The Issue Whether C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., is indebted to Other Side Sod, LLC, for the purchase of sod and pallets; and, if so, in what amount.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a Florida Limited Liability Corporation located in Arcadia, Florida, and at all times relevant hereto was a producer of agricultural products, as defined by section 604.15(9), Florida Statutes. Petitioner is also a “dealer in agricultural products” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). Respondent, during all times relevant hereto, was a “dealer in agricultural products,” within the meaning of section 604.15(2). At all times relevant to this proceeding, Great American served as surety for Respondent. At all times relevant to this proceeding, Respondent was a customer of Other Side Sod. Respondent purchased sod from Petitioner and thereafter resold and installed the sod to Respondent’s customers. Petitioner sold sod to its customers on wooden pallets. An integral part of each transaction involved the pallets. There are 10 invoices in dispute which cover the period October 14, 2016, through February 10, 2017. For the underlying transactions that relate to the invoices in question, the following language is contained on each field/delivery ticket: Terms of Sale: Payment due upon receipt. All payment[s] applied to pallet balance first. Interest at the rate of 1 1/2% per month will be charged on unpaid invoice amounts after 14 days. Invoices will be charged $0.02 per square foot additional after 30 days. Purchaser agrees to pay all costs of collection, including attorney fees, in [the] event it is necessary to institute suit for collection. Venue will be in DeSoto County, Florida. All Sales F.O.B. Shipping Point. On or about October 14, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47293, which showed a balance due of $462 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 83,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,664). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $124.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,664 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 23, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47378, which showed a balance due of $224 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 70,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($1,408). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $105.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($1,408 x 7.50 percent). On or about October 24, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47420, which showed a balance due of $280 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 16,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($320). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $24 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($320 x 7.50 percent). On or about November 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47549, which showed a balance due of $1,526 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 103,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($2,064). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $154.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($2,064 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 6, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 47755, which showed a balance due of $434 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 30,400 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($608). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $45.60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($608 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 8, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48093, which showed a balance due of $1,256 for 12,800 units of Bahia sod, $224 for a pallet deposit, and $72 for sales tax. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 12,800 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($256). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $19.20 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($256 x 7.50 percent). On or about December 13, 2016, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48166, which showed a balance due of $343 for pallets related to the sale of Bahia sod. The invoice remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 163,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($3,264). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $244.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($3,264 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 29, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48285, which showed a balance due of $3,000 for 40,000 units of Bahia sod, $308 for a pallet deposit, and $225 for sales tax (total = $3,533). On February 3, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $3,210.50, which left an unpaid balance of $322.50. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 40,000 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($800). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $60 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($800 x 7.50 percent). On or about January 31, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48301, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $91 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $510.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $468.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92.1/ The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent). On or about February 10, 2017, Petitioner sent Respondent invoice 48409, which showed a balance due of $390 for 5,200 units of Bahia sod, $21 for a pallet deposit, and $29.25 for sales tax (total = $440.25). On February 15, 2017, Respondent submitted to Petitioner partial payment in the amount of $398.33, which left an unpaid balance of $41.92. The balance remained unpaid for more than 30 days and Petitioner, in accordance with the terms of sale, amended the original invoice and added a charge of two cents for each of the 5,200 units of Bahia sod related to the transaction ($104). Petitioner also added to the invoice a charge of $7.80 for sales tax related to the late payment penalty ($104 x 7.50 percent).
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services enter a final order approving the claim of Other Side Sod, LLC, against C. Fullerton and Landscaping Co., Inc., in the amount of $4,981.34. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of November, 2017, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S LINZIE F. BOGAN Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of November, 2017.
