Conclusions The Office of Financial Regulation ("Office") issued a denial of Petitioner’s application to become licensed as an “associated person”. Petitioner in turn filed a Petition for Administrative Hearing, which the Office referred to the Division of Administrative Hearings ("DOAH"). The assigned Administrative Law Judge ("ALI") held a formal administrative hearing, and entered a Recommended Order thereon. That Recommended Order of November 17, 2604, is attached to this Final Order, and incorporated herein by reference.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the Respondent, the Department of Insurance, should pay reasonable attorney fees and costs to Crudele under Section 57.111, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Equal Access to Justice Act, after Crudele appealed and reversed the Department's Emergency Order of Suspension.
Findings Of Fact On July 15, 1996, the Department issued an Emergency Order of Suspension of Crudele's eligibility for licensure and license as a Florida life insurance agent and life and health insurance agent. The Emergency Order of Suspension was based on alleged violations of the insurance code in connection with the surrender of insurance annuities for purchase of a startup company's unsecured promissory notes. It stated: Based on the foregoing specific facts and for the reasons of protecting the insurance-buying public and insurers from further harm, preventing further abuses of fiduciary relationships, and preventing further defrauding of insureds and insurance companies by the [Petitioner], the Insurance Commissioner finds that [Crudele] constitutes and is an immediate and serious danger to public health, safety, or welfare necessitating and justifying the Emergency Suspension of all licenses and eligibility for licensure and registrations heretofore issued to [Crudele] under the purview of the Department of Insurance. The danger, more specifically, is to the insurance-buying public which must place its trust in the honesty and competence of insurance agents. The trust involves the responsibility that insurance agents have for fiduciary funds accepted by them and insurance matters entrusted to them. The danger is clear and present that failure to properly handle such funds and matters may cause serious losses and damage to the insurance-buying public. Prior to issuance of the Emergency Order of Suspension, the Department received two verified complaints--one by the alleged victim, and the other by her adult daughter. The complaints alleged essentially: Crudele was introduced to Mary Clem, an 84 year-old widow of a tenant farmer, by Charles Perks, Clem's insurance agent, in 1992. In 1992, Crudele and Perks solicited and sold Clem two annuities for a total of $50,000, representing Clem's life savings from working in sick people's homes as a nurses aide. A year after selling the annuities, Crudele and Perks returned to Clem and convinced her to invest the money she had in her annuities into a new company called Zuma that was to recycle automobile tires into useful products. Crudele and Perks represented that Zuma was a "sure fire business." They said they were offering Clem the opportunity to get "in on the ground floor" and that the stock would then go on the open market and double in value. Clem did not have a great deal of education and had no experience investing in stocks or bonds. Her sole source of income was Social Security plus her modest savings. She conceded that when she was offered a 12% interest rate, she found the offer too irresistible to refuse. Neither Crudele nor Perks gave Clem a prospectus or any other descriptive brochure about Zuma. Clem purchased a total of three Zuma promissory notes at three separate times for a total of $60,000. This represented the bulk of her retirement savings. Clem acted based on her trust and confidence in Crudele and Perks. Clem later went to a lawyer to draft a will. The lawyer became very concerned about Clem's purchases of the Zuma promissory notes and her inability to understand the nature of the transaction. Clem was not getting any of her payments from Zuma as promised. Clem was "going out of her mind" with worry. She summoned her daughter, Roberta Anderson, to come down to Florida from Indiana to investigate the matter. Anderson was unable to contact Crudele, and he did not contact her. Anderson and Clem were not aware of any efforts on Crudele's part to recover the funds or otherwise remedy the situation. After a great deal of effort, Anderson was able to recover approximately $23,000 of her mother's money. Crudele apparently played no part in helping Anderson recover the $23,000. The Zuma notes went into default, and apparently the remainder of the money was lost. Clem suffered a very serious financial loss that, given her circumstances, she could ill afford. It may be inferred from the evidence that the Department based its Emergency Order of Suspension on the Clem and Anderson verified complaints. There was no evidence of any other basis for the Emergency Order of Suspension. There was no evidence as to whether the Department conducted any investigation of any kind prior to entry of the Emergency Order of Suspension. Nor is there any evidence as to the Department's decision-making process. The Emergency Order of Suspension stated: (1) that it was being issued pursuant to "sections 120.59(3) [and] 120.60(8) [now Section 120.60(6), Florida Statutes (1997)], Florida Statutes [1995]; (2) that Crudele had "the right to request a hearing in accordance with the provisions of Section 120.59(4), Florida Statutes [1995]"; and (3) that Crudele "was entitled to seek review of this Order pursuant to Section 120.68, Florida Statutes [1995], and Rule 9.110, Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure." The Emergency Order of Suspension also stated that an Administrative Complaint seeking final disciplinary action would be filed within 20 days. On July 15, 1996, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint on essentially the same allegations as those in the Emergency Order of Suspension. Crudele sought judicial review of the Emergency Order of Suspension in the District Court of Appeal, First District. On August 19, 1997, the court issued an Opinion reversing the Emergency Order of Suspension because it did not "set forth particularized facts which demonstrate sufficient immediacy or likelihood of continuing harm to the public health, safety, and welfare to support a suspension of his license without notice and hearing." The court's Mandate issued on September 4, 1997; it referred to the court's Opinion and commanded that "further proceedings, if required, be had in accordance with said opinion, the rules of Court, and the laws of the State of Florida." The Administrative Complaint filed against Crudele was given Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) Case No. 97-2603. On February 17, 1998, a Final Order sustaining some of the charges and suspending Crudele's license and eligibility for licensure for six months was entered in Case No. 97-2603.
