the Board reversed the finding that Keel executed out-of-level options transactions. The Board also noted that the record demonstrates a high degree of direct interaction between Grolemund, Keel, Keel's clients, and Prudential-Bache's operations manager and that the firm's records distribution system may have prevented Grolemund from exercising greater supervision over Keel. Because branch managers did not receive copies of customer information relating to limited partnerships, such as the Maui/Waikiki deal, Grolemund had no opportunity to assess the suitability of Keel's customer for the offering, or to compare the documents that Keel had completed in connection with that deal with other account information regarding the customer. The Board also noted that Grolemund engaged in more-than-adequate follow-up with clients following the receipt of complaints and that the customer may have been less than candid regarding her lack of understanding of the investments that Keel recommended for her account. Nonetheless, the Board believed that Grolemund fell short of the standard of reasonable supervision in that it should have been clear to Grolemund that Keel had not been properly trained and lacked a basic understanding of the practices of the securities industry. The well-documented problems that Keel's options trading caused with respect to customers' margins, and Keel's documented confusion of cash and margin accounts, certainly should have put Grolemund on notice that Keel lacked sufficient training to engage in such risky trading strategies as writing options. The Board also thought Grolemund should have inquired why there was no options agreement on file for one customer until after options trading in her account had ceased. The Board concurred with the Committee that Grolemund fell below the standard of reasonable supervision, and thereby violated Article III, Section 1 and 27 of the Rules of Fair Practice. The Board of Governors affirmed the censure and $4,000 fine against Grolemund. However, in light of the various mitigating factors regarding Grolemund's overall conduct, the Board ruled that barring him as a principal was an excessively harsh penalty. Instead, the Board suspended him from acting in any principal capacity for seven days and required him to requalify by examination in all principal capacities. In July, 1985, long before either the Hampton or the Keel complaint was filed, Prudential-Bache promoted Grolemund to the new Tampa office. When Grolemund took over as branch manager, the Tampa office was only nine months old. Grolemund successfully managed the Tampa office until May, 1990, when he applied for registration as an associated person with Advest, Inc. During Grolemund's time as branch manager, the Tampa office grew to 35 account executives. The evidence proved that no violations occurred in the Tampa office during the almost five years that Grolemund was the branch manager there. Since the Hampton and Keel matters, the securities industry has changed remarkably, in part as a result of the October, 1987, stock market crash. Before the crash, options trading generally was viewed as a conservative investment--a way to participate in the market with limited resources and to provide an additional source of income from a conservative investment. The risks of options trading now are widely recognized, and management generally has become sensitive and responsive to those risks. In addition, the data processing and informations systems now in general use in the industry have given management new and effective tools for supervising the activities of account executives. Some of these systems make it impossible for some of the Hampton and Keel violations to occur today. For example, the systems will not process options trades for which there is no record of prior written authorization in the file. For these reasons, it is not likely that activities such as those in which Hampton and Keel were involved in 1981 through 1984 would go undetected today by a manager of Grolemund's caliber or that, detected, they would go unchecked. Advest, Inc., the securities dealer that wants to associate Grolemund to manage its new Clearwater office, is a respectable securities dealer that places reasonably strong emphasis on compliance with the requirements of the various regulatory agencies under which it must operate. It specializes in relatively safe investments, certainly as compared with the activities of the New Orleans office of Prudential-Bache in the early 1980s. Options trading represents only 14 to 15 percent of Advest's total business nationwide. Less than six percent of the business of its new Clearwater office consists of options trading. Advest's compliance department generates a monthly computer report called a "commission versus equity" run which displays the account name and number, the account executive's number, gross commission generated for the month and year, the number of trades for the month and year to date, the amount of cash and securities in the account, and the value of the account in relationship to the trading on a percentage basis. Some variation of the report is provided to the branch managers, to the division managers, and to the branch group manager, with each higher level of management getting more and more information in the report. An options activity report is produced in the Advest compliance department on a daily basis listing all accounts that traded outside their levels, if any, and any accounts that have a trade executed where the appropriate forms are not on file within the allowed period. Advest compliance sends out active account letters to verify customer satisfaction. If the customer does not respond within ten days, a second letter is sent. If the customer does not respond to the second letter within ten days, the account is restricted from further activity. The Advest compliance department reviews all aspects of the branch offices on an annual audit. Compliance then issues a report to the branch manager, the division manager, and the branch group manager. The computer generated commission report would automatically detect a trade executed by a registered representative not assigned to the account for which the trade is completed and would place an asterisk around the account executive number. The manager would then be contacted by the compliance department and asked to explain the discrepancy. In addition to the ordinary compliance procedures in place at Advest, to address the concerns of the Department and other regulatory agencies, Advest proposes several measures to reduce even further the likelihood of violations in the new Clearwater office to which it will assign Grolemund as branch manager. First, it will limit the number of account executives under Grolemund to 15 or less for the first year. Second, it will require another senior registered options principal to supervise the options trading along with Grolemund for the first year. Third, Advest's branch group manager or another Florida branch manager will personally visit Grolemund's office four times during the first year to monitor compliance; during the second year, either he or another Florida branch manager will personally visit Grolemund's office for this purpose at least twice. Fourth, two annual routine compliance monitoring visits will be made, instead of the usual one visit. Finally, the branch group manager personally will review all new account information from Grolemund's office weekly.