The Issue The issue for determination in this case is whether the Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section s. 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), by inserting an option provision into a lease agreement without the specific authorization of the tenants and subsequent to the tenants signing the original agreement. At the hearing, Petitioner's Exhibits 1-10 were offered and admitted into evidence. Leslie and Glenn Strickland, the tenants and complainants, testified on behalf of the Petitioner. Wayne Belton testified on his own behalf. Proposed Recommended Orders have been submitted by the parties. Those findings not incorporated in this Recommended Order were not considered relevant to the issues, were not supported by competent and substantial evidence or were considered immaterial to the results reached.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent Wayne E. Belton is a licensed real estate broker with his principal place of business at 337 Northeast Second Avenue, Delray Beach, Florida. On or about November 23, 1979, the Respondent prepared a one-year rental agreement or lease for property located at 2717 Southwest Sixth Street, Delray Beach, Florida, which was owned by Mrs. Margaret Finlay. Mr. and Mrs. Glenn Strickland executed the agreement as the tenants. The lease was prepared pursuant to an open listing by the owner for either sale or lease. When the Stricklands signed the original agreement it did not contain any provision concerning purchasing the property in the future through an option agreement. Although the Stricklands had discussed an option agreement with the Respondent, they did not specifically agree to an option agreement which required the deposit of additional monies in escrow which would not be refunded if the option were not exercised. The owner of the property, Mrs. Finlay, was primarily interested in selling the property and demanded that Respondent obtain a binding option from the Stricklands. When faced with the conflicting demands of the tenants and the owner, the Respondent inserted an option provision in the lease agreement after the Stricklands had signed the original lease which did not contain such a provision. When the Stricklands failed to deliver the $1,500 option money required by the option provision, Mrs. Finlay, through her attorney, threatened to take legal action against the Respondent. In response to the owner's demand, the Respondent through his attorney, demanded that the Stricklands pay $1,500 for the option pursuant to the lease agreement. When the Stricklands received the demand letter from Respondent's counsel, they contacted an attorney who eventually settled the matter. The Stricklands were required to expend $138.00 in attorney's fees to correct the problem caused by the Respondent. The Respondent admitted inserting the option provision into the lease agreement after the Stricklands executed it, but denied acting with any intent to alter the agreement contrary to what he believed the parties intended. Rather, the Respondent believed that he was remedying his original omission to conform to what he believed the parties had orally agreed to.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Petitioner enter a final order finding that Respondent Wayne E. Belton violated Section 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979) and imposing a reprimand and an administrative fine. DONE and ORDERED this 7th day of June, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of June, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: Michael J. Cohen, Esquire Suite 101 2715 East Oakland Park Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33306 Stephen G. Melcer, Esquire Suite 500 First Bank Building 551 Southeast Eighth Street Delray Beach, Florida 33444 Frederick H. Wilsen, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Carlos B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission Post Office Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32801 Samuel R. Shorstein Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
The Issue Whether Respondent owes payment to Petitioner in the amount of $60,748.78 for watermelons sold by Petitioner to Respondent.
Findings Of Fact Between May 18 and June 5, 1990, Petitioner James G. Young sold a total of 40 truckloads of watermelons to Respondent Maddox Brothers Produce, Inc. Petitioner was to have received a price of five cents per pound through May 26, 1990 and four cents per pound through the remainder of the shipping season. Respondent has failed to pay $60,748.78 of the amount owed to Petitioner for such produce. At no time did Petitioner received any complaint that the watermelons were unsatisfactory. Respondent is a licensed agricultural dealer engaged in the business of brokering agricultural products, Florida license #0030. Respondent is subject to regulation by the Department. Respondent has posted a Fireman's Fund Insurance Company surety bond #11141308327 in the amount of $50,000 with the Department. Respondent did not appear at the hearing. No evidence was presented to contradict the testimony of the Petitioner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a Final Order requiring Maddox Brothers Produce, Inc., to pay to Petitioner the sum of $60,748.78. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 26th day of April, 1991, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM F. QUATTLEBAUM Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, FL 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of April, 1991. COPIES FURNISHED: The Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, PL-10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Richard Tritschler General Counsel 515 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing and Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 James G. Young Route 3 Box 272-A Wildwood, Florida 34758 Patricia M. Harper, President Maddox Brothers Produce, Inc. 2124 Forest Avenue Knoxville, Tennessee 37916 Fireman's Fund Insurance Company Surety Claims Center Post Office Box 193136 San Francisco, Florida 94119-3136
The Issue Whether Respondent committed fraud, misrepresentation, concealment, false promises, false pretenses, dishonest dealing by trick, scheme or device, culpable negligence, or breach of trust in any business transaction as alleged in the Administrative Complaint in violation of Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006).1
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is the state agency charged with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to Section 20.165 and Chapters 120, 455 and 457, Florida Statutes. Petitioner has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings before the Florida Real Estate Commission (FREC) and is authorized to prosecute administrative complaints against licensees within FREC’s jurisdiction. At all times material, Respondent was a licensed Florida real estate broker, license number 684990, under Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. The last license issued to Respondent was as a broker at Florida’s Best Buy Realty & Mortgage Lender, LLC, Post Office Box 551, Winter Park, Florida 32793. On or about February 15, 2007, Respondent entered into a contract to manage the single-family dwelling owned by Jacqueline Danzer. The property is located at 2979 Krista Key Circle, Orlando, Florida 32817 (Subject Property). The agreement was for the period February 15, 2007, until February 15, 2008. Respondent was authorized, under the management agreement, to seek a tenant for the property. Said management agreement authorized Respondent to be compensated at the rate of 10 percent of the rent due during each rental period. On or about March 27, 2007, Respondent negotiated a lease agreement with Veronica Valcarcel to rent the Subject Propery. The tenant applied through the federal Section 8 program, administered by the Orange County Housing and Community Development Division (Agency), for rental assistance in order to rent the Subject Property. Section 8 assists low-income families with their rent. A tenant who qualifies for Section 8 