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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs REINALDO C. PASCUAL, 97-002371 (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Miami, Florida May 16, 1997 Number: 97-002371 Latest Update: Mar. 23, 1998

The Issue Whether Respondent violated Sections 943.13(7) and 943.1395(6), (7), Florida Statutes, and Rule 11B-27.011(4)(a), (c), Florida Administrative Code, and if so, what penalty should be imposed.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Reinaldo C. Pascual (Pascual), has been certified by the Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission (CJSTC), as a corrections officer since June 17, 1988. His certificate number is 65593. On May 24 and 25, 1993, Pascual was employed by the Metropolitan Dade County Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) as a corporal. He was assigned to the ninth floor of the pretrial detention facility. The ninth floor is the psychiatric ward. Pascual was working the 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. shift. On May 21, 1994, Eladio Vega appeared in court on a traffic matter after which the judge instructed him not to drive his vehicle because Mr. Vega had been drinking all night. Mr. Vega went to his vehicle after the court appearance. As a result of his actions, he was held in contempt of court and sentenced for a number of days in jail. Mr. Vega was incarcerated in the Dade County Jail and was placed on the fourth floor of the pretrial detention facility with the general inmate population. Late in the evening of May 24 or early morning hours of May 25, 1993, Mr. Vega began to exhibit some bizarre behavior, touching other inmates and changing the channels on the television set in the dayroom. Officer Gary Banks received complaints from the other inmates about Mr. Vega's behavior. Officer Banks went to Mr. Vega's cell and asked him to step outside the cell. Acting nervously, Mr. Vega complied but told Officer Banks that he had to get back in the cell because his son was in the cell. Mr. Vega's son was not in the cell. Thinking that Mr. Vega's behavior was strange, Officer Banks contacted his superior and requested authorization to take Mr. Vega to the clinic so that a nurse could take a look at him. Around 1:45 a.m., Officer Banks escorted Mr. Vega to the clinic. While Vega was in the clinic, he was pacing, sweating, and acting nervously. The nurse on duty determined that Mr. Vega should be transferred to the ninth floor until he could be evaluated by the day nurses. Mr. Vega was transferred to the ninth floor and placed in a cell with fifteen to twenty other psychiatric patients. The inmates complained about Mr. Vega's behavior, and Mr. Vega was transferred to cell 9-C-2, which is a single-man cell. The cell is one of five or six pods which are locked with no access to the dayroom. Each pod is approximately eight feet by six feet and contains a metal bunk, a toilet, and a sink. The only opening to the pod is a chow hole, which is a slot that is approximately two feet by one foot with a metal cover. The chow hole is used to serve food to the inmates. The door to the pod is made of steel with chicken wire enclosed by glass. The wall to the pod is transparent and made of glass. There are slots in the glass wall so that the inmates and officers can communicate. Mr. Vega began to bang on the cell walls, yelling and screaming. Officer Del Castillo was on duty on the ninth floor and went to see what was wrong with Mr. Vega. Officer Del Castillo tried to verbally calm Mr. Vega, but he did not succeed. Mr. Vega was trying to kick out the window in the cell, using a donkey kick by having his back to the window and kicking the window with his feet. Unable to quiet Mr. Vega, Officer Del Castillo went to his supervisor, Pascual, and told him about Mr. Vega's behavior and of his fear that Mr. Vega would harm himself. Pascual got the leg shackles and went to Mr. Vega's cell with Officer Del Castillo. Both officers unsuccessfully tried to calm Mr. Vega. Pascual decided to go into the cell and restrain Mr. Vega. As Officer Del Castillo opened the cell door, Pascual was standing directly in front of the door. When the door opened, Mr. Vega ran out, hitting Pascual in the abdominal area and knocking him toward the floor. Mr. Vega testified that he ran out of the cell because he thought the officers were trying to poison the air in his cell. Pascual managed to hit Mr. Vega in the face. Mr. Vega then turned and started to throw punches at Officer Del Castillo. None of Mr. Vega's punches found their mark. Officer Del Castillo was able to land a couple of punches on Mr. Vega's head and face. Having recovered from Mr. Vega's initial hit, Pascual hit Mr. Vega in the face. Mr. Vega fell backward and landed on the floor with his back to the cell wall. Mr. Vega hit the left side of his head on the chow hole in the cell. Pascual told Mr. Vega to turn onto his stomach and to put his hands behind his back. Mr. Vega did not comply but started to get up on his feet. Pascual, thinking that Mr. Vega was going to attack him again, grabbed Mr. Vega around the throat and tried to implement a lateral vascular neck restraint (LVNR). Mr. Vega was thrashing from side to side and leaned forward carrying Pascual upward on his back, piggy back style, until they lost their balance and fell forward hitting the metal bunk in the cell. Pascual was able to apply the LVNR, and Vega passed out for a few seconds. By this time Mr. Vega was bleeding profusely on the left side of his head. Pascual and Officer Del Castillo, placed handcuffs on Mr. Vega's wrists and shackles on his ankles. Mr. Vega was placed stomach down on a stretcher, which was between six to twelve inches from the floor. Pascual and Officer Del Castillo placed Mr. Vega in the elevator to take him to the clinic. While they were in the elevator, Mr. Vegal rolled off the stretcher at least two times. The stretchers were old and were not equipped with straps to hold the inmate down. When they arrived at the clinic, Nurses Kim Smith and Dorothy Ferguson were on duty along with Officer Lionel Cloney. Nurse Ferguson completed a medical addendum at 4:45 a.m. concerning Mr. Vega. She completed the section