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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. WILLIAM R. GRECO, 86-003974 (1986)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 86-003974 Latest Update: Dec. 30, 1986

Findings Of Fact Respondent was originally licensed to practice medicine in Florida on August 15, 1956. Respondent's license was placed on inactive status on December 13, 1979, and currently remains on inactive status. Respondent's last known address is 6201 Riverdale Road, Riverdale, Maryland 20801 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 1). On May 6, 1983 Respondent, by Indictment No. 18312601, was indicted for six counts of Medicaid fraud, three counts of false pretenses and one count of theft in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). On March 12, 1984, after Respondent's bench trial, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City ordered a judgment of conviction as to the six counts of Medicaid fraud. Respondent was acquitted of the other four counts of the indictment (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, P. 39 of the memorandum opinion). Respondent's conviction resulted from the inclusion of nonallowable costs in applications for Medicaid funds submitted by Magnolia Gardens Nursing Home while Respondent was the administrator and a 50 percent owner of the nursing home. The trial court specifically found that Respondent knew that nonreimbursable costs for construction done to Respondent's personal residences and medical office building were included in applications for Medicaid payments (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2, p. 39 of memorandum opinion). Use of Medicaid funds for improvements to a private physician's office is a violation of Maryland state law which clearly relates to the practice of medicine. As a result of Respondent's conviction for Medicaid fraud, he was sentenced to concurrent five-year terms of imprisonment on each of the six counts. All but 18 months of the sentence was suspended. Respondent was placed on 18 months of work release and 18 months of community service after work release at the rate of 20 hours per week. Respondent was also fined $60,000 and ordered to pay $50,000 restitution. Additionally, Respondent was placed on two years of unsupervised probation (See docket entry of April 23, 1984, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). On April 30, 1984 Respondent appealed his conviction to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland (See docket entry of April 30, 1984, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). On November 6, 1985 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals rendered its opinion in William R. Greco v. State of Maryland, Case No. 171 (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). Respondent's conviction was affirmed in all aspects and Respondent's sentence was affirmed as to the order to make restitution which was vacated (See Mandate of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, dated December 6, 1985, Petitioner's Exhibit No. 2). On October 3, 1986, the Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals. Greco v. State, 307 Md. 470, 515 A.2d 220 (1986). On December 4, 1984 Respondent was suspended from participation in the federal Medicare and Medicaid programs for a period of ten years (Petitioner's Exhibit No. 3).

Recommendation It is recommended that Respondent's license to practice medicine be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 30 day of December, 1986 in Tallahassee, Florida. SHARYN L. SMITH Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 30th day of December, 1986. COPIES FURNISHED: Stephanie A. Daniel, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 William W. Cahill, Jr., Esquire WEINBERG and GREEN 100 South Charles Street Baltimore, Maryland 21201 Dr. William R. Greco 6201 Riverdale Road Riverdale, Maryland 20737 Fred Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Salvatore Carpino, Esquire General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (1) 458.331
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. ANTONIO J. MANIGLIA, 82-000115 (1982)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 82-000115 Latest Update: Aug. 02, 1983

Findings Of Fact At all times, material hereto, Respondent Antonio J. Maniglia, M. D., has been licensed as a medical doctor under the laws of the State of Florida. Respondent graduated from medical school in Brazil in December, 1962. He came to the United States in 1963, and has practiced from then until the present date. He was licensed as a medical doctor by the State of Florida in 1971. On or about February 11, 1976, Maury Braga appeared at Respondent's office requesting to see him. Respondent had never before met Braga and had never heard of him. Braga brought with him a letter of introduction from a processor in Brazil whom Respondent knew. Braga advised Respondent that, he was a medical doctor from Brazil, that he had attended and graduated from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, Brazil, that he had practiced the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, that he was in the process of, obtaining his medical license in Florida, and that to complete his Florida medical application he needed statements from local doctors acknowledging that Braga was a Brazilian medical doctor. Braga showed to Respondent documentation concerning his education and practice, including his medical diploma. Based upon his interview of Braga and his examination of Braga's documents, Respondent signed a form utilized by Petitioner, which form is entitled "Affidavit" and which reads, in pertinent part, as follows: - I, Antonio J. Maniglia, M. D., F.A.C.S., of 1776 NW 10th Ave, Miami, Florida 33136, do hereby swear and affirm by my personal knowledge, that Maury Braga attended and graduated from Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos and did lawfully prac- tice the profession of medicine, in Brazil during the years of 1967 through 1972, and that I also practiced the same, profession in Brazil. When Respondent signed the "affidavit," it was not notarized. Respondent had no personal knowledge regarding whether Braga had ever attended or graduated from medical school or regarding whether Braga had ever practiced medicine in Brazil. Respondent relied totally on the information contained in the documents, Braga showed to him and upon what Braga told him. After Braga left Respondent's office, he had the "affidavit" signed by Respondent notarized. He attached the "affidavit" to an Application for Examination and Course in Continuing Medical Education, which application he then submitted to the Florida Board of Medical Examiners. "On February 26, 1976, the same day that Braga's application was received, the Executive Director of the Board of Medical Examiners wrote to Braga advising him that his application was received after the deadline of January 26, 1976, and was therefore rejected. The application was not returned to Braga, but rather was placed in a file opened under Braga's name to be retained in the event that Braga again applied within the next three years to take the course in continuing medical education and the examination for licensure. On January 17, 1977, Braga filed a second application to take the course in continuing medical education which would then qualify him to take the examination for licensure. The second application included "affidavits" from medical doctors other than Respondent. One of Braga's two applications was approved; Braga completed the course in continuing medical education; Braga took and passed the examination for licensure; and Braga was licensed as a medical doctor in the State of Florida on March 10, 1978. Maury Braga did not attend or graduate from the Faculdade de Ciencias Medicas de Santos, and did not lawfully practice the profession of medicine in Brazil during the years 1967 through 1972. Braga's license to practice medicine in the State of Florida has been revoked. At least prior to the revocation of his license, Braga's file with the Petitioner contained both the application he filed in 1976 and the application he filed in 1977 No evidence was introduced to show which application was reviewed when Braga's application to take the educational course and examination for licensure was approved.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Respondent guilty of the violation charged in Count Two of the Administrative Complaint, dismissing Counts One, Three and Four of the Administrative Complaint, and placing Respondent's license on probation for a period of one year, subject to terms and conditions set forth by the Board. DONE and RECOMMENDED this 17th day of February, 1983, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. LINDA M. RIGOT, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of February, 1983. COPIES FURNISHED: Joseph W. Lawrence, II, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack E. Thompson, Esquire Ingraham Building, Suite 516 25 SE Second Avenue Miami, Florida 33131 Frederick Roche, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Dorothy J. Faircloth, Executive Director Board of Medical Examiners 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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NEONATOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC. vs AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATION, 95-003049 (1995)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Tallahassee, Florida Jun. 19, 1995 Number: 95-003049 Latest Update: Aug. 02, 1996