assistance is prohibited from paying more than 40 percent of his or her income for rent and utilities. On April 26, 2007, Respondent, acting on behalf of the landlord for the Subject Property, entered into and signed a “Housing Assistance Payment Contract” or “HAP” contract with the Agency as part of the Section 8 program. The HAP contract provided that for the initial lease term for the Subject Property (for the period April 1, 2007, until March 31, 2008), the initial monthly rent was $1,150 per month. This was determined to be the maximum payment the tenant could pay without exceeding 40 percent of her income. The HAP contract explicitly provides in its terms that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the owner may not raise the rent to tenant.” Respondent knew that he was prohibited from charging more than the monthly rent stated in the HAP contract. Respondent has had experience in the past with other tenants who participated in the Section 8 program. Respondent has previously signed other HAP contracts which contained the same restrictive language. Under the lease contract that the tenant Veronica Valcarcel signed with the property owner Jacqueline Danzer, the monthly rent would be $1,150 per month. The signature page in the lease contract is not the same page on which the monthly rental amount is written. The property owner Jacqueline Danzer asserts that the initials in the lease contract reflecting a monthly rental of $1,150 were not all her initials. Under the terms of the Exclusive Property Management Agreement, Respondent was being compensated at the rate of 10 percent per month after the first month. A monthly rental amount of $1,500 indicates that the property owner would receive a net of $1,350 per month. The property management agreement provided that Respondent would make payments to the property owner by direct deposit. The property management agreement lists a 12-digit bank account number, with the last four digits of “6034,” into which Respondent was to make direct deposits. At the hearing, property owner Jacqueline Danzer testified that she had received payments from Respondent for the Subject Property to her Bank of America savings account, with the account number ending in “6034.” The last four digits of the account number on the Bank of America Statement match the last four digits on the account number found on the Property Management Agreement. According to the Bank of America records, Respondent made the following payments to the property owner: a) $1,550 on May 9, 2007 b) $1,000 on May 9, 2007 c) $850 on June 12, 2007 d) $1,350 on July 11, 2007 e) $1,350 on September 10, 2007 On September 12, 2007, property owner, Jacqueline Danzer went to see Lois Henry, the manager of the Section 8 department for the Agency. During the course of that meeting, Dnazer advised that Respondent was collecting $1,500 a month rent from the tenant instead of $1,150 a month. On September 12, 2007, during the course of a telephone conference with Jacqueline Danzer and Lois Henry, Respondent admitted that he had been collecting $1,500 monthly rent for the Subject Property, retaining a commission of $150 and depositing the balance in Danzer’s account. Respondent denied making an admission during the telephone conference on September 12, 2007. He also denied that he was collecting $1,500 from the tenant, and further denied that he was violating Section 8 regulations. Respondent’s testimony is not credible. The witness Danzer’s testimony is credible. Petitioner has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated the Housing Assistance Payments Contract. The total amount of investigative costs for the Petitioner for this case, not including attorney’s time, were $874.50.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Florida Real Estate Commission, enter a final order: Finding Respondent guilty of violating Subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes; Revoking Respondent’s license, and imposing an administrative fine of $1,000.00; and Requiring Respondent pay fees and costs related to the investigation in the amount of $874.50. DONE AND ENTERED this 26th day of August, 2009, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S DANIEL M. KILBRIDE Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 26th day of August, 2009.
Findings Of Fact In June, 1975 Randall J. Conley, attempting to set his son and daughter-in-law up in business, arranged for them, with his help, to purchase Roger Sparks' business known as Sparky's Pizza. By Exhibit 6 dated June 17, 1975 the owner and lessor of the premises executed, with Randall M. Conley and his wife Sandra, a Consent to Assignment whereby the lease between the lessor and Mr. Spaghetti and Roger Sparks was assigned to the younger Conley and his wife and the previous lessees were released from further liability under the five year lease they had executed on April 30, 1974. (Exhibit 10) By Collateral Assignment Note dated 6-2-75 Randall J. Conley, Randall M. Conley and Sandra Conley obligated themselves to pay the Florida Center Bank $9750 over a five-year period and pledged the equipment and fixtures in the pizza business as security therefor. In October, 1975 Sandra, who had been operating the business, left for another job preparatory to separating from her husband. The business closed on November 1, 1975 and Defendant learned that the lessees were delinquent in the rent and payments on the chattel mortgage. Thereafter he attempted to sell the business. In November, 1975 Charles Hicks, the owner of a small fast-food chain, while looking for a site for a franchisee, saw the empty Sparky's Pizza and ascertained that information on occupying the property could be obtained from Defendant. He called Defendant's office and was told the rent was $260 per month. Arrangements were made for Defendant to show him the property the same afternoon. On November 25, 1975 Defendant showed Hicks and his putative franchisee, Ronald Beasley, the property. After being assured that the rental included the equipment and fixtures they agreed to accept an assignment of the lease if the lessor agreed and to bind the transaction Hicks gave Defendant a check for $200 made payable, at the request of Defendant, to Randall J. Conley. No written agreement was executed by the parties at this time. The check stated on its face that it was a deposit on lease of building here involved. The following day Defendant called Hicks and told him that the lessor had agreed with the assignment and that he should bring a check for $7,000 to pay for the equipment, plus a check for the rent. Hicks objected to the purchase of the equipment and demanded return of his $200 deposit. Defendant refused to return the money and Hicks immediately tried to stop payment on the check. When he did so he learned that his check had been cashed by Defendant as soon as the bank opened that morning, November 26. After Hicks was unsuccessful in getting his deposit returned he reported the incident to the FREC and the complaint here under consideration was filed. Defendant contends that he was operating as the owner of the lease and not in his capacity as a broker; that the consent to assignment of the lease did not result in an assignment; that by executing the collateral installment note he was part owner of the business; that when his daughter-in-law left and the business folded he acquired the leasehold by abandonment; and that he was entitled to retain Hicks' deposit of $200 as liquidated damages. One witness called by Defendant testified that the bank's policy on chattel mortgage loans was that they would only make such loans to the owners of the business. However, he acknowledged that he did not handle the loan here involved and never saw any documents showing Randall J. Conley having an interest in the leased premises, the equipment and fixtures for which was the subject of the loan represented by Exhibit 9. Defendant had advertised the sale of the lease in the newspaper and therein indicated the assignee of the lease would be required to assume payments on the equipment. Neither Hicks nor Beasley ever saw any such advertisement.