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Department of Banking and Finance enter a final order granting Grolemund's application for registration as an associated person with Advest, Inc., subject only to the following conditions: First, that Advest limit the number of account executives under Grolemund to 15 or less for the first year; Second, that Advest require another senior registered options principal to supervise the options trading along with Grolemund for the first year. Third, that Advest's branch group manager or another Florida branch manager will personally visit Grolemund's office four times during the first year to monitor compliance and that, during the second year, either he or another Florida branch manager personally visit Grolemund's office for this purpose at least twice. Fourth, that Advest make two annual routine compliance monitoring visits to Grolemund's office, instead of the usual one visit. Finally, that the branch group manager personally review all new account information from Grolemund's office weekly. RECOMMENDED this 21st day of February, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. J. LAWRENCE JOHNSTON Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of February, 1991. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 90-5880 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected in part in that the Department did not consider the order of the Board of Governors of the NASD on appeal from the order of the District 5 Business Conduct Committee on the 1988 "Keel" complaint before giving notice of intent to deny the application. Otherwise, accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected in the sense that final action has not yet been taken. As it refers to Department notice of intended action, accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 8.-10. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Rejected as not proven. Also, subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. First sentence, accepted and incorporated. Second sentence, rejected as not proven exactly when the uniform guidedlines went into effect. Rejected as not proven exactly when the uniform guidedlines went into effect. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. 16.-17. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but unnecessary. Rejected as not proven that the system was in operation since 1980. 21.-23. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 24. Accepted and incorporated. 25.-28. Accepted and incorporated. 29. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 30.-36. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as not proven. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found and unnecessary. First clause, accepted; second clause, rejected consistent with the NASD orders. Accepted but subordinate to facts contrary to those found and unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. 43.-46. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated in the form of the findings of the Board of Governors of the NASD on appeal from the 1988 "Keel" complaint. Accepted but unnecessary. 49.-50. Accepted and incorporated. 51.-52 Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Accepted but subordinate and unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted and incorporated. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1.-2. Accepted and incorporated. Rejected as conclusion of law and unnecessary. Rejected that the orders were entered in 1986 and 1988; otherwise, accepted and incorporated. 5.-7. Rejected as conclusion of law and unnecessary. 8.-12. Accepted and incorporated to the extent not subordinate or unnecessary. Accepted but unnecessary. Accepted that the Committee characterized its decision in those terms by way of explaining why it was just to differentiate between Prudential-Bache and its representatives, including Grolemund, and E.F. Hutton and its representatives. However, in fact, the various dispositions were agreed by the parties. It is unnecessary to include this finding. 15.-18. Accepted and incorporated. 19. Accepted but unnecessary. 20.-21. Accepted and incorporated. 22. Accepted but unnecessary. COPIES FURNISHED: Edward W. Dougherty, Esquire Mang, Rett & Collette, P.A. 660 East Jefferson Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Margaret S. Karniewicz, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance Legal Section The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves, Esquire General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 18, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.002, 33-19.006, 33-19 et. seq., 33-19.012, 33-23 et. seq." were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules concern medical care of inmates. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioner's frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 17, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 17. That the (Petitioner) has learned that the (Respondent) act [sic] pursuant to an invalid delegation as 33-3.002 33-19 et. seq., 233-23 et. seq. that fail to establish adequate standards for agency decision making, and vests unbridled discretion in the agency or employees that's inconsistant [sic] to the statutory requirements of 120.54 and 944.09. This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in allegedly releasing confidential medical information to "security staff and psychologist or and other staff or employees with criminal intent" and other medical practices of the employees of the Respondent. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules are unconstitutional. Again, most of the Petitioner's arguments apparently concern violation of constitutional rights by the acts of employees of the Respondent as opposed to the violations of constitutional rights in the Challenged Rules. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 10, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend was entered. The Petitioner was informed that his Petition was being dismissed and the Petitioner was given an opportunity to file an amended petition. No amended petition has been filed by the Petitioner. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