Findings Of Fact At all times pertinent to the issues herein either the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, (Department), or the Florida Agency for Health Care Administration, (Agency), its successor agency, operated the Medicaid Program in Florida, a state and federally funded program to provide medical services to indigent and eligible individuals, including children, in Florida. Petitioner, Neonatology Associates, Inc., (NAI), is a provider to the Medicaid Program of the State of Florida, and is located in St. Petersburg, Florida. Its Medicaid provider number is 067920-01. It has been a Medicaid provider for approximately thirty years. Medicaid and Children's Medical Services (CMS) were, at one time, both separate components of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services. On July 1, 1993, responsibility for Medicaid was assigned to the Agency for Health Care Administration. Medicaid, and its fiscal agent, FMMIS, are not now and never have been a part of either Children's Medical Services or Regional Perinatal Intensive Care Center (RPICC) and neither CMS nor RPICC have ever been a part of Medicaid or its fiscal agent. RPICC serves only peripherally to Medicaid as a claims transmittal agency or billing agent. That relationship was formalized by a contract which is considered by FMMIS as a billing agent contract. The parties stipulated prior to the hearing that the medical services, which are represented by Petitioner to have been performed were actually performed and rendered, and that all of the patients for the disputed claims are assumed to be Medicaid eligible. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the five claims were submitted by Petitioner to RPICC in a timely manner; that the five claims were received by RPICC within a twelve month period from the date of service; that there was a problem at RPICC which precluded the transmittal of these five claims in a timely manner to the Florida Medicaid Management Information System, (FMMIS), the office with which they were to be filed for payment; and that there was communication by telephone and in person between officials of Petitioner, RPICC, and the Department/Agency, (CMS), in an effort to resolve the filing difficulty. These claims relate to five patients, M.H., M.C., C.J., B.A. and R.W. Claims which are not received by Medicaid or its fiscal agent within twelve months of service may not be paid pursuant to law described in the trade as the "twelve month rule." The five claims in issue here were transmitted electronically to RPICC by NAI's agent, Ms. Chandler, the RPICC billing clerk at All Children's Hospital, where the service was rendered, for subsequent re- transmittal by RPICC to FMMIS. This procedure is authorized by the Agency. However, due to technical problems not further identified, the claims were never received by FMMIS. RPICC, a part of the Department's Children's Medical Services, and operated by the University of Florida, does not adjudicate claims but merely gathers and analyzes neonatology data for statistical reporting. FMMIS, Medicaid's fiscal agent since July 1, 1993, is operated by a private vendor. The contract between Medicaid and the University under which RPICC data services are provided, and that between NAI and Medicaid, which provides for medical services, both contain the same "boiler plate" clauses. Both NAI and RPICC transmit electronic claims to Medicaid for adjudication, but neither is a party of or agent of Medicaid. FMMIS is Medicaid's agent for payment. RPICC data processing services charges are paid to the University of Florida by Children's Medical Services under their contract. Medicaid pays only for the actual medical care provided to indigent mothers and their sick newborn children. NAI has a contract with Medicaid. RPICC has a contract with Medicaid. Children's Medical Services has a contract with RPICC at the University of Florida. These are the only formal agreements involved in this situation. The contract between NAI and Medicaid provides that NAI will submit Medicaid claims "in accordance with program policies." Medicaid policy provides that receipt of electronic claims submission to Medicaid or its fiscal agent, FMMIS, takes place only upon acceptance and confirmation by FMMIS. Acceptance occurs when each claim is assigned its own identification number. Medicaid policy also provides that submittal of a claim to RPICC does not constitute receipt of the claim by Medicaid or its fiscal agent, and submittal of a claim to RPICC does not toll the running of time accounted for under the twelve month rule. The relationship between Medicaid and the RPICC data center may be likened to that of RPICC's being a billing transmittal agent for FMMIS. RPICC does not process claims submitted to it but merely forwards those it receives to the fiscal agent which operates the FMMIS. Medicaid, by letter from Mr. Thomas Arnold, dated March 5, 1990, authorized FMMIS to receive Medicaid claims from RPICC. That letter does no more than offer providers an option to have RPICC bill the fiscal agent for them, thereby creating a "billing agent" status for RPICC. It does not state that submittal of claims by providers to RPICC constitutes filing a claim with Medicaid or the fiscal agent so as to toll the running of the twelve months limit. The Medicaid Physician Provider