The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Amended Administrative Complaint? If so, what disciplinary action should be taken against him?
Findings Of Fact Based upon the evidence adduced at hearing, and the record as a whole, the following Findings of Fact are made: The Parties The Department is a state government licensing and regulatory agency. Respondent is now, and has been at all times material to the instant cases, a family practice physician licensed to practice medicine in the State of Florida. He holds license number ME 0030309. Facts Relating to Patient L.A. On April 29, 1991, L.A., a forty-one year old male, presented to Respondent with complaints of left elbow swelling, chills, and a temperature of 102 degrees Fahrenheit. His wife, R.A., had recommended that he see Respondent about these complaints. This was his first visit as a patient to Respondent. L.A.'s past medical history revealed no illnesses, injuries or surgeries. During the visit, L.A. was given a physical examination, which revealed, among other things, a temperature of 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Respondent diagnosed L.A. as having a fever, polyarthritis and left olecranon bursitis. As part of the course of treatment, Respondent injected L.A.'s left elbow with 1 cc of Decadron, which is a steroid. Respondent also aspirated 10 cc's of fluid from the elbow. The fluid was cloudy and straw-colored. In addition, Respondent prescribed an antibiotic (Keflex), as well as pain medication (Percocet) for L.A. to take. Respondent did not send the aspirated fluid to the laboratory for testing to ascertain if L.A. was suffering from septic arthritis. Nor did he order that any diagnostic x-rays be taken. Respondent did send to the laboratory blood that was drawn from L.A. during the visit. The test results revealed, among other things, a high white blood cell count and an extremely high eosinophil count. Given these test results and the symptoms with which L.A. had presented, there was a substantial likelihood that L.A. had an infection that was spreading throughout his body and that had the potential to become life- threatening if not properly treated. After receiving the results of the laboratory testing, Respondent ordered an arthritis profile. He did not order any additional tests, however, to find out the cause of L.A.'s highly elevated eosinophil count. Nor did he follow-up on the arthritis profile to determine the etiology of L.A.'s polyarthritis. On May 9, 1991, L.A. made his second and final visit to Respondent. He had continued complaints of a swollen left elbow and generalized joint aches and pains. During the visit, L.A. also mentioned that he had an ulcer, but he gave no indication that it was causing him any problems. Respondent examined L.A., after which he diagnosed L.A. as having a fever (99 degrees Fahrenheit) and polyarthritis. For the pain L.A. was experiencing, Respondent prescribed Percocet (quantity of 30). In not doing the following while L.A. was his patient, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonably prudent family practice physician would have recognized as being acceptable and appropriate at the time: having the fluid he had aspirated from L.A.'s elbow tested; ordering additional tests to determine the cause of L.A.'s highly elevated eosinophil count; and following-up on L.A.'s arthritis profile to determine the etiology of L.A.'s polyarthritis. Facts Relating to Patient R.A. R.A. first visited Respondent on March 29, 1990. She was 38 years of age at the time. R.A. presented with complaints of migraine headaches, back pain and depression. The primary purpose of her visit was to obtain treatment for her migraine headaches. She had been suffering from migraine headaches since she was 16 years of age. Although she was depressed that she still had these migraine headaches, R.A.'s depression was not severe and, based upon his conversation with her, Respondent reasonably believed that she was not a candidate to commit suicide. Consequently, he did not specifically ask her whether she had any suicidal ideation. During this initial visit, Respondent administered 100 mg. of Vistaril and 1 cc of Nubain to R.A. He also prescribed 30 tablets of Percocet. R.A. visited Respondent again on June 25, 1990, still complaining of severe migraine headaches. Her next visit to Respondent was on October 16, 1990. Her chief complaint was severe abdominal pain in an area where she had accidentally poked herself with a pointed object. Although Respondent believed that there was a possibility that R.A. had a laceration of her liver, he did not have her hospitalized for further evaluation and treatment to make certain that she was not going to bleed to death. Instead, he gave R.A. injections of Nubain (20 mg.) and Vistaril (100 mg.), prescribed Halcion (0.25 mg., quantity of 60), Fioricet (quantity of 40), and Percocet (quantity of 20) for her and sent her home. Blood that was drawn from R.A. during the visit was sent to the laboratory for testing. Blood cell profile testing revealed a low hemoglobin of 11.9 and a low hematocrit of 33.7. On R.A.'s next visit to Respondent, on December 17, 1990, she presented with complaints of abdominal pain and bloating, night sweats, black bowel movements, severe headaches, and the two-month absence of menstrual periods. Notwithstanding that R.A. reported having black bowel movements, Respondent did not perform a stool Hemoccult to check for the presence of blood in R.A.'s stool. Respondent did conduct a pregnancy examination, which revealed that R.A. was pregnant. In addition to concluding that R.A. was pregnant, Respondent diagnosed R.A. as having migraine headaches, fibrocystic breast disease, and intractable nausea. He prescribed Compazine (10 mg., quantity of 30) for her and sent her home. On May 6, 1991, R.A. presented to Respondent with complaints of migraine headaches and depression and she requested that Respondent put her on antidepressant medication. Respondent did not specifically ask R.A. if she was contemplating suicide, however, based upon his conversation with her, he had reason to believe that she had no suicidal ideation. Respondent treated R.A. with injections of Demerol (100 mg.) and Vistaril (100 mg.). He also prescribed Percocet (quantity of 30), Fiorinal and Desyrel for R.A.. Respondent did not record in R.A.'s medical records the amount of Fiorinal and Desyrel he prescribed. On September 29, 1991, R.A. presented to Respondent with complaints of severe abdominal cramps and bloating, back ache, diarrhea, vomiting, rapid heart beats, and chest pain and pressure. After being treated by Respondent with injections of Nubain (20 mg.) and Vistaril (100 mg.), R.A. remained in the office, under observation, for approximately an hour and a half, during which time her anxiety decreased. At the time she left the office, she was virtually pain-free. Respondent did not order an electrocardiogram or other cardiac work-up for R.A. given the improvement in her condition and that she was a pre- menopausal, 38-year old woman with a low risk of having a myocardial infarction. During the period of time that R.A. was his patient (March 29, 1990, to October 27, 1991), Respondent, in toto, saw her 29 times and gave her the following injections, prescriptions and samples: Injections- eight injections of Nubain; 16 injections of Vistaril; seven injections of Tigan; five injections of Demerol; one injection of Buprenex; and one injection of Toradol; Prescriptions and samples: 490 tablets of Percocet; four Tigan suppositories; 40 Tigan tablets; 30 tablets of Reglan; 20 Norflex tablets; three Lortab tablets; Desyrel; and samples of Vicodin. In not doing the following while R.A. was his patient, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonably prudent family practice physician would have recognized as being acceptable and appropriate at the time: hospitalizing R.A. on October 16, 1990, for further evaluation and treatment to make certain that she was not going to hemorrhage to death as a result of a liver laceration; and performing a stool Hemoccult on December 17, 1990, to check for the presence of blood in R.A.'s stool. Facts Relating to Patient R.M. R.M. first visited Respondent on April 10, 1990. She was 34 years of age at the time. R.M. presented with complaints of severe migraine headaches, nausea and a history of sinus allergies. Respondent had R.M. fill out a Forest Headache Questionnaire. In response to one of the questions on the questionnaire, R.M. listed the following as "headache medications" she had taken in the past: Fiorinal plain & Fiorinal #3 Fioricet Percocet Lortab Nolamine Rutuss Beconase Nasal Spray After examining R.M., Respondent concluded that she was suffering from sinusitis, anxiety, tension headaches and migraine headaches. Respondent treated R.M. with injections of Phenergan and Toradol, but did not record in R.M.'s medical records the amounts he injected. Respondent next saw R.M. on January 3, 1991, and again on January 14, 1991. R.M.'s following visit was on March 10, 1991. On this occasion, she presented with complaints of nausea, vomiting and a swollen and painful left eye. In addition, she was suffering from photophobia. A physical examination of R.M. revealed, among other things, that she had a temperature of 99 degrees Fahrenheit. Notwithstanding R.M.'s symptoms, which suggested that she might have some type of life-threatening facial or neurological infection, Respondent did not attempt to conduct either a basic eye or neurological examination (which would have included an examination of R.M.'s fundi) to further explore this possibility and find out if referral to a specialist was warranted. Instead, Respondent diagnosed R.M. as having a migraine headache, anxiety and intractable nausea, gave her an ice pack to place over her eye, treated her with injections of Nubain (20 mg.) and Vistaril (100 mg.) and prescribed Vistaril (100 mg., quantity of 50) for her. On March 22, 1991, R.M. presented to Respondent with complaints of depression. She told Respondent, among other things, that she was having marital problems. While R.M. was depressed about her family situation, her depression was not severe and, based upon his conversation with her, Respondent reasonably believed that she was not a candidate to commit suicide. Consequently, he did not specifically ask her whether she had any suicidal ideation. Respondent's record of this March 22, 1991, visit reflects that R.M. had been taking Fioricet, Lortab and Prozac. His records of her prior visits, however, gave no indication that Respondent or another physician had prescribed these medications for her. Fioricet is used to relieve tension headaches. Lortab is a pain medication. Prozac is used to treat depression. On March 25, 1991, R.M. presented to Respondent with a migraine headache and a non-healing abscess on her left hip. Respondent drained the abscess. He also gave R.M. injections of Phenergan and Nubain (10 mg.). Respondent's record of this March 25, 1991, visit reflects that R.M. had been taking, among other medications, Xanax, a medication that is indicated for the management of generalized anxiety disorders. His records of her prior visits, however, gave no indication that Respondent or another physician had ever prescribed Xanax for her. On April 10, 1991, Respondent treated R.M. for severe headaches and nausea. Respondent's record of this April 10, 1991, visit reflects that R.M. had been taking, among other medications, Percocet. His records of her prior visits, however, gave no indication that Respondent or another physician had ever prescribed Percocet for her. On May 2, 1991, R.M. presented to Respondent with a headache, sinus troubles, and an abscess on her buttock. Respondent drained the abscess. He also gave R.M. injections of Vistaril (100 mg.) and Nubain (20 mg.). On November 27, 1991, R.M. presented to Respondent with complaints of a headache and sinus trouble. She had a swollen face and blood coming out of both sides of her nose. Respondent treated R.M. with injections of Nubain (20 mg.) and Vistaril (100 mg.) and referred her to an ear, nose and throat (hereinafter referred to as "ENT") specialist. In addition, he suggested that X-rays be taken and that a CAT scan be done of her sinuses. Respondent did not conduct a funduscopic examination during the visit. R.M.'s last visit to Respondent was on November 28, 1991. It was an unscheduled, emergency visit. During the period of time that R.M. was his patient (April 10, 1990, to November 28, 1991), Respondent, in toto, saw her 28 times. On approximately 15 of these visits, including R.M.'s initial visit on April 10, 1990, Respondent diagnosed R.M. as having either sinusitis, acute sinusitis, or sinus headaches. In treating R.M., Respondent gave her, collectively, the following injections and prescriptions: Injections- 16 injections of Nubain; 25 injections of Vistaril; seven injections of Demerol; two injections of Phenergan; and three injections of Toradol; Prescriptions: 90 tablets of Percocet; 50 Halcion tablets; 140 units of Fiorinal; two prescriptions of Prozac; one prescription of Toradol tablets; two prescriptions of Beconase; and one prescription of Ru-Tuss. In not doing the following while R.A. was his patient, Respondent failed to practice medicine with that level of care, skill and treatment that, in light of the surrounding circumstances, a reasonably prudent family practice physician would have recognized as being acceptable and appropriate at the time: attempting, during R.M.'s March 10, 1991, visit, to conduct either a basic eye or neurological examination (which would have included an examination of R.M.'s fundi); and referring R.M. to an ENT specialist sooner than November 27, 1991. Facts Relating to Counts 10 and 11 On December 16, 1988, the Board of Medicine issued a Final Order in DPR Case Nos. 00-37320 and 00-53427 disposing of disciplinary charges that had been filed against Respondent by, among other things, placing Respondent on probation for a period of five years, with the condition that he "not in the future violate Chapters 455, 458 and 893, Florida Statutes, or the rules promulgated pursuant thereto." On or about May 15, 1991, Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida was suspended. On that same date, Respondent was presented with, and he signed, a Voluntary Surrender of Controlled Substances Privilege form. By signing the form, he effectively surrendered his federal Drug Enforcement Administration (hereinafter referred to as "DEA") Certificate of Registration and acknowledged that he understood that he would "not be permitted to order, manufacture, distribute, possess, dispense, administer, prescribe, or engage in any other controlled substance activities whatever, until such time as [he was] again properly registered." In conjunction with the surrender of his federal registration, he also surrendered to an agent of the State of Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (hereinafter referred to as "HRS") the controlled substances in his possession. In or about August of 1991, Respondent's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida was reinstated. Shortly thereafter HRS returned to Respondent the controlled substances he had surrendered. During August and September of 1991, Respondent possessed, stored and dispensed controlled substances without having a DEA registration. Although his attorney at the time told him that, inasmuch as his medical license had been reinstated, there was no legal impediment to his engaging in such controlled substance activities, Janice Barnes, a DEA investigator, advised him to the contrary on several occasions.