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the state agency authorized to administer and enforce provisions of Chapter 520, Florida Statutes, regulating the granting or denial of applications for Home Improvement Contractor Licenses. On November 30, 1988, Petitioner submitted an application on behalf of a corporation known as "The Durocoat Company" (Durocoat) to Respondent for licensure as a home improvement contractor. On that application, Petitioner disclosed the identity of the two principals of the corporation and the position held by those two individuals. Petitioner listed himself as the president of the corporation and another individual, Russell W. Black, as the corporation's vice-president. Each principal owns 50 percent of the corporation. Following the section of the application providing for the disclosure of the identities and addresses of business principals, a number of questions are listed and the person executing the form is required to provide an "X" in a block to indicate a "yes" or "no" answer to each of those questions. Question number four reads as follows: Are there unpaid judgments against the applicant or any of the persons listed above? If "yes" attach a copy of the complaint and judgment(s). Petitioner placed an "X" in the space allotted for a "yes" answer to the inquiry regarding unpaid judgments against the persons listed as business principals, namely himself and Mr. Black. Petitioner then attached a copy of a document entitled "Notice of Levy" issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of the United States Department of the Treasury. In sum, the notice certifies the existence of a tax lien against Mr. Black, Durocoat's vice-president, in the amount of $27,546.25. It is undisputed by the parties that creditors held unpaid judgments against Petitioner at the time he submitted the application on November 30, 1988, and that he failed to attach copies of those judgments to the application. Further, Petitioner acknowledged at the final hearing that he was aware at the time of submittal of the application of the existence of one of these judgments. That judgement, entered in favor of The American Express Company (American Express) for $7,602, has existed since September of 1987. In mitigation of his failure to disclose the American Express judgement, Petitioner testified at hearing that he didn't have a copy of the judgement at the time he filed the application and was unaware of the requirement that he should attach a copy. In view of his action in attaching a copy of the existing tax lien against Mr. Black to the application, Petitioner's testimony that he was unaware that he should attach copies of unpaid judgments is not credited. A copy of Petitioner's credit report, introduced at final hearing by Petitioner, discloses that a business known as "Speeler Marine" obtained a judgement against him in the amount of $250 in March of 1986. Petitioner testified at hearing that he was unaware of the existence of this judgement. No settlement discussions have been initiated by him with the creditor. Petitioner's credit report further discloses that an outstanding loan to Petitioner in 1985 in the amount of $36,000 by a financial institution identified as "Sun Bank" is classified as a "bad debt, placed for collection." Petitioner testified that this debt represents loan funds obtained in a previous business venture and is the subject of settlement negotiations and that he has repaid $4,000 of the amount at the present time. Petitioner's testimony also establishes that the credit report's disclosure of a 1987 foreclosure certificate of title to real estate represented real property located in Gainesville, Florida, which Petitioner had taken in trade for money owed to him. In view of the distance to that city, Petitioner testified that he simply chose not to pay off the existing mortgage on the property or oppose foreclosure action by the mortgage holder. A representative of Nationwide Chemical Coating Company (Nationwide) testified at the final hearing regarding that company's business relationship with Petitioner's corporation. Since February of 1988, Nationwide has sold supplies valued at $250,000 to Durocoat. The company has always paid charges within the 30 day required time limit and is considered to be a "class A" customer. In regard to the federal tax lien which Petitioner attached to the application, Russell W. Black testified that the lien resulted from the disallowance by IRS of a tax shelter investment of $34,000 made by Black in 1977 or 1978. Black was notified by IRS in 1981 that the tax shelter was not considered to be a valid deduction for tax purposes. The amount owed by Black to IRS in 1981 was $20,630.64. The amount is now $27,546.25 and, according to Black, is still unpaid because he doesn't have the money. On advice of counsel, he has not contacted IRS to schedule payments on the debt. Respondent denied Petitioner's application by letter dated January 13, 1989, stating that Petitioner's failure to attach copies of the unpaid judgments against himself constituted a material misstatement of fact sufficient to authorize the denial. The letter further stated that the unpaid judgments, along with the federal tax lien against Mr. Black, demonstrated a lack of financial responsibility by both individuals and constituted an additional ground for denial of the application.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered denying Petitioner's application for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of August, 1989, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DON W. DAVIS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of August, 1989. APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings, in accordance with Section 120.59, Florida Statutes, on findings of fact submitted by the parties. Petitioner's Proposed Findings. Petitioner's proposed findings consisted of 10 unnumbered paragraphs which have been numbered 1-10 and are treated as follows: 1-8. Addressed in part, remainder rejected as unnecessary. Rejected, unsupported by direct admissible evidence. Rejected, unnecessary to result reached. Respondent's Proposed Findings. 1-2. Addressed. 3-4. Rejected, unnecessary. 5-11. Addressed in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: John L. Riley, Esq. 2325 Fifth Avenue North St. Petersburg, FL 33713 William W. Byrd, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Office Of The Comptroller 1313 Tampa Street, Suite 615 Tampa, FL 33602-3394 Hon. Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 Charles Stutts, Esq. General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