Conclusions The Office of Financial Regulation ("Office") issued a denial of Petitioner’s application to become licensed as an “associated person”. Petitioner in turn filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing, which the Office referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH"). The assigned Administrative Law Judge ("ALI") held a formal administrative hearing, and entered a Recommended Order thereon. That Recommended Order of November 17, 2604, is attached to this Final Order, and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency authorized to administer and enforce provisions of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes, regulating the granting or denial of applications for Home Improvement Contractor Licenses. On November 30, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application on behalf of a corporation known as "The Durocoat Company" (Durocoat) to Respondent for licensure as a home improvement contractor. On that application, Petitioner disclosed the identity of the two principals of the corporation and the position held by those two individuals. Petitioner listed himself as the president of the corporation and another individual, Russell W. Black, as the corporation's vice-president. Each principal owns 50 percent of the corporation. Following the section of the application providing for the disclosure of the identities and addresses of business principals, a number of questions are listed and the person executing the form is required to provide an "X" in a block to indicate a "yes" or "no" answer to each of those questions. Question number four reads as follows: Are there unpaid judgments against the applicant or any of the persons listed above? If "yes" attach a copy of the complaint and judgment(s). Petitioner placed an "X" in the space allotted for a "yes" answer to the inquiry regarding unpaid judgments against the persons listed as business principals, namely himself and Mr. Black. Petitioner then attached a copy of a document entitled "Notice of Levy" issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States Department of the Treasury. In sum, the notice certifies the existence of a tax lien against Mr. Black, Durocoat's vice-president, in the amount of $27,546.25. It is undisputed by the parties that creditors held unpaid judgments against Petitioner at the time he submitted the application on November 30, 1988, and that he failed to attach copies of those judgments to the application. Further, Petitioner acknowledged at the final hearing that he was aware at the time of submittal of the application of the existence of one of these judgments. That judgement, entered in favor of The American Express Company (American Express) for $7,602, has existed since September of 1987. In mitigation of his failure to disclose the American Express judgement, Petitioner testified at hearing that he didn't have a copy of the judgement at the time he filed the application and was unaware of the requirement that he should attach a copy. In view of his action in attaching a copy of the existing tax lien against Mr. Black to the application, Petitioner's testimony that he was unaware that he should attach copies of unpaid judgments is not credited. A copy of Petitioner's credit report, introduced at final hearing by Petitioner, discloses that a business known as "Speeler Marine" obtained a judgement against him in the amount of $250 in March of 1986. Petitioner testified at hearing that he was unaware of the existence of this judgement. No settlement discussions have been initiated by him with the creditor. Petitioner's credit report further discloses that an outstanding loan to Petitioner in 1985 in the amount of $36,000 by a financial institution identified as "Sun Bank" is classified as a "bad debt, placed for collection." Petitioner testified that this debt represents loan funds obtained in a previous business venture and is the subject of settlement negotiations and that he has repaid $4,000 of the amount at the present time. Petitioner's testimony also establishes that the credit report's disclosure of a 1987 foreclosure certificate of title to real estate represented real property located in Gainesville, Florida, which Petitioner had taken in trade for money owed to him. In view of the distance to that city, Petitioner testified that he simply chose not to pay off the existing mortgage on the property or oppose foreclosure action by the mortgage holder. A representative of Nationwide Chemical Coating Company (Nationwide) testified at the final hearing regarding that company's business relationship with Petitioner's corporation. Since February of 1988, Nationwide has sold supplies valued at $250,000 to Durocoat. The company has always paid charges within the 30 day required time limit and is considered to be a "class A" customer. In regard to the federal tax lien which Petitioner attached to the application, Russell W. Black testified that the lien resulted from the disallowance by IRS of a tax shelter investment of $34,000 made by Black in 1977 or 1978. Black was notified by IRS in 1981 that the tax shelter was not considered to be a valid deduction for tax purposes. The amount owed by Black to IRS in 1981 was $20,630.64. The amount is now $27,546.25 and, according to Black, is still unpaid because he doesn't have the money. On advice of counsel, he has not contacted IRS to schedule payments on the debt. Respondent denied Petitioner's application by letter dated January 13, 1989, stating that Petitioner's failure to attach copies of the unpaid judgments against himself constituted a material misstatement of fact sufficient to authorize the denial. The letter further stated that the unpaid judgments, along with the federal tax lien against Mr. Black, demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility by both individuals and constituted an additional ground for denial of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of 10 unnumbered paragraphs which have been numbered 1-10 and are treated as follows: 1-8. Addressed in part, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by direct admissible evidence. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-2. Addressed. 3-4. Rejected, unnecessary. 5-11. Addressed in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Riley, Esq. 2325 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33713 William W. Byrd, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Office Of The Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles Stutts, Esq. General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