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby recommended that the Board enter a final order finding Respondent guilty of the alleged violations of subsection (1) of Section 458.331, Florida Statutes, noted above, dissmissing the remaining allegations against him and disciplining him for the violations he committed by suspending his license to practice medicine in the State of Florida for a period of five years, placing him on probation for the following five years, and imposing an administrative fine in the amount of $10,000.00. DONE AND ENTERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, this 15th day of June, 1994. STUART M. LERNER Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of June, 1994. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER IN CASE NO. 93-3689 The following are the Hearing Officer's specific rulings on the "facts" proposed by the Department in its proposed recommended order: 1-3. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. 4-6. Accepted and incorporated in substance, although not necessarily repeated verbatim, in this Recommended Order. First and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: To the extent that this proposed finding states that L.A. mentioned, during his May 9, 1991, visit, that he had an ulcer, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that it states that L.A. "complained" about the ulcer, it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First and second sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is outside the scope of the specific charges set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent should have "conduct[ed] a physical examination of L.A. on February 25, 1991 and on April 26, 1991," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 14-15. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. First sentence: Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support; Second and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance. 19-20. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 21. Rejected because it is outside the scope of the specific charges set forth in the Amended Administrative Complaint. 22-24. Accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that this proposed finding states that the amount of Percocet Respondent prescribed for R.A. was not in any way reflected in Respondent's medical records on R.A. and further states that Respondent had reason to believe that R.A. had "possible suicidal ideation," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. First sentence: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent should have "inquire[d] into possible suicidal ideation on March 29, 1990 and through May 6, 1991" and "order[ed] an EKG or further cardiac work-up on September 29, 1991," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. To the extent that this proposed finding states that "Respondent failed to record the amount of Percocet . . . prescribed to R.A. on May 6, 1991," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. First, second and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Remaining sentences: To the extent that these proposed findings are intended to refer to R.M.'s visit of April 10, 1991, they are accepted and incorporated in substance. To the extent that they are intended to refer to R.M.'s visit of April 10, 1990, they have been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. 33-35. Accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because it is more in the nature of a summary of testimony than a finding of fact. Accepted and incorporated in substance. First and third sentences: Accepted and incorporated in substance; Second sentence: Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. To the extent that this proposed finding states that R.M. visited Respondent 27, not 28, times, that on 16, not 15, of these visits Respondent diagnosed R.M. with either sinusitis, acute sinusitis, or sinus headaches, and that Respondent did not refer R.M. to an ENT specialist until November 28, rather than 27, 1991, it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 41-43. Rejected because inadequate evidentiary/record support. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent should have "inquire[d] into possible suicidal ideation of R.M. or refer her for psychiatric consultation or counseling," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. Rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. To the extent that this proposed finding states that Respondent should have "explain[ed] or justif[ied] R.M.'s being on the following drugs on the corresponding dates; Lortab and Prozac on March 22, 1991; Xanax, on March 25, 1991; [and] Percocet, on April 10, 1991," it has been rejected because of inadequate evidentiary/record support. Otherwise, it has been accepted and incorporated in substance. 47-48. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 49. Rejected as a finding of fact because it is more in the nature of legal argument. 50-52. Accepted and incorporated in substance. 53-54. Rejected as findings of fact because they are more in the nature of legal argument. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven A. Rothenburg, Esquire Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Suite 60 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Sheldon R. Zilbert, Esquire 200 South Biscayne Boulevard Suite 3120 Miami, Florida 33131 Dr. Marm Harris, Executive Director Board of Medicine Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792 Jack McRay, Esquire General Counsel Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0792
Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the allegations contained herein, Respondent was licensed as a naturopath in Florida under license number NA0000530, issued by the State of Florida, and maintained an office for his practice at 7202 East Broadway, Tampa, Florida. The Petitioner, Board of Medicine, is the state agency charged with regulating the practice of naturopathy in Florida. Pursuant to an ongoing investigation, on September 24, 1987, Detective Robert S. DuBose, acting in an undercover capacity in the name of Robert Adams, went to the Respondent's office to try to buy a controlled drug. He was accompanied by several other police officers and Mr. Fierman-Rentas, a DEA agent, all of whom remained outside in a car across the street, attempting to record the transmission from the body brig Mr. DuBose was wearing. On entering the Respondent's office, Mr. DuBose introduced himself to the doctor and told him he had been cut off from his prior source of Valium pills formerly supplied by an unstated friend. When the Respondent asked DuBose why he wanted the Valium, DuBose replied that nothing was wrong with him but that the Valium just made him feel good. Dr. Helland took DuBose's temperature, blood pressure, and pulse rate, stating at the time that he had to have some support for the prescription but that he knew nothing was wrong with DuBose. As a matter of fact, at that time, DuBose was under the care of another physician for a stomach condition not treated by Valium, but did not advise Respondent of this. DuBose's actual condition had no bearing on his relationship with the Respondent. During their conversation, Respondent asked DuBose how long he had been taking Valium and DuBose replied that though he had been taking it for 6 months, he was not sick but just wanted it because of how it made him feel. Respondent indicated he knew DuBose had nothing wrong with him but he had to put something down in his records. As a result, DuBose laughingly stated he was nervous. After filling out a small card on which he wrote some of the information given him by DuBose, Respondent then wrote out a prescription for Robert Adams for 30 tablets of 10 mg Valium for which DuBose paid him $30.00. At no time did Respondent take a proper medical history from DuBose or ask him if he was under the care of another physician. Valium is the commercial brand name of Diazepam, a Schedule IV controlled substance. On October 1, 1987, DuBose returned to Respondent's office, again accompanied by the other officers who waited in cars across the street. DuBose asked for a refill of his prescription and after Respondent asked DuBose what his name was and looked at his patient card, he indicated that DuBose was three days early for a refill. Thirty pills, prescribed for use at the rate of three a day, would not be used up for 10 days. When Respondent pointed this out, DuBose indicated he had given some to his girlfriend. Dr. Helland responded that he didn't care what DuBose did with them, but that he should come for a refill only every 10 days. However, Respondent stated that since he had obviously not explained that fully on the prior visit, he would write another prescription for 30 Valium tablets which he did after giving DuBose a cursory examination. When DuBose asked if an exam would be necessary each visit, Respondent stated that it would. Respondent seemed concerned that DuBose not suffer any side effects from the Valium and counselled him to stop taking them. Nonetheless, he wrote out the prescription which he gave to DuBose upon payment of a $30.00 fee. Again, DuBose indicated no medical support for a prescription for Valium. DuBose went back to Respondent's office on October 27, 1987, this time in the company of Detective Sinclair, also under cover as Donald Simpson, a construction worker. Sinclair waited in the waiting room while DuBose saw Respondent who took his pulse and blood pressure and listened to his heart and lungs. When DuBose asked why they had to go through that each time, Respondent replied that he had to make sure DuBose was all right. After receiving his third prescription for 30 Valium tablets from the Respondent, DuBose asked him if he could see his friend. Respondent asked what was wrong with the friend and DuBose stated he didn't think anything was wrong. Respondent stated then that he'd have to have some reason to prescribe for Sinclair. DuBose then got Sinclair, introduced him to the doctor, and left them alone. Sinclair had a brief introductory conversation with the Respondent during which Respondent asked what he wanted. Sinclair indicated he wanted Percodan, a Schedule II drug, because it made him feel good. Respondent would not prescribe Percodan for Sinclair stating he needed something more to justify any prescription. Respondent asked if Sinclair were nervous or needed something to help him sleep, which Sinclair denied. Respondent then said he had to have some "damned" thing to justify a prescription. Sinclair continued to decline to say more than it made him feel better. Respondent ultimately indicated that Sinclair must be nervous and needed a tranquilizer and Sinclair finally agreed. Respondent then took some personal information from him, took his blood pressure, temperature, and pulse, and listened to his heart and lungs. He then wrote out a prescription for 30 Valium tablets, whereupon Sinclair paid him $30.00 and left. At no time did Respondent take any medical tests or ask if Sinclair was under the care of another physician. When DuBose again went to Respondent's office, on November 19, 1987, he had Detective Stanbro with him posing as his girlfriend. As previously done, Respondent took his blood pressure and did a cursory examination during which DuBose said he felt good. Respondent wrote out a prescription for 30 Valium and DuBose asked if the doctor would prescribe Percodan as well. Respondent refused to do so. DuBose then asked Respondent to see his "girlfriend", introduced her, and left after paying for his own visit and prescription. At no time did DuBose ever indicate to the Respondent he had any ailment. In fact, he always said he felt good. When Respondent indicated he needed some medical justification to prescribe Valium, DuBose told him to put down that he was nervous and could not sleep. Respondent never tried to find a legitimate cause for that condition but instead merely conducted a cursory examination. He never asked if DuBose was under the care of another physician or if he was taking any medication. The first visit lasted about 15 minutes and the others were shorter. It is clear, therefore, that the "examinations" conducted by the Respondent of DuBose and Sinclair were no more than shadow exercises to justify writing a prescription and had no basis in actual medical diagnosis or treatment. When Ms. Stanbro saw the Respondent on November 19, 1987, he immediately saw there was nothing wrong with her and refused to give her a prescription for anything other than aspirin. He denied her request for Percodan and Valium even though he did no examination of any sort. Stanbro was with the doctor for only about a minute and a half. When he turned her down for both drugs, she left. At all times in his relationship with Ms. Stanbro, Respondent acted in a professional manner.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is, therefore: RECOMMENDED that Respondent's license as a naturopathic physician in Florida be revoked. RECOMMENDED this 8th day of August, 1988, at Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 8th day of August, 1988. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 88-1318 The following constitutes my specific rulings pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes, on all of the Proposed Findings of Fact submitted by the parties to this case. For the Petitioner: DPR 1 - 2. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 1. 3. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 6. 4 - 8. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 2-5. 9 -10. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 7. 11 - 19. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 8-9. For the Respondent: Dr. Helland 1 - 3. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 1. 4 - 5. Accepted. 6. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 6. 7. Accepted. 8 - 12. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 2-5. 13 - 16. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 7. 17 - 20. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 8-9. 21 - 23. Accepted and incorporated in Findings of Fact 10-11. 24. Accepted as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. 25 - 26. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Fact 9. Accepted as a restatement of testimony and not a Finding of Fact. Accepted and incorporated in Finding of Fact 12. Rejected as a comment in the evidence and not a Finding of Fact. COPIES FURNISHED: John R. Alexander, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 John M. Fitzgibbons, Esquire Suite 1550 600 North Florida Avenue Tampa, Florida 33602-4505 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director DPR, Board of Medicine 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue The issues in this case, as set forth in the Prehearing Stipulation, are as follows: Whether Respondent was terminated from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count I] Whether Respondent failed to update his practitioner profile within fifteen days of the filing of the order terminating him from the State Medicaid Program; [Case No. 14-2488, Count II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with T.J.[1/] for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with T.J.; [Case No. 14-1342, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with M.B. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with M.B.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with C.J. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with C.J.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with D.K. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with D.K.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with A.H. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with A.H.; [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II] and Whether Respondent exercised influence within the patient-physician relationship with S.D. for the purposes of engaging in sexual activity and/or whether Respondent engaged in sexual conduct with S.D. [Case No. 14-1343, Counts I & II]