entitled "Specific description of any and all injuries" as follows: Bizarre behavior. Irrational. Out of control. Violent Behavior! Bleeding from R eye/Laceration in ear. Bright red-Large amt bleeding. Harmful to self & others. Nurse Ferguson completed the section of the medical report entitled "Treatment Rendered and/or Medical Recommendations" as follows: 4 point restraints. Harmful to self & others. Refer Ward-D Emergency. Ward D is a section of Jackson Memorial Hospital for inmates that need to go to the hospital for medical treatment. There are three ways to transport an inmate from the pretrial detention facility to Ward D: first, inmates with the most extreme emergencies are transported by Fire Rescue; second, inmates with less extreme emergencies are transported by ambulance; third, inmates needing routine medical care are transported by Corrections. The medical staff at the pretrial detention facility decides how the inmates will be transported to the hospital. In the case of Mr. Vega, the nurses determined that Mr. Vega would be transported to Ward D by Corrections. Officers Del Castillo and Pascual took Mr. Vega to the lobby of the detention facility to wait to be transported to Ward D. Officer Del Castillo went back to the ninth floor to write his report, and Pascual stayed with Mr. Vega. They were in the lobby approximately fifteen minutes before they left for the hospital. While Mr. Vega and Pascual were waiting in the lobby, Sergeant Alfonso Iglesisas observed Mr. Vega yelling and screaming. He also saw Mr. Vega roll off the stretcher two or three times. Pascual and Officer Marshall transported Vega to Ward D in a Corrections station wagon. Mr. Vega was placed in the rear of the vehicle, and Pascual sat in the front seat with Officer Marshall. The trip to Ward D took less than five minutes. Upon their arrival at Ward D, Pascual advised Corrections personnel there that he had a violent inmate in a four-point restraint and that he needed assistance to bring the inmate inside. Two or three officers assigned to work Ward D came out with a wheelchair and took Mr. Vega inside. Pascual accompanied Mr. Vega inside, where Mr. Vega was placed in a holding cell. Mr. Vega was still behaving violently and screaming. Pascual returned to the pretrial detention center. Mr. Vega had the following injuries when he was admitted to the intensive care unit hospital on May 26, 1993 at 4:04 a.m.: fractures of the orbit, a large bruise on his flank, fracture of the nasal bone, fracture of the second cervical vertebra, a cut over the left ear, a punctured eardrum, extensive bruising on his arms, deep abrasions on the right side of his abdomen and left side of his chest and abdomen, and a rotator cuff tear. Additionally he was suffering from alcohol withdrawal delirium and rhabdomyolysis, which is damage to the muscle. Rhabdomyolysis can be caused by trauma or alcohol withdrawal. In Mr. Vega's case, it could not be determined what was the cause of his rhabdomyolysis. The injuries noted are consistent with more than three blows to the head. The rotator cuff tear likely occurred when the officers were trying to apply handcuffs to Mr. Vega. All of Mr. Vega's injuries were sustained at approximately the same time and could have occurred within a time period of five to six hours. Mr. Vega's injuries were caused by blunt trauma sustained as a result of being punched or kicked. Mr. Vega spent 13 days in intensive care at Jackson Memorial Hospital. As a result of his injuries, he required oral-facial surgery. The rotator cuff tear will produce some pain in the shoulder after it has healed and may result in arthritis in the future. At the time of the incident at issue, a Use of Force/Levels of Resistance Matrix established by the CJSTC was in effect. The matrix serves "as a guideline for an officer to select effective reasonable and legal force options in a verbal or physical encounter." (Petitioner's Exhibit 6) The matrix has six resistance levels and six response levels. Resistance level four is active physical resistance and is defined as follows: A subject makes physically evasive movements to defeat an officer's attempt at control. This may be in the form of bracing or tensing, attempts to push/pull away or not allowing the officer to get close to him/her. Resistance level five is aggressive physical resistance and means the following: A subject makes overt, hostile attacking movements which may cause injury, but are not likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the officer or others. The highest response level on the matrix for active physical resistance is the use of intermediate weapons, such as a baton, side handle baton, aerosol tear gas, and flashlight. These weapons are used primarily to control a person. The highest response level on the matrix for aggressive physical resistance is incapacitation, which is defined as: Techniques that are intended to stun or render a subject temporarily unconscious, delivered with or without an impact weapon, such as a strike to a major nerve area. If a specific level of response is not available to an officer, the officer can go up one level to respond to the resistance. Neither Pascual nor Officer Del Castillo had intermediate weapons available at the time that Mr. Vega ran out of his cell and starting fighting the officers. The Metro-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation does not use intermediate weapons. The LVNR is not included in or classified in the response levels of the Use of Force/Levels of Resistance Matrix. If it had been classified, it would come under incapacitation.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of December, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. SUSAN B. KIRKLAND Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of December, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Karen D. Simmons Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Teri Gutman Valdes Assistant General Counsel Dade County Police Benevolent Association 10680 Northwest 25th Street Miami, Florida 33172-2108 A. Leon Lowry, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489 Michael Ramage, General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302-1489