Findings Of Fact Respondent Anglickis is a Florida real estate broker holding license number 0001869. Respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., is a corporate real estate broker holding license number 0169476. The address of both respondents is 102 East Leland Heights Boulevard, Lehigh Acres, Florida. (P-26.) Respondent Anglickis is president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., and Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. All three companies are located at the same address. (Testimony of Campbell; P-5, P-26.) On March 12, 1979, Louis G. Hofstetter and his wife, Dale I. Hofstetter, both residents of North Carolina, entered into a real estate contract with American Heritage Builders, Inc. Respondent Anglickis signed on behalf of American Hertiage Inc. Under the terms of the contract, the Hofstetters were to Purchase a lot and home to be constructed thereon by American Heritage Builders, Inc. The purchase price included the transfer of a lot owned by the Hofstetters and a cash down payment. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-1, P-3, P-26.) The contract estimated closing costs to be approximately $2,000". It also contained conflicting conditions relative to the time within which any mortgage financing must be obtained. . . . In the event PURCHASER'S application for mortgage financing is not approved within sixty (60) days from date hereof, all monies receipted for, less cost of credit report, will be returned to the PURCHASER and this contract will be null and void. * * * FOR MORTGAGE TRANSACTIONS: This contract of Purchase and Sale shall be void unless Purchaser's application for Mortgage has been approved by a bank or financial institution and Purchaser has executed the Mortgage Acceptance Form, within four (3) [sic] months from date of this Contract of Purchase. 2/ (P-1, R-1.) On March 12, 1979, the Hofstetters signed a mortgage loan application and submitted it to Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc. (P-26.) On May 5, 1979, 45 days after accepting the application, Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., submitted the Hofstetters' mortgage loan application to First Federal of DeSoto. (Testimony of Archer.) On June 15, 1979 (95 days after receiving the loan application), Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters indicating that the local lender needed additional information on their stock holdings, and enclosing a document titled "Good Faith Estimate of Settlement Charges". This document estimated that closing costs would be $2,754--$754 more than the estimate contained in the real estate contract. (P-5.) On June 22, 1979, the Hofstetters protested the increased closing cost, requested clarification, and provided the requested information on their stock holdings. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-26.) On July 7, 1979, the Hofstetters notified Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., that the increased closing cost deviated from the contract, that they therefore considered the contract cancelled and wanted the deposit refunded. (Testimony of Hofstetter; P-8.) On June 29, 1979, Robert Campbell, vice-president of Lee County Mortgage and Title, Inc., wrote the Hofstetters and explained the meaning of each component of the closing cost. (P-7.) On July 17, 1979, respondent, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote a letter to the Hofstetters expressing his position: * * * Let me try and put the contract in the proper perspective for you. It's our contention that you have reluctantly provided to us the information that would enable us to make a proper and expedient application to the lending institution and that much of this information has been confused, causing further delays. In accordance with the contract, you were to make this application as quickly and as expediently as Possible so that the contract would not expire. However, this is not the case. Thus, my immediate Position is that the contract should be expired and all of the deposits, including the cash and the lot which we gave you $6,995.00 trade for, would be forfeited as agreed upon liquidated damages. He ended by outlining other alternatives and repeating his asserted right to cancel the transaction and retain the Hofstetters' deposit as liquidated damages * * * First, the lending institution must make a quick determination based on the facts that they have that you are either eligible or not eligible for a mortgage loan as outlined in our contract. If they still do not have enough information, we have no other choice then but to ask you to pay the increase which we have experienced at this time (price list enclosed), and in paying that increase we would be willing to take another 90 days to try and secure a loan for you. If your mortgage loan is denied, your deposit less the costs of processing your mortgage application will be returned to you. Of course, the third choice is the choice I hope we do not have to take, and that is cancelling this transaction and retaining your monies as agreed upon liquidated damages. (P-9.) Mr. Hofstetter responded on July 22, 1979. He denied that he was responsible for any delay or confusion in the Processing of their loan application; asserted that 93 days had elapsed from the submission of their loan application and Mr. Campbell's letter of June 15, 1979, asking for additional financial information; and informed respondent Anglickis that the contract had already expired by virtue of the clause allowing 60 days to obtain mortgage financing. He then, again, asked that his deposit be returned. (P-10.) On July 30, 1979, respondent Anglickis, as president of American Heritage Builders, Inc., wrote to the Hofstetters indicating that the loan had been approved 3/ and he was prepared to build their home at the contract price. He then addressed Mr. Hofstetter's July 22, 1979, denial of any responsibility for delay in obtaining the mortgage loan: I have reviewed your letter of July 22, 1979 and I understand we certainly have a difference of opinion as to whose fault the delay has been caused by. However, I don't think it's time to look at whose fault the delay might be, since it all has worked out to your satisfaction. The mortgage has been approved and we are ready to build. I expect you will now sign the mortgage papers when receipted for so that we may begin construction immediately. (P-11.) On August 6, 1979, the Hofstetters restated to respondent Anglickis that they were not prepared to go ahead with construction, that the contract became null and void by operation of the 60-day mortgage financing clause, and that the deposit should be immediately returned. (P-12.) On August 31, 1979, respondent Anglickis notified the Hofstetters that, pursuant to the contract conditions, he was retaining their full deposit, including cash and the real estate lot for which they received a $6,995 credit toward the purchase price. The full down payment totaled $10,350. (P-1, P-13.) On September 8, 1979, the Hofstetters replied: We cannot understand why you continue to ignore the provisions of the second sentence of Paragraph Two on the reverse side of Contract No. 1997, dated 12 March 1979. You say you intend to invoke the Provisions of the third sentence of this para- graph, but this sentence is Predicated on the assumption that the mortgage would be approved within sixty (60) days. The mortgage was not approved until late July (your letter of 17 July 1979 indicated it was not yet approved, and your letter of 30 July 1979 stated that it had now been approved), more than 120 days past the date of the original contract. Our Position is as Previously stated on several occasions: on 12 May 1979 the contract became null and void, and on that date our deposit should have been refunded. Any action other than this is illegal, according to the terms of the contract. We are due return of our down payment, plus interest, from 12 May 1979. (P-24.) On October 3, 1979, First Federal of DeSoto, which had continued to process the Hofstetter loan application, issued a commitment approving the requested loan. On October 10, 1979, the Hofstetters rejected the mortgage loan. (P-26.) Subsequently, the Hofstetters wrote letters to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs and the Lehigh Chamber of Commerce complaining of respondent Anglickis' retention of their deposit; they, then, retained an attorney and filed a civil action against respondents in the circuit court of Lee County. That action was settled out-of-court. There is no evidence whatsoever to support respondent Anglickis' assertion to the Hofstetters that they were dilatory or responsible for confusion or delay in obtaining the necessary mortgage financing.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the charges against respondent American Heritage Realty, Inc., be dismissed; That respondent Richard A. Anglickis be administratively fined $1,000. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 13th day of October, 1982, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oaklnd Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 13th day of October, 1982.