Findings Of Fact Petitioner, Department of Health, Board of Medicine (the “Department”) is the State agency responsible for licensing and monitoring physicians in the State of Florida. The Department regulates the practice of medicine in accordance with section 20.43 and chapters 456 and 458, Florida Statutes. Unless specifically stated otherwise herein, all references to Florida Statutes will be to the 2014 codification. Respondent is a licensed Florida physician, certified in the area of pain management, holding license number ME 97134. At all times relevant hereto, Respondent was practicing medicine at one of two locations: the Back Authority for Contemporary Knowledge, (a pain management clinic known as the “Back Center” located in Melbourne, Florida); and Advantacare (in its Altamonte Springs and Daytona Beach offices). Respondent was employed at the Back Center from January 2008 through September 2011, and at Advantacare from March 2012 through April 2013. Respondent provided pain management services for numerous patients during his tenure at each of the clinics. While at the Back Center, he saw 50 to 60 patients per day in an 8-hour workday, doing about 15 medication injections per day. At Advantacare he was seeing about 30 patients per day. By all accounts, Respondent is a skilled and proficient pain management physician. At Advantacare, Respondent would see patients for regular office visits at the Altamonte Springs office on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday; Wednesday would be set aside for administering injections under a fluoroscope, described as sort of a C-shaped X-ray machine, performed at the Daytona Beach office. None of the sexual behavior alleged in the Administrative Complaints occurred during injections performed under fluoroscope. A general policy existed at the Back Center that required physicians to have another facility employee (medical technician, nurse, other) present in an examination room when a physician was providing care to a patient not of the same gender as the doctor. This “chaperone” policy is standard in the health care industry. There is no credible evidence that Respondent was ever shown the Back Center’s policy in writing, although it is probable the policy was accessible on the website of the entity (Osler Corporation) that owned the Back Center for a period of time. As a practicing physician, Respondent was also presumed to be aware of and to follow the chaperone policy and he admitted knowing about the policy in general. Respondent was, however, verbally apprised of the policy by his supervisor, Dr. Hynes, by the clinic operations manager, Mr. Pachkoski, and by the chief administrative officer, Cathy Bird. Respondent acknowledged that it was best to have another person in the examination room if he was providing treatment to a female patient. If no chaperone was available, it was his stated practice to keep the door open. Respondent did not feel like assistants were always available to chaperone, but neither his supervisor (Dr. Hynes) nor a co-physician (Dr. Zaidi) remembers Respondent complaining that staff was not available at the Back Center. The testimony of all six complainants in this case contradicts Respondent’s contention; each of them said they were treated by Respondent (alone) in a room with the door closed. When asked directly whether he ever treated female patients at the Back Center in a room with the door closed, Respondent admitted that it happened on occasion. The best and most persuasive evidence in this case is that a chaperone policy did exist and that Respondent did not follow the policy. Between September 2008 and January 2013, Respondent treated six female patients who are the subjects of the Department’s Administrative Complaint. Each of the patients is identified only by their initials in an attempt to maintain their confidentiality and privacy. The six patients will be addressed in chronological order based on the dates of their alleged mistreatment by Respondent. Patient S.D. Patient S.D. was a patient of Respondent between September and December 2008. S.D.’s status as a patient was stipulated to by the parties.2/ While she was Respondent’s patient, S.D. was also an employee of the Back Center. During the period of time Respondent was treating S.D., they engaged in a series of emails which could be construed as very sexual in nature. For example, on September 23, 2008, Respondent and S.D. had the following email exchange: S.D. – “You buying Dinner….Or am I your [f***ing] dinner????”Respondent – “What do you think? I want u as breakfast, lunch and dinner. My precious love.” S.D. – Ok so what am I going to eat LOL??? Let me guess a protein shake”Respondent – “If I shake it hard enough yes.” Then, on September 25, the two had this email exchange:Respondent – “NO I WANT U TO FEED ME!!! AND NO YOU R NOT GOING THERE!!! ABSOLUTELY NOT!!! I’M UR MAN AND I SAY NO.”S.D. – “Then act like it and stop flirting with the [f***ing] skank!”Respondent – “WHY? GETTING JEALOUS SWEETHEART?”S.D. - “No I guess I have no reason to be.” Respondent – “EXACTLY, YOU HAD ME AT LUNCH AND LEFT TO GO TO WORK. SO YOU CAN’T SAY ANYTHING, PRECIOUS.” Respondent denies that the exchange of emails with S.D. suggests anything of a sexual nature. He said, e.g., that in his Iranian culture, talking about eating someone was tantamount to saying you cared deeply for them. Respondent’s denial of the sexual nature of the emails is not persuasive. S.D. did not testify at final hearing nor was her testimony preserved by way of a deposition transcript. The Department offered into evidence an exhibit comprised of various emails between S.D. and Respondent, two of which were discussed above. At least one co-worker, Lizamar Korfhage (a physician’s assistant at the Back Center), heard S.D. yell loudly in the office--as S.D. was being terminated from employment--that she (S.D.) and Respondent were having sexual relations. Cathy Bird, former chief administrative officer at the Back Center, had discussed the alleged affair with S.D. during several conversations before S.D.'s employment with the Back Center ended. Bird also talked with Respondent about the situation after S.D. was fired from the Back Center. Respondent was concerned that S.D. would tell Respondent’s wife about the affair and sought Bird’s guidance in the matter. Based upon the entirety of the clear and convincing evidence presented, Respondent was involved in a sexual relationship with S.D. at some point in time when S.D. was also a patient of the Back Center. Patient T.J. Patient T.J. was a 37-year-old patient when she saw Respondent at the Back Center on October 29, 2010. T.J. had seen Respondent professionally some 16 or so times previously. No inappropriate conduct had occurred on any of those visits. On the October 29 visit, T.J. was escorted into an examination room by a nurse as usual. Respondent came in and, after examining her, suggested that trigger point injections might help alleviate her pain, which she described as being a “2” on a scale of 1 to 10.3/ She agreed to the plan of treatment. Respondent had T.J. sit on an armless stool and lean her arms and head onto a desk. Respondent stood on her left side and began administering injections into her neck. As he leaned against her body, T.J. felt what she described as Respondent’s erect penis rubbing on her upper arm or shoulder. She felt like Respondent was intentionally rubbing her in what she later concluded to be a sexual manner. When he finished the injections, Respondent did not act any differently than usual. T.J. felt like something “weird” had just happened, but decided not to report it because she was not completely sure about her perceptions. Respondent, in contradiction to T.J.’s testimony, said he generally stayed four to five inches away from his patient when administering the injections, but would sometimes come into contact with them. T.J. returned for a follow up visit on November 24, 2010, receiving another injection by Respondent. She reported no misconduct by Respondent on that date. On December 23, 2010, T.J. returned to the Back Center for additional treatment. This time, her pain was radiating all the way down to her buttocks area and was described as a “3” out of 10. She was again escorted to an examination room to wait for Respondent. Respondent came in and closed the door, as was his usual practice during T.J.’s visits. After examining her, Respondent suggested injections for sacroiliac joint pain. T.J. was told to lie on the examination table on her left side. Respondent had T.J. lower her jeans to just below her knees. She had her left leg out straight and her right leg bent at the knee and across her left leg. Respondent then began to press his fingers on different parts of her inner thigh searching for the source of her pain. The pain was centered between her knee and buttocks area, and Respondent made an injection in that area. Respondent then had T.J. roll over to her right side as he pulled the table slightly away from the wall and placed himself between the wall and the table. Respondent began pushing on her inner thigh again, starting at her knee and moving upward toward her buttocks. As he did that, his tone of voice changed and he began panting. He continued to touch and probe her thighs as his hands went higher until he ultimately touched her vagina. T.J. immediately said, “That’s it” and quickly got off the examination table and pulled up her jeans. Respondent appeared sweaty and red-faced, looking to T.J. like a person who had just engaged in sex. T.J. then began to consider whether Respondent’s behavior during the October 29, 2010, visit had indeed been sexual in nature as well. She concluded that it was, and decided not to see Respondent for treatment in the future. She did not, however, report either of the incidents to the Back Center immediately. She ultimately did so, telling physician's assistant Korfhage about the incident some 10 months later. After seeing a report on television in 2013 that Respondent had been accused by another patient of sexual misconduct, she decided to make a report to the police about her own experiences with Respondent. When the police did not prosecute, she contacted an attorney in order to file a civil action against Respondent. T.J. appeared to be honest and forthright during her appearance at final hearing. Her testimony about her version of the events was credible, clear, and convincing. In his testimony at final hearing, Respondent did not specifically refute T.J.’s testimony so much as he explained how his normal process would not allow for the kind of touching T.J. alleged to have occurred. Respondent did not specifically or directly deny touching patient T.J.’s vagina, saying only that there would be no reason to do so. Patient D.K. (also known as D.W.) D.K. was a regular patient of Respondent and the Back Center. She had an appointment on January 13, 2011, to see Respondent for pain she was experiencing in her lower back and sides. On previous visits to the Back Center, Respondent had done localized injections to help D.K. deal with the pain. On those visits, she had simply rolled her pants down below her waist and leaned against the examination table in order for Respondent to do the injections. On the January 13 visit, she was told to lie on the table and pull her jeans down to her knees while Respondent went to prepare the medications. Respondent returned, closing the door as he came into the room. Respondent began injecting medications into her back and both sides. He then moved lower and administered injections into her thighs although she had not complained about any pain in that area. Respondent then moved her jeans down to her ankles and began administering injections into her calves. While he was injecting her, she felt him rubbing his erect penis against her thighs and heard his breathing get heavier. She could also feel Respondent lean closer to her and felt his breath on her thighs as he injected her calves. After the injections were complete, D.K. said Respondent was sweating, flushed, and “looked like my husband after we’ve had intercourse.” D.K. left the office and returned to her car. She immediately began to mentally process what had occurred to her, but did not immediately tell anyone at the Back Center. She was shocked and upset by the event but waited a few days before telling her husband what had happened. She then reported the events to someone at the Back Center. The Back Center asked her to come in so she could discuss the situation with Dr. Hynes, medical director of the Back Center. Later, D.K. made a complaint to local law enforcement about the incident. D.K. has also contacted an attorney to look into filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. In response to the complaint by D.K., Dr. Hynes mandated that Respondent have a medical assistant with him during any contact with female patients. Despite the prohibition, Respondent continued to see female patients in an examination room without others present. He was confronted several times by the site operations manager about this violation, but Respondent did not change his behavior. D.K. was a credible witness. She provided a clear and unequivocal description of what transpired during her visit to the Back Center on January 13, 2011. Patient C.J. Patient C.J. presented to the Back Center experiencing pain as a result of shrapnel wounds received while she was serving in the U.S. Army in Afghanistan. C.J. did not testify at final hearing so her physical demeanor could not be assessed. Her deposition transcript was admitted into evidence over objection. In May 2011, C.J. was referred to the Back Center by her treating physician at Patrick Air Force Base. She took the referral, called the Back Center, and was assigned to Respondent for pain management services. C.J. went to the Back Center on May 4, 2011. She was experiencing significant pain and was physically uncomfortable. C.J. was processed in by a receptionist and then led to an examination room by a female employee. The employee took C.J.’s blood pressure, gathered some personal information, and left the room. On that date, C.J. was wearing jeans, a blouse, and open- toed shoes. She had on “full underwear” that day. Respondent came into the room and examined C.J. as she sat on the examining table. He advised C.J. that an injection might benefit her. As C.J. remembered it, the injection was to be in the side of her neck, and then in her back or hip. Respondent left the room to obtain the medications as C.J. waited. Upon his return to the room, Respondent injected Depo- Medrol 40 mg, Toradol 30 mg, Lidocaine 2% 0.5 mL, and Marcaine 0.5 mL into the left side of her neck. After the initial injection, Respondent left the room while the medication took effect. C.J. began to feel very relaxed and sleepy. Respondent recollects that C.J. complained of feeling light-headed, but does not believe any medication he injected would have caused that to happen. Respondent later returned to the room and prepared to give C.J. another injection into her hip area. She sat up on the table as Respondent pulled one end of the table slightly away from the wall.4/ After moving the table, Respondent had C.J. lie down on her side, lift her blouse, and unbuckle her jeans. She then slid her jeans and underwear down past her hips as directed. At that point, Respondent began injecting a solution into C.J.’s hip. As the injection was proceeding, she felt Respondent slide his hand over her hip and “in my groin area.” While doing that, Respondent’s crotch was pressed against C.J.’s buttocks. C.J. felt what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her buttocks as he administered the injection. After the injection was completed, Respondent came around from behind the table and told C.J. she would need to come see him again in a few weeks. C.J. got up from the table and began to realize that “something was not right” about the treatment she had just received. When C.J. went to the front desk to check out, she asked a nurse to identify the medications which had been injected but was unable to get that information. C.J. then left the Back Center and immediately called her nurse case manager at Patrick Air Force Base to report what had occurred. Her nurse advised C.J. to call 911 to report the incident; C.J. did so as she walked out to her car in the parking lot. A policeman arrived some 20 minutes later and took her statement. The officer then went inside to talk to Respondent. He said Respondent appeared to be surprised and shocked by C.J.’s allegation. The police decided not to file any charges against Respondent based on C.J.’s complaint. The reporting police officer (Middendorf) seemed to question C.J.’s veracity or truthfulness on the day of the incident. He said C.J. was upset and seemed lethargic, except when she was talking on the telephone to “one of her superiors.” According to Middendorf, C.J. acted consistent with someone who may be under the influence of drugs. He did acknowledge that C.J. had just come out of a pain management clinic. Middendorf also felt C.J. was either confused or not telling the truth concerning where Respondent had allegedly touched her. C.J., who was obviously distraught at the time, indicated both her pubic area and her outer thigh when she told Middendorf that Respondent had touched her “groin.” Middendorf challenged her about that and C.J. became defensive and argumentative. He did not provide any credible testimony as to why he believed she might be lying to him. His statement that C.J.’s voice changed when she was talking to her office on the phone is not conclusive evidence that she was not telling him the truth. C.J. never returned to the Back Center. She obtained pain management treatment elsewhere. Inasmuch as C.J.’s demeanor could not be judged because she did not appear in person, her testimony must be considered using other factors. In this case, the testimony was very similar to the facts described by other patients of Respondent concerning their treatment by him. The events as described by C.J. were believable and convincing, especially when compared to the allegations by other alleged victims. Neither C.J. nor any of the other alleged victims/complainants has talked to other alleged victims about their experiences, so there does not appear to be any collusion between the victims. Patient M.B. Patient M.B. was already a regular patient at the Back Center when she first saw Respondent on July 7, 2011. Respondent’s notes in M.B.’s chart indicate the patient was presenting for “initial evaluation” that day, but that was not correct; she had already been seen several times by other physicians at the Back Center. M.B. had chronic lumbalgia (low back pain) and lower extremity dysesthesia (a burning sensation) which was increasing progressively. Respondent examined M.B., discussed his findings, and scheduled a follow-up appointment for August 2, 2011, at which time he gave her an injection of 1% Xylocaine with approximately 30 ml of Lidocaine 1% on both of her side hips. He also injected a block with a solution containing 2 ml of Marcaine 0.5%, 2 ml of Lidocaine 2%, and 2 ml of Depo- Medrol 80 mg into M.B.’s joints. M.B. reported no suspicious or untoward behavior by Respondent during the July 7 and August 2 appointments. On August 29, 2011, M.B. returned to see Respondent. She presented with pain in her hips and left side. Nurse Bobbi McDonald escorted M.B. to the examination room and took her vital signs before leaving. Respondent came into the room, alone, and closed the door. At that visit, M.B. was wearing khaki mid-thigh cargo shorts, a blouse that tied around her neck, and bikini underwear. Respondent