Findings Of Fact Based on the stipulations and admissions of the parties, on the exhibits received in evidence, and on the testimony of the witnesses at hearing, I make the following findings of fact. The Petitioner, Christopher James Arenal, filed a Form U-4 application seeking registration as an associated person with Rocky Mountain Securities & Investments, Inc., located at 1600 Stout Street, Suite 920, Denver, Colorado 80202. Said application was received by the Respondent on April 24, 1986. By letter dated June 17, 1986, the Respondent advised the Petitioner that it intended to deny his application for registration for the reasons set forth at length in the letter. (At the hearing the Respondent stipulated that the allegations of the top paragraph on the second page of the denial letter of June 17, 1986, should be deleted.) Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a timely request for hearing. Except for the reasons stated in the Respondent's denial letter dated June 17, 1986, the Petitioner is otherwise eligible for the registration he seeks. On October 26, 1982, the State of Tennessee issued a Complaint and Notice in the matter of First Colorado Investments and Securities, Inc., Mr. Arenal, and others, alleging the sale of securities while not being properly registered. On February 7, 1983, Mr. Arenal entered into a Findings and Consent Order which found that Mr. Arenal and others had engaged in securities transactions involving Tennessee residents at a time when Mr. Arenal and others were not registered in the State of Tennessee. Mr. Arenal and others were ordered to cease and desist from acting as agents in the State of Tennessee without being lawfully registered to do so. The transactions in question took place during 1981. The evidence does not show how many of those transactions involved Mr. Arenal. On April 28, 1983, the State of Wisconsin entered into a Stipulation and Consent Order of Prohibition with Mr. Arenal in which Mr. Arenal agreed to the entry of an Order of Prohibition. On June 2, 1983, a Consent Order of Prohibition was entered into in which Mr. Arenal was prohibited from transacting business as a securities agent in Wisconsin without lawful registration in that state. That order had as its genesis the fact that during 1981 Mr. Arenal had engaged in nine securities transactions for a Wisconsin resident who had previously been a client of Mr. Arenal when the client resided in New York. On January 11, 1984, the State of Iowa issued a Summary Order Denying Application For Securities Agent License on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The findings of fact in that order included findings that Mr. Arenal had "engaged in securities transactions on behalf of an Iowa resident in March, 1981, while unlicensed as a securities agent," and, with regard to an affidavit filed with the Iowa Division of Securities, that "Mr. Arenal's filed and notarized statement is a false statement." Since the issuance of the January 11, 1984, order, the State of-Iowa has approved Mr. Arenal's application to be registered as a securities agent and he is presently registered in that state. On November 5, 1984, the State of Utah entered an Order Summarily Denying Application For Registration as an Agent on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The denial was based on Mr. Arenal's prior disciplinary history. Since the issuance of the November 5, 1984, order, the State of Utah has approved Mr. Arenal's application to be registered as a securities agent and he is presently registered in that state. The State of Oregon, by letter dated November 1, 1985, denied Mr. Arenal's application for registration in that state. The Oregon denial letter does not set forth a factual basis for the denial. On September 6, 1984, the State of Nebraska issued an Order Denying Agent Registration on an application filed by Mr. Arenal. The denial was based on his prior disciplinary history. Mr. Arenal was again denied registration in the State of Nebraska on February 20, 1986. During 1985, the staff of the Respondent's Division of Securities was almost tripled in size. Shortly after the increase in staff size, a Task Force recommended that the Division of Securities devote more time and energy to the review of applicants with disciplinary history in order to more carefully screen such applicants. As a result of the increase in staff size and the increased emphasis on review of applicants with disciplinary history, the Respondent is now rejecting applications that previously might have gotten through a cursory review. All of the adverse actions taken against Mr. Arenal by the states of Tennessee and Wisconsin were based on events that occurred in 1981, at one firm, First Colorado Investments and Securities, Inc. Mr. Arenal's supervisors at that firm advised him that it was permissible for him to sell certain securities in states where he was not registered. Since those improper sales in 1981, Mr. Arenal has not engaged in any subsequent transactions in states where he was not registered. During his approximately eleven years of professional experience in the securities field, there have never been any client complaints against Mr. Arenal. Mr. Arenal has been previously registered as an associated person in the State of Florida. He was last registered in Florida from approximately February of 1985 until December of 1985. His prior registrations were processed prior to the changes in policy and procedure described in paragraph B, above.
Recommendation Based on all of the foregoing, I recommend the entry of a Final Order granting Mr. Arenal's application for registration as an associated person. DONE AND ENTERED this 9th day of June, 1987, at Tallahassee, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 9th day of June, 1987. COPIES FURNISHED: H. Richard Bisbee, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Mr. Christopher James Arenal 1600 Stout Street Suite 920 Denver, Colorado 80202 The Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 =================================================================
The Issue Whether proposed Rules 69O-175.003, 69O-170.005-007, 69O- 170.013, 69O-170.0135. 69O-170.014, 69O-170.0141, 69O-170.0142, and 69O-170.0155 are valid exercises of delegated rulemaking authority.