Handbook made available to all providers expressly states that all claim inquiries be made to Consultec, a private computer services provider. Both Mr. Blasioli and the Agency's regional claims representative noted that NAI did not contact Consultec regarding the computer problems regarding the instant claims prior to the expiration of the twelve month claim filing limit. Neither did NAI make use of RPICC's internal claims tracking system during the period in issue. The evidence establishes that NAI experienced difficulty in submitting the five claims in issue. Nonetheless, within a month of being employed by NAI, its billing administrator advised Medicaid that he had addressed the problem and had established procedures with RPICC's data center to prevent future claims from exceeding the twelve month limit. NAI's difficulty with the five claims in issue were first brought to the attention of Medicaid personnel after the twelve month filing limit had expired. Though the claims in issue here were submitted electronically, NAI could have submitted these claims directly to FMMIS by traditional paper claim, omitting the RPICC channel and its potential for technical problems. It chose not to do so. The "twelve month rule" provides for exceptions which are expressly limited to those claims which are delayed by either legal action or lack of proof of recipient eligibility. An additional exception is afforded claims delayed by "crossovers" with Medicare. The rule does not provide for extension of time due to computer system error unless such error relates to processing errors which arise subsequent to Medicaid's acknowledgment of claim receipt. In essence, to justify an exception to the twelve month rule, the computer error must be Medicaid's. The Medicaid program cannot deviate from federally imposed requirements. Should it do so, it faces the potential loss of federal expenditure reimbursement which constitutes fifty-five percent of all money spent by Florida in its operation of the Medicaid program. The program processes 100,000,000 claims annually from more than 60,000 providers, paying out approximately $6,700,000,000 each year. Even minor exceptions to the rules governing the adjudication process could have extensive impact on and consequences to the program and the benefits it imparts to the indigent health care recipients it serves.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is recommended that the Agency for Health Care Administration enter a final order denying as untimely Petitioner's five claims in issue. DONE and ENTERED this 22nd day of May, 1996, in Tallahassee, Florida. ARNOLD H. POLLOCK, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 22nd day of May, 1996. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 95-3049 To comply with the requirements of Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1993), the following rulings are made on the parties' proposed findings of fact: Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. - 3. Accepted and incorporated herein. First sentence accepted. Balance accepted as definitions, not Findings of Fact. - 12. Accepted. Merely a restatement of testimony in support of Petitioner's position. Not a proper Finding of Fact. Accepted. Rejected as no more than a comment on the evidence and a statement of party position. - 20. Accepted as a statement of position, but rejected as probative of any material factual issue. 21. - 24. Accepted. Accepted. & 27. Not Findings of Fact but citations of statute. 28. & 29. Accepted. Not Findings of fact but cites of agency rule. A restatement of Handbook matter. Accepted. - 35. Accepted. Accepted but non-probative argument. Rejected as contra to the weight of the evidence. - 43. Accepted. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of testimony. - 49. Accepted. 50. & 51. Accepted and incorporated herein. 52. - 55. Accepted. 56. - 58. Accepted. 59. & 61. Accepted, but no evidence exists that RPICC's actions constitute receipt of the claim. The evidence of record better suggests that RPICC receives information from providers based upon which it acts as billing agent for the provider and it remains incumbent upon the provider to insure it gets the pertinent information to RPICC in sufficient time for the claim to be billed within the tweleve month constrains. 62. - 65. Rejected as contra to the better evidence of record. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 1. & 2. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of the issue. - 7. Accepted and incorporated herein. 8. & 9. Accepted. 10. - 14. Accepted. Accepted. - 18. Accepted. 19. & 20. Accepted and incorporated herein. Not a Finding of Fact but a restatement of and comment on testimony. & 23. Accepted and incorporated herein. 24. Accepted but not probative of any material issue of issue of fact. COPIES FURNISHED: Frank P. Rainer, Esquire Ruden, McClosky, Smith, Schuster, and Russell, P.A. 215 South Monroe Street, Suite 815 Tallahassee, Florida 32310 Mark S. Thomas, Esquire Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3407 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Sam Power Agency Clerk Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive, Suite 3431 Tallahassee, Florida 32308 Jerome W. Hoffman General Counsel Agency for Health Care Administration 2727 Mahan Drive Tallahassee, Florida 32309