Findings Of Fact Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence adduced at the hearing, the following relevant facts are found: On September 23, 1980, James R. Cope signed a Reservation Agreement with Cheezem Investment Program I, Ltd. or its assigns expressing his interest in purchasing Unit 604 in the proposed Landmark Towers Two, a condominium located on Sand Key at 1250 Gulf Boulevard, Clearwater, Florida. A Purchase Agreement for Unit 604 was executed on March 19, 1981, and the Copes provided a down payment of $10,920 on a total purchase price of $109,200. At the time he executed this Purchase Agreement, he expected that the building would be completed and the closing on his unit would occur in the Fall of 1981. Paragraph 8(a) of the Purchase Agreement provided that the Agreement was not assignable without the prior written consent of the Developer, and that any request for assignment must be received in the Developer's office at least sixty (60) days prior to the closing date. Mr. Cope was aware of this provision in his Purchase Agreement. On July 7, 1981, Mr. Cope selected the balcony, vinyl and carpet for his condominium unit. On the same date, July 7th, a letter was sent to James R. Cope advising him that the Landmark Towers Two was rapidly approaching completion and that the closing of the units was expected to occur by late August or early September. Mr. Cope was advised in that letter that he would be informed of a more definite closing date as the building progressed, and the names of four lending institutions were provided in the event he desired mortgage financing. This July 7, 1981, letter was delivered on July 9, 1981, and the receipt was acknowledged by "Mrs. J. R. Cope." Mr. Cope, who admits that he has problems with his memory, does not recall receiving this specific letter. He remembers being away from his home during a portion of the month of July. Between the date of the Purchase Agreement and August 3, 1981, Mr. Cope made no attempt to either sell his Unit 604 or to obtain financing. He admits that prior to August 3, 1981, he received one or two communications from the Developers indicating that progress was being made and that the closing would occur. He then became aware that time was running out and he did not know how he could obtain financing for the closing. On August 3, 1981, James R. Cope and Georgia C. Cope signed an Assignment Listing Agreement purporting to give respondent Cheezem and Associates, Inc. the exclusive right to find a purchaser for the rights to the Copes' Unit 604 of the Landmark Tower Two Condominium. Mr. Cope could not recall where he obtained the Assignment Listing Agreement form, and stated that he never spoke with anyone at Cheezem and Associates about the assignment. Shortly after August 3, 1981, respondent Edwardo Avila, the Vice President of Cheezem and Associates, Inc., located in the Miami office, received in the mail the Assignment Listing Agreement signed by the Copes, with the initials of Mr. Benevides at the bottom of the form, indicating acceptance. Mr. Benevides supervised respondents' Sand Key office. Mr. Avila considered that the form was sent to him by Mr. Benevides for his (Avila's) approval, since he was the broker in charge. Listing contracts are between the seller and the broker. Since Mr. Benevides was not a broker, it was proper for him to initial the form (indicating that he had checked it for accuracy) and send it to the brokers in Miami for their acceptance. Mr. Avila did not approve or return the Assignment Listing Agreement since notice of the anticipated closing dates for the Landmark Towers Two Condominium had been sent out and it was then well within the sixty-day period during which assignments could not be made, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. Mr. Avila did not notify the Copes that the assignment was not accepted because the person who instituted the policy of prohibiting assignments within sixty days of the closing date was Mr. Cope's son-in-law and Mr. Avila felt that Mr. Cope would be aware of the prohibition against assignments. While Mr. Avila was not aware of the exact closing date on the Copes' unit, he knew that the anticipated closing dates were in late August or early September. Mr. Cope never received a copy of the Assignment Listing Agreement with Mr. Benevides' initials on it. By letter dated August 25, 1981, Mr. Cope was advised that the closing date on his condominium unit had been scheduled for September 18, 1981, and that he should be prepared to pay all monies due at that time. Mr. Cope then became concerned that he would have to forfeit his deposit since no sale of the condominium had been made. During a conversation with an attorney on another matter, Mr. Cope revealed his fear that he would lose his deposit and expressed doubt that Cheezem and Associates were actively attempting to sell his unit. That attorney contacted a real estate salesperson, Ms. Goodman, and requested that she go to the sales office at Sand Key and determine whether Unit 604 was for sale. Ms. Goodman did so on or about September 6, 1981. She spoke with a salesperson named Pat Massaro and told her she was shopping for her parents and wanted something on the sixth floor. She was given a list of condominiums which were available to be sold by the Developer. None of the units listed were on the sixth floor. Ms. Goodman did not specifically ask for Unit 604, nor did she make a request for assignment listings. She reported her findings to the attorney to whom Mr. Cope had spoken, and he requested her to obtain another person to investigate the matter. Ms. Goodman obtained an acquaintance of hers, Ms. Collins, to go to the sales office at Sand Key for the same purpose. Ms. Collins told Christine Poirier, a salesperson on the premises, that she was looking for a unit for her mother-in-law. She was given the same or a similar listing of units available as was given to Ms. Goodman. Ms. Collins did not specifically tell Ms. Poirier that she was interested in either Unit 604, something on the sixth floor, or a listing of assignments. Ms. Poirier could not specifically recall Ms. Collins, but testified that she generally did not spend a great deal of time or effort with prospects who stated that they were shopping for someone else. Christine Poirier worked as a real estate salesperson for Cheezem and Associates, Inc. at the Sand Key offices from May of 1978 to November of 1981. She considered herself as part of the Developer's sales force. On one occasion, Mr. Benevides, the sales manager at the Sand Key office, made one "casual" statement to her to the effect that the Developer's units should be sold first and that assignments should be sold only if the Developer's units did not suit the buyer's taste or price range. She never heard this statement from respondent Cheezem or respondent Avila, who visited the Sand Key office on an infrequent basis. An assignment listing book was maintained at the Sand Key office, and assignments were accepted and sold prior to July 1, 1981. After that period, assignments were not accepted due to the sixty-day clause in the individual Purchase Agreements. Ms. Poirier does not recall ever seeing an assignment listing for the Copes' Unit 604. Between August 3, 1981 and September 6, 1981, Mr. Cope never contacted anyone with Cheezem and Associates to determine the status of his Assignment Listing Agreement. The Copes never requested consent of the Developer to assign their condominium unit to another purchaser. The respondents never instructed their sales personnel not to represent to prospective purchasers that Unit 604 or any other unit under an Assignment Listing Agreement was available for purchase. As of the date of this hearing, the closing on Unit 604 had not occurred and Mr. Cope had not yet forfeited his deposit. Litigation not relevant to this proceeding is pending.