Florida Laws (6) 120.57776.012784.03784.045943.13943.1395
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs STEVEN S. WRIGHT, 90-007753 (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Clermont, Florida Dec. 07, 1990 Number: 90-007753 Latest Update: Jun. 10, 1991

The Issue The issue is whether the correctional officer certification of Steven S. Wright should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Steven S. Wright is a certified correctional officer, having been issued certificate number 43-88-502-05 on December 19, 1988. Mr. Wright was employed as a Correctional Officer I at Lake Correctional Institute in June 1989. On the morning of June 20, 1989, and on other occasions, Mr. Wright had discussed drugs with inmates. He did not encourage or support the use of drugs. He believed these discussions were a useful part of the rehabilitation process. Later on June 20, 1989, Inmate Clinton Gholson approached Mr. Wright in the Food Services area and placed a piece of paper in Mr. Wright's pocket. Mr. Wright was planning to be married in a short time. Gholson had indicated that he and some other inmates wanted to make a wedding present for Wright in Arts and Crafts. Because inmates are generally prohibited from giving gifts to correctional officers, Mr. Wright and Gholson had agreed to a paper work process which was to be followed if Gholson and the others wished to make the gift for Mr. Wright. Authorization was to be sought before Mr. Wright actually received the gift. Gholson was to give Mr. Wright a choice of gifts Gholson could make. Mr. Wright understood that Gholson was to give him a short written list from which to pick. While Mr. Wright was working on June 20, 1989, Gholson approached him from behind and slipped the piece of paper into Mr. Wright's back pocket. Gholson indicated it was the gift list and Mr. Wright was to circle the gift he wanted. Gholson said something like, "You do that and that's what we'll make." Mr. Wright did not look at the note then. He forgot about it and finished his work. When Mr. Wright got home that evening, he discovered the note in his pocket. When he opened it, instead of a gift list, he found $3.00 and a note asking Mr. Wright to smuggle drugs (a "twenty cent piece") into the prison and they would make $240.00 from it. Mr. Wright was scheduled off from work the next two days. He was afraid he would lose his job because of what Gholson had done. When Mr. Wright returned to work on June 23, 1989, he told Sergeant Alexander what had happened. She sent him to Major Collier to make a report. Wright made the report and submitted it. He had forgotten to bring the note and money that day, so he could not attach it to the report. When Mr. Wright returned home that night, the note and money were gone. It was never determined if his wife or his nephew or someone else had thrown it away. Once Gholson knew he had Mr. Wright in a bad position, he used it to his advantage. He began demanding money from Mr. Wright and stated at various times that he had given Mr. Wright $10.00 to buy drugs and that he had loaned Mr. Wright $10.00. Mr. Wright reported these incidents immediately. When Gholson wrote another note demanding $10.00, Mr. Wright immediately turned that note over to Major Collier. A hearsay statement from Gholson in the form of a taped interview was submitted into evidence. It is found that Gholson's statements are so unbelievable as to be unworthy of any credibility. Even if the statements were not hearsay, they would be too unbelievable to form the basis for a finding of fact. Mr. Wright was fired from his job at Lake Correctional Institute as a result of these incidents and Gholson's statements. While there are some insignificant inconsistencies among the various statements and reports given by Mr. Wright, I find that his testimony and account of these events is absolutely credible and worthy of belief. While it is not disputed that Mr. Wright left the correctional institute on June 20, 1989, with a note and $3.00 which Gholson slipped into his pocket, it is affirmatively found that Mr. Wright had unwittingly done so. Mr. Wright had no idea that Gholson had placed money into his pocket until he reached home later that night. Mr. Wright did not knowingly accept money from Gholson.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order dismissing all charges against Steven S. Wright. RECOMMENDED this 10th day of June, 1991, at Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 10th day of June, 1991.

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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EMORY L. MOSLEY vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 03-000137 (2003)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jan. 16, 2003 Number: 03-000137 Latest Update: Nov. 21, 2003

The Issue Whether Petitioner was discriminated against by the Department of Corrections based on race, religion, disability, age, or in retaliation for participation in an activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Emory Mosley, is an African-American male (Petitioner). In 1989, Petitioner was hired as a correctional officer by Respondent, the Department of Corrections (Department). Initially, he was assigned to the main unit at Madison Correctional Institution in Madison, Florida. By all accounts, during his first nine years with the Department, Petitioner was well liked by the institution's administration and his fellow officers. He was thought of as a hardworking professional officer and as one of the best officers at Madison Correctional Institution. New officers were routinely sent to Petitioner for him to train. In general and during Petitioner's employment, officers are assigned to different shifts and work assignments at Madison Correctional Institution so that officers can become familiar with all aspects of the Madison Correctional system. However, Petitioner was allowed to remain at the same post and shift for his first nine years. Over nine years, such permanence in Petitioner's assignment caused some resentment among other staff because of the perceived favoritism exhibited by the administration toward Petitioner. At some point in his ninth year with the Department, Petitioner began to perceive problems with other staff members. He concluded that certain rules were not being followed and began to believe that co-workers were in some manner conspiring against him, abusing inmates, and/or committing crimes related to their duties at the institution. His relationships with co-workers became strained. Staff and inmates began to complain about Petitioner's behavior toward them. During this time, Petitioner also complained to the warden about rule violations by staff. However, the details of these complaints were not revealed at the hearing. Petitioner's complaints did appear to be in the nature of "whistle-blowing." The evidence did not demonstrate that any of Petitioner's complaints involved any activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. In July 1999, Colonel David McCallum transferred Petitioner to the Madison Correctional Institution work camp. The work camp was located a few hundred yards away from the main unit. The duties of a correctional officer at the work camp are primarily the same as those at the main unit with the difference that there are significantly fewer inmates at the work camp. As a result, many officers feel that the work camp is somewhat more relaxed and an "easier" assignment than an assignment at the main unit. To some officers, it is a desirable assignment. To other officers, it is not a desirable assignment. Opportunities for promotion are not diminished at the work camp; pay and benefits remain the same. The evidence did not show that transfer to the work camp was an adverse employment action on the part of the Department. Colonel McCallum, who thinks highly of Petitioner, transferred Petitioner to the work camp because he believed that Petitioner needed a change of scenery because of the problems he was having with staff and inmates at the main unit. He believed that he was doing Petitioner a favor by transferring him because of the more relaxed atmosphere at the work camp. The transfer was also made due to complaints from staff that Petitioner was receiving preferential treatment in that he was allowed to maintain the same post and shift for such a long period of time. Colonel McCallum was not aware of any complaints by Petitioner to the warden of alleged rule violations at the time that Petitioner was transferred. The evidence did not show that Petitioner was transferred in retaliation for any activity protected under Chapter 760, Florida Statutes. Petitioner's supervisor at the work camp was Lieutenant Patricia Herring, an African-American female. Herring emphatically denied at the hearing that the work camp was in any manner run as a type of concentration camp as opined by Petitioner and did not relate any race relation problems at the camp. The camp was run in a less strict manner than the main unit, especially in relation to the procedure used during the counting of inmates. These more relaxed methods greatly disturbed Petitioner, and he constantly agitated the work environment about such relaxed methods that he perceived as "rule violations." Herring testified that Petitioner was insubordinate and disrespectful to her during his time at the work camp. She believed that his disrespect came from his unhappiness with having a female supervisor. Petitioner received a written reprimand as a result of his insubordination and disrespect toward Herring. Unquestionably, Petitioner and Herring had a serious conflict between their personalities. There was no evidence that any conflict was based on discrimination or retaliation. Ms. Herring also testified that Petitioner received the same treatment as all other officers, vis-à-vis, shift and post assignments. There was no substantive evidence that Petitioner was treated differently in the assignments he was given at the work camp. There was no evidence that Petitioner sought accommodation for his diabetes or high blood pressure. Petitioner retired from the Department, effective December 1, 1999. He admitted at hearing that his retirement date had nothing to do with any actions allegedly taken against him by the Department; rather, he planned to retire on December 1, 1999, well before any problems with the Department began because that date ensured that he would receive retirement benefits based on ten years of service. There was no substantive evidence presented at the hearing that Petitioner was discriminated or retaliated against. Therefore, the Petition for Relief should be dismissed.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Florida Commission on Human Relations enter a final order dismissing the Petition for Relief. DONE AND ENTERED this 24th day of June, 2003, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. DIANE CLEAVINGER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of June, 2003. COPIES FURNISHED: Denise Crawford, Agency Clerk Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Emory L. Mosley Post Office Box 8 Monticello, Florida 32345 Gary L. Grant, Esquire Department of Corrections 2601 Blair Stone Road Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500 Cecil Howard, General Counsel Florida Commission on Human Relations 2009 Apalachee Parkway, Suite 100 Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57760.10
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs TERESA D. MEJICO, 89-006410 (1989)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Fort Lauderdale, Florida Nov. 27, 1989 Number: 89-006410 Latest Update: May 24, 1990