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: Petitioner is a Florida corporation. It was incorporated on September 10, 1991. On August 25, 1995, it was administratively dissolved for failure to file its annual report. It has not been reinstated. At present, Petitioner has no assets. Its liabilities exceed $250,000.00 and include a judgment against it in the amount of $11,857.00 (plus interest) and numerous unpaid bills. Before its demise as an active corporation, 3/ Petitioner was a provider of travel services. It was registered as a "seller of travel" with the Agency in 1992 (from January 1 to December 31) and in 1993 (also from January 1 to December 31), during which time it held Seller of Travel Registration Number 14223. As part of the registration process, Petitioner posted with the Agency a $10,000.00 performance bond effective for the one year period commencing November 19, 1991 (the 1991-92 Performance Bond) and another $10,000.00 performance bond effective for the one year period commencing November 19, 1992 (the 1992-93 Performance Bond). 4/ The surety on these two performance bonds (the 1991-92 Performance Bond and the 1992-93 Performance Bond) was the Hartford Fire Insurance Company (the Hartford). Edward Volz, in his capacity as Petitioner's President, signed an indemnity agreement obligating Petitioner to indemnify the Hartford for any payments made by the Hartford "by reason or in consequence of its suretyship." 5/ Consumer claims against Petitioner were received by the Agency. By letter dated February 28, 1994, the Agency advised Petitioner of these "claims on the above referenced security" and of the Agency's intention "to make a demand under its [the security's] terms." By letter to the Hartford dated February 28, 1994, the Agency made "a demand on the surety bond." 6/ The letter read as follows: This is to notify your company that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services is in possession of claims made by persons who purchased travel-related services from the above-mentioned seller of travel [Petitioner]. This bond was issued by your company to secure the services of the seller of travel or to provide a refund to those customers who do not receive the services purchased. Please accept this letter as a demand on the surety bond. We would appreciate your advising this office in writing within fifteen (15) days from the date of this letter as to the form and information you require in order to make payment pursuant to the bonded obligation. If you have any questions please contact me at 904-922-2972 or Mr. Wayne Searcy, 904-922-2920. In or around March of 1994, Petitioner filed an application with the Agency to renew its "seller of travel" registration. In conjunction with the filing of its application, Petitioner posted with the Agency a $25,000.00 performance bond effective for the one year period commencing November 19, 1993 (the 1993-94 Performance Bond). The surety on the bond was the Hartford. 7/ By letter dated June 22, 1994, the Agency notified Petitioner that Petitioner's application for renewal of its registration had ben denied for failure "to provide a financial statement prepared by an independent public accountant." After receiving the Agency's June 22, 1994, letter, Petitioner discontinued its business operations. Having received additional claims against Petitioner since it had sent its February 28, 1994, demand letter to the Hartford and not having received any response from the Hartford to that letter, the Agency sent a second letter, dated September 29, 1994, to the Hartford. The letter read as follows: Subject: Excell Travel Club, Inc. 1239 East Newport Ctr., [Number] 113 Deerfield Beach, Florida 33442 Surety Bonds [Number] 41770-77 ($25,000) and [Number] 41770-77 ($10,000) Effective November 19, 1993/ Effective November 19, 1992 Dear Sir: The Department of Agriculture has claims exceeding the amount of the bonds [the 1992- 93 Performance Bond and the 1993-94 Performance Bond] from persons who purchased travel-related services from the above- mentioned seller of travel [Petitioner]. Therefore, the Department of Agriculture is making a demand on the bonds. The bonds were issued by your company to secure the services of the seller of travel or to provide a refund to those customers who do not receive the services purchased. Please accept this letter as a follow up demand on the surety bonds. We would appreciate your advising this office in writing within ten (10) days from the date of this letter as to the form and infor- mation you require in order to make payment to the bonded obligation. If you have any questions please contact me at 904-922-2820. A copy of this letter was sent to Petitioner. The Hartford sent a letter, dated October 18, 1994, to the Agency acknowledging receipt of the Agency's September 29, 1994, letter. Subsequently, the Hartford sent a second letter, dated November 2, 1994, to the Agency. The letter read as follows: RE: Our file: 319 S 26747 and 319 S 26748 Principal: Excell Travel Club, Inc. Dear Mr. Cloud: Enclosed are our checks totalling $35,000.00 which are in settlement of the two surety bonds with effective periods 11/19/92 to 11/19/93 and 11/19/93 to 11/19/94. Please acknowledge receipt of these two checks and acknowledge that our bonds are exonerated. Thank you for your advices concerning these matters. Appearing on both of the two checks that were enclosed with the Hartford's November 2, 1994, letter was the notation, "full and final settlement." Each of the checks also had a "loss date" written on it. The "loss date" written on the $10,000.00 check was November 18, 1993. The "loss date" written on the $25,000.00 check was September 29, 1994. Petitioner had no advance notice that the Hartford was going to make a "settlement" with the Agency. By letter dated May 17, 1995, the Agency advised Petitioner of its intention "to make distribution of the entire bond proceeds to the claimants on a pro rata basis." Thereafter, Petitioner filed a petition requesting an administrative hearing on such proposed action. Petitioner has not repaid any of the $35,000.00 that the Hartford paid the Agency for the benefit of those who filed claims against Petitioner, nor has the Hartford instituted legal proceedings to require Petitioner to indemnify it for having made such payment to the Agency.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Agency enter a final order dismissing, on the ground of lack of standing, Petitioner's petition requesting an administrative hearing on the Agency's proposed action to distribute the proceeds of the 1992-93 and 1993-94 Performance Bonds to claimants on a pro rata basis. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 8th day of October, 1996. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of October, 1996.
Findings Of Fact The Parties. The Department is a state agency charged with the administration and enforcement of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes, the Florida Mortgage Brokerage Act, and the rules promulgated thereunder. Financial Funding is a corporation. Eric Schwartz is the sole director, officer and shareholder of Financial Funding. Mr. Schwartz has been licensed by the Department as a mortgage broker continuously since 1983. Between 1983 and 1988 Mr. Schwartz acted as broker for a wholly-owned mortgage brokerage business. From 1988 until October 1, 1991, Mr. Schwartz was licensed as a self-employed mortgage broker. Mr. Schwartz has also held a real estate broker's license since approximately 1978. Financial Funding was created by Mr. Schwartz in order to comply with newly enacted requirements of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. Effective October 1, 1991, licensed mortgage brokers in Florida were required to be employed by a mortgage brokerage business. Mr. Schwartz was, therefore, required to create a business entity or work for someone else's mortgage brokerage business in order to continue as a mortgage broker. Financial Funding's Application. On or about December 12, 1991, Financial Funding filed an application with the Department for licensure as a mortgage brokerage business (hereinafter referred to as the "Application"). It was revealed in the Application that Mr. Schwartz was the President of Financial Funding. By letter dated April 24, 1992, the Department denied Financial Funding's Application. The Department denied the Application because of its conclusion that Mr. Schwartz, an officer of Financial Funding, had violated Chapter 494, Florida Statutes and had a disciplinary history. Financial Funding