Recommendation Based upon the findings of fact and conclusions of law recited herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Administrative Complaint filed against the respondents on May 28, 1982, be DISMISSED. Respectfully submitted and entered this 19th day of November, 1982, in Tallahassee, Florida. DIANE D. TREMOR, Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32301 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 19th day of November, 1982. COPIES FURNISHED: J. L. "Skip" Miller, Esquire 2426 First Avenue North St. Petersburg, Florida 33713 John T. Allen, Esquire and Michael J. Keane, Esquire 4508 Central Avenue St. Petersburg, Florida 33711 William Furlow, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation - Legal Services P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Mr. C. B. Stafford Executive Director Florida Real Estate Commission P.O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802
The Issue The issues are whether Respondent issued a voucher ticket without obtaining cash or cash equivalent in exchange, in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.020(5)(b); had adjudication withheld on felony charges involving larceny, in violation of section 849.086(6)(g), Florida Statutes (2014); or was ejected from Gulfstream Park, in violation of section 550.0251(6), Florida Statutes, as alleged in the Second Amended Administrative Complaint; and if so, what is the appropriate sanction.1/
Findings Of Fact The Division is the state agency charged with regulating pari-mutuel wagering and cardrooms in the state of Florida, pursuant to chapter 550 and section 849.086. On April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey was licensed by the Division and was working at Silks mutuels window number 607 at Gulfstream Park, a facility authorized to conduct pari-mutuel wagering and cardroom operations. At the end of the day on April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey's cash drawer did not balance. After a review of surveillance tapes and other information, Mr. Jorge Aparicio, a security director with Gulfstream Park, decided to investigate further. On May 2, 2014, when Mr. Havey returned to work, he was interviewed by Mr. Aparicio about the missing money. Mr. Havey initially stated that he accidently printed out a voucher for $5,000.00 for his friend Darren, when he had intended to punch the voucher for only $500.00. He said that Darren was supposed to give him the money at the end of the day. Later, Mr. Havey stated he really printed out the voucher for $5,000.00, placed it in his right shirt pocket, and gave the voucher to his friend Eddy inside the men's restroom for his friend to cash. Later that day, Mr. Havey prepared a written statement regarding the money missing from his cash drawer. He wrote: My friend Eddy needed 500. loan because I told he was being thriten. I offer to help Eddy by giving him 500 vocher. Eddy told me he would pay me back in a week. Eddy didn't want to come to my window #607. Eddy asked me to meet in the bathroom. I punched a $500 vocher I thought but it ended being a $5000. vocher. I gave him the vocher & never saw Eddy again. I planded on browing the five hundred from my friend to put $500. back in my money so I would balance, but[.] Mr. Aparicio testified that Mr. Havey could not give a last name or address for his friend and noted that the name of the friend given by Mr. Havey changed during the course of the interview. After the interview, Mr. Aparicio called the president of Gulfstream Park and described what had taken place. He was directed to call the police and to exclude Mr. Havey from the property indefinitely. As reflected in the Security Report, Mr. Havey was "excluded indefinitely" from Gulfstream Park on May 2, 2014. This action did not necessarily bar Mr. Havey from the park permanently, for the president could allow him to return, but he was excluded unless and until the president took further action. This "indefinite" exclusion constituted an ejection from Gulfstream Park. When Mr. Havey left the investigation room, the Hallandale Beach Police were there. Mr. Havey testified that they did not ask him a single question, but immediately placed him under arrest and handcuffed him. On August 21, 2014, Mr. Havey entered a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of grand theft in the third degree in the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit Court, in and for Broward County, Florida. Adjudication was withheld. He was placed on 24 months' probation, with the condition that he pay Gulfstream Park $4,500.00 in restitution within 18 months. At hearing, Mr. Havey admitted he issued a voucher ticket without receiving cash or cash equivalent in return. He also testified that he pled no contest with the understanding that if he paid $4,500.00 restitution to Gulfstream Park, the charges would be "disposed of," and his record would be clear. Clear and convincing evidence shows that on April 27, 2014, Mr. Havey issued a voucher ticket without receiving cash or cash equivalent in return; that he was ejected from Gulfstream Park on May 2, 2014; and that he pled nolo contendere to grand theft in the third degree on August 21, 2014, with adjudication withheld. Mr. Havey testified that he has been involved in pari- mutuel wagering in various parks, in dog racing, and Jai Alai for 40 years. He stated that the incident was "out of his character," that it was drug and alcohol related, and that he was not thinking clearly. He testified that he could barely remember what had happened on that "dark day" in his life. He said that he sought treatment and is now on the way to full recovery. Mr. Havey expressed remorse for his actions. Mr. Havey testified that he is now working part time at Mardi Gras Casino in Hallandale. He has performed well and has not been in any trouble there. He noted, however, that he is only making $10.00 per hour, rather than the $25.00 per hour he was making at Gulfstream Park. He lamented that it is extremely difficult to "keep a roof over your head" on only $250.00 a week and that he needed to work for a few more years. He stated that his wife should shortly be receiving money for a disability claim and that when she did so, he would pay Gulfstream Park full restitution. He testified that he hoped that the president of Gulfstream would then let him return. No evidence of prior discipline was introduced.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED: That the Department of Business and Professional Regulation, Division of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, enter a final order: (1) finding that Mr. Patrick M. Havey was in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 61D-7.020(5)(b), was ejected from a pari-mutuel facility, and had adjudication withheld on a felony involving larceny; and (2) revoking his pari-mutuel occupational license. DONE AND ENTERED this 17th day of May, 2016, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. S F. SCOTT BOYD Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 17th day of May, 2016.