The Issue The issue is whether Petitioner showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a refund of $1,500,216.60 in sales and use tax paid during the period from January 2005 through January 2007 to purchase industrial printing machinery that allegedly satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output for printing facilities that manufacture, process, compound or produce tangible personal property at fixed locations in the state within the meaning of Subsection 212.08(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and Florida Administrative Rule 12A-1.096.1/
Findings Of Fact Respondent is the agency responsible for administering the state sales tax imposed in Chapter 212. Petitioner is a "for profit" Florida corporation located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Petitioner is engaged in the business of publishing newspapers and commercial printing. Petitioner derives approximately 85 percent of its revenue from advertising and approximately 15 percent of its revenue from circulation subscriptions. In April, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $403,780.05 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment during the period from January, 2005, to January, 2006. In October, 2007, Petitioner requested a refund of $1,096,436.61 in sales and use taxes paid for the purchase of industrial machinery and equipment for the period from January, 2006, to January, 2007. The first refund request in April, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3938, and the second refund request in October, 2007, became DOAH Case Number 08-3939. The two cases were consolidated into this proceeding pursuant to the joint motion of the parties. The parties stipulated that the only issue for determination in this consolidated proceeding is whether Petitioner satisfied the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A- 1.096. If a finding were to be made that Petitioner satisfied the 10 percent requirement, the parties stipulate that the file will be returned to Respondent for a determination of whether the items purchased are qualifying machinery and equipment defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096. The issue of whether Petitioner satisfied the statutory requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096 is a mixed question of law and fact. The ALJ concludes as a matter of law that Petitioner did not satisfy the 10 percent requirement. The ALJ discusses that conclusion briefly, for context, in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Findings of Fact, and explains the conclusion and the supporting legal authority more fully in the Conclusions of Law. It is an undisputed fact that Petitioner counts items identified in the record as "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" separately from the "newspaper" as a means of exceeding the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Respondent construes the 10 percent exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) in pari materia with the exemption authorized in Subsection 212.08(5)(1)(g) for "preprints," "custom inserts," and "circulation inserts" (hereinafter "inserts"). The latter statutory exemption treats inserts as a "component part of the newspaper" which are not to be treated separately for tax purposes. For reasons stated more fully in the Conclusions of Law, the ALJ agrees with the statutory construction adopted by Respondent. That conclusion of law renders moot and, therefore, irrelevant and immaterial, the bulk of the evidence put forth by the parties during the two-day hearing because the evidence assumed arguendo that Petitioner's statutory interpretation would be adopted by the ALJ, i.e., inserts would be counted separately from the newspaper for purposes of satisfying the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). In an abundance of caution, the fact-finder made findings of fact based on the legal assumption that inserts are statutorily required to be counted separately for purposes of the 10 percent requirement in Subsection 212.08(5)(b). Those findings are set forth in paragraphs 9 through 11. The verification audit by Respondent's field office was able to verify an output increase of only 4.27 percent for 2005 and only 8.72 percent for 2006. A preponderance of evidence in this de novo proceeding did not overcome those findings. The trier of fact finds the evidence from Petitioner during this de novo proceeding to be inconsistent and unpersuasive. For example, Petitioner inflated production totals by counting materials printed for its own use, and materials in which the unit of measurement was inconsistent. In other instances, production totals for printing presses identified in the record as Didde and Ryobi presses varied dramatically with circulation. In other instances, Petitioner's reporting positions changed during the course of the proceeding. There is scant evidence that the alleged increase in production created jobs in the local market in a manner consistent with legislative intent. Rather, a preponderance of evidence shows that when Petitioner placed the equipment in service it was job neutral or perhaps reduced jobs.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent enter a final order finding that Petitioner did not satisfy the requirement for a 10 percent increase in productive output defined in Subsection 212.08(5)(b) and Rule 12A-1.096, and denying Petitioner's request for a refund. DONE AND ENTERED this 20th day of October 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL MANRY Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 20th day of October, 2009.