timely challenged the denial of its Application. The Eason Complaint. Between approximately 1984 and 1987, Mr. Schwartz was the sole owner and president of Paramount Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Paramount"). Mr. Schwartz was the principal mortgage broker for Paramount and utilized Paramount as the vehicle for his practice as a mortgage broker. On or about November 5, 1985, Agnes Eason filed a complaint against Mr. Schwartz and Paramount (hereinafter referred to as the "Eason Complaint"), in the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, In and For Dade County, Florida. A Final Judgment was entered on the Eason Complaint on or about February 17, 1987. The court found that Mr. Schwartz had initiated contact with the Plaintiff, Agnes Eason. The court also found that Mr. Schwartz had represented to Ms. Eason that the Small Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as the "SBA"), was about to foreclose a lien on her home. The court also found that "[t]he Small Business Administration, in fact, was not foreclosing on Plaintiff's property [and had no plans to institute foreclosure proceedings in the near future.]" The language in brackets was struck from the Final Judgment. Therefore, no determination was made as to whether foreclosure proceedings might have been instituted in the future. The striking of this language, however, does not prove that the SBA was considering possible foreclosure proceedings on Ms. Eason's property. Nor was Mr. Schwartz's testimony persuasive enough to reject the findings of the court on the Eason Complaint. The court concluded that Mr. Schwartz told Ms. Eason that "the only way to save her home from foreclosure" would be to execute notes and mortgages in favor of Paramount. Ms. Eason executed the suggested notes and mortgages and they were recorded. Although the notes and mortgages were executed on terms which Ms. Eason accepted, the court concluded that "no consideration" passed from Paramount to Ms. Eason for the notes or mortgages. The court also concluded that Ms. Eason executed the notes and mortgages because of the misrepresentation concerning the SBA by Mr. Schwartz. The court found that when Ms. Eason notified Mr. Schwartz that her payments on the note she had executed to Paramount were more than she could afford, the notes and mortgages were cancelled and a satisfaction was recorded. The court also found that after cancelling the notes and mortgages, Mr. Schwartz incorrectly told Ms. Eason that "the only way left to save her home from imminent foreclosure by the Small Business Administration" would be to execute a Warranty Deed conveying the fee simple interest in Ms. Eason's home to him. Mr. Schwartz also told Ms. Eason that, pursuant to a document titled a "Disclosure", he would grant Ms. Eason and her mother a life estate in the property. Mr. Schwartz was also to pay Ms. Eason $1,000.00 and to pay real estate taxes on the property pursuant to the Disclosure. Ms. Eason executed a Warranty Deed and the Disclosure on June 18, 1985. The Warranty Deed was recorded June 19, 1985. The Disclosure was recorded, but not until September 13, 1985. Although the transaction was explained by Mr. Schwartz to Ms. Eason and she accepted it, the court concluded that Mr. Schwartz's representation that foreclosure by the SBA was imminent was incorrect and that Mr. Schwartz failed to tender the sum of $1,000.00 agreed to in the Disclosure. Although Mr. Schwartz testified that he did attempt to tender the $1,000.00 (less $175.00 in recording fees), he did so after the Eason Complaint had been filed and it was rejected because of the litigation. Therefore, although the Disclosure agreement was executed June 18, 1985, Mr. Schwartz did not attempt to tender the $1,000.00 until some time after the Eason Complaint was filed on November 5, 1985. The court also found that Mr. Schwartz had not paid real estate taxes on the property as promised in the Disclosure. Mr. Schwartz explained, however, that the taxes had not been paid because the first real estate taxes due on the property had not become due until after the litigation had been instituted. The court concluded as a matter of law, among other things, the following: That the Defendant, ERIC SCHWARTZ, on behalf of Defendant PARAMOUNT FINANCE CORPORATION [fraudulently] misrepresented a material fact to the Plaintiff, AGNES EASON, for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to execute the aforementioned notes and mortgages. That the Defendant, ERIC SCHWARTZ [fraudulently] misrepresented a material fact to the Plaintiff, AGNES EASON, for the purpose of inducing Plaintiff to execute the aforementioned Warranty Deed and "Disclosure." That the Warranty Deed executed by Plaintiff in favor of Defendant was procured by Defendant SCHWARTZ through the exercise of coercion and duress upon Plaintiff. That no consideration passed from Defendant SCHWARTZ to Plaintiff for any of the instruments executed by Plaintiff. That the purported promises made by Defendant SCHWARTZ in the "Disclosure", to the effect that certain debts of the Plaintiff will be paid by SCHWARTZ "if necessary", are illusory promises and impose no obligation upon the Defendant SCHWARTZ. Such promises are therefore unenforceable and do not constitute consideration in support of the subject conveyance. The court ordered the promissory notes, Warranty Deed and the Disclosure cancelled and declared them null and void. The Department's Awareness of the Eason Complaint. There were employees of the Department that were aware of the Eason matter at the time that an administrative action against Mr. Schwartz, which is discussed, infra, was being investigated by the Department. Prior to the action of the Department in this case, the Department has not taken disciplinary action against Mr. Schwartz's individual mortgage broker license as the result of the judgment on the Eason Complaint. The weight of the evidence failed to prove why the Department did not take action against Mr. Schwartz as a result of the judgment on the Eason Complaint until this case arose. The evidence also failed to prove, however, that the Department ever represented to Mr. Schwartz that it would not take any action against his license as a result of the Eason matter. 1990 Administrative Action. At some point during 1987, Mr. Schwartz decided to begin business as a mortgage broker with Mr. Stephen Hertz. Mr. Schwartz intended to discontinue operating through Paramount. Mr. Schwartz and Mr. Hertz intended to operate their business as Dollar Mortgage Company (hereinafter referred to as "Dollar"). In June of 1987 Mr. Schwartz prepared an application to register Dollar as the mortgage broker. Mr. Schwartz also prepared an endorsement transferring his individual license as principal mortgage broker to Dollar. These documents (hereinafter referred to as the "Dollar Applications"), were provided to Mr. Hertz to file with the Department. Mr. Schwartz, having been advised by Mr. Hertz that the Dollar Applications had been filed, believed that the Dollar Applications had been filed with the Department. Before being informed by the Department that the Dollar Applications had been approved or that his individual license had been renewed, Mr. Schwartz engaged in several mortgage brokerage transactions in the name of Dollar. Engaging in the transactions in the name of Dollar, therefore, constituted acting as a mortgage brokerage business without a license. At some point after the Dollar Applications were filed, Mr. Schwartz contacted Mr. Paul Richman of the Department's Miami office to determine what the status of the applications was. Mr. Schwartz was informed that the Department was in the process of changing the manner in which applications were processed and the process was causing a delay. Mr. Richman advised Mr. Schwartz to check with the Department's Tallahassee office in November, 1987, if the Department had not acted on the Dollar Applications by then. In November, 1987, Mr. Schwartz contacted the Department's Tallahassee office and was informed that the Dollar Applications had never been received. Mr. Schwartz submitted new applications at that time. As a result of the fact that Mr. Schwartz had transacted business before his license had been renewed and had acted in the name of Dollar before receiving approval of Dollar to transact such business, the Department filed an Administrative Complaint, Number 1154-F-5/88 (hereinafter referred to as the "Complaint"), against Mr. Schwartz. The Complaint was entered August 29, 1988. On or about January 23, 1990, the Department