Florida Laws (3) 120.57409.907409.913
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BOARD OF OSTEOPATHIC MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. JEROME E. SCORZELLI, 78-000327 (1978)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 78-000327 Latest Update: May 30, 1978

Findings Of Fact Based on the testimony of the witnesses and their demeanor while testifying and the entire record filed herein, the following relevant facts are found. Respondent, Jerome E. Scorzelli, is licensed by the Board to practice osteopathic medicine and is the holder of license no. 3203. Documentary evidence introduced by a final order of the Board issued October 24, 1977 made findings of fact and conclusions of law to the effect that Respondent issued approximately 14 prescriptions for demerol and obtained said drug without good faith and not in the course of his professional practice within the months of August - November, 1976. That order found as a matter of law that Respondent unlawfully distributed and dispensed controlled substances as described in Chapter 893.03, F.S., and performed acts prohibited by Section 893.05, Florida Statutes, and as such violated Chapter 459.14(2)(m) and (n), Florida Statutes. In that order the Board ordered a suspension of the Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the state and all rights and privileges granted thereunder for a period of five years commencing October 15, 1977. However, the Board ruled that if Respondent satisfied five enumerated conditions the Board would hold the imposition of the suspension in abeyance as long as such conditions continued to be satisfied. If during the five year period of suspension the Board in its discretion determined that any or all such conditions stated in the order were not fully met and complied with, imposition of such suspension would immediately and automatically be imposed for the duration of the five year period of suspension. (See Petitioner's Composite Exhibit no. 2). Thereafter, on February 8, 1978, the Board issued the subject administrative complaint alleging that on November 19, 1977, in Broward County, Florida, Respondent unlawfully aided, abetted, counselled, hired, or otherwise procurred the commission of a criminal offense against the State of Florida to wit: uttering a forged or fraudulent prescription, said criminal offense being committed by Mitchell Paulson in that Mitchell Paulson did acquire or obtain or attempt to acquire or obtain possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Pethidinex (moperidine), commercially known as demerol, by misrepresentation, fraud, forgery, deception, or subterfuge, in that the said Mitchell Paulson, at the direction of Dr. Scorzelli and with Dr. Scorzelli's assistance did knowingly utter to Melvin S. Silver, a false or forged prescription contrary to Chapters 893.03(2)(b)14, 893.13(3)(a)(1) and (b), and 777.011, Florida Statutes. /1 Melvin S. Silver, a pharmacist registered in this state for approximately 16 years and the owner of Baron's Pharmacy in Broward County, testified that on November 19, 1977, a customer tendered him a prescription for two vials of demerol. Messr. Silver became suspicious of the prescription in that it appeared to be over correct since doctors usually do not write out in longhand, the drugs requested on prescriptions. For this reason, Messr. Silver checked with his delivery boy who confirmed that the address noted on the prescription was an incorrect address. The combination of these factors prompted Messr. Silver to call the doctor who he did not know and reached an answering service. He requested the answering service to contact the Respondent such that he could verify whether the prescription was issued by him. The answering service assured Messr. Silver that she would check with the doctor and have him to return the call. Within a few minutes Messr. Silver received a call from a person identifying himself as Dr. Scorzelli and advised that it was o.k. to fill the "Verdi" prescription. Messr. Silver, still not satisfied that the prescription was legitimate, again called the answering service and was assured by the person he spoke to that the service had contacted Dr. Scorzelli. Messr. Silver testified that suspicion still remained in his mind inasmuch as the person who called identifying himself as Dr. Scorzelli voice sounded young and was slurred. He called the Broward County Police and gave the description of that person who later turned out to be Mitchell Paulson who had given him the prescription. Paulson left out the side entrance and while so doing, detectives William Mattingly and James Harn, special detectives working in the organized crime and drug enforcement unit, apprehended Paulson in front of Baron's Drugs. At about the same time, they noted Dr. Scorzelli sitting outside in a Lincoln Continental who identified himself as Dr. Scorzelli. Detective Mattingly testified that, as is customary in these cases, the department attempts to verify the authenticity of such prescriptions by obtaining statements from the doctor that either his prescription pad was stolen or that the prescription was otherwise forged. Dr. Scorzelli refused to provide such a statement however he did appear with his attorney approximately three days later and signed a statement to the effect that the prescription was not authored by him. Detectives Mattingly and Harn obtained authorization from the State Attorney's office to receive the tolls for Dr. Scorzelli's mobile phone in his automobile which reveals that two calls were made from his mobile phone to his answering service and Baron's Drugs during the time frame in which Paulson was attempting to pass the prescription in Baron's Drugs. The Respondent gave a statement as to the ordeal he has undergone within the past six months and that he was in the process of filing bankruptcy since he had been unable to practice medicine for approximately six months. He testified that there were no malpractice suits filed against him and he is not a danger to the public. He confirmed that he is presently undergoing psychiatric counseling as he is obliged pursuant to the Board's final order of October 24, 1977.