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, admissions made by Respondent, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida. He holds license number 0265883. In March of 1990, Ulrich Wingens, by and through his attorney, Charles Burns, entered into a written contract to purchase from Jupiter Bay Shoppes Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "JBS") certain commercial property located in Palm Beach County. Respondent brokered the sale. The sale contract provided that JBS was responsible for payment of Respondent's broker's fee of $50,000.00 and that such compensation was to "[t]o be due and payable only if closing occur[red]." Respondent received a $20,000.00 earnest money deposit from Wingens in connection with the sale. The sale contract provided that the $20,000.00 was to be held in the Jim Towns Realty escrow account. The sale did not close. Litigation between Wingens and JBS ensued. During the pendency of the litigation, the parties instructed Respondent to continue to hold Wingens' $20,000.00 earnest money deposit in escrow until they advised him to do otherwise. Wingens and JBS settled their dispute before the case was scheduled to go to trial. On November 14, 1991, the judge assigned to the case, Palm Beach County Circuit Court Judge Edward H. Fine, entered an order directing Respondent "to immediately transfer to Fleming, Haile & Shaw, P.A. Trust Account the escrow deposit in the amount of $20,000.00 and any accrued interest thereon." Respondent did not comply with the order. He had appropriated the $20,000.00 for his own personal use and benefit and was not holding it in escrow. This was contrary to the instructions he had received from Wingens and JBS. At no time had Wingens or JBS authorized Respondent to take such action. Wingens' attorney, Burns, brought the matter to the attention of the Department. The Department assigned one of its investigators, Terry Giles, to the case. As part of her investigation, Giles interviewed Respondent. During the interview, Respondent admitted to Giles that he had closed his real estate office in October of 1991 and had not at any time prior to the interview notified the Department of the closure. At the time he closed his office, Respondent's real estate broker's license was still in active status.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law it is hereby recommended that the Commission enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the violations alleged in Counts I, II, III and IV of the Administrative Complaint and revoking his real estate broker's license. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 16th day of August, 1993. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 16th day of August, 1993. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE IN CASE NO. 93-1315 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "findings of facts" proposed by the Department in its post-hearing submittal: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. First sentence: Accepted as true and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. 3-13. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. 14-15. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because they would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. Accepted as true, but not incorporated because it would add only unnecessary detail to the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer. Accepted as true and incorporated in substance. COPIES FURNISHED: Janine B. Myrick, Esquire Senior Attorney Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate Legal Section, Suite N 308 Hurston Building, North Tower 400 West Robinson Street Orlando, Florida 32801-1772 Mr. James C. Towns 7101 Smoke Ranch Road #1007 Las Vegas, Nevada 89128 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director Division of Real Estate 400 West Robinson Street Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802-1900 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
The Issue An administrative complaint dated June 22, 1989, alleges that Respondents violated Sections 475.25(1)(e), 475.25(1)(o), 475.42(1)(a) and 475.42(1)(e), F.S., by failing to pay an administrative fine and by operating as a broker without a valid current license. The issue in this proceeding is whether those violations occurred, and, if so, what discipline is appropriate.