Findings Of Fact Section 20.05, Florida Statutes, addresses the structure and powers of the Department. Section 20.05 provides as follows, in pertinent part: 20.05 Heads of departments; powers and duties.-- (1) Each head of a department, except as otherwise provided by law, must: * * * (b) Have authority, . . ., to execute any of the powers, duties, and functions vested in the department or in any administrative unit thereof through administrative units . . . designated by the head of the department, . . . unless the head of the department is explicitly required by law to perform the same without delegation. * * * (e) Subject to the requirements of chapter 120, exercise existing authority to adopt rules pursuant and limited to the powers, duties, and functions transferred to the department. The Financial Services Commission (Commission) was created within the Department pursuant to Section 20.121, Florida Statutes. However, the Commission is not “subject to control, supervision or direction by the Department of Financial Services in any manner.” § 20.121(3), Fla. Stat. The Commission is composed of the Governor and Cabinet, who collectively serve as the agency head of the Commission. Action by the Commission can only be taken by majority vote “consisting of at least three affirmative votes.” Id. OIR is a structural unit of the Financial Services Commission. Section 20.121(3) states in relevant part, as follows: Structure.— The major structural unit of the commission is the office. Each office shall be headed by a director. The following offices are established: 1. The Office of Insurance Regulation, which shall be responsible for all activities concerning insurers and other risk-bearing entities . . . * * * * Organization.-- The commission shall establish by rule any additional organizational structure of the offices. It is the intent of the legislature to provide the commission with the flexibility to organize the offices in any manner they determine appropriate to promote both efficiency and accountability. Powers.— Commission members shall serve as the agency head for purposes of rulemaking . . . by the commission and all subunits of the commission. . . . (emphasis supplied) Clearly, under the Department’s, the Commission’s and the OIR’s organizational structures, only the Commission may promulgate rules for both itself and OIR. The Department does not have rulemaking authority over areas that have been given to the Commission. On the other hand, nothing in the statute prohibits OIR, as directed by the Commission, to perform steps, preliminary to proposing a rule, that often occur in the rule development process prior to the actual Notice of proposed rulemaking. See also § 120.54, Fla. Stat. To that end, the Commission, by non-rule policy, has delegated authority to OIR to engage in rulemaking activities on behalf of the Commission. However, this delegation is not limited to rule development activities that occur prior to the Notice of proposed Rules, but authorizes publication of the Notice prior to approval by the Commission of any proposed language or policy statement. As indicated, the Notices for the proposed Rules were published in the Florida Law Weekly in November 2004, with various changes made thereafter. The proposed Rules were published as OIR rules. Disturbingly and misleadingly, all the Notices for the proposed Rules state that the agency head approved the Rule that is the subject of the Notice on September 3, 2004 or November 2, 2004. However, none of the proposed Rules were approved by the Commission, the agency head, prior to their publication as a proposed rule in the Florida Administrative Weekly. The specific agency authority listed in the Notices for promulgating the proposed Rules was Section 624.308(1), Florida Statutes. Section 624.308(1) grants the Department of Financial Services (Department) and the Financial Services Commission (Commission) the general authority to adopt rules, pursuant to Sections 120.536(1) and 120.54 in order to implement laws that confer duties upon them. The statute does not confer the authority on the Office of Insurance Regulation (OIR) to adopt rules. See § 624.05, Fla. Stat. The statutes that confer a specific grant of rulemaking authority over the areas of the laws implemented in the proposed Rules are Sections 627.0651 and 627.331, Florida Statutes. These two statutes confer specific rulemaking authority over certain areas of insurance ratemaking only to the Commission; specific rulemaking authority is not granted to the Department or to OIR. Other than rulemaking authority, the various duties assigned in the laws implemented by proposed Rules are given to OIR.
Findings Of Fact The RFP Respondent issued a request for proposals in October, 1988, entitled "Turnpike Bridge Replacement Design/Build Project, State Road 91 (Florida's Turnpike)" (the "RFP"). The RFP solicited technical and price proposals for state Project Nos. 97890-3325 and 97930-3324. The State Projects involved the design and construction of temporary detours and permanent replacement bridges over canal crossings at several locations on Florida's Turnpike. The RFP required bridges to be constructed as permanent structures at each of the project sites. Respondent advised interested parties at the scope of services meeting on October 18, 1988, that detour bridges would also be required at all of the project sites. Local permitting was a key factor in the scope of services required for the projects contemplated in the RFP. Respondent advised interested parties, including Petitioner and Intervenor, at the scope of services meeting that Respondent had done no coordinating with local agencies and that local permitting was the responsibility of each party responding to the RFP ("offeror"). The local agency with responsibility for issuing permits for a majority of the canal crossings in the RFP was the Lake Worth Drainage District ("Lake Worth"). Both Petitioner and Intervenor inquired of Lake Worth while preparing their respective technical proposals to confirm Respondent's representation that bridges would be required for both detours and permanent structures at all project sites. Lake Worth advised Petitioner that vertical clearances and hydraulics required bridges for both detours and permanent structures at all canal crossings subject to Lake Worth's jurisdiction. However, Lake Worth advised Intervenor, on or about October 26, 1988, that culverts would be acceptable for detours at three of the project sites. Kenneth Bryant was the President of DSA Group, Inc. ("DSA"). DSA is a consulting engineering firm that was retained by Intervenor to assist in the preparation of its technical and price proposals. Mr. Bryant asked Lake Worth why culverts would not be acceptable for permanent structures if culverts were acceptable for detours. Lake Worth responded that consultants for Lake Worth would look into the hydraulics of the entire system. Petitioner and Intervenor submitted their respective technical proposals on or about January 11, 1989. 