Recommendation Based on the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, I hereby recommend that the Respondent's license to practice osteopathic medicine in the State of Florida be suspended for a period of 5 years. RECOMMENDED this 30th day of May, 1978, in Tallahassee, Florida. JAMES E. BRADWELL Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings 530 Carlton Building Tallahassee, Florida 32304 (904) 488-9675

Florida Laws (7) 120.54120.57120.60777.011893.03893.05893.13
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BOARD OF MEDICINE vs DOUGLAS R. SHANKLIN, 94-005903 (1994)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Filed:Gainesville, Florida Oct. 20, 1994 Number: 94-005903 Latest Update: Aug. 21, 1995

The Issue The issue to be resolved in this proceeding concerns whether disciplinary action should be imposed against the licensure of Douglas R. Shanklin, M.D., the Respondent, for allegedly falsely testifying that he had not been issued a "Letter of Guidance", in violation of Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes.

Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, the Respondent was a physician licensed in the State of Florida. He holds license number ME0009372. The Petitioner is an agency of the State of Florida charged with regulating the licensure status and related practice standards of physicians in Florida, including making investigations and bringing Administrative Complaints against those physicians, in their licensure status, believed to be departing from those practice standards. On January 8, 1993, the Respondent testified as a defense witness, by deposition, in a medical malpractice case. The case style was Faircloth v. Coastal Empire Pathology Services, P.C., et al. The trial occurred in Savannah, Georgia. During his deposition, the Respondent was asked three times, by opposing counsel, if he had ever been issued a Letter of Guidance by any state licensing agency. The Respondent stated three times that, indeed, he had not. In fact, on May 15, 1984, a Probable Cause Panel of the Board of Medical Examiners in Florida considered a complaint against the Respondent. The Probable Cause Panel made a determination that while probable cause existed to believe that the Respondent had violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act, the complaint should be dismissed with a Letter of Guidance. The Board stated in its Order that: Probable cause exists to believe that subject has violated the provisions of the Medical Practice Act. In light of the circumstances presented, however, this case should be and the same is hereby dismissed with a letter of guidance to subject. Thereafter, an undated letter was sent to and received by the Respondent. See Petitioner's Exhibit 2 in evidence. The Closing Order was never mailed to, nor received, by the Respondent. The Respondent was unaware of the Closing Order until March of 1993, when the investigation in this case was commenced and at which time he was first supplied a copy of that Closing Order of the Board's Probable Cause Panel. The Petitioner's Exhibit 2 in evidence, the undated letter, is not entitled or otherwise delineated as a "Letter of Guidance" and at no place in the letter is the word "guide" or "guidance" used. Consequently, at the time the Respondent received the letter, which is Exhibit 2, he did not understand or perceive it to be a Letter of Guidance but, rather, understood it to be a letter of closing indicating that he had prevailed in the complaint case. On January 8, 1993, when the Respondent testified at the deposition referenced above, he did not have in mind, nor did he remember, the undated letter. On January 8, 1993, when he testified at that deposition that he had not been issued the Letter of Guidance, he believed he was answering those questions truthfully. He did not know or understand that he had been issued a Letter of Guidance. On January 8, 1993, when he testified at the deposition, he did not testify falsely, because he had not been given the Closing Order at the time that the undated letter (Exhibit 2) was received. He thus did not understand that undated letter to be a Letter of Guidance from the then Department of Professional Regulation. He was never served a copy of the actual Closing Order which might have explained the situation to him. Consequently, he had a genuine, good-faith belief that he had not been issued a Letter of Guidance. Because his belief was genuine and he had no specific intent to tell a false story in those particulars, he made no false or fraudulent representation and committed no deception in conjunction with his answers to those questions at his deposition.

Recommendation Having considered the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, the evidence or record, the candor and credibility of the witnesses, it is RECOMMENDED that a Final Order be entered finding the Respondent not guilty of violating Section 458.331(1)(k), Florida Statutes, and that the Complaint be dismissed in its entirely. DONE AND ENTERED this 3rd day of May, 1995, in Tallahassee, Florida. P. MICHAEL RUFF, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 3rd day of May, 1995. APPENDIX TO RECOMMENDED ORDER, CASE NO. 94-5903 Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-3. Accepted. 4-6. Rejected, as not entirely in accord with the greater weight of the evidence and as subordinate to the Hearing Officer's findings of fact on this subject matter. Respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact 1-11. Accepted. COPIES FURNISHED: Steven Rothenburg, Senior Attorney Agency for Health Care Administration 9125 Bay Plaza Boulevard Suite 210 Tampa, FL 33619 Larry G. Turner, Esquire Post Office Box 508 Gainesville, FL 32602 Dr. Marm Harris Executive Director Department of Business and Professional Regulation 1940 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, FL 32399-0792 Tom Wallace, Assistant Director Agency for Health Care Administration The Atrium, Suite 301 325 John Knox Road Tallahassee, FL 32303

Florida Laws (2) 120.57458.331
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BOARD OF CHIROPRACTIC EXAMINERS vs. JACK P. RANDALL, 81-000269 (1981)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 81-000269 Latest Update: Oct. 23, 1990