Findings Of Fact Respondent, Jeffrey Robert Horne, is currently licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0433763 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. Respondent, the People's Realty, Inc., is now and was at all times material hereto, a corporation registered as a real estate broker in the State of Florida having been issued license number 0253302 in accordance with Chapter 475, F.S. Jeffrey Robert Horne is licensed and operating as the qualifying broker for The People's Realty, Inc., at 1125 U.S. Highway One, Sebastian, Florida 32958. On December 6, 1988, the Florida Real Estate Commission issued its Final Order in Department of Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate v. Jeffrey Robert Horne, Case #0156666, DOAH #88-2547, finding Respondent Horne guilty of violations of Section 475.25(1)(a), (b) and (k), F.S., reprimanding him, and assessing a fine of $500.00 for each of the three violations, for a total of $1,500.00. The order was filed, and was sent to counsel for Respondent, on December 13, 1988. The order does not, on its face, designate a deadline for payment of the fine. Jeffrey Horne sent a check dated 1/26/88 to the Department of Professional Regulation, (DPR) in the amount of $500.00, for one-third of his fine. The check was dishonored for insufficient funds and was returned to DPR. A form letter was sent to Jeffrey Horne notifying him of the nonpayment and assessing a $25.00 service charge. On or about April 7, 1989, Jeffrey Horne submitted a cashier's check to DPR in the amount of $525.00. Jeffrey Horne's April 7, 1989, submittal immediately followed his receipt of this form letter: (Note: some portions of letter are handwritten) Records Section 4-5-89 Jeffrey R. Horne 414 Quarry Lane Sebastian FL 32958 Dear I refer you to D. KELLER'S letter dated 2-24-89 , a copy of which is enclosed for your convenience, regarding your check(s) in the amount(s) of $500_ being dishonored by your bank, said check(s) being applicable to your request(s) for fine by Real Estate Commission. Since you have not complied with the above, this is to advise that I have cancelled your ( )salesman, (X)broker, (X)corporate license(s) No.(s) 0433763 & 0253302 effective 1-26-89 , and request the immediate return of said license(s) to this office. Accordingly, if you are operating as a ( )salesman, (X)broker, and/or (X)corporation, you are doing so without being the holder of valid license(s) and in violation of Chapter 475, of the Florida Statutes. For your information, the above license(s) cannot be reacti- vated unless the required amounts of $500 and $25 service charge are submitted by certified check or money order and license applied for on proper form to the undersigned. If within 10 days from the date of this letter, you still have not complied, this matter will be turned over to our Investigation Section. Sincerely, P.S. Both licenses also expired 3-31-89. No renewal shows as processed DJP: Enclosure D. Janet Puckey, Records Administrative Assistant II cc: DPR-Tallahassee - Finance & Accounting People's Realty Inc., 9516 Fellsmere Hwy, Sebastian 329 (Petitioner's exhibit #10) Nothing in the record of this proceeding explains how an effective date of 1/26/89 was established, or by what authority an Administrative Assistant II could cancel a license. In anticipation of license expiration, Jeffrey Horne had sent two renewal fee checks, dated March 27, 1989 and March 28, 1989, in the amount of $57.00 each, to DPR. These checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. Form letters dated April 26, 1989, were sent to Jeffrey Horne and to People's Realty, Inc., informing them that the checks were dishonored and requesting payment of the full amount, plus $10.00 service charge for each check. The letters also included this warning: * * * If you do not comply with the above, your license will be cancelled fifteen days from the receipt of this notice and immediate return of your license will be requested. Accordingly, any real estate business conducted subsequent to the expiration of your old license will be in violation of Chapter 475, Florida Statute. Your license cannot be reactivated unless the dishonored check is paid in full and a $10.00 service charge is paid. * * * (Petitioner's Exhibit #5) Jeffrey Horne received the notices approximately April 28, 1989, and on May 22, 1989, he sent a money order to DPR for $132.00, intending to cover the two $57.00 renewals and $10.00 service charges. He was later informed that he was $2.00 short, and he eventually sent that amount. Larry Whitten was an Investigative Specialist II, assigned to the Division of Real Estate Palm Beach office, between January 1988 and September 1989. In response to a memo from Attorney Steven Johnson, Investigator Whitten contacted Jeffrey Horne to determine whether he was currently operating. Investigator Whitten cannot recall the exact dates of his one office and two telephone contacts, but they were sometime between May 24, 1989 (the date of the memo), and June 16, 1989. The telephone was answered, "People's Realty", and