The Issue The issue presented is whether Charles Simon violated subsections 475.25(1)(b) and (f), Florida Statutes (1985) by pleading guilty to crimes involving moral turpitude or fraudulent and dishonest dealing, i.e. grand theft and trafficking in stolen property by reissuing and refunding airline tickets without making payment for them.
Findings Of Fact Charles Simon was at the times material to this proceeding licensed as a real estate broker in the State of Florida holding license number 0123689. The last license was issued to him as a broker at 90 Beacon Boulevard, Miami, Florida 33135. On about October 15, 1986, Mr. Simon pled guilty to six counts of an indictment alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO Act), grand theft and trafficking in stolen property for issuing and refunding of airline tickets without making payment for them. Adjudication of guilt was withheld and Mr. Simon was placed on community control for a period of twenty-four months to be followed by a period of probation of eight years, and he was ordered to pay $50,000 in restitution and court costs. By letter dated October 9, 1986, Respondent informed the Commission of having pleaded guilty to a felony. By letter dated January 6, 1987, Mr. Simon wrote again to the Commission, stated that he had received no reply to his letter of October 9, 1986 and enclosed a carbon copy of the October 9, 1986 letter. The Commission never received his first (October 9, 1986) letter, although it did receive a copy of it when attached to the January 6, 1987 letter. The Department relies solely upon the records of the conviction to make its case. It did not dispute Mr. Simon's explanation of the events underlying his guilty plea. Mr. Simon's version of the events is accepted, in part because his testimony was not contested by the Department, and in part because the explanation is plausible. In May of 1983, Mr. Simon's wife owned a travel agency in Dade County. His real estate office was located in the same suite of offices. While clerical employees of the travel agency would sometimes perform work for the real estate office they were wholly separate businesses. Mr. Simon was not an officer or employee of the travel agency and received no money from it. In May, 1983 Mr. Simon's wife put the agency up for sale. Travel agencies are approved by the Air Traffic Corporation (ATC) to write airline tickets on generic ticket stock if they meet certain requirements. ATC affiliation is important to a travel agency because it makes accounting to airlines for tickets sold much simpler. ATC serves as a clearinghouse; at the end of the week a travel agency sends one check to ATC for all tickets written during the week. ATC separates the billings according to airline, and writes one check to each airline for all tickets sold by the agents belonging to ATC. Blank ticket stock is valuable and purchasers must qualify through ATC to buy a travel agency that is an ATC member. Otherwise an untrustworthy new owner could write tickets out, collect money and never pay the ATC who in turn would not be able to pay the airlines. Mrs. Simon was familiar with people who expressed an interest in purchasing her agency, but they asked her not to tell ATC of the sale. When notified of the impending sale ATC would investigate the qualifications of the proposed new owners, and their previous employer or present employer would be contacted by ATC. The potential buyers were currently working at another travel agency. They wanted to buy Mrs. Simon's agency and move their clients to their new agency (Mrs. Simon's agency). They did not want to tip off their present employer of their intentions by having ATC contact the present employer. Mrs. Simon agreed to withhold notification to ATC to facilitate the sale of the travel agency. After the ownership of the travel agency was transferred and most of the purchase price had been paid, Mrs. Simon was informed that the new owners had ticket stock from other travel agencies at the agency she had sold. Although this is not a violation of any statute, it violates ATC rules and alerted Mrs. Simon that something was wrong. She realized that the reason the purchasers did not want to notify the ATC of the transfer was that they were engaging in a "bust out" of the agency, i.e., issuing valid airline tickets without receiving payment for them. The tickets would then be returned to the airlines for cash refunds (although they had never been paid for) or resold to others at less than their face value. Ultimately, ATC revoked the agency's authority to issue tickets, but by then the owners had defrauded the airlines of many thousands of dollars. Mrs. Simon panicked and Mr. Simon agreed to try to handle the situation. Instead of reporting the matter to the police Mr. Simon tried to cover it up so that Mrs. Simon would not be implicated in wrongdoing. Precisely what Mr. Simon did in his attempt to keep his wife from being implicated in the purchasers' scheme was not explained at the hearing. Those individuals involved in the "bust out" were ultimately arrested and convicted. Mr. Simon was also charged because of his involvement with the sale after Mrs. Simon discovered the purchasers' scheme. Under the sentencing guidelines the charges made against him would have called for a sentence of six years in jail. The state attorney's office agreed to two years of community control, eight years probation and $50,000 restitution to the airlines, if Mr. Simon would plead guilty to the charges rather than require a trial; the state attorney also agreed that no charges would be filed against Mr. Simon's wife in return for his guilty plea. The state attorney's office further agreed to a withholding of adjudication of guilt so that Mr. Simon's real estate license would not be affected. Based on 1) the cost of going through a trial to defend himself and potentially another legal proceeding for the defense of his wife (which would exceed $50,000) and, 2) his erroneous belief that a guilty plea with a withholding of adjudication would not affect his real estate license, Mr. Simon agreed to the state attorney's offer as being in his best interest even though he believed that he had done nothing illegal. Since that time Mr. Simon's community control has been terminated and he has been placed on regular probation, which merely requires a once a month report to a probation officer which can be done by mail. It has also been agreed that Mr. Simon may return to England to live. The lightness of the sentence and the reduction of the period of community control corroborates Mr. Simon's argument that the state attorney's office knew that he had not been involved in the fraudulent plan to "bust out" his wife's travel agency, although he was not entirely forthcoming when the purchaser's plan was discovered.