and Mr. Schwartz entered into a Stipulation and Consent Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the "Stipulation"), settling the Complaint. Mr. Schwartz admitted in the Stipulation to the following: 3. Eric S. Schwartz admits that he acted as a mortgage broker with an inactive license, and that Dollar acted as a mortgage brokerage business without a valid registration but denies intentional wrongdoing as more fully set forth in Mr. Schwartz's affidavit dated May 30, 1989 which is referenced as if fully set forth at length herein. Pursuant to the Stipulation, Mr. Schwartz was required to pay an administrative fine of $2,500.00 for his violation of Chapter 494, Florida Statutes. It was also agreed that the Dollar application would be withdrawn and it was. Mr. Schwartz's individual license was, however, renewed. The Stipulation also provided that the Department would make at least one examination of Mr. Schwartz's mortgage brokerage activities during each six month period during the next twenty-four months from the date of the Stipulation. Audits were in fact conducted by the Department. No further charges were brought against Mr. Schwartz as a result of these audits. Additionally, the following agreement was contained in the Stipulation: 13. The Department agrees that, upon execution of this Stipulation, payment of the administrative fine, payment of the restitution ordered, and faithful compliance hereafter by Eric S. Schwartz with all of the terms and conditions of this Stipulation, the Department will take no further action against Eric S. Schwartz for violations of the Act and the rules of the Department as set forth in the Complaint. However, should the Department, in its exercise of its discretion, deem it necessary to take action against Eric S. Schwartz for violations of the Act and rules of Department occurring after the time period set forth in the Complaint, then, in that event, all such allegations and charges may be used against Eric S. Schwartz in any such subsequent proceeding, if relevant. Eric S. Schwartz understands that there is no order, administrative or judicial, sealing these proceedings in the event of a future administrative complaint regarding activities alleged to occur subsequent to the final date of the timeframe of the investigation of the affairs of Eric S. Schwartz' activities as set forth in the Complaint. See the second paragraph number "13" on page 4-5 of the Stipulation. In March of 1990, the Department entered a Consent Final Order incorporating the Stipulation. The Department has not brought any charges against Mr. Schwartz subsequent to the execution of the Stipulation. The Department has continued to renew Mr. Schwartz's mortgage broker's license.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department enter a Final Order denying Financial Funding's application for licensure as a mortgage brokerage business. DONE AND ENTERED this 21st day of January, 1993, in Tallahassee, Florida. LARRY J. SARTIN Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of January, 1993. APPENDIX The parties have submitted proposed findings of fact. It has been noted below which proposed findings of fact have been generally accepted and the paragraph number(s) in the Recommended Order where they have been accepted, if any. Those proposed findings of fact which have been rejected and the reason for their rejection have also been noted. Financial Funding's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 6 and 8. Accepted in 9. Accepted in 3. Accepted in 4. Accepted in 5. Although the Department offered no such evidence, the weight of the evidence failed to prove that there is "no difference." Hereby accepted. See 8. Accepted in 34. Accepted in 10-11 and 28-29. Accepted in 30, 32-33 and 37. Accepted in 31 and 34. Whether Mr. Hertz advised Mr. Schwartz to start doing business in the name of Dollar is not relevant. The evidence failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz "had no reason to operate improperly." What Mr. Hertz noted in his letter of May 18, 1988 is hearsay. The evidence failed to prove when the documents "had been previously provided . . . ." The weight of the evidence also failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz "was not at fault." Hereby accepted. See 37 and 38. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that Mr. Schwartz had "nothing to hide." The evidence also failed to prove that the Department's audits were "extremely thorough. What the Department did during their audits of Mr. Schwartz is based upon hearsay. Accepted in 37. Accepted in 39. Not relevant. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 12 and 25. See also 17-19 and 21. The weight of the evidence failed to prove the second sentence. The fifth sentence through the end of this proposed paragraph is not relevant. The evidence also failed to prove that Ms. Eason was "initially pleased." 20 See 14-15, 19, 21 and 22. 21 See 25-27. The weight of the evidence failed to prove that the Department was aware of the Eason matter for "seven years." The weight of the evidence also failed to prove the third sentence.. The Department's Proposed Findings of Fact Accepted in 1. Accepted in 12. Hereby accepted. Accepted in 13, 21 and 23 and hereby accepted. Accepted in 34. Accepted in 35. The Stipulation was executed in January, not December. Accepted in 36. Accepted in 37. Accepted in 38. Accepted in 40. Accepted in 6. Accepted in 3 and 7. Accepted in 8. COPIES FURNISHED: Harold F. X. Purnell, Esquire Highpoint Center, Suite 1200 106 East College Avenue Tallahassee, Florida 32301 J. Ashley Peacock Assistant General Counsel Office of the Comptroller The Capitol, Suite 1302 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0350 Honorable Gerald Lewis Comptroller, State of Florida The Capitol, Plaza Level Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350 William G. Reeves General Counsel Room 1302 The Capitol Tallahassee, FL 32399-0350
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a dealer in heavy construction equipment and has been since its incorporation on August 1, 1946. Among petitioner's competitors are Dewind Machinery Company, Florida Equipment Company of Jacksonville, Florida- Georgia Tractor Company, Inc., Great Southern Equipment Company, Inc., Pilot Equipment Company, Inc., Ring Power Corporation and Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Company. Like its competitors, petitioner frequently leases equipment to its customers, giving them an option to purchase, rather than selling them the equipment outright. Petitioner's exhibit No. 1 reflects one such transaction. On April 19, 1973, petitioner quoted Houdaille Duval Wright Company (Houdaille) a purchase price of twenty-two thousand dollars ($22,000.00) plus sale's tax, and monthly rent of fourteen hundred dollars ($1,400.00) plus sales tax on a diesel powered, self-propelled vibratory roller. After negotiations between petitioner and Houdaille, the purchase price dropped to seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), but the monthly rental remained unchanged. Houdaille agreed to lease the vibratory roller from petitioner on these terms. With respect to its option to purchase, Houdaille specified that: 100 percent of all rentals to apply towards purchase price of $17,000.00 less 10 percent discount on remaining outstanding balance at time of purchase. Interest to accrue at a rate 7 1/2 percent simple. Houdaille made lease payments for nine months, totaling twelve thousand six hundred dollars ($12,600.00), before electing to exercise its option to purchase. In calculating the amount of money Houdaille was to pay to close out the transaction, petitioner began by treating the payments Houdaille had made under the lease as if they had been payments made in repayment of a loan, outstanding for the period of the lease, in the amount of seventeen thousand dollars ($17,000.00), at 7 1/2 percent per annum. Petitioner allocated portions of each lease payment to principal and to interest, calculated on the declining principal balance, aggregating eleven thousand nine hundred ten dollars and fifty-four cents ($11,910.54) to principal, and six hundred eighty-nine dollars and fourty-six cents ($689.46) to interest. Petitioner then calculated the 10 percent discount by multiplying one tenth times the difference between the original price ($17,000.00) and the amount aggregated to principal ($11,910.54), which yielded five hundred eight dollars and ninety-five cents ($508.95). This figure was subtracted from the original contract price ($17,000.00) to