Findings Of Fact Respondent, Teresa D. Mejico, was certified as a correctional officer by petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission, on February 17, 1988, and issued certificate number 03-87-502-02. At approximately 2:45 a.m., on October 3, 1988, respondent, while employed as a correctional officer at the Broward Correctional Institute, was observed by her supervisor leaning on her desk in the officer's station at Dormitory H-4. Sitting in a chair at respondent's side was Inmate Deronda Lemmonds, who was observed holding respondent's right arm, and kissing, licking and nuzzling it, while her right hand was between respondent's legs in the area of her crotch. Respondent was immediately relieved of duty, and later that day was discharged from her employment at Broward Correctional Institute for her failure to comply with Florida Department of Corrections Rule 33-4.002(28), Florida Administrative Code. That rule provides: Employees shall maintain a professional relationship with all persons in the custody or under supervision of the Department, and their immediate family or visitors. No personal or business relationships are permitted. Marriage between employees and inmates is prohibited. That respondent was fully aware of the foregoing rule, and the standard of conduct it established, cannot be gainsaid for she acknowledged such at hearing. Notwithstanding such knowledge, however, respondent persisted in fostering the personal relationship which existed between her and Inmate Lemmonds despite denials to her superintendent that any such relationship existed and counseling from her superintendent to avoid any such relationships. Following the termination of her employment at Broward Correctional Institute, respondent maintained contact with Inmate Lemmonds through the mail and by telephone, and variously expressed her affection and love for the inmate. On one occasion, she mailed the inmate 20-25 photographs of herself, including some photographs that captured respondent in partially nude and suggestive poses. In all, the proof demonstrated that respondent was romantically involved with Inmate Lemmonds while she was employed at Broward Correctional Institute, and continued to be so involved as of the date of hearing. It further demonstrated that she was untruthful with her superintendent, failed to abide the rules of conduct for correctional officers, and neglected her duty to guard Dormitory H-4 while engaged in a liaison with an inmate under her charge.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered revoking respondent' s certification. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 24th day of May 1990. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 24th day of May, 1990. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 89-6410 Petitioner's proposed findings of fact are addressed as follows: 1. Adopted in paragraph 1. 2-4. Adopted in paragraph 4. 5-9. Not material or not necessary to result reached. 10-14. Adopted in paragraph 5. Adopted in paragraph 2. Adopted in paragraph 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Elsa Lopez Whitehurst Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Teresa D. Mejico 7502 S.W. 5th Street North Lauderdale, Florida 33068 Jeffrey Long, Director Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore Commissioner Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (3) 120.57943.13943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.005
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs WILLIE L. TILLMAN, 92-003263 (1992)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:New Smyrna Beach, Florida May 27, 1992 Number: 92-003263 Latest Update: Jul. 25, 1995

The Issue The issue is whether the certification as a correctional officer issued to Willie L. Tillman (Tillman) should be revoked or otherwise penalized based on the acts alleged in the Administrative Complaint.