Recommendation It is RECOMMENDED that a final order be entered finding Mr. Simon guilty of violation of subsection 475.25(1)(b), Florida Statutes as charged in Count I of the administrative complaint and guilty of violation of subsection 475.25(1)(f), Florida Statutes as charged in Count II of the administrative complaint and that the real estate broker's license held by Mr. Simon be revoked. DONE and ORDERED this 21st day of September, 1987, in Tallahassee, Florida. WILLIAM R. DORSEY, JR. Hearing Officer Division of Administrative Hearings The Oakland Building 2009 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1550 (904) 488-9675 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 21st day of September, 1987. APPENDIX The following are my rulings on the proposed findings of fact submitted by the parties pursuant to Section 120.59(2), Florida Statutes (1985). Rulings on Proposals of the Petitioner's: Rejected as unnecessary. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Covered in Finding of Fact 1. Covered in Finding of Fact 2. Covered in Finding of Fact 2. Covered in Finding of Fact 3. COPIES FURNISHED: Charles Simon 90 Beacon Boulevard Miami, Florida 33135 Mr. Charles Simon 10435 S.W. 76th Street Miami, Florida 33173 James H. Gillis, Esquire Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Harold Huff, Executive Director Department of Professional Regulation Florida Real Estate Commission P. O. Box 1900 Orlando, Florida 32802 Tom Gallagher, Secretary Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750 Joseph A. Sole, General Counsel Department of Professional Regulation 130 North Monroe Street Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0750
The Issue Whether Respondent committed the violations alleged in the Administrative Complaint issued against him and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
Findings Of Fact Based on the evidence adduced at the "formal hearing," and the record as a whole, the following findings of fact are made: Respondent is now, and has been since October of 2000, a licensed real estate sales associate in the State of Florida, holding license number 695252. He is currently associated with AAA Realty, Inc., a broker corporation doing business in Broward County, Florida. From March 1, 2001, through June 26, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Allen Real Estate, Inc. (Allen), a broker corporation doing business in St. Lucie County, Florida. From June 27, 2001, through August 13, 2001, Respondent was an active real estate sales associate with Realty Unlimited, Inc. (Unlimited), a broker corporation (affiliated with GMAC Real Estate) with offices in Port St. Lucie and Stuart, Florida. Unlimited is now, and has been at all times material to the instant case, owned by Kevin Schevers, a Florida-licensed real estate broker. Gary Sprauer is a Florida-licensed real estate sales associate. He is currently associated with Unlimited. Like Respondent, Mr. Sprauer began his association with Unlimited on June 27, 2001, immediately after having worked for Allen. Respondent and Mr. Sprauer worked as "partners" at both Allen and Unlimited. They had an understanding that the commissions they each earned would be "split 50-50" between them. On February 7, 2001, Allen, through the efforts of Respondent and Mr. Sprauer, obtained an exclusive listing contract (Listing Contract) giving it, for the period of a year, the "exclusive right to sell," in a representative capacity, commercial property located at 3800 South Federal Highway that was owned by Vincent and Renee Piazza (Piazza Property). Paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Listing Contract addressed the subjects of "compensation," "cooperation with other brokers," and "dispute resolution," respectively, and provided, in pertinent part as follows as follows: COMPENSATION: Seller will compensate Broker as specified below for procuring a buyer who is ready, willing, and able to purchase the Property or any interest in the Property on the terms of this Agreement or on any other terms acceptable to Seller. Seller will pay Broker as follows (plus applicable sales tax): 8% of the total purchase price or $15,000 maximum, no later than the date of closing specified in the sales contract. However closing is not a prerequisite for Broker's fee being earned. * * * (d) Broker's fee is due in the following circumstances: (1) If any interest in the Property is transferred . . . , regardless of whether the buyer is secured by Broker, Seller or any other person. * * * COOPERATION WITH OTHER BROKERS: Broker's office policy is to cooperate with all other brokers except when not in the Seller's best interest, and to offer compensation to: Buyer's agents, who represent the interest of the buyer and not the interest of Seller in a transaction, even if compensated by Seller or Broker Nonrepresentatives Transaction brokers. None of the above (if this box is checked, the Property cannot be placed in the MLS). * * * 10. DISPUTE RESOLUTION: This Agreement will be construed under Florida law. All controversies, claim and other matters in question between the parties arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof will be settled by first attempting mediation under the rules of the American Arbitration Association or other mediator agreed upon by the parties. . . . Shortly after they left the employ of Allen and began working for Unlimited, Respondent and Mr. Sprauer showed Nicholas Damiano the Piazza Property. Mr. Damiano thereafter made a written offer to purchase the Piazza Property, which the Piazzas accepted, in writing, on July 4, 2001. The sales price was $165,000.00. Mr. Damiano put down a $10,000.00 deposit, which, in accordance with paragraph 2(a) of the contract between Mr. Damiano and the Piazzas (Sales Contract), was "held in escrow by [Unlimited]." The obligations of Unlimited, as escrow agent, were described in paragraph 6 of the Sales Contract, which provided as follows: ESCROW. Buyer and Seller authorize GMAC, Realty Unlimited Telephone: . . . Facsimile: . . . Address: . . . to receive funds and other items and, subject to clearance, disburse them in accordance with the terms of this Contract. Escrow Agent will deposit all funds received in a non- interest bearing account. If Escrow