asked about her pain, touched points on her body to identify the exact pain locations, and adjusted her back manually. He then suggested injection of a steroid as a stop-gap measure prior to scheduling her for a fluoroscope injection later. M.B. agreed to the plan. Respondent left the examination room to get the medication. When he returned, he was alone and again he closed the door. Respondent told M.B. to pull her shorts down below her waist and to cover herself with a paper gown. She pulled her shorts and underwear down about halfway across her buttocks, which was lower than she would normally pull them for fluoroscope injections. Respondent began to clean the area for the injection and asked M.B. to pull her garments down further, below her buttocks. Respondent then pulled the table out from the wall and he went between the table and the wall. He injected M.B.’s hip about five times with a solution containing Depo Medrol 80, Toradol 60, Lidocaine, and Marcaine 1 ml. As he injected her, M.B. could feel Respondent’s groin touching her hip. She could feel what she believed to be Respondent’s erect penis rubbing against her in a back and forth motion. By this time, her paper gown had fallen off, exposing her buttocks and vaginal area. After the last injection, M.B. felt Respondent’s fingers touching her vagina. As she pushed upward to get off the table, M.B. felt Respondent touch her vagina again. She got off the table, pulled up her pants, and sat down as the doctor began talking to her. M.B. did not say anything to Respondent. She immediately believed that she had been sexually assaulted, but was too confused and shocked to say anything to anyone. M.B. did not initially report Respondent’s behavior to the Back Center. She later reported her allegations to the Melbourne Police Department and also filed a civil lawsuit against Respondent and the Back Center. (M.B. would continue to return to the Back Center, but did not see Respondent again for any of her treatments.) M.B.’s testimony was not as immediately believable as that of some of the other witnesses. Based on her personality, fear of the process, or some other factor, she seemed to be fairly emotionless in describing the incident. However, inasmuch as her testimony was corroborated by what other patients had experienced, her clearly enunciated statements are convincing. Further, M.B. exhibited extreme visual cues as to her intense dislike for Respondent at the final hearing. The testimony of M.B. alone would not be clear and convincing evidence of any wrongdoing by Respondent. However, her testimony is corroboration of and support for the testimony of other victims. Respondent's employment at the Back Center was terminated shortly after M.B.'s appointment with him. There is no evidence as to Respondent's employment from September 2011 until he went to Advantacare in March 2012. Patient A.H. Patient A.H. presented to Advantacare (Daytona Beach office) on January 9, 2013, in an effort to address pain she was suffering as a result of an automobile accident that occurred in October 2012. She wanted to reduce her pain while also reducing the amount of medications she was taking. A.H. had a job which required driving, so she needed to be as drug-free as possible. A.H. was escorted to the examination room. She remembers that Respondent came in, closed the door, and propped it shut. Respondent remembers the door to that room being open, that it would open by itself unless something was placed against it. The medical technician assigned to Respondent said the door did not have any problems, but it would always be half open. There is no corroborated evidence as to whether the door to the room was open, closed, or ajar when A.H. was being examined. Respondent examined A.H. and began to show her some exercises and stretches that he thought might alleviate some of her pain. As she was sitting in a chair being shown how to stretch, A.H. felt Respondent’s erect penis pushing against her back. She quickly told Respondent “I’ve got it” in order to stop his actions. She got up quickly and moved to another chair in the office. A.H. clearly described what she had felt and had no confusion or doubt about what happened. Her testimony about the incident was credible. Respondent then told A.H. to lie on the table on her side with her arms stretched out in front of her. Despite what had just happened, A.H. complied with his directions.5/ When she got into position, Respondent had A.H. move her body over to the very edge of the table and began to manipulate her back. As his hands continued down her back, she felt his hands go down inside her panties. As this happened, she could feel Respondent “humping” her, grinding his groin area against her backside. Respondent then told A.H. to change positions on the table, moving her feet to the opposite end. Amazingly, she again complied with his instructions. Respondent began touching her upper thigh near her vagina and “did the same thing he had done before.” At that, A.H. quickly moved off the table and onto a chair, where she sat rigid and refused to move. Respondent seemed calm and relaxed, showing no sign of having acted inappropriately. A.H. did not tell anyone at Advantacare about the incident on that day because she could not fully grasp what had happened. As she began to understand the situation better, she was worried about reporting the incident because it would be her word against the doctor’s. A.H. did tell another doctor (Dr. Jacobson) about the incident when she saw him the next day for a regularly scheduled appointment. Dr. Jacobson had been an employee with Advantacare and presumably relayed A.H.’s allegations to the center. A.H. also reported the incident to the Board of Health and to law enforcement. She later contacted an attorney about filing a civil lawsuit against Respondent. A.H. did not return to Advantacare for treatment after this event because of the traumatic impact of the incident. Respondent has no independent recollection of A.H. as a patient, but said he did not touch her inappropriately. A.H.’s testimony was believable. She was a credible witness and articulated her testimony clearly. It is strange that A.H. would continue to obey Respondent even after he had touched her inappropriately, but she was obviously a compliant person, especially as it relates to physicians. Respondent’s defenses to allegations by patients Respondent claims he never saw a written chaperone policy at the Back Center but that he knew that it existed. According to him, there was insufficient staff available to make it possible to comply with the policy. Respondent’s testimony in this regard is rejected as being contrary to better, more persuasive evidence. Respondent said he was on several medications for “five or six years” prior to the final hearing, including Zoloft for mild depression, Lisinopril for hypertension, and Toprol for hypertension. One of the possible side effects of those medications is impotence or erectile dysfunction. However, during the time he was taking these drugs, Respondent fathered his two children. There is no competent evidence that Respondent suffered from impotence or erectile dysfunction during the time of any of the allegations about sexual misconduct. Respondent usually wore a lab coat when treating patients. The coat is long and had large pockets in the front, at about groin level. Respondent would keep empty syringes in his coat pocket. He suggests that female patients who said they felt his erect penis were actually feeling the syringes. His suggestion is not very plausible or persuasive. Respondent demonstrated at final hearing the normal physical stance he took when doing an injection of a patient in an examination room setting. He suggested that his body would be turned at a 45-degree angle from the patient rather than facing them directly, thus eliminating the possibility of full frontal contact with the patient. He also said that he generally stood four or five inches away from the patient, but might come into contact with the patient occasionally. Neither the statements nor his demonstration were persuasive. Respondent’s contention is that each and every one of the patients who alleged sexual misconduct was lying. He suggests that patient D.K. was overweight and thus would not have sexually aroused him. Also, he maintains that her description of the injections being performed while Respondent was rubbing against her would have necessarily resulted in horrible pain at best or a broken needle at worst. He claims that since patient M.B. was married to a policeman, she would have necessarily taken photographs of her numerous injections to preserve a record and she would have complained immediately. Her failure to do so, he suggests, impugns her testimony. Respondent contends that patient T.J.’s tardiness in reporting her allegations suggests the allegations were false. Respondent refutes A.H.’s allegations on the basis that there was a disagreement as to the physical layout of the medical office. Respondent contends there is no evidence that patient S.D. (his alleged lover) was his patient, even though there is a stipulation to that effect. Despite these speculative defenses, the evidence presented by the alleged victims is credible and accepted as fact. Failure to update practitioner profile A letter dated March 27, 2013, advising Respondent of his termination from participation in the Medicaid Program, was mailed to Respondent at two separate addresses: 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard, Suite 610, Melbourne, Florida 32901, i.e., the address of the Back Center, and 930 South Harbor City Boulevard, Melbourne, Florida 32901, the address for Osler (the company with whom the Back Center merged at some point in time). The letter to 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard was received on April 1, 2013, and an acknowledgement was signed by Chandra Carrender, a Back Center employee. Respondent’s employment with the Back Center had been terminated some 16 months previously, i.e., in August 2011. The letter mailed to 930 Harbor City Boulevard was returned as undeliverable. The termination letter provided Respondent notice of his right to contest the decision. He was given 21 days from receipt of the letter to file a Petition if he wanted to challenge the termination. Respondent did not file a challenge, so on or about June 21, 2013, a Termination Final Order was filed by the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA), setting forth Respondent’s termination from participation in the Florida Medicaid Program. The termination was issued pursuant to section 409.913, Florida Statutes. By law, Respondent was required to update his Florida practitioner profile within 15 days of receipt of the Termination Final Order. The Termination Final Order was mailed to Respondent, return receipt requested, at two different addresses: The 930 South Harbor City Boulevard address and the 2222 South Harbor City Boulevard address. Respondent denies having received the letter or TFO until just prior to the formal administrative hearing in this matter. Licensed physicians in the State of Florida are required to maintain a current address of record with the Agency for Health Care Administration (AHCA) and the Department of Health. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided evidence as to what Respondent’s official address of record was at the time the TFO and the letter were sent to Respondent at the two Harbor City Boulevard addresses. According to the deposition testimony of Michael West of the AHCA Medicaid Program Integrity office, the notices were sent to Respondent’s “address of record” per section 409.913(6), Florida Statutes. West’s testimony, however, did not specify what address that was. It might be logically presumed that one or both of the Harbor City Boulevard addresses were the “address of record,” because that is where the notices were mailed. However, there is no clear and convincing evidence as to Respondent’s official address of record at the time the Termination Final Order was mailed. The statutory section referred to by West states: Any notice required to be given to a provider under this section is presumed to be sufficient notice if sent to the address last shown on the provider enrollment file. It is the responsibility of the provider to furnish and keep the agency informed of the provider’s current address. United States Postal Service proof of mailing or certified or registered mailing of such notice to the provider at the address shown on the provider enrollment file constitutes sufficient proof of notice. Any notice required to be given to the agency by this section must be sent to the agency at an address designated by rule. Respondent did not update his Florida practitioner profile because he claims never to have received a copy of the TFO or the letter. Neither Respondent nor the Department provided direct evidence of Respondent’s “address last shown on the provider enrollment file” as of March 27, 2013.6/ Other factual considerations Respondent was terminated from employment at the Back Center in September 2011. The termination occurred as follows: T.J. reported the alleged October 29, 2010 incident in April 2011. Dr. Hynes was already aware of another incident (from D.K. in January 2011). Dr. Hynes met with Respondent to discuss his alleged behavior. Respondent denied the allegations, saying that people just seem to like him and take advantage of him. He said the patients were lying about the incidents. Dr. Hynes mandated at that time that Respondent have a chaperone in the examining room with every female patient. Rather than being allowed to exercise “medical judgment” like other doctors in the clinic, Respondent was ordered to always use a chaperone with all female patients. After patient C.J.’s allegations came to light in May 2011, Dr. Hynes told Respondent that three times was enough; something had to be done. The Back Center commenced preparation of a termination letter. The letter was to tell Respondent that, pursuant to his Employment Agreement, the Back Center was providing him the 180-day notice of termination of employment “without cause.” The purpose of that letter was to allow Respondent time to find a job and not have a blemish on his record. One of the bases for the termination letter was that Respondent had been referred to the Physicians Recovery Network (PRN) for counseling to address his behavior. Dr. Hynes presumed Respondent was obtaining that counseling. However, when C.J. reported the incident on May 4, 2011, Dr. Hynes found out that Respondent had not been going to PRN as he had previously indicated. At about the time the 180-day letter was being drafted, another incident (by patient M.B.) was reported to the Back Center. Upon hearing of that allegation, Dr. Hynes verbally fired Respondent, effective immediately, with cause. The 180-day letter was not actually delivered to Respondent until after the verbal termination, so the letter was moot when it arrived. Respondent did not tell his next employer, Advantacare, that he had been terminated from employment by the Back Center. He also did not advise Advantacare about the sexual allegations made by patients at the Back Center. In summary, Respondent engaged in activities of a sexual nature with patients at the Back Center in December 2010, January 2011, May 2011, and August 2011 (in addition to his relations with S.D. in 2008–2010). He engaged in sexually related touching of a patient at Advantacare in January 2013. His employment with the Back Center was terminated in September 2011; his employment with Advantacare was terminated in April 2013. Former patients of Respondent expressed dismay that he was being charged with the violations set forth in the Administrative Complaint. They found Respondent to be a caring and professional doctor. It is clear Respondent did not treat all his patients the same way he treated the victims identified herein. Some of his co-workers said they did not see Respondent engage in any of the alleged actions. They did not receive any complaints from other patients. Respondent obviously has a stellar reputation with some of his patients and co-workers. That status, however, does not excuse his behavior with the victims in the present cases. It is also alleged that Bobbi McDonald was a rumor-mongerer and a liar. She appeared credible at final hearing and there is no competent, substantial evidence to support the dispersions cast by others. It should be noted that several witnesses identified by Respondent were displeased with the manner in which they were questioned by Department personnel prior to the final hearing. The witnesses expressed extreme discomfort when Department employees (attorneys) suggested that Respondent was “an addict” or a sociopath. While a state agency is bound to pursue all claims against individuals which it is responsible for licensing and monitoring, it is improper to harangue or disparage such persons in order to sway potential witnesses’ testimony. Upon full review of the evidence in this case, the potential witnesses who complained about the Department’s aggressive nature did not provide substantive testimony on the issues of this case. Thus, any harm which may have resulted from the Department’s statements would not affect the final decision herein.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered by the Department of Health revoking Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D.’s license to practice medicine in the State of Florida. It is further RECOMMENDED that the final order assess the cost of investigating and prosecuting this case, and that payment of such costs be assessed against Respondent, Albert Esmailzadeh, M.D. DONE AND ENTERED this 19th day of November, 2014, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S R. BRUCE MCKIBBEN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 2014.