ascertain the' discounted price ($16,491.05) against which the lease payments were credited in their entirety ($12,600.00), yielding the figure three thousand eight hundred ninety-one dollars and five cents ($3,891.05), on which petitioner calculated 4 percent sales tax. In addition, petitioner required Houdaille, in exercising its option to purchase, to pay six hundred eighty-nine dollars and forty-six cents ($689.46), the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. In every respect pertinent to the dispute between petitioner and respondent, this transaction between petitioner and Houdaille is typical of the transactions on which contested portions of the tax assessments were based. The same is true of petitioner's lease and sale of a truck crane to Poston Bridge & Iron, Inc. (Poston), the transaction reflected in exhibit No. 2 (although petitioner's agreement with Poston did not involve a discount.) The terms of the lease purchase agreement, as stated on respondent's exhibit No. 2, were: Option Price $124,855.00 with 100 percent of paid rentals to apply to purchase price less interest at 8.5 percent simple. After making lease payments totalling twenty-six thousand dollars ($26,000.00), Poston exercised its option to purchase. At this point the lease payments were recast as installment sales payments, portions being allocated to principal and interest accordingly. Respondent collected sales tax on the amount of money Poston paid in exchange for title, after electing to purchase, less the aggregate amount of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. Petitioner has been entering into lease purchase agreements of this kind with various customers since 1946 or 1947, and, when customers exercised purchase options, petitioner ordinarily calculated sales tax in the manner it employed in connection with the sale of the vibratory roller to Houdaille, and the truck crane to Poston. In at least one instance, however, petitioner calculated sales tax as 4 percent of all the money a customer, Misener Marine Construction, Inc., paid when exercising its option to purchase a truck crane, including portions of lease payments petitioner had allocated to interest. On the lease payments themselves, petitioner regularly collected 4 percent sales tax which it regularly remitted to respondent. For federal income tax purposes, petitioner treated payments from customers under a lease purchase agreement as lease payments for every tax year in which the option to purchase was not exercised. For the tax year in which the option to purchase was exercised, the lease payments were treated as payments under an installment sale contract, for federal income tax purposes. When respondent audited petitioner's rentals for the period May 1, 1970, to April 30, 1973, and earlier when respondent performed a general audit of petitioner's books for the period July 1, 1959, to February 28, 1962, no mention was mace of petitioner's sales tax treatment of lease purchase agreements under which lessees had exercised purchase options. Before the audit which eventuated in the assessments now in controversy, however, the auditors were given a copy of a letter from L. N. Hansen to Thomas D. Aitken dated December 9, 1974. Mr. Hansen was formerly director of respondent's sales and use tax division. In the fall of 1974, he was one of a group or "board" of respondent's employees who considered questions arising under the tax laws and formulated policy for respondent. His letter to Mr. Aitken, which came in evidence as, petitioner's exhibit No. 5, was written on behalf of respondent after its substance was discussed at a meeting of respondent's policy group. It pertains to lease purchase agreements entered into by Joseph L. Rozier Machinery Co. (Rozier). Mr. Hansen's letter stated that Rozier was "not correct in reducing the taxable sales price by the rental payments and thereafter adding an interest charge which, if it was incurred at all, was incurred prior to the time of sale." Petitioner's exhibit No. 5, p. 1. The foregoing findings of fact should be read in conjunction with the statement required by Stucky's of Eastman, Georgia vs. Department of Transportation, 340 So.2d 119 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), which appears as an appendix to the order.
Recommendation Upon consideration of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That respondent abandon the uncollected portions of its deficiency assessments. DONE and ENTERED this 31st day of August, 1977, in Tallahassee, Florida. ROBERT T. BENTON, II Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings Room 530, Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 APPENDIX Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 1, 4-8, and 10 have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 2 is irrelevant insofar as it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7, and for that reason has not been adopted where it differs from petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 7. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 3 has not been adopted because it is not relevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 9 has not been adopted because what motivated respondent's employees is not relevant and because it was not proven what would have happened "[b]ut for the Hansen letter." Petitioner's proposed findings of fact Nos. 11 and 12 have not been adopted because they are irrelevant. Petitioner's proposed finding of fact No. 13 has not been adopted as such because it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. The first paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has been adopted, in substance, except that exercise of the purchase option may be said to relate back to the beginning of the contract. Significantly, respondent proposes as a finding of fact that the "amount termed 'Interest' . . . is payable for the use of the money during the rental/lease period." Paragraphs two through seven, nine and ten of respondent's proposed findings of fact have been adopted, in substance, insofar as relevant. The eighth paragraph of respondent's proposed findings of fact has not been adopted; it is actually a proposed conclusion of law. COPIES FURNISHED: Mr. Daniel S. Dearing, Esquire Post Office Box 1118 424 North Calhoun Street Tallahassee, Florida 32302 Ms. Patricia S. Turner, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Department of Legal Affairs The Capitol Tallahassee, Florida 32304
The Issue At issue in this proceeding is whether Respondents committed the offenses set forth in the Administrative Complaints and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Preliminary matters Petitioner, Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Real Estate (Department), is a state government licensing and regulatory agency charged, inter alia, with the responsibility and duty to prosecute administrative complaints pursuant to the laws of the State of Florida, including Chapters 455 and 475, Florida Statutes. Respondent, Mizeral Robinson (Robinson), is now and was at all times material hereto a licensed real estate broker in the State of Florida, having been issued license number 0484257. From July 18, 1988, through January 5, 1997, Robinson was registered with the Department as a broker/officer of Wakefield Realty, Inc. (Wakefield Realty), a broker-corporation, and from January 6, 1997, through June 30, 1997, Robinson was registered as an active broker-salesperson with Township Realty, Inc., a broker-corporation located at 1333 South State Road 7, North Lauderdale, Florida. Since June 30, 1997, Robinson has been registered as a broker-salesperson without a current employer, with an address of 6372 Harbor Bend, Margate, Florida. From July 18, 1988, through January 6, 1997, Wakefield Realty was registered with the Department as a broker-corporation (registration number 0255869), with an address of 4699 North State Road 7, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. However, in October 1996, without notice to the Florida Real Estate Commission, Wakefield Realty relocated its offices to 2240 Woolbright Road, Boynton Beach, Florida. On January 6, 1997, the license of its corporate broker, Robinson, was reissued as a broker-salesperson with Township Realty, Inc., and, no active broker having been appointed to fill the vacancy within 14 calendar days, Wakefield Realty's corporate registration was cancelled. Rule 61J2-5.018, Florida Administrative Code. The Dobson contract and related matters (DOAH Case No. 97-5041) On October 31, 1995, Respondents, Robinson and Wakefield