Agent receives conflicting demands or has a good faith doubt as to Escrow Agent's duties or liabilities under this Contract, he/she may hold the subject matter of the escrow until the parties mutually agree to its disbursement or until issuance of a court order or decision of arbitrator determining the parties' rights regarding the escrow or deposit the subject matter of the escrow with the clerk of the circuit court having jurisdiction over the dispute. Upon notifying the parties of such action, Escrow Agent will be released from all liability except for the duty to account for items previously delivered out of escrow. If a licensed real estate broker, Escrow Agent will comply with applicable provisions of Chapter 475, Florida Statutes. In any suit or arbitration in which Escrow Agent is made a party because of acting as agent hereunder or interpleads the subject matter of the escrow, Escrow Agent will recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs at all levels, with such fees and costs to be paid from the escrowed funds or equivalent and charged and awarded as court or other costs in favor of the prevailing party. The parties agree that Escrow Agent will not be liable to any person for misdelivery to Buyer or Seller of escrowed items, unless the misdelivery is due to Escrow Agent's willful breach of this Contract or gross negligence. Paragraph 12 of the Sales Contract addressed the subject of "brokers" and provided as follows: BROKERS. Neither Buyer nor Seller has utilized the services of, or for any other reason owes compensation to, a licensed real estate broker other than: Listing Broker: Allen Real Estate, Inc. who is a transaction broker and who will be compensated by x Seller _ Buyer _ both parties pursuant to x a listing agreement _ other (specify) Cooperating Broker: GMAC Realty Unlimited who is a transaction broker who will compensated by _ Buyer x Seller _ both parties pursuant to _ an MLS or other offer of compensation to a cooperating broker _ other (specify) (collectively referred to as "Broker") in connection with any act relating to the Property, included but not limited to, inquiries, introductions, consultations and negotiations resulting in this transaction. Seller and Buyer agree to indemnify and hold Broker harmless from and against losses, damages, costs and expenses of any kind, including reasonable attorneys' fees at all levels, and from liability to any person, arising from (1) compensation claimed which is inconsistent with the representation in this Paragraph, (2) enforcement action to collect a brokerage fee pursuant to Paragraph 10, (3) any duty accepted by Broker at the request of Buyer or Seller, which duty is beyond the scope of services regulated by Chapter 475, F.S., as amended, or (4) recommendations of or services provided and expenses incurred by any third party whom Broker refers, recommends or retains for or on behalf of Buyer or Seller. The Damiano/Piazza transaction was originally scheduled to close on July 25, 2001. At the request of the Piazzas, the closing was rescheduled for August 7, 2001. A few days before August 7, 2001, Mr. Sprauer asked Respondent "where the closing was going to take place" and "what title company" would be handling the matter. Respondent replied that the closing was "going to be delayed again because Mr. Damiano . . . was going to have to have some type of cancer surgery." It turned out that the closing was not "delayed again." It took place on August 7, 2001. At the closing were Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, Respondent, and the closing agent from the title company, First American Title Insurance Company (First American).3 Neither Mr. Schevers, nor Mr. Sprauer, was in attendance. Mr. Sprauer did not even know that the closing was taking place. He was under the impression, based on what Respondent had told him, that the closing had been postponed. Had he not been misinformed, he would have attended the closing. Respondent did not contact Mr. Sprauer following the closing to let him know that, in fact, the closing had occurred. Mr. Schevers, on the other hand, was made aware that closing would be held on August 7, 2001. He was unable to attend because he had "prior commitments." It was Respondent who informed Mr. Schevers of the August 7, 2001, closing date. The morning of August 7, 2001, Respondent went to Unlimited's Stuart office and asked Mr. Schevers for the $10,000.00 Unlimited was holding in escrow in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction, explaining that he needed it for the closing that was going to be held later that day. Before complying with Respondent's request, Mr. Schevers contacted First American and asked that he be faxed a copy of the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development Settlement Statement (HUD Statement) that First American had prepared for the closing. As requested, First American faxed a copy of the HUD Statement to Mr. Schevers. Upon reviewing the document, Mr. Schevers "immediately noticed that [it indicated that] the entire commission [of $7,000.00] was going to Allen." Mr. Schevers "then proceeded to call First American" and asked why Unlimited was not "reflected on this settlement statement." Mr. Schevers was told that a First American representative "would get right on it and get back to [him]." Mr. Schevers did not wait to hear back from First American before handing an "escrow check" in the amount of $10,000.00 to Respondent. He instructed Respondent, however, to "not give anybody this check unless that statement [the HUD Statement] [was] changed and reflect[ed] [Unlimited's]" share of the commission earned from the sale of the Piazza Property. He further directed Respondent to telephone him if this change was not made. Respondent did not follow the instructions Mr. Schevers had given him. He delivered the $10,000.00 "escrow check" to the closing agent at the closing, even though the HUD Statement had not been changed to reflect Unlimited's sharing of the commission. At no time during the closing did Mr. Schevers receive a telephone call from Respondent. According to the HUD Statement that Mr. Damiano, the Piazzas, and the closing agent signed at the closing, Allen received a commission of $7,000.00 "from seller's funds at