2/ Intervenor used culverts in its technical proposal at those canal crossings where Lake Worth had approved the use of culverts for detours. Intervenor also included documentation of the approvals by Lake Worth. Petitioner included bridges in its technical proposal for all detours and permanent structures. The date for submitting price proposals was changed by Respondent several times. The original date was scheduled for 30 days after receipt of the technical proposals. After several delays, price proposals were timely submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor on June 21, 1989. The opening of price proposals was set for July 6, 1989, pursuant to a letter dated June 23, 1989, from Bill Deyo, Design/Build Coordinator for Respondent. The letter stated in relevant part: ... If approved by the Final Selection Committee the selected team will be posted on July 10, 1989, with the final awarding scheduled for July 14, 1989. Award and execution of this contract is contingent upon approval of budget by the Governor's office. Respondent selected Petitioner's proposal as number one and Intervenor's proposal as number two. The Final Selection Committee issued a "memo" on July 6, 1989, authorizing award of the contract. 3/ Award and execution of the contract was approved by the Governor's office. 4/ Rejection of All Proposals On July 10, 1989, Respondent sent a telegram to each offeror cancelling the posting of "bid" tabulations for that day. On August 31, 1989, the Final Selection Committee issued a memorandum rescinding its authorization to award the contract for the RFP, and requested its Contracts Administration Office to notify all "...Design/Build teams of the decision to REJECT all price proposals." On September 12, 1989, Respondent notified all offerors by certified mail of Respondent's decision to reject all "bids". No reason for Respondent's rejection of all price proposals was stated in the certified letter. At that time, offerors were not otherwise advised by Respondent of the reason for the rejection. Respondent rejected all price proposals based upon a substantial reduction in the scope of services required for the RFP. Between October, 1988, and August 31, 1989, Lake Worth determined that culverts would be acceptable instead of bridges at five of the six project sites within the jurisdiction of Lake Worth. Lake Worth's change in position substantially reduced the scope of services required in the RFP. The value of that reduction in the scope of services was approximately $3.6 million. 5/ Respondent knew or should have known from the technical proposal submitted by Intervenor on January 11, 1989, that the scope of services required in the original; RFP had been reduced to the extent Lake Worth had approved the use of culverts instead of bridges for the detours at some of the project sites. Respondent did not investigate the potential reduction in the scope of services until after the opening of price proposals on July 6, 1989. The parties stipulated at the formal hearing that Respondent's rejection of all price proposals was not at issue. Therefore, the question of whether Respondent's rejection of all proposals was arbitrary, capricious, or beyond the scope of Respondent's discretion as a state agency is not at issue in this proceeding. 6/ Respondent's Existing Rule The legislature required Respondent to adopt by rule procedures for administering combined design/build contracts. Section 337.11(5)(b), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, Respondent adopted Florida Administrative Code Rule 14- 91.006 on March 13, 1988 ("Rule 14-91.006"). 17. Rule 14-91.006(5) provided: The Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical Policy and Engineering Services, jointly with the Deputy Assistant Secretary representing the District in which the project is located, may determine it is in the best interest of the state to provide funds to firms selected for preparation of technical and price proposals in response to the Design Criteria Package. Each firm selected shall receive identical fixed fees for this work. Specific Authority 334.044(2) 337.11(5)(b) F.S. Law implemented 337.11(5) F.S. History-New 3-13-88. (emphasis added) Rule 14-91.006(5) was adopted to facilitate competitive responses to a request for proposals by paying fixed fees to firms selected by Respondent to prepare technical and price proposals. Rule 14-91.006(5) was also adopted so that Respondent could compensate offerors, retain their technical proposals, and use the design concepts on similar projects. Rule 14-91.006 was amended on June 13, 1990, in relevant part, by repealing Rule 14-91.006(5). The repeal of Rule 14-91.006(5) occurred approximately 33 days after the date of the formal hearing but before the entry of a final order in this proceeding. 7/ Request for Payment After Respondent notified offerors of the rejection of all price proposals, Petitioner and Intervenor requested Respondent to make a determination of whether it was in the best interest of the state to provide funds to Petitioner and Intervenor for the preparation of their respective technical and price proposals in accordance with Rule 14-91.006(5). Petitioner and Intervenor requested on several occasions that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Technical Policy and Engineering Services jointly with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Turnpike convene a meeting to make the determination authorized in Rule 14-91.006(5) Informal conferences with Respondent's representatives were requested on at least four occasions to discuss the issue of Petitioner's compensation for its technical and price proposals. Respondent's representatives met with Petitioner a few days before the formal hearing on May 10, 1990. Respondent stated that it had no statutory authority to compensate Petitioner for Petitioner's technical and price proposals in the absence of a contract. Respondent neither contracted with Petitioner and Intervenor to pay for their technical and price proposals nor offered to enter into such a contract. Petitioner offered to enter into such a contract and also offered to provide computer tapes containing plans and specifications required in the RFP if Respondent would agree to compensate Petitioner. Repeal of Respondent's Existing Rule Sometime between March 13, 1988, and October, 1988, Respondent considered the payment of funds pursuant to Rule 14-91.006(5) in a design/build project that preceded the RFP. 8/ Respondent requested funds from the comptroller but was advised by the comptroller that no funds could be provided pursuant to Rule 14-91.006(5) in the absence of a contract. Respondent's general counsel confirmed that there was no statutory authority to provide funds pursuant to Rule 14-91.006(5) in the absence of a contract. Respondent took no public action to repeal Rule 14- 91.006(5) until March 16, 1990, approximately two years after the earliest date Respondent could have received the directives from its comptroller and general