Findings Of Fact Tillman is certified as a correctional officer by the Commission, having been issued certificate number C-3171 on October 7, 1977. At all times relevant to the charges, Tillman was employed by the Volusia County Department of Corrections (VCDC) as a correctional officer at the Daytona Beach Correctional Facility. In June of 1988, Tillman held the rank of corporal, a promotional rank. His chain of command ran from Sergeant (now Lieutenant) Fitts through Lieutenant (now Captain) Bolton, his shift commander. Tillman knew or should have known that he had a duty to immediately report any use of force against an inmate and to obtain medical attention for any inmate against whom force was used. This duty to immediately report such an incident and to seek medical attention for the inmate involved is important for the health of the inmate and for the protection of the correctional institution and correctional officer against unwarranted claims of injury. At all times material to these charges, the policy and rules of the VCDC, as taught to correctional officers, required that correctional officers avoid one-on-one physical confrontations with inmates and recommended that a correctional officer faced with a potentially hostile or aggressive inmate attempt to disengage himself from the confrontation, diffuse the threat through conversation if possible, and obtain assistance from other officers before approaching or making physical contact with the inmate. The only exception to this rule of disengagement is in the case of a sudden or spontaneous attack by an inmate. On June 22, 1988, Tillman, a very large and muscular man, was making a head count at about 11:00 p.m. Tillman thought that inmate George Hoover had squirted toothpaste on his back as he walked past Hoover's cell. Tillman told the officer who was working with him to open the cell. Tillman then entered the cell and struck Hoover in the jaw and face with a closed fist. Hoover fell on to his bunk. Tillman did not report the incident and he did not seek medical attention for Hoover. Tillman had no valid reason for his failure to report the incident and he was not excused from reporting the use of force that night before leaving the job site. Hoover requested medical attention, which brought the use of force to the attention of the VCDC. Hoover suffered a loosened tooth from being struck by Tillman. When confronted with the matter, Tillman said that he entered Hoover's cell to remove contraband, namely cups of water and coffee. Hoover assumed a boxing stance and Tillman struck him in response to that perceived aggression. Tillman's stories then and at hearing are simply unbelievable. The incident report that Tillman finally wrote said he removed contraband cups of water and coffee from the cell. The officer with Tillman that night never saw any cups removed. At hearing for the first time Tillman said that the contraband consisted of cups of urine and feces which added to the level of threat which he felt. Tillman's testimony in this regard is contrary to his own reports prepared in 1988 and is contrary to anything Tillman had said or reported before the hearing. As the trier of fact, the undersigned simply finds that Tillman was not truthful in his testimony on this and other matters. It is also not believed that Hoover, a small man weighing about 150 pounds, assumed an aggressive boxing stance with Tillman, a man about twice his size. From the evidence it can only be concluded that Tillman engaged in an unprovoked and unnecessary use of force by striking Hoover with his fist. Based on the rules, policies and procedures of the VCDC, Tillman should not have entered Hoover's cell in a one-on- one confrontation after Hoover squirted toothpaste on him. After he had entered the cell, Tillman should have withdrawn and disengaged from the situation to avoid a confrontation even if Hoover had assumed an aggressive stance. Finally, after the use of force occurred, Tillman should have reported it and should have sought medical attention for Hoover immediately following the incident and should not have left work that night without doing these things. Tillman was verbally counselled about the rules and policies related to disengagement and reporting of use of force. On October 14, 1988, while supervising a group of inmates returning from eating, Tillman became involved in a vocal argument with inmate William F. Elmore. Tillman repeatedly goaded Elmore to hit him, but Elmore attempted to withdraw from Tillman. Tillman hit Elmore in the jaw with his closed fist. Elmore attempted to walk away from Tillman, but Tillman pursued him and threw him up against a wall more than once. Elmore was between 5'7" and 5'10" and weighed between 165 and 180 pounds. Tillman claimed that Elmore approached him with raised hands in a semi-boxing stance. No other witness, either officer or inmate, mentioned any such aggressive approach or stance on the part of Elmore. One officer said that he thought that Elmore tried to kick Tillman. One inmate said that Elmore may have flinched or something, but that he did not see any aggressive posture or movement by Elmore. Tillman did not disengage or attempt to avoid the one- on-one confrontation with Elmore, even when Correctional Officer Zima called to Tillman to offer help. Instead, Tillman was aggressive and abrasive with Elmore. Tillman then over-reacted to the situation which he had provoked and used excessive force against Elmore. As a result of this incident, Tillman was recommended for termination, but he successfully appealed the termination and was instead suspended for ten days. Tillman was counseled that his interpretation of the use of force rules was erroneous and was told that when an inmate assumes an offensive posture such as a boxing stance, Tillman was not to strike the inmate. In the early morning of July 15, 1989, Tillman instructed Correctional Officer Trainee Anderson to open the cell door of inmate Michael P. Frascella, so that Frascella could clean up a mess he had made in and around his cell. Frascella was in an observation cell because of an earlier disturbance he had created. After cleaning up, Frascella was returning to his cell and noticed an apple on the desk. He reached for it and Tillman told him to put it back. Tillman then hit Frascella in the face with a closed fist. Frascella fell to the floor. Anderson heard the sound of the fall, looked over, and saw Frascella laying on the floor, glassy-eyed and bleeding from the mouth area. Tillman denies that he touched Frascella in any way and says he never saw Frascella on the floor or with blood on his face. This is why he says no use of force report was ever filed. Frascella's testimony is more credible regarding this incident than is that of Tillman. While it is clear that Frascella bears ill feelings toward Tillman because of the incident, his statements are more consistent with those of Anderson. Tillman clearly did not tell the truth regarding the incident with inmate Hoover and there is considerable doubt about his truthfulness regarding Elmore. There is no reason to believe that Tillman has been any more forthright about what happened with Frascella. Based on the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, it is concluded that Frascella's version is the closest to the what actually happened that morning. Former inmate and trustee Dwight Jensen testified about an incident in which Tillman struck an inmate with no justification. While it cannot be determined whether that inmate was Frascella, the testimony of Jensen is probative regarding Tillman's moral character and suitability to retain his certification as a correctional officer. From Jensen's testimony it can only be concluded that on an occasion which may or may not have been the one involving Frascella, Tillman struck an inmate in the face and nose in retaliation for verbal abuse from that inmate. That inmate's nose was so badly injured that Jensen was required to mop up considerable blood from the floor. That inmate was provided with no medical attention because he was placed on a bus to Starke within a couple of hours after he was struck. Jensen was incarcerated from 1988 to March of 1990. Since Tillman was suspended following the incident with Frascella until his termination, it is further concluded that Jensen's testimony relates to the same time frame as that relevant to this complaint.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission enter a Final Order and therein revoke certificate no. C-3171 issued to Willie L. Tillman. DONE and ENTERED this 14th day of October, 1992, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE K. KIESLING Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 14th day of October, 1992. APPENDIX TO THE RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 92-3263 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on the proposed findings of fact submitted in this case. Specific Rulings on Proposed Findings of Fact Submitted by Petitioner, Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Each of the following proposed findings of fact is adopted in substance as modified in the Recommended Order. The number in parentheses is the Finding of Fact which so adopts the proposed finding of fact: 1(1); 2(2); 3&4(3); 5(6); 6&7(4); 8(5); 9(6); 14&15(7); 23&24(16); 25&26(17); 27(18); 29(21); 30(22); 31&32(23); 33(24); 34&35(25); and 38(26). Proposed findings of fact 10-13, 16-22, 28, 36, and 37 are subordinate to the facts actually found in this Recommended Order. COPIES FURNISHED: John P. Booth Assistant General Counsel Florida Department of Law Enforcement Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Willie L. Tillman 2400 Spring Hollow Drive Orange City, Florida 32763 Jeffrey Long, Director Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302 James T. Moore, Commissioner Criminal Justice Standards and Training Commission Post Office Box 1489 Tallahassee, Florida 32302

Florida Laws (6) 120.57784.03943.13943.133943.139943.1395 Florida Administrative Code (1) 11B-27.0011
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DOUGLAS M. JACKSON vs. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 87-001730RX (1987)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 87-001730RX Latest Update: Jul. 27, 1987