the office was open and staffed by Jeffrey Horne and another person. On June 12, 1990, Darlene F. Keller, Director of the DPR Division of Real Estate, executed a "Certification of Absence of Public Record", stating: I HEREBY CERTIFY that a search of the records of the Florida Real Estate Commission has revealed that as of June 19, 1989, $1,000.00 of the fine owed by Jeffrey Robert Horne had not been received, nor had the renewal fee of $67.00 been paid. The licenses of both Respondents were invalid from April 1, 1989 to June 14, 1989. WITNESS my hand and seal this 12th day of June, 1990. (Petitioner's Exhibit #6) Paragraph 10 of the Administrative Complaint which initiated this proceeding states: "On or before June 14, 1989, Respondent made good the renewal fee checks previously returned NSF." This statement is consistent with Respondents' exhibit #1, which includes the DPR letters acknowledging payments. However, this conflicts with the statement in paragraph 10, above, that as of June 19, 1989, the renewal fee of $67.00 had not been paid. The same claim is also repeated in paragraph 11 of the Administrative Complaint. The complaint alleges that both Respondents are licensed, and that from January 13, 1989 to March 31, 1989, Respondent Horne was licensed and operating as the qualifying broker for the People's Realty, Inc., but that from April 1, 1989 to June 14, 1989, they were operating without valid and current licenses. (Paragraphs #1-4, Administrative Complaint dated June 22, 1989.) It is apparent from the above that it is Petitioner's position that Respondents' licenses expired on March 31, 1989, for nonpayment of a renewal fee, and were reinstated on June 14, 1989, when (according to one version of DPR's account) the renewal fees were properly paid. The retroactive "cancellation" of Jeffrey Horne's license by D. Janet Puckey is either given no effect, or his license was retroactively reinstated when he sent the $525.00. Jeffrey Horne has been licensed as a real estate broker since 1987. Prior to that he was licensed in Florida as a real estate salesman. The incident which led to his discipline in 1988 occurred when he was a salesman and is his only infraction of record. At the time that his checks were dishonored in 1989, he was in financial straits, having incurred legal expenses due to the disciplinary proceedings, and having recently started over with his own business. He does not consider his financial situation a threat to his clients as he refuses to accept or hold funds in escrow. Rather, he has an arrangement with a title company to maintain the escrow account. When the DPR checks were written, he thought that they would be covered by commission checks he had deposited. When he was notified that the checks were bad, he provided restitution as soon as he could. The payment of $132.00 rather than $134.00, to cover the two $57.00 renewal fees and $20.00 in service charges was a mathematical error. Jeffrey Horne concedes that he continued to operate as a broker and to operate the People's Realty, without pause, during the relevant period. He denies that he was given a deadline for payment of his fine, and he was attempting to pay it in installments. Until he was contacted by the investigator, he did not believe that his license had been revoked and would have stopped operating if he had been clearly instructed. He also attempted to pay his renewal fees and, until he was informed otherwise by DPR, he believed the fees were paid. The notice, described in paragraph 7, above, is ambiguous, but appears to provide a 15-day grace period when a check has been dishonored. Horne received the notices on April 28, 1989, but did not send the money order until May 22, 1989. He is guilty, at most, of knowingly practicing with an expired license for nine days (May 13th until May 22nd). At the time of hearing, the entire $1,500.00 administrative fine had been paid, as had the renewal fees.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby, recommended that a Final Order be entered finding that Respondents violated Section 475.42(1)(a), F.S., reprimanding them, and assessing a fine of $100.00, to be paid in full 30 days from the date of the Final Order. RECOMMENDED this 18th day of July, 1990, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MARY CLARK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904)488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 18th day of July, 1990. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven W. Johnson, Esquire DPR-Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32802 Gregory J. Gore, P.A. P.O. Box 780384 Sebastian, FL 32978-0384 Kenneth E. Easley, General Counsel Dept. of Professional Regulation 1940 N. Monroe St., Suite 60 Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Darlene F. Keller, Division Director DPR-Division of Real Estate P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, FL 32801
The Issue The issue for consideration in this matter is whether Petitioner should be granted registration as an associated person of FISCL Securities in Florida.