counsel advising Respondent that Rule 14-91.006(5) exceeded its statutory authority. Instead of formally repealing Rule 14-91.006(5), Respondent followed the comptroller's recommendation to obtain legislative authority to pay funds pursuant to Rule 14- 91.006(5). Respondent unsuccessfully proposed such legislation to the House Transportation Committee during the 1989 legislative session. In November, 1989, Respondent drafted an amendment to Rule 14-91.006 which, in relevant part, repealed Rule 14-91.006(5). Notice of the proposed formal repeal of Rule 14- 91.006(5) was published in the Florida Administrative Weekly on March 16, 1990. The amendment to Rule 14-91.006 was adopted and Rule 14-91.006(5) was formally repealed through appropriate rulemaking procedures on June 13, 1990. During 12 design/build projects, Respondent never paid funds to any firm for technical and price proposals when the firm had not been awarded a contract pursuant to a request for proposals. Respondent never adopted standards for determining the proper timing for payment of funds pursuant to Rule 14-91.006(5). Respondent never adopted standards for determining when it would be in the best interest of the state to provide funds pursuant to Rule 14- 91.006(5). Respondent refused to apply Rule 14-91.006(5) and refused to determine if it would be in the best interest of the state to provide funds to Petitioner and Intervenor for their respective technical and price proposals. The sole reason given by Respondent for its refusal to apply Rule 14-91.006(5) was the lack of statutory authority to provide funds to firms selected for preparation of technical and price proposals in the absence of a contract. Respondent's representatives never considered applying Rule 14- 91.006(5). When Respondent's representatives met with Petitioner shortly before May 10, 1990, they stated that they would like to provide the requested funds and that such funds should be provided, but that no statutory authority existed for providing such funds in the absence of a contract. The signatories to the memorandum from the Final Selection Committee, dated August 31, 1989, never met until after the meeting that took place shortly before May 10, 1990, to discuss payment for the technical and price proposals submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. When they did meet, it was determined that no statutory authority existed to provide funds pursuant to Rule 14-91.006(5) in the absence of a contract. Respondent never intended to compensate either Petitioner or Respondent for their respective technical and price proposals in the absence of a contract. Respondent never conducted any review of the technical and price proposals prepared and submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor for the purposes described in Rule 14-91.006(5). Two significant factors to be considered in making such a determination, however, would have been the benefit derived by Respondent from the technical and price proposals submitted and the effect that the provision of such funds would have on competition. Best Interest of the State Payment of funds to Petitioner and Intervenor would have been in the best interest of the state within, the meaning of Rule 14-91.006(5). 9/ Respondent derived substantial benefit from the technical and price proposals submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor including a reduction in the cost of State Project Nos. 97890-3325 and 97930-3324 in the approximate amount of $3.6 million. The fair market value of the proposals submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor was between $500,000.00 and $700,000.00 for each of the two proposals. All of the plan sheets and drawings were completed. The plans were prepared in accordance with Respondent's criteria for plan preparation. Every detail was followed and a complete maintenance of traffic plan was included. Where bridges were designed, the bridge calculations were included. Very little work was left to be done. In order to price out a project of the magnitude and scope required in the RFP, the technical proposals had to be very close to final design. Petitioner's technical proposal for both projects contemplated in the RFP was recorded on magnetic media in Petitioner's computer automated drawing machine. The magnetic media files could be easily transferred to Respondent. Petitioner at all times was ready, willing, and able to make such a transfer if Respondent had agreed to provide funds to Petitioner pursuant to Rule 14- 91.006(5). A great deal of valuable information was contained in the technical proposals prepared and submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor. Eighty to 90 percent of the engineering decisions were made and depicted either on the preliminary drawings or within the calculations included in the technical proposals. Information gathering and coordination with local permitting agencies, including Lake Worth, was a major component of designing and building the projects described in the RFP. Those kinds of activities required a good deal of time from higher level personnel in each organization. Respondent derived benefit from the technical proposals prepared by Petitioner and Intervenor irrespective of whether bridges or culverts are ultimately used at the canal crossings in the RFP. The only change that would be required would be to erase the bridges and insert details for a culvert crossing. Respondent derived benefit from the technical proposals prepared by Petitioner and Intervenor with respect to the projects contemplated in the RFP and similar projects in the future. Respondent can "relet" the project in the future and intends to do so. 10/ Respondent has retained the technical and price proposals submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor pending the outcome of this proceeding. Respondent's unwritten policy is to either return technical and price proposals to their offerors or destroy such proposals upon the concurrence of the, appropriate offeror. After this proceeding is concluded, Respondent intends to either return or dispose of the technical and price proposals submitted by Petitioner and Intervenor in a manner consistent with its unwritten policy. Reliance On Respondent's Existing Rule Petitioner and Intervenor were aware of Rule 14-91.006(5) in preparing and submitting their respective technical and price proposals. Neither Petitioner nor Intervenor, however, presented evidence of the extent to which they may have relied on Rule 14-91.006(5). Petitioner and Intervenor did not demonstrate that they were induced by Rule 14-91.006(5) to respond to the RFP or that Rule 14-91.006(5) was even a material or significant consideration to them. Payment of funds pursuant to Rule 14-91.006 (5) was neither addressed in the RFP nor discussed by the parties prior to Respondent's rejection of all price proposals. The record leaves open to speculation whether Petitioner and Intervenor would not have responded to the RFP in the absence of Rule 14- 91.006(5).