Findings Of Fact The Respondent, Jack P. Randall, is a chiropractic physician licensed to practice in the State of Florida. He holds license number 2770. On August 8, 1978, a federal grand jury filed an indictment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, charging the Respondent with 29 counts of willfully making a false, fictitious and fraudulent statement and representation as to material facts in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Health Care Financing Administration (formerly Social Security Administration) in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001 which states: "Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States knowingly and wilfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme of device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both." This indictment asserts that on 29 occasions between December, 1976, and January, 1978, the Respondent requested payment from the United States for chiropractic services performed on patients when such services were not actually performed. On October 25, 1978, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, the Respondent was convicted of 24 of the 29 counts in the indictment, and sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one year, and fined the sum of $5,000, to be followed by a suspended sentence of four years during which time the Respondent would be placed on probation. Each of the 24 counts upon which the Respondent was convicted directly relates to the practice of chiropractic. Thereafter, the Respondent appealed his conviction to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. By its opinion filed on April 19, 1979, the verdict and judgment against the Respondent was affirmed. Certified copies of the indictment, the verdict and judgment, and the appellate opinion were received in evidence in support of the Administrative Complaint. In his defense, the Respondent asserted that the representation he received from his attorney was ineffective, and that the trial court would not let him employ another attorney. However, these matters are collateral to the issues presented in this proceeding. If they consist of a remedy, the Respondent must pursue it in court and not here.

Recommendation Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, it is RECOMMENDED that license number 2770 held by the Respondent, Jack P. Randall, be revoked. THIS RECOMMENDED ORDER entered on this 15th day of May, 1981. COPIES FURNISHED: Tina Hipple, Esquire Assistant General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32301 Jack P. Randall 3244 Seminole Avenue Macon, Georgia 31204 WILLIAM B. THOMAS Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 15th day of May,1981

USC (1) 18 U.S.C 1001 Florida Laws (2) 460.401460.413
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BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS vs. GEORGE A. CHAKMAKIS, 80-001086 (1980)
Division of Administrative Hearings, Florida Number: 80-001086 Latest Update: Aug. 29, 1990

The Issue Whether respondent, a medical doctor, should have his license to practice medicine revoked or otherwise disciplined for alleged malpractice, unethical medical practices', and performance of services which he knew or should have known he was not competent to perform.