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts 2/ The Respondent is a licensed physician in the State of Florida and has been licensed in Florida at all times material herein. The Respondent is Board Certified in family practice. The patient B. M., a female born on May 18, 1934, with a history of hypertension, diabetes, and obesity, presented to the Respondent on multiple occasions between August of 1979 and November of 1990. On September 29, 1979, when she was forty-five years old, patient B. M. notified the Respondent that her periods were spreading out and that she was getting hot flashes. On February 18, 1982, patient B. M. indicated that she was having irregular periods every couple of months. The Respondent's medical records indicate that he did not see or treat the patient B. M. between October 1, 1984, and July 3, 1987. On July 3, 1987, patient B. M. presented to the Respondent with complaints of excessive vaginal bleeding for the past three (3) months. The patient indicated the bleeding had stopped approximately three weeks earlier. The Respondent diagnosed patient B. M. with vaginitis, and prescribed her medication for vaginitis, based on the patient's complaints of vaginal discharge. Respondent did not perform a pelvic examination on that day to make that diagnosis. Patient B. M. returned the following week for a pelvic examination. The Respondent did not document the medical history of the patient B. M. during the preceding three years, although she had a history of high blood pressure and diabetes, both conditions that require periodic monitoring and prescription medication. The Respondent also did not document any pertinent information relating to the patient's gynecological history, including, but not limited to, the dates of the patient's last period, how often her periods were occurring, and how much she was bleeding, despite her complaints of excessive bleeding. On August 7, 1987, after several other visits, the patient B. M. returned for an examination. A pelvic examination revealed a vaginal laceration that was bleeding. On January 18, 1988, patient B. M. presented to the Respondent with complaints of irregular bleeding for the prior month. The Respondent suggested a dilation and curettage (scraping of the uterine walls) if patient B. M.'s bleeding continued. On December 21, 1989, patient B. M. presented to the Respondent with complaints of excessive vaginal bleeding with clots since the previous night. The Respondent indicated that the patient had her regular period the previous week, and was using condoms. The Respondent performed a pelvic examination which revealed blood clots, and diagnosed patient B. M. with dysfunctional uterine bleeding and administered progesterone to patient B. M. The Respondent did not document any additional information concerning the patient's menstrual activity, such as how often she had periods, what was meant by uncontrollable vaginal bleeding, where the bleeding was coming from, or why she was using condoms. The patient B. M. continued to complain of occasional bleeding after December 21, 1989, and on January 15, 1990, the Respondent referred the patient B. M. to a gynecologist. On February 5, 1990, the patient B. M. presented to a gynecologist, who took cervical biopsies and subsequently performed a dilation and curettage on the patient B. M. on or about February 23, 1990. The patient was subsequently initially diagnosed with grade two endometrial cancer, and after biopsy was diagnosed with grade three endometrial cancer and was referred to another gynecologist at the University of Miami. 3/ On April 5, 1990, the patient B. M. underwent a total hysterectomy. The patient B. M. was then diagnosed with Stage III-C endometrial carcinoma and underwent intravenous Adriamycin chemotherapy. On December 25, 1990, the patient B. M. expired. Facts based on evidence at hearing At all times material to this case, the subject patient 4/ weighed approximately three hundred pounds. Periods spreading out and hot flashes are signs that a woman may be beginning menopause. The average length of time between the beginning of menopausal symptoms and a cessation of menstruation is six months to one year. Endometrial cancer is cancer of the uterus. It is the most common gynecological cancer in women. Endometrial cancer occurs most often in women who are post-menopausal. About 20 to 25 percent of women are diagnosed with endometrial cancer before menopause. Most patients are diagnosed with endometrial cancer after the age of 50. When diagnosed early, patients with endometrial cancer have a very high survival rate. When diagnosed late, patients with endometrial cancer have a very low survival rate. The subject patient had several of the risk factors associated with endometrial cancer. The first symptom in most cases of endometrial cancer is abnormal bleeding. Any woman with post-menopausal abnormal bleeding should be checked for endometrial cancer. The subject patient was hospitalized in 1982. During that hospitalization she was evaluated by a gynecologist who determined that there was no evidence of abnormal or irregular gynecological problems at that time. After February 18, 1982, through October 1, 1984, there are no references in the Respondent's medical records to the subject patient's menstrual history, and no indication as to whether the patient had regular or irregular menstrual periods during that period of time. The subject patient was not seen by the Respondent on any occasion between October 1, 1984, and July 3, 1987. 5/ The subject patient returned to the Respondent's office on July 3, 1987. On the occasion of that visit she gave a history to the Respondent's office staff which is recorded in the Respondent's medical records as "excessive bleeding vaginal for 3 mos. Stopped 6/13." The Respondent's records for July 3, 1987, do not contain any additional details regarding the nature of the excessive bleeding. The Respondent's medical records for the July 3, 1987, office visit also indicate that at that time the patient had a vaginal infection with a discharge. This information was obtained from the patient. On that day the Respondent did not examine the patient to confirm the condition described by the patient. The Respondent diagnosed the patient as having vaginitis and prescribed Sultrin cream and Betadine douche for the vaginitis. The medical records for the July 3, 1987, office visit note that the patient had high blood pressure. Although the records, standing alone, do not clearly show that any treatment was undertaken on that day for the patient's high blood pressure, during the course of the July 3, 1987, visit, the Respondent prescribed medication for the patient's high blood pressure, as well as syringes for her diabetes. Those prescriptions were recorded in the patient's chart on the front cover. Because the subject patient had returned for a single office visit on July 3, 1987, after an absence of almost three years, the Respondent determined at that time that he needed to do a full physical examination on her, as well as a pelvic exam. Although the Respondent did not perform either examination at the July 3, 1987, office visit, he made plans to do both shortly thereafter. The subject patient returned ten days later, on July 13, 1987, at which time the Respondent performed a complete physical examination of the patient. No pelvic examination was performed that day, because the Respondent was having her period. The Respondent asked the patient to return one week later for a pelvic examination. The subject patient returned on July 20, 1987, at which time a pelvic examination was performed. On that day there was no evidence of any irregular or unusual bleeding. The patient did have a vaginal infection that day. The vaginal infection was treated appropriately by the Respondent. In view of the vaginal infection, the patient was advised to return to the office one week later, at which time she would be examined again. The subject patient returned to the Respondent's office on August 7, 1987, for a follow-up pelvic examination, at which time the Respondent identified a small superficial laceration in the patient's vagina. The laceration was causing some slight bleeding. The Respondent noted that there was no bleeding from the cervical os, which indicated that the small laceration was the sole source of the patient's bleeding that day. As an additional follow-up, the Respondent ordered a sonogram. The sonogram was ordered in part because, due to the patient's obesity, the Respondent was unable to palpate her internal organs. The Respondent did not document any details concerning the vaginal laceration, such as the size of the laceration, the amount the laceration was bleeding, or the precise location of the laceration, because it was a very small laceration with very slight bleeding which was of very little medical significance. The Respondent did not refer the patient to a gynecologist after learning the results of the sonogram he ordered on August 7, 1987. The Respondent concluded that the 1987 sonogram results were not significantly different from the 1982 sonogram results. Such conclusion was reasonable under the circumstances. Accordingly, the 1987 sonogram results did not suggest any need for further investigation. The subject patient returned to the Respondent's office on August 24, 1987, at which time she had no complaints of any type of vaginal bleeding. She was being seen in order to follow up on her other complaints, notably her diabetes and her high blood pressure. The Respondent assumed that the vaginal laceration had healed and did not conduct a pelvic examination of the patient during that visit. After August 24, 1987, and before January 18, 1988, the Respondent saw and treated the subject patient once a month on four more occasions. The medical records for those four office visits do not mention the patient's menstrual history or whether she was bleeding on any of those occasions. During the four monthly visits between August of 1987 and January of 1988, the subject patient did not complain of any episodes of irregular vaginal bleeding. On January 18, 1988, the subject patient returned to the Respondent's office with complaints of irregular vaginal bleeding since having been the victim of a mugging during the previous month. The Respondent did not record any detailed information about the bleeding, such as her current menstrual condition, how much she was bleeding, or how often she was bleeding. The Respondent concluded that the bleeding was probably due to the patient's anxiety about the recent mugging incident. Nevertheless, he wanted to follow up on the irregular bleeding if it did not resolve on its own. To that end he discussed the matter with the patient and told her that if the irregular bleeding did not get better, she should come back and he would do a D & C. The Respondent noted in his record for that visit: "May need D & C if bleeding continues." In view of the patient's intelligence, the Respondent fully (and reasonably) expected she would tell him if she had any further irregular bleeding. The procedure known as D & C, or dilation and curretage, is a procedure wherein a physician obtains a sample of the lining of the uterus to evaluate it for possible abnormalities. The D & C procedure is commonly used to diagnose, or to rule out, endometrial cancer. Following the office visit on January 18, 1988, the subject patient presented to the Respondent's office on three other visits during each of which she did not have any complaints of irregular bleeding. The subject patient did not have any further gynecological complaints until December 21, 1989. On that day she returned to the Respondent's office with complaints of uncontrollable vaginal bleeding since 7:30 p. m. of the previous evening. During the course of the December 21, 1989, office visit, the subject patient told the Respondent that she had had her last regular menstrual period the week before. She also told him she was using condoms. During the course of the December 21, 1989, office visit the Respondent performed a pelvic examination of the patient and made a provisional or working diagnosis of dysfunctional uterine bleeding. He administered an injection of progesterone and instructed the patient to return in three days. He also instructed the patient to have another pelvic sonogram performed. Dysfunctional uterine bleeding is abnormal uterine bleeding not related to or caused by an organic problem such as cancer, polyps, fibroids, or infections. It is usually caused by an hormonal imbalance. In the case of a woman who is not post- menopausal and who presents with complaints of irregular vaginal bleeding, one of the differential diagnoses can be dysfunctional uterine bleeding. In such a case it is appropriate to administer progesterone prior to embarking on additional studies. In such a case the administration of progesterone is useful for two reasons: (1) if the progesterone is successful in stopping the irregular bleeding its success tends to confirm the differential diagnosis of dysfunctional uterine bleeding, and (2) if the progesterone is unsuccessful in stopping the irregular bleeding it tends to rule out the diagnosis of dysfunctional uterine bleeding and confirm the need for further investigation. Under the circumstances that existed on December 21, 1989, it was reasonable and appropriate for the Respondent to administer progesterone on the basis of a provisional or working diagnosis of dysfunctional uterine bleeding, because if the treatment was successful it would tend to confirm the provisional or working diagnosis and it the treatment was not successful it would rule out the provisional or working diagnosis. 6/ The fact that dysfunctional uterine bleeding was only a provisional or working diagnosis is illustrated by the fact that the Respondent at the same time ordered a sonogram in order to investigate other possible causes of the abnormal bleeding. A verbal report of the results of the sonogram ordered on December 21, 1989, was given to the Respondent's office by telephone on December 26, 1989. 7/ A written report of the results was provided shortly thereafter. The report of the sonogram ordered on December 21, 1989, indicated that the subject patient had an enlarged uterus measuring 18.8 x 9.3 x 10.8 centimeters. The 1989 sonogram report revealed that the patient's uterus was substantially larger than it had been at the time of the 1987 sonogram. The report of the December 21, 1989, sonogram included a recommendation for follow up examination of the uterus and the endometrial canal. The subject patient returned to the Respondent's office on December 26, 1989, at which time she told the Respondent that the bleeding had stopped. He asked her to return again in two weeks. When she returned twenty days later on January 15, 1990, she had started to again have occasional episodes of bleeding and spotting. The Respondent thereupon referred the patient for a gynecological consult. The subject patient was seen by a gynecologist, Dr. William Shure, on February 5, 1990. The patient provided Dr. Shure with a history that her last menstrual period had been on December 19, 1989. This last menstrual period history is the same history that was recorded by the Respondent on December 21, 1989. On February 5, 1990, Dr. Shure took cervical biopsies from the subject patient, and subsequently performed a D & C on the patient on February 23, 1990. The patient was then diagnosed with Stage II-B endometrial cancer. Following a total hysterectomy on April 5, 1990, the patient was diagnosed with Stage III-C endometrial cancer. Stage II-B endometrial cancer is cancer of the uterus with extension into the cervix. Stage III-C endometrial cancer is an advanced stage of cancer of the uterus which extends into the cervix and has metastasis to pelvic lymph nodes. The patient underwent chemotherapy for the cancer. The chemotherapy was unsuccessful and the patient expired on December 25, 1990. At all times material to this case the Respondent used a record- keeping methodology in his medical practice known as the SOAP method. This is an appropriate methodology for record- keeping in a medical practice. The Respondent's records regarding the subject patient demonstrate that he kept a running list of all medications prescribed for the patient. The Respondent's records regarding his care and treatment of the subject patient were sufficient to justify his course of treatment of the patient. 8/ The care, skill, and treatment applied by the Respondent in the treatment of the subject patient from July of 1987 through January of 1990 (the only time period at issue here) was reasonable under the circumstances and did not depart from the level of care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as being acceptable under similar conditions and circumstances. The Respondent's treatment of the subject patient did not constitute gross or repeated malpractice. 9/ The Respondent has not been the subject of any prior disciplinary proceedings.