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that: Petitioner's written formal protest should be DENIED; Respondent should return the respective technical and price proposals to Petitioner and Intervenor; Respondent should not provide funds to either Petitioner or Intervenor pursuant to former Rule 14-91.006(5). DONE AND ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 10th day of January, 1991. DANIEL MANRY Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk, of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of January, 1991.
The Issue Whether Discovery Experimental and Development, Inc. ("Discovery") is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs under the authority of Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes?
Findings Of Fact In Discovery Experimental and Development, Inc., v. Department of Health, DOAH Case No. 99-0005RX (the "rule challenge"), three existing rules of the Department were challenged by Discovery pursuant to Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes. At final hearing, challenge to one of the three was dropped because it was no longer in effect. On February 22, 1999, the Final Order was rendered in the case. Discovery prevailed as to one of the two rules still subject to the proceeding. Rule 69F-12.019, Florida Administrative Code (the "invalidated rule"), was determined to constitute an invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority. The determination of invalidity was made because the rule, in an unrestrained manner, purported to allow Department agents to inspect any property, building, or records in determining compliance with certain state drug laws. The statute which the rule attempts to implement circumscribes which property, building, or records may be inspected. The Administrative Procedure Act mandates the following: If the . . . administrative law judge declares a rule or portion of a rule invalid pursuant to Section 120.56(3), Florida Statutes, a[n] . . . order shall be rendered against the agency for reasonable costs and attorney's fees, unless the agency demonstrates that its actions were substantially justified or special circumstances exist which would make the award unjust. Section 120.595(3), Florida Statutes. Substantial Justification or Special Circumstances The Department's witness testified that the rule had been amended into its invalidated form, to make the "rule more understandable and easier to read." (Tr. 58). The amended rule is more expansive than its predecessor with regard to what buildings, property, and records are subject to inspection. Still, the procedures governing the Department's inspectors (outside of those provided by the challenged rule) remained consistent before and after the amendment: to inspect only establishments, commercial or otherwise, that "are involved in the drug, device and cosmetic industry" (Tr. 60), all in relation to compliance with Chapter 499, Florida Statutes. The Department's bureau chief responsible for supervising inspectors and for development of the invalidated rule thought that department inspections would be confined by the challenged rule itself to only those buildings, property, and records as allowed by statute since the rule in subsection (1) announces that "[i]nspections and investigations are conducted to determine compliance with the provisions of Chapter 499, [and] Chapter 893, F.S. . . ." This expectation defies the plain wording of the rule that allows inspectors access to any buildings, property, or records. Reasonable Costs and Attorney's Fees Discovery was represented by its in-house counsel, R. Elliott Dunn, Esquire. As in-house counsel, Mr. Dunn is paid a salary. He does not normally keep records of time spent in matters representing Discovery, nor is he required to do so by his employer/client. He did not keep any contemporaneous records of time actually spent on the rule challenge. DOAH Case No. 99-0005RX was the first proceeding pursuant to Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, in which Mr. Dunn had ever been involved. The challenge involved extensive research into the Fourth Amendment's impact on search and seizure cases in industries historically regulated in a pervasive manner by government. In addition to legal services expended in litigation, Mr. Dunn was required to review the law in relation to both Section 120.56, Florida Statutes, and the Fourth Amendment's relationship to regulatory inspections conducted within the drug and pharmaceutical manufacturing industry. Mr. Dunn spent approximately 104 hours on the case, of which roughly 83 hours (80%) related directly to the invalidated rule. A rate of $175. per hour is a reasonable rate for attorney's fees in a case of this kind. The petition in this case requests that fees be awarded for 52 hours of work at $175 per hour for a total fees award of $9,100. Discovery also claims costs in the amount of $648 for air fare for both Mr. Dunn and Discovery's President, James T. Kimball, to travel to Tallahassee from Wesley Chapel via the Tampa International Airport for the final hearing. (Mr. Kimball appeared pro se in DOAH Case No. 99-0006RX, a case that was consolidated with Case No. 99-0005RX but dismissed for lack of standing.) Additional costs claimed by Discovery are $78 for automobile rental and parking. No receipts for any of the costs claimed were presented by Discovery. The only supporting documentation is an exhibit to an affidavit sworn to by Mr. Dunn and attached to the petition.