Findings Of Fact Respondent, George A. Chakmakis, M.D., is licensed by the Department to practice medicine in Florida. At all times material to this proceeding, he was engaged in the general practice of medicine at 123 Tampa Street, Auburndale, Florida., (P-6.) I. As to Count I Failure to Detect Clear Abnormality in Patient's Chest X-ray From 1974 to 1977, Mary Louise Wahl was respondent's patient. At various times, he treated her for rheumatoid arthritis, chronic bronchitis, and the flu. (P-8.) On .February 16, 1977, respondent had a chest x-ray taken of Ms. Wahl. In reading the x-ray film, he failed to detect or identify any abnormality in her lung. In a letter he subsequently wrote to another physician, respondent contended that, in February, 1977, her chest x-ray "was clear." (Testimony of Spanogle; P-5, P-8.) During the next eight months, Ms. Wahl suffered from chronic breathing problems. Respondent treated her for bronchitis and prescribed various antibiotics--none of which caused any noticeable improvement in her condition. Her last visit to respondent's office was on November 11, 1977. (P-8.) On December 15, 1977, Ms. Wahl was admitted to the emergency room of Winter Haven Hospital. She complained of progressive shortness of breath and coughing to Dr. Alan G. Gasner, the physician on duty. (P-8.) Dr. Gasner did a complete history, performed a physical examination and had a chest x-ray taken of Ms. Wahl. The x-ray revealed a massive left pleural effusion. He removed the fluid from the left side of her chest and conducted tests to determine the cause of the effusion. He concluded that she had a carcinoma of the lung, with metastic tumor as the cause of the left pleural effusion. She received chemotherapy and was discharged from the hospital 13 days later. (P-8.) On May 5, 1978, Ms. Wahl was readmitted to Winter Haven Hospital. Twelve days later, she died. The cause of death: metastatic carcinoma (or cancer) of the lung. (P-8.) The chest x-ray of Ms. Wahl, taken by respondent on February 16, 1977 clearly showed an abnormality in the upper left lobe of her lung. The abnormality, indicated by a white hazy area between the ribs, was obvious, not subtle: a physician who had completed medical training should have been able to recognize it. The white hazy area was present only on the left lobe, not the right. In examining lung x-rays, physicians are trained to compare the left side with the right side. Additional factors were present: Ms. Wahl was 63 years old and respondent was aware that she smoked cigarettes. Respondent's failure to detect such an obvious abnormality in the February 16, 1977, chest x- ray deviates from the standard of care, skill, and treatment recognized by reasonably prudent similar physicians as acceptable under similar circumstances. This standard of care, and respondent's deviation therefrom, was established at hearing by the expert testimony of five licensed physicians who practice medicine in the Auburndale-Winter Haven area. Respondent admitted, at hearing, that the February 16, 1977, chest x-ray shows an increased density in the left upper lobe of the lung. (Testimony of Chakmakis, Gasner, Libinski, Cottrell, Koon, Morgan; P-5.) The abnormality shown in the February 16, 1977, chest x-ray of Ms. Wahl, if detected, would have warranted further action by the treating physician, such as additional x-rays, including a lateral view, and tests. In light of Ms. Wahl's age and smoking habit, the February 16, 1977, x-ray would lead a prudent physician to suspect a malignancy or carcinoma. If it was a carcinoma, immediate action would have been necessary; it is possible that surgical intervention to remove the carcinoma could have been performed. (Testimony of Cottrell, Gasner, Lipinski, Koon, Morgan.) It cannot, however, be concluded that respondent's failure to detect the clear abnormality in Ms. Wahl's lung caused or contributed to her eventual death from carcinoma of the lung. No definite link has been established. There is no way of now knowing whether Ms. Wahl had a carcinoma or cancer in February, 1977. The abnormality shown in the x-ray could be consistent with these different primary diagnoses: cancer, tuberculosis, and pneumonia. (Tr. 50.) Failure to Provide Chest X-ray to Ms. Wahl's Subsequently Treating Physician When Ms. Wahl was admitted to Winter Haven Hospital in December, 1977, she explained to Dr. Gasner that she had been under the care and treatment of respondent. Dr. Gasner immediately asked respondent to forward her medical records so that he could determine the nature of her treatment. Respondent replied by letter dated December 21, 1977: he indicated that her last chest x- ray, taken February, 1977, was clear; that her last office visit was on November 11, 1977, when she was treated for bronchitis; and he enclosed copies of lab test results. On December 28, 1977, Dr. Gasner wrote respondent, explaining that he needed to have her prior chest x-ray films in order to plan a course of therapy for her. Dr. Gasner received no response from respondent. (P-8.) Respondent's failure to provide Dr. Gasner with the requested chest x- rays of Ms. Wahl is insufficient, in itself, to support a conclusion that respondent refused to supply such records. Respondent testified that he believed that the requested x-rays had been sent to Dr. Gasner; such testimony, although self-serving, was not refuted by the Department. It is concluded that respondent's failure to supply the x-rays requested by Dr. Gasner's December 28, 1977, letter was due to inadvertence, not willful refusal. (Testimony of Chakmakis.) Refusal to supply patient medical records requested by a subsequent treating physician constitutes a deviation from the accepted standard of care in the Auburndale-Winter Haven area. But, it has not been shown that the inadvertent failure to supply such records constitutes a deviation. (Testimony of Koon, Cottrell.) II. As to Count II Argola O'Neal was respondent's patient from November 8, 1978, through December 20, 1978. She went to him for treatment of kidney problems and recalls receiving two drug prescriptions from him. He also dispensed drugs to her in his office. (Testimony of O'Neal.) She has no complaints about the quality of the treatment she received. The medications respondent prescribed made her feel better. She stopped seeing respondent because her husband felt that respondent's prices were too high. (Testimony of O'Neal.) After leaving the care of respondent, Ms. O'Neal became a patient of Dr. William Cottrell. At Dr. Cottrell's request, she showed him the medications which had been prescribed by respondent. They included: Inderal, 40 milligram and 20 milligram tablets; Digoxin, .25 milligrams; Tofranil; Synthroid; Isomil; Dyazide; Serapes, 10 milligrams; Nitrostat; Lasix, 20 milligrams; Mylicon; Darvocet-N 100; Thyroid, 2-grain tablets; and Gaviscon. The Inderal prescriptions were duplicative, as were the drugs Synthroid and throid extract. If used improperly, they were potentially dangerous to the patient. (Testimony of Cottrell.) Ms. O'Neal, age 76, is a frail woman suffering from senility and hardening of the arteries. Her ability to accurately recall respondent's brief treatment of her--occurring three years prior to hearing--has been affected. For example, she did not recognize respondent until he introduced himself to her immediately before hearing. Her testimony conflicts with that of her husband, Fred O'Neal. He testified that she stopped seeing respondent because she was dissatisfied with his treatment. (Testimony of O'Neal, Cottrell.) Because Ms. O'Neal had medications prescribed by an earlier doctor, respondent was concerned about prescribing duplicate medications. He instructed her to stop taking duplicative diuretics, thyroid, and heart medications. Although Ms. O'Neal does not recall such instructions, respondent's recollection is persuasive. (Testimony of