Findings Of Fact I find the following facts based on the facts admitted by both parties in the Prehearing Stipulation filed on May 22, 1987. Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33, as found in the Florida Administrative Code Annotated, through the March 1987 supplement, is true and correct. The Petitioner's current address is Douglas M. Jackson, Inmate Number 823916, Florida State Prison, Post Office Box 747, Starke, Florida 32091. The Respondent's name and address is Florida Department of Corrections, 1311 Winewood Boulevard, Tallahassee, Florida 32399-2500. The Department rule on which an administrative determination is sought is Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007, "Inmate Grievance Procedure." The statutory provision on which the above Department rule is based is Section 944.331, Florida Statutes, which states: The department shall establish by rule an inmate grievance procedure which shall conform to the Minimum Standards for Inmate Grievance Procedures as promulgated by the United States Department of Justice pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. The ten (10) days in Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(13), which deals with the filing of appeals of grievances, are "10 calendar days." This can include two weekends (a total of four days) when mail is not normally picked up at the prisons or delivered in the Office of the Secretary. If an inmate receives his institutional response on a Friday that is dated for the previous day (Thursday), his response must be received in Tallahassee by the following Friday. (The second Sunday following would be ten (10) days from the date of the institutional grievance, but the Central Office Inmate Grievance Administrator does not work on Saturday or Sunday to receive and log inmate grievance appeals). Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.007(6)(a) and (7) require the availability of grievance forms at all Department institutions. If the inmate needs a day to obtain a grievance appeal form and prepare it, he will not be able to mail his appeal until Sunday. But, there is no mail service on Sunday so his grievance appeal will not be mailed until Monday at the earliest. This means the grievance appeal must get from the prison to the Office of the Secretary in four (4) days or it will be denied as out-of-time. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(8) provides that: An extension of the 15-day period [to file at the institutional level] will be granted when it is clearly demonstrated by the inmate to the satisfaction of the Superintendent or Assistant Superintendent that it was not feasible to file the grievance within the 15- day period. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007(15), which covers the filing of the grievance appeal, imposes an absolute requirement of ten (10) calendar days. No possibility exists under the rule, as promulgated, for the slightest extension of time for any possible reason, no matter how meritorious it might be. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 does not inform the inmate that he must utilize the grievance procedure to exhaust his administrative remedies before he can file a petition for writ of habeas corpus, challenging the loss of gain time or confinement as a result of a disciplinary proceeding. Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-3.007 has been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval under the provisions of Section 944.331, Florida Statutes and 42 U.S.C. s. 1997e. Florida Administrative Code Rules 33-3.0025(11)(c), 33-3.012(1)(b)3, 33-3.012(4)(e), and Florida Administrative Code Chapter 33-22 have not been submitted to the United States Department of Justice for certification approval.

Florida Laws (6) 120.54120.56120.68454.116.02944.331
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TERESA BURNS vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 97-004538RP (1997)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Sep. 29, 1997 Number: 97-004538RP Latest Update: Dec. 08, 1997
Florida Laws (5) 120.52120.68120.81944.09944.23
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DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND TRAINING COMMISSION vs. JOE H. TOOLE, 85-003823 (1985)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 85-003823 Latest Update: Jul. 22, 1986

Findings Of Fact 1. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 1. 2-7. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 16. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 3 and 4. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 6. 10-11. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 7 and 8. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 10 and 11. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 17. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 16. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 12-14. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 15. Incorporated in Finding of Facts 12-14. Incorporated in Finding of Fact 15.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings Of Fact and Conclusions Of Law, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that: Respondent's certification as a corrections officer be revoked, but that the revocation be suspended and respondent placed on probation for a-period of two years at which time if there is no further evidence of misconduct by the Respondent, the revocation be remitted and the probation terminated. RECOMMENDED this 22nd day of July, 1986, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings This 22nd day of July, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph S. White, Esq. Assistant General Counsel Department of Law Enforcement P. O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 Gene "Hal" Johnson, Esq. 233 W. College Avenue Tallahassee, FL 32301 Robert R. Dempsey Executive Director Department of Law Enforcement O. Box 1489 Tallahassee, FL 32302 APPENDIX The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.57(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case.

Florida Laws (4) 120.57943.13943.137943.1395
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WILLIAM VAN POYCK vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 90-004049RX (1990)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jul. 10, 1991 Number: 90-004049RX Latest Update: Jun. 25, 1992

The Issue Whether Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, constitute an invalid exercise of delegated authority?