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations herein, the Petitioner was an applicant for registration as an associated person of FISCL Securities. The Respondent, Department, was the state agency charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 517, FLORIDA STATUTES, the Florida Securities and Investor Protection Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder which include the registration of associated persons as securities dealers inthis state. Under the rules of the Department, anyone who seeks to represent a securities dealer in Florida is required to file an application form, (Form U- 4), with the National Association of Securities Dealers, (NASD), which, upon review, is forwarded to the state in which the applicant resides and seeks registration. If the records of the NASD disclose any disciplinary action having been taken against the applicant, it is identified to the state in which registration is sought. In Florida the Department is the appropriate agency and Department officials review the application to see if it should be approved. In this regard, all disciplinary information, the records of the NASD, is forwarded to the pertinent state for review in accordance with the rules and statutes of that state and, based on the information provided, a decision is made as to whether the application should be approved fully, approved with conditions, or denied. In Florida, all documents relating to the applicant's disciplinary history are secured and reviewed by the Department's Division of Securities prior to a recommendation being made as to approval or denial of the application for registration. In the instant case, the information submitted by NASD, pertaining to the Petitioner herein, included evidence of a prior disciplinary record. Upon receipt of the notice, Ms. Cain, the Division's Assistant Director, sent out a discrepancy letter to the Petitioner and requested copies of the disciplinary record and his form U-4 from NASD. The information submitted to the Department by Ellen J. Badler, Assistant Director, Special Registration, with NASD, dated July 18, 1990, reflected three letters of admission, waiver and consent from First Heritage Corporation, a securities dealer in Southfield Michigan, and Louis Feldman, Petitioner, a registered options principal with and president of the firm. The documents show that on the basis of periodic review of the company records in October and November, 1981, the corporation failed to obtain or maintain option account agreements for 7 of its option customers; that in 5 cases it failed to obtain or maintain sufficient background and financial information on customers approved for trading; and that it failed to show the date prospectuses were furnished to options customers. All of the above were cited as violations of Article III, Section 33, Appendix E, NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. This inquiry also indicated that the corporation and Petitioner failed to inform its customers, in writing, of the method it used to allocate exercise notices to its customers' accounts, and failed to explain the way the system operated and its consequences, in violation of Section 63, of NASD's Uniform Practice Code. Mr. Feldman, along with the company, admitted those violations in a Letter of Admission, Waiver and Consent he executed in response to NASD's District 8 Business Conduct Committee, (Committee), and they were punished with a censure to the company and a joint fine of up to $500.00 for Mr. Feldman andthe company. No further disciplinary action was taken against the Petitioner or his company by NASD, the SEC, or the state of Michigan until, in 1989, NASD entered its Decision and Order of Acceptance of Respondents' Offer of Settlement regarding three Complaints filed by the Committee in 1988 for alleged violations of rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board, (MSRB), and the Rules of Fair Practice. These complaints, filed against Petitioner, First Heritage, and as to one of the three, to a third party as well, related to: effecting the purchase and sale of municipal securities at prices in which the aggregate price at which the securities were purchased or sold were not reasonable and fair under the circumstances; placing several different advertisements which omitted material facts and were mis- leading; again, purchasing and selling municipal securities at prices which were not fair and reasonable. The Committee found that the Petitioner and the other parties involved were in violation of the rules as alleged, and fined Petitioner and First Heritage $10,000.00 jointly as to the two price allegations, and $5,000.00 as to the advertising allegation. Petitioner claims the violations were more ministerial and technical than substantive and that no customer ever complained about or was in any way injured by those actions. As to the advertisements, he claims they were not misleading. Examination of the advertisements does not necessarily support that claim, however, He also claims that the policies complained of were the same as those followed for the 13 years the company was in business and prior audits by NASD had never resulted in any noted discrepancies. The Department does not consider as pertinent the fact that injury to a consumer was not involved. By the same token, given, as here, the completed disciplinary action which has become final, it will not look behind that action and re-litigate, at a hearing such as this, the truth of the allegations. Petitioner also claims that in each case he was advised by counsel that it would be useless to fight the allegations of misconduct since it appeared the collective mind of the agency was made up to take action. Further, weighing the minimal fines sought against the extensive cost to Petitioner in attorney fees and lost commissions while litigating the allegations, he elected to take that route less expensive to him in the short run and accept punishment. This decision did not, it would appear, redound to his benefit. Petitioner also claims, and it is so found, that at no time has any disciplinary action ever been taken against him for actions in the securities business by the states of Michigan or Florida. On the basis of those actions, by letter of October 11, 1990, the Department notified the Petitioner that his application for registration was denied. The two page letterclearly indicated the Petitioner's professional history and the fact that he was the subject of "at least two regulatory actions filed by the NASD." The letter then listed the specific allegations of misconduct charged against the Petitioner in each of the two actions and noted the agency action taken in each case. The Department's letter also cited the pertinent statute which authorizes it to deny an application for registration and the bases therefor, and noted the reasons for its action. Petitioner was also notified of his right to and the procedure for contesting the Department's action.