Recommendation On the basis of all of the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Board of Medicine enter a Final Order in this case dismissing all charges in all three counts of the Amended Administrative Complaint. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May 1996 at Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. MICHAEL M. PARRISH, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May 1996.
The Issue At issue is whether Samuel Hess, a minor, qualifies for coverage under the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan (Plan).
Findings Of Fact Stipulated facts Jeffrey Hess and Jeanmarie Hess are the natural parents of Samuel Hess, a minor. Samuel was born a live infant on January 7, 2002, at St. Vincent's Medical Center, a licensed hospital in Jacksonville, Florida, and his birth weight exceeded 2,500 grams. The physician providing obstetrical services at Samuel's birth was Karen D. Bonar, M.D., who, at all times material hereto, was a "participating physician" in the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, as defined by Section 766.302(7), Florida Statutes. Coverage under the Plan Pertinent to this case, coverage is afforded by the Plan for infants who suffer a "birth-related neurological injury," defined as an "injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant permanently and substantially mentally and physically impaired." § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. See also §§ 766.309 and 766.31, Fla. Stat. Here, Petitioners are of the view that Samuel suffered such an injury. More particularly, Petitioners believe Samuel's neurologic impairments are the result of a brain injury caused by hydrocephalus, secondary to an intraventricular hemorrhage (diagnosed at six days of life), that was precipitated by oxygen deprivation (a hypoxic ischemic insult), and which occurred during labor and delivery. In contrast, NICA is of the view that Samuel's impairments are most likely developmentally based, as opposed to birth related, and that, whatever the etiology of Samuel's impairments, he is not permanently and substantially physically impaired. Samuel's birth and immediate newborn course At or about 12:55 p.m., January 7, 2002, Mrs. Hess, with an estimated delivery date of January 21, 2002, and the fetus at 38 weeks' gestation, was admitted to St. Vincent's Medical Center, following spontaneous rupture of the membranes, with clear fluid noted, at 9:00 a.m. On admission, mild, irregular contractions were noted; vaginal examination revealed the cervix at 2 to 3 centimeters dilation, 60 percent effacement, and the fetus at -1 station; and fetal monitoring was reassuring for fetal well-being, with a baseline of 120 to 130 beats per minute. Given rupture of the membranes, Mrs. Hess was committed to deliver, and she was admitted for pitocin augmentation. Following admission, an IV was started at 1:48 p.m.; an epidural was placed at 3:56 p.m.; pitocin drip was started at 4:05 p.m.; Mrs. Hess was noted as pushing at 9:24 p.m.; and Samuel was delivered spontaneously at 10:24 p.m., with "Nu[cal]/Hand" (the umbilical cord wrapped around the hand) noted. In the interim, staring at or about 8:00 p.m., monitoring revealed, over time, late decelerations; marked decelerations with slow return to baseline; and evidence of a hypertonic uterus (starting at 9:24 p.m., and persisting, following periods of relaxation, until 10:22 p.m.), with exaggerated fetal heart rate variability. Such a pattern is consistent with fetal stress, and raises concerns regarding fetal reserves and adequate oxygenation. However, at delivery, Samuel was not depressed; did not require resuscitation; was accorded normal Apgar scores of 8 and 9, at one and five minutes, respectively, reflective of a healthy newborn2; and no abnormalities were observed at birth, except pronounced molding.3 Following delivery, Samuel was transferred to the nursery, and ultimately discharged with his mother on January 10, 2002. In the interim, Samuel's newborn course was normal, except for evidence of mild jaundice (diagnosed the morning of January 9, 2002), which did not require light therapy. However, on discharge, instructions were given to follow-up the next day at the Seton Center for a repeat bilirubin check. As instructed, Mrs. Hess presented with Samuel at the Seton Center on January 11, 2002, for a repeat bilirubin check. At the time, Samuel was noted to be active, alert, and in no apparent distress; his temperature was recorded as normal (as it had been following delivery, and during his admission in the nursery at St. Vincent's Medical Center); his newborn examination, apart from evidence of jaundice, was within normal limits; and Mrs. Hess reported that Samuel had fed well.4 The results of the bilirubin test were obtained at or about 1:30 p.m., that afternoon, and called to a staff physician (Dr. Vaughn), who gave instructions to initiate phototherapy. Accordingly, later that afternoon, Samuel was put under the bilirubin lights at home, with instructions to monitor his temperature every two hours. On January 12, 2002, Samuel recorded a temperature of 100.6, and on the instructions of Dr. Vaughn, Samuel was taken to the emergency room at Wolfson Children's Hospital for evaluation.5 There, Samuel was received at 6:35 p.m., and triaged at 6:42 p.m. Chief complaint was jaundice, and temperature was noted as 100.7, otherwise no abnormalities were observed. Samuel's physical examination and immediate hospital course were documented, as follows: PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: His temperature is 100.7 in the ER. The rest of his vitals are normal. His weight is 2.7 kg. He is resting, easily aroused. Anterior fontanelle is soft and flat, with normal sutures. Has good red reflexes bilaterally. Ear canals are patent. Nose without congestion. Oropharynx is clear, no cleft. Heart is normal S1 and S2 without murmurs. Abdomen is soft and nontender. Chest is clear to auscultation. Extremities are without rashes, cyanosis, clubbing or edema. He does have good femoral pulses bilaterally, and no hip clicks. Neurologically, he is alert and active . . . . LABORATORY: . . . Total bilirubin on admission was 14.2, direct was 0.5. He was tapped, and had a white count in his spinal fluid of 2,500 and red count of 241,250. He had 65 segs, 17 lymphocytes and 18 monocytes, and the spinal fluid Gram stain showed no organisms, but an occasional leukocyte. IMPRESSION AND PLAN: My impression is that we have a six-day-old with fever and abnormal leukocytosis in his spinal fluid. He was placed on ampicillin, and gentamicin . . . . He was also cultured for herpes [, which was negative]. He was started on Acyclovir 20/kilo q.8 hours. He will continue to feed. A repeat spinal tap was attempted to clear up the meningitis issue on two occasions; however, both times they were bloody. We, therefore, are going to obtain a head CT with contrast to rule out an intracranial bleed. A CT of the head was done on January 13, 2002, and revealed a bilateral intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) and a left posterior parietal cephalohematoma.6 The CT scan was read, as follows: FINDINGS: There is molding of the bones of the calvarium, compatible with recent vaginal delivery. Curvilinear area of increased density identified within the scalp soft tissues in the left posterior parietal region, compatible with a cephalohematoma. Increased densities identified within the lumen of the left lateral ventricle, predominantly involving the left choroid plexus, but also layering in the dependent portion of the lateral ventricle, compatible with intraventricular hemorrhage from the choroid plexus bleed. In addition, increased density is identified in the dependent portion of the right lateral ventricle consistent with intraventricular hemorrhage. No extra axial fluid collections are identified. Linear area of increased density is identified in the right frontal region, only seen on images #11, and therefore likely not due to subarachnoid hemorrhage. The ventricular system is not dilated. No focal parenchymal mass is identified. After contrast administration, there are no abnormal areas of parenchymal or meningeal enhancement identified. IMPRESSION: Left posterior parietal cephalohematoma Bilateral intraventricular hemorrhage, left greater than right, with the left intraventricular hemorrhage due to choroid plexus bleed. Molding of the bones of the calvarium compatible with history of recent vaginal delivery . . . . Given the abnormalities reported on the CT scan, Dr. Randell Powell, a neurosurgeon, was requested to see Samuel for neurosurgical input. That consultation occurred on January 16, 2002,7 and was reported, as follows: . . . I have been requested to see the child for neurosurgical input. I am informed that the baby is now doing well. Septic work-up was completely negative and antibiotics have since been discontinued and the baby is anticipating discharge later on today. PHYSICAL EXAMINATION: Reveals a beautiful, sleeping, male infant with a very soft head, a very soft fontanelle, no splitting of the sutures. The head circumference is measured to be slightly less than the 50th percentile for a newborn. There is no nuchal rigidity and bending the legs did not appear to cause irritation as well. The child has a bilateral red reflex. Pupils are equal and reactive. The Moro reflex is symmetric. Computed tomographic scan shows hemorrhage emanating from the choroid plexus and the trigone of the left lateral ventricle. There is mild ventricular dilatation. Follow-up ultrasound shows similar findings. IMPRESSION: Intraventricular hemorrhage. DISCUSSION: Intraventricular hemorrhages in the newborn perinatal period that are caused by choroid plexus hemorrhage generally have an excellent prognosis as no significant brain parenchyma is disrupted and these hemorrhages usually resolve without sequelae. However, there is roughly a 20% chance of developing post hemorrhagic hydrocephalus which in 50% of cases could require more aggressive treatment. That means the baby's chances of needing neurosurgical intervention is somewhat less than 10% and this was discussed extensively with the parents who were happy to hear this news. There are no overt signs of hydrocephalus at this time and in my opinion I think that we can safely follow the baby with serial physical examination consisting of palpation of the fontanelle and head circumference measurements. I would be glad to see the baby at age one month for follow- up, but I suspect a good prognosis here. Samuel was discharged from Wolfson Children's Hospital at 6:15 p.m., January 16, 2002, with instructions to monitor his head circumference once a week, and for follow-up appointments with Dr. Hamaty (his pediatrician at the time8) and Dr. Powell. Samuel's subsequent development Following discharge, Samuel was followed by Dr. Powell for mild posthemorrhagic hydrocephalus, that appeared to stabilize, but then got worse between ages four and six months.9 Serial studies showed progressive ventricular enlargement consistent with hydrocephalus, and after discussing treatment options Samuel's parents elected to proceed with endoscopic third ventriculostomy, which was performed on August 26, 2002. Initially, Samuel appeared to be doing reasonably well, but then he developed an accelerated head circumference (53.8 centimeters, which placed him above the 98th percentile), consistent with progressive hydrocephalus, and on December 6, 2002, a Codman programmable ventriculoperioneal shunt was placed. Since that time, Samuel has done fairly well, without symptoms related to increased intracranial pressure. However, he continues to evidence macrocrania (above the 98th percentile), ventriculomegaly (enlargement of the laterial ventricules), and atrophy of brain tissue.10 (Exhibit 34). Samuel's current presentation With regard to Samuel's current presentation, the parties agree, and the proof is otherwise compelling, that Samuel is permanently and substantially mentally impaired.11 As for his physical presentation, while there may be room for disagreement, the complexity of Samuel's difficulties support the conclusion that he is also permanently and substantially physically impaired. In so concluding, it is noted that on the Vineland Adoptive Behavior Scales Form (VABS), related to daily living skills and motor skills, Samuel scored in the mentally handicapped range. "He is not yet toilet trained despite intensive efforts in this regard"; "[h]e is able to assist with simple dressing and undressing tasks but is not yet independent with these skills"; and he "continues to display gross-motor, fine-motor, visual-motor, and motor planning impairment." (Exhibits 18 and 30). It is further noted that Samuel presents with impaired postural control (aggravated by his large head), impaired strength, hypotonia, and bilateral pronatal feet. As a result, Samuel has moderate to severe impairment in strength, endurance, postural control, balance responses (with unexpected falls), functional mobility, and activities of daily living. Notably, at approximately five years of age, Samuel requires a stroller for extended outings, and caregiver assistance for 90 percent of self care needs. (Exhibit 10). The cause of Samuel's impairments As for the cause of Samuel's neurologic impairments, the proof demonstrates that, more likely than not, they are the result of a brain injury, caused by hydrocephalus, secondary to the intraventricular hemorrhage (IVH) he suffered, and which was diagnosed at six days of life. What remains to resolve is the genesis of Samuel's IVH or, stated otherwise, whether the proof demonstrated, more likely than not, that the IVH was caused by oxygen deprivation, and occurred during labor, delivery or resuscitation. § 766.302(2), Fla. Stat. ("'Birth-related neurological injury' means injury to the brain . . . caused by oxygen deprivation . . . occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation in the immediate postdelivery period."); Nagy v. Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, 813 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)(The oxygen deprivation and injury to the brain must occur during labor, delivery, or immediately afterward.). The genesis of Samuel's IVH Regarding the intraventricular hemorrhage Samuel suffered, the proof is compelling that an IVH in a term infant, such as Samuel, is a rare occurrence, and its cause frequently cannot be identified. Indeed, among the physicians who addressed the issue, there is apparent agreement that the majority of IVHs (approximately 50 percent) are related to oxygen deprivation (hypoxia-ischemia) or trauma, and the remainder fall into one of two groups, those with another identifiable cause (such as vascular malformation, infection, clotting disorder, venous infarct, or genetic disorder) and those of unknown etiology (idiopathic). To address the cause and timing of Samuel's IVH, the parties offered the deposition testimony of Julius Piver, M.D., J.