Realty, as agents for Hubert and Ruth Dobson, the Buyers, presented a written offer to purchase a house owned by Adrienne and Nancy Cutler, the Sellers, at 951 Southwest 88th Terrace, Pembroke Pines, Florida. On November 7, 1995, following negotiations, the Dobsons' offer was accepted by the Sellers. The agreed purchase price was $123,480, with the method of payment as follows: a $2,000 deposit tendered with the offer; an additional deposit of $4,000 "due within 10 United States banking days after date of acceptance"; the proceeds ($117,306) of a new conventional mortgage to be secured by the buyers; and, a balance of $174 to be paid by the buyers at closing. All deposits were to be held in escrow by Wakefield Realty. In addition to the provisions of the agreement relating to the deposits, discussed supra, the agreement contained the following pertinent provisions: D. NEW MORTGAGES: . . . if this Contract provides for Buyer to obtain a new mortgage, then Buyer's performance under this Contract shall be contingent upon Buyer's obtaining said mortgage financing upon the terms stated, or if none are stated, than upon the terms generally prevailing at such time in the county where the property is located. The buyer agrees to apply within 5 banking days . . . and to make a good faith, diligent effort to obtain the mortgage financing. In the event a commitment for said financing is not obtained within 45 banking days . . . from the date of this Contract, then the other party may terminate this Contract by delivery of written notice to the other party or his agent, the deposit shall be returned to the Buyer and all parties shall be released from all further obligations hereunder. This right of termination shall cease upon the Buyer obtaining a written commitment letter for mortgage financing at the rate and terms of payment previously specified herein prior to the delivery of the notice of termination. * * * X. DEFAULT: In the event of default of either party, the rights of the non- defaulting party and the broker shall be as provided herein and such rights shall be deemed to be the sole and exclusive rights in such event; (a) If Buyer fails to perform any of the covenants of this Contract, all money paid or deposited pursuant to this Contract by the Buyer shall be retained by or for the account of the Seller as consideration for the execution of this Contract as agreed and liquidated damages and in full settlement of any claims for damages and specific performance by the Seller against the Buyer. . . . * * * (CHECK and COMPLETE THE ONE APPLICABLE) (X) IF A WRITTEN LISTING AGREEMENT IS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT: Seller agrees to pay the Broker named above including cooperating sub-agents and/or cooperating Buyers Agents named, according to the terms of an existing, separate written agreement; * * * If Buyer fails to perform and deposit(s) is retained, 50% thereof, but not exceeding the Broker's fee above provided, shall be paid Broker, as full consideration for Broker's services including costs expended by Broker, and the balance shall be paid to Seller. To finance the purchase, Robinson submitted an application on the Dobsons' behalf for a conventional residential mortgage loan with Citizens Federal Bank. That application was denied January 8, 1996. Following the denial of their application, the Dobsons made demand of Respondents, under the mortgage contingency provision of the purchase agreement, for the return of their $6,000 deposit.3 Respondents, notwithstanding the rejection of the Dobsons' application for financing and the Sellers' execution of a release of deposit, which directed the escrow agent to disburse the escrow deposit of $6,000 to the Dobsons, failed and refused to return any portion of the deposit to the Dobsons. To date, such failure continues, and the proof is compelling that Respondents have converted the deposit to their own use and benefit.4 The Rafiee contract and related matters (DOAH Case No. 98-0003) On October 25, 1996, Respondent, Mizeral Robinson, procured a written offer from Iran Rafiee to purchase a triplex owned by Henry Sweigart, located at 11460 Northwest 39th Street, Coral Springs, Florida. The stated purchase price was $195,000, with the method of payment as follows: a $1,000 deposit tendered with the offer; an additional deposit of $9,000 "due within 5 United States banking days after date of acceptance"; the proceeds ($156,000) of a new conventional mortgage to be secured by the buyer; and, a balance of $30,000 [sic] to be paid by the buyer at closing. All deposits were to be held by Wakefield Realty, Inc., Mizeral Robinson, escrow agent. According to the "Deposit Receipt and Contract for Sale and Purchase," Rafiee's offer was accepted on what appears to be October 27, 1996 (Petitioner's Exhibit 12), and Rafiee's initial deposit, which was in Robinson's possession by at least October 25, 1996,5 was deposited on October 30, 1996.6 Accepting October 25, 1996, as the date Robinson received the check, the check was deposited "no later than the end of the third business day following receipt."7 Rule 61J2-14.008(d), Florida Administrative Code. In addition to the provisions of the agreement relating to the deposits, discussed supra, the agreement contained the following pertinent provisions: 29. DEFAULT: In the event of default of either party, the rights of the non- defaulting party and the broker shall be as provided herein and such rights shall be deemed to be the sole and exclusive rights in such event. If Buyer fails to perform any of the covenants of this Contract, all money paid or to be paid as deposits pursuant to this Contract by the Buyer shall be retained by or for the account of the Seller as consideration for the execution of this Contract as agreed and liquidated damages and in full settlement of any claims for damages and specific performance by the Seller against the Buyer. * * * (CHECK AND COMPLETE THE ONE APPLICABLE) (X) IF A WRITTEN LISTING AGREEMENT IS CURRENTLY IN EFFECT: Seller agrees to pay the Broker(s) named above according to the terms of an existing, separate written professional service fee agreement; * * * If Buyer fails to perform and deposit(s) is retained, 50% thereof, but not exceeding the Broker's fee above provided, shall be paid Broker, as full consideration for Broker's services including costs expended by Broker, and the balance shall be paid to Seller. Within days of the acceptance of her offer, Ms. Rafiee decided that she no longer desired to purchase the property and, on or about October 31, 1996, notified Robinson of her decision and requested the return of her deposit. At the time, Robinson was noncommittal and, observing that the check had only recently been deposited and likely had not yet been paid, stated they would have to speak of the matter at a later date. Thereafter, when pressed regarding the return of Ms. Rafiee's deposit, Robinson informed her that the deposit had been given to the seller, as required by the contract. Nevertheless, when Ms. Rafiee voiced her intention to pursue the matter further, Robinson agreed to pay her $800 (the parties agreeing that Robinson was entitled to $200 for her efforts) by December 20, 1996. Following the passage of a number of deadlines, and one check returned for insufficient funds, Robinson, in or about May 1997, eventually paid Ms. Rafiee the $800.00. At hearing, Robinson averred that because of Ms. Rafiee's default, she and the seller were, under the terms of the contract, each entitled to 50% of the $1,000 deposit, and that she disbursed the deposit accordingly. As for her offer to pay Ms. Rafiee $800, it was Robinson's view that such offer was made to appease Ms. Rafiee, since Robinson expected to secure further business from her, and should not be considered an admission that Ms. Rafiee was entitled to the return of any of her deposit. Given Ms. Rafiee's default under the purchase agreement, it must be concluded that Robinson, as the broker, had apparent authority to retain 50% ($500) of the deposit and to remit the remaining 50% ($500) to the seller. This is what Robinson avers she did and, given the proof or, stated differently, the lack thereof, it cannot be resolved, with the requisite degree of certainty, that she did otherwise.8
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered revoking Respondents' licensure and eligibility for licensure. DONE AND ENTERED this 29th day of May, 1998, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. WILLIAM J. KENDRICK Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 29th day of May, 1998.