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioners, William Van Poyck, Mike Ramadanovic and Kenneth Boudreaux, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioners are subject to the rules of the Respondent, including the rules challenged in these cases, Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l), 33-3.0083(9)(i), and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code (hereinafter referred to as the "Challenged Rules"). Petitioner Van Poyck is on death row, which is considered administrative confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Van Poyck have been suspended for almost three years. Petitioner Ramadanovic at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. All exercise privileges for Petitioner Ramadanovic have been suspended for almost one year. Petitioner Bourdreaux at the time of the final hearing was in close management confinement. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. The Challenged Rules. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "administrative confinement". Administrative confinement is the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for one or more specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (l) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis excluding showers and clinic trips may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule shall be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise out of doors. Such exercise periods shall be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. The superintendent or assistant superintendent may restrict exercise for an individual inmate when the inmate continues to pose a serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates; by involvement in acts which seriously interfere with the staff's daily security functions, or by actions demonstrating an extreme escape risk. Inmates shall be notified in writing of this decision and may appeal through the grievance procedure. The denial of exercise shall be for the shortest length of time to accomplish the goal of safety, security and order within the institution and shall be documented on Form DC4-814. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not compromise the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "close management". Close management is the "long-term single cell confinement of an inmate apart from the general inmate population, where the inmate, through his own behavior, has demonstrated an inability to live in the general population without abusing the rights and privileges of other inmates or disturbing the security, order or operation of the institution." Rule 33-3.0083(1), Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a 24-hour basis, excluding showers and clinic trips, may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a 30-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of 2 hours per week of exercise outside of cell. Such exercise periods will be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted. Medical restrictions may also place limitations on the exercise periods. Recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period provided such equipment does not threaten the safety or security of the institution. Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, governs exercise of inmates who have been placed in "disciplinary confinement". Rule 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provides the following: (n) Exercise -- Those inmates confined on a twenty- four hour basis (excluding showers and clinic trips) may exercise in their cells. However, if confinement extends beyond a thirty-day period, an exercise schedule should be implemented to ensure a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell. Such exercise periods should be documented on the confinement records. Exceptions to this requirement may be made only when clear and compelling facts show that such exercise periods should not be granted. Restrictions may also be placed on the exercise periods by medical staff. The reason for any exercise restrictions shall be documented. Period of Outdoor Exercise. The Challenged Rules all provide that inmates may exercise in their cells and that "a minimum of two hours per week of exercise outside of the cell" should be provided to inmates in administrative confinement, close management and disciplinary confinement. Unless specified otherwise, all references to "inmates" in this Final Order are to an inmate in administrative confinement, close management or disciplinary confinement. At Florida State Prison, non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules are given an opportunity to attend one, two-hour exercise session a week. If an inmate misses a session for medical or attorney "call out", a holiday or inclement weather, the session is not made up. The Challenged Rules do not specifically require that missed sessions be made up. On their face, the Challenged Rules provide that two hours of exercise should be provided without indicating any exceptions. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, is mandatory: two-hours of exercise must be provided each week. The amount of time inmates are allowed to exercise is affected by the budget and staff of the Respondent. Because of lack of funds and staff, the Respondent is not able to provide more exercise time to non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. At Florida State Prison, a maximum security prison, there are thirteen wings housing inmates. Ten wings house inmates (including four housing inmates on death row) in various types of confinement status. Nine of the ten wings have a separate area, referred to as a "yard", in which inmates may exercise outdoors. There are two correctional officers on duty at each of the yards during the outdoor exercise period for non-death row inmates subject to the Challenged Rules. One sergeant also rotates between the yards. Four to five correctional officers are required to take inmates in and out of the yards. Each inmate must be strip searched, handcuffed with his hands behind his back and then escorted into the yard. Exercise Yards. The Challenged Rules do not specify the size of the area in which outdoor exercise to be provided to inmates. The Challenged Rules also do not specify the number of inmates that may be placed in an area for outdoor exercise. Yards at Florida State Prison consist of a fenced concrete slab. The yards for non-death row inmates are approximately 24' by 33', or 792 square feet. Usually 17 inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. The number of inmates in the yard on occasion may be 20 to 25. This is the exception, rather than the rule. Recreational Equipment. The Challenged Rules do not require that recreational equipment be provided to non-death row inmates. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, provide that recreational equipment may be available for the exercise period if it does not compromise the safety or security of the institution Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code, is silent concerning recreational equipment. Recreational equipment is not provided to inmates during exercise at Florida State Prison. Inmates tend to fight over recreational equipment and to abuse it when it is provided. In light of the findings of fact, infra, concerning death row inmates, the evidence failed to prove that the failure to provide non-death row inmates with recreational equipment is arbitrary or capricious. Although there is a rational and reasonable reason for not providing recreational equipment to inmates who have proven to be a disciplinary problem (including some death row inmates) the Respondent is evidently prohibited from withholding recreational equipment for death row inmates by court decree. No such decree applies to non- death row inmates. Yard Suspension. The Challenged Rules provide that exceptions to the provision for outdoor exercise may be made "only when clear and compelling facts can document such exercise periods should not be granted." Rule 33-3.0083(9)(i), Florida Administrative Code. Rules 33-3.0081(9)(l) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, contain very similar language. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, do not specify who may decide who is to be denied exercise in the yard, referred to as being placed on the "yard suspension list", or the specific reasons for placing an inmate on such a list. The various institutions are given discretion to decide who will place an inmate on the yard suspension list and the reasons for such suspensions. Rules 33-3.0083(9)(i) and 33-3.0084(1)(n), Florida Administrative Code, also do not specify the procedures for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list, do not require periodic review of the list, do not specify a maximum period of time an inmate may be on the list and do not specify the conditions which must be met for an inmate to be removed from the yard suspension list. Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, provides who may restrict exercise, requires that there be a "serious threat to the safety, security and order of the institution by recent demonstrations of violence, by continuing threats of physical harm, written and spoken, toward staff and other inmates" and other acts, requires that inmates be notified in writing and provides that denial of exercise be for the shortest length of time possible. There is a list of inmates at Florida State Prison who have been denied yard exercise. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list because of security problems similar to those specified in Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code, caused by an inmate. The procedure for placing an inmate on the yard suspension list is as follows: The chief security officer recommends that an inmate be placed on the list. The recommendation of the chief security officer is reviewed by a team of senior correctional officers and the superintendent. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate is placed on the yard suspension list. Any inmate placed on the list is notified in writing and may appeal the decision through the grievance procedure. Chapter 33-29, Florida Administrative Code. The following procedure is followed to determine whether an inmate is removed from the yard suspension list: The list is reviewed monthly by the team of senior correctional officers that recommends the placement of an inmate on the list. If an inmate's behavior demonstrates that he has adapted to the institution and is no longer acting out in such a manner to create a security problem, a recommendation is made to the superintendent to remove the inmate's name from the list. The superintendent makes the final decision of whether an inmate's name is removed. Inmates are placed on the yard suspension list for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the goal of changing the inmate's behavior and to eliminate the threat to security caused by the inmate. Inmates on the yard suspension list are still allowed to exercise in their cells. Although cells are small and exercise is not necessarily easy in the cells, inmates may do elevated push-ups, step-ups, and jog in place. There are at any given time approximately 100 inmates at Florida State Prison on the yard suspension list. Inmates may be kept on the yard suspension list for years. Inmate Jimmy Stephens has been on the yard suspension list since February, 1990, and was previously on the yard suspension list for over fifteen years. Petitioner Van Poyck was placed on the yard suspension list upon his arrival at Florida State Prison on December 28, 1988, and remained on the list until January 7, 1992. Death Row Inmates. Inmates on death row are in administrative confinement and are, therefore, subject to Rule 33-3.0081(9)(l), Florida Administrative Code. Inmates on death row are provided two, two-hour exercise sessions each week. A total of four hours of exercise. If an exercise session is missed by a death-row inmate, the session is made up. The yards provided to death row inmates are larger than the yards provided to non-death row inmates. The yards for death row inmates at Florida State Prison are 71' by 69' (4,899 square feet), 80' by 64' (5,120 square feet), 62' by 91' (5,642 square feet) and 74' by 80' (5,920 square feet). Approximately 24 to 30 death row inmates are placed in the yard next to the inmates' wing at a time. Death row inmates are provided with a variety of recreational equipment. The amount of exercise time, the size of the yards and the amount of recreational equipment provided to death row inmates was agreed to in a consent decree in a federal court proceeding involving the Department of Corrections.