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology (albeit one who has not practiced obstetrics for 20 years); Mary Edwards-Brown, M.D., a physician board-certified in radiology, with subspecialty certification in neuroradiology; David Hammond, M.D., a physician board-certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, and clinical neurophysiology; Donald Willis, M.D., a physician board-certified in obstetrics and gynecology, and maternal-fetal medicine; and Michael Duchowny, M.D., a physician board- certified in pediatrics, neurology with special competence in child neurology, electroencephalography, and clinical neurophysiology.12 The testimony of Doctors Piver, Edwards- Brown, and Hammond were offered in support of Petitioners' view on causation, and testimony of Doctors Willis and Duchowny were offered in support of NICA's view on causation. Pertinent to the issue of causation, Doctors Piver, Edwards-Brown, and Hammond were of the opinion that an infant can suffer a intraventricular hemorrhage during labor and delivery, as a result of a hypoxic-ischemic insult, and not show any clinical evidence in the immediate postnatal period. However, although offered the opportunity to do so, Dr. Hammond declined to offer an opinion as to the likely etiology (cause and timing) of Samuels IVH.13 Consequently, we are left to consider the testimony of Doctors Piver and Edwards-Brown with regard to Petitioners' view on causation. As for the etiology of Samuel's IVH, it was Dr. Piver's opinion, based on his review of the medical records, that Samuel's IVH was most likely caused by partial prolonged asphyxia, that was sufficient to cause a subtle, slow bleed during labor and delivery, which progressed to the significant IVH noted at 6 days of life, but that was initially insufficient to reveal itself (by clinical evidence of a bleed) in the immediate postnatal period. In reaching his conclusion, Dr. Piver relied heavily on his evaluation of the fetal monitor strips, which he opined revealed, starting at 6:48 p.m. (18:48), and continuing for 30 to 35 minutes, evidence of marked loss of beat-to-beat variability; late decelerations at 8:01 p.m., 8:03 p.m., 8:05 p.m., 8:25 p.m., 8:28 p.m., 8:31 p.m., and 8:33 p.m.; a marked deceleration to a low of 70 beats per minute at 8:50 p.m., with a slow return to baseline at 8:56 p.m.; a marked deceleration from 180 beats per minute to 90 beats per minute between 9:14 p.m. to 9:20 p.m.; a late deceleration at 9:23 p.m.; and evidence of a hypertonic uterus starting at 9:24 p.m., and persisting to 9:42 p.m., again at 9:50 p.m., and persisting to 10:14 p.m., and again at 10:20 p.m. and persisting to 10:22 p.m., with exaggerated fetal heart rate variability. While acknowledging the bleed could have started at any time between the 7th of January (Samuel's delivery date) and the 12th of January, when Samuel presented to Wolfson Children's Hospital, Dr. Piver was of the opinion, given his review of the fetal monitor strips, that Samuel's bleed was most likely caused by hypoxia, and that it began during labor and delivery. Dr. Piver variously noted the likely onset of the bleed as "[b]etween 2030 and 2130 hours"; "around 2000 hours"; "from 2000 hours to 2130 hours"; "between 1800 and 2224 hours"; "between 1800 and 2100 hours"; and "the 21:24 to 22:20 time interval." (Exhibit 23, pages 34, 48, 49, 57, 80, 82; Exhibit 23, deposition Exhibit 6). Dr. Edwards-Brown, like Dr. Piver, was of the opinion that Samuel's IVH was most likely caused by hypoxia, that caused a slow bleed during labor and delivery, but an insufficient bleed to reveal evidence of brain damage during the immediate postnatal period. Dr. Edwards-Brown's opinion was explained, as follows: Q How are you able to determine, based on the films that you reviewed, that the hemorrhage began during labor and delivery? A Based on the films alone, we can't make that determination. It's simply the path of physiology of the hemorrhages and the hospital course as well as the labor and delivery records that allow me to make that conclusion. * * * Q Are you able to look at the effect of the hemorrhage on the brain structures to determine or time when the hemorrhage may have occurred? A What I see is a large hemorrhage wherein the ventricle that is pretty bright and that hemorrhage is causing hydrocephalus; and the hydrocephalus, I'm sure, is causing symptoms, but hemorrhages don't cause hydrocephalus initially. It takes some time before that occurs. So all I can say is yes, the hemorrhage is having an effect on the brain, and that effect is hydrocephalus and ischemia, and it could have occurred sometime from the time of labor and delivery until the time that film was obtained. Q It could have occurred at any time in between there? A. The hydrocephalus and the ischemia. Q But not the hemorrhage? A Certainly the hemorrhage could have occurred after birth, but I would have expected some evidence of that in the clinical history. I would have expected evidence that this child had suffered a profound hypoxic injury as one might see if this child had had a code or a profound drop in his oxygen status. None of that is in the record; therefore, I don't think it's a post natal event. * * * Q Okay. How are you able to rule out in this case that the hemorrhage did not begin on January 9th, 10th, 11th or 12th? A Several things. Number one, I don't have evidence on the 9th, 10th, 11th, or 12th of January that this child suffered any hypoxic injury. Q Hemorrhage [can] be caused by something other than hypoxic injury? A It can. Q Okay, and what are the other possible causes? A Intraventricular hemorrhage might result from a tumor, might result from a vascular malformation, it could result from an infection, but it usually results from hypoxia. Q We sometimes do not know what causes intraventricular hemorrhage? A I think when we don't know what causes intraventricular hemorrhage, it is a reasonable presumption that there was hypoxia at a time when someone was not looking, as in the prenatal or labor and delivery period. If there wasn't a fetal heart monitoring strip obtained during that period and the child is born with -- excuse me, with intraventricular hemorrhage, I think the presumption should be that there was hypoxia during that time. But certainly there may be some times when we don't have an answer. Q Sometimes we simply don't know what caused the hemorrhage? A That is undeniably true; however, one should not make that presumption until we have excluded the usual causes. And in this case, based on Dr. Piver's testimony that there was evidence of hypoxia during labor and delivery, one must assume that that was the cause. We don't make the diagnosis of an idiopathic cause. That means we don't have the answer when we have evidence of a reasonable cause, which we have here. Q In your letter to Mr. Sharrit that we referred to earlier, you state on Page No. 2 further down that, "The absence of symptoms in the three days following birth is not unusual since bleeding begins small and increases with time." What do you mean by that? A That's the nature of bleeding. I'm sure you know this. We have all bled. You don't -- Well, bleeding -- unless it's the result of an aneurism -- is not so massive initially. It starts out as a leak in the vessels, and the longer it bleeds the more it accumulates . . . . (Exhibit 27, pages 39, 41, 42, 44-46). Contrasted with the opinion held by Doctors Piver, Edwards-Brown, and Hammond, Doctors Willis and Duchowny were of the opinion that if a hypoxic event is significant enough to cause an intraventricular hemorrhage during labor and delivery, there will be clinical evidence in the immediate newborn period. Dr. Willis expressed his observations on the medical records, as well as the basis of his opinions on causations, as follows: Q . . . Dr. Willis, in reviewing the records and the fetal heart tracings, were you able to identify any intervals, any intervals of concern, I suppose, or any that you thought that may have been hypoxic intervals? A Well, the fetal heart rate monitor strip looks pretty good until about an hour and a half before delivery, and then there are fetal heart rate decelerations that pretty much continue until the time of birth. Q And what was the significance of those intervals that you're talking about, to you? A Well, the decrease in fetal heart rate usually means that there's some decrease in oxygen supply to the baby. Q Okay. A Or umbilical cord compression, which could lead to that same thing. Q So are you saying you found intervals that were suspicious for oxygen compromise? A That's correct. Q Did you identify intervals of lack of beat-to-beat variability that you thought were of concern? A Well, I'll look, but most of what I saw were fetal heart rate decelerations along with really exaggerated fetal heart rate variability, which usually you see with umbilical cord compression. Q Well, are you saying, then, that there were episodes in this case where you felt there was significant cord compression? A Well, the fetal heart rate tracing certainly is consistent with umbilical cord compression. Q And over what time period would you say the fetal heart tracings are consistent with cord compression? A Well, off and on for the last hour and a half prior to birth. Q And could that create a scenario, an hypoxic scenario that could lead to some kind of vascular insult within the brain? A Now, let me be sure I understand the question. Are you asking me if I believe this fetal heart rate pattern, the abnormalities that I see led to that or can abnormalities in fetal heart rate pattern in general lead to brain injury? Q I guess my question would be, the pattern that you've identified in this case, is that consistent with a pattern that can lead to injury, vascular injury within the brain? A Well, I think it shows that there's probably some lack of oxygen during that time period. Now, the question then is, you know, did that lack of oxygen lead to brain damage. And in this case, you know, my feeling is or my opinion is that it did not lead to brain damage. Q Let's break that up a little bit. Without knowing, without looking at the final result -- I presume you're looking at the early neonatal period right after birth to help you make that conclusion. Am I correct? A Yes. Q If we for the moment put aside the early clinical course of the child, just by looking at the heart tracings and the patterns that you've identified, are those consistent with or perhaps suspicious for the kind of pattern that could lead to a fetal compromise, brain compromise? A Well, I don't know if anyone could predict fetal brain damage simply based on a fetal heart rate pattern. You really have to look at the baby, the condition of the baby after birth to be able to say whether or not the abnormalities in the fetal heart rate pattern resulted in oxygen deprivation and brain injury. * * * Q Now, you did, no doubt, note that the child did return to the hospital after discharge and was found to have a bloody spinal tap, and ultimately it was determined that it had an intraventricular hemorrhage? A That's correct. That's, I believe, on the fifth day after birth. Q Well, having identified hypoxic consistent patterns within the fetal heart tracings, how is it that you can say that perhaps did not lead to a vascular insult that slowly progressed over a period of four or five days into an extensive hemorrhage? * * * A . . . I think that it's pretty clear that if you're going to have an hypoxic injury to the brain that's substantial enough to cause brain injury then the baby really is going to be depressed at time of birth and is going to have an unstable newborn period. Simply having an abnormal fetal heart rate pattern is not enough to say that any lack of oxygen that occurred during labor caused brain damage. Q . . . And I guess you're saying across the board and without exception there can be no slowly progressing brain damage that can occur due to labor and delivery hypoxia? A Well, in order to have an hypoxic event during labor or delivery that would be substantial enough to cause an hypoxic- related brain injury, then really the baby is going to have to be depressed at birth. Now, I mean, you can have intracranial hemorrhages, choroid plexus bleeds in babies that have normal, spontaneous vaginal births with normal-looking fetal heart rate tracings. I mean, there are spontaneous hemorrhages that can occur during labor, delivery, at some point after the baby is born, in the newborn period. But what I'm saying is that if you're going to have an intracranial hemorrhage due to an hypoxic event during labor or delivery, then the baby really should be depressed at time of birth and have an unstable newborn course. Q When you say depressed after the birth, do you put any outer limit on the time frame during which the baby might become depressed? A Well, usually, by the newborn -- by the immediate post-delivery period they mean immediately after birth and until the baby is essentially stabilized after birth. For instance, in this case the baby had Apgar scores of eight and nine, required no resuscitation at all. So, you know, we really don't have anything to suggest that there's a problem in the immediate newborn period. And then during the hospital stay, other than the jaundice, the baby did not really have any problems. The baby breast-fed. It did not have any neurologic findings that were abnormal, didn't have renal failure, did not have seizures, you know, the types of things that we see with babies that suffer an hypoxic insult during labor or delivery. * * * Q I know that your opinion is that if an hypoxic event is significant enough to cause a brain damage, then you're going to have to necessarily see signs of depression at birth or shortly after birth. Am I stating that correctly? A Very nicely. Q Okay. What if we're not talking about brain damage or encephalopathy in the broad sense but we're just talking about a very small insult to one of the blood vessels in the brain that doesn't readily turn into brain damage but, rather, becomes a progressive problem over a period of several days? Is that a possible scenario? A I guess most things are possible, but that seems unlikely to me. Q It seems unlikely to you that you could have a weakening of a blood vessel or some injury that lessens the integrity of the blood vessel and that the brain damage is then latent and that's perhaps the reason why it would not negatively impact the early clinical course? A Well, let me say -- and I think we kind of went over this before -- that you can have intracranial hemorrhages on babies that have no apparent problems at all during labor, delivery. Just for reasons unknown you can have intracranial hemorrhage and blood vessels can rupture. But I guess what we're talking about is brain injury due to lack of oxygen or mechanical trauma. And my point being that if you're going to get a hemorrhage due to lack of oxygen or mechanical trauma, then the baby really should be depressed at time of birth (Exhibit 28, pages 23-30). Dr. Duchowny expressed his observations of the medical records, as well as his opinions on causation, as follows: Q. Let me at this time suggest a brain injury pathway that has been offered by others in this case for Samuel Hess and ask you to comment on that. Others have suggested that in this case there was labor and delivery hypoxia that resulted in a choroid plexus bleed and was associated with an isolated -- excuse me, where the blood was isolated -- the bleed was isolated within the ventricles during the pre-natal course and that that later produced hydrocephalus -- MR. BAJALIA: Pre-natal? MR. SHARRIT: Yes, in the first few days after birth. Q. Are you with me, doctor? A. Yes, I am, but I think you mean post- natal course. Q. I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I do. Thank you. Labor and delivery hypoxia, the choroid plexus bleed isolated within the ventricles during the post-natal course that later produced hydrocephalus and increased the internal cranial pressure that later after - - well after discharge from the hospital resulted in periventricular white matter damage. Is that a reasonable interpretation for Samuel Hess' brain injury? A. No. Q. Why not? A. There's no evidence of hypoxia. * * * Q. . . . [Y]ou don't think that they are a result of hypoxia because you don't discern evidence of hypoxia on the fetal monitor strips? A. There are abnormalities on the fetal monitoring strips. As I said before, I don't think they are associated with hypoxia. * * * Q. I understand your testimony to the contrary, but if -- if it turned out that after reviewing Samuel's fetal monitor strips you decided that there was evidence of hypoxia, would that be a reasonable link to the hemorrhage that was diagnosed? A. No, because Samuel didn't show any of the signs of hypoxia at birth so I don't believe he had any type of hypoxic damage. * * * Q. Do you not find any evidence at all of hypoxia on the fetal monitor strips? A. I believe the fetal monitoring strips indicate some fetal stress and that's all. Q. As opposed to distress? A. It just shows stress to the fetus during the inter-partum experience. That's all. Q. How do you define stress? A. I think the decelerations indicate, you know, stress on -- you know, stress is being placed on the fetus. Q. . . . [But] can't late decelerations be an indication of hypoxia? A. It's possible. Q. Could bradycardia in the 60 to 70 be[at]s per minute range be an indication of hypoxia? A. It's possible but not necessarily. * * * Q. . . . If you have an intraventricular hemorrhage that you attribute to a hypoxic ischemic insult that resulted during the course of labor and delivery and late in delivery, as has been suggested in this case, wouldn't you expect to see some clinically recognizable neurologic dysfunction in the neonate during the immediate newborn period? A. Yes, you would. Q. Even if the hemorrhage was, to use opposing counsel's words, isolated? A. Yes. If you're claiming that the neurologic problems are related to hypoxia, you would expect to see clinical signs of hypoxia at the time. Q. Even if the hemorrhage was isolated? A. Yes. Q. Can you explain that? A. You would see clinical manifestations in some way. You know, there would be some compromise in respiratory status, evidence of compromise in organ function because the lack of oxygen would affect not only the brain but other organ systems as well. You might see elevation of cardiac enzymes, liver enzymes, changes in renal function, changes in mental status, seizures, changes in blood pressure, respirations, etcetera. Q. And just so I'm clear, that is true even if the hemorrhage was isolated just within the ventricle? A. Yes, if you're attributing it to hypoxia. * * * Q. And based upon your review of the medical records, did you see any indication that Samuel had any such clinically recognizable neurological impairment or dysfunction during the immediate newborn period? A. No, I did not. Q. Did you note what his APGAR scores were? A. Yes, I believe he had normal APGAR scores. I believe they were eight and nine and one at five minutes. Q. Is that consistent with Samuel having suffered an isolated intraventricular hemorrhage that was the result of a hypoxic ischemic insult that occurred late in delivery -- A. No. Q. -- labor and delivery? A. I don't believe so. Q. Is the fact that there was no documented evidence of impaired neurologic function in Samuel during the immediate newborn period consistent with Samuel having suffered an isolated intraventricular hemorrhage that occurred late in labor and delivery? A. No. (Exhibit 29, pages 17, 18, 20-23, and 36-39). Here, there is no apparent reason to credit the testimony of Petitioners' witnesses on the issue of causation over the testimony of NICAs witnesses. Indeed, as among those who spoke to the issue of causation, Doctors Willis and Duchowny are the more qualified to address the issue, and their testimony the more persuasive.
Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Charles P. Shook, M.D., is a medical doctor having been issued license number 0020414, pursuant to Chapter 458, Florida Statutes. He is board certified in the areas of general and peripheral vascular surgery and practices in those specialty areas in Fort Myers, Lee County, Florida. He has been practicing in Lee County since 1973. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida, charged with enforcing the licensure and practice standards embodied in Chapter 458, Florida Statutes and related statutes and rules and imposing disciplinary measures for departure from those standards by physicians licensed in Florida when such are proven. Mrs. Betty A. Fiore, at times pertinent hereto, was an obese, 47-year old female, with a history of thrombo-phlebitis and progressively enlarging and painful bilaterial varicosities of the veins in her right and left legs. She was admitted to Fort Myers Community Hospital on January 28, 1979, by the Respondent, for performance of a bilateral "vein-stripping" surgical procedure. Her medical history reflected that she had had a similar vein-stripping procedure performed over 20 years previously. The patient was operated on by the Respondent on January 29, 1979, beginning at approximately 9:25 a.m. The procedure was quite lengthy due to certain complications and lasted until 1:25 p.m. that day. After normal preparations, under general anesthesia, the Respondent began the operation by performing an oblique groin incision on the left leg just below the inquinal liagment, approximately ten centimeters in length. The incision penetrated the subcutaneous tissue and, as the "fossa-ovalis" was approached, the Respondent noted a significant amount of scar tissue, apparently related to the earlier surgical procedure, which obliterated and concealed much of the normal anatomy and structure in the area of surgery. It was of such a dense nature that only a faintly palpable pulse could be felt in the vessel. The Respondent dissected out the various venous branches in the area and individually ligated them. During his dissection process, the distal common femoral artery was injured by being slightly nicked with the surgical instrument. Repair procedures for the injury to the artery were carried out as will be described below. In any event, the "codman stripper" was employed in carrying out the stripping operation on the vein in question and additionally, several incisions were made around the calf of the leg to alleviate smaller varicosities. One large perforating vein in the malleolar area had to be ligated after the superficial portion had been stripped away. The Respondent then began to perform a similar procedure on the right leg, in spite of the initial difficulties he had had on the left leg, because he did not expect such severe scar tissue involvement with the anatomical structures in the area of incision on both legs. When he carried out the incision on the right leg however, he found that the anatomy of the right leg was essentially the same as that of the left and that substantial scar tissue reaction had occurred, related to prior surgery, with obliteration of much of the normal anatomy, including concealment of the femoral artery. Due in large part to these anatomical changes and complications involved in dissecting out the various venous branches involved in the stripping procedure, the right femoral artery was also slightly nicked by the scalpel. The Respondent attempted to suture the femoral arteries nicked in both legs at the time these injuries occurred, but the sutures would not hold in the arteries due to some then unknown, medical condition. After the same failure to hold sutures was encountered with regard to both femoral arteries, the Respondent sent samples of the arteries to the pathologist for evaluation. The pathologist report indicated that the arteries were "normal." Parenthetically it should he noted that the "complaining witness," Mrs. Fiore, has been found to exhibit symptoms of diabetes mellitus. Her testimony was somewhat evasive concerning the degree to which she may suffer from this malady, which can have a detrimental effect on the vascular system. In any event, when working first on the left leg, the Respondent elected to resect back along the artery for approximately a half-inch on each side of the wound and after that resection, to repair the femoral artery with the insertion of a 6 millimeter gortex graft. Likewise, with regard to the right leg, the Respondent found the sutures would not hold in the damaged artery (which was of a "cheese-like" consistency). He therefore performed a similar resection and insertion of a 6 millimeter gortex graft to repair the injury. The surgical procedure was then successfully concluded. Post-operatively the patient encountered some complications involving infection in the groin area, requiring two additional admissions to Fort Myers Community Hospital. Subsequently, she was transferred to Methodist Hospital in Houston, Texas, where she underwent two additional surgical procedures. The Petitioner presented the opinions of two expert witnesses, Dr. Alexander Braze and Dr. E. William Reiber. Dr. Braze's expert opinion is predicated on the review of Mrs. Fiore's office records from the Respondent's office, the hospital charts for her three admissions to Fort Myers Community Hospital, and summaries of her two admissions to the Methodist Hospital in Houston, Texas. His opinion is not based on any examination of the patient involved. Dr. Braze thus opined that because of the previous surgery on the greater saphenous vein, bilaterally, there would be obvious and considerable scarring and scar tissue in the subcutaneous area which would distort and conceal the individual anatomical structures. He himself has never nicked a femoral artery while doing a vein-stripping operation but, although he acknowledges it is an "uncommon complication, he has heard of it occurring. He was unable to render an opinion concerning whether or not the operation was performed properly because this was not a typical vein ligation and stripping procedure, due to the presence of extensive scar tissue, and resulting difficulty involved. The dense scar tissue precluded identification of the structures in the area of the surgical incision and meant that the Respondent had to proceed slowly and very meticulously with a careful dissection, deviation from which careful procedure could cause difficulty. The doctor's procedure was slow and meticulous. The procedure (for both legs) took approximately four hours. Although the Respondent proceeded with care, he nicked the arteries anyway. Dr. Braze could not state that such a complication, albeit uncommon, constituted a departure from standards normally recognized in the medical community. With regard to the doctor's judgmental decision to proceed to the right leg after nicking and repairing the artery in the left leg and completing the vein stripping procedure in the left leg. Dr. Braze opined that he was acting as a reasonable physician in proceeding to the other leg since he had already corrected the initial injury, especially since it was the leg in which she was having her chief complaints. In any event, Dr. Braze was unable to render an opinion as to whether or not the procedure up to the point of nicking the artery was properly or improperly done, although he acknowledged that the lengthy time taken to perform the total procedure indicates that the doctor was proceeding slowly and with greater than normal difficulties. In any event, after the arteries were nicked, the procedure followed by the Respondent was excellent and the repair work was competently and efficiently performed. Dr. Reiber, Petitioner's other expert witness, testified by deposition, which was stipulated into evidence. His expert opinion was based on a review of the deposition of the Respondent, the Fort Myers Community Hospital records of the patient, and the depositions of the patient, Betty Fiore, Arnold Flare and Quillen Jones. Additionally, he reviewed the records dealing with Mrs. Flare's treatment in Houston, Texas. He thus opined that the Respondent made two technical errors when he injured the arteries in each leg and he felt that it was an error in judgment to have performed the procedure on the right leg after having encountered difficulty in the initial procedure on the left leg. He was unable to opine however, that the treatment rendered the patient by Respondent fell below the appropriate standard of care accepted by similar physicians in the community. Moreover, he also opined that the Respondent's treatment after nicking the arteries affirmatively met the standard of care for reasonably prudent physicians in such circumstances. The expert witnesses presented on behalf of the Respondent were Drs. Peter M. Sidell and Luis A. Ruilova. Both witnesses opined, in effect, that, given the obesity of the patient and the difficult surgical process that alone entailed, coupled with the significant involvement of scar tissue in the area of the incision, that the complications associated with this procedure could occur in the hands of even the most renowned surgeon. The fact that the Respondent experienced these complications does not render his practice in this regard to be below the standard of care for vascular surgeons in that community or area of practice. They further opined that it is a matter of personal judgment on whether to proceed to the other leg after encountering these difficulties. A reasonable judgment would have been to explore the groin area on the other side, after accomplishing repair of the first injured artery, which was done. The initial arterial injury having been repaired in a successful manner, both of the Respondent's experts opined that, the patient then being stabilized, the Respondent was justified in proceeding to the other leg and performing the procedure on that side. The main purpose of the operation was to remove the veins of the patient since the patient was symptomatic with varicosities. It therefore would be poor judgment to simply repair the nicked artery and proceed no further, since the symptomatic vein would remain uncorrected. In short, both experts for Respondent opined that neither the vein-stripping procedure, the repair of the damaged arteries nor post-operative management for which Respondent was responsible were performed in a manner below the appropriate standard of care of reasonably prudent physicians in the community. Thus, although the patient unfortunately experienced difficulties during a procedure involving the accidental nicking of her femoral arteries and, after the grafts repairing those injured arteries were performed, later suffered an infection at the operative site necessitating further hospitalization, no expert witness could describe the treatment and care afforded this patient as being below the appropriate standard of care exercised by a reasonably prudent physician performing such vascular surgical practice in the Fort Myers community or area. The Respondent has never encountered this difficulty either before or since this occasion in his practice, which is characterized by frequent vascular surgical procedures. Additionally, Dr. Ruilova established that the nicking of the femoral arteries during such a procedure, although not a common occurrence, is well documented in the literature and not at all unheard of. Indeed, Dr. Ruilova, when assisting a distinguished surgeon who was chief of surgery at the Mayo Clinic at the time, observed that expert surgeon nick a femoral artery in a vein- stripping procedure on two occasions. Finally, it is noted that the Respondent's practice has been characterized by a high level of professional expertise, competence and compassion in caring for his patients, both before and since the occasion in question. He has never before been subjected to disciplinary action.
Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence of record, the candor and demeanor of the witnesses and the pleadings and arguments of the parties, it is, therefore RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered by the Board of Medical Examiners dismissing the complaint in its entirety. DONE and ENTERED this 11th day of October, 1984, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904)488-9675 FILED with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 11th day of October, 1984. COPIES FURNISHED: Barbara K. Hobbs, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Patrick Geraghty, Esquire HENDERSON, FRANKLIN, STARNES & HOLT Post Office Box 280 Fort Myers, Florida 33902 Fred M. Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301