settlement." The document makes no mention of any other commission having been paid as part of the closing. On or about August 9, 2001, Respondent received a "commission check" from Allen. The check was made payable to Respondent and was in the amount of $3,000.00. Under the "DOLLARS" line on the check, the following was typed: 4200 Total Comm[4] 1200 ADVANCE[5] Typed next to "MEMO" on the bottom left hand corner of the check was "DAMIANO-PIAZZA 165,000 S&L." It has not been shown that the "commission check" Respondent received from Allen was for anything other than the commission Allen owed Respondent for services performed when Respondent was still employed by Allen. Mr. Schevers' consent to Respondent's receiving this $3,000.00 "commission check" was neither sought nor given. Less than a week after the closing, having spotted Mr. Damiano mowing grass on a vacant lot that Mr. Damiano owned, Mr. Sprauer walked up to him and asked "how his surgery [had gone]." Mr. Damiano "acted very surprised [like] he didn't know what [Mr. Sprauer] was talking about." Mr. Damiano's reaction to his inquiry led Mr. Sprauer to believe "that the closing had probably taken place." He "immediately contacted [Mr. Schevers] and asked him to check into it." Mr. Schevers subsequently learned from First American that Allen "had gotten all of the [commission] check" at the closing. Mr. Schevers then telephoned Respondent. This was the first communication he had had with Respondent since before the closing. Respondent told Mr. Schevers that "he got the check" and "he would be right over with it." Respondent, however, did not keep his promise. After his telephone conversation with Respondent, Mr. Schevers discovered that Allen "had cut [Respondent] a check and [Respondent] had gone immediately and deposited it." This discovery prompted Mr. Schevers to place another telephone call to Respondent. This telephone conversation ended with Mr. Schevers telling Respondent "he was terminated." Mr. Schevers thereafter notified Petitioner in writing that Respondent was no longer associated with Unlimited. He also filed with Petitioner a complaint against Respondent alleging that Respondent had "acted inappropriately" in connection with the Damiano/Piazza transaction. Mr. Schevers had expected Unlimited to receive, for the role it played in the Damiano/Piazza transaction, "50 percent of the total commission," or $3,500.00, in accordance with the provisions of the "multiple listing service for St. Lucie County."6 He holds Respondent responsible, at least in part, for Unlimited's not receiving these monies.7 At the time of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, Unlimited had contracts with its sales associates which provided that the associates would receive "70 percent of the net" of any commission Unlimited earned as a result of the associates' efforts. Had Unlimited received a commission as a result of the Damiano/Piazza transaction, it would have "split" it with Respondent and Mr. Sprauer as required by the contracts it had with them.8
Recommendation Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby RECOMMENDED that the Commission issue a final order dismissing the Administrative Complaint issued against Respondent in the instant case in its entirety. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of July, 2004, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. STUART M. LERNER Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (850) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (850) 921-6847 www.doah.state.fl.us Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of July, 2004.
The Issue Whether Respondent, Redland Brokers, a dealer in agricultural products, is indebted to Petitioner, a producer of agricultural products, for 529 hampers of peas delivered by Petitioner to Redland Brokers on May 2, 3, and 7, 1996, and subsequently resold by Redland Brokers on behalf of Petitioner.
Findings Of Fact Petitioner is a producer of agricultural products. Respondent, Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc. (Redland), is a dealer in agricultural products. At all times pertinent to this proceeding, there was a marketing agreement in effect between Petitioner and Redland. This agreement provided, in pertinent part, as follows: The grower (Petitioner) gives Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc. the right to sell or consign to the general trade. No guarantees as to sales price are made and only amounts actually received by Redland Brokers Exchange less selling charges, loading charges, cooling charges and any other charges will be paid to the grower. Final settlement will be made within a reasonable length of time and may be held until payment is received from the purchaser. On May 2, 1996, Martin Ruiz, the son of the Petitioner, delivered to Redland 233 hampers of peas for sale on consignment. On May 3, 1996, Mr. Ruiz delivered to Redland 38 hampers of peas for sale on consignment. On May 3, 1996, Mr. Ruiz delivered to Redland 124 hampers of peas. On May 7, 1996, Mr. Ruiz delivered to Redland 134 hampers of peas. These peas were produced by Petitioner and her family. Petitioner asserts that the sale price for the peas delivered on May 2 and 3, 1996, should have been $20.00 per hamper. Petitioner asserts that the sale price for the peas delivered May 7, 1996, should have been $14.00 per hamper. Petitioner does not challenge the amounts deducted from the sales price by Redland for its commission, advances it made to the grower, and for crates. The greater weight of the evidence established that Mr. Ruiz was misinformed as to the fair market value for the peas that were delivered to Redland in May 1996 and that he believed the price to be greater than the actual fair market value. Redland did not misrepresent to Petitioner the fair market value of these peas. The greater weight of the evidence established that Redland sold the peas that Petitioner delivered to it in the regular course of business and that it paid Petitioner in full for that product consistent with the marketing agreement that was in effect. The lower prices were the result of falling market prices and the poor quality of some of the peas. Petitioner failed to establish that Redland was indebted to her as a result of these transactions.