Chakmakis.) When Ms. O'Neal became Dr. Cottrell's patient, she expressed some confusion concerning the medications which she had received from respondent. Although Dr. Cottrell testified that, in his opinion, there was some redundancy in the medications prescribed by respondent, he consistently avoided concluding that the prescriptions were sufficiently excessive or inappropriate to constitute a deviation from the prevailing standard of medical care in the Auburndale-Winter Haven area. 2/ (Tr. 235-236.) In his treatment of Ms. O'Neal, Dr. Cottrell tried to simplify the medication instructions and make sure that her husband was fully aware of them. (Testimony of Cottrell.) III. As to Count III Ronald Sequino was respondent's patient from November 30, 1978, through December 11, 1978. On Friday, November 30, 1978, respondent surgically removed two cysts from Sequino's back. The agreed-upon price was $30. (Testimony of Sequino; P-2, P-6.) That evening, the cyst wounds began to open. Sequino, concerned about infection, telephoned respondent's office number Friday evening, Saturday, and Sunday. He obtained respondent's answering service which informed him that respondent was unavailable; he left a message for respondent to contact him. Respondent did not return Sequino's call. (Testimony of Sequino.) The next week, Sequino returned to respondent's office for treatment of the wound which, by then, was discharging pus. Sequino, disturbed by his inability to reach respondent during the weekend, asked respondent whether the answering service had contacted him; respondent replied that he had gotten the message from the answering service but "made light of it" by telling Sequino that he worried too much. (Testimony of Sequino.) During the weekend that Sequino tried unsuccessfully to reach him, respondent did not have another physician covering for him. Respondent's testimony to the contrary is rejected as selfserving and uncorroborated. Neither did respondent have hospital privileges. (Testimony of Davis, Sequino; P-6.) Sequino returned to respondent two more times for post-operative care. The healing of his cysts was aggravated because Sequino frequently got his back wet, contrary to respondent's instruction. Because of this, respondent charged Sequino an additional $12 for each follow-up visit. (Testimony of Davis.) Sequino was disturbed by what he perceived as respondent's lack of concern; he was also upset about being separately charged for each follow-up visit. He became angry, used threatening language toward respondent, and mumbled profanities on leaving the office. (Testimony of McGuire.) Respondent denies that he was unavailable or received an answering service message from Sequino during the weekend following the cyst removals. He denies that he made "light" of Sequino's concern about not being able to reach him. He asserts that if he was unavailable, he had another physician covering for him. These contentions are rejected as selfserving and lacking corroboration. Diane Davis, his former receptionist and clerk-secretary, testified that--to her knowledge--respondent had no physician cover for him when he was out of town; that, during the weekends when he was unavailable, he never referred a patient to another physician. (Testimony of Chakmakis, Davis.) By failing to provide continuing care to Sequino over the weekend, or making arrangements so that another physician would be available to provide such care, respondent deviated from the prevailing standard of medical care and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under the circumstances. That standard of care requires that a physician be available to his patients or have a physician cover for him at all times. Similarly, contrary to the Principles of Medical Ethics, he neglected his patient after having undertaken to provide him medical care. Such a breach of medical ethics constitutes a deviation from the standard of medical care recognized by a prudent similar physician as acceptable under the circumstances. (Testimony of Morgan; P-7.) IV. As to Count IV Respondent admits having used the Bellew Vaccine Method for Treating Arthritis ("the Bellew Method"). He used it to treat the arthritis of Mary Wahl. The Bellew Method was developed by Bernard A. Bellew, M.D. Generally, it consists of regimen of intradermal and subcutaneous injections of commonly available influenza viral vaccines and respiratory bacterial vaccines. It purports to provide therapeutic or curative relief to arthritis. (Testimony of Chakmakis; P-1, P-8, P-16.) The Bellew Method is not widely known or used by the medical profession. Respondent does not know of another physician in the United States who uses it. (Testimony of Chakmakis; The Bellew Method is considered, at best, as an "unusual treatment" by other physicians the Auburndale-Winter Haven area. It is not accepted in that area, or elsewhere in the country, as an acceptable method for treating arthritis. It is so far removed from the accepted practice and method of treating arthritis that it cannot be considered to have even achieved experimental status. (Testimony of Cottrell; P-8.) Respondent's use of the Bellew Method to treat Ms. Wahl's arthritis deviated from the standard of care, skill, and treatment recognized by a reasonably prudent similar physician as acceptable under similar circumstances. (P-8.) No evidence was presented to show either that the Bellew Method has been proven effective or that it was harmful to Ms. Wahl. Neither was evidence presented to show that, before utilizing this method, respondent disclosed to Ms. Wahl that the Bellew Method had not been proven effective; that it was held in disfavor or not used by the mainstream of the medical community. No evidence was presented to show that Ms. Wahl gave her informed consent to such treatment after having been advised that, at best, it was considered to be unusual or unorthodox treatment by the medical community. V. Costs Incurred by Department in Obtaining Orders Compelling Discovery Respondent's failure to respond to discovery resulted in the Department filing numerous motions to compel. By orders dated July 15 and August 11, 1981, two such motions were granted and orders compelling discovery were issued. Respondent gave no excuse, or justification for his failure to respond to the Department's discovery. Accordingly, pursuant to Rules 1.380, Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the Department was awarded reasonable expenses which it incurred in obtaining these orders. By stipulation, the Department's reasonable expenses were to be determined by affidavit of the Department's counsel submittal at final hearing. The affidavit indicates the Department incurred expenses in the amount of $419.16. (Affidavit of Expenses, dated August 13, 1981.)

Recommendation Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Board of Medical Examiners enter a final order suspending respondent's medical license for six (6) months, after which the suspension should be vacated upon: (1) a showing by respondent that he has satisfactorily completed an approved continuing education course on the proper administration, interpretation, and use of x-rays; and (2) respondent demonstrating, to the Board's satisfaction, that he recognizes the serious statutory, professional, and ethical obligations placed on a physician who administers experimental or unorthodox treatment to a patient. That the Board, as part of its final order, require respondent to pay $419.16 to the Department as reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the orders compelling discovery dated July 15 and August 11, 19,81. DONE AND RECOMMENDED this 12th day of March, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. R. L. CALEEN, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 12th day of March, 1982.

Florida Laws (3) 11.111120.57458.331
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