Florida Laws (7) 120.52120.54120.56120.6820.315944.09945.04
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WILLIAM VAN POYCK vs DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 91-002292RP (1991)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Apr. 15, 1991 Number: 91-002292RP Latest Update: Dec. 10, 1991

The Issue Whether a proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, constitutes an invalid exercise of delegated authority?

Findings Of Fact Standing. The Petitioner, William Van Poyck, and the Intervenor, Robert David Roy, are inmates in the custody of the Respondent, the Department of Corrections. The Petitioner and the Intervenor are subject to the rules of the Respondent. The evidence failed to prove that the Petitioner and Intervenor are, or have been, placed in administrative confinement by the Respondent. The Respondent. Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that the Respondent, the Florida Department of Corrections, adopt rules governing the administration of the correctional system in Florida. Among other things, Section 944.09, Florida Statutes, requires that rules be adopted by the Respondent governing all aspects of the operation of the prison system in Florida. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, a rule of the Respondent, governs the placement of an inmate in "administrative confinement". "Administrative confinement" is "the removal of an inmate from the general inmate population for . . . " various specified reasons. Rule 33-3.0081(1), Florida Administrative Code. By letter dated September 27, 1990, the Respondent advised the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee (hereinafter referred to as the "Committee"), of proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Be letter dated November 5, 1990, M. Catherine Green, an attorney with the Committee, informed the Respondent that a review of the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, had been completed. Ms. Green also informed the Respondent of certain "technical errors" and "substantive errors" that she found with Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code. Ms. Green indicated that a "substantive error" referred to "errors which will result in recommended objections to the committee unless they are eliminated prior to adoption." Among the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code: (3) Placement in administrative confinement shall be for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 9 was, in pertinent part, as follows: What does "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" mean? This has the effect of not notifying the inmate of the length of time in which he will be in administrative confinement and the criteria to be considered in releasing him or her. The rule discusses criteria for placing inmates in administrative confinement, but sets no criteria other than "desired results" as to when an inmate shall be released. If the two criteria are the same, please make that clear. Another of the "substantive errors" identified by Ms. Green, was a comment concerning the following portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after an informal hearing when no reasonable alternative exists. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. Rule 33-3.0081(4)(b), Florida Administrative Code, provides for review of the senior correctional officer's "informal hearing" and Rule 33-3.0081(4)(c), Florida Administrative Code, provides for a 48-hour delay in the "informal hearing" in case of certain emergencies. Ms. Green's comment concerning the portion of Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, quoted in finding of fact 11 was, in pertinent part, as follows: Please provide a cross reference to the rules of procedure for an informal hearing. Does the review procedure conflict with provisions of Chapter 33-29, F.A.C.? Please clarify what the phrase "when no reasonable alternative exists" means in reference to an inmate's confinement after an informal hearing. . . . . In a letter dated January 23, 1991, the Respondent, through a Senior Attorney, responded to Ms. Green's comments. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, was made: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replace it with "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the phrase "for the shortest period of time necessary to accomplish the desired results" and replacing it with the phrase "continue until the factors which created the need for protective management have been resolved". The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the circumstances under which an inmate placed in administrative confinement will be returned to the general inmate population. Under Rule 33-3.0081(3), Florida Administrative Code, prior to the proposed amendment, "the shortest time possible" occurred when the factors which necessitated placing an inmate in administrative confinement no longer applied. The proposed amendment merely clarifies when "the shortest time possible" has occurred. The following response to Ms. Green's comments concerning Rule 33- 3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, was also made in the January 23, 1991, letter: The Department of Corrections will delete the phrase "an informal hearing" and insert "being advised of an incident or situation which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution". The Respondent subsequently proposed to amend Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, by deleting the terms "informal hearing" and replacing them with the following underlined language: (4)(a) An inmate may be placed in administrative confinement by the senior correctional officer after being advised of a situation or incident which prohibits the inmate from remaining in open population without endangering himself or others or compromising the security of the institution, if the situation cannot be resolved. The reason for placement shall be explained to the inmate, and he shall be given an opportunity to present his views on the matter to the senior correctional officer. When the senior correctional officer places an inmate in administrative confinement, this action shall be documented on a Report . . ., including the reasons for the action and a summary of the inmate's comments or objections. The inmate may also submit a written statement. . . . The proposed amendment to Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, does not substantively change the manner in which an inmate is informed that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The "informal hearing" previously required in Rule 33-3.0081(4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, required no more than the proposed amendment provides for. By eliminating the terms "informal hearing" the proposed rule amendment eliminates any confusion as to whether some more formal process is to be followed by the Respondent in informing an inmate that he or she is being placed in administrative confinement. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking which contained the proposed amendments at issue in this proceeding was subsequently filed by the Respondent with the Bureau of Administrative Code, for publication, and with the Committee. The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking included the following "purpose and effect" clause: The proposed amendments are needed in order to correct technical and substantive errors noted by the Joint Administrative Procedures Committee. The proposed amendments provide clarification of policies and procedures regarding administrative confinement and protective management. The purpose and effect clause is consistent with the substantive changes to Rule 33-3.0081(3) and (4)(a), Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the proposed amendments to Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, at issue in this proceeding are arbitrary or capricious. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that any of the suggestions concerning Rule 33-3.0081, Florida Administrative Code, made by Ms. Green were ever approved, adopted, or reviewed by the Committee. In fact, Ms. Green indicates in her letter that "substantive errors" she perceived would be recommended as objections to the Committee only if they were not eliminated prior to adoption. Since the "substantive errors" at issue in this proceeding were eliminated, they were apparently never recommended or considered by the Committee.

Florida Laws (6) 120.52120.54120.545120.6820.315944.09
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