Recommendation Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is RECOMMENDED that the Petitioner’s complaint be dismissed. DONE AND ENTERED this 7th day of April, 1997, in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida. CLAUDE B. ARRINGTON Administrative Law Judge Division of Administrative Hearings The DeSoto Building 1230 Apalachee Parkway Tallahassee, Florida 32399-3060 (904) 488-9675 SUNCOM 278-9675 Fax Filing (904) 921-6847 Filed with the Clerk of the Division of Administrative Hearings this 7th day of April, 1997. COPIES FURNISHED: Oralia Vera, pro se 14500 Southwest 280th Street, Lot 4 Homestead, Florida 33032 Frank T. Basso, Jr., President Redland Brokers Exchange, Inc. Post Office Box 343544 Florida City, Florida 33034 Florida Farm Bureau General Insurance Company (Legal Dept.) Post Office Box 147030 Gainesville, Florida 32614 Brenda Hyatt, Chief Bureau of Licensing & Bond Department of Agriculture 508 Mayo Building Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0800 Richard Tritschler, General Counsel Department of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810 Honorable Bob Crawford Commissioner of Agriculture The Capitol, Plaza Level 10 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0810
Findings Of Fact At all times material hereto, Respondent, Lawrence P. Weiner, was a registered Florida real estate salesman employed by Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Continental Marketing Services, Inc. solicited real property listings from property owners in the State of Florida by means of postal cards inquiring of those property owners whether they would like to sell their Florida real property. Interested owners were requested to fill out a card with their address and telephone number, and to forward that card to Continental Marketing Services, Inc. which would then contact the property openers by telephone, Respondent, as a real estate salesman in the employ of Continental Marketing Services, Inc., would then contact responding property owners from a list furnished him by his employer. Respondent would obtain information by telephone from property owners such as initial purchase price, size and location of the property. Both Respondent and his employer represented to property owners that, should they list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., the property would be advertised in foreign countries where investors existed who were interested in purchasing Florida real estate. In order to list their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., property owners were required to pay an "advance fee" for these listings, usually $350, which amount they were told would be used to defray the cost of initial preparation of a directory listing those properties in Florida which were for sale. After obtaining initial background information, Respondent would submit the information to his employer, which, though unclear from the record, would analyze these facts and return to Respondent for transmission to the property owner a suggested sales price. This suggested sales price was usually several times the initial purchase price for the property. For example, one witness at the hearing testified that a lot purchased on April 27, 1967 for $2,640 was ultimately listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. at Respondent's suggestion, at a sales price of $7,600. Testimony at the hearing indicated that comparable lots in the same area are presently selling for $4,700. Another witness testified that two lots purchased in 1965 for $2,390, were discussed in 1977 with Respondent who suggested that they be listed at a suggested sales price of $16,600. Finally, still another witness testified that he listed property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. as a result of his contacts with the Respondent at a purchase price of $5,000 per acre in 1976 for property that he had purchased for $500 an acre in 1964. Those property owners testifying at the hearing who listed their property for sale with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., indicated that they had no further contact with either Respondent or Continental Marketing Services, Inc. after having paid their $350 listing fee. None of these property owners received any offers to purchase their property as a result of its listing with Continental Marketing Services, Inc., and, as of the date of the final hearing in this cause, the property remained unsold. The Respondent testified that his only responsibilities with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. involved contacting those persons on the lists furnished to him, and obtaining their agreement to listing their property with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. Suggested sale prices for particular pieces of property were furnished to Respondent by other employees of Continental Marketing Service, Inc. Respondent further testified that placing of advertisements for properties listed with Continental Marketing Services, Inc. was accomplished by other employees of the company. Respondent testified that he "understood" that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had sold properties and that some of these sales were to foreign investors, although he did not know the identity of the foreign investors, or the number of parcels sold by the company. Respondent denied that he had represented to property owners that the sale of their property would be accomplished in sixty to ninety days. This contention is borne out by the testimony of two of the property owners testifying in this proceeding, one of whom testified that Respondent indicated that her property could "probably be sold within sixty to ninety days", and another property owner testified that Respondent made no representation to him concerning the length of time necessary to effect a sale of his property. There is no evidence in the record to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. failed to advertise property listed for sale as promised in the Listing Brokerage Agreement with those property owners testifying in this proceeding. There is no evidence in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc., in fact, knew of no foreign investors interested in purchasing property in the United States. Further, there is no testimony in the record in this proceeding to establish that Continental Marketing Services, Inc. had never sold property for other property owners in either the United states or the State of Florida. Finally, although property belonging to three of the witnesses testifying in this proceeding was listed at several times its initial purchase price, there is no indication in the record that Respondent played any part in setting the suggested listing prices.