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is therefore recommended that a Final Order be entered denyingPetitioner, Louis Feldman's application for registration as an associated person of FISCL Securities in Florida. RECOMMENDED in Tallahassee, Florida this 17th day of September, 1991. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of September, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: Gregory G. Schultz, Esquire Schultz & Associates, P.A. 26750 U.S. Highway 19 N. Suite 310-A Clearwater, Florida 34621 Margaret S. Karniewicz, Esquire Department of Banking and Finance Suite 1302, The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Gerald Lewis Comptroller The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Department of Banking and Finance The Capitol, Plaza Level, Room 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact The initial Petition for Administrative Hearing was filed on November 8, 1991. The Petition was filed by Ervin James Horton. 3. In the Petition Rules "33-3.001, 33-3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.004(3)(A), 33-22.0012 Code 3, s. 3-12, 33-29 and 33-4.001, 33-4.002" and Internal Operating Procedure Number AG-91.51 were challenged. Most of the Challenged Rules are lengthy and deal with a number of subjects. The common thread of the Challenged Rules and IOP concerns the possession of contraband and punishment therefor. The Petition is, to say the least, confusing. This confusion is caused by the Petitioners frequent use of legal terms and phrases with little in the way of factual explanation. As an example, paragraph 2, State of the Case and Facts, provides the following: 2. That the (Respondents) Rules as 33-29 et. seq. 33- 3.006, 33-3.0025, 33-22.0012 Code 3, s 3-12 is [sic] invalid, arbitrary, capricious, vague, delegation to exceed, modify, contravenes, the specific provisions of laws [sic] implemented, citation required by 120.54(7), Florida Statutes and 944.09(1)(A). This paragraph is fairly typical of most of the Petition. Although it contains some "legalese", it does not, read alone or in conjunction with all of the Petitioner's pleadings, adequately put the Respondent on notice as to what the Petitioner is challenging or the basis for his challenge. Apparently, the Petitioner is complaining of the actions of employees of the Respondent in punishing the Petitioner for having contraband in his possession. The Petitioner has also attempted to raise constitutional arguments to support his challenge to the Challenged Rules and the IOP. The statements concerning constitutional issues consist of mere statements that constitutional rights are being violated without any facts to support an argument that the Challenged Rules or the IOP are unconstitutional. Insufficient alleged facts concerning why it is believed that the Challenged Rules and the IOP are an "invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority", as defined in Section 120.52(8), Florida Statutes, were included in the Petition. On December 4, 1991, an Order Granting Motion to Dismiss with Leave to Amend and Cancelling Formal Hearing was entered. On December 23, 1991, an Amended Petition was filed by the Petitioner. The Amended Petition consolidated the Petitioner's challenges in this case and case number 90-7190R. The Amended Petition is very similar to the Petition and suffers from the same deficiencies. Additionally, the Petitioner includes the Department of Legal Affairs, and the State Attorney of the Eighth Judicial Circuit, the Respondents in case number 91-7190R as Respondents and addresses his challenge to other rules, internal operating procedures and directives of the other named Respondents challenged in case number 91-7190R. The Amended Petition is devoid of a sufficient statement of the alleged facts pertinent to the issues raised in the Petition or the Amended Petition which, if proven, would support a determination that the Challenged Rules, the IOP or the other matters challenged in the Amended Petition are invalid under Section 120.56, Florida Statutes. On January 14, 1992, an Order Concerning Amended Petition was entered dismissing the Amended Petition and giving the parties an opportunity to file proposed final orders.
Findings Of Fact The policy being challenged provides that: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. This provision is routinely and customarily embodied in the notices issued by Respondent to parties before it in matters arising under Florida Statutes 447.307 and 447.503. The Respondent acknowledges that it did not adopt and promulgate the policy pursuant to Florida Statutes 120.54 or any other relevant provision of Chapter 120. On 12 July 1979 Petitioner filed a petition with Respondent in which Petitioner sought to represent certain employees employed by the Collier County Board of County Commissioners. This petition was accepted by Respondent and on 30 July 1979 Respondent issued a Notice of Representation Hearing and a Prehearing Order. This Prehearing Order directed the parties to that proceeding to file with Respondent at least seven (7) days prior to the date of the hearing, and serve upon each other, a prehearing statement, identifying: Those fact disputes to be presented for resolution. Any and all legal questions to be presented for resolution. The legal authority to be relied upon by each party in presenting its arguments. Those witnesses to be called at the hearing, except rebuttal witnesses. The approximate time necessary to present the party's case. Any outstanding motions or procedural questions to be resolved. This Pre-Hearing Order then provided: The hearing may be cancelled if a petitioner or intervenor fails to timely file its prehearing statement. Petitioner did not file its prehearing statement within the prescribed 7-day period and on 21 August 1979 Petitioner was notified that the hearing scheduled to commence 23 August had been cancelled. On 22 August Petitioner was advised that a written order cancelling the 23 August hearing had been entered by the Commission. Thereafter Petitioner filed the petition here under consideration contending that the policy of Respondent to enter the cancellation-of-hearing notice in prehearing orders is a rule and invalid by reason of not being promulgated pursuant to Chapter 120. Respondent takes the position that the provision in the prehearing order is not a rule, but even if it could otherwise be considered to be a statement of general applicability, it is exempt from being so found by 447.207(6), Florida Statutes.
